Business action on climate change

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_action_on_climate_change 

Business action on climate change includes a range of activities relating to global warming, and to influencing political decisions on global-warming-related regulation, such as the Kyoto Protocol. Major multinationals have played and to some extent continue to play a significant role in the politics of global warming, especially in the United States, through lobbying of government and funding of global warming deniers. Business also plays a key role in the mitigation of global warming, through decisions to invest in researching and implementing new energy technologies and energy efficiency measures. (See also individual and political action on climate change.)

Overview

In 1989 in the US, the petroleum and automotive industries and the National Association of Manufacturers created the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) to oppose mandatory actions to address global warming. In 1997, when the US Senate overwhelmingly passed a resolution against ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, the industry funded a $13 million industry advertising blitz in the run-up to the vote.

In 1998 The New York Times published an American Petroleum Institute (API) memo outlining a strategy aiming to make "recognition of uncertainty ... part of the 'conventional wisdom.'" The memo has been compared to a late 1960s memo by tobacco company Brown and Williamson, which observed: "Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the 'body of fact' that exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the means of establishing a controversy." Those involved in the memo included Jeffrey Salmon, then executive director of the George C. Marshall Institute, Steven Milloy, a prominent denialist commentator, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute's Myron Ebell. In June 2005 a former API lawyer, Philip Cooney, resigned his White House post after accusations of politically motivated tampering with scientific reports.

In 2002, in the wake of both declining membership and President Bush's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the GCC announced that it would "deactivate" itself.

Ex-World Bank economist Herman Daly suggests that neoliberalism and globalisation bring about "a permanent international standard-lowering competition to attract capital". If accurate, this contemporary economic environment therefore also aids businesses who are hostile to action against climate change. They are able to relocate their activities to states which have less climate based regulations.

At the same time, since 1989 many previously denialist petroleum and automobile industry corporations have changed their position as the political and scientific consensus has grown, with the creation of the Kyoto Protocol and the publication of the International Panel on Climate Change's Second and Third Assessment Reports. These corporations include major petroleum companies like Royal Dutch Shell, Texaco, and BP, as well as automobile manufacturers like Ford, General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler. Some of these have joined with the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (formerly the Pew Center on Global Climate Change), a non-profit organization aiming to support efforts to address global climate change.

Since 2000, the Carbon Disclosure Project has been working with major corporations and investors to disclose the emissions of the largest companies. By 2007, the CDP published the emissions data for 2400 of the largest corporations in the world, and represented major institutional investors with $41 trillion combined assets under management. The pressure from these investors had had some success in working with companies to reduce emissions.

The World Business Council for Sustainable Development, a CEO-led association of some 200 multinational companies, has called on governments to agree on a global targets, and suggests that it is necessary to cut emissions by 60-80 percent from current levels by 2050.

In 2017, after the election of Donald Trump, backing was shown in the business community for the Paris Agreement, which became effective November 4, 2016.

In 2020 the demand for business action to stop climate change grow steadily. An organisation named "Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures" was created with a specific aim to show which companies are trying to stop climate change and which not. The bank of England launched an initiative for showing what investment can become non profitable with climate action. British Petroleum pledged to become carbon neutral by 2050 and the biggest finance management company BlackRock said it will not serve those who will not try to reduce GGG emissions. Investors with a capital of 5 trillion dollars pledged to have 100% fossil free investments by the year 2050.

Global Climate Coalition

A central organization in climate denial was the Global Climate Coalition (1989–2002), a group of mainly United States businesses opposing immediate action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The coalition funded deniers with scientific credentials to be public spokespeople, provided industry a voice on climate change, and fought the Kyoto Protocol. The New York Times reported that "even as the coalition worked to sway opinion [towards denial], its own scientific and technical experts were advising that the science backing the role of greenhouse gases in global warming could not be refuted."

In the year 2000, the rate of corporate members leaving accelerated when they became the target of a national divestiture campaign run by John Passacantando and Phil Radford with the organization Ozone Action. According to The New York Times, when Ford Motor Company was the first company to leave the coalition, it was "the latest sign of divisions within heavy industry over how to respond to global warming." After that, between December 1999 and early March 2000, the GCC was deserted by Daimler-Chrysler, Texaco, the Southern Company and General Motors.

The organization closed in 2002, or in their own words, 'deactivated'.

World Economic Forum

In the beginning of the 21st century the forum begun to increasingly deal with environmental issues. In the Davos Manifesto 2020 it is said that a company among other things:

"acts as a steward of the environmental and material universe for future generations. It consciously protects our biosphere and champions a circular, shared and regenerative economy."

"responsibly manages near-term, medium-term and long-term value creation in pursuit of sustainable shareholder returns that do not sacrifice the future for the present."

"is more than an economic unit generating wealth. It fulfils human and societal aspirations as part of the broader social system. Performance must be measured not only on the return to shareholders, but also on how it achieves its environmental, social and good governance objectives."

The forum launched the Environmental Initiative that covers climate change and water issues. Under the Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, the U.K. government asked the World Economic Forum at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles in 2005 to facilitate a dialogue with the business community to develop recommendations for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This set of recommendations, endorsed by a global group of CEOs, was presented to leaders ahead of the G8 Summit in Toyako and Hokkaido held in July 2008.

In January 2017, WEF launched the Platform for Accelerating the Circular Economy (PACE), which is a global public private partnership seeking to scale circular economy innovations. PACE is co-chaired by Frans van Houten (CEO of Philips), Naoko Ishii (CEO of the Global Environment Facility, and the head of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The Ellen MacArthur Foundation, the International Resource Panel, Circle Economy and Accenture serve as knowledge partners.

The Environment and Natural Resource Security Initiative was emphasized for the 2017 meeting to achieve inclusive economic growth and sustainable practices for global industries. With increasing limitations on world trade through national interests and trade barriers, the WEF has moved towards a more sensitive and socially minded approach for global businesses with a focus on the reduction of carbon emissions in China and other large industrial nations.

The World Economic Forum is working to eliminate plastic pollution, stating that by the year 2050 it will consume 15% of the global carbon budget and will pass by its weight fishes in the world's oceans. One of the methods is to achieve circular economy.

The theme of 2020 World Economic Forum annual meeting was "Stakeholders for a Cohesive and Sustainable World". Climate change and sustainability were central themes of discussion. Many argued that GDP is failed to represent correctly the wellbeing and that fossil fuel subsydies should be stopped. Many of the participants said that a better capitalism is needed. Al Gore summarized the ideas in the conference as: "I don't want to be naive, but I want to acknowledge that the center of the global economy is now saying things that many of us have dreamed they might for a long time," and "The version of capitalism we have today in our world must be reformed".

In this meeting the World Economic Forum launched the Trillion Tree Campaign - an initiative aiming to "grow, restore and conserve 1 trillion trees around the world - in a bid to restore biodiversity and help fight climate change". Donald Trump joined the initiative. The forum stated that: "Nature-based solutions – locking-up carbon in the world's forests, grasslands and wetlands – can provide up to one-third of the emissions reductions required by 2030 to meet the Paris Agreement targets," adding that the rest should come from the heavy industry, finance and transportation sectors. One of the targets is to unify existing reforestation projects.

In 2020, the forum published an article in which it claims that the COVID-19 pandemic is linked to the destruction of nature. The number of emerging diseases is rising and this rise is linked to deforestation and species loss. In the article there are multiple examples of the degradation of ecological systems caused by humans. It is also says that half of the global GDP is moderately or largely dependent on nature. The article concludes that the recovery from the pandemic should be linked to nature recovery.

In July 2020 the forum published the "Future of Nature and Business Report", saying that "Prioritizing Nature" can give to the global economy 10.1 trillion dollars per year and 395 million jobs by the year 2030.

U.S. Climate Action Partnership

The U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) was formed in January 2007 with the primary goal of influencing the regulation of Greenhouse gas emissions by the United States. Original members included General Electric, Alcoa, and Natural Resources Defense Council, and they were joined in April, 2007 by ConocoPhillips and AIG.

Energy industry

ExxonMobil

ExxonMobil has been a leading figure in the business world's position on climate change, providing substantial funding to a range of global-warming-denialist organizations. Mother Jones counted some 40 ExxonMobil-funded organization that "either have sought to undermine mainstream scientific findings on global climate change or have maintained affiliations with a small group of "skeptic" (denialist) scientists who continue to do so." Between 2000 and 2003 these organizations received more than $8m in funding.

It has also had a key influence in the Bush administration's energy policy, including on the Kyoto Protocol, supported by both $55m spent on lobbying since 1999, and direct contacts between the company and leading politicians. It was a leading member of the Global Climate Coalition. It encouraged (and may have been instrumental in) the replacement in 2002 of the head of the IPCC, Robert Watson. It has also invested $100m into the Global Climate and Energy Project, with Stanford University, and other programs at institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Carnegie Mellon University and the International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas Research and Development Program.

