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Thursday, January 25, 2024

Metamathematics

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The title page of the Principia Mathematica (shortened version), an important work of metamathematics.

Metamathematics is the study of mathematics itself using mathematical methods. This study produces metatheories, which are mathematical theories about other mathematical theories. Emphasis on metamathematics (and perhaps the creation of the term itself) owes itself to David Hilbert's attempt to secure the foundations of mathematics in the early part of the 20th century. Metamathematics provides "a rigorous mathematical technique for investigating a great variety of foundation problems for mathematics and logic" (Kleene 1952, p. 59). An important feature of metamathematics is its emphasis on differentiating between reasoning from inside a system and from outside a system. An informal illustration of this is categorizing the proposition "2+2=4" as belonging to mathematics while categorizing the proposition "'2+2=4' is valid" as belonging to metamathematics.

History

Metamathematical metatheorems about mathematics itself were originally differentiated from ordinary mathematical theorems in the 19th century to focus on what was then called the foundational crisis of mathematics. Richard's paradox (Richard 1905) concerning certain 'definitions' of real numbers in the English language is an example of the sort of contradictions that can easily occur if one fails to distinguish between mathematics and metamathematics. Something similar can be said around the well-known Russell's paradox (Does the set of all those sets that do not contain themselves contain itself?).

Metamathematics was intimately connected to mathematical logic, so that the early histories of the two fields, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, largely overlap. More recently, mathematical logic has often included the study of new pure mathematics, such as set theory, category theory, recursion theory and pure model theory, which is not directly related to metamathematics.

Serious metamathematical reflection began with the work of Gottlob Frege, especially his Begriffsschrift, published in 1879.

David Hilbert was the first to invoke the term "metamathematics" with regularity (see Hilbert's program), in the early 20th century. In his hands, it meant something akin to contemporary proof theory, in which finitary methods are used to study various axiomatized mathematical theorems (Kleene 1952, p. 55).

Other prominent figures in the field include Bertrand Russell, Thoralf Skolem, Emil Post, Alonzo Church, Alan Turing, Stephen Kleene, Willard Quine, Paul Benacerraf, Hilary Putnam, Gregory Chaitin, Alfred Tarski, Paul Cohen and Kurt Gödel.

Today, metalogic and metamathematics broadly overlap, and both have been substantially subsumed by mathematical logic in academia.

Milestones

The discovery of hyperbolic geometry

The discovery of hyperbolic geometry had important philosophical consequences for metamathematics. Before its discovery there was just one geometry and mathematics; the idea that another geometry existed was considered improbable.

When Gauss discovered hyperbolic geometry, it is said that he did not publish anything about it out of fear of the "uproar of the Boeotians", which would ruin his status as princeps mathematicorum (Latin, "the Prince of Mathematicians"). The "uproar of the Boeotians" came and went, and gave an impetus to metamathematics and great improvements in mathematical rigour, analytical philosophy and logic.

Begriffsschrift

Begriffsschrift (German for, roughly, "concept-script") is a book on logic by Gottlob Frege, published in 1879, and the formal system set out in that book.

Begriffsschrift is usually translated as concept writing or concept notation; the full title of the book identifies it as "a formula language, modeled on that of arithmetic, of pure thought." Frege's motivation for developing his formal approach to logic resembled Leibniz's motivation for his calculus ratiocinator (despite that, in his Foreword Frege clearly denies that he reached this aim, and also that his main aim would be constructing an ideal language like Leibniz's, what Frege declares to be quite hard and idealistic, however, not impossible task). Frege went on to employ his logical calculus in his research on the foundations of mathematics, carried out over the next quarter century.

Principia Mathematica

Principia Mathematica, or "PM" as it is often abbreviated, was an attempt to describe a set of axioms and inference rules in symbolic logic from which all mathematical truths could in principle be proven. As such, this ambitious project is of great importance in the history of mathematics and philosophy, being one of the foremost products of the belief that such an undertaking may be achievable. However, in 1931, Gödel's incompleteness theorem proved definitively that PM, and in fact any other attempt, could never achieve this goal; that is, for any set of axioms and inference rules proposed to encapsulate mathematics, there would in fact be some truths of mathematics which could not be deduced from them.

One of the main inspirations and motivations for PM was the earlier work of Gottlob Frege on logic, which Russell discovered allowed for the construction of paradoxical sets. PM sought to avoid this problem by ruling out the unrestricted creation of arbitrary sets. This was achieved by replacing the notion of a general set with notion of a hierarchy of sets of different 'types', a set of a certain type only allowed to contain sets of strictly lower types. Contemporary mathematics, however, avoids paradoxes such as Russell's in less unwieldy ways, such as the system of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.

