Prehistory of nakedness and clothing

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prehistory_of_nakedness_and_clothing

 

Main article: Nudity

Of the many characteristics of humans, nakedness and clothing are highly related. The loss of body hair distinguishes humans from other primates. The current evidence indicates that anatomically modern humans were naked in prehistory for at least 90,000 years before the invention of clothing. Today, isolated Indigenous peoples in tropical climates continue to be without clothing in many everyday activities.

Evolution of hairlessness

Humans' closest living relatives have both extensive areas of fur and also bare patches

The general hairlessness of humans in comparison to related species may be due to loss of functionality in the pseudogene KRTHAP1 (which helps produce keratin) in the human lineage about 240,000 years ago. On an individual basis, mutations in the gene HR can lead to complete hair loss, though this is not typical in humans. Humans may also lose their hair as a result of hormonal imbalance due to drugs or pregnancy.

In order to comprehend why humans have significantly less body hair than other primates, one must understand that mammalian body hair is not merely an aesthetic characteristic; it protects the skin from wounds, bites, heat, cold, and UV radiation. Additionally, it can be used as a communication tool and as a camouflage.

The first member of the genus homo to be hairless was Homo erectus, originating about 1.6 million years ago. The dissipation of body heat remains the most widely accepted evolutionary explanation for the loss of body hair in early members of the genus homo, the surviving member of which is modern humans. Less hair, and an increase in sweat glands, made it easier for their bodies to cool when they moved from living in shady forest to open savanna. This change in environment also resulted in a change in diet, from largely vegetarian to hunting. Pursuing game on the savanna also increased the need for regulation of body heat.

Anthropologist and paleo-biologist Nina Jablonski posits that the ability to dissipate excess body heat through eccrine sweating helped make possible the dramatic enlargement of the brain, the most temperature-sensitive human organ. Thus the loss of fur was also a factor in further adaptations, both physical and behavioral, that differentiated humans from other primates. Some of these changes are thought to be the result of sexual selection. By selecting more hairless mates, humans accelerated changes initiated by natural selection. Sexual selection may also account for the remaining human hair in the pubic area and armpits, which are sites for pheromones, while hair on the head continued to provide protection from the sun. Anatomically modern humans, whose traits include hairlessness, evolved 260,000 to 350,000 years ago.

Phenotypic changes

Humans are the only primate species that have undergone significant hair loss and of the approximately 5000 extant species of mammal, only a handful are effectively hairless. This list includes elephants, rhinoceroses, hippopotamuses, walruses, some species of pigs, whales and other cetaceans, and naked mole rats. Most mammals have light skin that is covered by fur, and biologists believe that early human ancestors started out this way also. Dark skin probably evolved after humans lost their body fur, because the naked skin was vulnerable to the strong UV radiation as explained in the Out of Africa hypothesis. Therefore, evidence of the time when human skin darkened has been used to date the loss of human body hair, assuming that the dark skin was needed after the fur was gone.

With the loss of fur, darker, high-melanin skin evolved as a protection from ultraviolet radiation damage. As humans migrated outside of the tropics, varying degrees of depigmentation evolved in order to permit UVB-induced synthesis of previtamin D₃. The relative lightness of female compared to male skin in a given population may be due to the greater need for women to produce more vitamin D during lactation.

The sweat glands in humans could have evolved to spread from the hands and feet as the body hair changed, or the hair change could have occurred to facilitate sweating. Horses and humans are two of the few animals capable of sweating on most of their body, yet horses are larger and still have fully developed fur. In humans, the skin hairs lie flat in hot conditions, as the arrector pili muscles relax, preventing heat from being trapped by a layer of still air between the hairs, and increasing heat loss by convection.

Sexual selection hypothesis

Another hypothesis for the thick body hair on humans proposes that Fisherian runaway sexual selection played a role (as well as in the selection of long head hair), (see terminal and vellus hair), as well as a much larger role of testosterone in men. Sexual selection is the only theory thus far that explains the sexual dimorphism seen in the hair patterns of men and women. On average, men have more body hair than women. Males have more terminal hair, especially on the face, chest, abdomen, and back, and females have more vellus hair, which is less visible. The halting of hair development at a juvenile stage, vellus hair, would also be consistent with the neoteny evident in humans, especially in females, and thus they could have occurred at the same time. This theory, however, has significant holdings in today's cultural norms. There is no evidence that sexual selection would proceed to such a drastic extent over a million years ago when a full, lush coat of hair would most likely indicate health and would therefore be more likely to be selected for, not against.

Water-dwelling hypothesis

The aquatic ape hypothesis (AAH) includes hair loss as one of several characteristics of modern humans that could indicate adaptations to an aquatic environment. Serious consideration may be given by contemporary anthropologists to some hypotheses related to AAH, but hair loss is not one of them.

Parasite hypothesis

A divergent explanation of humans' relative hairlessness holds that ectoparasites (such as ticks) residing in fur became problematic as humans became hunters living in larger groups with a "home base". Nakedness would also make the lack of parasites apparent to prospective mates. However, this theory is inconsistent with the abundance of parasites that continue to exist in the remaining patches of human hair.

The "ectoparasite" explanation of modern human nakedness is based on the principle that a hairless primate would harbor fewer parasites. When our ancestors adopted group-dwelling social arrangements roughly 1.8 mya, ectoparasite loads increased dramatically. Early humans became the only one of the 193 primate species to have fleas, which can be attributed to the close living arrangements of large groups of individuals. While primate species have communal sleeping arrangements, these groups are always on the move and thus are less likely to harbor ectoparasites.

It was expected that dating the split of the ancestral human louse into two species, the head louse and the pubic louse, would date the loss of body hair in human ancestors. However, it turned out that the human pubic louse does not descend from the ancestral human louse, but from the gorilla louse, diverging 3.3 million years ago. This suggests that humans had lost body hair (but retained head hair) and developed thick pubic hair prior to this date, were living in or close to the forest where gorillas lived, and acquired pubic lice from butchering gorillas or sleeping in their nests. The evolution of the body louse from the head louse, on the other hand, places the date of clothing much later, some 100,000 years ago.

Fire hypothesis

Another hypothesis is that humans' use of fire caused or initiated the reduction in human hair.

Childrearing hypothesis

Another view is proposed by James Giles, who attempts to explain hairlessness as evolved from the relationship between mother and child, and as a consequence of bipedalism. Giles also connects romantic love to hairlessness.

The last common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees was only partially bipedal, often using their front legs for locomotion. Other primate mothers do not need to carry their young because there is fur for them to cling to, but the loss of fur encouraged full bipedalism, allowing the mothers to carry their babies with one or both hands. The combination of hairlessness and upright posture may also explain the enlargement of the female breasts as a sexual signal. Another theory is that the loss of fur also promoted mother-child attachment based upon the pleasure of skin-to-skin contact. This may explain the more extensive hairlessness of female humans compared to males. Nakedness also affects sexual relationships as well, the duration of human intercourse being many times the duration of any other primates.

Origin of clothing

Main article: History of clothing and textiles

See also: Body modification

A necklace reconstructed from perforated sea snail shells from Upper Palaeolithic Europe, dated between 39,000 and 25,000 BCE. The practice of body adornment is associated with the emergence of behavioral modernity.

The current empirical evidence for the origin of clothing is from a 2010 study published in Molecular Biology and Evolution. That study indicates that the habitual wearing of clothing began at some point in time between 83,000 years ago and 170,000 years ago based upon a genetic analysis indicating when clothing lice diverged from their head louse ancestors. This information suggests that the use of clothing likely originated with anatomically modern humans in Africa prior to their migration to colder climates, allowing them to do so.

Some of the technology for what is now called clothing may have originated to make other types of adornment, including jewelry, body paint, tattoos, and other body modifications, "dressing" the naked body without concealing it. According to Mark Leary and Nicole R. Buttermore, body adornment is one of the changes that occurred in the late Paleolithic (40,000 to 60,000 years ago) in which humans became not only anatomically modern, but also behaviorally modern and capable of self-reflection and symbolic interaction. More recent studies place the use of adornment at 77,000 years ago in South Africa, and 90,000—100,000 years ago in Israel and Algeria. While modesty may be a factor, often overlooked purposes for body coverings are camouflage used by hunters, body armor, and costumes used to impersonate "spirit-beings".

The origin of complex, fitted clothing required the invention of fine stone knives for cutting skins into pieces, and the eyed needle for sewing. This was done by Cro-Magnons, who migrated to Europe around 35,000 years ago. The Neanderthal occupied the same region, but became extinct in part because they could not make fitted garments, but draped themselves with crudely cut skins—based upon their simple stone tools—which did not provide the warmth needed to survive as the climate grew colder in the Last Glacial Period. In addition to being less functional, the simple wrappings would not have been habitually worn by Neanderthal due to their being more cold-tolerant than Homo sapiens, and would not have acquired the secondary functions of decoration and promoting modesty.

The earliest archeological evidence of fabric clothing is inferred from representations in figurines in the southern Levant dated between 11,700 and 10,500 years ago. The surviving examples of woven cloth are linen from Egypt dated 5,000 BCE, although knotted or twisted flax fibers have been found as early as 7000 BCE.

While adults are rarely completely naked in modern societies, covering at least their genitals, adornments and clothing often emphasize, enhance, or otherwise call attention to the sexuality of the body.

Surface modification of biomaterials with proteins

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surface_modification_of_biomaterials_with_proteins

Protein patterning – chessboard pattern

Biomaterials are materials that are used in contact with biological systems. Biocompatibility and applicability of surface modification with current uses of metallic, polymeric and ceramic biomaterials allow alteration of properties to enhance performance in a biological environment while retaining bulk properties of the desired device.

Surface modification involves the fundamentals of physicochemical interactions between the biomaterial and the physiological environment at the molecular, cellular and tissue levels (reduce bacterial adhesion, promote cell adhesion). Currently, there are various methods of characterization and surface modification of biomaterials and useful applications of fundamental concepts in several biomedical solutions.

Function

The function of surface modification is to change the physical and chemical properties of surfaces to improve the functionality of the original material. Protein surface modification of various types biomaterials (ceramics, polymers, metals, composites) is performed to ultimately increase biocompatibility of the material and interact as a bioactive material for specific applications. In various biomedical applications of developing implantable medical devices (such as pacemakers and stents), surface properties/interactions of proteins with a specific material must be evaluated with regards to biocompatibility as it plays a major role in determining a biological response. For instance, surface hydrophobicity or hydrophilicity of a material can be altered. Engineering biocompatibility between the physiological environment and the surface material allows new medical products, materials and surgical procedures with additional biofunctionality.

Surface modification can be done through various methods, which can be classified through three main groups: physical (physical adsorption, Langmuir blodgett film), chemical (oxidation by strong acids, ozone treatment, chemisorption, and flame treatment) and radiation (glow discharge, corona discharge, photo activation (UV), laser, ion beam, plasma immersion ion implantation, electron beam lithography, and γ-irradiation).

Biocompatibility

In a biomedical perspective, biocompatibility is the ability of a material to perform with an appropriate host response in a specific application. It is described to be non-toxic, no induced adverse reactions such as chronic inflammatory response with unusual tissue formation, and designed to function properly for a reasonable lifetime. It is a requirement of biomaterials in which the surface modified material will cause no harm to the host, and the material itself will not harmed by the host. Although most synthetic biomaterials have the physical properties that meet or even exceed those of natural tissue, they often result in an unfavorable physiological reaction such as thrombosis formation, inflammation and infection.