Some of Exxon's activities on climate change produced strong criticism from environmental groups, including reactions such as a leaflet produced by the Stop Esso campaign, saying 'Don't buy E$$o', and featuring a tiger hand setting fire to the Earth. The company's carbon dioxide emissions are more than 50% higher than those of British rival BP, despite the US firm's oil and gas production being only slightly larger.

According to a 2004 study commissioned by Friends of the Earth, ExxonMobil and its predecessors caused 4.7 to 5.3 percent of the world's man-made carbon dioxide emissions between 1882 and 2002. The group suggested that such studies could form the basis for eventual legal action.

ExxonMobil made several modest climate pledges. There are some concerns about the implementation.

BP

BP left the Global Climate Coalition in 1997 and said that global warming was a problem that had to be dealt with, although it subsequently joined others in lobbying the Australian government not to sign the Kyoto Protocol unless the US did. In March 2002 BP's chief executive, Lord Browne, declared in a speech that global warming was real and that urgent action was needed, saying that "Companies composed of highly skilled and trained people can't live in denial of mounting evidence gathered by hundreds of the most reputable scientists in the world." In 2005 BP was considering testing carbon sequestration in one of its North Sea oil fields, by pumping carbon dioxide into them (and thereby also increasing yields). Throughout 2006 BP, led by their CEO Lord John Browne, has continued to make statements on climate change. It has cut its own operational emissions of CO₂ by 10%. It is investing $8 billion in renewable energy over the next 10 years. Most recently it has launched a 'target zero' campaign in the UK to encourage its customers to offset their vehicle emissions when they fill up at the petrol station.

BP's American division is a member of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) (see above).

BP pledged to become 100% climate neutral by 2050. It also declared that it will increase 10 times the investment in low carbon technology, like Renewable energy by the year 2030, stop searching for oil and gas in new countries, cut its oil and gas production by 40%. After the declaration the share price of the company rose by 7% - 8%.

Shell

In 2021 Royal Dutch Shell announced that its CO₂ emissions peaked in 2018 and its oil production in 2019. The company intends to cut emissions by 6% - 8% by 2023, 20% by 2030, 45% by 2035 and 100% by 2050.

Koch Industries

From 2005 to 2008, Koch Industries donated $5.7 million on political campaigns and $37 million on direct lobbying to support fossil fuel industries. Between 1997 and 2008, Koch Industries donated a total of nearly $48 million to climate opposition groups. According to Greenpeace, Koch Industries is the major source of funds of what Greenpeace calls "climate denial". Koch Industries and its subsidiaries spent more than $20 million on lobbying in 2008 and $12.3 million in 2009, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, a nonpartisan research group.

Others

American Electric Power, the world's largest private producer of carbon dioxide, said in 2005 that targets for carbon reduction "represent a common-sense approach that can begin the process of lowering emissions along a gradual, cost-effective path." The company complained that "uncertainties over the cost of carbon" made it very difficult to make decisions about capital investment.

DuPont has cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 65% since 1990, saving hundreds of millions of dollars in the process. "Give us a date, tell us how much we need to cut, give us the flexibility to meet the goals, and we'll get it done", Xcel Energy CEO Wayne Brunetti told Business Week in 2004.

Duke Energy, FPL Group, and PG&E Corporation are members of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) (see above).

Total and Royal Dutch Shell pledged to reach zero emission by 2050. Chevron and ExxonMobil made a more modest pledge. There are some concerns about the implementation of the pledges.

Transportation

A large proportion of carbon dioxide emissions occur because of transportation. Several companies have formed or invested in electric substitutes for standard automobiles. The Tesla Roadster (2008) is an all-electric sports car, and Tesla also produces the Tesla Model S sedan. Vectrix produces and sells an electric scooter rated for 100 km/h (60 mph).

There has also been greatly increased interest in personal rapid transit, which applies system engineering principles to reduce energy use, eliminate traffic jams, and produce an acceptable substitute to replace cars, all at the same time. Most systems fully meet Kyoto Treaty carbon emission goals now, 60 years ahead of schedule. Korean steel maker POSCO and its partner Vectus Ltd. have produced a working safety case, including test track and vehicles, that remains fully functional in Swedish winters. Vectus and Suncheon S. Korea signed a memorandum of understanding to install a system. Advanced Transportation Systems' ULTra passed safety certification by the UK Rail Inspectorate in 2003, and won a demonstration project at Heathrow Airport due to be in service in early 2010. ATS Ltd. estimates its ULTra PRT will consume 839 BTU per passenger mile (0.55 MJ per passenger km). By comparison, automobiles consume 3,496 BTU, and personal trucks consume 4,329 BTU per passenger mile. 2getthere Inc. sells automated electric freight handling and transit vehicles designed to share existing rights of way with normal traffic. The company recently won the personal rapid transit competition for Masdar.

JetBlue announced a plan to become carbon neutral on domestic flights in the US through use of carbon offsets, with longterm plans including the possibility of alternative fuels and other technologies. However, the International Air Transport Association reports that such alternative fuels are in short supply as of January 2020.

General Motors

General Motors announced in the year 2021 that by the year 2035 it will completely stop producing cars powered by diesel and gas and will become carbon neutral by 2040.

Insurance industry

In 2004 Swiss Re, the world's second largest reinsurance company, warned that the economic costs of climate-related disasters threatened to reach $150 billion a year within ten years.

In 2006 Lloyd's of London, published a report highlighting the latest science and implications for the insurance industry.

Swiss Re, has said that if the shore communities of four Gulf Coast states choose not to implement adaptation strategies, they could see annual climate-change related damages jump 65 percent a year to $23 billion by 2030. "Society needs to reduce its vulnerability to climate risks, and as long as they remain manageable, they remain insurable, which is our interest as well," said Mark D. Way, head of Swiss Re's sustainable development for the Americas.

AIG is a member of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) (see above).

Zurich Insurance Group, according to Ben Harper, the head of the sustainability unit in the North American section of the company, has a program for reducing its carbon footprint: make the facilities 100% renewables in a few years, reduce the use of paper by 80%, stop using single-use plastic, invest $4.6 billion in green and social projects. The company already has many green products and services and want to make more. The work on the implementation was not stopped at the time of Coronavirus disease 2019 and the pandemic may result even in higher ecological consciousness, among other it increase demand for ecological products, walking, biking, simple living.

The company was the leading insurer of the Trans Mountain pipeline, but stopped supporting it, in July 2020.

Media

In the UK, some newspapers (Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph) are significantly anti-science, while most others (with varying enthusiasm, The Independent giving it most prominence) support action on global warming. Overall, British newspapers have given the issue three times more coverage than US newspapers. In 2006 (British Sky Broadcasting (Sky) became the world's first media company to go 'climate neutral' by purchasing enough carbon offsets. The CEO of the company James Murdoch (son of Rupert Murdoch and heir apparent for the News International empire) is a strong advocate of action on climate change and is thought to be influential on the issue within the wider group of companies. In June 2006, to much industry interest, Rupert Murdoch invited Al Gore to make his climate change presentation at the annual News Corp (including the Fox Network) gathering at the Pebble Beach golf resort, (USA). In August 2007, Rupert Murdoch announced plans for News Corp. to be carbon neutral by 2010.

Facebook

Facebook announced in 2021 that it will make effort stop disinformation about climate change. The company will use George Mason University, Yale Program on Climate Change Communication and the University of Cambridge as sources of information. The company will expand its information hub on climate to 16 countries. Users in others countries will be directed to the site of the United Nations Environment Programme for information.

Finance management

Black Rock

In January 2020 BlackRock, the largest finance management company in the world, announced that it would begin divestment from thermal coal and take another measures to make its assets more sustainable. Other companies that made similar statements include "Goldman Sachs, Liberty Mutual,... the Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.,... and the European Investment Bank—the largest international public bank in the world "

JP Morgan

The company is the biggest investor in fossil fuels in the world, therefore many try to persuade it to take climate action. In 2017 the company committed to giving 200 billion dollars to clean finance by 2025 and take 100% of its energy from renewables by the end of 2020. It expects to reach both targets. In 2020 the company pledged to give 200 billion to support climate action and reaching Sustainable Development Goals in the year 2020, expand the restriction on investment in coal and stop investment in arctic oil and gas drilling, create a more sustainable investment portfolio, join the climate action 100+ coalition. It did not pledge to stop investments in tar sands, fracking and other fossil fuels.

In October 2020 JPMorgan Chase declared that it begun to work on achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.

