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Thursday, February 2, 2023

Living Constitution

The Living Constitution, or judicial pragmatism, is the viewpoint that the United States Constitution holds a dynamic meaning that evolves and adapts to new circumstances even if the document is not formally amended. The Constitution is said to develop alongside society's needs and provide a more malleable tool for governments. The idea is associated with views that contemporary society should be considered in the constitutional interpretation of phrases. The Constitution is referred to as the living law of the land as it is transformed according to necessities of the time and the situation. Some supporters of the living method of interpretation, such as professors Michael Kammen and Bruce Ackerman, refer to themselves as organists.

The arguments for the Living Constitution vary but can generally be broken into two categories. First, the pragmatist view contends that interpreting the Constitution in accordance with its original meaning or intent is sometimes unacceptable as a policy matter and so an evolving interpretation is necessary. The second, relating to intent, contends that the constitutional framers specifically wrote the Constitution in broad and flexible terms to create such a dynamic, "living" document.

Opponents often argue that the Constitution should be changed by an amendment process because allowing judges to change the Constitution's meaning undermines democracy. Another argument against the Living Constitution is that legislative action, rather than judicial decisions, better represent the will of the people in the United States in a constitutional republic, since periodic elections allow individuals to vote on who will represent them in the United States Congress, and members of Congress should (in theory) be responsive to the views of their constituents. The primary alternative to a living constitution theory is "originalism." Opponents of the Living Constitution often regard it as a form of judicial activism.

History

During the Progressive Era, many initiatives were promoted and fought for but prevented from full fruition by legislative bodies or judicial proceedings. One case in particular, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., enraged early progressive activists hoping to achieve an income tax. That led progressives to the belief that the Constitution was unamendable and ultimately for them to find a new way to achieve the desired level of progress. Other proposals were considered, such as making the amending formula easier.

Origins

The phrase originally derives from the title of a 1927 book of that name by Professor Howard Lee McBain, and early efforts at developing the concept in its modern form have been credited to figures like Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Louis D. Brandeis, and Woodrow Wilson. The earliest mentions of the Constitution as "living," particularly in the context of a new way of interpreting it, comes from Woodrow Wilson's book Constitutional Government in the United States in which he wrote:

Living political constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and in practice.

Wilson strengthened that view, at least publicly, while he campaigned for president in 1912:

Society is a living organism and must obey the laws of life, not of mechanics; it must develop. All that progressives ask or desire is permission - in an era when "development," "evolution," is the scientific word - to interpret the Constitution according to the Darwinian principle; all they ask is recognition of the fact that a nation is a living thing and not a machine.

Judicial pragmatism

Although the "Living Constitution" is itself a characterization, rather than a specific method of interpretation, the phrase is associated with various non-originalist theories of interpretation, most commonly judicial pragmatism. In the course of his judgment in Missouri v. Holland 252 U.S. 416 (1920), Holmes remarked on the Constitution's nature:

With regard to that we may add that when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether [252 U.S. 416, 434] it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that amendment has reserved.

According to the pragmatist view, the Constitution should be seen as evolving over time as a matter of social necessity. Looking solely to original meaning, which would largely permit many practices that are now universally condemned, thus causes the rejection of pure originalism out of hand.

That general view has been expressed by Judge Richard Posner:

A constitution that did not invalidate so offensive, oppressive, probably undemocratic, and sectarian law [as the Connecticut law banning contraceptives] would stand revealed as containing major gaps. Maybe that is the nature of our, or perhaps any, written Constitution; but yet, perhaps the courts are authorized to plug at least the most glaring gaps. Does anyone really believe, in his heart of hearts, that the Constitution should be interpreted so literally as to authorize every conceivable law that would not violate a specific constitutional clause? This would mean that a state could require everyone to marry, or to have intercourse at least once a month, or it could take away every couple's second child and place it in a foster home.... We find it reassuring to think that the courts stand between us and legislative tyranny even if a particular form of tyranny was not foreseen and expressly forbidden by framers of the Constitution.

The pragmatist objection is central to the idea that the Constitution should be seen as a living document. Under that view, for example, constitutional requirements of "equal rights" should be read with regard to current standards of equality, not those of decades or centuries ago, an alternative that would be unacceptable.

Original intent

In addition to pragmatist arguments, most proponents of the living Constitution argue that the Constitution was deliberately written to be broad and flexible to accommodate social or technological change over time. Edmund Randolph, in his Draft Sketch of Constitution, wrote:

In the draught of a fundamental constitution, two things deserve attention:

1. To insert essential principles only; lest the operations of government should be clogged by rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be accommodated to times and events: and
2. To use simple and precise language, and general propositions, according to the example of the constitutions of the several states.

The doctrine's proponents assert that Randolph's injunction to use "simple and precise language, and general propositions," such that the Constitution could "be accommodated to times and events," is evidence of the "genius" of its framers.

James Madison, the principal author of the Constitution and often called the "Father of the Constitution," said this in argument for original intent and against changing the Constitution by evolving language:

I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution. And if that is not the guide in expounding it, there may be no security for a consistent and stable, more than for a faithful exercise of its powers. If the meaning of the text be sought in the changeable meaning of the words composing it, it is evident that the shape and attributes of the Government must partake of the changes to which the words and phrases of all living languages are constantly subject. What a metamorphosis would be produced in the code of law if all its ancient phraseology were to be taken in its modern sense.

Some Living Constitutionists seek to reconcile themselves with the originalist view, which interprets the Constitution based on its original meaning.

Application

One application of the Living Constitution's framework is seen in the Supreme Court's reference to "evolving standards of decency" under the Eighth Amendment, as was seen in the 1958 Supreme Court case of Trop v. Dulles:

[T]he words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.

The Court referred in Trop only to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, but its underlying conception was that the Constitution is written in broad terms and that the Court's interpretation of those terms should reflect current societal conditions, which is the heart of the Living Constitution.

Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses

The Warren Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, is recognized as having dramatically expanded civil liberties protected under the Constitution.

From its inception, one of the most controversial aspects of the living constitutional framework has been its association with broad interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.

Proponents of the Living Constitution suggest that a dynamic view of civil liberties is vital to the continuing effectiveness of the constitutional scheme. It is now seen as unacceptable to suggest that married women or descendants of slaves are not entitled to liberty or equal protection with regard to coverture laws, slavery laws, and their legacy, as they were not expressly seen as free from such by those who ratified the Constitution. Advocates of the Living Constitution believe that the framers never intended their 18th-century practices to be regarded as the permanent standard for those ideals.

Living Constitutionalists suggest that broad ideals such as "liberty" and "equal protection" were included in the Constitution precisely because they are timeless and for their inherently dynamic nature. Liberty in 1791 is argued to have never been thought to be the same as liberty in 1591 or in 1991, but it was rather seen as a principle transcending the recognized rights of the day and age. Giving them a fixed and static meaning in the name of "originalism" is thus said to violate the very theory that it purports to uphold.

Points of contention

As the subject of significant controversy, the idea of a Living Constitution is plagued by numerous conflicting contentions.