Biointegration is the ultimate goal in for example orthopedic implants that bones establish a mechanically solid interface with complete fusion between the artificial implanted material and bone tissues under good biocompatibility conditions. Modifying the surface of a material can improve its biocompatibility, and can be done without changing its bulk properties. The properties of the uppermost molecular layers are critical in biomaterials since the surface layers are in physicochemical contact with the biological environment.

Furthermore, although some of the biomaterials have good biocompatibility, it may possess poor mechanical or physical properties such as wear resistance, anti-corrosion, or wettability or lubricity. In these cases, surface modification is utilized to deposit a layer of coating or mixing with substrate to form a composite layer.

Cell adhesion

As proteins are made up of different sequences of amino acids, proteins can have various functions as its structural shape driven by a number of molecular bonds can change. Amino acids exhibit different characteristics such as being polar, non-polar, positively or negatively charged which is determined by having different side chains. Thus, attachment of molecules with different protein for example, those containing Arginine-Glycine-Aspartate (RGD) sequences are expected to modify the surface of tissue scaffolds and result in improvement of cell adhesion when placed into its physiological environment. Additional modifications of the surface could be through attachment of functional groups of 2D or 3D patterns on the surface so that cell alignment is guided and new tissue formation is improved.

Biomedical materials

Some of the surface modification techniques listed above are particularly used for certain functions or kinds of materials. One of the advantages of plasma immersion ion implantation is its ability to treat most materials. Ion implantation is an effective surface treatment technique that be used to enhance the surface properties of biomaterials. The unique advantage of plasma modification is that the surface properties and biocompatibility can be enhanced selectively while the favorable bulk attributes of the materials such as strength remain unchanged. Overall, it is an effective method to modify medical implants with complex shape. By altering the surface functionalities using plasma modification, the optimal surface, chemical and physical properties can be obtained.

Plasma immersion implantation is a technique suitable for low melting point materials such as polymers, and widely accepted to improve adhesion between pinhole free layers and substrates. The ultimate goal is to enhance the properties of biomaterials such as biocompatibility, corrosion resistance and functionality with the fabrication of different types of biomedical thin films with various biologically important elements such as nitrogen, calcium, and sodium implanted with them. Different thin films such as titanium oxide, titanium nitride, and diamond-like carbon have been treated previously, and results show that the processed material exhibit better biocompatibility compared to the some current ones used in biomedical implants. In order to evaluate the biocompatibility of the fabricated thin films, various in vitro biological environment need to be conducted.

Biological response

The immune system will react differently if an implant is coated in extra-cellular matrix proteins. The proteins surrounding the implant serve to "hide" the implant from the innate immune system. However, if the implant is coated in allergenic proteins, the patient's adaptive immune response may be initiated. To prevent such a negative immune reaction, immunosuppressive drugs may be prescribed, or autologous tissue may produce the protein coating.

Acute response

Immediately following insertion, an implant (and the tissue damage from surgery) will result in acute inflammation. The classic signs of acute inflammation are redness, swelling, heat, pain, and loss of function. Hemorrhaging from tissue damage results in clotting which stimulates latent mast cells. The mast cells release chemokines which activate blood vessel endothelium. The blood vessels dilate and become leaky, producing the redness and swelling associated with acute inflammation. The activated endothelium allows extravasation of blood plasma and white blood cells including macrophages which transmigrate to the implant and recognize it as non-biologic. Macrophages release oxidants to combat the foreign body. If antioxidants fail to destroy the foreign body, chronic inflammation begins.

Chronic response

Implantation of non-degradable materials will eventually result in chronic inflammation and fibrous capsule formation. Macrophages that fail to destroy pathogens will merge to form a foreign-body giant cell which quarantines the implant. High levels of oxidants cause fibroblasts to secrete collagen, forming a layer of fibrous tissue around the implant.

By coating an implant with extracellular matrix proteins, macrophages will be unable to recognize the implant as non-biologic. The implant is then capable of continued interaction with the host, influencing the surrounding tissue toward various outcomes. For instance, the implant may improve healing by secreting angiogenic drugs.

Fabrication techniques

Physical modification

Physical immobilization is simply coating a material with a biomimetic material without changing the structure of either. Various biomimetic materials with cell adhesive proteins (such as collagen or laminin) have been used in vitro to direct new tissue formation and cell growth. Cell adhesion and proliferation occurs much better on protein-coated surfaces. However, since the proteins are generally isolated, it is more likely to elicit an immune response. Generally, chemistry qualities should be taken into consideration.

Chemical modification

Covalent binding of protein with polymer graft

Alkali hydrolysis, covalent immobilization, and the wet chemical method are only three of the many ways to chemically modify a surface. The surface is prepped with surface activation, where several functionalities are placed on the polymer to react better with the proteins. In alkali hydrolysis, small protons diffuse between polymer chains and cause surface hydrolysis which cleaves ester bonds. This results in the formation of carboxyl and hydroxyl functionalities which can attach to proteins. In covalent immobilization, small fragments of proteins or short peptides are bonded to the surface. The peptides are highly stable and studies have shown that this method improves biocompatibility. The wet chemical method is one of the preferred methods of protein immobilization. Chemical species are dissolved in an organic solution where reactions take place to reduce the hydrophobic nature of the polymer. Surface stability is higher in chemical modification than in physical adsorption. It also offers higher biocompatibility towards cell growth and bodily fluid flow.

Photochemical modification

Cell adhesion for various functional groups. OH and CONH₂ improve surface wetting compared with COOH

Successful attempts at grafting biomolecules onto polymers have been made using photochemical modification of biomaterials. These techniques employ high energy photons (typically UV) to break chemical bonds and release free radicals. Protein adhesion can be encouraged by favorably altering the surface charge of a biomaterial. Improved protein adhesion leads to better integration between the host and the implant. Ma et al. compared cell adhesion for various surface groups and found that OH and CONH₂ improved PLLA wettability more than COOH.

Applying a mask to the surface of the biomaterial allows selective surface modification. Areas that UV light penetrate will be modified such that cells will adhere to the region more favorably.

The minimum feature size attainable is given by:

${\displaystyle CD=k_1\cdot \frac{\lambda }{NA}}$

where

${\displaystyle CD}$ is the minimum feature size

${\displaystyle k_1}$ (commonly called k1 factor) is a coefficient that encapsulates process-related factors, and typically equals 0.4 for production.

${\displaystyle \lambda }$ is the wavelength of light used

${\displaystyle NA}$ is the numerical aperture of the lens as seen from the wafer

According to this equation, greater resolution can be obtained by decreasing the wavelength, and increasing the numerical aperture.

Composites and graft formation

Graft formation improves the overall hydrophilicity of the material through a ratio of how much glycolic acid and lactic acid is added. Block polymer, or PLGA, decreases hydrophobicity of the surface by controlling the amount of glycolic acid. However, this doesn't increase the hydrophilic tendency of the material. In brush grafting, hydrophilic polymers containing alcohol or hydroxyl groups are placed onto surfaces through photopolymerization.

Plasma treatment

Plasma techniques are especially useful because they can deposit ultra thin (a few nm), adherent, conformal coatings. Glow discharge plasma is created by filling a vacuum with a low-pressure gas (ex. argon, ammonia, or oxygen). The gas is then excited using microwaves or current which ionizes it. The ionized gas is then thrown onto a surface at a high velocity where the energy produced physically and chemically changes the surface. After the changes occur, the ionized plasma gas is able to react with the surface to make it ready for protein adhesion. However, the surfaces may lose mechanical strength or other inherent properties because of the high amounts of energy.

Several plasma-based technologies have been developed to contently immobilize proteins depending on the final application of the resulting biomaterial. This technique is a relatively fast approach to produce smart bioactive surfaces.

Applications

Bone tissue

Extra-cellular matrix (ECM) proteins greatly dictate the process of bone formation—the attachment and proliferation of osteogenitor cells, differentiation to osteoblasts, matrix formation, and mineralization. It is beneficial to design biomaterials for bone-contacting devices with bone matrix proteins to promote bone growth. It is also possible to covalently and directionally immobilize osteoinductive peptides in the surface of the ceramic materials such as hydroxyapatite/β-tricalcium phosphate to stimulate osteoblast differentiation and better bone regeneration. RGD peptides have been shown to increase the attachment and migration of osteoblasts on titanium implants, polymeric materials, and glass. Other adhesive peptides that can be recognized by molecules in the cell membrane can also affect binding of bone-derived cells. Particularly, the heparin binding domain in fibronectin is actively involved in specific interaction with osteogenic cells. Modification with heparin binding domains have the potential to enhance the binding of osteoblasts without affecting the attachment of endothelial cells and fibroblasts. Additionally, growth factors such as those in the bone morphogenic protein family are important polypeptides to induce bone formation. These growth factors can be covalently bound to materials to enhance the osteointegration of implants.

Neural tissue

Peripheral nervous system damage is typically treated by an autograft of nerve tissue to bridge a severed gap. This treatment requires successful regeneration of neural tissue; axons must grow from the proximal stump without interference in order to make a connection with the distal stump. Neural guidance channels (NGC), have been designed as a conduit for growth of new axons and the differentiation and morphogenesis of these tissues is affected by interaction between neural cells and the surrounding ECM. Studies of laminin have shown the protein to be an important ECM protein in the attachment of neural cells. The penta-peptide YIGSR and IKVAV, which are important sequences in laminin, have been shown to increase attachment of neural cells with the ability to control the spatial organization of the cells.

Cardiovascular tissue

It is important that cardiovascular devices such as stents or artificial vascular grafts be designed to mimic properties of the specific tissue region the device is serving to replace. In order to reduce thrombogenicity, surfaces can be coated with fibronectin and RGD containing peptides, which encourages attachment of endothelial cells. The peptides YIGSR and REDV have also been shown to enhance attachment and spreading of endothelial cells and ultimately reduce the thrombogenicity of the implant.

Surface protein sequence	Function
RGD	Promotes cell adhesion
Osteopontin-1	Improves mineralization by osteoblasts
Laminin	Promotes neurite outgrowth
GVPGI	Improves mechanical stability of vascular grafts
REDV	Enhances endothelial cell adhesion
YIGSR	Promotes neural and endothelial cell attachment
PHPMA-RGD	Promotes axonal outgrowth
IKVAV	Promotes neural cell attachment
KQAGDVA	Promotes smooth muscle cell adhesion
VIPGIG	Enhances elastic modulus of artificial ECM
FKRRIKA	Improves mineralization by osteoblasts
KRSR	Promotes osteoblast adhesion
MEPE	Promotes osteoblast differentiation

Big Crunch

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Crunch

An animation of the expected behavior of a Big Crunch

The Big Crunch is a hypothetical scenario for the ultimate fate of the universe, in which the expansion of the universe eventually reverses and the universe recollapses, ultimately causing the cosmic scale factor to reach zero, an event potentially followed by a reformation of the universe starting with another Big Bang. The vast majority of evidence indicates that this hypothesis is not correct. Instead, astronomical observations show that the expansion of the universe is accelerating rather than being slowed by gravity, suggesting that the universe is far more likely to end in heat death.

The theory dates back to 1922, with Russian physicist Alexander Friedmann creating a set of equations showing that the end of the universe depends on its density. It could either expand or contract rather than stay stable. With enough matter, gravity could stop the universe's expansion and eventually reverse it. This reversal would result in the universe collapsing on itself, not too dissimilar to a black hole.