HSBC

In October 2020, HSBC, the biggest bank in Europe committed to achieve zero emission by 2050, e.g., by this year it would not only become carbon neutral by itself but also will work only with carbon neutral clients. It also committed to provide 750 - 1,000 billion dollar to help clients make the transition. It also pledged to achieve carbon neutrality in his own operations by 2030.

More on business action

Businesses take action on climate change for several reasons. Action improves corporate image and better aligns corporate actions with the environmental interests of owners, employees, suppliers, and customers. Action also occurs to reduce costs, increase return on investments, and to reduce dependency on uncontrollable costs.

Increased energy efficiency

For many companies, looking at more efficient energy use can pay off in the medium to long term; unfortunately, shareholders need to be satisfied in the short term, so regulatory intervention is often required, to encourage prudent conservation measures. However, as carbon intensity starts to show up on balance books through organizations such as the Carbon Disclosure Project, voluntary action is starting to take place.

Recently there has been a spate of companies acting to improve their energy efficiency. Possibly the most prominent of these companies is Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart, the largest retailer in the US, has announced specific environmental goals to reduce energy use in its stores and pressure its 60,000 suppliers in its worldwide supply chain to follow its lead. On energy efficiency, Wal-Mart wants to increase the fuel efficiency of its truck fleet by 25% over the next three years and double it within ten years, moving from 6.5 mpg. This seems an attainable goal, and by 2020, it is expected to save the company $494 million a year. The company also wants to build a store that is at least 25% more energy efficient within four years.

Use of renewable energies

In August 2002, the largest gathering of ministers in the history of the world met at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. The global environmental community discussed the role of renewables and energy efficiency in lowering carbon emissions, mitigating poverty reduction (energy access) and improving energy security. One result from WSSD was the formation of to carry forward the international dialogue on sustainable energy and its role in the energy mix.

Partnerships formed include the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, the Global Village Energy Partnership, the Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition (JREC), and the Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development.

Renewable energies and renewable energy technologies have many advantages over their fossil fuel counterparts. These advantages include the absence of local pollution such as particulates, sulphur oxides (SOX's) and nitrous oxides (NOX's). For the business community, the economic advantages are also becoming clearer. Numerous studies have shown that the working environment has a significant effect on workforce morale. Renewable energy solutions are a part of this, wind turbines in particular being seen by many as a potent symbol of a new modernity, where environmental considerations are taken seriously. A workforce seeing a forward-looking and responsible company is more likely to feel good about working for such a company. A happier workforce is a more productive workforce.

More directly, the high petroleum (oil) and gas prices of 2005 have only added to the attraction of renewable energy sources. Although most renewable energies are more expensive at current fuel prices, the difference is narrowing, and uncertainty in oil and gas markets is a factor worth considering for highly energy-intensive businesses.

Another factor affecting the uptake of renewable energies in Europe is the EU Energy Trading Scheme (ETS or EUTS). Many large businesses are fined for increases in emissions, but can sell any "excess" reductions they make.

Companies with high-profile renewable energy portfolios include an aluminium smelter (Alcan), a cement company (Lafarge), and a microchip manufacturer (Intel). Many examples of corporate leadership in this area can be found on the website of The Climate Group, an independent organization set up for promoting such action by business and government.

Carbon offsets

The principle of carbon offset is fairly simple: a business decides that it doesn't want to contribute further to global warming, and it has already made efforts to reduce its carbon (dioxide) emissions, so it decides to pay someone else to further reduce its net emissions by planting trees or by taking up low-carbon technologies. Every unit of carbon that is absorbed by trees—or not emitted due to funding of renewable energy deployment—offsets the emissions from fossil fuel use. In many cases, funding of renewable energy, energy efficiency, or tree planting—particularly in developing nations—can be a relatively cheap way of making an event, project, or business "carbon neutral". Many carbon offset providers—some as inexpensive as $0.10 per ton of carbon dioxide—are referenced in the carbon offset article of this encyclopedia.

Many businesses are now looking to carbon offset all their work. An example of a business going carbon neutral is FIFA: their 2006 World Cup Final will be carbon neutral. FIFA estimate they are offsetting one hundred thousand tons of carbon dioxide created by the event, largely as a result of people travelling there. Other carbon neutral companies include the bank HSBC, the consumer staples manufacturer Annie's Homegrown, world leading society publisher Blackwell Publishing, and the publishing house New Society Publishers. The Guardian also offsets its carbon emissions resulting from international air travel.

Many companies are trying to achieve carbon offsets by Nature-based solutions like reforestation, including mangrove forests and soil restoration. Among them Microsoft, Eni. Increasing the forest cover of Earth by 25% will offset the human emissions in the latest 20 years. In any case it will be necessary to pull from the atmosphere the CO2 that already have been emitted. However, it can work only if the companies will stop to pump new emissions to the atmosphere and stop deforestation.

Carbon projects

A carbon project refers to a business initiative that receives funding because it will result in a reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs). To prove that the project will result in real, permanent, verifiable reductions in greenhouse gases, proof must be provided in the form of a project design document and activity reports validated by an approved third party.

Reasons for carbon project development

Carbon projects are developed for reasons of voluntary environmental stewardship, as well as legal compliance under an emissions trading program. Voluntary carbon (GHG) reducers may wish to monetize reductions in their carbon footprint by trading the reductions in exchange for monetary compensation. The transfer of environmental stewardship rights would then allow another entity to make an environmental stewardship claim. There are several developing voluntary reduction standards that projects can use as guides for development.

Kyoto Protocol

Carbon projects have become increasingly important since the advent of emissions trading under Phase I of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. They may be used if the project has been validated by a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Designated Operational Entity (DOE) according to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The resulting emissions reductions may become Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) when a DOE has produced a verification report which has been submitted to the CDM Executive Board (EB).

There may be new project methodology validated by the CDM EB for post phase II Kyoto trading.

United States

In the United States, standards similar to those of the Kyoto Protocol schemes are developing around California's AB-32 and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Offset projects can be of many types, but only those that have proven additionality are likely to become monetized under a future US Cap & Trade program.

One example of such a project, the Valley Wood Carbon Sequestration Project, receives funding from a partnership that was developed by Verus Carbon Neutral that linked 17 merchants of Atlanta's Virginia-Highland shopping and dining neighborhood retail district, through the Chicago Climate Exchange, to directly fund thousands of acres of forest in rural Georgia. The unique partnership established Virginia-Highland as the first Carbon-Neutral Zone in the United States.

Operation

An entity whose greenhouse gas emissions are capped by a regulatory program has three choices for complying if they exceed their cap. First, they could pay an alternative compliance measure or "carbon tax", a default payment set by the regulatory body. This choice is usually the least attractive given the ability to comply by trading.

The second option is to purchase carbon credits within an emissions trading scheme. The trade provides an economic disincentive to the polluter, while providing an incentive to the less polluting organisation. As fossil fuel generation becomes less attractive it will be increasingly unattractive to exceed a carbon cap because the financial disincentive will grow via market forces. The price of a carbon allowance would go up because supply would decline while demand stays constant (assuming a positive growth rate for energy consumption).

The final option is to invest in a carbon project. The carbon project will result in a greenhouse gas emission reduction which can be used to offset the excess emissions generated by the polluter. The financial disincentive to pollute is in the form of the capital expenditure to develop the project or the cost of purchasing the offset from the developer of the project. In this case the financial incentive would go to the owner of the carbon project.

Project selection

The most important part of developing a carbon project is establishing and documenting the additionality of the project - that the carbon project would not have otherwise occurred. It is also essential to document the measurement and the verification methodology applied, as outlined in the project development document.

Developing a carbon project is appropriate for renewable energy projects such as wind power, solar power, low impact-small hydropower, biomass, and biogas. Projects have also been developed for a wide variety of other emissions reductions such as reforestation, fuel switching (i.e. to carbon-neutral fuels and carbon-negative fuels), carbon capture and storage, and energy efficiency.

Economics of climate change

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economics_of_climate_change 

The economics of climate change concerns the economic aspects of climate change; this can inform policies that governments might consider in response. A number of factors make this and the politics of climate change a difficult problem: it is a long-term, intergenerational problem; benefits and costs are distributed unequally both within and across countries; and both scientific and public opinions need to be taken into account.

One of the most important greenhouse gases is carbon dioxide (CO
2). Around 20% of carbon dioxide which is emitted due to human activities can remain in the atmosphere for many thousands of years. The long time scales and uncertainty associated with global warming have led analysts to develop "scenarios" of future environmental, social and economic changes. These scenarios can help governments understand the potential consequences of their decisions.

The impacts of climate change include the loss of biodiversity, sea level rise, increased frequency and severity of some extreme weather events, and acidification of the oceans. Economists have attempted to quantify these impacts in monetary terms, but these assessments can be controversial. The two main policy responses to global warming are to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (climate change mitigation) and to adapt to the impacts of global warming (e.g., by building levees in response to sea level rise).

