Impeachment in the United States is the process by which a legislature (usually in the form of the lower house) brings charges against a civil officer of government for crimes alleged to have been committed, analogous to the bringing of an indictment by a grand jury. Impeachment may occur at the federal level or the state level. The federal House of Representatives can impeach federal officials, including the president, and each state's legislature can impeach state officials, including the governor, in accordance with their respective federal or state constitution.
Most impeachments
have concerned alleged crimes committed while in office, though there
have been a few cases in which officials have been impeached and
subsequently convicted for crimes committed prior to taking office. The impeached official remains in office until a trial is held. That trial, and their removal from office if convicted, is separate from the act of impeachment itself.
In impeachment procedings the defendant does not risk forfeiture of life, liberty, or property; according to the Constitution,
the only penalties upon conviction are removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit
under the United States.
Federal impeachment
Constitutional provisions
According to the U.S. Senate: "if a federal official commits a crime
or otherwise acts improperly, the House of Representatives may
impeach—formally charge—that official. If the official subsequently is
convicted in a Senate impeachment trial, he is removed from office."
There are several provisions in the United States Constitution relating to impeachment:
Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 provides:
- The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
- The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.
- Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
Article II, Section 2 provides:
- [The President] ... shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.
Article II, Section 4 provides:
- The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Impeachable offenses: "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
The Constitution limits grounds of impeachment to "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors". The precise meaning of the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is not defined in the Constitution itself.
The notion that only criminal conduct can constitute sufficient
grounds for impeachment does not comport with either the views of the
founders or with historical practice. Alexander Hamilton,
in Federalist 65, described impeachable offenses as arising from "the
misconduct of public men, or in other words from the abuse or violation
of some public trust." Such offenses were "political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself."
According to this reasoning, impeachable conduct could include behavior
that violates an official's duty to the country, even if such conduct
is not necessarily a prosecutable offense. Indeed, in the past both
houses of Congress have given the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" a
broad reading, finding that impeachable offenses need not be limited to
criminal conduct.
The purposes underlying the impeachment process also indicate
that non-criminal activity may constitute sufficient grounds for
impeachment.
The purpose of impeachment is not to inflict personal punishment for
criminal activity. Instead, impeachment is a "remedial" tool; it serves
to effectively "maintain constitutional government" by removing
individuals unfit for office.
Grounds for impeachment include abuse of the particular powers of
government office or a violation of the "public trust"—conduct that is
unlikely to be barred via statute.
In drawing up articles of impeachment, the House has placed little emphasis on criminal conduct.
Less than one-third of the articles that the House have adopted have
explicitly charged the violation of a criminal statute or used the word
"criminal" or "crime" to describe the conduct alleged.
Officials have been impeached and removed for drunkenness, biased
decision-making, or inducing parties to enter financial transactions,
none of which is specifically criminal. Two of the articles against President Andrew Johnson
were based on rude speech that reflected badly on the office: President
Johnson had made "harangues" criticizing the Congress and questioning
its legislative authority, refusing to follow laws, and diverting funds
allocated in an army appropriations act, each of which brought the
presidency "into contempt, ridicule, and disgrace". A number of individuals have been impeached for behavior incompatible with the nature of the office they hold.
Some impeachments have addressed, at least in part, conduct before the
individuals assumed their positions: for example, Article IV against
Judge Thomas Porteous related to false statements to the FBI and Senate in connection with his nomination and confirmation to the court.
On the other hand, the Constitutional Convention rejected
language that would have permitted impeachment for "maladministration,"
with Madison arguing that "[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a
tenure during pleasure of the Senate."
Congressional materials have cautioned that the grounds for
impeachment "do not all fit neatly and logically into categories"
because the remedy of impeachment is intended to "reach a broad variety
of conduct by officers that is both serious and incompatible with the
duties of the office".
Congress has identified three general types of conduct that constitute
grounds for impeachment, although these categories should not be
understood as exhaustive:
- improperly exceeding or abusing the powers of the office;
- behavior incompatible with the function and purpose of the office; and
- misusing the office for an improper purpose or for personal gain.