The outcome of the universe can be seen by seeing which force will beat out the other; one is the explosive force from the Big Bang, and the other is gravity. If gravity overcomes the force of the Big Bang, then the Big Crunch will start, reversing the Big Bang. However if this doesn't happen, heat death is the most likely scenario. While astronomers know that the universe is expanding, there is no consensus or data on how large the force of expansion actually is.

The ending of the Big Crunch would get filled with radiation from stars and high-energy particles; when this is condensed and blueshifted to higher energy, it would be intense enough to ignite the surface of stars before they collide. In the final moments, the universe would be one large fireball with a temperature of infinity, and at the absolute end, neither time, nor space would remain.

Overview

The Big Crunch scenario hypothesized that the density of matter throughout the universe is sufficiently high that gravitational attraction will overcome the expansion which began with the Big Bang. The FLRW cosmology can predict whether the expansion will eventually stop based on the average energy density, Hubble parameter, and cosmological constant. If the metric expansion stopped, then contraction will inevitably follow, accelerating as time passes and finishing the universe in a kind of gravitational collapse, turning the universe into a black hole.

Experimental evidence in the late 1990s and early 2000s (namely the observation of distant supernovas as standard candles; and the well-resolved mapping of the cosmic microwave background) led to the conclusion that the expansion of the universe is not getting slowed by gravity but is instead accelerating. The 2011 Nobel Prize in Physics was awarded to researchers who contributed to this discovery.

The Big Crunch theory also leads into another theory known as the Big Bounce, in which after the big crunch destroys the universe, it does a sort of bounce, causing another big bang. This could potentially repeat forever in a phenomenon known as a cyclic universe.

History

Richard Bentley, a churchman, and a scholar, in preparation for a lecture on Newton's theories and the rejection of atheism, sent a letter out to Sir Isaac Newton,

"If we're in a finite universe and all stars attract each other together, would they not all collapse to a singular point, and if we're in an infinite universe with infinite stars, would infinite forces in every direction not affect all of those stars?"

This question is known as Bentley's paradox, a proto-theory of the Big Crunch. Although, it is now known that stars move around and aren't static.

Newton's copy of Principia, the book that caused Richard Bentley to send Newton the letter.

Einstein's cosmological constant

Albert Einstein favored a completely unchanging model of the universe. He collaborated in 1917 with Dutch astronomer Willem de Sitter to help demonstrate that the theory of general relativity would work with a static model; Willem demonstrated that his equations could describe a very simple universe. Finding no problems initially, scientists adapted the model to describe the universe. However, they ran into a different form of Bentley's paradox.

The theory of general relativity also described the universe as restless, contradicting information he found. Einstein realized that for a static universe to exist—which was observed at the time—an anti-gravity would be needed to counter the gravity contracting the universe together, adding an extra force that would ruin the equations in the theory of relativity. In the end, the cosmological constant, the name for the anti-gravity force, was added to the theory of relativity.

Discovery of Hubble's law

Scatter plot that Hubble used to find the Hubble constant.

Edwin Hubble working in the Mount Wilson Observatory took measurements of the distances of galaxies and paired them with Vesto Silpher and Milton Humason's measurements of redshifts associated with said galaxies. He discovered a rough proportionality between the redshift of an object and its distance. Hubble plotted a trend line from 46 galaxies, studying and obtaining the Hubble Constant, which he deduced to be 500 km/s/Mpc, nearly seven times than what it is considered today, but still giving the proof that the universe was expanding and was not a static object.

Abandonment of the cosmological constant

After publishing Hubble's discovery, Einstein completely abandoned the cosmological constant. In their simplest form, the equations generated a model of the universe that expanded or contracted. Contradicting what was observed, hence the creation of the cosmological constant. After the confirmation that the universe was expanding, Einstein called his assumption that the universe was static his "biggest mistake." In 1931, Einstein visited Hubble to thank him for "providing the basis of modern cosmology."

After this discovery, Einstein's and Newton's models of a contracting, yet static universe, were dropped for the model expanding universe model.

Cyclic universes

A theory called "Big Bounce" proposes that the universe could collapse to the state where it began and then initiate another Big Bang, so in this way, the universe would last forever but would pass through phases of expansion (Big Bang) and contraction (Big Crunch). This means that there may be a universe in a state of constant Big Bangs and Big Crunches.

Cyclic universes were briefly considered by Albert Einstein in 1931. He theorized that there was a universe before the Big Bang, which ended in a Big Crunch, which could create a Big Bang as a reaction. Our universe could be in a cycle of expansion and contraction, a cycle possibly going on infinitely.

Ekpyrotic model

Photo of two branes, the basis of the Ekpyrotic model.

There are more modern theories of Cyclic universes as well. The Ekpyrotic theory, formed by Paul Steinhardt, states that the Big Bang could have been caused by two parallel orbifold planes, referred to as branes colliding in a higher-dimensional space. The four dimension universe lies on one of the branes. The collision corresponds to the Big Crunch, then a Big Bang. The matter and radiation around us today are quantum fluctuations from before the branes. After several billion years, the universe has reached its modern state, and it will start contracting in another several billion years. Dark Energy corresponds to the force between the branes, allowing for problems, like the flatness and monopole in the previous theories to be fixed. The cycles can also go infinitely into the past and the future, and an attractor allows for a complete history of the universe.

This fixes the problem of the earlier model of the universe going into heat death from entropy buildup. The new model avoids this with a net expansion after every cycle, stopping entropy buildup. However, there are still some flaws in this model. The basis of the theory, branes, are still not understood completely by string theorists, and the possibility that the scale invariant spectrum could be destroyed from the big crunch. While cosmic inflation and the general character of the forces—or the collision of the branes in the Ekpyrotic model—required to make vacuum fluctuations is known. A candidate from particle physics is missing.

Conformal Cyclic Cosmology (CCC) model

A map of the CMB showing different hot spots around the universe.

Physicist Roger Penrose advanced a general relativity-based theory called the conformal cyclic cosmology in which the universe expands until all the matter decays and is turned to light. Since nothing in the universe would have any time or distance scale associated with it, it becomes identical with the Big Bang (resulting in a type of Big Crunch which becomes the next Big Bang, thus starting the next cycle). Penrose and Gurzadyan suggested that signatures of conformal cyclic cosmology could potentially be found in the cosmic microwave background; as of 2020, these have not been detected.

There are also some flaws with this theory as well, skeptics pointed out that in order to match up an infinitely large universe to an infinitely small universe, that all particles must lose their mass when the universe gets old. However, Penrose presented evidence of CCC in the form of rings that had uniform temperature in the CMB, the idea being that these rings would be the signature in our aeon—An aeon being the current cycle of the universe that we're in—was caused by spherical gravitational waves caused by colliding black holes from our previous aeon.

Loop quantum cosmology (LQC)

Loop quantum cosmology is a model of the universe that proposes a "quantum-bridge" between expanding and contracting universes. In this model quantum geometry creates a brand new force negligible at low space-time curvature. However, rising very rapidly in the Planck regime, overwhelming classical gravity which resolves singularities of general relativity. Once the singularities are resolved the conceptual paradigm of cosmology changes, forcing one to revisit the standard issues—such as the horizon problem—from a new perspective.

Due to quantum geometry, the Big Bang is replaced by the Big Bounce with no assumptions or any fine tuning. An important feature of the theory being the space-time description of the underlying quantum evolution. The approach of effective dynamics have been used extensively in loop quantum cosmology to describe physics at the Planck-scale and also the beginning of the universe. Numerical simulations have confirmed the validity of effective dynamics, which provides a good approximation of the full loop quantum dynamics. It has been shown when states have very large quantum fluctuations at late times, meaning they do not lead to macroscopic universes as described by general relativity, but the effective dynamics departs from quantum dynamics near bounce and the later universe. In this case, the effective dynamics will overestimate the density at bounce, but it will still capture qualitative aspects extremely well.

Empirical scenarios from physical theories

If a form of quintessence driven by a scalar field evolving down a monotonically decreasing potential that passes sufficiently below zero is the (main) explanation of dark energy and current data (in particular observational constraints on dark energy) is true as well, the accelerating expansion of the Universe would inverse to contraction within the cosmic near-future of the next 100 million years. According to an Andrei-Ijjas-Steinhardt study, the scenario fits "naturally with cyclic cosmologies and recent conjectures about quantum gravity". The study suggests that the slow contraction phase would "endure for a period of order 1 billion y before the universe transitions to a new phase of expansion".

Effects

Paul Davies considered a scenario in which the Big Crunch happens about 100 billion years from the present. In his model, the contracting universe would evolve roughly like the expanding phase in reverse. First, galaxy clusters, and then galaxies, would merge, and the temperature of the cosmic microwave background (CMB) would begin to rise as CMB photons get blueshifted. Stars would eventually become so close together that they begin to collide with each other. Once the CMB becomes hotter than M-type stars (about 500,000 years before the Big Crunch in Davies' model), they would no longer be able to radiate away their heat and would cook themselves until they evaporate; this continues for successively hotter stars until O-type stars boil away about 100,000 years before the Big Crunch. In the last minutes, the temperature of the universe would be so great that atoms and atomic nuclei would break up and get sucked up into already coalescing black holes. At the time of the Big Crunch, all the matter in the universe would be crushed into an infinitely hot, infinitely dense singularity similar to the Big Bang. The Big Crunch may be followed by another Big Bang, creating a new universe.

First Amendment to the United States Constitution

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution

The First Amendment (Amendment I) to the United States Constitution prevents the government from making laws that regulate an establishment of religion, or that prohibit the free exercise of religion, or abridge the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, or the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. It was adopted on December 15, 1791, as one of the ten amendments that constitute the Bill of Rights.

The Bill of Rights was proposed to assuage Anti-Federalist opposition to Constitutional ratification. Initially, the First Amendment applied only to laws enacted by the Congress, and many of its provisions were interpreted more narrowly than they are today. Beginning with Gitlow v. New York (1925), the Supreme Court applied the First Amendment to states—a process known as incorporation—through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Everson v. Board of Education (1947), the Court drew on Thomas Jefferson's correspondence to call for "a wall of separation between church and State", though the precise boundary of this separation remains in dispute and the terms "church" and "State" do not appear in the Amendment. Speech rights were expanded significantly in a series of 20th and 21st century court decisions which protected various forms of political speech, anonymous speech, campaign finance, pornography, and school speech; these rulings also defined a series of exceptions to First Amendment protections. The Supreme Court overturned English common law precedent to increase the burden of proof for defamation and libel suits, most notably in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964). Commercial speech, however, is less protected by the First Amendment than political speech, and is therefore subject to greater regulation.

The Free Press Clause protects publication of information and opinions, and applies to a wide variety of media. In Near v. Minnesota (1931) and New York Times v. United States (1971), the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment protected against prior restraint—pre-publication censorship—in almost all cases. The Petition Clause protects the right to petition all branches and agencies of government for action. In addition to the right of assembly guaranteed by this clause, the Court has also ruled that the amendment implicitly protects freedom of association.

Although the First Amendment applies only to state actors, there is a common misconception that it prohibits anyone from limiting free speech, including private, non-governmental entities. Moreover, the Supreme Court has determined that protection of speech is not absolute.