One of the responses to the uncertainties of global warming is to adopt a strategy of sequential decision making. This strategy recognizes that decisions on global warming need to be made with incomplete information, and that decisions in the near term will have potentially long-term impacts. Governments might choose to use risk management as part of their policy response to global warming. For instance, a risk-based approach can be applied to climate impacts which are difficult to quantify in economic terms, e.g., the impacts of global warming on indigenous peoples.

Analysts have assessed global warming in relation to sustainable development. Sustainable development considers how future generations might be affected by the actions of the current generation. In some areas, policies designed to address global warming may contribute positively towards other development objectives, for example abolishing fossil fuel subsidies would reduce air pollution and thus save lives. Direct global fossil fuel subsidies reached $319 billion in 2017, and $5.2 trillion when indirect costs such as air pollution are priced in. In other areas, the cost of global warming policies may divert resources away from other socially and environmentally beneficial investments (the opportunity costs of climate change policy). More recent studies suggest that economic damages due to climate change have been underestimated, and may be severe, with the probability of disastrous tail-risk events being nontrivial.

Scenarios

One of the economic aspects of climate change is producing scenarios of future economic development. Future economic developments can, for example, affect how vulnerable society is to future climate change, what the future impacts of climate change might be, as well as the level of future GHG emissions.

Emissions scenarios

In scenarios designed to project future GHG emissions, economic projections, e.g., changes in future income levels, will often necessarily be combined with other projections that affect emissions, e.g., future population levels. Since these future changes are highly uncertain, one approach is that of scenario analysis. In scenario analysis, scenarios are developed that are based on differing assumptions of future development patterns. An example of this are the "SRES" emissions scenarios produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The SRES scenarios project a wide range of possible future emissions levels. The SRES scenarios are "baseline" or "non-intervention" scenarios, in that they assume no specific policy measures to control future GHG emissions. The different SRES scenarios contain widely differing assumptions of future social and economic changes. For example, the SRES "A2" emissions scenario projects a future population level of 15 billion people in the year 2100, but the SRES "B1" scenario projects a lower population level of 7 billion people. The SRES scenarios were not assigned probabilities by the IPCC, but some authors have argued that particular SRES scenarios are more likely to occur than others.

Some analysts have developed scenarios that project a continuation of current policies into the future. These scenarios are sometimes called "business-as-usual" scenarios.

Experts who work on scenarios tend to prefer the term "projections" to "forecasts" or "predictions". This distinction is made to emphasize the point that probabilities are not assigned to the scenarios, and that future emissions depend on decisions made both now and into the future.

Another approach is that of uncertainty analysis, where analysts attempt to estimate the probability of future changes in emission levels.

Global futures scenarios

"Global futures" scenarios can be thought of as stories of possible futures. They allow for the description of factors which are difficult to quantify but are important in affecting future GHG emissions. The IPCC Third Assessment Report (Morita et al., 2001) includes an assessment of 124 global futures scenarios. These scenarios project a wide range of possible futures. Some are pessimistic, for example, 5 scenarios project the future breakdown of human society. Others are optimistic, for example, in 5 other scenarios, future advances in technology solve most or all of humanity's problems. Most scenarios project increasing damage to the natural environment, but many scenarios also project this trend to reverse in the long-term.

In the scenarios, Morita et al. (2001) found no strong patterns in the relationship between economic activity and GHG emissions. By itself, this relationship is not proof of causation, and is only reflective of the scenarios that were assessed.

In the assessed scenarios, economic growth is compatible with increasing or decreasing GHG emissions. In the latter case, emissions growth is mediated by increased energy efficiency, shifts to non-fossil energy sources, and/or shifts to a post-industrial (service-based) economy. Most scenarios projecting rising GHGs also project low levels of government intervention in the economy. Scenarios projecting falling GHGs generally have high levels of government intervention in the economy.

Factors affecting emissions growth

Changes in components of the Kaya identity between 1971 and 2009. Includes global energy-related CO
₂ emissions, world population, world GDP per capita, energy intensity of world GDP and carbon intensity of world energy use.

Historically, growth in GHG emissions have been driven by economic development. One way of understanding trends in GHG emissions is to use the Kaya identity. The Kaya identity breaks down emissions growth into the effects of changes in human population, economic affluence, and technology:

CO
₂ emissions from energy ≡

Population × (gross domestic product (GDP) per head of population) × (energy use / GDP) × (CO
₂ emissions / energy use)

GDP per person (or "per capita") is used as a measure of economic affluence, and changes in technology are described by the other two terms: (energy use / GDP) and (energy-related CO
₂ emissions / energy use). These two terms are often referred to as "energy intensity of GDP" and "carbon intensity of energy", respectively. Note that the abbreviated term "carbon intensity" may also refer to the carbon intensity of GDP, i.e., (energy-related CO
₂ emissions / GDP).

Reductions in the energy intensity of GDP and/or carbon intensity of energy will tend to reduce energy-related CO
₂ emissions. Increases in population and/or GDP per capita will tend to increase energy-related CO
₂ emissions. If, however, energy intensity of GDP or carbon intensity of energy were reduced to zero (i.e., complete decarbonization of the energy system), increases in population or GDP per capita would not lead to an increase in energy-related CO
₂ emissions.

The graph on the right shows changes in global energy-related CO
₂ emissions between 1971 and 2009. Also plotted are changes in world population, world GDP per capita, energy intensity of world GDP, and carbon intensity of world energy use. Over this time period, reductions in energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy use have been unable to offset increases in population and GDP per capita. Consequently, energy-related CO
₂ emissions have increased. Between 1971 and 2009, energy-related CO
₂ emissions grew on average by about 2.8% per year. Population grew on average by about 2.1% per year and GDP per capita by 2.6% per year. Energy intensity of GDP on average fell by about 1.1% per year, and carbon intensity of energy fell by about 0.2% per year.

Trends and projections

Emissions

Equity and GHG emissions

In considering GHG emissions, there are a number of areas where equity is important. In common language equity means "the quality of being impartial" or "something that is fair and just." One example of the relevance of equity to GHG emissions are the different ways in which emissions can be measured. These include the total annual emissions of one country, cumulative emissions measured over long time periods (sometimes measured over more than 100 years), average emissions per person in a country (per capita emissions), as well as measurements of energy intensity of GDP, carbon intensity of GDP, or carbon intensity of energy use (discussed earlier). Different indicators of emissions provide different insights relevant to climate change policy, and have been an important issue in international climate change negotiations (e.g., see Kyoto Protocol#Negotiations).

Developed countries' past contributions to climate change were in the process of economically developing to their current level of prosperity; developing countries are attempting to rise to this level, this being one cause of their increasing greenhouse gas emissions. Equity is an issue in GHG emissions scenarios, Sonali P. Chitre argues, and Emerging markets countries, such as India and China, often would rather analyze Per capita emissions instead of committing to aggregate Emissions reduction because of historical contributions by the Industrialized nations to the climate change crisis, under the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities. For example, the scenarios used in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) First Assessment Report of 1990 were criticized by Parikh (1992). Parikh (1992) argued that the stabilization scenarios contained in the Report "stabilize the lifestyles of the rich and adversely affect the development of the poor". The IPCC's later "SRES" scenarios, published in 2000, explicitly explore scenarios with a narrowing income gap (convergence) between the developed and developing countries. Projections of convergence in the SRES scenarios have been criticized for lacking objectivity (Defra/HM Treasury, 2005).

Emissions projections

Projected total carbon dioxide emissions between 2000–2100 using the six illustrative "SRES" marker scenarios.

Changes in future greenhouse gas emission levels are highly uncertain, and a wide range of quantitative emission projections have been produced. Rogner et al. (2007) assessed these projections. Some of these projections aggregate anthropogenic emissions into a single figure as a "carbon dioxide equivalent" (CO
2-eq). By 2030, baseline scenarios projected an increase in greenhouse emissions (the F-gases, nitrous oxide, methane, and CO
2, measured in CO
2-eq) of between 25% and 90%, relative to the 2000 level. For CO
2 only, two-thirds to three-quarters of the increase in emissions was projected to come from developing countries, although the average per capita CO
2 emissions in developing country regions were projected to remain substantially lower than those in developed country regions.

By 2100, CO
2-eq projections ranged from a 40% reduction to an increase in emissions of 250% above their levels in 2000.

Concentrations and temperatures

As mentioned earlier, impacts of climate change are determined more by the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere than annual GHG emissions. Changes in the atmospheric concentrations of the individual GHGs are given in greenhouse gas.