Conversely, not all criminal conduct is impeachable: in 1974, the
Judiciary Committee rejected an article of impeachment against President
Nixon alleging that he committed tax fraud, primarily because that
"related to the President's private conduct, not to an abuse of his
authority as President."
Several commentators have suggested that Congress alone may decide for itself what constitutes a "high Crime or Misdemeanor", especially since the Supreme Court decided in Nixon v. United States that it did not have the authority to determine whether the Senate properly "tried" a defendant. In 1970, then-House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford
defined the criterion as he saw it: "An impeachable offense is whatever
a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a
given moment in history."
Of the 17 impeachments voted by the House:
- No official has been charged with treason. (In 1797, Senator Blount was impeached for assisting Britain in capturing Spanish territory. In 1862, Judge Humphries was impeached and convicted for siding with the Confederacy and taking a position as a Confederate judge during the Civil War.)
- Three officials have been charged with bribery. Of those, two proceeded to trial and were removed (Judge Archibald and Judge Hastings); the other resigned prior to trial (Secretary Belknap).
- The remaining charges against all the other officials fall under the category of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors".
The standard of proof
required for impeachment and conviction is also left to the discretion
of individual Representatives and Senators, respectively. Defendants
have argued that impeachment trials are in the nature of criminal
proceedings, with convictions carrying grave consequences for the
accused, and that therefore proof beyond a reasonable doubt
should be the applicable standard. House Managers have argued that a
lower standard would be appropriate to better serve the purpose of
defending the community against abuse of power, since the defendant does
not risk forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, for which the reasonable doubt standard was set.
Officers subject to impeachment: "civil officers of the United States"
The Constitution gives Congress the authority to impeach and remove
"The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United
States" upon a determination that such officers have engaged in treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The Constitution does
not articulate who qualifies as a "civil officer of the United States".
Federal judges are subject to impeachment. In fact, 15 of 19
officers impeached, and all eight officers removed after Senate trial,
have been judges. The most recent impeachment effort against a Supreme
Court justice that resulted in a House of Representatives investigation
was against Justice William O. Douglas. In 1970, Representative Gerald
Ford, who was then House minority leader, called for the House to
impeach Douglas. However, a House investigation led by Congressman
Emanuel Celler (D-NY) determined that Ford's allegations were baseless.
According to Professor Joshua E. Kastenberg at the University of New
Mexico, School of Law, Ford and Nixon sought to force Douglas off the
Court in order to cement the "Southern Strategy" as well as to provide
cover for the invasion of Cambodia. When their efforts failed, Douglas
remained on the Court.
Within the executive branch, any Presidentially appointed
"principal officer," including a head of an agency such as a Secretary,
Administrator, or Commissioner, is a "civil officer of the United
States" subject to impeachment.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, lesser functionaries, such as
federal civil service employees, do not exercise "significant
authority", and are not appointed by the President or an agency head.
These employees do not appear to be subject to impeachment, though that
may be a matter of allocation of House floor debate time by the Speaker,
rather than a matter of law.
The Senate has concluded that members of Congress
(Representatives and Senators) are not "civil officers" for purposes of
impeachment.
As a practical matter, expulsion is effected by the simpler procedures
of Article I, Section 5, which provides "Each House shall be the Judge
of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members ...
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member."
This allows each House to expel its own members without involving the
other chamber. In 1797, the House of Representatives impeached Senator William Blount of Tennessee,
The Senate expelled Senator Blount under Article I, Section 5, on the
same day. However, the impeachment proceeding remained pending
(expulsion only removes the individual from office, but conviction after
impeachment may also bar the individual from holding future office, so
the question of further punishment remained to be decided). After four
days of debate, the Senate concluded that a Senator is not a "civil
officer of the United States" for purposes of the Impeachment clause,
and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The House has not impeached a Member of Congress since Blount.
Procedure
At the federal level, the impeachment process is a three-step procedure.
