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Sunday, February 13, 2022

Cathodic protection

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Aluminium sacrificial anodes (light colored rectangular bars) mounted on a steel jacket structure.
 
Zinc sacrificial anode (rounded object) screwed to the underside of the hull of a small boat.

Cathodic protection is a technique used to control the corrosion of a metal surface by making it the cathode of an electrochemical cell. A simple method of protection connects the metal to be protected to a more easily corroded "sacrificial metal" to act as the anode. The sacrificial metal then corrodes instead of the protected metal. For structures such as long pipelines, where passive galvanic cathodic protection is not adequate, an external DC electrical power source is used to provide sufficient current.

Cathodic protection systems protect a wide range of metallic structures in various environments. Common applications are: steel water or fuel pipelines and steel storage tanks such as home water heaters; steel pier piles; ship and boat hulls; offshore oil platforms and onshore oil well casings; offshore wind farm foundations and metal reinforcement bars in concrete buildings and structures. Another common application is in galvanized steel, in which a sacrificial coating of zinc on steel parts protects them from rust.

Cathodic protection can, in some cases, prevent stress corrosion cracking.

History

Cathodic protection was first described by Sir Humphry Davy in a series of papers presented to the Royal Society in London in 1824. The first application was to HMS Samarang in 1824. Sacrificial anodes made from iron attached to the copper sheath of the hull below the waterline dramatically reduced the corrosion rate of the copper. However, a side effect of cathodic protection was the increase in marine growth. Usually, copper when corroding releases copper ions which have an anti-fouling effect. Since excess marine growth affected the performance of the ship, the Royal Navy decided that it was better to allow the copper to corrode and have the benefit of reduced marine growth, so cathodic protection was not used further.

Davy was assisted in his experiments by his pupil Michael Faraday, who continued his research after Davy's death. In 1834, Faraday discovered the quantitative connection between corrosion weight loss and electric current and thus laid the foundation for the future application of cathodic protection.

Thomas Edison experimented with impressed current cathodic protection on ships in 1890, but was unsuccessful due to the lack of a suitable current source and anode materials. It would be 100 years after Davy's experiment before cathodic protection was used widely on oil pipelines in the United States — cathodic protection was applied to steel gas pipelines beginning in 1928 and more widely in the 1930s.

Types

Galvanic sacrificial anode attached to the hull of a ship, showing corrosion.

Galvanic

In the application of passive cathodic protection, a galvanic anode, a piece of a more electrochemically "active" metal (more negative electrode potential), is attached to the vulnerable metal surface where it is exposed to an electrolyte. Galvanic anodes are selected because they have a more "active" voltage than the metal of the target structure (typically steel).

Concrete has a pH around 13. In this environment the steel reinforcement has a passive protective layer and remains largely stable. Galvanic systems are "constant potential" systems that aim to restore the concrete's natural protective environment by providing a high initial current to restore passivity. It then reverts to a lower sacrificial current while harmful negative Chloride ions migrate away from the steel and towards the positive anode. The anodes remain reactive through their lifetime (10-20 years typically) increasing current when the resistivity decreases due to corrosion hazards such as rainfall, temperature increases or flooding. The reactive nature of these anodes makes them an efficient choice.

Unlike ICCP systems steel constant polarization is not the goal, rather the restoration of the environment. Polarization of the target structure is caused by the electron flow from the anode to the cathode, so the two metals must have a good electrically conductive contact. The driving force for the cathodic protection current is the difference in electrode potential between the anode and the cathode. During the initial phase of high current, the potential of the steel surface is polarized (pushed) more negative protecting the steel which hydroxide ion generation at the steel surface and ionic migration restore the concrete environment.

Over time the galvanic anode continues to corrode, consuming the anode material until eventually it must be replaced.

Galvanic or sacrificial anodes are made in various shapes and sizes using alloys of zinc, magnesium and aluminium. ASTM International publishes standards on the composition and manufacturing of galvanic anodes.

In order for galvanic cathodic protection to work, the anode must possess a lower (that is, more negative) electrode potential than that of the cathode (the target structure to be protected). The table below shows a simplified galvanic series which is used to select the anode metal. The anode must be chosen from a material that is lower on the list than the material to be protected.

Metal Potential with respect to a Cu:CuSO4

reference electrode in neutral pH environment (volts)

Carbon, Graphite, Coke +0.3
Platinum 0 to −0.1
Mill scale on Steel −0.2
High Silicon Cast Iron −0.2
Copper, brass, bronze −0.2
Mild steel in concrete −0.2
Lead −0.5
Cast iron (not graphitized) −0.5
Mild steel (rusted) −0.2 to −0.5
Mild steel (clean) −0.5 to −0.8
Commercially pure aluminium −0.8
Aluminium alloy (5% zinc) −1.05
Zinc −1.1
Magnesium Alloy (6% Al, 3% Zn, 0.15% Mn) −1.6
Commercially Pure Magnesium −1.75

Impressed current systems

Simple impressed current cathodic protection system. A source of DC electric current is used to help drive the protective electrochemical reaction.

In some cases, impressed current cathodic protection (ICCP) systems are used. These consist of anodes connected to a DC power source, often a transformer-rectifier connected to AC power. In the absence of an AC supply, alternative power sources may be used, such as solar panels, wind power or gas powered thermoelectric generators.

