Refugees at Taurus Pass during the Armenian Genocide.
The Ottoman government aimed to reduce the number of Armenians below
5–10% of the population in any part of the empire, which necessarily
entailed the elimination of a million Armenians.
Ethnic cleansing is the systematic forced removal or
extermination of ethnic, racial and/or religious groups from a given
area, often with the intent of making a region ethnically homogeneous. Along with direct removal (deportation, population transfer), it also includes indirect methods aimed at coercing the victim group to flee and preventing its return, such as murder, rape, and property destruction. Although the term ethnic cleansing has no legal definition under international criminal law, it constitutes a crime against humanity and may also fall under the Genocide Convention.
Ethnic cleansing is usually accompanied by efforts to remove
physical and cultural evidence of the targeted group in the territory
through the destruction of homes, social centers, farms, and
infrastructure, as well as through the desecration of monuments,
cemeteries, and places of worship.
Although many instances of ethnic cleansing have occurred
throughout history, the term was first used by the perpetrators as a
euphemism during the Yugoslav Wars
in the 1990s. Since then it has gained widespread acceptance due to
journalism and the media's heightened use of the term in its generic
meaning.
Etymology
An antecedent to the term is the Greek word andrapodismos (Greek: ἀνδραποδισμός; lit. "enslavement"), which was used in ancient texts to describe atrocities that accompanied Alexander the Great's conquest of Thebes in 335 BC. In the early 1900s, regional variants of the term could be found among the Czechs (očista), the Poles (czystki etniczne), the French (épuration) and the Germans (Säuberung). A 1913 Carnegie Endowment report condemning the actions of all participants in the Balkan Wars contained various new terms to describe brutalities committed toward ethnic groups.
During World War II, the euphemism čišćenje terena ("cleansing the terrain") was used by the Croatian Ustaše to describe military actions in which non-Croats were purposely killed or otherwise uprooted from their homes. Viktor Gutić,
a senior Ustaše leader, was one of the first Croatian nationalists on
record to use the term as a euphemism for committing atrocities against Serbs. The term was later used in the internal memorandums of Serbian Chetniks in reference to a number of retaliatory massacres they committed against Bosniaks and Croats between 1941 and 1945. The Russian phrase очистка границ (ochistka granits;
lit. "cleansing of borders") was used in Soviet documents of the early
1930s to refer to the forced resettlement of Polish people from the
22-kilometre (14 mi) border zone in the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs. This process was repeated on an even larger scale in 1939–41, involving many other groups suspected of disloyalty towards the Soviet Union. During The Holocaust, Nazi Germany pursued a policy of ensuring that Europe was "cleansed of Jews" (Judenrein).
In its complete form, the term appeared for the first time in the Romanian language (purificare etnică) in an address by Vice Prime Minister Mihai Antonescu to cabinet members in July 1941. After the beginning of the invasion of the USSR, he concluded: “I do not know when the Romanians will have such chance for ethnic cleansing." In the 1980s, the Soviets used the term "ethnic cleansing" to describe the inter-ethnic violence in Nagorno-Karabakh.
At around the same time, the Yugoslav media used it to describe what
they alleged was an Albanian nationalist plot to force all Serbs to
leave Kosovo. It was widely popularized by the Western media during the Bosnian War (1992–95). The first recorded mention of its use in the Western media can be traced back to an article in The New York Times dated 15 April 1992, in a quote by an anonymous Western diplomat.
The Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780
defined ethnic cleansing as "a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic
or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the
civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain
geographic areas".
In its previous, first interim report it noted, "based on the many
reports describing the policy and practices conducted in the former Yugoslavia, [that] 'ethnic cleansing' has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape
and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto
areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian
population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on
civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. Those
practices constitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention."
The official United Nations definition of ethnic cleansing is "rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group".
As a category, ethnic cleansing encompasses a continuum or spectrum of policies. In the words of Andrew Bell-Fialkoff:
[E]thnic
cleansing [...] defies easy definition. At one end it is virtually
indistinguishable from forced emigration and population exchange while
at the other it merges with deportation and genocide. At the most
general level, however, ethnic cleansing can be understood as the
expulsion of a population from a given territory.
Terry Martin
has defined ethnic cleansing as "the forcible removal of an ethnically
defined population from a given territory" and as "occupying the central
part of a continuum between genocide on one end and nonviolent
pressured ethnic emigration on the other end".
The term 'ethnic cleansing' has
frequently been employed to refer to the events in Bosnia and
Herzegovina which are the subject of this case ... [UN] General Assembly
resolution 47/121 referred in its Preamble to 'the abhorrent policy of
"ethnic cleansing", which is a form of genocide', as being carried on in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. ... It [i.e., ethnic cleansing] can only be a
form of genocide within the meaning of the [Genocide] Convention, if it
corresponds to or falls within one of the categories of acts prohibited
by Article II of the Convention. Neither the intent, as a matter of
policy, to render an area "ethnically homogeneous", nor the operations
that may be carried out to implement such policy, can as such be
designated as genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is "to
destroy, in whole or in part" a particular group, and deportation or
displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is
not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such
destruction an automatic consequence of the displacement. This is not to
say that acts described as 'ethnic cleansing' may never constitute
genocide, if they are such as to be characterized as, for example,
'deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part', contrary to
Article II, paragraph (c), of the Convention, provided such action is
carried out with the necessary specific intent (dolus specialis),
that is to say with a view to the destruction of the group, as distinct
from its removal from the region. As the ICTY has observed, while
'there are obvious similarities between a genocidal policy and the
policy commonly known as 'ethnic cleansing' (Krstić, IT-98-33-T,
Trial Chamber Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 562), yet '[a] clear
distinction must be drawn between physical destruction and mere
dissolution of a group. The expulsion of a group or part of a group does
not in itself suffice for genocide.'
— ECHR quoting the ICJ.
As a crime under international law
There is no international treaty that specifies a specific crime of ethnic cleansing. However, ethnic cleansing in the broad sense—the forcible deportation of a population—is defined as a crime against humanity under the statutes of both the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
The gross human-rights violations integral to stricter definitions of
ethnic cleansing are treated as separate crimes falling under public
international law of crimes against humanity and in certain circumstances genocide.