Text

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

The hand-written copy of the proposed articles of amendment passed by Congress in 1789, cropped to show just the text in the third article that would later be ratified as the First Amendment

Background

Further information: Anti-Federalism

George Mason was the principal author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted by the Fifth Virginia Convention on June 12, 1776.

James Madison, drafter of the Bill of Rights

The right to petition for redress of grievances was a principle included in the 1215 Magna Carta, as well as the 1689 English Bill of Rights. In 1776, the second year of the American Revolutionary War, the Virginia colonial legislature passed a Declaration of Rights that included the sentence "The freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic Governments." Eight of the other twelve states made similar pledges. However, these declarations were generally considered "mere admonitions to state legislatures", rather than enforceable provisions.

After several years of comparatively weak government under the Articles of Confederation, a Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia proposed a new constitution on September 17, 1787, featuring among other changes a stronger chief executive. George Mason, a Constitutional Convention delegate and the drafter of Virginia's Declaration of Rights, proposed that the Constitution include a bill of rights listing and guaranteeing civil liberties. Other delegates—including future Bill of Rights drafter James Madison—disagreed, arguing that existing state guarantees of civil liberties were sufficient and any attempt to enumerate individual rights risked the implication that other, unnamed rights were unprotected. After a brief debate, Mason's proposal was defeated by a unanimous vote of the state delegations.

For the constitution to be ratified, however, nine of the thirteen states were required to approve it in state conventions. Opposition to ratification ("Anti-Federalism") was partly based on the Constitution's lack of adequate guarantees for civil liberties. Supporters of the Constitution in states where popular sentiment was against ratification (including Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York) successfully proposed that their state conventions both ratify the Constitution and call for the addition of a bill of rights. The U.S. Constitution was eventually ratified by all thirteen states. In the 1st United States Congress, following the state legislatures' request, James Madison proposed twenty constitutional amendments, and his proposed draft of the First Amendment read as follows:

The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed. The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable. The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for redress of their grievances.

This language was greatly condensed by Congress, and passed the House and Senate with almost no recorded debate, complicating future discussion of the Amendment's intent. Congress approved and submitted to the states for their ratification twelve articles of amendment on September 25, 1789. The revised text of the third article became the First Amendment, because the last ten articles of the submitted 12 articles were ratified by the requisite number of states on December 15, 1791, and are now known collectively as the Bill of Rights.

Freedom of religion

Main articles: Freedom of religion in the United States and Religion in the United States

The Maryland Toleration Act secured religious liberty in the English colony of Maryland. Similar laws were passed in the Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut and Pennsylvania. These laws stood in direct contrast with the Puritan theocratic rule in the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay colonies.

Religious liberty, also known as freedom of religion, is "the right of all persons to believe, speak, and act – individually and in community with others, in private and in public – in accord with their understanding of ultimate truth." The acknowledgement of religious freedom as the first right protected in the Bill of Rights points toward the American founders' understanding of the importance of religion to human, social, and political flourishing. Freedom of religion is protected by the First Amendment through its Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, which together form the religious liberty clauses of the First Amendment. The first clause prohibits any governmental "establishment of religion" and the second prohibits any governmental interference with "the free exercise thereof." These clauses of the First Amendment encompass "the two big arenas of religion in constitutional law. Establishment cases deal with the Constitution’s ban on Congress endorsing, promoting or becoming too involved with religion. Free exercise cases deal with Americans’ rights to practice their faith." Both clauses sometimes compete with each other. The Supreme Court in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union (2005) clarified this by the following example: When the government spends money on the clergy, then it looks like establishing religion, but if the government cannot pay for military chaplains, then many soldiers and sailors would be kept from the opportunity to exercise their chosen religions. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943) the Supreme Court stated that "Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.". The Court added:

Plainly, a community may not suppress, or the state tax, the dissemination of views because they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful. If that device were ever sanctioned, there would have been forged a ready instrument for the suppression of the faith which any minority cherishes but which does not happen to be in favor. That would be a complete repudiation of the philosophy of the Bill of Rights.

In his dissenting opinion in McGowan v. Maryland (1961), Justice William O. Douglas illustrated the broad protections offered by the First Amendment's religious liberty clauses:

The First Amendment commands government to have no interest in theology or ritual; it admonishes government to be interested in allowing religious freedom to flourish—whether the result is to produce Catholics, Jews, or Protestants, or to turn the people toward the path of Buddha, or to end in a predominantly Moslem nation, or to produce in the long run atheists or agnostics. On matters of this kind, government must be neutral. This freedom plainly includes freedom from religion, with the right to believe, speak, write, publish and advocate anti-religious programs. Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, 319 U. S. 641. Certainly the "free exercise" clause does not require that everyone embrace the theology of some church or of some faith, or observe the religious practices of any majority or minority sect. The First Amendment, by its "establishment" clause, prevents, of course, the selection by government of an "official" church. Yet the ban plainly extends farther than that. We said in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 330 U. S. 16, that it would be an "establishment" of a religion if the Government financed one church or several churches. For what better way to "establish" an institution than to find the fund that will support it? The "establishment" clause protects citizens also against any law which selects any religious custom, practice, or ritual, puts the force of government behind it, and fines, imprisons, or otherwise penalizes a person for not observing it. The Government plainly could not join forces with one religious group and decree a universal and symbolic circumcision. Nor could it require all children to be baptized or give tax exemptions only to those whose children were baptized.

Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?

--Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in her concurring opinion in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union (2005).

The First Amendment tolerates neither governmentally established religion nor governmental interference with religion. One of the central purposes of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court wrote in Gillette v. United States (1970), consists "of ensuring governmental neutrality in matters of religion." The history of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause and the Supreme Court's own constitutional jurisprudence with respect to these clauses was explained in the 1985 case Wallace v. Jaffree. The Supreme Court noted at the outset that the First Amendment limits equally the power of Congress and of the states to abridge the individual freedoms it protects. The First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the states the same limitations the First Amendment had always imposed on the Congress. This "elementary proposition of law" was confirmed and endorsed time and time again in cases like Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940) and Wooley v. Maynard (1977). The central liberty that unifies the various clauses in the First Amendment is the individual's freedom of conscience:

Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of a broader concept of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. At one time, it was thought that this right merely proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. But when the underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all. This conclusion derives support not only from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful, and from recognition of the fact that the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Christian sects – or even intolerance among "religions" – to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain.

Establishment of religion

See also: Establishment Clause

Thomas Jefferson's tombstone. The inscription, as he stipulated, reads "Here was buried Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of American Independence, of the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and father of the University of Virginia."

The precise meaning of the Establishment Clause can be traced back to the beginning of 19th century. Thomas Jefferson wrote about the First Amendment and its restriction on Congress in an 1802 reply to the Danbury Baptists, a religious minority that was concerned about the dominant position of the Congregational church in Connecticut, who had written to the newly elected president about their concerns. Jefferson wrote back:

Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof", thus building a wall of separation between Church & State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.

In Reynolds v. United States (1878) the Supreme Court used these words to declare that "it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere [religious] opinion, but was left free to reach [only those religious] actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." Quoting from Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom the court stated further in Reynolds:

In the preamble of this act ... religious freedom is defined; and after a recital 'that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty,' it is declared 'that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere [only] when [religious] principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order.' In these two sentences is found the true distinction between what properly belongs to the church and what to the State.

A April 22, 1885, cartoon from the Puck magazine depicting an army of clergymen assaulting a fortress defended by newspaper editors including from Puck, while atop a hill in the background a statue labeled "Constitution" that states "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" can be seen

Reynolds was the first Supreme Court decision to use the metaphor "a wall of separation between Church and State." American historian George Bancroft was consulted by Chief Justice Morrison Waite in Reynolds regarding the views on establishment by the Founding Fathers. Bancroft advised Waite to consult Jefferson and Waite then discovered the above quoted letter in a library after skimming through the index to Jefferson's collected works according to historian Don Drakeman.

The Establishment Clause forbids federal, state, and local laws which purpose is "an establishment of religion." The term "establishment" denoted in general direct aid to the church by the government. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. (1982) the Supreme Court stated that "the core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause is preventing "a fusion of governmental and religious functions," Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 374 U. S. 222 (1963)." The Establishment Clause acts as a double security, for its aim is as well the prevention of religious control over government as the prevention of political control over religion. The First Amendment's framers knew that intertwining government with religion could lead to bloodshed or oppression, because this happened too often historically. To prevent this dangerous development they set up the Establishment Clause as a line of demarcation between the functions and operations of the institutions of religion and government in society. The Federal government of the United States as well as the state governments are prohibited from establishing or sponsoring religion, because, as observed by the Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York (1970), the 'establishment' of a religion historically implied sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. The Establishment Clause thus serves to ensure laws, as said by Supreme Court in Gillette v. United States (1970), which are "secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary impact".

The First Amendment's prohibition on an establishment of religion includes many things from prayer in widely varying government settings over financial aid for religious individuals and institutions to comment on religious questions. The Supreme Court stated in this context: "In these varied settings, issues of about interpreting inexact Establishment Clause language, like difficult interpretative issues generally, arise from the tension of competing values, each constitutionally respectable, but none open to realization to the logical limit." The National Constitution Center observes that, absent some common interpretations by jurists, the precise meaning of the Establishment Clause is unclear and that decisions by the United Supreme Court relating to the Establishment Clause often are by 5–4 votes. The Establishment Clause, however, reflects a widely held consensus that there should be no nationally established church after the American Revolutionary War. Against this background the National Constitution Center states:

Virtually all jurists agree that it would violate the Establishment Clause for the government to compel attendance or financial support of a religious institution as such, for the government to interfere with a religious organization's selection of clergy or religious doctrine; for religious organizations or figures acting in a religious capacity to exercise governmental power; or for the government to extend benefits to some religious entities and not others without adequate secular justification.

Originally, the First Amendment applied only to the federal government, and some states continued official state religions after ratification. Massachusetts, for example, was officially Congregational until the 1830s. In Everson v. Board of Education (1947), the Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause (i.e., made it apply against the states):

The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion to another ... in the words of Jefferson, the [First Amendment] clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State'. ... That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.

The Founding of Maryland (1634) depicts Father Andrew White, a Jesuit missionary in the left and colonists meeting the people of the Yaocomico branch of the Piscatawy Indian Nation in St. Mary's City, Maryland, the site of Maryland's first colonial settlement.

At the core of the Establishment Clause lays the core principle of denominational neutrality. In Epperson v. Arkansas (1968) the Supreme Court outlined the broad principle of denominational neutrality mandated by the First Amendment: "Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion, and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is, according to the Supreme Court in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another. In Zorach v. Clauson (1952) the Supreme Court further observed: "Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person. But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects. It may not thrust any sect on any person. It may not make a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or to take religious instruction. But it can close its doors or suspend its operations as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction." In McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union (2005) the Court explained that when the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, then it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, because there being no neutrality when the government's ostensible object is to take sides.

In Torcaso v. Watkins (1961), the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution prohibits states and the federal government from requiring any kind of religious test for public office. The Supreme Court in the same case made it also clear that state governments and the federal government are prohibited from passing laws or imposing requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, as well as aiding those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs. In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet (1994), the Court concluded that "government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion." In a series of cases in the first decade of the 2000s—Van Orden v. Perry (2005), McCreary County v. ACLU (2005), and Salazar v. Buono (2010)—the Court considered the issue of religious monuments on federal lands without reaching a majority reasoning on the subject.