Anodes for ICCP systems are available in a variety of shapes and sizes. Common anodes are tubular and solid rod shapes or continuous ribbons of various materials. These include high silicon cast iron, graphite, mixed metal oxide (MMO), platinum and niobium coated wire and other materials.

For pipelines, anodes are arranged in groundbeds either distributed or in a deep vertical hole depending on several design and field condition factors including current distribution requirements.

Cathodic protection transformer-rectifier units are often custom manufactured and equipped with a variety of features, including remote monitoring and control, integral current interrupters and various type of electrical enclosures. The output DC negative terminal is connected to the structure to be protected by the cathodic protection system. The rectifier output DC positive cable is connected to the anodes. The AC power cable is connected to the rectifier input terminals.

The output of the ICCP system should be optimised to provide enough current to provide protection to the target structure. Some cathodic protection transformer-rectifier units are designed with taps on the transformer windings and jumper terminals to select the voltage output of the ICCP system. Cathodic protection transformer-rectifier units for water tanks and used in other applications are made with solid state circuits to automatically adjust the operating voltage to maintain the optimum current output or structure-to-electrolyte potential. Analog or digital meters are often installed to show the operating voltage (DC and sometime AC) and current output. For shore structures and other large complex target structures, ICCP systems are often designed with multiple independent zones of anodes with separate cathodic protection transformer-rectifier circuits.

Hybrid Systems

Hybrid systems have been used for over a decade and incorporate the coordination, monitoring and high restorative current flow of ICCP systems with the reactive, lower cost and easier to maintain galvanic anodes.

The system is made up of wired galvanic anodes in arrays typically 400mm apart which are then initially powered for a short period to restore the concrete and power ionic migration. The power supply is then taken away and the anodes simply attached to the steel as a galvanic system. More powered phases can be administered if needed. Like Galvanic systems corrosion rate monitoring from polarisation tests and half-cell potential mapping can be used to measure corrosion. Polarization is not the goal for the life of the system.

Applications

Hot Water Tank / Water Heater

This technology is also used to protect water heaters. Indeed, the electrons sent by the imposed current anode (composed of titanium and covered with MMO) prevents the inside of the tank from rusting.

In order to be recognized as effective, these anodes must comply with certain standards: A cathodic protection system is considered efficient when its potential reaches or exceeds the limits established by the cathodic protection criteria. The cathode protection criteria used come from the standard NACE SP0388-2007 (formerly RP0388-2001) of the NACE National Association of Corrosion Engineers.

Pipelines

An air cooled cathodic protection rectifier connected to a pipeline.
 
Cathodic protection markers over a gas pipeline in Leeds, West Yorkshire, England.

Hazardous product pipelines are routinely protected by a coating supplemented with cathodic protection. An impressed current cathodic protection system (ICCP) for a pipeline consists of a DC power source, often an AC powered transformer rectifier and an anode, or array of anodes buried in the ground (the anode groundbed).

The DC power source would typically have a DC output of up to 50 amperes and 50 volts, but this depends on several factors, such as the size of the pipeline and coating quality. The positive DC output terminal would be connected via cables to the anode array, while another cable would connect the negative terminal of the rectifier to the pipeline, preferably through junction boxes to allow measurements to be taken.

Anodes can be installed in a groundbed consisting of a vertical hole backfilled with conductive coke (a material that improves the performance and life of the anodes) or laid in a prepared trench, surrounded by conductive coke and backfilled. The choice of groundbed type and size depends on the application, location and soil resistivity.

The DC cathodic protection current is then adjusted to the optimum level after conducting various tests including measurements of pipe-to-soil potentials or electrode potential.

It is sometimes more economically viable to protect a pipeline using galvanic (sacrificial) anodes. This is often the case on smaller diameter pipelines of limited length. Galvanic anodes rely on the galvanic series potentials of the metals to drive cathodic protection current from the anode to the structure being protected.

Water pipelines of various pipe materials are also provided with cathodic protection where owners determine the cost is reasonable for the expected pipeline service life extension attributed to the application of cathodic protection.

Ships and boats

The white patches visible on the ship's hull are zinc block sacrificial anodes.

Cathodic protection on ships is often implemented by galvanic anodes attached to the hull and ICCP for larger vessels. Since ships are regularly removed from the water for inspections and maintenance, it is a simple task to replace the galvanic anodes.

Galvanic anodes are generally shaped to reduced drag in the water and fitted flush to the hull to also try to minimize drag.

Smaller vessels, with non-metallic hulls, such as yachts, are equipped with galvanic anodes to protect areas such as outboard motors. As with all galvanic cathodic protection, this application relies on a solid electrical connection between the anode and the item to be protected.

For ICCP on ships, the anodes are usually constructed of a relatively inert material such as platinised titanium. A DC power supply is provided within the ship and the anodes mounted on the outside of the hull. The anode cables are introduced into the ship via a compression seal fitting and routed to the DC power source. The negative cable from the power supply is simply attached to the hull to complete the circuit. Ship ICCP anodes are flush-mounted, minimizing the effects of drag on the ship, and located a minimum 5 ft below the light load line in an area to avoid mechanical damage. The current density required for protection is a function of velocity and considered when selecting the current capacity and location of anode placement on the hull.