Some say that failed states see most mass killing, often in an anarchic manner. According to Michael Mann (sociologist), in The Dark Side of Democracy
(2004), murderous ethnic cleansing is strongly related to the creation
of democracies. He argues that murderous ethnic cleansing is due to the
rise of nationalism, which associates citizenship with a specific ethnic group.
Democracy, therefore, is tied to ethnic and national forms of
exclusion. Nevertheless, it is not democratic states that are more prone
to commit ethnic cleansing, because minorities tend to have
constitutional guarantees. Neither are stable authoritarian regimes
(except the nazi and communist regimes) which are likely perpetrators of
murderous ethnic cleansing, but those regimes that are in process of
democratization. Ethnic hostility appears where ethnicity overshadows
social classes as the primordial system of social stratification.
Usually, in deeply divided societies, categories such as class and
ethnicity are deeply intertwined, and when an ethnic group is seen as
oppressor or exploitative of the other, serious ethnic conflict can
develop. Michael Mann holds that when two ethnic groups claim
sovereignty over the same territory and can feel threatened, their
differences can lead to severe grievances and danger of ethnic
cleansing. The perpetration of murderous ethnic cleansing tends to occur
in unstable geopolitical environments and in contexts of war. As ethnic
cleansing requires high levels of organisation and is usually directed
by states or other authoritative powers, perpetrators are usually state
powers or institutions with some coherence and capacity, not failed
states as it is generally perceived. The perpetrator powers tend to get
support by core constituencies that favour combinations of nationalism, statism and violence.
Ethnic cleansing is part of a continuum of violence whose most extreme form is genocide, where the perpetrator's goal is the destruction of the targeted group. Ethnic cleansing is similar to forced deportation or population transfer
whereas genocide is the attempt to destroy part or all of a particular
ethnic, racial, religious, or national group. While ethnic cleansing and
genocide may share the same goal and the acts which are used to
perpetrate both crimes may often resemble each other, ethnic cleansing
is intended to displace a persecuted population from a given territory,
while genocide is intended to destroy a group.
Some academics consider genocide to be a subset of "murderous ethnic cleansing".
Thus, these concepts are different, but related, as Norman Naimark
writes: "literally and figuratively, ethnic cleansing bleeds into
genocide, as mass murder is committed in order to rid the land of a
people".
William Schabas adds, "Ethnic cleansing is also a warning sign of
genocide to come. Genocide is the last resort of the frustrated ethnic
cleanser."
As a military, political and economic tactic
As
a tactic, ethnic cleansing has a number of systemic impacts. It enables
a force to eliminate civilian support for resistance by eliminating the
civilians—recognizing Mao Zedong's dictum that guerrillas among a civilian population are fish in water, it removes the fish by draining the water. When enforced as part of a political settlement, as happened with the forced resettlement of ethnic Germans to Germany in its reduced borders after 1945, it can contribute to long-term stability. Some individuals of the large German population in Czechoslovakia and prewar Poland had encouraged Nazi jingoism before the Second World War, but this was forcibly resolved. It thus establishes "facts on the ground"—radical demographic changes which can be very hard to reverse.
Instances
See List of ethnic cleansing campaigns
for a list of events often referred to as instances of ethnic
cleansings. In many cases, the side perpetrating the alleged ethnic
cleansing and its allies have fiercely disputed the charge.
Criticism of the term
Gregory Stanton, the founder of Genocide Watch,
has criticised the rise of the term and its use for events that he
feels should be called "genocide": because "ethnic cleansing" has no
legal definition, its media use can detract attention from events that
should be prosecuted as genocide. Because of widespread acceptance after media influence, it has become a word used legally, but carries no legal repercussions.
The ideological
underpinnings of attitudes and behaviours labelled as sectarian are
extraordinarily varied. Members of a religious, national or political
group may believe that their own salvation, or the success of their
particular objectives, requires aggressively seeking converts from other
groups; likewise, adherents of a given faction may believe that the
achievement of their own political or religious goals requires the
conversion or purging of dissidents within their own sect.
Sometimes a group that is under economic or political pressure
will kill or attack members of another group which it regards as
responsible for its own decline. It may also more rigidly define the
definition of orthodox belief within its particular group or
organization, and expel or excommunicate those who do not support this
newfound clarified definition of political or religious orthodoxy.
In other cases, dissenters from this orthodoxy will secede from the
orthodox organization and proclaim themselves as practitioners of a
reformed belief system, or holders of a perceived former orthodoxy. At
other times, sectarianism may be the expression of a group's nationalistic or cultural ambitions, or exploited by demagogues.
The phrase "sectarian conflict" usually refers to violent
conflict along religious or political lines such as the conflicts
between Nationalists and Unionists in Northern Ireland
(religious and class-divisions may play major roles as well). It may
also refer to general philosophical, political disparity between
different schools of thought such as that between Shia and SunniMuslims.
Non-sectarians espouse that free association and tolerance of different
beliefs are the cornerstone to successful peaceful human interaction.
They espouse political and religious pluralism.
While sectarianism is often labelled as 'religious' and/ or
'political', the reality of a sectarian situation is usually much more
complex. In its most basic form sectarianism has been defined as, 'the
existence, within a locality, of two or more divided and actively
competing communal identities, resulting in a strong sense of dualism
which unremittingly transcends commonality, and is both culturally and
physically manifest.'
Sectarianization
Various
scholars have made a differentiation between "sectarianism" and
"sectarianization". While the first describes prejudice, discrimination,
and hatred between subdivisions within a group, e.g. based on their
religious or ethnic identity, the latter describes how sectarianism is
mobilized by political actors due to ulterior political motives. The use of the word sectarianism to explain sectarian violence and its upsurge in i.e. the Middle East is insufficient, as it does not take into account complex political realities. In the past and present, religious identities have been politicized and mobilized by state actors inside and outside of the Middle East in pursuit of political gain and power. The term sectarianizationconceptualizes this notion.
Sectarianization is an active, multi-layered process and a set of
practices, not a static condition, that is set in motion and shaped by
political actors pursuing political goals. While religious identity is salient in the Middle East and has
contributed to and intensified conflicts across the region, it is the
politicization and mobilization of popular sentiments around certain
identity markers ("sectarianization") that explains the extent and
upsurge of sectarian violence in the Middle East. The Ottoman Tanzimat, European colonialism and authoritarianism are key in the process of sectarianization in the Middle East.