Separationists

President Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1802 of "a wall of separation".

Everson used the metaphor of a wall of separation between church and state, derived from the correspondence of President Thomas Jefferson. It had been long established in the decisions of the Supreme Court, beginning with Reynolds v. United States (1878), when the Court reviewed the history of the early Republic in deciding the extent of the liberties of Mormons. Chief Justice Morrison Waite, who consulted the historian George Bancroft, also discussed at some length the Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments by James Madison, who drafted the First Amendment; Madison used the metaphor of a "great barrier".

In Everson, the Court adopted Jefferson's words. The Court has affirmed it often, with majority, but not unanimous, support. Warren Nord, in Does God Make a Difference?, characterized the general tendency of the dissents as a weaker reading of the First Amendment; the dissents tend to be "less concerned about the dangers of establishment and less concerned to protect free exercise rights, particularly of religious minorities".

Beginning with Everson, which permitted New Jersey school boards to pay for transportation to parochial schools, the Court has used various tests to determine when the wall of separation has been breached. Everson laid down the test that establishment existed when aid was given to religion, but that the transportation was justifiable because the benefit to the children was more important.

Felix Frankfurter called in his concurrence opinion in McCollum v. Board of Education (1948) for a strict separation between state and church: "Separation means separation, not something less. Jefferson's metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State speaks of a 'wall of separation', not of a fine line easily overstepped. ... 'The great American principle of eternal separation'—Elihu Root's phrase bears repetition—is one of the vital reliances of our Constitutional system for assuring unities among our people stronger than our diversities. It is the Court's duty to enforce this principle in its full integrity."

In the school prayer cases of the early 1960s Engel v. Vitale and Abington School District v. Schempp, aid seemed irrelevant. The Court ruled on the basis that a legitimate action both served a secular purpose and did not primarily assist religion.

In Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York (1970), the Court ruled that a legitimate action could not entangle government with religion. In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), these points were combined into the Lemon test, declaring that an action was an establishment if:

1. the statute (or practice) lacked a secular purpose;
2. its principal or primary effect advanced or inhibited religion; or
3. it fostered an excessive government entanglement with religion.

The Lemon test has been criticized by justices and legal scholars, but it has remained the predominant means by which the Court enforced the Establishment Clause. In Agostini v. Felton (1997), the entanglement prong of the Lemon test was converted to simply being a factor in determining the effect of the challenged statute or practice. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), the opinion of the Court considered secular purpose and the absence of primary effect; a concurring opinion saw both cases as having treated entanglement as part of the primary purpose test. Further tests, such as the endorsement test and coercion test, have been developed to determine whether a government action violated the Establishment Clause.

In Lemon, the Court stated that the separation of church and state could never be absolute: "Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable", the court wrote. "Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall', is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."

After the Supreme Court ruling in the coach praying case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), the Lemon Test may have been replaced or complemented with a reference to historical practices and understandings.

Accommodationists

Accommodationists, in contrast, argue along with Justice William O. Douglas that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Furthermore, as observed by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York (1970) with respect to the separation of church and state: "No perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts—one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement." He also coined the term "benevolent neutrality" as a combination of neutrality and accommodationism in Walz to characterize a way to ensure that there is no conflict between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Burger's successor, William Rehnquist, called for the abandonment of the "wall of separation between church and State" metaphor in Wallace v. Jaffree (1985), because he believed this metaphor was based on bad history and proved itself useless as a guide to judging.

David Shultz has said that accommodationists claim the Lemon test should be applied selectively. As such, for many conservatives, the Establishment Clause solely prevents the establishment of a state church, not public acknowledgements of God nor 'developing policies that encourage general religious beliefs that do not favor a particular sect and are consistent with the secular government's goals'. In Lynch v. Donnelly (1984), the Supreme Court observed that the "concept of a "wall" of separation between church and state is a useful metaphor, but is not an accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists. The Constitution does not require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."

Free exercise of religion

See also: Free Exercise Clause

The First Church of Christ, Scientist in Boston, Massachusetts

The acknowledgement of religious freedom as the first right protected in the Bill of Rights points toward the American founders' understanding of the importance of religion to human, social, and political flourishing. The First Amendment makes clear that it sought to protect "the free exercise" of religion, or what might be called "free exercise equality." Free exercise is the liberty of persons to reach, hold, practice and change beliefs freely according to the dictates of conscience. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits governmental interference with religious belief and, within limits, religious practice. "Freedom of religion means freedom to hold an opinion or belief, but not to take action in violation of social duties or subversive to good order." The clause withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. "The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 303. Government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67; nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573; cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233."

The Free Exercise Clause offers a double protection, for it is a shield not only against outright prohibitions with respect to the free exercise of religion, but also against penalties on the free exercise of religion and against indirect governmental coercion. Relying on Employment Division v. Smith (1990) and quoting from Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah (1993) the Supreme Court stated in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer (2017) that religious observers are protected against unequal treatment by virtue of the Free Exercise Clause and laws which target the religious for "special disabilities" based on their "religious status" must be covered by the application of strict scrutiny.

In Reynolds v. United States (1878), the Supreme Court found that while laws cannot interfere with religious belief and opinions, laws can regulate religious practices like human sacrifice or the obsolete Hindu practice of suttee. The Court stated that to rule otherwise, "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government would exist only in name under such circumstances." If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.

Bear Butte, in South Dakota, is a sacred site for over 30 Plains tribes.

In Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Free Exercise Clause to the states. While the right to have religious beliefs is absolute, the freedom to act on such beliefs is not absolute. Religious freedom is a universal right of all human beings and all religions, providing for the free exercise of religion or free exercise equality. Due to its nature as fundamental to the American founding and to the ordering of human society, it is rightly seen as a capricious right, i.e. universal, broad, and deep—though not absolute. Justice Field put it clearly in Davis v. Beason (1890): "However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation." Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith made clear that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 455 U. S. 263, n. 3 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); see Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, supra, 310 U.S. at 310 U. S. 595 (collecting cases)." Smith also set the precedent "that laws affecting certain religious practices do not violate the right to free exercise of religion as long as the laws are neutral, generally applicable, and not motivated by animus to religion."

To accept any creed or the practice of any form of worship cannot be compelled by laws, because, as stated by the Supreme Court in Braunfeld v. Brown (1961), the freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute. Federal or state legislation cannot therefore make it a crime to hold any religious belief or opinion due to the Free Exercise Clause. Legislation by the United States or any constituent state of the United States which forces anyone to embrace any religious belief or to say or believe anything in conflict with his religious tenets is also barred by the Free Exercise Clause. Against this background, the Supreme Court stated that Free Exercise Clause broadly protects religious beliefs and opinions:

The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all "governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such." Sherbert v. Verner supra, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 402. The government may not compel affirmation of religious belief, see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 322 U. S. 86–88 (1944), impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status, see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 345 U. S. 69 (1953); cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 456 U. S. 245 (1982), or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma, see Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U. S. 440, 393 U. S. 445–452 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 344 U. S. 95–119 (1952); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696, 426 U. S. 708–725 (1976). But the "exercise of religion" often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a state would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of "statues that are to be used for worship purposes," or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf."

In Sherbert v. Verner (1963), the Supreme Court required states to meet the "strict scrutiny" standard when refusing to accommodate religiously motivated conduct. This meant the government needed to have a "compelling interest" regarding such a refusal. The case involved Adele Sherbert, who was denied unemployment benefits by South Carolina because she refused to work on Saturdays, something forbidden by her Seventh-day Adventist faith. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Court ruled that a law which "unduly burdens the practice of religion" without a compelling interest, even though it might be "neutral on its face", would be unconstitutional.

Washington National Cathedral, the Episcopal cathedral in Washington, D.C.

The need for a compelling governmental interest was narrowed in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which held no such interest was required under the Free Exercise Clause regarding a neutral law of general applicability that happens to affect a religious practice, as opposed to a law that targets a particular religious practice (which does require a compelling governmental interest). In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993), in which the meaning of "neutral law of general applicability" was elaborated by the court, the Supreme Court ruled Hialeah had passed an ordinance banning ritual slaughter, a practice central to the Santería religion, while providing exceptions for some practices such as the kosher slaughter. Since the ordinance was not "generally applicable", the Court ruled that it needed to have a compelling interest, which it failed to have, and so was declared unconstitutional. In this case the Supreme Court also stated that inquiries whether laws discriminate based on religion does not end with the text of the laws at issue. Facial neutrality of laws (i.e. laws which are apparently neutral in their language but in reality discriminate against a particular group) is not determinative in these inquiries, because both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause extends beyond facial discrimination. The Supreme Court explained that "[o]fficial action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality" and "[t]he Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt." The neutrality of a law is also suspect if First Amendment freedoms are curtailed to prevent isolated collateral harms not themselves prohibited by direct regulation. The Court also observed: "The Free Exercise Clause "protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment," Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 148 (1987) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), and inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation. The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause."

The U.S. guarantees freedom of religion, and some churches in the U.S. take strong stances on political subjects.

In 1993, the Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), seeking to restore the compelling interest requirement applied in Sherbert and Yoder. In City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the Court struck down the provisions of RFRA that forced state and local governments to provide protections exceeding those required by the First Amendment, on the grounds that while the Congress could enforce the Supreme Court's interpretation of a constitutional right, the Congress could not impose its own interpretation on states and localities. Congress can enact legislation to expand First Amendment free exercise rights through its enforcement powers in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but to do so "there must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." The decision in City of Boerne struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act RFRA in so far as it applied to states and other local municipalities within them., so that partly in response to it 21 states enacted State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts since 1993. According to the court's ruling in Gonzales v. UDV (2006), RFRA remains applicable to federal laws and so those laws must still have a "compelling interest."

RFRA secures Congress’ view of the right to free exercise under the First Amendment, and it provides a remedy to redress violations of that right. The Supreme Court decided in light of this in Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020) that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's express remedies provision permits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. This decision is significant "not only for the plaintiffs but also for cases involving violations of religious rights more broadly." In the 1982 U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Lee (1982) (1982) the Court declared: "Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity." The Supreme Court in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) echoed this statement by quoting Judge Learned Hand from his 1953 case Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (CA2 1953): "The First Amendment ... gives no one the right to insist that, in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities." In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014) the Supreme Court had to decide, with a view to the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, "the profound cultural question of whether a private, profit-making business organized as a corporation can "exercise" religion and, if it can, how far that is protected from government interference." The Court decided that closely held, for-profit corporations have free exercise rights under the RFRA, but its decision was not based on the constitutional protections of the First Amendment.

In Locke v. Davey (2004), the Court stated, "[g]iven the historic and substantial state interest at issue, it cannot be concluded that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect", explaining that denying funding a scholarship when it was going to be used for education in theology and when that state's constitution forbids state aid to religious institutions "was not presumptively unconstitutional, because the state was neither criminalizing nor penalizing the study of theology." The Court ruled therefore that a state has a "substantial state interest" in denying funding a scholarship when it was going to be used for education in theology and when that state's constitution forbids state aid to religious institutions. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer (2017), the Court ruled that denying a generally available public benefit on account of the religious nature of an institution violates the Free Exercise Clause. In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020), the Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause forbad a state from denying a tax credit on the basis of a Blaine Amendment in that state's constitution, which the Court said is subject to the "strictest scrutiny" and can only survive if it is "narrowly tailored" to promote "interests of the highest order". Citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988) the Supreme Court decided in the Espinoza follow-up case Carson v. Makin (2022) that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects against “indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.”