Rogner et al. (2007) reported that the then-current estimated total atmospheric concentration of long-lived GHGs was around 455 parts-per-million (ppm) CO
2-eq (range: 433-477 ppm CO
2-eq). The effects of aerosol and land-use changes (e.g., deforestation) reduced the physical effect (the radiative forcing) of this to 311 to 435 ppm CO
2-eq, with a central estimate of about 375 ppm CO
2-eq. The 2011 estimate of CO
2-eq concentrations (the long-lived GHGs, made up of CO
2, methane (CH
₄), nitrous oxide (N
₂O), chlorofluorocarbon-12 (CFC-12), CFC-11, and fifteen other halogenated gases) is 473 ppm CO
2-eq (NOAA, 2012). The NOAA (2012) estimate excludes the overall cooling effect of aerosols (e.g., sulfate).

Six of the SRES emissions scenarios have been used to project possible future changes in atmospheric CO
2 concentrations. For the six illustrative SRES scenarios, IPCC (2001) projected the concentration of CO
2 in the year 2100 as ranging between 540 and 970 parts-per-million (ppm) . Uncertainties such as the removal of carbon from the atmosphere by "sinks" (e.g., forests) increase the projected range to between 490 and 1,260 ppm. This compares to a pre-industrial (taken as the year 1750) concentration of 280 ppm, and a concentration of 390.5 ppm in 2011.

Temperature

Indicative probabilities of exceeding various increases in global mean temperature for different stabilization levels of atmospheric GHG concentrations.

Atmospheric GHG concentrations can be related to changes in global mean temperature by the climate sensitivity. Projections of future global warming are affected by different estimates of climate sensitivity. For a given increase in the atmospheric concentration of GHGs, high estimates of climate sensitivity suggest that relatively more future warming will occur, while low estimates of climate sensitivity suggest that relatively less future warming will occur. Lower values would correspond with less severe climate impacts, while higher values would correspond with more severe impacts.

In the scientific literature, there is sometimes a focus on "best estimate" or "likely" values of climate sensitivity. However, from a risk management perspective (discussed below), values outside of "likely" ranges are relevant, because, though these values are less probable, they could be associated with more severe climate impacts (the statistical definition of risk = probability of an impact × magnitude of the impact).

Analysts have also looked at how uncertainty over climate sensitivity affects economic estimates of climate change impacts. Hope (2005), for example, found that uncertainty over the climate sensitivity was the most important factor in determining the social cost of carbon (an economic measure of climate change impacts).

Cost–benefit analysis

Standard cost–benefit analysis (CBA) (also referred to as a monetized cost–benefit framework) has been applied to the problem of climate change. This requires (1) the valuation of costs and benefits using willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) compensation as a measure of value, and (2) a criterion for accepting or rejecting proposals:

For (1), in CBA where WTP/WTA is used, climate change impacts are aggregated into a monetary value, with environmental impacts converted into consumption equivalents, and risk accounted for using certainty equivalents. Values over time are then discounted to produce their equivalent present values.

The valuation of costs and benefits of climate change can be controversial because some climate change impacts are difficult to assign a value to, e.g., ecosystems and human health. It is also impossible to know the preferences of future generations, which affects the valuation of costs and benefits. Another difficulty is quantifying the risks of future climate change.

For (2), the standard criterion is the (Kaldor-Hicks) compensation principle. According to the compensation principle, so long as those benefiting from a particular project compensate the losers, and there is still something left over, then the result is an unambiguous gain in welfare. If there are no mechanisms allowing compensation to be paid, then it is necessary to assign weights to particular individuals.

One of the mechanisms for compensation is impossible for this problem: mitigation might benefit future generations at the expense of current generations, but there is no way that future generations can compensate current generations for the costs of mitigation. On the other hand, should future generations bear most of the costs of climate change, compensation to them would not be possible. Another transfer for compensation exists between regions and populations. If, for example, some countries were to benefit from future climate change but others lose out, there is no guarantee that the winners would compensate the losers; similarly, if some countries were to benefit from reducing climate change but others lose out, there would likewise be no guarantee that the winners would compensate the losers.

Cost–benefit analysis and risk

In a cost–benefit analysis, an acceptable risk means that the benefits of a climate policy outweigh the costs of the policy. The standard rule used by public and private decision makers is that a risk will be acceptable if the expected net present value is positive. The expected value is the mean of the distribution of expected outcomes. In other words, it is the average expected outcome for a particular decision. This criterion has been justified on the basis that:

• a policy's benefits and costs have known probabilities
• economic agents (people and organizations) can diversify their own risk through insurance and other markets.

On the first point, probabilities for climate change are difficult to calculate. Although some impacts, such as those on human health and biodiversity, are difficult to value it has been estimated that 3.5 million people die prematurely each year from air pollution from fossil fuels. The health benefits of meeting climate goals substantially outweigh the costs of action. According to Professor Sir Andy Haines at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine the health benefits of phasing out fossil fuels measured in money (estimated by economists using the value of life for each country) are substantially more than the cost of achieving the 2 degree C goal of the Paris Agreement.

On the second point, it has been suggested that insurance could be bought against climate change risks. In practice, however, there are difficulties in implementing the necessary policies to diversify climate change risks.

Risk

In order to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of CO
₂, emissions worldwide would need to be dramatically reduced from their present level.

Granger Morgan et al. (2009) recommend that an appropriate response to deep uncertainty is to adopt an iterative and adaptive decision-making strategy. This contrasts with a strategy in which no action is taken until research resolves all key uncertainties.

One of the problems of climate change are the large uncertainties over the potential impacts of climate change, and the costs and benefits of actions taken in response to climate change, e.g., in reducing GHG emissions. Two related ways of thinking about the problem of climate change decision-making in the presence of uncertainty are iterative risk management and sequential decision making. Considerations in a risk-based approach might include, for example, the potential for low-probability, worst-case climate change impacts.

An approach based on sequential decision making recognises that, over time, decisions related to climate change can be revised in the light of improved information. This is particularly important with respect to climate change, due to the long-term nature of the problem. A near-term hedging strategy concerned with reducing future climate impacts might favour stringent, near-term emissions reductions. As stated earlier, carbon dioxide accumulates in the atmosphere, and to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of CO
2, emissions would need to be drastically reduced from their present level (refer to diagram opposite). Stringent near-term emissions reductions allow for greater future flexibility with regard to a low stabilization target, e.g., 450 parts-per-million (ppm) CO
2. To put it differently, stringent near-term emissions abatement can be seen as having an option value in allowing for lower, long-term stabilization targets. This option may be lost if near-term emissions abatement is less stringent.

On the other hand, a view may be taken that points to the benefits of improved information over time. This may suggest an approach where near-term emissions abatement is more modest. Another way of viewing the problem is to look at the potential irreversibility of future climate change impacts (e.g., damages to ecosystems) against the irreversibility of making investments in efforts to reduce emissions (see also Economics of climate change mitigation#Irreversible impacts and policy). Overall, a range of arguments can be made in favour of policies where emissions are reduced stringently or modestly in the near-term.

Resilient and adaptive strategies

Granger Morgan et al. (2009) suggested two related decision-making management strategies that might be particularly appealing when faced with high uncertainty. The first were resilient strategies. This seeks to identify a range of possible future circumstances, and then choose approaches that work reasonably well across all the range. The second were adaptive strategies. The idea here is to choose strategies that can be improved as more is learned as the future progresses. Granger Morgan et al. (2009) contrasted these two approaches with the cost–benefit approach, which seeks to find an optimal strategy.

Portfolio theory

An example of a strategy that is based on risk is portfolio theory. This suggests that a reasonable response to uncertainty is to have a wide portfolio of possible responses. In the case of climate change, mitigation can be viewed as an effort to reduce the chance of climate change impacts (Goldemberg et al., 1996, p. 24). Adaptation acts as insurance against the chance that unfavourable impacts occur. The risk associated with these impacts can also be spread. As part of a policy portfolio, climate research can help when making future decisions. Technology research can help to lower future costs.

Optimal choices and risk aversion

The optimal result of decision analysis depends on how "optimal" is defined (Arrow et al., 1996. See also the section on trade offs). Decision analysis requires a selection criterion to be specified. In a decision analysis based on monetized cost–benefit analysis (CBA), the optimal policy is evaluated in economic terms. The optimal result of monetized CBA maximizes net benefits. Another type of decision analysis is cost-effectiveness analysis. Cost-effectiveness analysis aims to minimize net costs.

Monetized CBA may be used to decide on the policy objective, e.g., how much emissions should be allowed to grow over time. The benefits of emissions reductions are included as part of the assessment.

Unlike monetized CBA, cost-effectiveness analysis does not suggest an optimal climate policy. For example, cost-effectiveness analysis may be used to determine how to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at lowest cost. However, the actual choice of stabilization target (e.g., 450 or 550 ppm carbon dioxide equivalent), is not "decided" in the analysis.