The Ottoman Tanzimat and European colonialism
The
Ottoman Tanzimat, a period of Ottoman reform (1839–1876), emerged from
an effort to resist European intervention by emancipating the non-Muslim
subjects of the empire, as European powers had started intervening in
the region "on a explicitly sectarian basis".
The resulting growth of tensions and the conflicting interpretations of
the Ottoman reform led to the 1840s sectarian violence in Mount Lebanon and the massacres of 1860. This resulted in "a system of local administration and politics explicitly defined on a narrow communal basis".[6] Sectarianism arose from the confrontation between European colonialism and the Ottoman Empire and was used to mobilize religious identities for political and social purposes.[5]
In the decades that followed, a colonial strategy and technique to assert control and perpetuate power used by the French during their mandate rule of Lebanon was divide and rule. The establishment of the Ja'fari court in 1926, facilitated by the French as a "quasi-colonial institution", provided Shi'a Muslims with sectarian rights through the institutionalization of Shia Islam, and hence gave rise to political Shi’ism. The "variation in the institutionalization of social welfare across different sectarian communities forged and exacerbated social disparities". Additionally, with the standardization, codification and bureaucratization of Shia Islam, a Shi’i collective identity began to form and the Shi’i community started to "practice" sectarianism. "The French colonial state contributed to rendering the Shi‘i community in Jabal ‘Amil and Beirut more visible, more empowered, but also more sectarian, in ways that it had never quite been before."
This fundamental transformation, or process of sectarianization, led by
the French created a new political reality that paved the way for the
"mobilization" and "radicalization" of the Shi’a community during the Lebanese civil war.
Authoritarian regimes
In
recent years, authoritarian regimes have been particularly prone to
sectarianization. This is because their key strategy of survival lies in
manipulating sectarian identities to deflect demands for change and justice and preserve and perpetuate their power.
Christian communities, and other religious and ethnic minorities in the
Middle East, have been socially, economically and politically excluded
and harmed primarily by regimes that focus on "securing power and
manipulating their base by appeals to Arab nationalism and/or to Islam". An example of this is the Middle Eastern regional response to the Iranian revolution of 1979. Middle Eastern dictatorships backed by the United States, especially Saudi Arabia,
feared that the spread of the revolutionary spirit and ideology would
affect their power and dominance in the region. Therefore, efforts were
made to undermine the Iranian revolution by labeling it as a Shi’a
conspiracy to corrupt the Sunni Islamic tradition. This was followed by a rise of anti-Shi’a sentiments across the region and a deterioration of Shi'a-Sunni relations, impelled by funds from the Gulf states.
Therefore, the process of sectarianization, the mobilization and
politicization of sectarian identities, is a political tool for
authoritarian regimes to perpetuate their power and justify violence. Western powers indirectly take part in the process of sectarianization by supporting undemocratic regimes in the Middle East. As Nader Hashemi asserts:
The U.S. invasion of Iraq; the support of various Western
governments for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which commits war crime
upon war crime in Yemen and disseminates poisonous sectarian propaganda
throughout the Sunni world; not to mention longstanding Western support
for highly repressive dictators who manipulate sectarian fears and
anxieties as a strategy of control and regime survival – the "ancient
hatreds" narrative [between Sunnis and Shi’as] washes this all away and
lays the blame for the regionʹs problems on supposedly trans-historical
religious passions. Itʹs absurd in the extreme and an exercise in bad
faith.[4]
Religious sectarianism
In 1871, New York's Orange Riots were incited by Irish Protestants. 63 citizens, mostly Irish Catholics, were massacred in the resulting police-action.
Wherever people of different religions live in close proximity to
each other, religious sectarianism can often be found in varying forms
and degrees. In some areas, religious sectarians (for example Protestant
and Catholic Christians) now
exist peacefully side by side for the most part, although these
differences have resulted in violence, death, and outright warfare as
recently as the 1990s. Probably the best-known example in recent times
were The Troubles.
Catholic-Protestant sectarianism has also been a factor in U.S. presidential campaigns. Prior to John F. Kennedy, only one Catholic (Al Smith)
had ever been a major party presidential nominee, and he had been
solidly defeated largely because of claims based on his Catholicism. JFK
chose to tackle the sectarian issue head-on during the West Virginia
primary, but that only sufficed to win him barely enough Protestant
votes to eventually win the presidency by one of the narrowest margins
ever.
Within Islam, there has been conflict at various periods between Sunnis and Shias; Shi'ites consider Sunnis to be damned, due to their refusal to accept the first Caliph as Ali
and accept all following descendants of him as infallible and divinely
guided. Many Sunni religious leaders, including those inspired by Wahhabism and other ideologies have declared Shias to be heretics or apostates.
Long before the Reformation, dating back to the 12th century, there
has been sectarian conflict of varying intensity in Ireland. This
sectarianism is connected to a degree with nationalism. This has been particularly intense in Northern Ireland since the early 17th century plantation of Ulster
under James I, with its religious and denominational sectarian tensions
lasting to the present day in some forms. This has translated to parts
of Great Britain, most notably Liverpool,
and the West Central Scotland, the latter being very close
geographically to Northern Ireland, and where some fans of the two
best-known football clubs, Celtic (long been affiliated with Catholics) and Rangers (long affiliated with Protestants), indulge in provocative and sectarian behaviour.
In most places where Protestantism is the majority or "official"
religion, there have been examples of Catholics being persecuted. In countries where the Reformation was successful, this often lay in the perception that Catholics retained allegiance to a 'foreign' power (the Papacy or the Vatican),
causing them to be regarded with suspicion. Sometimes this mistrust
manifested itself in Catholics being subjected to restrictions and
discrimination, which itself led to further conflict. For example,
before Catholic Emancipation was introduced with the Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829, Catholics were forbidden from voting, becoming MP's or buying land in Ireland.
Ireland was deeply scarred by religious sectarianism following the Protestant Reformation
as tensions between the native Catholic Irish and Protestant settlers
from Britain led to massacres and attempts at ethnic cleaning by both
sides during the Irish Rebellion of 1641, Cromwellian conquest of Ireland, Irish Rebellion of 1798 and the Home Rule Crisis of 1912. The invasion of Ireland by English parliamentarian forces under Oliver Cromwell in 1659 was notoriously brutal and witnessed the widespread ethnic cleansing of the native Irish. The failure of the Rebellion of 1798,
which sought to unite Protestants and Catholics for an independent
Ireland, helped cause more sectarian violence in the island, most
infamously the Scullabogue Barn massacre, in which Protestants were burned alive in County Wexford. The British response, which included the public executions of dozens of suspected rebels in Dunlavin and Carnew,
along with other violence perpetrated by all sides, ended the hope that
Protestants and Catholics could work together for Ireland.