Freedom of speech and of the press

Further information: Freedom of speech in the United States and United States free speech exceptions

Inscription of the First Amendment (December 15, 1791) in front of Independence Hall in Philadelphia

The First Amendment broadly protects the rights of free speech and free press. Free speech means the free and public expression of opinions without censorship, interference, or restraint by the government. The term "freedom of speech" embedded in the First Amendment encompasses the decision what to say as well as what not to say. Free press means the right of individuals to express themselves through publication and dissemination of information, ideas, and opinions without interference, constraint, or prosecution by the government. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943), the Supreme Court stated that "Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.". The Court added that a community may not suppress, or the state tax, the dissemination of views because they are unpopular, annoying, or distasteful. That would be a complete repudiation of the philosophy of the Bill of Rights, according to the Court. In Stanley v. Georgia (1969), the Supreme Court stated that the First Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and to be generally free from governmental intrusions into one's privacy and control of one's own thoughts.

The Supreme Court of the United States characterized the rights of free speech and free press as fundamental personal rights and liberties and noted that the exercise of these rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men. In Bond v. Floyd (1966), a case involving the Constitutional shield around the speech of elected officials, the Supreme Court declared that the First Amendment central commitment is that, in the words of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." The Court further explained that just as erroneous statements must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive, so statements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must be similarly protected. The Supreme Court in Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley (1972) said:

"But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. ... To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.""

The level of protections with respect to free speech and free press given by the First Amendment is not limitless. As stated in his concurrence in Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley (1972), Chief Justice Warren E. Burger said:

"Numerous holdings of this Court attest to the fact that the First Amendment does not literally mean that we "are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship." This statement is subject to some qualifications, as for example those of Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964)."

Attached to the core rights of free speech and free press are several peripheral rights that make these core rights more secure. The peripheral rights encompass not only freedom of association, including privacy in one's associations, but also, in the words of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), "the freedom of the entire university community", i.e., the right to distribute, the right to receive, and the right to read, as well as freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach. The United States Constitution protects, according to the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia (1969), the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and to be generally free from governmental intrusions into one's privacy and control of one's thoughts. As stated by the Court in Stanley: "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."

Wording of the clause

The First Amendment bars Congress from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press". U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens commented about this phraseology in a 1993 journal article: "I emphasize the word 'the' in the term 'the freedom of speech' because the definite article suggests that the draftsmen intended to immunize a previously identified category or subset of speech." Stevens said that, otherwise, the clause might absurdly immunize things like false testimony under oath. Like Stevens, journalist Anthony Lewis wrote: "The word 'the' can be read to mean what was understood at the time to be included in the concept of free speech." But what was understood at the time is not 100% clear. In the late 1790s, the lead author of the speech and press clauses, James Madison, argued against narrowing this freedom to what had existed under English common law:

The practice in America must be entitled to much more respect. In every state, probably, in the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men, of every description, which has not been confined to the strict limits of the common law.

Madison wrote this in 1799, when he was in a dispute about the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Laws, which was legislation enacted in 1798 by President John Adams' Federalist Party to ban seditious libel. Madison believed that legislation to be unconstitutional, and his adversaries in that dispute, such as John Marshall, advocated the narrow freedom of speech that had existed in the English common law.

Speech critical of the government

The Supreme Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of any federal law regarding the Free Speech Clause until the 20th century. For example, the Supreme Court never ruled on the Alien and Sedition Acts; three Supreme Court justices riding circuit presided over sedition trials without indicating any reservations. The leading critics of the law, Vice President Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, argued for the Acts' unconstitutionality based on the First Amendment and other Constitutional provisions. Jefferson succeeded Adams as president, in part due to the unpopularity of the latter's sedition prosecutions; he and his party quickly overturned the Acts and pardoned those imprisoned by them. In the majority opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), the Court noted the importance of this public debate as a precedent in First Amendment law and ruled that the Acts had been unconstitutional: "Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history."

World War I

Further information: Clear and present danger

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes formulated the clear and present danger test for free speech cases.

During the patriotic fervor of World War I and the First Red Scare, the Espionage Act of 1917 imposed a maximum sentence of twenty years for anyone who caused or attempted to cause "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of the United States". Specifically, the Espionage Act of 1917 states that if anyone allows any enemies to enter or fly over the United States and obtain information from a place connected with the national defense, they will be punished. Hundreds of prosecutions followed. In 1919, the Supreme Court heard four appeals resulting from these cases: Schenck v. United States, Debs v. United States, Frohwerk v. United States, and Abrams v. United States.

In the first of these cases, Socialist Party of America official Charles Schenck had been convicted under the Espionage Act for publishing leaflets urging resistance to the draft. Schenck appealed, arguing that the Espionage Act violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In Schenck v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Schenck's appeal and affirmed his conviction. Debate continued over whether Schenck went against the right to freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing for the Court, explained that "the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." One week later, in Frohwerk v. United States, the court again upheld an Espionage Act conviction, this time that of a journalist who had criticized U.S. involvement in foreign wars.

In Debs v. United States, the Court elaborated on the "clear and present danger" test established in Schenck. On June 16, 1918, Eugene V. Debs, a political activist, delivered a speech in Canton, Ohio, in which he spoke of "most loyal comrades were paying the penalty to the working class—these being Wagenknecht, Baker and Ruthenberg, who had been convicted of aiding and abetting another in failing to register for the draft." Following his speech, Debs was charged and convicted under the Espionage Act. In upholding his conviction, the Court reasoned that although he had not spoken any words that posed a "clear and present danger", taken in context, the speech had a "natural tendency and a probable effect to obstruct the recruiting services". In Abrams v. United States, four Russian refugees appealed their conviction for throwing leaflets from a building in New York; the leaflets argued against President Woodrow Wilson's intervention in Russia against the October Revolution. The majority upheld their conviction, but Holmes and Justice Louis Brandeis dissented, holding that the government had demonstrated no "clear and present danger" in the four's political advocacy.

Extending protections

Justice Louis Brandeis wrote several dissents in the 1920s upholding free speech claims.

The Supreme Court denied a number of Free Speech Clause claims throughout the 1920s, including the appeal of a labor organizer, Benjamin Gitlow, who had been convicted after distributing a manifesto calling for a "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat". In Gitlow v. New York (1925), the Court upheld the conviction, but a majority also found that the First Amendment applied to state laws as well as federal laws, via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes and Brandeis dissented in several more cases in this decade, however, advancing the argument that the Free Speech Clause protected a far greater range of political speech than the Court had previously acknowledged. In Whitney v. California (1927), in which Communist Party USA organizer Charlotte Anita Whitney had been arrested for "criminal syndicalism", Brandeis wrote a dissent in which he argued for broader protections for political speech:

Those who won our independence ... believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.

In Herndon v. Lowry (1937), the Court heard the case of African American Communist Party organizer Angelo Herndon, who had been convicted under the Slave Insurrection Statute for advocating black rule in the southern United States. The Court reversed Herndon's conviction, holding that Georgia had failed to demonstrate any "clear and present danger" in Herndon's political advocacy. The clear and present danger test was again invoked by the majority in the 1940 Thornhill v. Alabama decision in which a state antipicketing law was invalidated. The importance of freedom of speech in the context of "clear and present danger" was emphasized in Terminiello v. City of Chicago (1949) where the Supreme Court noted that the vitality of civil and political institutions in society depends on free discussion. Democracy requires free speech because it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. Restrictions on free speech are only permissible when the speech at issue is likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the Court that "a function of free speech under our system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."

Although the Court referred to the clear and present danger test in a few decisions following Thornhill, the bad tendency test was not explicitly overruled, and the clear and present danger test was not applied in several subsequent free speech cases involving incitement to violence. In 1940, Congress enacted the Smith Act, making it illegal to advocate "the propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force and violence". The statute provided law enforcement a tool to combat Communist leaders. Eugene Dennis was convicted in the Foley Square trial for attempting to organize a Communist Party. In Dennis v. United States (1951), the Court upheld the Smith Act. Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson relied on Holmes' "clear and present danger" test as adapted by Learned Hand: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as necessary to avoid the danger." Clearly, Vinson suggested, clear and present danger did not intimate "that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited." In a concurring opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter proposed a "balancing test", which soon supplanted the "clear and present danger" test:

The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process.

In Yates v. United States (1957), the Supreme Court limited the Smith Act prosecutions to "advocacy of action" rather than "advocacy in the realm of ideas". Advocacy of abstract doctrine remained protected while speech explicitly inciting the forcible overthrow of the government was punishable under the Smith Act.

During the Vietnam War, the Court's position on public criticism of the government changed drastically. Though the Court upheld a law prohibiting the forgery, mutilation, or destruction of draft cards in United States v. O'Brien (1968), fearing that burning draft cards would interfere with the "smooth and efficient functioning" of the draft system, the next year, the court handed down its decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), expressly overruling Whitney v. California. Brandenburg discarded the "clear and present danger" test introduced in Schenck and further eroded Dennis. Now the Supreme Court referred to the right to speak openly of violent action and revolution in broad terms:

[Our] decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not allow a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or cause such action.

In Cohen v. California (1971), the Court voted reversed the conviction of a man wearing a jacket reading "Fuck the Draft" in the corridors of a Los Angeles County courthouse. Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote in the majority opinion that Cohen's jacket fell in the category of protected political speech despite the use of an expletive: "One man's vulgarity is another man's lyric."

Political speech

The ability to publicly criticize even the most prominent politicians and leaders without fear of retaliation is part of the First Amendment, because political speech is core First Amendment speech. As the Supreme Court stated with respect to the judicial branch of the government exemplarily that the First Amendment prohibits "any law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow. [...] The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect."

Anonymous speech

In Talley v. California (1960), the Court struck down a Los Angeles city ordinance that made it a crime to distribute anonymous pamphlets. Justice Hugo Black wrote in the majority opinion: "There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression. ... Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind." In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995), the Court struck down an Ohio statute that made it a crime to distribute anonymous campaign literature. However, in Meese v. Keene (1987), the Court upheld the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, under which several Canadian films were defined as "political propaganda", requiring their sponsors to be identified.

Campaign finance

See also: Campaign finance reform in the United States

U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell, plaintiff in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court reviewed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and related laws, which restricted the monetary contributions that may be made to political campaigns and expenditure by candidates. The Court affirmed the constitutionality of limits on campaign contributions, saying they "serve[d] the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion." However, the Court overturned the spending limits, which it found imposed "substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech".

The court again scrutinized campaign finance regulation in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003). The case centered on the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), a federal law that imposed new restrictions on campaign financing. The Supreme Court upheld provisions which barred the raising of soft money by national parties and the use of soft money by private organizations to fund certain advertisements related to elections. However, the Court struck down the "choice of expenditure" rule, which required that parties could either make coordinated expenditures for all its candidates, or permit candidates to spend independently, but not both, which the Court agreed "placed an unconstitutional burden on the parties' right to make unlimited independent expenditures". The Court also ruled that the provision preventing minors from making political contributions was unconstitutional, relying on Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.

