https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito,_ergo_sum
Cogito, ergo sum is a Latin philosophical proposition by René Descartes usually translated into English as "I think, therefore I am". The phrase originally appeared in French as je pense, donc je suis in his Discourse on the Method, so as to reach a wider audience than Latin would have allowed. It appeared in Latin in his later Principles of Philosophy. As Descartes explained, "we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt...." A fuller version, articulated by Antoine Léonard Thomas, aptly captures Descartes's intent: dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum ("I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am"). The concept is also sometimes known as the cogito.
This proposition became a fundamental element of Western philosophy, as it purported to form a secure foundation for knowledge in the face of radical doubt. While other knowledge could be a figment of imagination, deception, or mistake, Descartes asserted that the very act of doubting one's own existence served—at minimum—as proof of the reality of one's own mind; there must be a thinking entity—in this case the self—for there to be a thought.
The critique against the proposition is the presupposition of an "I" doing the thinking, so that the most Descartes was entitled to say was: "thinking is occurring".
Cogito, ergo sum is a Latin philosophical proposition by René Descartes usually translated into English as "I think, therefore I am". The phrase originally appeared in French as je pense, donc je suis in his Discourse on the Method, so as to reach a wider audience than Latin would have allowed. It appeared in Latin in his later Principles of Philosophy. As Descartes explained, "we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt...." A fuller version, articulated by Antoine Léonard Thomas, aptly captures Descartes's intent: dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum ("I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am"). The concept is also sometimes known as the cogito.
This proposition became a fundamental element of Western philosophy, as it purported to form a secure foundation for knowledge in the face of radical doubt. While other knowledge could be a figment of imagination, deception, or mistake, Descartes asserted that the very act of doubting one's own existence served—at minimum—as proof of the reality of one's own mind; there must be a thinking entity—in this case the self—for there to be a thought.
The critique against the proposition is the presupposition of an "I" doing the thinking, so that the most Descartes was entitled to say was: "thinking is occurring".
In Descartes's writings
Descartes first wrote the phrase in French in his 1637 Discourse on the Method. He referred to it in Latin without explicitly stating the familiar form of the phrase in his 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy. The earliest written record of the phrase in Latin is in his 1644 Principles of Philosophy,
where, in a margin note (see below), he provides a clear explanation of
his intent: "[W]e cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt". Fuller
forms of the phrase are attributable to other authors.
Discourse on the Method
The phrase first appeared (in French) in Descartes's 1637 Discourse on the Method in the first paragraph of its fourth part:
(French:) Ainsi, à cause que nos sens nous trompent quelquefois, je voulus supposer qu'il n'y avait aucune chose qui fût telle qu'ils nous la font imaginer; Et parce qu'il y a des hommes qui se méprennent en raisonnant, même touchant les plus simples matières de Géométrie, et y font des Paralogismes, jugeant que j'étais sujet à faillir autant qu'aucun autre, je rejetai comme fausses toutes les raisons que j'avais prises auparavant pour Démonstrations; Et enfin, considérant que toutes les mêmes pensées que nous avons étant éveillés nous peuvent aussi venir quand nous dormons, sans qu'il y en ait aucune raison pour lors qui soit vraie, je me résolus de feindre que toutes les choses qui m'étaient jamais entrées en l'esprit n'étaient non plus vraies que les illusions de mes songes. Mais aussitôt après je pris garde que, pendant que je voulais ainsi penser que tout était faux, il fallait nécessairement que moi qui le pensais fusse quelque chose; Et remarquant que cette vérité, je pense, donc je suis, était si ferme et si assurée, que toutes les plus extravagantes suppositions des Sceptiques n'étaient pas capables de l'ébranler, je jugeai que je pouvais la recevoir sans scrupule pour le premier principe de la Philosophie que je cherchais.
(English:) Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; And because some men err in reasoning, and fall into Paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of Geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for Demonstrations; And finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be something; And as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am, was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.
Meditations on First Philosophy
In 1641, Descartes published (in Latin) Meditations on first philosophy in which he referred to the proposition, though not explicitly as "cogito, ergo sum" in Meditation II:
(Latin:) hoc pronuntiatum: ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum.
(English:) this proposition: I am thinking, therefore I am/exist, whenever it is uttered from me, or conceived by the mind, necessarily is true.
Principles of Philosophy
In 1644, Descartes published (in Latin) his Principles of Philosophy where the phrase "ego cogito, ergo sum" appears in Part 1, article 7:
(Latin:) Sic autem rejicientes illa omnia, de quibus aliquo modo possumus dubitare, ac etiam, falsa esse fingentes, facilè quidem, supponimus nullum esse Deum, nullum coelum, nulla corpora; nosque etiam ipsos, non habere manus, nec pedes, nec denique ullum corpus, non autem ideò nos qui talia cogitamus nihil esse: repugnat enim ut putemus id quod cogitat eo ipso tempore quo cogitat non existere. Ac proinde haec cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum, est omnium prima & certissima, quae cuilibet ordine philosophanti occurrat.[l]
(English:) While we thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even imagine that it is false, we easily indeed suppose that there is neither God, nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves even have neither hands nor feet, nor, finally, a body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not while we doubt of the truth of these things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving that what thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Accordingly, the knowledge, I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophizes orderly.