After the Partition of Ireland in 1922, Northern Ireland
witnessed decades of intensified conflict, tension, and sporadic
violence between the dominant Protestant majority and the Catholic
minority, which in 1969 finally erupted into 25 years of violence known
as “The Troubles” between Irish Republicans whose goal is a United Ireland
and Ulster loyalists who wish for Northern Ireland to remain a part of
the United Kingdom. The conflict was primarily fought over the existence
of the Northern Irish state rather than religion, though sectarian
relations within Northern Ireland fueled the conflict. However, religion
is commonly used as a marker to differentiate the two sides of the
community. The Catholic minority primarily favour the nationalist, and
to some degree, republican, goal of unity with the Republic of Ireland, while the Protestant majority favour Northern Ireland continuing the union with Great Britain.
The sack of Magdeburg by Catholic army in 1631. Of the 30,000 Protestant citizens, only 5,000 survived.
Northern Ireland has introduced a Private Day of Reflection, since 2007, to mark the transition to a post-[sectarian] conflict society, an initiative of the cross-community Healing Through Remembering organization and research project.
The civil wars in the Balkans which followed the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s have been heavily tinged with sectarianism. Croats and Slovenes have traditionally been Catholic, Serbs and MacedoniansEastern Orthodox, and Bosniaks and most Albanians
Muslim. Religious affiliation served as a marker of group identity in
this conflict, despite relatively low rates of religious practice and
belief among these various groups after decades of communism.
Africa
Over 1,000 Muslims and Christians were killed in the sectarian violence in the Central African Republic in 2013–2014. Nearly 1 million people, a quarter of the population, were displaced.
Australia
Sectarianism in Australia was a historical legacy from the 18th, 19th
and 20th centuries, between Catholics of mainly Celtic heritage and
Protestants of mainly English descent. It has largely disappeared in the
21st century. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, religious
tensions are more centered on Muslim immigrants amid the backdrop of
Salafist or Islamist terrorism.
Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim countries the world, has seen serious Shia-Sunnisectarian violence. Almost 80 - 85%
of Pakistan's Muslim population is Sunni, and another 10 - 20% are Shia. However, this Shia minority forms the second largest Shia population of any country, larger than the Shia majority in Iraq.
In the last two decades, as many as 4,000 people are estimated to have died in sectarian fighting in Pakistan, 300 in 2006. Among the culprits blamed for the killing are Al Qaeda working "with local sectarian groups" to kill what they perceive as Shi'a apostates.
Sri Lanka
Most
Muslims in Sri Lanka are Sunnis. There are a few Shia Muslims too from
the relatively small trading community of Bohras. Divisiveness is not a
new phenomenon to Beruwala. Sunni Muslims in the Kalutara district are
split in two different sub groups. One group, known as the Alaviya sect,
historically holds its annual feast at the Ketchimalai mosque located
on the palm-fringed promontory adjoining the fisheries harbour in
Beruwala.
It is a microcosm of the Muslim identity in many ways. The Galle
Road that hugs the coast from Colombo veers inland just ahead of the
town and forms the divide. On the left of the road lies China Fort, the
area where some of the wealthiest among Sri Lankans Muslims live. The
palatial houses with all modern conveniences could outdo if not equal
those in the Colombo 7 sector. Most of the wealthy Muslims, gem dealers,
even have a home in the capital, not to mention property.
Strict Wahabis believe that all those who do not practise their
form of religion are heathens and enemies. There are others who say
Wahabism's rigidity has led it to misinterpret and distort Islam,
pointing to the Taliban as well as Osama bin Laden. What has caused
concern in intelligence and security circles is the manifestation of
this new phenomenon in Beruwala. It had earlier seen its emergence in
the east.
Sultan Selim the Grim, regarding the Shia Qizilbash as heretics, reportedly proclaimed that "the killing of one Shiite had as much otherworldly reward as killing 70 Christians." In 1511, a pro-Shia revolt known as Şahkulu Rebellion was brutally suppressed by the Ottomans: 40,000 were massacred on the order of the sultan.
Iran
Overview
Sectarianism in Iran has been existing for centuries, dating back to the Islamic conquer of the country in early Islamic years and continued throughout the Iranian history upon now. During the Safavid Dynasty's reign sectarianism started to play an important role in shaping the path of the country. During the Safavid rule between 1501 and 1722, Shiism
started to evolve and became established as the official state
religion, leading to the creation of the first religiously legitimate
government since the occultation of the Twelfth imam.
This pattern of sectarianism prevailed throughout Iranian history.
The approach that sectarianism has taken after the Iranian 1979
revolution is shifted compared to the earlier periods. Never before the
Iranian 1979 revolution did the Shiite leadership gain as much
authority.
Due to this change, the sectarian timeline in Iran can be divided in
pre- and post-Iranian 1979 revolution where the religious leadership
changed course.
Pre-1979 Revolution
Shiism
has been an important factor in shaping the politics, culture and
religion within Iran, long before the Iranian 1979 revolution. During the Safavid Dynasty Shiism was established as the official ideology.
The establishment of Shiism as an official government ideology opened
the doors for clergies to benefit from new cultural, political and
religious rights which were denied prior to the Safavid ruling. During the Safavid Dynasty Shiism was established as the official ideology.
The Safavid rule allowed greater freedom for religious leaders. By
establishing Shiism as the state religion, they legitimised the
religious authority. After this power establishment, religious leaders
started to play a crucial role within the political system but remained
socially and economically independent.
The monarchial power balance during the Safavid ere changed every few
years, resulting in a changing limit of power of the clergies. The
tensions concerning power relations of the religious authorities and the
ruling power eventually played a pivotal role in the 1906 constitutional revolution which limited the power of the monarch, and increased the power of religious leaders.
The 1906 constitutional revolution involved both constitutionalist and
anti-constitutionalist clergy leaders. Individuals such as Sayyid Jamal al-Din Va'iz were constitutionalist clergies whereas other clergies such as Mohammed Kazem Yazdi
were considered anti-constitutionalist. The establishment of a Shiite
government during the Safavid rule resulted in the increase of power
within this religious sect. The religious power establishment increased
throughout the years and resulted in fundamental changes within the
Iranian society in the twentieth century, eventually leading to the
establishment of the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.