In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2007), the Court sustained an "as applied" challenge to BCRA, holding that issue ads may not be banned from the months preceding a primary or general election. In Davis v. Federal Election Commission (2008), the Supreme Court declared the "Millionaire's Amendment" provisions of the BCRA to be unconstitutional. The Court held that easing BCRA restrictions for an opponent of a self-financing candidate spending at least $350,000 of his or her own money violated the freedom of speech of the self-financing candidate.

In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), the Court ruled that the BCRA's federal restrictions on electoral advocacy by corporations or unions were unconstitutional for violating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), which had upheld a state law that prohibited corporations from using treasury funds to support or oppose candidates in elections did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also overruled the portion of McConnell that upheld such restrictions under the BCRA. In other words, the ruling was considered to hold that "political spending is a form of protected speech under the First Amendment".

In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014), the Court ruled that federal aggregate limits on how much a person can donate to candidates, political parties, and political action committees, combined respectively in a two-year period known as an "election cycle", violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

Flag desecration

The divisive issue of flag desecration as a form of protest first came before the Supreme Court in Street v. New York (1969). In response to hearing an erroneous report of the murder of civil rights activist James Meredith, Sidney Street burned a 48-star U.S. flag. Street was arrested and charged with a New York state law making it a crime "publicly [to] mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or act [any flag of the United States]". The Court, relying on Stromberg v. California (1931), found that because the provision of the New York law criminalizing "words" against the flag was unconstitutional, and the trial did not sufficiently demonstrate he had been convicted solely under the provisions not yet deemed unconstitutional, the conviction was unconstitutional. The Court, however, "resist[ed] the pulls to decide the constitutional issues involved in this case on a broader basis" and left the constitutionality of flag-burning unaddressed.

The ambiguity with regard to flag-burning statutes was eliminated in Texas v. Johnson (1989). In that case, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag at a demonstration during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas. Charged with violating a Texas law prohibiting the vandalizing of venerated objects, Johnson was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote in the decision that "if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable." Congress then passed a federal law barring flag burning, but the Supreme Court struck it down as well in United States v. Eichman (1990). A Flag Desecration Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has been proposed repeatedly in Congress since 1989, and in 2006 failed to pass the Senate by a single vote.

Falsifying military awards

While the unauthorized wear or sale of the Medal of Honor has been a punishable offense under federal law since the early twentieth century, the Stolen Valor Act criminalized the act of not only wearing, but also verbally claiming entitlement to military awards a person did not in fact earn. In United States v. Alvarez (2012), the Supreme Court struck down the Act, ruling that the First Amendment bars the government from punishing people for making false claims regarding military service or honors where the false claim was not "made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations". The Supreme Court could not agree on a single rationale for its decision.

Compelled speech

Main article: Compelled speech

The Supreme Court has determined that the First Amendment also protects citizens from being compelled by the government to say or to pay for certain speech.

In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), the Court ruled that school children could not be punished for refusing either to say the pledge of allegiance or salute the American flag. The Court also overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940), which had upheld such punishments of school children.

In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018), the Court ruled that a California law requiring crisis pregnancy centers to post notices informing patients they can obtain free or low-cost abortions and include the number of the state agency that can connect the women with abortion providers violated those centers' right to free speech.

In Janus v. AFSCME (2018), the Court ruled that requiring a public sector employee to pay dues to a union to which he is not a member violated the First Amendment. According to the Court, "the First Amendment does not permit the government to compel a person to pay for another party's speech just because the government thinks that the speech furthers the interests of the person who does not want to pay." The Court also overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977), which had upheld legally obligating public sector employees to pay such dues.

Commercial speech

Main article: Commercial speech

Commercial speech is speech done on behalf of a company or individual for the purpose of making a profit. Unlike political speech, the Supreme Court does not afford commercial speech full protection under the First Amendment. To effectively distinguish commercial speech from other types of speech for purposes of litigation, the Court uses a list of four indicia:

1. The contents do "no more than propose a commercial transaction".
2. The contents may be characterized as advertisements.
3. The contents reference a specific product.
4. The disseminator is economically motivated to distribute the speech.

Alone, each indicium does not compel the conclusion that an instance of speech is commercial; however, "[t]he combination of all these characteristics ... provides strong support for ... the conclusion that the [speech is] properly characterized as commercial speech."

In Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942), the Court upheld a New York City ordinance forbidding the "distribution in the streets of commercial and business advertising matter", ruling the First Amendment protection of free speech did not include commercial speech.

In Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976), the Court overturned Valentine and ruled that commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection:

What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. ... [W]e conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative.

In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association (1978), the Court ruled that commercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment as much as other types of speech:

We have not discarded the 'common-sense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech. To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite a dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the [First] Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.^[240]

In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980), the Court clarified what analysis was required before the government could justify regulating commercial speech:

1. Is the expression protected by the First Amendment? Lawful? Misleading? Fraud?
2. Is the asserted government interest substantial?
3. Does the regulation directly advance the governmental interest asserted?
4. Is the regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest?

Six years later, the U.S. Supreme Court, applying the Central Hudson standards in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico (1986), affirmed the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's conclusion that Puerto Rico's Games of Chance Act of 1948, including the regulations thereunder, was not facially unconstitutional. The lax interpretation of Central Hudson adopted by Posadas was soon restricted under 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996), when the Court invalidated a Rhode Island law prohibiting the publication of liquor prices.

School speech

Main article: Freedom of speech in schools in the United States

In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), the Supreme Court extended free speech rights to students in school. The case involved several students who were punished for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. The Court ruled that the school could not restrict symbolic speech that did not "materially and substantially" interrupt school activities. Justice Abe Fortas wrote:

First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. ... [S]chools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students ... are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.

In Healy v. James (1972), the Court ruled that Central Connecticut State College's refusal to recognize a campus chapter of Students for a Democratic Society was unconstitutional, reaffirming Tinker.

However, since 1969 the Court has also placed several limitations on Tinker. In Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986), the Court ruled that a student could be punished for his sexual-innuendo-laced speech before a school assembly and, in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), the Court found that schools need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with their basic educational mission. In Morse v. Frederick (2007), the Court ruled that schools could restrict student speech at school-sponsored events, even events away from school grounds, if students promote "illegal drug use".

In 2014, the University of Chicago released the "Chicago Statement", a free speech policy statement designed to combat censorship on campus. This statement was later adopted by a number of top-ranked universities including Princeton University, Washington University in St. Louis, Johns Hopkins University, and Columbia University.

Internet access

In Packingham v. North Carolina (2017), the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina law prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing various websites impermissibly restricted lawful speech in violation of the First Amendment. The Court held that "a fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more."

Obscenity

Further information: United States obscenity law

Justice Potter Stewart wrote that while he could not precisely define pornography, he "[knew] it when [he saw] it".

According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the First Amendment's protection of free speech does not apply to obscene speech. Therefore, both the federal government and the states have tried to prohibit or otherwise restrict obscene speech, in particular the form that is now called pornography. As of 2019, pornography, except for child pornography, is in practice free of governmental restrictions in the United States, though pornography about "extreme" sexual practices is occasionally prosecuted. The change in the twentieth century, from total prohibition in 1900 to near-total tolerance in 2000, reflects a series of court cases involving the definition of obscenity. The U.S. Supreme Court has found that most pornography is not obscene, a result of changing definitions of both obscenity and pornography. The legal tolerance also reflects changed social attitudes: one reason there are so few prosecutions for pornography is that juries will not convict.

In Rosen v. United States (1896), the Supreme Court adopted the same obscenity standard as had been articulated in a famous British case, Regina v. Hicklin (1868). The Hicklin test defined material as obscene if it tended "to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall". In the early twentieth century, literary works including An American Tragedy (Theodore Dreiser, 1925) and Lady Chatterley's Lover (D.H. Lawrence, 1928) were banned for obscenity. In the federal district court case United States v. One Book Called Ulysses (1933), Judge John M. Woolsey established a new standard to evaluate James Joyce's novel Ulysses (1922), stating that works must be considered in their entirety, rather than declared obscene on the basis of an individual part of the work.

The Supreme Court ruled in Roth v. United States (1957) that the First Amendment did not protect obscenity. It also ruled that the Hicklin test was inappropriate; instead, the Roth test for obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest". This definition proved hard to apply, however, and in the following decade, members of the Court often reviewed films individually in a court building screening room to determine if they should be considered obscene. Justice Potter Stewart, in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964), famously said that, although he could not precisely define pornography, "I know it when I see it".

The Roth test was expanded when the Court decided Miller v. California (1973). Under the Miller test, a work is obscene if:

(a)  'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find the work, as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... (b) ... the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) ... the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

"Community" standards—not national standards—are applied to determine whether allegedly obscene material appeals to the prurient interest and is patently offensive. By contrast, the question whether a work lacks serious value depends upon "whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material, taken as a whole."

Child pornography is not subject to the Miller test, as the Supreme Court decided in New York v. Ferber (1982) and Osborne v. Ohio (1990), ruling that the government's interest in protecting children from abuse was paramount.

Personal possession of obscene material in the home may not be prohibited by law. In Stanley v. Georgia (1969), the Court ruled that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." However, it is constitutionally permissible for the government to prevent the mailing or sale of obscene items, though they may be viewed only in private. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) further upheld these rights by invalidating the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, holding that, because the act "[p]rohibit[ed] child pornography that does not depict an actual child" (simulated child pornography) it was overly broad and unconstitutional under the First Amendment and:

First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.

In United States v. Williams (2008), the Court upheld the PROTECT Act of 2003, ruling that prohibiting offers to provide and requests to obtain child pornography did not violate the First Amendment, even if a person charged under the Act did not possess child pornography.

Memoirs of convicted criminals

In some states, there are Son of Sam laws prohibiting convicted criminals from publishing memoirs for profit. These laws were a response to offers to David Berkowitz to write memoirs about the murders he committed. The Supreme Court struck down a law of this type in New York as a violation of the First Amendment in the case Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Board (1991). That statute did not prohibit publication of a memoir by a convicted criminal. Instead, it provided that all profits from the book were to be put in escrow for a time. The interest from the escrow account was used to fund the New York State Crime Victims Board—an organization that pays the medical and related bills of victims of crime. Similar laws in other states remain unchallenged.

Defamation

Further information: United States defamation law

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote the landmark decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, requiring the demonstration of "actual malice" in libel suits against public figures.

American tort liability for defamatory speech or publications traces its origins to English common law. For the first two hundred years of American jurisprudence, the basic substance of defamation law continued to resemble that existing in England at the time of the Revolution. An 1898 American legal textbook on defamation provides definitions of libel and slander nearly identical to those given by William Blackstone and Edward Coke. An action of slander required the following:

1. Actionable words, such as those imputing the injured party: is guilty of some offense, suffers from a contagious disease or psychological disorder, is unfit for public office because of moral failings or an inability to discharge his or her duties, or lacks integrity in profession, trade or business;
2. That the charge must be false;
3. That the charge must be articulated to a third person, verbally or in writing;
4. That the words are not subject to legal protection, such as those uttered in Congress; and
5. That the charge must be motivated by malice.

An action of libel required the same five general points as slander, except that it specifically involved the publication of defamatory statements. For certain criminal charges of libel, such as seditious libel, the truth or falsity of the statements was immaterial, as such laws were intended to maintain public support of the government and true statements could damage this support even more than false ones. Instead, libel placed specific emphasis on the result of the publication. Libelous publications tended to "degrade and injure another person" or "bring him into contempt, hatred or ridicule".