Disregard of constitutional language

The idea of a Living Constitution was often characterized by Justice Scalia and others as inherently disregarding constitutional language and as suggesting that one should not simply read and apply the constitutional text.

Jack Balkin argues that was not the intended meaning of the term, however, and suggests that the Constitution be read contemporaneously, rather than historically. Such an inquiry often consults the original meaning or intent, along with other interpretive devices. A proper application then involves some reconciliation between the various devices, not a simple disregard for one or another.

Judicial activism

Another common view of the Living Constitution is as synonymous with "judicial activism," a phrase that is generally used to accuse judges of resolving cases based on their own political convictions or preferences.

Comparisons

It may be noted that the Living Constitution does not itself represent a detailed philosophy and that distinguishing it from other theories can be difficult. Indeed, supporters often suggest that it is the true originalist philosophy, but originalists generally agree that phrases such as "just compensation" should be applied differently than 200 years ago. It has been suggested that the true difference between the judicial philosophies regards not meaning at all but rather the correct application of constitutional principles. A supporter of the Living Constitution would not necessarily state, for instance, that the meaning of "liberty" has changed since 1791, but it may be what it has always been, a general principle that recognizes individual freedom. The important change might be in what is recognized as liberty today but was not fully recognized two centuries ago. That view was enunciated for the Supreme Court by Justice George Sutherland in 1926:

[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must fall.

To complete the example, the question of how to apply a term like "liberty" may not be a question of what it "means" but rather a question of which liberties are now entitled to constitutional protection. Supporters of a Living Constitution tend to advocate a broad application in accordance with current views, and originalists tend to seek an application consistent with views at the time of ratification. Critics of the Living Constitution assert that it is more open to judicial manipulation, but proponents argue that theoretical flexibility in either view provides adherents extensive leeway in what decision to reach in a particular case.

Debate

Chief Justice William Rehnquist criticized the notion of a Living Constitution.

By its nature, the "Living Constitution" is not held to be a specific theory of construction but a vision of a Constitution whose boundaries are dynamic and congruent with the needs of society as it changes. That vision has its critics; in the description of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, it "has about it a teasing imprecision that makes it a coat of many colors."

It is important to note that the term "Living Constitution" is sometimes used by critics as a pejorative, but some advocates of the general philosophy avoid the term. Opponents of the doctrine tend to use the term as an epithet synonymous with "judicial activism" (itself a hotly-debated phrase). However, just as some conservative theorists have embraced the term Constitution in Exile, which similarly gained popularity through use by liberal critics, textualism was a term that had pejorative connotations before its widespread acceptance as a badge of honor. Some liberal theorists have embraced the image of a living document as appealing.

Support

One argument in support of the concept of a "Living Constitution" is the concept that the Constitution itself is silent on the matter of constitutional interpretation. Proponents assert that the Constitution's framers, most of whom were trained lawyers and legal theorists, were certainly aware of the debates and would have known the confusion that not providing a clear interpretive method would cause. If the framers had meant for future generations to interpret the Constitution in a specific manner, they could have indicated such within the Constitution itself. The lack of guidance within the text of the Constitution suggests that there was no such consensus, or the framers never intended any fixed method of constitutional interpretation.

Relating to the pragmatic argument, it is further argued that if judges were denied the opportunity to reflect on changes to modern society in interpreting the scope of constitutional rights, the resulting Constitution either would not reflect the current mores and values or would require a constant amendment process to reflect the changing society.

Another defense of the Living Constitution is based in viewing the Constitution not merely as law but also as a source of foundational concepts for the governing of society. Of course, laws must be fixed and clear so that people can understand and abide by them on a daily basis. However, if the Constitution is more than a set of laws but also provides guiding concepts, which will in turn provide the foundations for laws, the costs and benefits of such an entirely-fixed meaning are very different. The reason is simple: if a society locks itself into a previous generation's interpretive ideas, it will wind up either constantly attempting to change the Constitution to reflect changes or simply scrapping the Constitution altogether. While the rights and powers provided in the Constitution remain, the scope that those rights and powers should account for society's present experiences. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1914: "Provisions of the Constitution of the United States are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form, but are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is not to be gathered simply from the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth."

A prominent endorsement of the Living Constitution concept was heard during the 2000 presidential campaign by the Democratic candidate, Al Gore.

Opposition

A common argument against the doctrine of a "Living Constitution" comes not from its moderate use but the concept being seen as promoting activism. The term presumes the premise of that what is written is insufficient in the light of what has happened since. The more moderate concept is generally not the target of those who are against the Living Constitution. The concept considered perverse by constructionalists is making the law say what is desired, rather than submitting to what it actually says.

Economist Thomas Sowell argues in his book Knowledge and Decisions that since the Constitution's original designers provided for the means of amending it, they never intended for their original words to change meaning. Sowell also points out cases in which arguments are made that the original framers never considered certain issues, although a clear record of them doing so exists.

Another argument against is similar to the argument for it: the fact that the Constitution itself is silent on the matter of constitutional interpretation. The Living Constitution is a doctrine that relies on the concept that the original framers could not come to a consensus about how to interpret or never intended any fixed method of interpretation. That would then allow future generations the freedom to reexamine for themselves how to interpret it. This view does not take into account why the original constitution does not allow for judicial interpretation in any form. The Supreme Court's power for constitutional review, and by extension its interpretation, was not formalized until Marbury v. Madison in 1803. Thus, the argument therefore relies on an argument that had no validity when the constitution was actually written.

The views of the constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe are often described by conservative critics such as Robert Bork as being characteristic of the Living Constitution paradigm. Bork labeled Tribe's approach as "protean", since it was whatever Tribe needed it to be to reach a desired policy outcome. Tribe rejected both the term and the description. Such a construction appears to define the doctrine as being an ends dictate the means anti-law philosophy. Some liberal constitutional scholars have since implied a similar charge of intellectual dishonesty regarding originalists by noting that they virtually never reach outcomes with which they disagree. (Many academic political scientists believe that justices and appeals judges are willing to alter their outcomes to attain philosophical majorities on certain questions.)

In 1987, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered a lecture, "The Constitution: A Living Document," in which he argued that the Constitution must be interpreted in light of the moral, political, and cultural climate of the age of interpretation. If Bork's formulation of "the living Constitution" is guiding, any constitutional interpretation other than originalism of one form or another implies the Living Constitution. If, however, Marshall's formulation is guiding, it is unclear whether methods derived from law and economics or the Moral Constitution might be implicated.

References to the Living Constitution are relatively rare among legal academics and judges, who generally prefer to use language that is specific and less rhetorical. It is also worth noting that there is disagreement among the opponents of the doctrine on whether the idea is the same as, implied by, or assumed by judicial activism, which has a similar ambiguity of meaning and is also used primarily as a derogatory epithet.

Justice Clarence Thomas has routinely castigated "living Constitution" doctrine. In one particularly strongly-worded attack, he noted:

Let me put it this way; there are really only two ways to interpret the Constitution – try to discern as best we can what the framers intended or make it up. No matter how ingenious, imaginative or artfully put, unless interpretive methodologies are tied to the original intent of the framers, they have no more basis in the Constitution than the latest football scores. To be sure, even the most conscientious effort to adhere to the original intent of the framers of our Constitution is flawed, as all methodologies and human institutions are; but at least originalism has the advantage of being legitimate and, I might add, impartial.