Gödel's incompleteness theorem

Gödel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems capable of doing arithmetic. The theorems, proven by Kurt Gödel in 1931, are important both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics. The two results are widely, but not universally, interpreted as showing that Hilbert's program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics is impossible, giving a negative answer to Hilbert's second problem.

The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an "effective procedure" (e.g., a computer program, but it could be any sort of algorithm) is capable of proving all truths about the relations of the natural numbers (arithmetic). For any such system, there will always be statements about the natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system. The second incompleteness theorem, an extension of the first, shows that such a system cannot demonstrate its own consistency.

Tarski's definition of model-theoretic satisfaction

The T-schema or truth schema (not to be confused with 'Convention T') is used to give an inductive definition of truth which lies at the heart of any realisation of Alfred Tarski's semantic theory of truth. Some authors refer to it as the "Equivalence Schema", a synonym introduced by Michael Dummett.

The T-schema is often expressed in natural language, but it can be formalized in many-sorted predicate logic or modal logic; such a formalisation is called a T-theory. T-theories form the basis of much fundamental work in philosophical logic, where they are applied in several important controversies in analytic philosophy.

As expressed in semi-natural language (where 'S' is the name of the sentence abbreviated to S): 'S' is true if and only if S

Example: 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.

The undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem

The Entscheidungsproblem (German for 'decision problem') is a challenge posed by David Hilbert in 1928. The Entscheidungsproblem asks for an algorithm that takes as input a statement of a first-order logic (possibly with a finite number of axioms beyond the usual axioms of first-order logic) and answers "Yes" or "No" according to whether the statement is universally valid, i.e., valid in every structure satisfying the axioms. By the completeness theorem of first-order logic, a statement is universally valid if and only if it can be deduced from the axioms, so the Entscheidungsproblem can also be viewed as asking for an algorithm to decide whether a given statement is provable from the axioms using the rules of logic.

In 1936, Alonzo Church and Alan Turing published independent papers showing that a general solution to the Entscheidungsproblem is impossible, assuming that the intuitive notation of "effectively calculable" is captured by the functions computable by a Turing machine (or equivalently, by those expressible in the lambda calculus). This assumption is now known as the Church–Turing thesis.

Metalanguage

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In logic and linguistics, a metalanguage is a language used to describe another language, often called the object language. Expressions in a metalanguage are often distinguished from those in the object language by the use of italics, quotation marks, or writing on a separate line. The structure of sentences and phrases in a metalanguage can be described by a metasyntax. For example, to say that the word "noun" can be used as a noun in a sentence, one could write "noun" is a <noun>.

Types of metalanguage

There are a variety of recognized types of metalanguage, including embedded, ordered, and nested (or hierarchical) metalanguages.

Embedded

An embedded metalanguage is a language formally, naturally and firmly fixed in an object language. This idea is found in Douglas Hofstadter's book, Gödel, Escher, Bach, in a discussion of the relationship between formal languages and number theory: "... it is in the nature of any formalization of number theory that its metalanguage is embedded within it."

It occurs in natural, or informal, languages, as well—such as in English, where words such as noun, verb, or even word describe features and concepts pertaining to the English language itself.

Ordered

An ordered metalanguage is analogous to an ordered logic. An example of an ordered metalanguage is the construction of one metalanguage to discuss an object language, followed by the creation of another metalanguage to discuss the first, etc.

Nested

A nested (or hierarchical) metalanguage is similar to an ordered metalanguage in that each level represents a greater degree of abstraction. However, a nested metalanguage differs from an ordered one in that each level includes the one below.

The paradigmatic example of a nested metalanguage comes from the Linnean taxonomic system in biology. Each level in the system incorporates the one below it. The language used to discuss genus is also used to discuss species; the one used to discuss orders is also used to discuss genera, etc., up to kingdoms.

In natural language

Natural language combines nested and ordered metalanguages. In a natural language there is an infinite regress of metalanguages, each with more specialized vocabulary and simpler syntax.

Designating the language now as , the grammar of the language is a discourse in the metalanguage , which is a sublanguage nested within .