Concerns that defamation under common law might be incompatible with the new republican form of government caused early American courts to struggle between William Blackstone's argument that the punishment of "dangerous or offensive writings ... [was] necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty" and the argument that the need for a free press guaranteed by the Constitution outweighed the fear of what might be written. Consequently, very few changes were made in the first two centuries after the ratification of the First Amendment.

The Supreme Court's ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) fundamentally changed American defamation law. The case redefined the type of "malice" needed to sustain a libel case. Common law malice consisted of "ill-will" or "wickedness". Now, a public officials seeking to sustain a civil action against a tortfeasor needed to prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that there was actual malice. The case involved an advertisement published in The New York Times indicating that officials in Montgomery, Alabama had acted violently in suppressing the protests of African-Americans during the civil rights movement. The Montgomery Police Commissioner, L. B. Sullivan, sued the Times for libel, saying the advertisement damaged his reputation. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the $500,000 judgment against the Times. Justice Brennan suggested that public officials may sue for libel only if the statements in question were published with "actual malice"—"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not". In sum, the court held that "the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity)."

While actual malice standard applies to public officials and public figures, in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps (1988), the Court found that, with regard to private individuals, the First Amendment does "not necessarily force any change in at least some features of the common-law landscape". In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985) the Court ruled that "actual malice" need not be shown in cases involving private individuals, holding that "[i]n light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern ... the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even absent a showing of 'actual malice'." In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), the Court ruled that a private individual had to prove malice only to be awarded punitive damages, not actual damages. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988), the Court extended the "actual malice" standard to intentional infliction of emotional distress in a ruling which protected parody, in this case a fake advertisement in Hustler suggesting that evangelist Jerry Falwell's first sexual experience had been with his mother in an outhouse. Since Falwell was a public figure, the Court ruled that "importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern" was the paramount concern, and reversed the judgement Falwell had won against Hustler for emotional distress.

In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990), the Court ruled that the First Amendment offers no wholesale exception to defamation law for statements labeled "opinion", but instead that a statement must be provably false (falsifiable) before it can be the subject of a libel suit. Nonetheless, it has been argued that Milkovich and other cases effectively provide for an opinion privilege.

Private action

Despite the common misconception that the First Amendment prohibits anyone from limiting free speech, the text of the amendment prohibits only the federal government, the states and local governments from doing so.

State constitutions provide free speech protections similar to those of the U.S. Constitution. In a few states, such as California, a state constitution has been interpreted as providing more comprehensive protections than the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has permitted states to extend such enhanced protections, most notably in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins. In that case, the Court unanimously ruled that while the First Amendment may allow private property owners to prohibit trespass by political speakers and petition-gatherers, California was permitted to restrict property owners whose property is equivalent to a traditional public forum (often shopping malls and grocery stores) from enforcing their private property rights to exclude such individuals. However, the Court did maintain that shopping centers could impose "reasonable restrictions on expressive activity". Subsequently, New Jersey, Colorado, Massachusetts and Puerto Rico courts have adopted the doctrine; California's courts have repeatedly reaffirmed it.

Freedom of the press

Further information: Freedom of the press in the United States

The free speech and free press clauses have been interpreted as providing the same protection to speakers as to writers, except for radio and television wireless broadcasting which have, for historical reasons, been given less constitutional protections. The Free Press Clause protects the right of individuals to express themselves through publication and dissemination of information, ideas and opinions without interference, constraint or prosecution by the government. This right was described in Branzburg v. Hayes as "a fundamental personal right" that is not confined to newspapers and periodicals, but also embraces pamphlets and leaflets. In Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes defined "press" as "every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion". This right has been extended to media including newspapers, books, plays, movies, and video games. While it is an open question whether people who blog or use social media are journalists entitled to protection by media shield laws, they are protected equally by the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause, because both clauses do not distinguish between media businesses and nonprofessional speakers. This is further shown by the Supreme Court consistently refusing to recognize the First Amendment as providing greater protection to the institutional media than to other speakers. For example, in a case involving campaign finance laws the Court rejected the "suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the same communication by" non-institutional-press businesses. Justice Felix Frankfurter stated in a concurring opinion in another case succinctly: "[T]he purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it." In Mills v. Alabama (1943) the Supreme Court laid out the purpose of the free press clause:

The Newseum's depiction of the five freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment to the US Constitution in Washington, D.C.

Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This, of course, includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes. The Constitution specifically selected the press, which includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and circulars, see Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus, the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials, and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, which is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.

A landmark decision for press freedom came in Near v. Minnesota (1931), in which the Supreme Court rejected prior restraint (pre-publication censorship). In this case, the Minnesota legislature passed a statute allowing courts to shut down "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspapers", allowing a defense of truth only in cases where the truth had been told "with good motives and for justifiable ends". The Court applied the Free Press Clause to the states, rejecting the statute as unconstitutional. Hughes quoted Madison in the majority decision, writing, "The impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press."

The leak of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg (pictured here in 2018) led to New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), a landmark press freedom decision.

However, Near also noted an exception, allowing prior restraint in cases such as "publication of sailing dates of transports or the number or location of troops". This exception was a key point in another landmark case four decades later: New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), in which the administration of President Richard Nixon sought to ban the publication of the Pentagon Papers, classified government documents about the Vietnam War secretly copied by analyst Daniel Ellsberg. The Court found that the Nixon administration had not met the heavy burden of proof required for prior restraint. Justice Brennan, drawing on Near in a concurrent opinion, wrote that "only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an evil kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order." Justices Black and Douglas went still further, writing that prior restraints were never justified.

The courts have rarely treated content-based regulation of journalism with any sympathy. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (1974), the Court unanimously struck down a state law requiring newspapers criticizing political candidates to publish their responses. The state claimed the law had been passed to ensure journalistic responsibility. The Supreme Court found that freedom, but not responsibility, is mandated by the First Amendment and so it ruled that the government may not force newspapers to publish that which they do not desire to publish.

Content-based regulation of television and radio, however, have been sustained by the Supreme Court in various cases. Since there is a limited number of frequencies for non-cable television and radio stations, the government licenses them to various companies. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the problem of scarcity does not allow the raising of a First Amendment issue. The government may restrain broadcasters, but only on a content-neutral basis. In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Communications Commission's authority to restrict the use of "indecent" material in broadcasting.

State governments retain the right to tax newspapers, just as they may tax other commercial products. Generally, however, taxes that focus exclusively on newspapers have been found unconstitutional. In Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936), the Court invalidated a state tax on newspaper advertising revenues, holding that the role of the press in creating "informed public opinion" was vital. Similarly, some taxes that give preferential treatment to the press have been struck down. In Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland (1987), for instance, the Court invalidated an Arkansas law exempting "religious, professional, trade and sports journals" from taxation since the law amounted to the regulation of newspaper content. In Leathers v. Medlock (1991), the Supreme Court found that states may treat different types of the media differently, such as by taxing cable television, but not newspapers. The Court found that "differential taxation of speakers, even members of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas."

In Branzburg v. Hayes (1972), the Court ruled that the First Amendment did not give a journalist the right to refuse a subpoena from a grand jury. The issue decided in the case was whether a journalist could refuse to "appear and testify before state and Federal grand juries" basing the refusal on the belief that such appearance and testimony "abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment". The decision was that such a protection was not provided by the First Amendment. However, a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell, in which he said a claim for press privilege "should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions," has been frequently cited by lower courts since the decision.

Petition and assembly

Further information: Right to petition in the United States and Freedom of assembly

Chief Justice Morrison Waite ruled in United States v. Cruikshank (1875) that the right of assembly was a secondary right to the right to petition.

The Petition Clause protects the right "to petition the government for a redress of grievances". The right expanded over the years: "It is no longer confined to demands for 'a redress of grievances', in any accurate meaning of these words, but comprehends demands for an exercise by the government of its powers in furtherance of the interest and prosperity of the petitioners and of their views on politically contentious matters." The right to petition the government for a redress of grievances therefore includes the right to communicate with government officials, lobbying government officials and petitioning the courts by filing lawsuits with a legal basis. The Petition Clause first came to prominence in the 1830s, when Congress established the gag rule barring anti-slavery petitions from being heard; the rule was overturned by Congress several years later. Petitions against the Espionage Act of 1917 resulted in imprisonments. The Supreme Court did not rule on either issue.

In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (1972), the Supreme Court said the right to petition encompasses "the approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition." Today, thus, this right encompasses petitions to all three branches of the federal government—the Congress, the executive and the judiciary—and has been extended to the states through incorporation. According to the Supreme Court, "redress of grievances" is to be construed broadly: it includes not solely appeals by the public to the government for the redressing of a grievance in the traditional sense, but also, petitions on behalf of private interests seeking personal gain. The right protects not only demands for "a redress of grievances" but also demands for government action. The petition clause includes according to the Supreme Court the opportunity to institute non-frivolous lawsuits and mobilize popular support to change existing laws in a peaceful manner.

In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011), the Supreme Court stated regarding the Free Speech Clause and the Petition Clause:

It is not necessary to say that the two Clauses are identical in their mandate or their purpose and effect to acknowledge that the rights of speech and petition share substantial common ground ... Both speech and petition are integral to the democratic process, although not necessarily in the same way. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs. Beyond the political sphere, both speech and petition advance personal expression, although the right to petition is generally concerned with expression directed to the government seeking redress of a grievance.

The right of assembly is the individual right of people to come together and collectively express, promote, pursue, and defend their collective or shared ideas. This right is equally important as those of free speech and free press, because, as observed by the Supreme Court of the United States in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 365 (1937), the right of peaceable assembly is "cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental ... [It] is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions—principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause ... The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question ... is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." The right of peaceable assembly was originally distinguished from the right to petition. In United States v. Cruikshank (1875), the first case in which the right to assembly was before the Supreme Court, the court broadly declared the outlines of the right of assembly and its connection to the right of petition:

The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or duties of the National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.

Justice Morrison Waite's opinion for the Court carefully distinguished the right to peaceably assemble as a secondary right, while the right to petition was labeled to be a primary right. Later cases, however, paid less attention to these distinctions. An example for this is Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization (1939), where it was decided that the freedom of assembly covered by the First Amendment applies to public forums like streets and parks. In two 1960s decisions collectively known as forming the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the Court established that the right to petition prohibited the application of antitrust law to statements made by private entities before public bodies: a monopolist may freely go before the city council and encourage the denial of its competitor's building permit without being subject to Sherman Act liability.

Freedom of association

Further information: Freedom of association § United States Constitution

Although the First Amendment does not explicitly mention freedom of association, the Supreme Court ruled, in NAACP v. Alabama (1958), that this freedom was protected by the amendment and that privacy of membership was an essential part of this freedom. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984), the Court stated that "implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment" is "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends". In Roberts the Court held that associations may not exclude people for reasons unrelated to the group's expression, such as gender.

However, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995), the Court ruled that a group may exclude people from membership if their presence would affect the group's ability to advocate a particular point of view. Likewise, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), the Court ruled that a New Jersey law, which forced the Boy Scouts of America to admit an openly gay member, to be an unconstitutional abridgment of the Boy Scouts' right to free association.

In Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta (2021), the Court ruled that California's requiring disclosure of the identities of nonprofit companies' big-money donors did not serve a narrowly tailored government interest and, thus, violated those donors' First Amendment rights.