The choice of selection criterion for decision analysis is subjective. The choice of criterion is made outside of the analysis (it is exogenous). One of the influences on this choice on this is attitude to risk. Risk aversion describes how willing or unwilling someone is to take risks. Evidence indicates that most, but not all, individuals prefer certain outcomes to uncertain ones. Risk-averse individuals prefer decision criteria that reduce the chance of the worst possible outcome, while risk-seeking individuals prefer decision criteria that maximize the chance of the best possible outcome. In terms of returns on investment, if society as a whole is risk-averse, we might be willing to accept some investments with negative expected returns, e.g., in mitigation. Such investments may help to reduce the possibility of future climate damages or the costs of adaptation.

Alternative views

As stated, there is considerable uncertainty over decisions regarding climate change, as well as different attitudes over how to proceed, e.g., attitudes to risk and valuation of climate change impacts. Risk management can be used to evaluate policy decisions based a range of criteria or viewpoints, and is not restricted to the results of particular type of analysis, e.g., monetized CBA. Some authors have focused on a disaggregated analysis of climate change impacts. "Disaggregated" refers to the choice to assess impacts in a variety of indicators or units, e.g., changes in agricultural yields and loss of biodiversity. By contrast, monetized CBA converts all impacts into a common unit (money), which is used to assess changes in social welfare.

International insurance

Traditional insurance works by transferring risk to those better able or more willing to bear risk, and also by the pooling of risk (Goldemberg et al., 1996, p. 25). Since the risks of climate change are, to some extent, correlated, this reduces the effectiveness of pooling. However, there is reason to believe that different regions will be affected differently by climate change. This suggests that pooling might be effective. Since developing countries appear to be potentially most at risk from the effects of climate change, developed countries could provide insurance against these risks.

A study carried out by David R. Easterling et al. identified societal impacts in the United States. Losses caused by catastrophes, defined by the property insurance industry as storms causing insured losses over $5 million in the year of occurrence, have grown steadily in the United States from about $100 million annually in the 1950s to $6 billion per year in the 1990s, and the annual number of catastrophes grew from 10 in the 1950s to 35 in the 1990s.”

Authors have pointed to several reasons why commercial insurance markets cannot adequately cover risks associated with climate change (Arrow et al., 1996, p. 72). For example, there is no international market where individuals or countries can insure themselves against losses from climate change or related climate change policies.

Financial markets for risk

There are several options for how insurance could be used in responding to climate change (Arrow et al., 1996, p. 72). One response could be to have binding agreements between countries. Countries suffering greater-than-average climate-related losses would be assisted by those suffering less-than-average losses. This would be a type of mutual insurance contract. Another approach would be to trade "risk securities" among countries. These securities would amount to betting on particular climate outcomes.

These two approaches would allow for a more efficient distribution of climate change risks. They would also allow for different beliefs over future climate outcomes. For example, it has been suggested that these markets might provide an objective test of the honesty of a particular country's beliefs over climate change. Countries that honestly believe that climate change presents little risk would be more prone to hold securities against these risks.

Impacts

The economic impacts of climate change are the part of the economics of climate change related to the effects of climate change. In 2019, climate change contributed to extreme weather events causing at least $100 billion in damages. Increasing temperature will lead to accelerating economic losses. A 2017 survey of independent economists looking at the effects of climate change found that future damage estimates range "from 2% to 10% or more of global GDP per year." The Stern Review for the British Government also predicted that world GDP would be reduced by several percent due to climate related costs; among the factors they considered were increased extreme weather events and stresses to low-lying areas due to sea level rise. Insofar as their calculations may omit ecological effects that are difficult to quantify economically (such as human deaths or loss of biodiversity) or whose economic consequences will manifest slowly, these estimates may be low. More recent studies suggest that economic damages due to climate change have been underestimated, and may be severe, with the probability of disastrous tail-risk events being nontrivial.

Adaptation and vulnerability

IPCC (2007a) defined adaptation (to climate change) as "[initiatives] and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or expected climate change effects" (p. 76). Vulnerability (to climate change) was defined as "the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes" (p. 89).

Autonomous and planned adaptation

Autonomous adaptation are adaptations that are reactive to climatic stimuli, and are done as a matter of course without the intervention of a public agency. Planned adaptation can be reactive or anticipatory, i.e., undertaken before impacts are apparent. Some studies suggest that human systems have considerable capacity to adapt autonomously (Smit et al., 2001:890). Others point to constraints on autonomous adaptation, such as limited information and access to resources (p. 890). Smit et al. (2001:904) concluded that relying on autonomous adaptation to climate change would result in substantial ecological, social, and economic costs. In their view, these costs could largely be avoided with planned adaptation.

Costs and benefits

A literature assessment by Adger et al. (2007:719) concluded that there was a lack of comprehensive, global cost and benefit estimates for adaptation. Studies were noted that provided cost estimates of adaptation at regional level, e.g., for sea-level rise. A number of adaptation measures were identified as having high benefit-cost ratios.

Adaptive capacity

Adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust to climate change. Smit et al. (2001:895–897) described the determinants of adaptive capacity:

• Economic resources: Wealthier nations are better able to bear the costs of adaptation to climate change than poorer ones.
• Technology: Lack of technology can impede adaptation.
• Information and skills: Information and trained personnel are required to assess and implement successful adaptation options.
• Social infrastructure
• Institutions: Nations with well-developed social institutions are believed to have greater adaptive capacity than those with less effective institutions, typically developing nations and economies in transition.
• Equity: Some believe that adaptive capacity is greater where there are government institutions and arrangements in place that allow equitable access to resources.

Smit et al. (2001) concluded that:

• countries with limited economic resources, low levels of technology, poor information and skills, poor infrastructure, unstable or weak institutions, and inequitable empowerment and access to resources have little adaptive capacity and are highly vulnerable to climate change (p. 879).
• developed nations, broadly speaking, have greater adaptive capacity than developing regions or countries in economic transition (p. 897).

Enhancing adaptive capacity

Smit et al. (2001:905) concluded that enhanced adaptive capacity would reduce vulnerability to climate change. In their view, activities that enhance adaptive capacity are essentially equivalent to activities that promote sustainable development. These activities include (p. 899):

• improving access to resources
• reducing poverty
• lowering inequities of resources and wealth among groups
• improving education and information
• improving infrastructure
• improving institutional capacity and efficiency

Goklany (1995) concluded that promoting free trade – e.g., through the removal of international trade barriers – could enhance adaptive capacity and contribute to economic growth.

Regions

With high confidence, Smith et al. (2001:957–958) concluded that developing countries would tend to be more vulnerable to climate change than developed countries. Based on then-current development trends, Smith et al. (2001:940–941) predicted that few developing countries would have the capacity to efficiently adapt to climate change.

• Africa: In a literature assessment, Boko et al. (2007:435) concluded, with high confidence, that Africa's major economic sectors had been vulnerable to observed climate variability. This vulnerability was judged to have contributed to Africa's weak adaptive capacity, resulting in Africa having high vulnerability to future climate change. It was thought likely that projected sea-level rise would increase the socio-economic vulnerability of African coastal cities.
• Asia: Lal et al. (2001:536) reviewed the literature on adaptation and vulnerability. With medium confidence, they concluded that climate change would result in the degradation of permafrost in boreal Asia, worsening the vulnerability of climate-dependent sectors, and affecting the region's economy.
• Australia and New Zealand: Hennessy et al. (2007:509) reviewed the literature on adaptation and vulnerability. With high confidence, they concluded that in Australia and New Zealand, most human systems had considerable adaptive capacity. With medium confidence, some Indigenous communities were judged to have low adaptive capacity.
• Europe: In a literature assessment, Kundzewicz et al. (2001:643) concluded, with very high confidence, that the adaptation potential of socioeconomic systems in Europe was relatively high. This was attributed to Europe's high GNP, stable growth, stable population, and well-developed political, institutional, and technological support systems.
• Latin America: In a literature assessment, Mata et al. (2001:697) concluded that the adaptive capacity of socioeconomic systems in Latin America was very low, particularly in regard to extreme weather events, and that the region's vulnerability was high.
• Polar regions: Anisimov et al. (2001, pp. 804–805) concluded that:
  • within the Antarctic and Arctic, at localities where water was close to melting point, socioeconomic systems were particularly vulnerable to climate change.
  • the Arctic would be extremely vulnerable to climate change. Anisimov et al. (2001) predicted that there would be major ecological, sociological, and economic impacts in the region.
• Small islands: Mimura et al. (2007, p. 689) concluded, with very high confidence, that small islands were particularly vulnerable to climate change. Partly this was attributed to their low adaptive capacity and the high costs of adaptation in proportion to their GDP.