Some ships may require specialist treatment, for example aluminium hulls with steel fixtures will create an electrochemical cell where the aluminium hull can act as a galvanic anode and corrosion is enhanced. In cases like this, aluminium or zinc galvanic anodes can be used to offset the potential difference between the aluminium hull and the steel fixture. If the steel fixtures are large, several galvanic anodes may be required, or even a small ICCP system.

Marine

Marine cathodic protection covers many areas, jetties, harbors, offshore structures. The variety of different types of structure leads to a variety of systems to provide protection. Galvanic anodes are favored, but ICCP can also often be used. Because of the wide variety of structure geometry, composition, and architecture, specialized firms are often required to engineer structure-specific cathodic protection systems. Sometimes marine structures require retroactive modification to be effectively protected 

Steel in concrete

The application to concrete reinforcement is slightly different in that the anodes and reference electrodes are usually embedded in the concrete at the time of construction when the concrete is being poured. The usual technique for concrete buildings, bridges and similar structures is to use ICCP, but there are systems available that use the principle of galvanic cathodic protection as well, although in the UK at least, the use of galvanic anodes for atmospherically exposed reinforced concrete structures is considered experimental.

For ICCP, the principle is the same as any other ICCP system. However, in a typical atmospherically exposed concrete structure such as a bridge, there will be many more anodes distributed through the structure as opposed to an array of anodes as used on a pipeline. This makes for a more complicated system and usually an automatically controlled DC power source is used, possibly with an option for remote monitoring and operation. For buried or submerged structures, the treatment is similar to that of any other buried or submerged structure.

Galvanic systems offer the advantage of being easier to retrofit and do not need any control systems as ICCP does.

For pipelines constructed from pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipe (PCCP), the techniques used for cathodic protection are generally as for steel pipelines except that the applied potential must be limited to prevent damage to the prestressing wire.

The steel wire in a PCCP pipeline is stressed to the point that any corrosion of the wire can result in failure. An additional problem is that any excessive hydrogen ions as a result of an excessively negative potential can cause hydrogen embrittlement of the wire, also resulting in failure. The failure of too many wires will result in catastrophic failure of the PCCP. To implement ICCP therefore requires very careful control to ensure satisfactory protection. A simpler option is to use galvanic anodes, which are self-limiting and need no control.

Internal cathodic protection

Vessels, pipelines and tanks which are used to store or transport liquids can also be protected from corrosion on their internal surfaces by the use of cathodic protection. ICCP and galvanic systems can be used. A common application of internal cathodic protection is water storage tanks and power plant shell and tube heat exchangers.

Galvanized steel

Galvanizing generally refers to hot-dip galvanizing which is a way of coating steel with a layer of metallic zinc or tin. Galvanized coatings are quite durable in most environments because they combine the barrier properties of a coating with some of the benefits of cathodic protection. If the zinc coating is scratched or otherwise locally damaged and steel is exposed, the surrounding areas of zinc coating form a galvanic cell with the exposed steel and protect it from corrosion. This is a form of localized cathodic protection - the zinc acts as a sacrificial anode.

Galvanizing, while using the electrochemical principle of cathodic protection, is not actually cathodic protection. Cathodic protection requires the anode to be separate from the metal surface to be protected, with an ionic connection through the electrolyte and an electron connection through a connecting cable, bolt or similar. This means that any area of the protected structure within the electrolyte can be protected, whereas in the case of galvanizing, only areas very close to the zinc are protected. Hence, a larger area of bare steel would only be protected around the edges.

Automobiles

Several companies market electronic devices claiming to mitigate corrosion for automobiles and trucks. Corrosion control professionals find they do not work. There is no peer reviewed scientific testing and validation supporting the use of the devices. In 1996 the FTC ordered David McCready, a person that sold devices claiming to protect cars from corrosion, to pay restitution and banned the names "Rust Buster" and "Rust Evader."

Testing

Electrode potential is measured with reference electrodes. Copper-copper sulphate electrodes are used for structures in contact with soil or fresh water. Silver/silver chloride/seawater electrodes or pure zinc electrodes are used for seawater applications. The methods are described in EN 13509:2003 and NACE TM0497 along with the sources of error in the voltage that appears on the display of the meter. Interpretation of electrode potential measurements to determine the potential at the interface between the anode of the corrosion cell and the electrolyte requires training and cannot be expected to match the accuracy of measurements done in laboratory work.

Problems

Production of hydrogen

A side effect of improperly applied cathodic protection is the production of atomic hydrogen, leading to its absorption in the protected metal and subsequent hydrogen embrittlement of welds and materials with high hardness. Under normal conditions, the atomic hydrogen will combine at the metal surface to create hydrogen gas, which cannot penetrate the metal. Hydrogen atoms, however, are small enough to pass through the crystalline steel structure, and lead in some cases to hydrogen embrittlement.

Cathodic disbonding

This is a process of disbondment of protective coatings from the protected structure (cathode) due to the formation of hydrogen ions over the surface of the protected material (cathode). Disbonding can be exacerbated by an increase in alkali ions and an increase in cathodic polarization. The degree of disbonding is also reliant on the type of coating, with some coatings affected more than others. Cathodic protection systems should be operated so that the structure does not become excessively polarized, since this also promotes disbonding due to excessively negative potentials. Cathodic disbonding occurs rapidly in pipelines that contain hot fluids because the process is accelerated by heat flow.