Justice Antonin Scalia expressed similar sentiments and commented:

[There's] the argument of flexibility and it goes something like this: The Constitution is over 200 years old and societies change. It has to change with society, like a living organism, or it will become brittle and break. But you would have to be an idiot to believe that; the Constitution is not a living organism; it is a legal document. It says something and doesn't say other things.... [Proponents of the living constitution want matters to be decided] not by the people, but by the justices of the Supreme Court .... They are not looking for legal flexibility, they are looking for rigidity, whether it's the right to abortion or the right to homosexual activity, they want that right to be embedded from coast to coast and to be unchangeable.

He also said:

If you think aficionados of a living Constitution want to bring you flexibility, think again.... You think the death penalty is a good idea? Under the formalist understanding of the Constitution, but not under the Living Constitution understanding, you can persuade your fellow citizens to adopt it. You want a right to abortion? Persuade your fellow citizens and enact it. That's flexibility.

Professor Michael Ramsey has criticized living constitutionalism on the grounds that there are very few limits on what it could achieve. Ramsey uses Kenneth Jost's argument in favor of the unconstitutionality of the electoral college to argue that a living constitutionalist could believe, "Even something expressly set forth in the Constitution can be unconstitutional if annoying, inconvenient or ill-advised." Likewise, Professors Nelson Lund and John McGinnis have argued that it would be difficult for a living constitutionalist such as Robert Post to object if the US Supreme Court had used its reverse incorporation principle together with the principles of Reynolds v. Sims to make the US cte apportioned exclusively based on population and still retained the trust of the American people after doing so.

Judicial activism

One accusation made against the living Constitution method states that judges that adhere to it are judicial activists and seek to legislate from the bench. That generally means that a judge winds up substituting his judgment on the validity, meaning, or scope of a law for that of the democratically-elected legislature.

Adherents of the Living Constitution are often accused of "reading rights" into the Constitution and of claiming that the Constitution implies rights that are not found in its text. For example, in Roe v. Wade, the US Supreme Court held that the Constitution has an implicit "right to privacy," which extends to a woman's right to decide to have an abortion. As such, the Court held that the government can regulate that right with a compelling interest and only if the regulation is as minimally intrusive as possible. Conservative critics have accused the Supreme Court of activism in inventing a constitutional right to abortion. That accusation is accurate in that abortion rights indeed had not been recognized but, the accusation has been applied selectively. For example, few conservatives levy the same claim against the Supreme Court for its decisions concerning sovereign immunity, a term that was also found to be implicit in the Eleventh Amendment by the Supreme Court.

Outside the United States

Canada

In Canada, the living constitution is described under the living tree doctrine.

Unlike in the United States, the fact that the Canadian Constitution was intended from the outset to encompass unwritten conventions and legal principles is beyond question. For example, the text of the original constitution does not mention the office of Prime Minister and still fails to state that the Governor General always grants royal assent to bills. Principles such as democracy, the implied Bill of Rights, the rule of law, and judicial independence are held to derive in part from the preamble of the constitution, which declared the Canadian Constitution to be "similar in principle" to the British Constitution.

The concept of an evolving constitution has notably been applied to determine the division of powers between provinces and the federal government in areas of jurisdiction that were not contemplated at the time of enactment of the British North America Act. For example, authority over broadcasting has been held to fall within the federal "peace, order and good government" power.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in Re: Same-Sex Marriage (2004), held that the Canadian Parliament, as opposed to provincial legislatures, had the power to define marriage as including same-sex unions. It rejected claims that the constitutionally-enumerated federal authority in matters of "Marriage and Divorce" could not include same-sex marriage because the notion had not been conceived in 1867:

The "frozen concepts" reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life.

United Kingdom

It has been argued that a primary determinative factor in whether a legal system will develop a "living constitutional" framework is the ease with which constitutional amendments can be passed. With that view in mind, the British constitution could be considered a "living constitution" and requires only a simple majority vote to amend. It is also important to note that the British constitution not derive from a single written document. Therefore, its dependence on the important role of statute law and the influence of its own version of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom also make it a living constitution. For instance, after the World War II, human-rights based philosophy also became profoundly influential in creating a new international legal order, which the United Kingdom conformed with. It is also important to note the different levels to which the United Kingdom and the United States hold a living constitution, with the United States still referring to an original document that quite contrasts the United Kingdom's unwritten document.

India

The Constitution of India is considered to be a living and breathing document.

Skepticism in law

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Lady Justice is the symbol of the judiciary. Justice is depicted as a goddess equipped with three symbols of the rule of law: a sword symbolizing the court's coercive power; scales representing the weighing of competing claims; and a blindfold indicating impartiality.

Skepticism in law is a school of jurisprudence that was a reaction against the idea of natural law, and a response to the 'formalism' of legal positivists. Legal skepticism is sometimes known as legal realism.

According to Richard Posner, "The skeptical vein in American thinking about law runs from Holmes to the legal realists to the critical legal studies movement, while behind Holmes stretches a European skeptical legal tradition that runs from Thrasymachus (in Plato's Republic) to Hobbes and Bentham and beyond".

...men make their own laws; that these laws do not flow from some mysterious omnipresence in the sky, and that judges are not independent mouthpieces of the infinite.The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

Origin

Skepticism (American English and Canadian English) or scepticism (British English and Australian English) is a philosophical approach that includes a scientific method and a rejection of unevidenced claims to certainty. Skepticism has been known in various degrees. Pyrrho was the first philosopher who developed it to a high degree. Greek Sophist were also skeptics. Protagoras was a famous Greek Sophist. Greek Sophists were also law teachers.

Writing about the courts of Athenian democracy, Bertrand Russell states: "In general, there were a large number of judges to hear each case. The plaintiff and defendant, or prosecutor and accused, appeared in person, not through professional lawyers. Naturally, success or failure depended largely on oratorical skill in appealing to popular prejudices. Although a man had to deliver his own speech, he could hire an expert to write a speech for him, or, as many preferred, he could pay for instruction in the arts required for success in the law courts. These arts the Sophists were supposed to teach".

Stumpf writes about Sophists as, "It was their skepticism and relativism that made them suspect. No one would have criticized them for training lawyers, as they did, to be able to argue either side of a case" Philosophy, History & Problems, p. 30. American legal skeptics are influenced by 'pragmatism' of William James, Dr. John Dewey, and F.e.S. Schiller.

Bertrand Russell declares that William James's doctrine is "an attempt to build a superstructure of belief upon a foundation of scepticism". One of the three founders of pragmatism, Schiller, considered himself a disciple of Protagoras. These are the reasons for the preference of some people for the word 'skepticism'.