Post-1979 Revolution: Islamic Republic of Iran
The Iranian 1979 revolution led to the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of the Islamic Government of Iran.
The governing body of Iran displays clear elements of sectarianism
which are visible within different layers of its system.
The 1979 revolution led to changes in political system, leading to the
establishment of a bureaucratic clergy-regime which has created its own
interpretation of the Shia sect in Iran.
Religious differentiation is often used by authoritarian regimes to
express hostility towards other groups such as ethnic minorities and
political opponents. Authoritarian regimes can use religion as a weapon to create an "us and them"
paradigm. This leads to hostility amongst the involved parties and
takes place internally but also externally. A valid example is the
suppression of religious minorities like the Sunnis and Baha-ís. With the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran
sectarian discourses arose in the Middle-East as the Iranian religious
regime has attempted and in some cases succeeded to spread its religious
and political ideas in the region. These sectarian labeled issues are
politically charged. The most notable Religious leaders in Iran are
named Supreme-leaders. Their role has proved to be pivotal in the
evolvement of sectarianism within the country and in the region. The
following part discusses Iran's supreme-leadership in further detail.
Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei
During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's first supreme-leader, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the participation of all Iranians in the war. His usage of Shia martyrdom led to the creation of a national consensus.
In the early aftermath of the Iranian 1979 revolution, Khomeini started
to evolve a sectarian tone in his speeches. His focus on Shiism and
Shia Islam grew which was also implemented within the changing policies
of the country. In one of his speeches Khomeini quoted: "the Path to
Jerusalem passes through Karbala." His phrase lead to many different
interpretations, leading to turmoil in the region but also within the
country. From a religious historic viewpoint, Karbala and Najaf
which are both situated in Iraq, serve as important sites for Shia
Muslims around the world. By mentioning these two cities, Khomeini led
to the creation of Shia expansionism.
Khomeini's war with the Iraqi Bath Regime
had many underlying reasons and sectarianism can be considered as one
of the main reasons. The tensions between Iran and Iraq are of course
not only sectarian related, but religion is often a weapon used by the
Iranian regime to justify its actions. Khomeini's words also resonated
in other Arab countries who had been fighting for Palestinian liberation against Israel. By naming Jerusalem, Khomeini expressed his desire for liberating Palestine from the hands of what he later often has named "the enemy of Islam."
Iran has supported rebellious groups throughout the region. Its support
for Hamas and Hezbollah has resulted in international condemnation.
This desire for Shia expansionism did not disappear after Khomeini's
death. It can even be argued that sectarian tone within the Islamic
Republic of Iran has grown since then.
The Friday prayers held in Tehran by Ali Khamenei can be seen as a proof
of growing sectarian tone within the regime. Khamenei's speeches are
extremely political and sectarian.
He often mentions extreme wishes such as the removal of Israel from the
world map and fatwas directed towards those opposing the regime.
Regional tensions and Iran's role
The
political approach that the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken in the
previous decades has led to the increase of tensions in the region.
World leaders from around the world have criticised the political
ambitions of Iran and have condemned its involvement and support for
opposition groups such as Hezbollah. By using religion as an instrument, Iran has expanded its authority to neighbouring countries. An important figure in this process of power and ideology expansion was the major general of Iran's Quds Force, the foreign arm of the IRGC, Qasem Soleimani. Soleimani was assassinated in Iraq by an American drone in January 2020 leading to an increase of tension between the United States of America and Iran.
Soleimani was responsible for strengthening Iran's ties with foreign
powers such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria's al-Assad and Shia militia
groups in Iraq.
Soleimani was seen as the number-one commander of Iran's foreign troops
and played a crucial role in the spread of Iran's ideology in the
region. According to President Donald Trump,
Soleimani was the world's most wanted terrorist and had to be
assassinated in order to bring more peace to the Middle-East region but
also the rest of the world.
Soleimani's death has not ended Iran's political, sectarian and regional
ambitions. Iran remains a key power in expending ideologies to its
neighbouring countries. Shiism is used by the regime to justify its
actions. But it can be concluded that Iran's usage of religion is an
excuse to spread its political power regionally.
Iraq
Sunni Iraqi insurgency and foreign Sunni terrorist organizations who came to Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein
have targeted Shia civilians in sectarian attacks. Following the civil
war, the Sunnis have complained of discrimination by Iraq's Shia
majority governments, which is bolstered by the news that Sunni
detainees were allegedly discovered to have been tortured in a compound used by government forces on November 15, 2005. This sectarianism has fueled a giant level of emigration and internal displacement.
The Shia majority oppression by the Sunni minority has a long
history in Iraq, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the British
imposed upon Iraq a rule of Sunni Hashemite monarchy that suppressed
various uprisings against its rule by the Christian Assyrians, Kurds,
Yazidis and Shi'ites. After the monarchy was overthrown, Iraq was ruled
by the de jure secular Baathist Party, while de facto a minority Sunni absolute rule that discriminated against and persecuted the Shia majority.
Syria
Although sectarianism has been described as one of the characteristic features of the Syrian civil war, the narrative of sectarianism already had its origins in Syria's past.
Ottoman rule
Wounded civilians arrive at a hospital in Aleppo
The hostilities that took place in 1850 in Aleppo and subsequently in 1860 in Damascus,
had many causes and reflected long-standing tensions. However, scholars
have claimed that the eruptions of violence can also be partly
attributed to the modernizing reforms, the Tanzimat, taking place within the Ottoman Empire, who had been ruling Syria since 1516. The Tanzimat bring about equality between Muslims and non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire. This caused the non-Muslims to gain privileges and influence.
In addition to this growing position of non-Muslims through the
Tanzimat reforms, the influence of European powers also came mainly to
the benefit of the Christians, Druzes and Jews.
In the silk trade business, European powers formed ties with local
sects. They usually opted for a sect that adhered to a religion similar
to the one in their home countries, thus not Muslims.
These developments caused new social classes to emerge, consisting of
mainly Christians, Druzes and Jews. These social classes stripped the
previously existing Muslim classes of their privileges. The involvement
of another foreign power, though this time non-European, also had its
influence on communal relations in Syria. Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt ruled Syria between 1831 and 1840. His divide-and-rule strategy contributed to the hostilities between the Druze and Maronite
community, by arming the Maronite Christians. However, it is noteworthy
to mention that different sects did not fight the others out of
religious motives, nor did Ibrahim Pasha aim to disrupt society among
communal lines.