Cathodic shielding

Effectiveness of cathodic protection (CP) systems on steel pipelines can be impaired by the use of solid film backed dielectric coatings such as polyethylene tapes, shrinkable pipeline sleeves, and factory applied single or multiple solid film coatings. This phenomenon occurs because of the high electrical resistivity of these film backings. Protective electric current from the cathodic protection system is blocked or shielded from reaching the underlying metal by the highly resistive film backing. Cathodic shielding was first defined in the 1980s as being a problem, and technical papers on the subject have been regularly published since then.

A 1999 report concerning a 20,600 bbl (3,280 m3) spill from a Saskatchewan crude oil line contains an excellent definition of the cathodic shielding problem:

"The triple situation of disbondment of the (corrosion) coating, the dielectric nature of the coating and the unique electrochemical environment established under the exterior coating, which acts as a shield to the electrical CP current, is referred to as CP shielding. The combination of tenting and disbondment permits a corrosive environment around the outside of the pipe to enter into the void between the exterior coating and the pipe surface. With the development of this CP shielding phenomenon, impressed current from the CP system cannot access exposed metal under the exterior coating to protect the pipe surface from the consequences of an aggressive corrosive environment. The CP shielding phenomenon induces changes in the potential gradient of the CP system across the exterior coating, which are further pronounced in areas of insufficient or sub-standard CP current emanating from the pipeline's CP system. This produces an area on the pipeline of insufficient CP defense against metal loss aggravated by an exterior corrosive environment."

Cathodic shielding is referenced in a number of the standards listed below. Newly issued USDOT regulation Title 49 CFR 192.112, in the section for Additional design requirements for steel pipe using alternative maximum allowable operating pressure requires that "The pipe must be protected against external corrosion by a non-shielding coating" (see coatings section on standard). Also, the NACE SP0169:2007 standard defines shielding in section 2, cautions against the use of materials that create electrical shielding in section 4.2.3, cautions against use of external coatings that create electrical shielding in section 5.1.2.3, and instructs readers to take 'appropriate action' when the effects of electrical shielding of cathodic protection current are detected on an operating pipeline in section 10.9.

Standards

  • 49 CFR 192.451 - Requirements for Corrosion Control - Transportation of natural and other gas by pipeline: US minimum federal safety standards
  • 49 CFR 195.551 - Requirements for Corrosion Control - Transportation of hazardous liquids by pipelines: US minimum federal safety standards
  • AS 2832 - Australian Standards for Cathodic Protection
  • ASME B31Q 0001-0191
  • ASTM G 8, G 42 - Evaluating Cathodic Disbondment resistance of coatings
  • DNV-RP-B401 - Cathodic Protection Design - Det Norske Veritas
  • EN 12068:1999 - Cathodic protection. External organic coatings for the corrosion protection of buried or immersed steel pipelines used in conjunction with cathodic protection. Tapes and shrinkable materials
  • EN 12473:2000 - General principles of cathodic protection in sea water
  • EN 12474:2001 - Cathodic protection for submarine pipelines
  • EN 12495:2000 - Cathodic protection for fixed steel offshore structures
  • EN 12499:2003 - Internal cathodic protection of metallic structures
  • EN 12696:2012 - Cathodic protection of steel in concrete
  • EN 12954:2001 - Cathodic protection of buried or immersed metallic structures. General principles and application for pipelines
  • EN 13173:2001 - Cathodic protection for steel offshore floating structures
  • EN 13174:2001 - Cathodic protection for "Harbour Installations".
  • EN 13509:2003 - Cathodic protection measurement techniques
  • EN 13636:2004 - Cathodic protection of buried metallic tanks and related piping
  • EN 14505:2005 - Cathodic protection of complex structures
  • EN 15112:2006 - External cathodic protection of well casing
  • EN 15280-2013 - Evaluation of a.c. corrosion likelihood of buried pipelines
  • EN 50162:2004 - Protection against corrosion by stray current from direct current systems
  • BS 7361-1:1991 - Cathodic Protection
  • NACE SP0169:2013 - Control of External Corrosion on Underground or Submerged Metallic Piping Systems
  • NACE TM 0497 - Measurement Techniques Related to Criteria for Cathodic Protection on Underground or Submerged Metallic Piping Systems

Biological warfare

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Biological warfare, also known as germ warfare, is the use of biological toxins or infectious agents such as bacteria, viruses, insects, and fungi with the intent to kill, harm or incapacitate humans, animals or plants as an act of war. Biological weapons (often termed "bio-weapons", "biological threat agents", or "bio-agents") are living organisms or replicating entities ( ⁠i.e.viruses, which are not universally considered "alive"). Entomological (insect) warfare is a subtype of biological warfare.

Offensive biological warfare is prohibited under customary international humanitarian law and several international treaties. In particular, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological weapons. Therefore, the use of biological agents in armed conflict is a war crime. In contrast, defensive biological research for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes is not prohibited by the BWC.

Biological warfare is distinct from warfare involving other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear warfare, chemical warfare, and radiological warfare. None of these are considered conventional weapons, which are deployed primarily for their explosive, kinetic, or incendiary potential.