Early history

Mickey Dias writes: "a preliminary warning is needed against the tendency to imagine that there is anything like a 'school' of American realists. A difficulty in the way of a coherent presentation of their views is that there are varying versions of realism as well as changes of front; positions formerly defended with zest have since been forgotten or abandoned……. Judge Jerome Frank (1889–1957), a leading exponent preferred the phrases 'experimentalists' or 'constructive skeptics', He repudiated the charge that 'the realist school embraced fantastically inconsistent ideas' by pointing out that 'actually no such school existed'. The common bond is, in his words ,'skepticism as to some of the conventional legal theories, a skepticism stimulated by a zeal to reform, in the interests of justice, some court-house ways. ", With such zeal to reform, legal skeptics made a revolt against the formalism.

Lord Lloyd of Hamstead has described this revolt in a wider philosophical perspective as follows:

"In the nineteenth and at the beginning of the present century, laissez-faire was the dominant creed in America. This creed was associated, in the intellectual sphere, with a certain attachment to what has been called "formalism" in philosophy and the social sciences. This was marked by a reverence for the role of logic and mathematics and a priori reasoning as applied to philosophy, economics and jurisprudence, with but little urge to link these empirically to the facts of life. Yet empirical science and technology were increasing dominating American society and with this development arose and intellectual movement in favor of treating philosophy and the social sciences, and even logic itself, as empirical studies not rooted in abstract formalism. In America this movement was associated with such figures as William James and Dewey in philosophy and logic. Veblen in economics, Beard and Robinson in historical studies, and Mr. Justice Holmes in jurisprudence. It is important to note that this movement was especially hostile to the so-called British empirical school derived from Hume, and to which Jeremy Bentham, Austin and John Stuart Mill adhered. For while it is true that these thinkers were positivist and anti-metaphysical they were for the anti-formalists, not empirical enough, since they were associated with a priori reasoning not based on actual study of the facts, such as Mill's formal logic and his reliance on an abstract "economic man," Bentham's hedonic calculus of pleasures and pains, and the analytical approach to jurisprudence derived from Austin. They were particularly critical of the ahistorical approach of the English utilitarians. Nor, unlike the sociologists of Pound persuasion, were they interested to borrow from Bentham such abstract analyses of society as his doctrine of conflicting to emphasise was the need to enlarge knowledge empirically, and to relate it to the solution of the practical problems of man in society at the present day., 

The new movement in jurisprudence found philosophical support of 'Pragmatism'. The principal exponent of 'Pragmatism', William James, writes: "A pragmatist turns away from abstraction and insufficiencies, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards completeness and adequacy, towards facts, towards actions, towards powers...

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

This skeptical approach impressed Justice Holmes, who laid the foundation of healthy and constructive skepticism in the law. Hughes writes: "Though another half century was to elapse before the appearance of Ogden and Richard's The Meaning of Meaning, exploration of meaning of meaning of law was Holmes's pioneer enterprise. Hughes further writes: " To me, Mr. Justice Holmes is a prophet of the Law,

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was graduated from Harvard Law School in 1866, and opened a private law practice. He devoted most of his energies to legal scholarship. From 1870 to 1873 he served as editor of the American Law Review and taught constitutional law at Harvard.

In 1881, Holmes published The Common Law, representing a new departure in legal philosophy. He changed the attitude of the law through his writings. The opening sentence captures the pragmatic theme of that work and of Holmes's philosophy of law: "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. " As a justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was well known for the eloquence, pungency, and abundance of his dissenting opinions––so much so that he was called the "Great Dissenter." Holmes was appointed justice in 1902, and served the Court for thirty years. At that time, many state regulatory laws were being declared unconstitutional because the Court felt they did not conform to its concept of due process of law.

In a dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York (1905) Holmes declared that the law should develop along with society and that the 14th Amendment did not deny states a right to experiment with social legislation. He also argued for judicial restraint, asserting that the Court should not interpret the Constitution according to its own social philosophy. Speaking for a unanimous Court in Schenck v. United States (1919), however, he stated that judicial review was necessary in cases involving Freedom and Speech and presented the "clear and present danger" doctrine associated with his name. Francis Biddle writes: He was convinced that one who administers constitutional law should multiply his skepticisms to avoid heading into vague words like liberty, and reading into law his private convictions or the prejudices of his class.

According to Holmes, 'men make their own laws; that these laws do not flow from some mysterious omnipresence in the sky, and that these laws do not flow from some mysterious omnipresence in the sky, and that judges are not independent mouthpieces of the infinite. 'The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky'. Law should be viewed 'from the stance of the bad man'. 'The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law'. A judge must be aware of social facts. Only a judge or lawyer who is acquainted with the historical, social, and economic aspects of the law will be in a position to fulfill his functions properly.

As a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Holmes introduced a new method of constitutional interpretation. He challenged the traditional concept of constitution. Holmes also protested against the method of abstract logical deduction from general rules in the judicial process. According to Holmes, lawyers and judges are not logicians and mathematicians. The books of the laws are not books of logic and mathematics. He writes: "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, and even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.

The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics., 

In Lochner v. New York he observes that, 'General propositions do not decide concrete cases."

"General propositions do not decide concrete cases."

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

Holmes, also insisted on the separation of 'ought' and 'is' which are obstacles in understanding the realities of the law. As an ethical skeptic, Holmes tells us that if you want to know the real law, and nothing else, you must consider it from the point of view of 'bad man' who cares only from material consequences of the courts' decisions, and not from the point of view of good man, who find his reasons for conduct "in the vaguer sanctions of his conscience. The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and talks about rights and duties, malice, intent, and negligence- and nothing is easier in legal reasoning than to take these words in their moral sense. Holmes said: "I think our morally tinted words have caused a great deal of confused thinking. But Holmes is not unconcerned with moral question. He writes: "The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men. When I emphasize the difference between law and morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of learning and understanding the law.

Jerome Frank

Jerome New Frank followed Holmes skepticism, and made an elaborate system of legal skepticism. He considered himself to be 'a constructive skeptic'. He challenged the traditional conception that law consists of rules from which deductions are made. He called that conception a 'basic myth of law'. He argued that it is fruitless to seek such certainty, that the law is uncertain and that the law cannot be separated from decisions of the courts.

Frank argues that every legal controversy is unique and may not be decided by rigid universals and abstract generalizations. He calls those jurists who find legal uncertainty within the laws's formal rules 'Rule-skeptics', and those who find legal uncertainty arising from the nature of facts 'Fact-skeptics'. Dias writes: "Frank divided realists into two camps, described as 'rule skeptics' and 'fact skeptic'. The 'rule skeptics' rejected legal rules as providing uniformity in law, and tried instead to find uniformity in rules evolved out of psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, politics, etc. Hans Kelsen, it will be remembered, maintained that it is not possible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. The 'rule skeptics' avoided that criticism by saying that they were not deriving purposive 'oughts', but only predictions of judicial behaviour analogous to the laws of science. Frank called this brand realism the left-wing adherents of a right-wing traditions, namely, the tradition of trying to find uniformity in rules. They, too, had to account for uncertainty in the law on the basis of rule-uncertainty. The 'fact skeptics', among them Frank, rejected even this aspiration towards uniformity. So he abandoned all attempts to seek rule-certainty and pointed to the uncertainty of establishing even the facts in trial courts. These have to be established largely by witnesses, who are fallible and who may be lying. It is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty how fallible a particular witness is likely to be, or how persuasively he will lie. All persons, judges and jurymen alike, form different impressions of the dramas unfolded before them; an inflexion or a cough may awaken subconscious predilections, varied idiosyncrasies and prejudices. Eternal verities are not to be erected on such a basis. Frank alleged that all those who write on legal certainty, not excepting the 'rule skeptics', over look these difficulty. 'They often call their writings 'jurisprudence'; but as they almost never consider juries and jury-trials, one might chide them for forgetting jurisprudence. ", "For any particular lay person", Frank writes: "the law, with respect to any particular set of facts, is a decision of a court with respect to those facts so far as that decision affects that particular person. Until a court has passed on those facts no law on that subject is yet in existence.