This can also be illustrated by the unification of Druzes and Maronites
in their revolts to oust Ibrahim Pasha in 1840. This goes to show the
fluidity of communal alliances and animosities and the different, at
times non-religious, reasons that may underline sectarianism.
After Ottoman rule
Before the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate in Syria, the Syrian territory had already witnessed massacres on the Maronite Christians, other Christians, Alawites, Shias and Ismailiyas, which had resulted in distrustful sentiments between the members of different sects. In an attempt to protect the minority communities against the majority Sunni population, France, with the command of Henri Gouraud, created five states for the following sects: Armenians, Alawites, Druzes, Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims.
This focus on minorities was new and part of a divide-and-rule strategy
of the French, which enhanced and politicized differences between
sects.
The restructuring by the French caused the Alawite community to advance
itself from their marginalized position. In addition to that, the
Alawites were also able to obtain a position of power through granting
top level positions to family members of the ruling clan or other tribal
allies of the Alawite community.
During the period 1961–1980, Syria was not necessarily
exclusively ruled by the Alawite sect, but due to efforts of the Sunni
Muslim extremist opponents of the Ba’th regime in Syria, it was
perceived as such. The Ba’ath regime was being dominated by the Alawite community, as well as were other institutions of power.
As a result of this, the regime was considered to be sectarian, which
caused the Alawite community to cluster together, as they feared for
their position. This period is actually contradictory as Hafez al-Assad tried to create a Syrian Arab nationalism, but the regime was still regarded as sectarian and sectarian identities were reproduced and politicized.
Sectarian tensions that later gave rise to the Syrian civil war,
had already appeared in society due to events preceding 1970. For
example, President Hafez al-Assad's involvement in the Lebanese civil war by giving political aid to Maronite Christians in Lebanon. This was viewed by many Sunny Muslims as an act of treason, which made them link al-Assad's actions to his Alawite identity. The Muslim Brothers, a part of the Sunni Muslims, used those tensions towards the Alawites as a tool to boost their political agenda and plans.
Several assassinations were carried out by the Muslim Brothers, mostly
against Alawites, but also against some Sunni Muslims. The failed
assassination attempt on President Hafez al-Assad is arguably the most
well-known. Part of the animosity between the Alawites and the Sunni Islamists of the Muslim Brothers is due to the secularization of Syria, which the later holds the Alawites in power to be responsible for.
Syrian Civil War
As
of 2015, the majority of the Syrian population consisted of Sunni
Muslims, namely two-thirds of the population, which can be found
throughout the country. The Alawites are the second largest group, which
make up around 10 percent of the population.
This makes them a ruling minority. The Alawites were originally settled
in the highlands of Northwest Syria, but since the twentieth century
have spread to places like Latakia, Homs and Damascus.
Other groups that can be found in Syria are Christians, among which the
Maronite Christians, Druzes and Twelver Shias. Although sectarian
identities played a role in the unfolding of events of the Syrian Civil
War, the importance of tribal and kinship relationships should not be
underestimated, as they can be used to obtain and maintain power and
loyalty.
At the start of the protests against President Basher al-Assad
in March 2011, there was no sectarian nature or approach involved. The
opposition had national, inclusive goals and spoke in the name of a
collective Syria, although the protesters being mainly Sunni Muslims.
This changed after the protests and the following civil war began to be
portrayed in sectarian terms by the regime, as a result of which people
started to mobilize along ethnic lines.
However, this does not mean that the conflict is solely or primarily a
sectarian conflict, as there were also socio-economic factors at play.
These socio-economic factors were mainly the result of Basher al-Assad's
mismanaged economic restructuring.
The conflict has therefore been described as being semi-sectarian,
making sectarianism a factor at play in the civil war, but certainly
does not stand alone in causing the war and has varied in importance
throughout time and place.
In addition to local forces, the role of external actors in the
conflict in general as well as the sectarian aspect of the conflict
should not be overlooked. Although foreign regimes were first in support
of the Free Syrian Army,
they eventually ended up supporting sectarian militias with money and
arms. However, it has to be said that their sectarian nature did not
only attract these flows of support, but they also adopted a more
sectarian and Islamic appearance in order to attract this support.
Yemen
Introduction
In Yemen, there have been many clashes between Salafis and Shia Houthis. According to The Washington Post,
"In today’s Middle East, activated sectarianism affects the political
cost of alliances, making them easier between co-religionists. That
helps explain why Sunni-majority states are lining up against Iran, Iraq
and Hezbollah over Yemen."
Historically, divisions in Yemen along religious lines (sects) are less intense than those in Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Most political forces in Yemen are primarily characterized by regional interests and not by religious sectarianism. Regional interests are, for example, the north's proximity to the Hejaz, the south's coast along the Indian Ocean trade route, and the southeast's oil and gas fields. Yemen's northern population consists for a substantial part of Zaydis, and its southern population predominantly of Shafi’is. Hadhramaut in Yemen's southeast has a distinct SufiBa’Alawi profile.
Ottoman era, 1849–1918
Sectarianism reached the region once known as Arabia Felix with the 1911 Treaty of Daan.It divided the Yemen Vilayet into an Ottoman controlled section and an Ottoman-Zaydi controlled section. The former dominated by Sunni Islam and the latter by Zaydi-Shia Islam,
thus dividing the Yemen Vilayet along Islamic sectarian lines. Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din became the ruler of the Zaidi community within this Ottoman entity. Before the agreement, inter-communal battles between Shafi’is and Zaydis never occurred in the Yemen Vilayet. After the agreement, sectarian strife still did not surface between religious communities. Feuds between Yemenis were nonsectarian in nature, and Zaydis attacked Ottoman officials not because they were Sunnis.
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the divide between Shafi’is and Zaydis changed with the establishment of the Kingdom of Yemen.
Shafi’i scholars were compelled to accept the supreme authority of
Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din, and the army “institutionalized the
supremacy of the Zaydi tribesman over the Shafi’is”.