  • The grammar of , which has the form of a factual description, is a discourse in the metametalanguage , which is also a sublanguage of .
  • The grammar of , which has the form of a theory describing the syntactic structure of such factual descriptions, is stated in the metametametalanguage , which likewise is a sublanguage of .
  • The grammar of has the form of a metatheory describing the syntactic structure of theories stated in .
  • and succeeding metalanguages have the same grammar as , differing only in reference.

Since all of these metalanguages are sublanguages of , is a nested metalanguage, but and sequel are ordered metalanguages. Since all these metalanguages are sublanguages of they are all embedded languages with respect to the language as a whole.

Metalanguages of formal systems all resolve ultimately to natural language, the 'common parlance' in which mathematicians and logicians converse to define their terms and operations and 'read out' their formulae.

Types of expressions

There are several entities commonly expressed in a metalanguage. In logic usually the object language that the metalanguage is discussing is a formal language, and very often the metalanguage as well.

Deductive systems

A deductive system (or, deductive apparatus of a formal system) consists of the axioms (or axiom schemata) and rules of inference that can be used to derive the theorems of the system.

Metavariables

A metavariable (or metalinguistic or metasyntactic variable) is a symbol or set of symbols in a metalanguage which stands for a symbol or set of symbols in some object language. For instance, in the sentence:

Let A and B be arbitrary formulas of a formal language .

The symbols A and B are not symbols of the object language , they are metavariables in the metalanguage (in this case, English) that is discussing the object language .

Metatheories and metatheorems

A metatheory is a theory whose subject matter is some other theory (a theory about a theory). Statements made in the metatheory about the theory are called metatheorems. A metatheorem is a true statement about a formal system expressed in a metalanguage. Unlike theorems proved within a given formal system, a metatheorem is proved within a metatheory, and may reference concepts that are present in the metatheory but not the object theory.

Interpretations

An interpretation is an assignment of meanings to the symbols and words of a language.

Role in metaphor

Michael J. Reddy (1979) argues that much of the language we use to talk about language is conceptualized and structured by what he refers to as the conduit metaphor. This paradigm operates through two distinct, related frameworks.

The major framework views language as a sealed pipeline between people:

Major framework
Stage Description Example
1 Language transfers people's thoughts and feelings (mental content) to others Try to get your thoughts across better
2 Speakers and writers insert their mental content into words You have to put each concept into words more carefully
3 Words are containers That sentence was filled with emotion
4 Listeners and readers extract mental content from words Let me know if you find any new sensations in the poem

The minor framework views language as an open pipe spilling mental content into the void:

Minor framework
Stage Description Example
1 Speakers and writers eject mental content into an external space Get those ideas out where they can do some good
2 Mental content is reified (viewed as concrete) in this space That concept has been floating around for decades
3 Listeners and readers extract mental content from this space Let me know if you find any good concepts in the essay

Metaprogramming

Computers follow programs, sets of instructions in a formal language. The development of a programming language involves the use of a metalanguage. The act of working with metalanguages in programming is known as metaprogramming.

Backus–Naur form, developed in the 1960s by John Backus and Peter Naur, is one of the earliest metalanguages used in computing. Examples of modern-day programming languages which commonly find use in metaprogramming include ML, Lisp, m4, and Yacc.

Metalogic

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Metalogic is the study of the metatheory of logic. Whereas logic studies how logical systems can be used to construct valid and sound arguments, metalogic studies the properties of logical systems. Logic concerns the truths that may be derived using a logical system; metalogic concerns the truths that may be derived about the languages and systems that are used to express truths.

The basic objects of metalogical study are formal languages, formal systems, and their interpretations. The study of interpretation of formal systems is the branch of mathematical logic that is known as model theory, and the study of deductive systems is the branch that is known as proof theory.

Overview

Formal language

A formal language is an organized set of symbols, the symbols of which precisely define it by shape and place. Such a language therefore can be defined without reference to the meanings of its expressions; it can exist before any interpretation is assigned to it—that is, before it has any meaning. First-order logic is expressed in some formal language. A formal grammar determines which symbols and sets of symbols are formulas in a formal language.

A formal language can be formally defined as a set A of strings (finite sequences) on a fixed alphabet α. Some authors, including Rudolf Carnap, define the language as the ordered pair <α, A>. Carnap also requires that each element of α must occur in at least one string in A.

Formation rules

Formation rules (also called formal grammar) are a precise description of the well-formed formulas of a formal language. They are synonymous with the set of strings over the alphabet of the formal language that constitute well formed formulas. However, it does not describe their semantics (i.e. what they mean).