Felix Frankfurter, who wrote book "Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court" published three years after the death of Holmes, observes in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. V. Browning that: "It would be a narrow conception of jurisprudence to confine the notion of 'laws' to what is found written on the statute books, and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon it."

It would be a narrow conception of jurisprudence to confine the notion of 'laws' to what is found written on the statute books, and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon it.

Justice Felix Frankfurter

Statutes and constitutions are inanimate object which cannot speak by themselves. John Chipman Gray, the great American Jurist, who reiterated Holmes's view, writes: "Statutes do not interpret themselves; their meaning is declared by the courts, and it is with the meaning declared by the courts, and with no other meaning, that they are imposed upon the community as law. He further writes: "It has been sometime said that the Law is composed of two parts,-legislative law and judge-made law, but, in truth all the Law is judge-made law. The shape in which a statute is imposed on the community as a guide for conduct is that statute as interpreted by the courts. The courts put life into the dead words of the statute. 339 To quote from Bishop Hoadly.......'Nay, whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is He who is truly the law Giver to all intents and purposes, and not who first who wrote and spoke them”.

Legal realism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Legal realism is a naturalistic approach to law; it is the view that jurisprudence should emulate the methods of natural science, i.e., rely on empirical evidence. Hypotheses must be tested against observations of the world.

Legal realists believe that legal science should only investigate law with the value-free methods of natural sciences, rather than through philosophical inquiries into the nature and meaning of the law that are separate and distinct from the law as it is actually practiced. Indeed, legal realism asserts that the law cannot be separated from its application, nor can it be understood outside of its application. As such, legal realism emphasizes law as it actually exists, rather than law as it ought to be. Locating the meaning of law in places such as legal opinions issued by judges and their deference or dismissal of past precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis, it stresses the importance of understanding the factors involved in judicial decision making. The United States of America is described as "home of the principal realist tradition in jurisprudence". In Scandinavia Axel Hägerström developed another realist tradition that was influential in European jurisprudential circles for most of the 20th century.

Overview

Legal realism is associated with American jurisprudence during the 1920s and 1930s, particularly among federal judges and lawyers within the Roosevelt administration. Notable jurists associated with legal realism include Felix Cohen, Morris Cohen, Arthur Corbin, Walter Wheeler Cook, Robert Hale, Wesley Hohfeld, Karl Llewellyn, Underhill Moore, Herman Oliphant and Warren Seavey, many of whom were associated with Yale Law School. As Keith Bybee argues, "legal realism exposed the role played by politics in judicial decision-making and, in doing so, called into question conventional efforts to anchor judicial power on a fixed, impartial foundation." Contemporary legal scholars working within the Law and Society tradition have expanded upon the foundations set by legal realism to postulate what has been referred to as new legal realism.

As a form of jurisprudence, legal realism is defined by its focus on the law as it actually exists in practice, rather than how it exists in books. To this end, it was primarily concerned with the actions of judges and the factors that influenced processes of judicial decision making. As Karl Llewellyn argues, “[b]ehind decisions stand judges; judges are men; as men they have human backgrounds.” The law, therefore, did not exist in a metaphysical realm of fundamental rules or principles, but was inseparable from human action and the power of judges to determine the law. In order to understand the decisions and actions of legal actors, legal realists turned to the ideas of the social sciences in order to understand the human behavior and relationships that culminated in a given legal outcome.

American legal realists believe that there is more to adjudication than the "mechanical" application of known legal principles to uncontroversial fact-finding in line with the arguments of legal formalism. Some realists believe that one can never be sure that the facts and law identified in the judge's reasons were the actual reasons for the judgment, whereas other realists accept that a judge's reasons can often be relied upon, but not always. Realists believe that the legal principles that legal formalism treats as uncontroversial actually hide contentious political and moral choices.

Due to their value-free approach, legal realists oppose natural law traditions. Legal realists contend that these traditions are historical and social phenomena and should be explained by psychological and sociological hypotheses, conceiving of legal phenomena as determined by human behavior that should be investigated empirically, rather than according to theoretical assumptions about the law. As a result, legal realism stands in opposition to most versions of legal positivism.

Realism was treated as a conceptual claim for much of the late 20th century due to H. L. A. Hart's misunderstanding of the theory. Hart was an analytical legal philosopher who was interested in the conceptual analysis of concepts such as "law." This entailed identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the concept of "law." When realists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. pointed out that individuals embroiled in the legal system generally wanted to know what was going to happen, Hart assumed that they were offering the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the concept of "law." Nowadays, legal theorists tend to recognize that the realists and the conceptual lawyers were interested in different questions. Realists are interested in methods of predicting judges' decisions with more accuracy, whereas conceptual lawyers are interested in the correct use of legal concepts.

Legal realism was primarily a reaction to the legal formalism of the late 19th century and early 20th century and was the dominant approach for much of the early 20th century. It succeeded in its negative aspiration of casting doubt upon formalist assumptions that judges always did what they said, so that it is often said that "we are all realists now." However, realism failed in its positive aspiration of discovering a better way of predicting how judges would behave than relying on the reasons given by judges.

A theory of law and legal reasoning that arose in the early decades of the twentieth century is broadly characterized by the claim that law can be best understood by focusing on what judges actually do in deciding cases, rather than on what they say they are doing. The central target of legal realism was legal formalism: the classical view that judges don't make law, but mechanically apply it by logically deducing uniquely correct legal conclusions from a set of clear, consistent, and comprehensive legal rules. American legal realism has aptly been described as "the most important indigenous jurisprudential movement in the United States during the twentieth century".

Forerunners

Although the American legal realist movement first emerged as a cohesive intellectual force in the 1920s, it drew heavily upon a number of prior thinkers and was influenced by broader cultural forces. In the early years of the twentieth century, formalist approaches to the law had been forcefully criticized by thinkers such as Roscoe Pound, John Chipman Gray, and Benjamin Cardozo. Philosophers such as John Dewey had held up empirical science as a model of all intelligent inquiry, and argued that law should be seen as a practical instrument for advancing human welfare. Outside the realm of law, in fields such as economics and history, there was a general "revolt against formalism," a reaction in favor of more empirical ways of doing philosophy and the human sciences. But by far the most important intellectual influence on the legal realists was the thought of the American jurist and Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.