Biological weapons may be employed in various ways to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over the enemy, either by threats or by actual deployments. Like some chemical weapons, biological weapons may also be useful as area denial weapons. These agents may be lethal or non-lethal, and may be targeted against a single individual, a group of people, or even an entire population. They may be developed, acquired, stockpiled or deployed by nation states or by non-national groups. In the latter case, or if a nation-state uses it clandestinely, it may also be considered bioterrorism.

Biological warfare and chemical warfare overlap to an extent, as the use of toxins produced by some living organisms is considered under the provisions of both the BWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Toxins and psychochemical weapons are often referred to as midspectrum agents. Unlike bioweapons, these midspectrum agents do not reproduce in their host and are typically characterized by shorter incubation periods.

Overview

A biological attack could conceivably result in large numbers of civilian casualties and cause severe disruption to economic and societal infrastructure.

A nation or group that can pose a credible threat of mass casualty has the ability to alter the terms under which other nations or groups interact with it. When indexed to weapon mass and cost of development and storage, biological weapons possess destructive potential and loss of life far in excess of nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons. Accordingly, biological agents are potentially useful as strategic deterrents, in addition to their utility as offensive weapons on the battlefield.

As a tactical weapon for military use, a significant problem with biological warfare is that it would take days to be effective, and therefore might not immediately stop an opposing force. Some biological agents (smallpox, pneumonic plague) have the capability of person-to-person transmission via aerosolized respiratory droplets. This feature can be undesirable, as the agent(s) may be transmitted by this mechanism to unintended populations, including neutral or even friendly forces. Worse still, such a weapon could "escape" the laboratory where it was developed, even if there was no intent to use it – for example by infecting a researcher who then transmits it to the outside world before realizing that they were infected. Several cases are known of researchers becoming infected and dying of Ebola, which they had been working with in the lab (though nobody else was infected in those cases) – while there is no evidence that their work was directed towards biological warfare, it demonstrates the potential for accidental infection even of careful researchers fully aware of the dangers. While containment of biological warfare is less of a concern for certain criminal or terrorist organizations, it remains a significant concern for the military and civilian populations of virtually all nations.

History

Antiquity and Middle Ages

Rudimentary forms of biological warfare have been practiced since antiquity. The earliest documented incident of the intention to use biological weapons is recorded in Hittite texts of 1500–1200 BCE, in which victims of tularemia were driven into enemy lands, causing an epidemic. The Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with the fungus ergot, though with unknown results. Scythian archers dipped their arrows and Roman soldiers their swords into excrements and cadavers – victims were commonly infected by tetanus as result. In 1346, the bodies of Mongol warriors of the Golden Horde who had died of plague were thrown over the walls of the besieged Crimean city of Kaffa. Specialists disagree about whether this operation was responsible for the spread of the Black Death into Europe, Near East and North Africa, resulting in the deaths of approximately 25 million Europeans.

Biological agents were extensively used in many parts of Africa from the sixteenth century AD, most of the time in the form of poisoned arrows, or powder spread on the war front as well as poisoning of horses and water supply of the enemy forces. In Borgu, there were specific mixtures to kill, hypnotize, make the enemy bold, and to act as an antidote against the poison of the enemy as well. The creation of biologicals was reserved for a specific and professional class of medicine-men.

1763 to present

The British Army attempted use of smallpox against Native Americans during the Siege of Fort Pitt in June 1763. A reported outbreak that began the spring before left as many as one hundred Native Americans dead in Ohio Country from 1763 to 1764. It is not clear whether the smallpox was a result of the Fort Pitt incident or the virus was already present among the Delaware people as outbreaks happened on their own every dozen or so years and the delegates were met again later and seemingly had not contracted smallpox. During the American Revolutionary War General George Washington heard a report that British General William Howe was going to send people inoculated with smallpox out from Boston, in order to infect other Americans. Washington reported this to Congress but said he could hardly give credit to it. Washington inoculated his soldiers, diminishing the effect of the on-going smallpox epidemic. Some historians believe that the British Marines deliberately used smallpox in New South Wales, Australia, in 1789. Dr Seth Carus states: "Ultimately, we have a strong circumstantial case supporting the theory that someone deliberately introduced smallpox in the Aboriginal population."

By 1900 the germ theory and advances in bacteriology brought a new level of sophistication to the techniques for possible use of bio-agents in war. Biological sabotage in the form of anthrax and glanders was undertaken on behalf of the Imperial German government during World War I (1914–1918), with indifferent results. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons.

With the onset of World War II, the Ministry of Supply in the United Kingdom established a biological warfare program at Porton Down, headed by the microbiologist Paul Fildes. The research was championed by Winston Churchill and soon tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism toxins had been effectively weaponized. In particular, Gruinard Island in Scotland, was contaminated with anthrax during a series of extensive tests for the next 56 years. Although the UK never offensively used the biological weapons it developed, its program was the first to successfully weaponize a variety of deadly pathogens and bring them into industrial production. Other nations, notably France and Japan, had begun their own biological weapons programs.

When the United States entered the war, Allied resources were pooled at the request of the British. The U.S. then established a large research program and industrial complex at Fort Detrick, Maryland in 1942 under the direction of George W. Merck. The biological and chemical weapons developed during that period were tested at the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah. Soon there were facilities for the mass production of anthrax spores, brucellosis, and botulism toxins, although the war was over before these weapons could be of much operational use.