Systems and sectors

• Coasts and low-lying areas: According to Nicholls et al. (2007, p. 336), societal vulnerability to climate change is largely dependent on development status. Developing countries lack the necessary financial resources to relocate those living in low-lying coastal zones, making them more vulnerable to climate change than developed countries. With high confidence, Nicholls et al. (2007, p. 317) concluded that on vulnerable coasts, the costs of adapting to climate change are lower than the potential damage costs.
• Industry, settlements and society:
  • At the scale of a large nation or region, at least in most industrialized economies, the economic value of sectors with low vulnerability to climate change greatly exceeds that of sectors with high vulnerability (Wilbanks et al., 2007, p. 366). Additionally, the capacity of a large, complex economy to absorb climate-related impacts, is often considerable. Consequently, estimates of the aggregate damages of climate change – ignoring possible abrupt climate change – are often rather small as a percentage of economic production. On the other hand, at smaller scales, e.g., for a small country, sectors and societies might be highly vulnerable to climate change. Potential climate change impacts might therefore amount to very severe damages.
  • Wilbanks et al. (2007, p. 359) concluded, with very high confidence, that vulnerability to climate change depends considerably on specific geographic, sectoral and social contexts. In their view, these vulnerabilities are not reliably estimated by large-scale aggregate modelling.

Mitigation

Mitigation of climate change involves actions that are designed to limit the amount of long-term climate change (Fisher et al., 2007:225). Mitigation may be achieved through the reduction of GHG emissions or through the enhancement of sinks that absorb GHGs, e.g., forests.

International public goods

The atmosphere is an international public good, and GHG emissions are an international externality (Goldemberg et al., 1996:21, 28, 43). A change in the quality of the atmosphere does not affect the welfare of all individuals equally. In other words, some individuals may benefit from climate change, while others may lose out. This uneven distribution of potential climate change impacts, plus the uneven distribution of emissions globally, make it difficult to secure a global agreement to reduce emissions (Halsnæs et al., 2007:127).

Policies

National

Both climate and non-climate policies can affect emissions growth. Non-climate policies that can affect emissions are listed below (Bashmakov et al., 2001:409-410):

• Market-orientated reforms can have important impacts on energy use, energy efficiency, and therefore GHG emissions.
• Price and subsidy policies: Many countries provide subsidies for activities that impact emissions, e.g., subsidies in the agriculture and energy sectors, and indirect subsidies for transport.
• Market liberalization: Restructuring of energy markets has occurred in several countries and regions. These policies have mainly been designed to increase competition in the market, but they can have a significant impact on emissions.

There are a number of policies that might be used to mitigate climate change, including *The Green Marshall Plan (http://nb.referata.com/w/index.php?title=Green_Marshall_Plan&action=edit) which calls for global central bank money creation to fund green infrastructure, (Bashmakov et al., 2001:412–422):

• Regulatory standards, such as fuel-efficiency standards for cars (Creutzig et al., 2011).
• Market-based instruments, such as emissions taxes and tradable permits.
• Voluntary agreements between public agencies and industry.
• Informational instruments, e.g., to increase public awareness of climate change.
• Use of subsidies and financial incentives, e.g., feed-in tariffs for renewable energy (Gupta et al., 2007:762).
• Removal of subsidies, e.g., for coal mining and burning (Barker et al., 2001:567–568).
• Demand-side management, which aims to reduce energy demand through energy audits, product labelling, etc.

International

• The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC sets out legally binding emission reduction commitments for the "Annex B" countries (Verbruggen, 2007, p. 817). The Protocol defines three international policy instruments ("Flexibility Mechanisms") which can be used by the Annex B countries to meet their emission reduction commitments. According to Bashmakov et al. (2001:402), use of these instruments could significantly reduce the costs for Annex B countries in meeting their emission reduction commitments.
• Other possible policies include internationally coordinated carbon taxes and/or regulation (Bashmakov et al., 2001:430).

Finance

The International Energy Agency estimates that US$197 billion is required by states in the developing world above and beyond the underlying investments needed by various sectors regardless of climate considerations, this is twice the amount promised by the developed world at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Cancún Agreements. Thus, a new method is being developed to help ensure that funding is available for climate change mitigation. This involves financial leveraging, whereby public financing is used to encourage private investment.

Cost estimates

According to a literature assessment by Barker et al. (2007b:622), mitigation cost estimates depend critically on the baseline (in this case, a reference scenario that the alternative scenario is compared with), the way costs are modelled, and assumptions about future government policy. Fisher et al. (2007:204–206) (summarized by IPCC, 2007b:11) estimated macroeconomic costs in 2030 for multi-gas mitigation (reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs, such as methane) as between a 3% decrease in global GDP to a small increase, relative to baseline. This was for an emissions pathway consistent with atmospheric stabilization of GHGs between 445 and 710 ppm CO₂-eq. In 2050, the estimated costs for stabilization between 710 and 445 ppm CO₂-eq ranged between a 1% gain to a 5.5% decrease in global GDP, relative to baseline. These cost estimates were supported by a moderate amount of evidence and much agreement in the literature (IPCC, 2007b:11,18).

Macroeconomic cost estimates made by Fisher et al. (2007:204) were mostly based on models that assumed transparent markets, no transaction costs, and perfect implementation of cost-effective policy measures across all regions throughout the 21st century. According to Fisher et al. (2007), relaxation of some or all these assumptions would lead to an appreciable increase in cost estimates. On the other hand, IPCC (2007b:8) noted that cost estimates could be reduced by allowing for accelerated technological learning, or the possible use of carbon tax/emission permit revenues to reform national tax systems.

• Regional costs were estimated as possibly being significantly different from the global average. Regional costs were found to be largely dependent on the assumed stabilization level and baseline scenario.
• Sectoral costs: In a literature assessment, Barker et al. (2001:563–564), predicted that the renewables sector could potentially benefit from mitigation. The coal (and possibly the oil) industry was predicted to potentially lose substantial proportions of output relative to a baseline scenario, with energy-intensive sectors, such as heavy chemicals, facing higher costs.

One 2020 study estimated economic losses due to climate change could be between 127 and 616 trillion dollars extra until 2100 with current commitments, compared to 1.5 °C or well below 2 °C compatible action action. Failure to implement current commitments raises economic losses to 150–792 trillion dollars until 2100. In this study, mitigation was achieved by countries optimising their own economy.

Adaptation and mitigation

The distribution of benefits from adaptation and mitigation policies are different in terms of damages avoided (Toth et al., 2001:653). Adaptation activities mainly benefit those who implement them, while mitigation benefits others who may not have made mitigation investments. Mitigation can therefore be viewed as a global public good, while adaptation is either a private good in the case of autonomous adaptation, or a national or regional public good in the case of public sector policies.

Paying for an international public good

Economists generally agree on the following two principles (Goldemberg, et al.., 1996:29):

• For the purposes of analysis, it is possible to separate equity from efficiency. This implies that all emitters, regardless of whether they are rich or poor, should pay the full social costs of their actions. From this perspective, corrective (Pigouvian) taxes should be applied uniformly (see carbon tax#Economic theory). It has been suggested that countries over the average per person emissions be carbon taxed and the funds raised given to countries under the average.
• It is inappropriate to redress all equity issues through climate change policies. However, climate change itself should not aggravate existing inequalities between different regions.

Some early studies suggested that a uniform carbon tax would be a fair and efficient way of reducing emissions (Banuri et al., 1996, pp. 103–104). A carbon tax is a Pigouvian tax, and taxes fuels based on their carbon content (Hoeller and Wallin, 1991, p. 92). A literature assessment by Banuri et al. (1996:103–104) summarized criticisms of such a system:

• A carbon tax would impose different burdens on countries due to existing differences in tax structures, resource endowments, and development.
• Most observers argue that such a tax would not be fair because of differences in historical emissions and current wealth.
• A uniform carbon tax would not be Pareto efficient unless lump sum transfers were made between countries. Pareto efficiency requires that the carbon tax would not make any countries worse off than they would be without the tax (Chichilnisky and Heal, 1994, p. 445; Tol, 2001, p. 72). Also, at least one country would need to be better off.

An alternative approach to having a Pigouvian tax is one based on property rights. A practical example of this would be a system of emissions trading, which is essentially a privatization of the atmosphere (Hepburn, 2007). The idea of using property rights in response to an externality was put forward by Coase (1960). Coase's model of social cost assumes a situation of equal bargaining power among participants and equal costs of making the bargain (Toth et al.., 2001:668). Assigning property rights can be an efficient solution. This is based on the assumption that there are no bargaining/transaction costs involved in buying or selling these property rights, and that buyers and sellers have perfect information available when making their decisions.