Formal systems

A formal system (also called a logical calculus, or a logical system) consists of a formal language together with a deductive apparatus (also called a deductive system). The deductive apparatus may consist of a set of transformation rules (also called inference rules) or a set of axioms, or have both. A formal system is used to derive one expression from one or more other expressions.

A formal system can be formally defined as an ordered triple <α,,d>, where d is the relation of direct derivability. This relation is understood in a comprehensive sense such that the primitive sentences of the formal system are taken as directly derivable from the empty set of sentences. Direct derivability is a relation between a sentence and a finite, possibly empty set of sentences. Axioms are so chosen that every first place member of d is a member of and every second place member is a finite subset of .

A formal system can also be defined with only the relation d. Thereby can be omitted and α in the definitions of interpreted formal language, and interpreted formal system. However, this method can be more difficult to understand and use.

Formal proofs

A formal proof is a sequence of well-formed formulas of a formal language, the last of which is a theorem of a formal system. The theorem is a syntactic consequence of all the well formed formulae that precede it in the proof system. For a well formed formula to qualify as part of a proof, it must result from applying a rule of the deductive apparatus of some formal system to the previous well formed formulae in the proof sequence.

Interpretations

An interpretation of a formal system is the assignment of meanings to the symbols and truth-values to the sentences of the formal system. The study of interpretations is called Formal semantics. Giving an interpretation is synonymous with constructing a model.

Important distinctions

Metalanguage–object language

In metalogic, formal languages are sometimes called object languages. The language used to make statements about an object language is called a metalanguage. This distinction is a key difference between logic and metalogic. While logic deals with proofs in a formal system, expressed in some formal language, metalogic deals with proofs about a formal system which are expressed in a metalanguage about some object language.

Syntax–semantics

In metalogic, 'syntax' has to do with formal languages or formal systems without regard to any interpretation of them, whereas, 'semantics' has to do with interpretations of formal languages. The term 'syntactic' has a slightly wider scope than 'proof-theoretic', since it may be applied to properties of formal languages without any deductive systems, as well as to formal systems. 'Semantic' is synonymous with 'model-theoretic'.

Use–mention

In metalogic, the words 'use' and 'mention', in both their noun and verb forms, take on a technical sense in order to identify an important distinction. The use–mention distinction (sometimes referred to as the words-as-words distinction) is the distinction between using a word (or phrase) and mentioning it. Usually it is indicated that an expression is being mentioned rather than used by enclosing it in quotation marks, printing it in italics, or setting the expression by itself on a line. The enclosing in quotes of an expression gives us the name of an expression, for example:

'Metalogic' is the name of this article.
This article is about metalogic.

Type–token

The type-token distinction is a distinction in metalogic, that separates an abstract concept from the objects which are particular instances of the concept. For example, the particular bicycle in your garage is a token of the type of thing known as "The bicycle." Whereas, the bicycle in your garage is in a particular place at a particular time, that is not true of "the bicycle" as used in the sentence: "The bicycle has become more popular recently." This distinction is used to clarify the meaning of symbols of formal languages.

History

Metalogical questions have been asked since the time of Aristotle. However, it was only with the rise of formal languages in the late 19th and early 20th century that investigations into the foundations of logic began to flourish. In 1904, David Hilbert observed that in investigating the foundations of mathematics that logical notions are presupposed, and therefore a simultaneous account of metalogical and metamathematical principles was required. Today, metalogic and metamathematics are largely synonymous with each other, and both have been substantially subsumed by mathematical logic in academia. A possible alternate, less mathematical model may be found in the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce and other semioticians.

Results

Results in metalogic consist of such things as formal proofs demonstrating the consistency, completeness, and decidability of particular formal systems.

Major results in metalogic include:

Scheme (mathematics)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In mathematics, a scheme is a mathematical structure that enlarges the notion of algebraic variety in several ways, such as taking account of multiplicities (the equations x = 0 and x2 = 0 define the same algebraic variety but different schemes) and allowing "varieties" defined over any commutative ring (for example, Fermat curves are defined over the integers).

Scheme theory was introduced by Alexander Grothendieck in 1960 in his treatise Éléments de géométrie algébrique; one of its aims was developing the formalism needed to solve deep problems of algebraic geometry, such as the Weil conjectures (the last of which was proved by Pierre Deligne). Strongly based on commutative algebra, scheme theory allows a systematic use of methods of topology and homological algebra. Scheme theory also unifies algebraic geometry with much of number theory, which eventually led to Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem.