Shiro Ishii, commander of Unit 731, which performed live human vivisections and other biological experimentation

The most notorious program of the period was run by the secret Imperial Japanese Army Unit 731 during the war, based at Pingfan in Manchuria and commanded by Lieutenant General Shirō Ishii. This unit biological warfare, conducted often fatal human experiments on prisoners, and produced biological weapons for combat use. Although the Japanese effort lacked the technological sophistication of the American or British programs, it far outstripped them in its widespread application and indiscriminate brutality. Biological weapons were used against Chinese soldiers and civilians in several military campaigns. In 1940, the Japanese Army Air Force bombed Ningbo with ceramic bombs full of fleas carrying the bubonic plague. Many of these operations were ineffective due to inefficient delivery systems, although up to 400,000 people may have died. During the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign in 1942, around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces.

During the final months of World War II, Japan planned to use plague as a biological weapon against U.S. civilians in San Diego, California, during Operation Cherry Blossoms at Night. The plan was set to launch on 22 September 1945, but it was not executed because of Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945.

In Britain, the 1950s saw the weaponization of plague, brucellosis, tularemia and later equine encephalomyelitis and vaccinia viruses, but the programme was unilaterally cancelled in 1956. The United States Army Biological Warfare Laboratories weaponized anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, Q-fever and others.

In 1969, US President Richard Nixon decided to unilaterally terminate the offensive biological weapons program of the US, allowing only scientific research for defensive measures. This decision increased the momentum of the negotiations for a ban on biological warfare, which took place from 1969 to 1972 in the United Nation's Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. These negotiations resulted in the Biological Weapons Convention, which was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975 after the ratification by 22 states.

Despite being a party and depositary to the BWC, the Soviet Union continued and expanded its massive offensive biological weapons program, under the leadership of the allegedly civilian institution Biopreparat. The Soviet Union attracted international suspicion after the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax leak killed approximately 65 to 100 people.

International law

The Biological Weapons Convention

International restrictions on biological warfare began with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use but not the possession or development of biological and chemical weapons. Upon ratification of the Geneva Protocol, several countries made reservations regarding its applicability and use in retaliation. Due to these reservations, it was in practice a "no-first-use" agreement only.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) supplements the Geneva Protocol by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological weapons. Having entered into force on 26 March 1975, the BWC was the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban the production of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. As of March 2021, 183 states have become party to the treaty. The BWC is considered to have established a strong global norm against biological weapons, which is reflected in the treaty's preamble, stating that the use of biological weapons would be "repugnant to the conscience of mankind". The BWC's effectiveness has been limited due to insufficient institutional support and the absence of any formal verification regime to monitor compliance.

In 1985, the Australia Group was established, a multilateral export control regime of 43 countries aiming to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

In 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1540, which obligates all UN Member States to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, in particular, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors.

Bioterrorism

Biological weapons are difficult to detect, economical and easy to use, making them appealing to terrorists. The cost of a biological weapon is estimated to be about 0.05 percent the cost of a conventional weapon in order to produce similar numbers of mass casualties per kilometer square. Moreover, their production is very easy as common technology can be used to produce biological warfare, like that used in production of vaccines, foods, spray devices, beverages and antibiotics. A major factor in biological warfare that attracts terrorists is that they can easily escape before the government agencies or secret agencies have even started their investigation. This is because the potential organism has an incubation period of 3 to 7 days, after which the results begin to appear, thereby giving terrorists a lead.

A technique called Clustered, Regularly Interspaced, Short Palindromic Repeat (CRISPR-Cas9) is now so cheap and widely available that scientists fear that the amateurs will start experimenting with them. In this technique, a DNA sequence is cut off and replaced with a new sequence or code that codes for a particular protein or characteristic, which could potentially show up in the required organism. Though this technique is a breakthrough and is commendable, it can cause serious issues and potential danger if used by people with wrong intentions. Concerns have emerged regarding do-it-yourself biology research organizations due to their associated risk that a rogue amateur DIY researcher could attempt to develop dangerous bioweapons using genome editing technology.

In 2002, when CNN went through Al-Qaeda's (AQ's) experiments with crude poisons, they found out that AQ had begun planning ricin and cyanide attacks with the help of a loose association of terrorist cells. The associates had infiltrated many countries like Turkey, Italy, Spain, France and others. In 2015, to combat the threat of bioterrorism, a National Blueprint for Biodefense was issued by the Blue-Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense. Also, 233 potential exposures of select biological agents outside of the primary barriers of the biocontainment in the US were described by the annual report of the Federal Select Agent Program.

Though a verification system can reduce bioterrorism, an employee, or a lone terrorist having adequate knowledge of the company facilities, can cause potential danger by injecting a deadly or harmful substance into the facility. Moreover, it has been found that about 95% of accidents that have occurred due to low security have been done by employees or those who had a security clearance.

Entomology

Entomological warfare (EW) is a type of biological warfare that uses insects to attack the enemy. The concept has existed for centuries and research and development have continued into the modern era. EW has been used in battle by Japan and several other nations have developed and been accused of using an entomological warfare program. EW may employ insects in a direct attack or as vectors to deliver a biological agent, such as plague. Essentially, EW exists in three varieties. One type of EW involves infecting insects with a pathogen and then dispersing the insects over target areas. The insects then act as a vector, infecting any person or animal they might bite. Another type of EW is a direct insect attack against crops; the insect may not be infected with any pathogen but instead represents a threat to agriculture. The final method uses uninfected insects, such as bees or wasps, to directly attack the enemy.