- First, the Congress investigates. This investigation typically begins in the House Judiciary Committee, but may begin elsewhere. For example, the Nixon impeachment inquiry began in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The facts that led to impeachment of Bill Clinton were first discovered in the course of an investigation by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr.
- Second, the House of Representatives must pass, by a simple majority of those present and voting, articles of impeachment, which constitute the formal allegation or allegations. Upon passage, the defendant has been "impeached".
- Third, the Senate tries the accused. In the case of the impeachment of a president, the Chief Justice of the United States
presides over the proceedings. For the impeachment of any other
official, the Constitution is silent on who shall preside, suggesting
that this role falls to the Senate's usual presiding officer, the President of the Senate, who is also the Vice President of the United States. Conviction in the Senate requires a two-thirds supermajority vote of those present. The result of conviction is removal from office.
Rules
A number of rules have been adopted by the House and Senate and are honored by tradition.
Jefferson's Manual, which is integral to the Rules of the House of Representatives,
states that impeachment is set in motion by charges made on the floor,
charges proffered by a memorial, a member's resolution referred to a
committee, a message from the president, or from facts developed and
reported by an investigating committee of the House. It further states
that a proposition to impeach is a question of high privilege in the
House and at once supersedes business otherwise in order under the rules
governing the order of business.
The House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House
is a reference source for information on the rules and selected
precedents governing the House procedure, prepared by the House
Parliamentarian. The manual has a chapter on the House's rules,
procedures, and precedent for impeachment.
In 1974, as part of the preliminary investigation in the Nixon
impeachment inquiry, the staff of the Impeachment Inquiry of the House
Judiciary Committee prepared a report, Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment.
The primary focus of the Report is the definition of the term "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" and the relationship to criminality, which the
Report traces through history from English roots, through the debates at
the 1787 Constitutional Convention, and the history of the impeachments
before 1974.
The 1974 report has been expanded and revised on several
occasions by the Congressional Research Service, and the current version
Impeachment and Removal dates from October 2015.[1]
While this document is only staff recommendation, as a practical
matter, today it is probably the single most influential definition of
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
The Senate has formal Rules and Procedures of Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials.
Calls for impeachment, and Congressional power to investigate
While the actual impeachment of a federal public official is a rare
event, demands for impeachment, especially of presidents, are common, going back to the administration of George Washington in the mid-1790s.
While almost all of them were for the most part frivolous and
were buried as soon as they were introduced, several did have their
intended effect. Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon and Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas both resigned in response to the threat of impeachment hearings, and, most famously, President Richard Nixon resigned from office after the House Judiciary Committee had already reported articles of impeachment to the floor.
In advance of the formal resolution by the full House to
authorize proceedings, committee chairmen have the same power for
impeachment as for any other issue within the jurisdiction of the
committee: to investigate, subpoena witnesses, and prepare a preliminary
report of findings. For example:
- In 1970, House minority leader Gerald R. Ford attempted to initiate impeachment proceedings against Associate Justice William O. Douglas; the attempt included a 90-minute speech on the House floor. The House did not vote to initiate proceedings.
- In 1973, the Senate Watergate hearings (with testimony from John Dean, and the revelation of the White House tapes by Alexander Butterfield) were held in May and June 1973, and the House Judiciary Committee authorized Chairman Rodino to commence an investigation, with subpoena power, on October 30, 1973. The full House voted to initiate impeachment proceedings on February 6, 1974, that is, after nine months of formal investigations by various Congressional committees.
- Other examples are discussed in the article on Impeachment investigations of United States federal officials.
Targets of congressional investigations have challenged the power of
Congress to investigate before a formal resolution commences impeachment
proceedings. For example, President Buchanan wrote to the committee investigating his administration:
I do, therefore, ... solemnly protest against these proceedings of the House of Representatives, because they are in violation of the rights of the coordinate executive branch of the Government, and subversive of its constitutional independence; because they are calculated to foster a band of interested parasites and informers, ever ready, for their own advantage, to swear before ex parte committees to pretended private conversations between the President and themselves, incapable, from their nature, of being disproved; thus furnishing material for harassing him, degrading him in the eyes of the country ...