Formally, a scheme is a topological space, together with commutative rings for all of its open sets, that arises from gluing together spectra (spaces of prime ideals) of commutative rings along their open subsets. In other words, it is a ringed space that is locally a spectrum of a commutative ring.

The relative point of view is that much of algebraic geometry should be developed for a morphism XY of schemes (called a scheme X over Y), rather than for an individual scheme. For example, in studying algebraic surfaces, it can be useful to consider families of algebraic surfaces over any scheme Y. In many cases, the family of all varieties of a given type can itself be viewed as a variety or scheme, known as a moduli space.

For some of the detailed definitions in the theory of schemes, see the glossary of scheme theory.

Development

The origins of algebraic geometry mostly lie in the study of polynomial equations over the real numbers. By the 19th century, it became clear (notably in the work of Jean-Victor Poncelet and Bernhard Riemann) that algebraic geometry was simplified by working over the field of complex numbers, which has the advantage of being algebraically closed. Two issues gradually drew attention in the early 20th century, motivated by problems in number theory: how can algebraic geometry be developed over any algebraically closed field, especially in positive characteristic? (The tools of topology and complex analysis used to study complex varieties do not seem to apply here.) And what about algebraic geometry over an arbitrary field?

Hilbert's Nullstellensatz suggests an approach to algebraic geometry over any algebraically closed field k: the maximal ideals in the polynomial ring k[x1,...,xn] are in one-to-one correspondence with the set kn of n-tuples of elements of k, and the prime ideals correspond to the irreducible algebraic sets in kn, known as affine varieties. Motivated by these ideas, Emmy Noether and Wolfgang Krull developed the subject of commutative algebra in the 1920s and 1930s. Their work generalizes algebraic geometry in a purely algebraic direction: instead of studying the prime ideals in a polynomial ring, one can study the prime ideals in any commutative ring. For example, Krull defined the dimension of any commutative ring in terms of prime ideals. At least when the ring is Noetherian, he proved many of the properties one would want from the geometric notion of dimension.

Noether and Krull's commutative algebra can be viewed as an algebraic approach to affine algebraic varieties. However, many arguments in algebraic geometry work better for projective varieties, essentially because projective varieties are compact. From the 1920s to the 1940s, B. L. van der Waerden, André Weil and Oscar Zariski applied commutative algebra as a new foundation for algebraic geometry in the richer setting of projective (or quasi-projective) varieties. In particular, the Zariski topology is a useful topology on a variety over any algebraically closed field, replacing to some extent the classical topology on a complex variety (based on the topology of the complex numbers).

For applications to number theory, van der Waerden and Weil formulated algebraic geometry over any field, not necessarily algebraically closed. Weil was the first to define an abstract variety (not embedded in projective space), by gluing affine varieties along open subsets, on the model of manifolds in topology. He needed this generality for his construction of the Jacobian variety of a curve over any field. (Later, Jacobians were shown to be projective varieties by Weil, Chow and Matsusaka.)

The algebraic geometers of the Italian school had often used the somewhat foggy concept of the generic point of an algebraic variety. What is true for the generic point is true for "most" points of the variety. In Weil's Foundations of Algebraic Geometry (1946), generic points are constructed by taking points in a very large algebraically closed field, called a universal domain. Although this worked as a foundation, it was awkward: there were many different generic points for the same variety. (In the later theory of schemes, each algebraic variety has a single generic point.)

In the 1950s, Claude Chevalley, Masayoshi Nagata and Jean-Pierre Serre, motivated in part by the Weil conjectures relating number theory and algebraic geometry, further extended the objects of algebraic geometry, for example by generalizing the base rings allowed. The word scheme was first used in the 1956 Chevalley Seminar, in which Chevalley was pursuing Zariski's ideas. According to Pierre Cartier, it was André Martineau who suggested to Serre the possibility of using the spectrum of an arbitrary commutative ring as a foundation for algebraic geometry.

Origin of schemes

Grothendieck then gave the decisive definition of a scheme, bringing to a conclusion a generation of experimental suggestions and partial developments. He defined the spectrum X of a commutative ring R as the space of prime ideals of R with a natural topology (known as the Zariski topology), but augmented it with a sheaf of rings: to every open subset U he assigned a commutative ring OX(U). These objects Spec(R) are the affine schemes; a general scheme is then obtained by "gluing together" affine schemes.