Genetics

Theoretically, novel approaches in biotechnology, such as synthetic biology could be used in the future to design novel types of biological warfare agents.

  1. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective;
  2. Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents;
  3. Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent;
  4. Would increase the transmissibility of a pathogen;
  5. Would alter the host range of a pathogen;
  6. Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection tools;
  7. Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.

Most of the biosecurity concerns in synthetic biology are focused on the role of DNA synthesis and the risk of producing genetic material of lethal viruses (e.g. 1918 Spanish flu, polio) in the lab. Recently, the CRISPR/Cas system has emerged as a promising technique for gene editing. It was hailed by The Washington Post as "the most important innovation in the synthetic biology space in nearly 30 years." While other methods take months or years to edit gene sequences, CRISPR speeds that time up to weeks. Due to its ease of use and accessibility, it has raised a number of ethical concerns, especially surrounding its use in the biohacking space.

By target

Anti-personnel

The international biological hazard symbol

Ideal characteristics of a biological agent to be used as a weapon against humans are high infectivity, high virulence, non-availability of vaccines and availability of an effective and efficient delivery system. Stability of the weaponized agent (the ability of the agent to retain its infectivity and virulence after a prolonged period of storage) may also be desirable, particularly for military applications, and the ease of creating one is often considered. Control of the spread of the agent may be another desired characteristic.

The primary difficulty is not the production of the biological agent, as many biological agents used in weapons can be manufactured relatively quickly, cheaply and easily. Rather, it is the weaponization, storage, and delivery in an effective vehicle to a vulnerable target that pose significant problems.

For example, Bacillus anthracis is considered an effective agent for several reasons. First, it forms hardy spores, perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, this organism is not considered transmissible from person to person, and thus rarely if ever causes secondary infections. A pulmonary anthrax infection starts with ordinary influenza-like symptoms and progresses to a lethal hemorrhagic mediastinitis within 3–7 days, with a fatality rate that is 90% or higher in untreated patients. Finally, friendly personnel and civilians can be protected with suitable antibiotics.

Agents considered for weaponization, or known to be weaponized, include bacteria such as Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Burkholderia mallei, Burkholderia pseudomallei, Chlamydophila psittaci, Coxiella burnetii, Francisella tularensis, some of the Rickettsiaceae (especially Rickettsia prowazekii and Rickettsia rickettsii), Shigella spp., Vibrio cholerae, and Yersinia pestis. Many viral agents have been studied and/or weaponized, including some of the Bunyaviridae (especially Rift Valley fever virus), Ebolavirus, many of the Flaviviridae (especially Japanese encephalitis virus), Machupo virus, Coronaviruses (especially SARS-Cov-2 that causes COVID-19), Marburg virus, Variola virus, and yellow fever virus. Fungal agents that have been studied include Coccidioides spp.

Toxins that can be used as weapons include ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, botulinum toxin, saxitoxin, and many mycotoxins. These toxins and the organisms that produce them are sometimes referred to as select agents. In the United States, their possession, use, and transfer are regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Select Agent Program.

The former US biological warfare program categorized its weaponized anti-personnel bio-agents as either Lethal Agents (Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Botulinum toxin) or Incapacitating Agents (Brucella suis, Coxiella burnetii, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B).

Anti-agriculture

Anti-crop/anti-vegetation/anti-fisheries

The United States developed an anti-crop capability during the Cold War that used plant diseases (bioherbicides, or mycoherbicides) for destroying enemy agriculture. Biological weapons also target fisheries as well as water-based vegetation. It was believed that the destruction of enemy agriculture on a strategic scale could thwart Sino-Soviet aggression in a general war. Diseases such as wheat blast and rice blast were weaponized in aerial spray tanks and cluster bombs for delivery to enemy watersheds in agricultural regions to initiate epiphytotic (epidemics among plants). On the other hand, some sources report that these agents were stockpiled but never weaponized. When the United States renounced its offensive biological warfare program in 1969 and 1970, the vast majority of its biological arsenal was composed of these plant diseases. Enterotoxins and Mycotoxins were not affected by Nixon's order.

Though herbicides are chemicals, they are often grouped with biological warfare and chemical warfare because they may work in a similar manner as biotoxins or bioregulators. The Army Biological Laboratory tested each agent and the Army's Technical Escort Unit was responsible for the transport of all chemical, biological, radiological (nuclear) materials.

Biological warfare can also specifically target plants to destroy crops or defoliate vegetation. The United States and Britain discovered plant growth regulators (i.e., herbicides) during the Second World War, which were then used by the UK in the counterinsurgency operations of the Malayan Emergency. Inspired by the use in Malaysia, the US military effort in the Vietnam War included a mass dispersal of a variety of herbicides, famously Agent Orange, with the aim of destroying farmland and defoliating forests used as cover by the Viet Cong. Sri Lanka deployed military defoliants in its prosecution of the Eelam War against Tamil insurgents.