Unification period, 1918–1990
Before the 1990 Yemeni unification, the region had never been united as one country. In order to create unity and overcome sectarianism, the myth of Qahtanite was used as a nationalist narrative. Although not all ethnic groups of Yemen fit in this narrative, such as the Al-Akhdam and the Teimanim.The latter established a Jewish kingdom in ancient Yemen, the only one ever created outside Palestine. A massacre of Christians, executed by the Jewish king Dhu Nuwas, eventually led to the fall of the Homerite Kingdom. In modern times, the establishment of the Jewish state resulted in the 1947 Aden riots, after which most Teimanim left the country during Operation Magic Carpet.
Conflicting geopolitical interests surfaced during the North Yemen Civil War (1962-1970). Wahhabist Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies supported Muhammad al-Badr, the deposed Zaydi imam of the Kingdom of Yemen. His adversary, Abdullah al-Sallal, received support from Egypt and other Arab republics. Both international backings were not based on religious sectarian affiliation.
In Yemen however, President Abdullah al-Sallal (a Zaydi) sidelined his
vice-president Abdurrahman al-Baidani (a Shaffi'i) for not being a
member of the Zaydi sect. Shaffi'i officials of North Yemen also lobbied for "the establishment of a separate Shaffi'i state in Lower Yemen" in this period.
Contemporary Sunni-Shia rivalry
According to Lisa Wedeen, the perceived sectarian rivalry between Sunnis and Shias in the Muslim world is not the same as Yemen's sectarian rivalry between Salafists and Houthis. Not all supporters of Houthi's Ansar Allah movement are Shia, and not all Zaydis are Houthis. Although most Houthis are followers of Shia's Zaydi branch, most Shias in the world are from the Twelver branch. Yemen is geographically not in proximity of the so-called Shia Crescent. To link Hezbollah and Iran, whose subjects are overwhelmingly Twelver Shias, organically with Houthis is exploited for political purposes. Saudi Arabia emphasized an alleged military support of Iran for the Houthis during Operation Scorched Earth. The slogan of the Houthi movement is 'Death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews'. This is a trope of Iran and Hezbollah, so the Houthis seem to have no qualms about a perceived association with them.
Ali Abdullah Saleh is a Zaydi from the Hashid's Sanhan clan and founder of the nationalist party General People's Congress. During his decades long reign as head of state, he used Sa'dah's Salafist's ideological dissemination against Zaydi's Islamic revivaladvocacy. In addition, the Armed Forces of Yemen used Salafists as mercenaries to fight against Houthis. Though, Ali Abdullah Saleh also used Houthis as a political counterweight to Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood. Due to the Houthis persistent opposition to the central government, Upper Yemen was economically marginalized by the state. This policy of divide and rule executed by Ali Abdullah Saleh worsened Yemen's social cohesion and nourished sectarian persuasions within Yemen's society.
Following the Arab Spring and the Yemeni Revolution, Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to step down as president in 2012. Subsequently, a complex and violent power struggle broke out between three national alliances: (1) Ali Abdullah Saleh, his political party General People's Congress, and the Houthis; (2) Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, supported by the political party Al-Islah; (3) Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, supported by the Joint Meeting Parties.
According to Ibrahim Fraihat, “Yemen’s conflict has never been about
sectarianism, as the Houthis were originally motivated by economic and
political grievances. However, in 2014, the regional context
substantially changed”. The Houthi takeover in 2014-2015 provoked a Saudi-led intervention, strengthening the sectarian dimension of the conflict. Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah heavily criticized the Saudi intervention, bolstering the regional Sunni-Shia geopolitical dynamic behind it.
Saudi Arabia
The Saudi government has often been viewed as an active oppressor of Shia Muslims because of the funding of the Wahabbi ideology which denounces the Shia faith. Prince Bandar bin Sultan,
Saudi ambassador to the United States, stated: "The time is not far off
in the Middle East when it will be literally 'God help the Shia'. More
than a billion Sunnis have simply had enough of them."
According to The New York Times, "The documents from Saudi
Arabia’s Foreign Ministry illustrate a near obsession with Iran, with
diplomats in Africa, Asia and Europe monitoring Iranian activities in
minute detail and top government agencies plotting moves to limit the
spread of Shiite Islam."
Sectarianism
in Lebanon has been formalized and legalized within state and non-state
institutions and is inscribed in its constitution. The foundations of
sectarianism in Lebanon date back to the mid-19th century during Ottoman
rule. It was subsequently reinforced with the creation of the Republic
of Lebanon in 1920 and its 1926 constitution, and in the National Pact
of 1943. In 1990, with the Taif Agreement, the constitution was revised
but did not structurally change aspects relating to political
sectarianism. The dynamic nature of sectarianism in Lebanon has prompted some historians and authors to refer to it as "the sectarian state par excellence"
because it is an amalgam of religious communities and their myriad
sub-divisions, with a constitutional and political order to match.
Historical background
According
to various historians, sectarianism in Lebanon is not simply an
inherent phenomena between the various religious communities there.
Rather, historians have argued that the origins of sectarianism lay at
the "intersection of nineteenth-century European colonialism and Ottoman
modernization".
The symbiosis of Ottoman modernization (through a variety of reforms)
and indigenous traditions and practices became paramount in reshaping
the political self-definition of each community along religious lines.
The Ottoman reform movement launched in 1839 and the growing European
presence in the Middle East subsequently led to the disintegration of
the traditional Lebanese social order based on a hierarchy that bridged
religious differences. Nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon was host to competing armies and ideologies and for "totally contradictory interpretations of the meaning of reform" (i.e. Ottoman or European).
This fluidity over reform created the necessary conditions for
sectarianism to rise as a "reflection of fractured identities" pulled
between enticements and coercions of Ottoman and European power.
As such, the Lebanese encounter with European colonization altered the
meaning of religion in the multi-confessional society because it
"emphasized sectarian identity as the only viable marker of political
reform and the only authentic basis for political claims." As such, during both Ottoman rule and later during the French Mandate, religious identities were deliberately mobilized for political and social reasons.
The Lebanese political system
Lebanon
gained independence on 22 November 1943. Shortly thereafter, the
National Pact was agreed upon and established the political foundations
of modern Lebanon and laid the foundations of a sectarian power-sharing
system (also known as confessionalism) based on the 1932 census.
The 1932 census is the only official census conducted in Lebanon: with a
total population of 1,046,164 persons, Maronites made up 33.57%, Sunnis
made up 18.57% and Shiites made up 15.92% (with several other
denominations making up the remainder). The National Pact served to
reinforce the sectarian system that had begun under the French Mandate,
by formalizing the confessional distribution of the highest public
offices and top administrative ranks according to the proportional
distribution of the dominant sects within the population.