Much of algebraic geometry focuses on projective or quasi-projective varieties over a field k; in fact, k is often taken to be the complex numbers. Schemes of that sort are very special compared to arbitrary schemes; compare the examples below. Nonetheless, it is convenient that Grothendieck developed a large body of theory for arbitrary schemes. For example, it is common to construct a moduli space first as a scheme, and only later study whether it is a more concrete object such as a projective variety. Also, applications to number theory rapidly lead to schemes over the integers that are not defined over any field.

Definition

An affine scheme is a locally ringed space isomorphic to the spectrum Spec(R) of a commutative ring R. A scheme is a locally ringed space X admitting a covering by open sets Ui, such that each Ui (as a locally ringed space) is an affine scheme. In particular, X comes with a sheaf OX, which assigns to every open subset U a commutative ring OX(U) called the ring of regular functions on U. One can think of a scheme as being covered by "coordinate charts" that are affine schemes. The definition means exactly that schemes are obtained by gluing together affine schemes using the Zariski topology.

In the early days, this was called a prescheme, and a scheme was defined to be a separated prescheme. The term prescheme has fallen out of use, but can still be found in older books, such as Grothendieck's "Éléments de géométrie algébrique" and Mumford's "Red Book".

A basic example of an affine scheme is affine n-space over a field k, for a natural number n. By definition, An
k
is the spectrum of the polynomial ring k[x1,...,xn]. In the spirit of scheme theory, affine n-space can in fact be defined over any commutative ring R, meaning Spec(R[x1,...,xn]).

The category of schemes

Schemes form a category, with morphisms defined as morphisms of locally ringed spaces. (See also: morphism of schemes.) For a scheme Y, a scheme X over Y (or a Y-scheme) means a morphism XY of schemes. A scheme X over a commutative ring R means a morphism X → Spec(R).

An algebraic variety over a field k can be defined as a scheme over k with certain properties. There are different conventions about exactly which schemes should be called varieties. One standard choice is that a variety over k means an integral separated scheme of finite type over k.

A morphism f: XY of schemes determines a pullback homomorphism on the rings of regular functions, f*: O(Y) → O(X). In the case of affine schemes, this construction gives a one-to-one correspondence between morphisms Spec(A) → Spec(B) of schemes and ring homomorphisms BA. In this sense, scheme theory completely subsumes the theory of commutative rings.

Since Z is an initial object in the category of commutative rings, the category of schemes has Spec(Z) as a terminal object.

For a scheme X over a commutative ring R, an R-point of X means a section of the morphism X → Spec(R). One writes X(R) for the set of R-points of X. In examples, this definition reconstructs the old notion of the set of solutions of the defining equations of X with values in R. When R is a field k, X(k) is also called the set of k-rational points of X.

More generally, for a scheme X over a commutative ring R and any commutative R-algebra S, an S-point of X means a morphism Spec(S) → X over R. One writes X(S) for the set of S-points of X. (This generalizes the old observation that given some equations over a field k, one can consider the set of solutions of the equations in any field extension E of k.) For a scheme X over R, the assignment SX(S) is a functor from commutative R-algebras to sets. It is an important observation that a scheme X over R is determined by this functor of points.

The fiber product of schemes always exists. That is, for any schemes X and Z with morphisms to a scheme Y, the fiber product X×YZ (in the sense of category theory) exists in the category of schemes. If X and Z are schemes over a field k, their fiber product over Spec(k) may be called the product X × Z in the category of k-schemes. For example, the product of affine spaces Am and An over k is affine space Am+n over k.

Since the category of schemes has fiber products and also a terminal object Spec(Z), it has all finite limits.

Examples

Here and below, all the rings considered are commutative:

  • Every affine scheme Spec(R) is a scheme.
  • A polynomial f over a field k, fk[x1, ..., xn], determines a closed subscheme f = 0 in affine space An over k, called an affine hypersurface. Formally, it can be defined as
    For example, taking k to be the complex numbers, the equation x2 = y2(y+1) defines a singular curve in the affine plane A2
    C
    , called a nodal cubic curve.
  • For any commutative ring R and natural number n, projective space Pn
    R
    can be constructed as a scheme by gluing n + 1 copies of affine n-space over R along open subsets. This is the fundamental example that motivates going beyond affine schemes. The key advantage of projective space over affine space is that Pn
    R
    is proper over R; this is an algebro-geometric version of compactness. A related observation is that complex projective space CPn is a compact space in the classical topology (based on the topology of C), whereas Cn is not (for n > 0).
  • A homogeneous polynomial f of positive degree in the polynomial ring R[x0, ..., xn] determines a closed subscheme f = 0 in projective space Pn over R, called a projective hypersurface. In terms of the Proj construction, this subscheme can be written as
    For example, the closed subscheme x3 + y3 = z3 of P2
    Q
    is an elliptic curve over the rational numbers.
  • The line with two origins (over a field k) is the scheme defined by starting with two copies of the affine line over k, and gluing together the two open subsets A1 − 0 by the identity map. This is a simple example of a non-separated scheme. In particular, it is not affine.
  • A simple reason to go beyond affine schemes is that an open subset of an affine scheme need not be affine. For example, let X = An − 0, say over the complex numbers C; then X is not affine for n ≥ 2. (The restriction on n is necessary: the affine line minus the origin is isomorphic to the affine scheme Spec(C[x, x−1]). To show that X is not affine, one computes that every regular function on X extends to a regular function on An, when n ≥ 2. (This is analogous to Hartogs's lemma in complex analysis, though easier to prove.) That is, the inclusion f: X → An induces an isomorphism from O(An) = C[x1, ...., xn] to O(X). If X were affine, it would follow that f was an isomorphism. But f is not surjective and hence not an isomorphism. Therefore, the scheme X is not affine.
  • Let k be a field. Then the scheme is an affine scheme whose underlying topological space is the Stone–Čech compactification of the positive integers (with the discrete topology). In fact, the prime ideals of this ring are in one-to-one correspondence with the ultrafilters on the positive integers, with the ideal corresponding to the principal ultrafilter associated to the positive integer n. This topological space is zero-dimensional, and in particular, each point is an irreducible component. Since affine schemes are quasi-compact, this is an example of a quasi-compact scheme with infinitely many irreducible components. (By contrast, a Noetherian scheme has only finitely many irreducible components.)

Examples of morphisms

It is also fruitful to consider examples of morphisms as examples of schemes since they demonstrate their technical effectiveness for encapsulating many objects of study in algebraic and arithmetic geometry.

Arithmetic surfaces

If we consider a polynomial then the affine scheme has a canonical morphism to and is called an arithmetic surface. The fibers are then algebraic curves over the finite fields . If is an elliptic curve then the fibers over its discriminant locus generated by where

[16] are all singular schemes. For example, if is a prime number and
then its discriminant is . In particular, this curve is singular over the prime numbers .

Motivation for schemes

Here are some of the ways in which schemes go beyond older notions of algebraic varieties, and their significance.

  • Field extensions. Given some polynomial equations in n variables over a field k, one can study the set X(k) of solutions of the equations in the product set kn. If the field k is algebraically closed (for example the complex numbers), then one can base algebraic geometry on sets such as X(k): define the Zariski topology on X(k), consider polynomial mappings between different sets of this type, and so on. But if k is not algebraically closed, then the set X(k) is not rich enough. Indeed, one can study the solutions X(E) of the given equations in any field extension E of k, but these sets are not determined by X(k) in any reasonable sense. For example, the plane curve X over the real numbers defined by x2 + y2 = −1 has X(R) empty, but X(C) not empty. (In fact, X(C) can be identified with C − 0.) By contrast, a scheme X over a field k has enough information to determine the set X(E) of E-rational points for every extension field E of k. (In particular, the closed subscheme of A2
    R
    defined by x2 + y2 = −1 is a nonempty topological space.)
  • Generic point. The points of the affine line A1
    C
    , as a scheme, are its complex points (one for each complex number) together with one generic point (whose closure is the whole scheme). The generic point is the image of a natural morphism Spec(C(x)) → A1
    C
    , where C(x) is the field of rational functions in one variable. To see why it is useful to have an actual "generic point" in the scheme, consider the following example.
  • Let X be the plane curve y2 = x(x−1)(x−5) over the complex numbers. This is a closed subscheme of A2
    C
    . It can be viewed as a ramified double cover of the affine line A1
    C
    by projecting to the x-coordinate. The fiber of the morphism X → A1 over the generic point of A1 is exactly the generic point of X, yielding the morphism
    This in turn is equivalent to the degree-2 extension of fields
    Thus, having an actual generic point of a variety yields a geometric relation between a degree-2 morphism of algebraic varieties and the corresponding degree-2 extension of function fields. This generalizes to a relation between the fundamental group (which classifies covering spaces in topology) and the Galois group (which classifies certain field extensions). Indeed, Grothendieck's theory of the étale fundamental group treats the fundamental group and the Galois group on the same footing.
  • Nilpotent elements. Let X be the closed subscheme of the affine line A1
    C
    defined by x2 = 0, sometimes called a fat point. The ring of regular functions on X is C[x]/(x2); in particular, the regular function x on X is nilpotent but not zero. To indicate the meaning of this scheme: two regular functions on the affine line have the same restriction to X if and only if they have the same value and first derivative at the origin. Allowing such non-reduced schemes brings the ideas of calculus and infinitesimals into algebraic geometry.
  • For a more elaborate example, one can describe all the zero-dimensional closed subschemes of degree 2 in a smooth complex variety Y. Such a subscheme consists of either two distinct complex points of Y, or else a subscheme isomorphic to X = Spec C[x]/(x2) as in the previous paragraph. Subschemes of the latter type are determined by a complex point y of Y together with a line in the tangent space TyY. This again indicates that non-reduced subschemes have geometric meaning, related to derivatives and tangent vectors.