Anti-livestock

During World War I, German saboteurs used anthrax and glanders to sicken cavalry horses in U.S. and France, sheep in Romania, and livestock in Argentina intended for the Entente forces. One of these German saboteurs was Anton Dilger. Also, Germany itself became a victim of similar attacks – horses bound for Germany were infected with Burkholderia by French operatives in Switzerland.

During World War II, the U.S. and Canada secretly investigated the use of rinderpest, a highly lethal disease of cattle, as a bioweapon.

In the 1980s Soviet Ministry of Agriculture had successfully developed variants of foot-and-mouth disease, and rinderpest against cows, African swine fever for pigs, and psittacosis to kill the chicken. These agents were prepared to spray them down from tanks attached to airplanes over hundreds of miles. The secret program was code-named "Ecology".

During the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952, the poisonous latex of the African milk bush was used to kill cattle.

Defensive operations

Medical countermeasures

In 2010 at The Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction in Geneva the sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance was suggested as well-tested means for enhancing the monitoring of infections and parasitic agents, for the practical implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005). The aim was to prevent and minimize the consequences of natural outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases as well as the threat of alleged use of biological weapons against BTWC States Parties.

Public health and disease surveillance

It is important to note that most classical and modern biological weapons' pathogens can be obtained from a plant or an animal which is naturally infected.

In the largest biological weapons accident known—the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in the Soviet Union in 1979—sheep became ill with anthrax as far as 200 kilometers from the release point of the organism from a military facility in the southeastern portion of the city and still off-limits to visitors today, (see Sverdlovsk Anthrax leak).

Thus, a robust surveillance system involving human clinicians and veterinarians may identify a bioweapons attack early in the course of an epidemic, permitting the prophylaxis of disease in the vast majority of people (and/or animals) exposed but not yet ill.

For example, in the case of anthrax, it is likely that by 24–36 hours after an attack, some small percentage of individuals (those with the compromised immune system or who had received a large dose of the organism due to proximity to the release point) will become ill with classical symptoms and signs (including a virtually unique chest X-ray finding, often recognized by public health officials if they receive timely reports). The incubation period for humans is estimated to be about 11.8 days to 12.1 days. This suggested period is the first model that is independently consistent with data from the largest known human outbreak. These projections refine previous estimates of the distribution of early-onset cases after a release and support a recommended 60-day course of prophylactic antibiotic treatment for individuals exposed to low doses of anthrax. By making these data available to local public health officials in real time, most models of anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before becoming symptomatic, and thus avoid the moderately high mortality of the disease.

Common epidemiological warnings

From most specific to least specific:

  1. Single cause of a certain disease caused by an uncommon agent, with lack of an epidemiological explanation.
  2. Unusual, rare, genetically engineered strain of an agent.
  3. High morbidity and mortality rates in regards to patients with the same or similar symptoms.
  4. Unusual presentation of the disease.
  5. Unusual geographic or seasonal distribution.
  6. Stable endemic disease, but with an unexplained increase in relevance.
  7. Rare transmission (aerosols, food, water).
  8. No illness presented in people who were/are not exposed to "common ventilation systems (have separate closed ventilation systems) when illness is seen in persons in close proximity who have a common ventilation system."
  9. Different and unexplained diseases coexisting in the same patient without any other explanation.
  10. Rare illness that affects a large, disparate population (respiratory disease might suggest the pathogen or agent was inhaled).
  11. Illness is unusual for a certain population or age-group in which it takes presence.
  12. Unusual trends of death and/or illness in animal populations, previous to or accompanying illness in humans.
  13. Many affected reaching out for treatment at the same time.
  14. Similar genetic makeup of agents in affected individuals.
  15. Simultaneous collections of similar illness in non-contiguous areas, domestic, or foreign.
  16. An abundance of cases of unexplained diseases and deaths.

Bioweapon identification

The goal of biodefense is to integrate the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. Health care providers and public health officers are among the first lines of defense. In some countries private, local, and provincial (state) capabilities are being augmented by and coordinated with federal assets, to provide layered defenses against biological weapon attacks. During the first Gulf War the United Nations activated a biological and chemical response team, Task Force Scorpio, to respond to any potential use of weapons of mass destruction on civilians.

The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water: focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease is being strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and repetitive.

The growing threat of biowarfare agents and bioterrorism has led to the development of specific field tools that perform on-the-spot analysis and identification of encountered suspect materials. One such technology, being developed by researchers from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), employs a "sandwich immunoassay", in which fluorescent dye-labeled antibodies aimed at specific pathogens are attached to silver and gold nanowires.

In the Netherlands, the company TNO has designed Bioaerosol Single Particle Recognition eQuipment (BiosparQ). This system would be implemented into the national response plan for bioweapon attacks in the Netherlands.

Researchers at Ben Gurion University in Israel are developing a different device called the BioPen, essentially a "Lab-in-a-Pen", which can detect known biological agents in under 20 minutes using an adaptation of the ELISA, a similar widely employed immunological technique, that in this case incorporates fiber optics.

List of programs, projects and sites by country

United States

United Kingdom

Soviet Union and Russia

Japan

U.S. authorities granted Unit 731 officials immunity from prosecution in return for access to their research.

Iraq

South Africa

Rhodesia

Canada

List of associated people

Bioweaponeers:

Includes scientists and administrators

Writers and activists:

Cooperative

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