Because the census showed a slight Christian dominance over Muslims,
seats in the Chamber of Deputies (parliament) were distributed by a
six-to-five ratio favoring Christians over Muslims. This ratio was to be
applied to all highest-level public and administrative offices, such as
ministers and directors. Furthermore, it was agreed that the President
of the Republic would be a Maronite Christian; the Premier of the
Council of Ministers would be a Sunni Muslim; the President of the
National Assembly would be a Shiite Muslim; and the Deputy Speaker of
Parliament a Greek Orthodox Christian.
The Lebanese Civil War, 1975–1990
During the three decades following independence from the French
Mandate, "various internal tensions inherent to the Lebanese system and
multiple regional developments collectively contributed to the breakdown
of governmental authority and the outbreak of civil strife in 1975”. According to Makdisi, sectarianism reached its peak during the civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990.
The militia politics that gripped Lebanon during the civil war
represents another form of popular mobilization along sectarian lines
against the elite-dominated Lebanese state.
Christians began setting up armed militias what they “saw as an
attempt by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to seize
Lebanon – those militias would be united under the Lebanese Forces
umbrella in 1976”.
Lebanese Sunni groups splintered into armed factions as well, competing
against one another and against the Christian militias. The beginning
of the Lebanese Civil War dates to 1975, when a Maronite militia opened
fire on a bus full of civilians in response to an assassination attempt
of a Maronite leader by PLO-affiliated Muslims.
On May 31, seven weeks after fighting began between militias, Beirut
witnessed its first sectarian massacre in which "unarmed civilians were
killed simply on the grounds of their religion."
Syria entered the conflict in June 1976, in order to avoid a PLO
takeover of Lebanon – Syria's entry into the war resulted in a de facto
division of the country into zones controlled by Syria, the PLO, and
Maronite militias.
Shi’a militias were also created, including the formation of Amal in
the late 1970s and later when some Amal militants decided to create a
more religious Shi’a militia known as Hezbollah (Party of God).
The Lebanese Civil War became a regional dilemma when Israel
invaded in 1982 with two avowed aims: destroy the PLO military
infrastructure and secure its northern frontier. In March 1989, Prime
Minister (and Acting President) General Michel Aoun launched a
“liberation war” against the Syrian army with the backing of the PLO and
Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. In doing so, General Aoun
internationalized the Lebanese crisis by “emphasized the destructive
role of the Syrian army in the country”.
His decision resulted in multilateral negotiations as well as efforts
to strengthen the role of the UN. By 1983, what had begun as an internal
war between Lebanese factions had become a regional conflict that drew
in Syria, Israel, Iran, Europe and the United States directly - with
Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the Soviet Union involved indirectly by
providing financial support and weaponry to different militias.
After fifteen years of war, at least 100,000 Lebanese were dead,
tens of thousands had emigrated abroad, and an estimated 900,000
civilians were internally displaced.
The Taif Agreement
After twenty-two days of discussions and negotiations, the surviving
members of the 1972 parliament reached an agreement to end the Civil War
on October 22, 1989. The Taif Agreement reconfigured the political
power-sharing formula that formed that basis of government in Lebanon
under the National Pact of 1943.
As noted by Eugene Rogan, "the terms of Lebanon's political
re-construction, enshrined in the Taif [Agreement], preserved many of
the elements of the confessional system set up in the National Pact but
modified the structure to reflect the demographic realities of modern
Lebanon."
As such, several key provisions of the National Pact were changed
including: it relocated most presidential powers in favor of Parliament
and the Council of Ministers and, as such, the Maronite Christian
President lost most of his executive powers and only retained symbolic
roles; it redistributed important public offices, including those of
Parliament, Council of Ministers, general directors, and grade-one posts
evenly between Muslims and Christians thereby upsetting the traditional
ratio of six to five that favored Christians under the National Pact;
it “recognized the chronic instability of confessionalism and called for
devising a national strategy for its political demise. It required the
formation of a national committee to examine ways to achieve
deconfessionalization and the formation of a non-confessional
Parliament," which has not yet been implemented to date
and it required the disarmament of all Lebanese militias; however,
Hezbollah was allowed to retain its militant wing as a “resistance
force” in recognition of its fight against Israel in the South.
Spillover from the Syrian conflict
The Syrian conflict which began in 2011 when clashes began between
the Assad government and opposition forces has had a profound effect on
sectarian dynamics within Lebanon. In November 2013, the United States
Institute of Peace published a Peace Brief in which Joseph Bahout
assesses how the Syrian crisis has influenced Lebanon's sectarian and
political dynamics. Bahout argues that the Syrian turmoil is
intensifying Sunni-Shia tensions on two levels: “symbolic and
identity-based on the one hand, and geopolitical or interest based, on
the other hand." Syria's conflict has profoundly changed mechanisms of
inter-sectarian mobilization in Lebanon: interest-based and “political”
modes of mobilization are being transformed into identity-based and
“religious” modes. Bahout notes that this shift is likely due to how
these communities are increasingly perceiving themselves as defending
not only their share of resources and power, but also their very
survival. As the conflict grows more intense, the more the sectarian
competition is internalized and viewed as a zero-sum game. Perceptions
of existential threat exist among both the Shiite and Sunni communities
throughout Lebanon: the continuation of the Syrian conflict will likely
increase these perceptions over time and cause terrorism.
There are notable divisions within the Lebanese community along
sectarian lines regarding the Syrian Civil War. The Shi'ite militant and
political organization Hezbollah and its supporters back the Assad
government, while many of the country's Sunni communities back the
opposition forces. These tensions have played out in clashes between
Sunnis and Shi'ites within Lebanon, resulting in clashes and deaths. For
instance, clashes in the northern city of Tripoli, Lebanon left three
dead when fighting broke out between Assad supporters and opponents.
The largest concentration of Syrian refugees, close to one
million people as of April 2014, can be found in Lebanon and has
resulted in a population increase by about a quarter. According to the
United Nations, the massive influx of refugees threatens to upset the
“already fragile demographic balance between Shi’ites, Sunnis, Druze,
and Christians.”
The Lebanese government faces major challenges for handling the
refugee influx, which has strained public infrastructure as Syrians seek
housing, food, and healthcare at a time of economic slowdown in
Lebanon.