Coherent sheaves

A central part of scheme theory is the notion of coherent sheaves, generalizing the notion of (algebraic) vector bundles. For a scheme X, one starts by considering the abelian category of OX-modules, which are sheaves of abelian groups on X that form a module over the sheaf of regular functions OX. In particular, a module M over a commutative ring R determines an associated OX-module ~M on X = Spec(R). A quasi-coherent sheaf on a scheme X means an OX-module that is the sheaf associated to a module on each affine open subset of X. Finally, a coherent sheaf (on a Noetherian scheme X, say) is an OX-module that is the sheaf associated to a finitely generated module on each affine open subset of X.

Coherent sheaves include the important class of vector bundles, which are the sheaves that locally come from finitely generated free modules. An example is the tangent bundle of a smooth variety over a field. However, coherent sheaves are richer; for example, a vector bundle on a closed subscheme Y of X can be viewed as a coherent sheaf on X that is zero outside Y (by the direct image construction). In this way, coherent sheaves on a scheme X include information about all closed subschemes of X. Moreover, sheaf cohomology has good properties for coherent (and quasi-coherent) sheaves. The resulting theory of coherent sheaf cohomology is perhaps the main technical tool in algebraic geometry.

Generalizations

Considered as its functor of points, a scheme is a functor that is a sheaf of sets for the Zariski topology on the category of commutative rings, and that, locally in the Zariski topology, is an affine scheme. This can be generalized in several ways. One is to use the étale topology. Michael Artin defined an algebraic space as a functor that is a sheaf in the étale topology and that, locally in the étale topology, is an affine scheme. Equivalently, an algebraic space is the quotient of a scheme by an étale equivalence relation. A powerful result, the Artin representability theorem, gives simple conditions for a functor to be represented by an algebraic space.

A further generalization is the idea of a stack. Crudely speaking, algebraic stacks generalize algebraic spaces by having an algebraic group attached to each point, which is viewed as the automorphism group of that point. For example, any action of an algebraic group G on an algebraic variety X determines a quotient stack [X/G], which remembers the stabilizer subgroups for the action of G. More generally, moduli spaces in algebraic geometry are often best viewed as stacks, thereby keeping track of the automorphism groups of the objects being classified.

Grothendieck originally introduced stacks as a tool for the theory of descent. In that formulation, stacks are (informally speaking) sheaves of categories. From this general notion, Artin defined the narrower class of algebraic stacks (or "Artin stacks"), which can be considered geometric objects. These include Deligne–Mumford stacks (similar to orbifolds in topology), for which the stabilizer groups are finite, and algebraic spaces, for which the stabilizer groups are trivial. The Keel–Mori theorem says that an algebraic stack with finite stabilizer groups has a coarse moduli space that is an algebraic space.

Another type of generalization is to enrich the structure sheaf, bringing algebraic geometry closer to homotopy theory. In this setting, known as derived algebraic geometry or "spectral algebraic geometry", the structure sheaf is replaced by a homotopical analog of a sheaf of commutative rings (for example, a sheaf of E-infinity ring spectra). These sheaves admit algebraic operations that are associative and commutative only up to an equivalence relation. Taking the quotient by this equivalence relation yields the structure sheaf of an ordinary scheme. Not taking the quotient, however, leads to a theory that can remember higher information, in the same way that derived functors in homological algebra yield higher information about operations such as tensor product and the Hom functor on modules.

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