He maintained that the House of Representatives possessed no general
powers to investigate him, except when sitting as an impeaching body.
When the Supreme Court has considered similar issues, it held that the power to secure "needed information ... has long been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate. ...
[The power to investigate is deeply rooted in the nation's history:] It
was so regarded in the British Parliament and in the colonial
Legislatures before the American Revolution, and a like view has
prevailed and been carried into effect in both houses of Congress and in
most of the state Legislatures."
The Supreme Court also held, "There can be no doubt as to the power of
Congress, by itself or through its committees, to investigate matters
and conditions relating to contemplated legislation."
The Supreme Court considered the power of the Congress to
investigate, and to subpoena executive branch officials, in a pair of
cases arising out of alleged corruption in the administration of
President Warren G. Harding. In the first, McGrain v. Daugherty,
the Court considered a subpoena issued to the brother of Attorney
General Harry Daugherty for bank records relevant to the Senate's
investigation into the Department of Justice. Concluding that the
subpoena was valid, the Court explained that Congress's “power of
inquiry ... is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function,” as “[a] legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”
The Supreme Court held that it was irrelevant that the Senate's
authorizing resolution lacked an “avow[al] that legislative action was
had in view” because, said the Court, “the subject to be investigated
was ... [p]lainly [a] subject ...
on which legislation could be had” and such legislation “would be
materially aided by the information which the investigation was
calculated to elicit.” Although “[a]n express avowal” of the Senate's
legislative objective “would have been better,” the Court admonished
that “the presumption should be indulged that [legislation] was the real
object.”
Two years later, in Sinclair v. United States,
the Court considered investigation of private parties involved with
officials under potential investigation for public corruption. In Sinclair,
Harry Sinclair, the president of an oil company, appealed his
conviction for refusing to answer a Senate committee's questions
regarding his company's allegedly fraudulent lease on federal oil
reserves at Teapot Dome in Wyoming. The Court, acknowledging
individuals’ “right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary or
unreasonable inquiries and disclosures in respect of their personal and
private affairs,” nonetheless explained that because “[i]t was a matter
of concern to the United States,” “the transaction purporting to lease
to [Sinclair’s company] the lands within the reserve cannot be said to
be merely or principally ... personal.” The
Court also dismissed the suggestion that the Senate was impermissibly
conducting a criminal investigation. “It may be conceded that Congress
is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the
prosecution of pending suits,” explained the Court, “but the authority
of that body, directly or through its committees, to require pertinent
disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged
because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such
suits.”
The Supreme Court reached similar conclusions in a number of other cases. In Barenblatt v. United States,
the Court permitted Congress to punish contempt, when a person refused
to answer questions while testifying under subpoena by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. The Court explained that although
“Congress may not constitutionally require an individual to disclose his
… private affairs except in relation to” “a valid legislative purpose,”
such a purpose was present. Congress's “wide power to legislate in the
field of Communist activity ... and to
conduct appropriate investigations in aid thereof[] is hardly
debatable,” said the Court, and “[s]o long as Congress acts in pursuance
of its constitutional power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene
on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power.”
Presidents have often been the subjects of Congress's legislative
investigations. For example, in 1832, the House vested a select
committee with subpoena power “to inquire whether an attempt was made by
the late Secretary of War ... [to] fraudulently [award] ... a contract for supplying rations” to Native Americans and to “further ... inquire whether the President ...
had any knowledge of such attempted fraud, and whether he disapproved
or approved of the same.” In the 1990s, first the House and Senate
Banking Committees and then a Senate special committee investigated
President and Mrs. Clinton's involvement in the Whitewater land deal and
related matters. The Senate had an enabling resolution; the House did
not.
The Supreme Court has also explained that Congress has not only
the power, but the duty, to investigate so it can inform the public of
the operations of government:
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.