If these assumptions are correct, efficiency is achieved regardless of how property rights are allocated. In the case of emissions trading, this suggests that equity and efficiency can be addressed separately: equity is taken care of in the allocation of emission permits, and efficiency is promoted by the market system. In reality, however, markets do not live up to the ideal conditions that are assumed in Coase's model, with the result that there may be trade-offs between efficiency and equity (Halsnæs et al., 2007).

Efficiency and equity

No scientific consensus exists on who should bear the burden of adaptation and mitigation costs (Goldemberg et al.., 1996:29). Several different arguments have been made over how to spread the costs and benefits of taxes or systems based on emissions trading.

One approach considers the problem from the perspective of who benefits most from the public good. This approach is sensitive to the fact that different preferences exist between different income classes. The public good is viewed in a similar way as a private good, where those who use the public good must pay for it. Some people will benefit more from the public good than others, thus creating inequalities in the absence of benefit taxes. A difficulty with public goods is determining who exactly benefits from the public good, although some estimates of the distribution of the costs and benefits of global warming have been made – see above. Additionally, this approach does not provide guidance as to how the surplus of benefits from climate policy should be shared.

A second approach has been suggested based on economics and the social welfare function. To calculate the social welfare function requires an aggregation of the impacts of climate change policies and climate change itself across all affected individuals. This calculation involves a number of complexities and controversial equity issues (Markandya et al., 2001:460). For example, the monetization of certain impacts on human health. There is also controversy over the issue of benefits affecting one individual offsetting negative impacts on another (Smith et al.., 2001:958). These issues to do with equity and aggregation cannot be fully resolved by economics (Banuri et al.., 1996:87).

On a utilitarian basis, which has traditionally been used in welfare economics, an argument can be made for richer countries taking on most of the burdens of mitigation (Halsnæs et al., 2007). However, another result is possible with a different modeling of impacts. If an approach is taken where the interests of poorer people have lower weighting, the result is that there is a much weaker argument in favour of mitigation action in rich countries. Valuing climate change impacts in poorer countries less than domestic climate change impacts (both in terms of policy and the impacts of climate change) would be consistent with observed spending in rich countries on foreign aid (Hepburn, 2005; Helm, 2008:229).

In terms of the social welfare function, the different results depend on the elasticity of marginal utility. A declining marginal utility of consumption means that a poor person is judged to benefit more from increases in consumption relative to a richer person. A constant marginal utility of consumption does not make this distinction, and leads to the result that richer countries should mitigate less.

A third approach looks at the problem from the perspective of who has contributed most to the problem. Because the industrialized countries have contributed more than two-thirds of the stock of human-induced GHGs in the atmosphere, this approach suggests that they should bear the largest share of the costs. This stock of emissions has been described as an "environmental debt" (Munasinghe et al., 1996, p. 167). In terms of efficiency, this view is not supported. This is because efficiency requires incentives to be forward-looking, and not retrospective (Goldemberg et al., 1996, p. 29). The question of historical responsibility is a matter of ethics. Munasinghe et al. (1996, p. 167) suggested that developed countries could address the issue by making side-payments to developing countries.

Trade offs

It is often argued in the literature that there is a trade-off between adaptation and mitigation, in that the resources committed to one are not available for the other (Schneider et al., 2001:94). This is debatable in practice because the people who bear emission reduction costs or benefits are often different from those who pay or benefit from adaptation measures.

There is also a trade off in how much damage from climate change should be avoided. The assumption that it is always possible to trade off different outcomes is viewed as problematic by many people (Halsnæs et al., 2007). For example, a trade off might exist between economic growth and damages faced by indigenous cultures.

Some of the literature has pointed to difficulties in these kinds of assumptions. For instance, there may be aversion at any price towards losing particular species. It has also been suggested that low-probability, extreme outcomes are overweighted when making choices. This is related to climate change, since the possibility of future abrupt changes in the climate or the Earth system cannot be ruled out. For example, if the West Antarctic ice sheet was to disintegrate, it could result in a sea level rise of 4–6 meters over several centuries.

Cost–benefit analysis

In a cost–benefit analysis, the trade offs between climate change impacts, adaptation, and mitigation are made explicit. Cost–benefit analyses of climate change are produced using integrated assessment models (IAMs), which incorporate aspects of the natural, social, and economic sciences.

In an IAM designed for cost–benefit analysis, the costs and benefits of impacts, adaptation and mitigation are converted into monetary estimates. Some view the monetization of costs and benefits as controversial (see Economic impacts of climate change#Aggregate impacts). The "optimal" levels of mitigation and adaptation are then resolved by comparing the marginal costs of action with the marginal benefits of avoided climate change damages (Toth et al., 2001:654). The decision over what "optimal" is depends on subjective value judgements made by the author of the study (Azar, 1998).

There are many uncertainties that affect cost–benefit analysis, for example, sector- and country-specific damage functions (Toth et al., 2001:654). Another example is with adaptation. The options and costs for adaptation are largely unknown, especially in developing countries.

Results

A common finding of cost–benefit analysis is that the optimum level of emissions reduction is modest in the near-term, with more stringent abatement in the longer-term (Stern, 2007:298; Heal, 2008:20; Barker, 2008). This approach might lead to a warming of more than 3 °C above the pre-industrial level (World Bank, 2010:8). In most models, benefits exceed costs for stabilization of GHGs leading to warming of 2.5 °C. No models suggest that the optimal policy is to do nothing, i.e., allow "business-as-usual" emissions.

Along the efficient emission path calculated by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) (referred to by Fisher et al.., 2007), the long-run global average temperature after 500 years increases by 6.2 °C above the 1900 level. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) stated their concern over the potentially large and uncertain impacts of such a large environmental change. The projected temperature in this IAM, like any other, is subject to scientific uncertainty (e.g., the relationship between concentrations of GHGs and global mean temperature, which is called the climate sensitivity). Projections of future atmospheric concentrations based on emission pathways are also affected by scientific uncertainties, e.g., over how carbon sinks, such as forests, will be affected by future climate change. Klein et al. (2007) concluded that there were few high quality studies in this area, and placed low confidence in the results of cost–benefit analysis.

Hof et al. (2008) (referred to by World Bank, 2010:8) examined the sensitivity of the optimal climate target to assumptions about the time horizon, climate sensitivity, mitigation costs, likely damages, and discount rates. The optimal target was defined as the concentration that would result in the lowest reduction in the present value (i.e., discounted) of global consumption. A set of assumptions that included a relatively high climate sensitivity (i.e., a relatively large global temperature increase for a given increase in GHGs), high damages, a long time horizon, low discount rates (i.e., future consumption is valued relatively highly), and low mitigation costs, produced an optimum peak in the concentration of CO₂e at 540 parts per million (ppm). Another set of assumptions that assumed a lower climate sensitivity (lower global temperature increase), lower damages, a shorter time horizon, and a higher discount rate (present consumption is valued relatively more highly), produced an optimum peaking at 750 ppm.

Strengths

In spite of various uncertainties or possible criticisms of cost–benefit analysis, it does have several strengths:

• It offers an internally consistent and global comprehensive analysis of impacts (Smith et al., 2001:955).
• Sensitivity analysis allows critical assumptions in the analysis to be changed. This can identify areas where the value of information is highest and where additional research might have the highest payoffs (Downing, et al., 2001:119).
• As uncertainty is reduced, the integrated models used in producing cost–benefit analysis might become more realistic and useful.

Geoengineering

Geoengineering are technological efforts to stabilize the climate system by direct intervention in the Earth-atmosphere-system's energy balance (Verbruggen, 2007, p. 815). The intent of geoengineering is to reduce the amount of global warming (the observed trend of increased global average temperature (NRC, 2008, p. 2)). IPCC (2007b:15) concluded that reliable cost estimates for geoengineering options had not been published. This finding was based on medium agreement in the literature and limited evidence.

Major reports considering economics of climate change

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has produced several reports where the economics literature on climate change is assessed. In 1995, the IPCC produced its second set of assessment reports on climate change. Working Group III of the IPCC produced a report on the "Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change." In the later third and fourth IPCC assessments, published in 2001 and 2007 respectively, the assessment of the economics literature is divided across two reports produced by IPCC Working Groups II and III. In 2011 IPCC Working Group III published a Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation.

The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change is a 700-page report released for the British government on 30 October 2006, by economist Nicholas Stern, chair of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics. The report discusses the effect of global warming on the world economy.

The Garnaut Climate Change Review was a study by Professor Ross Garnaut, commissioned by then Opposition Leader, Kevin Rudd and by the Australian State and Territory Governments on 30 April 2007. After his election on 24 November 2007 Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd confirmed the participation of the Commonwealth Government in the Review.

A report by the United Nations Environment Program and the World Trade Organization "provides an overview of the key linkages between trade and climate change based on a review of available literature and a survey of relevant national policies".

In 2020, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission released a report warning that the consequences of climate change could create chaos in the financial system and disrupt the American economy.