Descartes's margin note for the above paragraph is:
(Latin:) Non posse à nobis dubitari, quin existamus dum dubitamus; atque hoc esse primum, quod ordine philosophando cognoscimus.
(English:) That we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt, and that this is the first knowledge we acquire when we philosophize in order.
The Search for Truth
Descartes, in a lesser-known posthumously published work dated as written ca. 1647 and titled La Recherche de la Vérité par La Lumiere Naturale (The Search for Truth by Natural Light), wrote:
(Latin:) … [S]entio, oportere, ut quid dubitatio, quid cogitatio, quid exsistentia sit antè sciamus, quàm de veritate hujus ratiocinii : dubito, ergo sum, vel, quod idem est, cogito, ergo sum : plane simus persuasi.
(English:) … [I feel that] it is necessary to know what doubt is, and what thought is, [what existence is], before we can be fully persuaded of this reasoning — I doubt, therefore I am — or what is the same — I think, therefore I am.
Other forms
The proposition is sometimes given as dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum. This fuller form was penned by the eloquent French literary critic, Antoine Léonard Thomas, in an award-winning 1765 essay in praise of Descartes, where it appeared as "Puisque je doute, je pense; puisque je pense, j'existe."
In English, this is "Since I doubt, I think; since I think, I exist";
with rearrangement and compaction, "I doubt, therefore I think,
therefore I am", or in Latin, "dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum".
A further expansion, dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum—res cogitans ("…—a thinking thing") extends the cogito with Descartes's statement in the subsequent Meditation, "Ego
sum res cogitans, id est dubitans, affirmans, negans, pauca
intelligens, multa ignorans, volens, nolens, imaginans etiam et sentiens
…", or, in English, "I am a thinking (conscious) thing, that is, a
being who doubts, affirms, denies, knows a few objects, and is ignorant
of many …". This has been referred to as "the expanded cogito".
Translation
Neither je pense nor cogito indicate whether the verb form corresponds to the English simple present or progressive aspect. Translation needs a larger context to determine aspect.
Following John Lyons (1982),
Vladimir Žegarac notes, "The temptation to use the simple present is
said to arise from the lack of progressive forms in Latin and French,
and from a misinterpretation of the meaning of cogito as habitual or generic." (Cf. gnomic aspect.) Ann Banfield
writes (also following Lyons), "In order for the statement on which
Descartes's argument depends to represent certain knowledge, … its tense
must be a true present—in English, a progressive, … not as 'I think'
but as 'I am thinking, in conformity with the general translation of the
Latin or French present tense in such nongeneric, nonstative contexts." Or in the words of Simon Blackburn,
"Descartes’s premise is not ‘I think’ in the sense of ‘I ski’, which
can be true even if you are not at the moment skiing. It is supposed to
be parallel to ‘I am skiing’."
Fumitaka Suzuki (2012) writes "Taking consideration of Cartesian
theory of continuous creation, which theory was developed especially in
the Meditations and in the Principles, we would assure that 'I am
thinking, therefore I am/exist' is the most appropriate English
translation of 'ego cogito, ergo sum'."
The similar translation “I am thinking, therefore I exist” of Descartes's correspondence in French (“je pense, donc je suis”) appears in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes by Cottingham et al. (1988).
The earliest known translation as "I am thinking, therefore I am" is from 1872 by Charles Porterfield Krauth.
Interpretation
As
put succinctly by Krauth (1872), "That cannot doubt which does not
think, and that cannot think which does not exist. I doubt, I think, I
exist."
The phrase cogito, ergo sum is not used in Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy but the term "the cogito" is used to refer to an argument from it. In the Meditations, Descartes phrases the conclusion of the argument as "that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." (Meditation II)
At the beginning of the second meditation, having reached what he
considers to be the ultimate level of doubt—his argument from the
existence of a deceiving god—Descartes examines his beliefs to see if
any have survived the doubt. In his belief in his own existence, he
finds that it is impossible to doubt that he exists. Even if there were
a deceiving god (or an evil demon),
one's belief in their own existence would be secure, for there is no
way one could be deceived unless one existed in order to be deceived.
But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I, too, do not exist? No. If I convinced myself of something [or thought anything at all], then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who deliberately and constantly deceives me. In that case, I, too, undoubtedly exist, if he deceives me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (AT VII 25; CSM II 16–17)
There are three important notes to keep in mind here. First, he claims only the certainty of his own
existence from the first-person point of view — he has not proved the
existence of other minds at this point. This is something that has to be
thought through by each of us for ourselves, as we follow the course of
the meditations. Second, he does not say that his existence is
necessary; he says that if he thinks, then necessarily he exists (see the instantiation principle).