House of Representatives: Impeachment
Impeachment proceedings may be requested by a member of the House of
Representatives on his or her own initiative, either by presenting a
list of the charges under oath or by asking for referral to the
appropriate committee. The impeachment process may be requested by non-members. For example, when the Judicial Conference of the United States suggests a federal judge be impeached, a charge of actions constituting grounds for impeachment may come from a special prosecutor, the President, or state or territorial legislature, grand jury, or by petition.
An impeachment proceeding formally begins with a resolution adopted by
the full House of Representatives, which typically includes a referral
to a House committee.
The type of impeachment resolution determines the committee to which it is referred. A resolution impeaching a particular individual is typically referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. A resolution to authorize an investigation regarding impeachable conduct is referred to the House Committee on Rules,
and then to the Judiciary Committee. The House Committee on the
Judiciary, by majority vote, will determine whether grounds for
impeachment exist (this vote is not law and is not required, US
Constitution and US law). If the Committee finds grounds for
impeachment, it will set forth specific allegations of misconduct in one
or more articles of impeachment. The Impeachment Resolution, or
Articles of Impeachment, are then reported to the full House with the
committee's recommendations.
The House debates the resolution
and may at the conclusion consider the resolution as a whole or vote on
each article of impeachment individually. A simple majority
of those present and voting is required for each article for the
resolution as a whole to pass. If the House votes to impeach, managers
(typically referred to as "House managers", with a "lead House manager")
are selected to present the case to the Senate. Recently, managers have
been selected by resolution, while historically the House would
occasionally elect the managers or pass a resolution allowing the
appointment of managers at the discretion of the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives.
These managers are roughly the equivalent of the prosecution or
district attorney in a standard criminal trial. Also, the House will
adopt a resolution in order to notify the Senate of its action. After
receiving the notice, the Senate will adopt an order notifying the House
that it is ready to receive the managers. The House managers then
appear before the bar of the Senate and exhibit the articles of
impeachment. After the reading of the charges, the managers return and
make a verbal report to the House.
Senate trial
The proceedings unfold in the form of a trial, with each side having the right to call witnesses and perform cross-examinations.
The House members, who are given the collective title of managers
during the course of the trial, present the prosecution case, and the
impeached official has the right to mount a defense with his or her own
attorneys as well. Senators must also take an oath or affirmation that they will perform their duties honestly and with due diligence. After hearing the charges, the Senate usually deliberates in private. The Constitution requires a two-thirds supermajority to convict a person being impeached. The Senate enters judgment on its decision, whether that be to convict or acquit, and a copy of the judgment is filed with the Secretary of State.
Upon conviction in the Senate, the official is automatically removed
from office and may also be barred from holding future office. The trial
is not an actual criminal proceeding and more closely resembles a civil
service termination appeal in terms of the contemplated deprivation.
Therefore, the removed official may still be liable to criminal
prosecution under a subsequent criminal proceeding. The President may
not grant a pardon in the impeachment case, but may in any resulting
Federal criminal case.
Beginning in the 1980s with Harry E. Claiborne, the Senate began using "Impeachment Trial Committees" pursuant to Senate Rule XI.
These committees presided over the evidentiary phase of the trials,
hearing the evidence and supervising the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses. The committees would then compile the
evidentiary record and present it to the Senate; all senators would then
have the opportunity to review the evidence before the chamber voted to
convict or acquit. The purpose of the committees was to streamline
impeachment trials, which otherwise would have taken up a great deal of
the chamber's time. Defendants challenged the use of these committees,
claiming them to be a violation of their fair trial rights as this did
not meet the constitutional requirement for their cases to be "tried by
the Senate". Several impeached judges, including District Court Judge Walter Nixon, sought court intervention in their impeachment proceedings on these grounds. In Nixon v. United States (1993), the Supreme Court determined that the federal judiciary could not review such proceedings, as matters related to impeachment trials are political questions and could not be resolved in the courts.