Holmes is a towering figure in American legal thought for many reasons, but what the realists drew most from Holmes was his famous prediction theory of law, his utilitarian approach to legal reasoning, and his "realist" insistence that judges, in deciding cases, are not simply deducing legal conclusions with inexorable, machine-like logic, but are influenced by ideas of fairness, public policy, prejudices, and experience. In the opening paragraph of The Common Law, he wrote:

The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, and even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.

All these themes can be found in Holmes's famous 1897 essay, "The Path of the Law". There Holmes attacks formalist approaches to judicial decision-making and states a pragmatic definition of law: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law". If law is prophecy, Holmes continues, we must reject the view of "text writers" who tell us that law "is something different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts or England, that it is a system of reason that is a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not coincide with the decisions".

Holmes next introduces his most important and influential argument, the "bad-man" theory of law: "[I]f we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws" about either the morality or the logic of the law. For the bad man, "legal duty" signifies only "a prophecy that if he does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment". The bad man cares nothing for legal theorizing and concerns himself only with practical consequences. In the spirit of pragmatism, Holmes suggests that this is a useful way of laying bare the true meaning of legal concepts.

The utilitarian or instrumentalist flavor of "The Path of the Law" also found favor with the realists. The purpose of the law, Holmes insisted, was the deterrence of undesirable social consequences: "I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage." Before the Civil War, this conception of adjudication as a form of social engineering had been widely shared by American judges, but in the late nineteenth century it had fallen out of favor. One of the aspirations of both Holmes and the realists was to revive it. For example, in his dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, Holmes wrote, "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign ... that can be identified," thereby arguing in favor of a pragmatic and more realistic approach to judicial interpretation of common law.

Key themes

Drawing upon Holmes and other critics of legal formalism, a number of iconoclastic legal scholars launched the legal realist movement in the 1920s and 30s. Among the leading legal realists were Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Herman Oliphant, Underhill Moore, Walter Wheeler Cook, Leon Green, and Felix Cohen. Two American law schools, Yale and Columbia, were hotbeds of realist thought. Realism was a mood more than it was a cohesive movement, but it is possible to identify a number of common themes. These include:

  • A distrust of the judicial technique of seeming to deduce legal conclusions from so-called rules of law. The realists believed that judges neither do nor should decide cases formalistically. Law is not, as the formalists claimed, a system of rules that is clear, consistent, and complete. Rather, the law is riddled with ambiguities, contradictions, gaps, vague terms, and conflicting rules of interpretation. As a result, there is often (perhaps always) no uniquely correct answer to any hard case that appellate judges decide. Law is incurably "indeterminate".
  • A belief in the instrumental nature of the law. Like Dewey and Pound, the realists believed that law does and should serve social ends. Judges unavoidably take account of considerations of fairness and public policy, and they are right to do so.
  • A desire to separate legal from moral elements in the law. The realists were legal positivists who believed that law should be treated scientifically. A clear distinction should be drawn between what the law is and what it should be. Law can only be viewed as an empirical science, as it ought to be, if moralistic notions are either excluded or are translated into empirically verifiable terms. The idea that legal talk of "duty", "right", etc. is really just talk about how judges are likely to decide cases, is a clear example of how many realists tried to purge law of moralistic language and translate everything into "realistic" talk of actual consequences and testable predictions.

Criticisms

Legal realism had its heyday from the 1920s to the 1940s. In the 1950s, legal realism was largely supplanted by the legal process movement, which viewed law as a process of "reasoned elaboration" and claimed that appeals to "legislative purpose" and other well-established legal norms could provide objectively correct answers to most legal questions. In his 1961 book The Concept of Law, British legal theorist H. L. A. Hart dealt what many scholars saw as a "decisive blow" to legal realism, by attacking the predictive theory of law that many realists had taken over from Holmes. Hart pointed out that if a law is just a prediction of what courts will do, a judge pondering the legal merits of a case before him is really asking, "How will I decide this case?" As Hart notes, this completely misses the fact that judges use legal rules to guide their decisions, not as data to predict their eventual holdings.

Many critics have claimed that the realists exaggerated the extent to which law is "riddled" with gaps, contradictions, and so forth. The fact that most legal questions have simple, clear-cut answers that no lawyer or judge would dispute is difficult to square with the realists' strong claims of pervasive legal "indeterminacy". Other critics, such as Ronald Dworkin and Lon Fuller, have faulted legal realists for their attempt to sharply separate law and morality.

Influence and continuing relevance

Though many aspects of legal realism are now seen as exaggerated or outdated, most legal theorists would agree that the realists were successful in their central ambition: to refute "formalist" or "mechanical" notions of law and legal reasoning. It is widely accepted today that law is not, and cannot be, an exact science, and that it is important to examine what judges are actually doing in deciding cases, not merely what they say they are doing. As ongoing debates about judicial activism and judicial restraint attest, legal scholars continue to disagree about when, if ever, it is legitimate for judges to "make law", as opposed to merely "following" or "applying" existing law. But few would disagree with the realists' core claim that judges (for good or ill) are often strongly influenced by their political beliefs, their personal values, their individual personalities, and other extra-legal factors.

Legal realism and the European Court of Human Rights

A statistical natural language processing method has been applied to automatically predict the outcome of cases tried by the European Court of Human Rights (violation or no violation of a specific article) based on their textual contents, reaching a prediction accuracy of 79%. A subsequent qualitative analysis of these results provided some support towards the theory of legal realism. The authors write: "In general, and notwithstanding the simplified snapshot of a very complex debate that we just presented, our results could be understood as lending some support to the basic legal realist intuition according to which judges are primarily responsive to non-legal, rather than to legal, reasons when they decide hard cases."

Substantive due process

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Substantive due process is a principle in United States constitutional law that allows courts to establish and protect certain fundamental rights from government interference, even if only procedural protections are present or the rights are unenumerated elsewhere in the U.S. Constitution. Courts have asserted that such protections come from the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibit the federal and state governments, respectively, from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law". Substantive due process demarks the line between those acts that courts hold to be subject to government regulation or legislation and those that courts place beyond the reach of governmental interference. Whether the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments were intended to serve that function continues to be a matter of scholarly as well as judicial discussion and dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas has called on the Supreme Court to reconsider all of its rulings that were based on substantive due process.

Substantive due process is to be distinguished from procedural due process. The distinction arises from the words "of law" in the phrase "due process of law". Procedural due process protects individuals from the coercive power of government by ensuring that adjudication processes, under valid laws, are fair and impartial. Such protections, for example, include sufficient and timely notice of why a party is required to appear before a court or other governmental body, the right to an impartial trier of fact and trier of law, and the right to give testimony and present relevant evidence at hearings. In contrast, substantive due process protects individuals against majoritarian policy enactments that exceed the limits of governmental authority: courts may find that a majority's enactment is not law and cannot be enforced as such, regardless of whether the processes of enactment and enforcement were actually fair.

The term was first used explicitly in 1930s legal casebooks as a categorical distinction of selected due process cases, and by 1952 had been mentioned twice in Supreme Court opinions. The term "substantive due process" itself is commonly used in two ways: to identify a particular line of case law and to signify a particular political attitude toward judicial review under the two due process clauses.

Much substantive due process litigation involves legal challenges about unenumerated rights that seek particular outcomes instead of merely contesting procedures and their effects. In successful cases, the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutionally based liberty and considers laws that seek to limit that liberty to be unenforceable or limited in scope. Critics of substantive due process decisions usually assert that there is no textual basis in the U.S. Constitution for such protection and that such liberties should be left under the purview of the more politically accountable branches of government.

Conceptual basics

The courts have viewed the Due Process Clause and sometimes other clauses of the Constitution as embracing the fundamental rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty". The rights have not been clearly identified and the Supreme Court's authority to enforce the unenumerated rights is unclear. Some of the rights have been said to be "deeply rooted" in American history and tradition; that phrase was used for rights related to the institution of the family.

The courts have largely abandoned the Lochner era approach (c. 1897–1937), when substantive due process was used to strike down minimum wage and labor laws to protect freedom of contract. Since then, the Supreme Court has decided that numerous other freedoms, even if they are not in the text of the Constitution, are protected by it. If they were not protected by the federal courts' doctrine of substantive due process, they could nevertheless be protected in other ways; for example, some rights are protected by other provisions of the state or federal constitutions or by legislatures.

Today, the Supreme Court provides special protection for three types of rights under substantive due process in the Fourteenth Amendment – an approach which originated in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), footnote 4:

  • Rights enumerated in and derived from the first eight amendments to the Constitution
  • The right to participate in the political process, such as the rights of voting, association, and free speech
  • The rights of "discrete and insular minorities"

The Supreme Court usually looks first to see whether the right is a fundamental right by examining whether it is deeply rooted in American history and traditions. If the right is not a fundamental right, the court applies a rational basis test: if the violation of the right can be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, the law is then held valid. If the court establishes that the right being violated is a fundamental right, it applies strict scrutiny and asks whether the law is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and whether the law is narrowly tailored to address that interest.

History of jurisprudence

Early in American judicial history, various jurists attempted to form theories of natural rights and natural justice to limit the power of government, especially on property and the rights of persons. Opposing "vested rights" were other jurists, who argued that the written constitution was the supreme law of the State and that judicial review could look only to that document, not to the "unwritten law" of "natural rights". Opponents also argued that the "police power" of government allowed legislatures to regulate the holding of property in the public interest, subject only to specific prohibitions of the written constitution.

Early origins

The phrase substantive due process was not used until the 20th century, but the concept was arguably employed in the 19th century. The idea was a way to import natural law norms into the Constitution; prior to the American Civil War, the state courts, then exempted from the Fifth Amendment, were the places in which the struggle was carried out. Critics of substantive due process claim that the doctrine began, at the federal level, with the infamous 1857 slavery case of Dred Scott v. Sandford. Advocates of substantive due process acknowledge that the doctrine was employed in Dred Scott but claim that it was employed incorrectly. Indeed, abolitionists and others argued that both before and after Dred Scott, the Due Process Clause actually prohibited the federal government from recognizing slavery. Also, the first appearance of substantive due process, as a concept, had appeared in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852).

The "vested rights" jurists saw the "law of the land" and "due process" clauses of state constitutions as restrictions on the substantive content of legislation. They were sometimes successful in arguing that certain government infringements were prohibited, regardless of procedure. For example, in 1856, the New York Court of Appeals held in Wynehamer v. New York that "without 'due process of law', no act of legislation can deprive a man of his property, and that in civil cases an act of the legislature alone is wholly inoperative to take from a man his property". However, the rationale of Wynehamer was subsequently rejected, in 1887, by the U.S. Supreme Court. Other antebellum cases on due process include Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., which dealt with procedural due process, but the rationale of Murray was subsequently characterized by the Supreme Court, in the case of Hurtado v. California, as not providing "an indispensable test" of due process.

Another important pre-Civil War milestone in the history of due process was Daniel Webster's argument to the Supreme Court as counsel in Dartmouth College v. Woodward that the Due Process Clause forbids bills of attainder and various other types of bad legislation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court declined in the case to address that aspect of Webster's argument, the New Hampshire Supreme Court having already rejected it.

Roger Taney, in his Dred Scott opinion, pronounced without elaboration that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional because an "act of Congress that deprived a citizen of his liberty or property merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law". In the case, neither Taney nor the dissenting Benjamin Robbins Curtis mentioned or relied upon the Court's previous discussion of due process in Murray, and Curtis disagreed with Taney about what "due process" meant.

Lochner era

Following the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause prompted substantive due process interpretations to be urged on the Supreme Court as a limitation on state legislation. Initially, however, the Supreme Court rejected substantive due process as it came to be understood, including in the seminal Slaughter-House Cases. Beginning in the 1870s through the late 1880s, the Supreme Court hinted in dicta that various state statutes challenged under a different constitutional provision may have been invalidated under the due process clause. The first case to invalidate a state government economic regulation under this theory was Allgeyer v. Louisiana in 1897 which interpreted the word "liberty" in the due process clause to mean economic liberty. The Supreme Court would go on to impose on both federal and state legislation a firm judicial hand on property and economics right until the Great Depression in the 1930s.

The Court typically invalidated statutes during the Lochner era (named after Lochner v. New York) by declaring the statutes in violation of the right to contract. The Court invalidated state laws prohibiting employers from insisting, as a condition of employment, that their employees agree not to join a union. The Court also declared a state minimum wage law for women unconstitutional. Because many of the first applications protected the rights of corporations and employers to be free of governmental regulation, substantive due process has been charged to have developed as a consequence of the Court's desire to accommodate 19th-century railroads and trusts.

Later development

The end of the Lochner era came in 1937 with the Supreme Court's holding in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish. In that case, the Court upheld the state of Washington's "Minimum Wages for Women" act, reasoning that the Constitution permitted the restriction of liberty of contract by state law where such restriction protected the community, health and safety, or vulnerable groups.

Although economic due process restrictions on legislation were largely abandoned by the courts, substantive due process rights continue to be successfully asserted today in non-economic legislation that affects intimate issues like bodily integrity, marriage, religion, childbirth, child-rearing, and sexuality.

Privacy, which is not mentioned in the Constitution, was at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut, when the Court held, in 1965, that criminal prohibition of contraceptive devices for married couples violated federal, judicially enforceable privacy rights. The right to contraceptives was found in what the Court called the "penumbras", or shadow edges, of certain amendments that arguably refer to certain privacy rights, such as the First Amendment, which protects freedom of expression; the Third Amendment, which protects homes from being taken for use by soldiers; and the Fourth Amendment, which provides security against unreasonable searches. The penumbra-based rationale of Griswold has since been discarded; the Supreme Court now uses the Due Process Clause as a basis for various unenumerated privacy rights, as John Marshall Harlan II had argued in his concurring Griswold opinion, instead of relying on the "penumbras" and "emanations" of the Bill of Rights, as the majority opinion did in Griswold.

Although it has never been the majority view, some have argued that the Ninth Amendment, on unenumerated rights, could be used as a source of fundamental judicially enforceable rights, including a general right to privacy, as discussed by Arthur Goldberg in concurring in Griswold.