In theory at least, as President of the Senate, the Vice President of the United States could preside over his own impeachment, although legal theories suggest that allowing a defendant to be the judge in his own case would be a blatant conflict of interest. If the Vice President did not preside over an impeachment (of anyone besides the President), the duties would fall to the President pro tempore of the Senate.
To convict an accused, "the concurrence of two thirds of the
[Senators] present" for at least one article is required. If there is no
single charge commanding a "guilty" vote of two-thirds supermajority of
the senators present, the defendant is acquitted and no punishment is
imposed.
Result of conviction: removal, and with an additional Senate vote, disqualification
Conviction immediately removes the defendant from office. Following
conviction, the Senate may vote to further punish the individual by
barring him or her from holding future federal office, elected or
appointed. As the threshold for disqualification is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution, the Senate has taken the position that
disqualification votes only require a simple majority rather than a
two-thirds supermajority. The Senate has used disqualification
sparingly, as only three individuals have been disqualified from holding
future office.
Conviction does not extend to further punishment, for example,
loss of pension. After conviction by the Senate, "the Party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment
and Punishment, according to Law" in the regular federal or state
courts.
History of federal constitutional impeachment
In the United Kingdom, impeachment was a procedure whereby a member of the House of Commons could accuse someone of a crime. If the Commons voted for the impeachment, a trial would then be held in the House of Lords. Unlike a bill of attainder, a law declaring a person guilty of a crime, impeachments did not require royal assent, so they could be used to remove troublesome officers of the Crown even if the monarch was trying to protect them.
The monarch, however, was above the law and could not be impeached, or indeed judged guilty of any crime. When King Charles I was tried before the Rump Parliament of the New Model Army
in 1649 he denied that they had any right to legally indict him, their
king, whose power was given by God and the laws of the country, saying:
"no earthly power can justly call me (who is your King) in question as a
delinquent ... no learned lawyer will
affirm that an impeachment can lie against the King." While the House of
Commons pronounced him guilty and ordered his execution anyway, the
jurisdictional issue tainted the proceedings.
With this example in mind, the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention chose to include an impeachment procedure in Article II, Section 4
of the Constitution which could be applied to any government official;
they explicitly mentioned the President to ensure there would be no
ambiguity. Opinions differed, however, as to the reasons Congress should
be able to initiate an impeachment. Initial drafts listed only treason
and bribery, but George Mason favored impeachment for "maladministration" (incompetence). James Madison
argued that impeachment should only be for criminal behavior, arguing
that a maladministration standard would effectively mean that the
President would serve at the pleasure of the Senate.
Thus the delegates adopted a compromise version allowing impeachment
for "treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors".
Formal federal impeachment investigations and results
The House of Representatives has initiated impeachment proceedings 62 times since 1789.
The House has impeached 20 federal officers. Of these:
- 15 were federal judges: thirteen district court judges, one court of appeals judge (who also sat on the Commerce Court), and one Supreme Court Associate Justice.
- three were Presidents: Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton were later acquitted by the Senate, and Donald Trump, who is awaiting trial.
- one was a Cabinet secretary
- one was a U.S. Senator.
Of the 20 impeachments by the House, two cases did not come to trial
because the individuals had left office, seven were acquitted, and eight
officials were convicted, all of whom were judges. One, former judge Alcee Hastings, was elected as a member of the United States House of Representatives after being removed from office.
Additionally, an impeachment process against Richard Nixon was commenced, but not completed, as he resigned from office before the full House voted on the articles of impeachment. To date, no president or vice president has been removed from office by impeachment and conviction.
The following table lists federal officials for whom impeachment
proceedings were instituted and referred to a committee of the House of
Representatives. Numbered lines of the table reflect officials impeached by a majority vote of the House. Unnumbered
lines are those officials for whom an impeachment proceeding was
formally instituted, but ended when (a) the Committee did not vote to
recommend impeachment, (b) the Committee recommended impeachment but the
vote in the full House failed, or (c) the official resigned or died
before the full House vote.