The Supreme Court also recognized a substantive due process right "to control the education of one's children", thus voiding state laws mandating for all students to attend public school. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court said in 1925:

We think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.

Some justices have argued, however, that a substantive due process claim may not be necessary in cases of this type, as it is possible for those laws to be deemed to violate "First Amendment principles" as well. Justice Anthony Kennedy speculated in the 2000 case of Troxel v. Granville that current Supreme Court doctrine prohibits the judiciary from using the Due Process Clause instead of an applicable specific constitutional provision if one is available.

The right to marry a person of a different race was addressed in Loving v. Virginia, in which the Court said, in 1967, that its decision striking down anti-miscegenation laws could be justified either by substantive due process, or by the Equal Protection Clause. The unconstitutionality of bans on and refusals to recognize same-sex marriage was decided partly on substantive due process grounds by Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015. A right to have children was addressed in Skinner v. Oklahoma, but the Court in Skinner, in 1942, explicitly declined to base its decision on due process but instead cited the Equal Protection Clause since the Oklahoma law required sterilization of some three-time felons but not others. A substantive due process right of a parent to educate a young child (before ninth grade) in a foreign language was recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska, in 1923, with two justices dissenting, and Justice Kennedy has mentioned that Meyer might be decided on different grounds in modern times. Laws that "shock the conscience" of the Court were generally deemed unconstitutional, in 1952, in Rochin v. California, but in concurring, Justices Black and Douglas argued that pumping a defendant's stomach for evidence should have been deemed unconstitutional on the narrower ground that it violates the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination. The Court, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, in 1975, said that due process is violated by confining a nondangerous mentally ill person who is capable of surviving safely in freedom. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion was that such confinement may also amount to "punishment" for being mentally ill, violating the Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in Robinson v. California. Freedom from excessive punitive damages was deemed to be a due process right in BMW v. Gore, in 1996, but four justices disagreed. The Court, in Cruzan v. Missouri, decided, in 1990, that due process is not violated if a state applies "a clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state".

In 2022, the Court declared that the right to an abortion is not deeply rooted in the nation’s history, and therefore is not among unenumerated rights in the constitution by virtue of the Due Process clause.

Criticisms

Criticisms of the doctrine continue as before. Critics argue that judges are making determinations of policy and morality that properly belong with legislators ("legislating from the bench"), that they are reading doctrines and principles into the Constitution that are not expressed in or implied by the document, or that they are claiming power to expand the liberty of some people at the expense of other people's liberty (such as in Dred Scott v. Sandford).

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., a proponent of legal realism, worried that the Court was overstepping its boundaries and wrote, in 1930, in one of his last dissents:

I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions. Yet I can think of no narrower reason that seems to me to justify the present and the earlier decisions to which I have referred. Of course the words due process of law, if taken in their literal meaning, have no application to this case; and while it is too late to deny that they have been given a much more extended and artificial signification, still we ought to remember the great caution shown by the Constitution in limiting the power of the States, and should be slow to construe the clause in the Fourteenth Amendment as committing to the Court, with no guide but the Court's own discretion, the validity of whatever laws the States may pass.

Originalists, such as Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas, who rejects the substantive due process doctrine, and Antonin Scalia, who also questioned the legitimacy of the doctrine, have called substantive due process a "judicial usurpation" or an "oxymoron". Both Scalia and Thomas occasionally joined Court opinions that mention the doctrine and, in their dissents, often argued over how substantive due process should be employed based on Court precedent.

Many non-originalists, like Justice Byron White, have also been critical of substantive due process. As propounded in his dissents in Moore v. East Cleveland and Roe v. Wade, as well as his majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, White argued that the doctrine of substantive due process gives the judiciary too much power over the governance of the nation and takes away such power from the elected branches of government. He argued that the fact that the Court has created new substantive rights in the past should not lead it to "repeat the process at will". In his book Democracy and Distrust, non-originalist John Hart Ely criticized "substantive due process" as a glaring non sequitur. Ely argued the phrase was both a contradiction in terms, like the phrase green pastel redness, and radically undemocratic by allowing judges to impose substantive values on the political process. Ely argued that the courts should serve to reinforce the democratic process, not to displace the substantive value choices of the people's elected representatives.

The current majority view of the Supreme Court supports substantive due process rights in a number of areas. An alternative to strict originalist theory is advocated by former Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, one of the Court's supporters of substantive due process rights. Breyer believes the justices need to look at cases in light of how their decisions will promote what he calls "active liberty", the Constitution's aim of promoting participation by citizens in the processes of government. That is an approach that ostensibly emphasizes "the document's underlying values" and a broad look at a law's purpose and consequences. Critics charge that such an approach would also give judges the ability to look very broadly at the consequences and unwritten purpose of constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process Clause, thus removing issues from the democratic process.

Originalism is usually linked to opposition against substantive due process rights, and the reasons can be found in the following explanation that was endorsed unanimously by the Supreme Court in the 1985 case University of Michigan v. Ewing: "we must always bear in mind that the substantive content of the [Due Process] Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by preconstitutional history; that content is nothing more than the accumulated product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."

Originalists do not necessarily oppose protection of rights protected by substantive due process. Most originalists believe that such rights should be identified and protected legislatively or by further constitutional amendments or other existing provisions of the Constitution. For example, some substantive due process liberties may be protectable according to the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most originalists believe that rights should be identified and protected by the majority legislatively or, if legislatures lack the power, by constitutional amendments.

The original perceived scope of the Due Process Clause was different from the one in use today. For instance, even though many of the Framers of the Bill of Rights believed that slavery violated the fundamental natural rights of African Americans, legal scholar Robert Cover argued in 1975 that a "theory that declared slavery to be a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment ... requires nothing more than a suspension of reason concerning the origin, intent, and past interpretation of the clause". The Thirteenth Amendment ultimately abolished slavery and removed the federal judiciary from the business of returning fugitive slaves. Until then, it was "scarcely questioned" (as Abraham Lincoln put it) that the Constitution "was intended by those who made it, for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the law-giver is the law".

Judicial review

When a law or other act of government is challenged as a violation of individual liberty under the Due Process Clause, courts now use two forms of scrutiny or judicial review. The inquiry balances the importance of the governmental interest being served and the appropriateness of the method of implementation against the resulting infringement of individual rights. If the governmental action infringes upon a fundamental right, the highest level of review, strict scrutiny, is used. To pass strict scrutiny, the law or the act must be both narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.

If the governmental restriction restricts liberty in a manner that does not implicate a fundamental right, rational basis review is used, which determines whether a law or act is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The government's goal must be something that it is acceptable for the government to pursue. The legislation must use reasonable means to the government's goals but not necessarily the best. Under a rational basis test, the burden of proof is on the challenger so laws are rarely overturned by a rational basis test.

There is also a middle level of scrutiny, called intermediate scrutiny, but it is used primarily in Equal Protection cases, rather than in Due Process cases: "The standards of intermediate scrutiny have yet to make an appearance in a due process case." To pass intermediate scrutiny, the challenged law must further an important government interest by means that are substantially related to that interest.

Samaritans

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