Third, this proposition "I am, I exist" is held true not based on a
deduction (as mentioned above) or on empirical induction but on the
clarity and self-evidence of the proposition. Descartes does not use
this first certainty, the cogito, as a foundation upon which to
build further knowledge; rather, it is the firm ground upon which he can
stand as he works to discover further truths. As he puts it:
Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakable. (AT VII 24; CSM II 16)
According to many Descartes specialists, including Étienne Gilson,
the goal of Descartes in establishing this first truth is to
demonstrate the capacity of his criterion — the immediate clarity and
distinctiveness of self-evident propositions — to establish true and
justified propositions despite having adopted a method of generalized
doubt. As a consequence of this demonstration, Descartes considers
science and mathematics to be justified to the extent that their
proposals are established on a similarly immediate clarity,
distinctiveness, and self-evidence that presents itself to the mind. The
originality of Descartes's thinking, therefore, is not so much in
expressing the cogito — a feat accomplished by other predecessors, as we shall see — but on using the cogito
as demonstrating the most fundamental epistemological principle, that
science and mathematics are justified by relying on clarity,
distinctiveness, and self-evidence.
Baruch Spinoza in "Principia philosophiae cartesianae" at its Prolegomenon identified "cogito ergo sum" the "ego sum cogitans" (I am a thinking being) as the thinking substance with his ontological interpretation.
Predecessors
Although the idea expressed in cogito, ergo sum is widely attributed to Descartes, he was not the first to mention it. Plato spoke about the "knowledge of knowledge" (Greek νόησις νοήσεως nóesis noéseos) and Aristotle explains the idea in full length:
But if life itself is good and pleasant (...) and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercise, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think, we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist... (Nicomachean Ethics, 1170a25 ff.)
In the late sixth or early fifth century BC, Parmenides is quoted as saying "For to be aware and to be are the same" (B3). Augustine of Hippo in De Civitate Dei writes Si […] fallor, sum ("If I am mistaken, I am") (book XI, 26), and also anticipates modern refutations of the concept. Furthermore, in the Enchiridion Augustine attempts to refute skepticism
by stating, "[B]y not positively affirming that they are alive, the
skeptics ward off the appearance of error in themselves, yet they do
make errors simply by showing themselves alive; one cannot err who is
not alive. That we live is therefore not only true, but it is altogether
certain as well" (Chapter 7 section 20). In 1640 correspondence,
Descartes thanked two colleagues for drawing his attention to Augustine
and notes similarity and difference. (See CSMK III 159, 161.)
Another predecessor was Avicenna's "Floating Man" thought experiment on human self-awareness and self-consciousness.
The 8th century Hindu philosopher Adi Shankara
wrote in a similar fashion, No one thinks, 'I am not', arguing that
one's existence cannot be doubted, as there must be someone there to
doubt. The central idea of cogito, ergo sum is also the topic of Mandukya Upanishad.
Spanish philosopher Gómez Pereira in his 1554 work De Inmortalitate Animae, published in 1749, wrote "nosco me aliquid noscere, & quidquid noscit, est, ergo ego sum" ("I know that I know something, anyone who knows exists, then I exist").
Critique
Use of "I"
In Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry, Bernard Williams provides a history and full evaluation of this issue. The first to raise the "I" problem was Pierre Gassendi.
He "points out that recognition that one has a set of thoughts does not
imply that one is a particular thinker or another. Were we to move from
the observation that there is thinking occurring to the attribution of
this thinking to a particular agent, we would simply assume what we set out to prove,
namely, that there exists a particular person endowed with the capacity
for thought". In other words, "the only claim that is indubitable here
is the agent-independent claim that there is cognitive activity
present". The objection, as presented by Georg Lichtenberg,
is that rather than supposing an entity that is thinking, Descartes
should have said: "thinking is occurring." That is, whatever the force
of the cogito, Descartes draws too much from it; the existence of a thinking thing, the reference of the "I," is more than the cogito can justify. Friedrich Nietzsche
criticized the phrase in that it presupposes that there is an "I", that
there is such an activity as "thinking", and that "I" know what
"thinking" is. He suggested a more appropriate phrase would be "it
thinks" wherein the "it" could be an impersonal subject as in the
sentence "It is raining."
Kierkegaard
The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard calls the phrase a tautology in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript. He argues that the cogito
already presupposes the existence of "I", and therefore concluding with
existence is logically trivial. Kierkegaard's argument can be made
clearer if one extracts the premise "I think" into the premises "'x'
thinks" and "I am that 'x'", where "x" is used as a placeholder in order
to disambiguate the "I" from the thinking thing.
Here, the cogito has already assumed the "I"'s existence
as that which thinks. For Kierkegaard, Descartes is merely "developing
the content of a concept", namely that the "I", which already exists,
thinks.
As Kierkegaard argues, the proper logical flow of argument is that
existence is already assumed or presupposed in order for thinking to
occur, not that existence is concluded from that thinking.
Williams
Bernard
Williams claims that what we are dealing with when we talk of thought,
or when we say "I am thinking," is something conceivable from a third-person perspective; namely objective "thought-events" in the former case, and an objective thinker in the latter. He argues, first, that it is impossible to make sense of "there is thinking" without relativizing it to something.
However, this something cannot be Cartesian egos, because it is
impossible to differentiate objectively between things just on the basis
of the pure content of consciousness. The obvious problem is that,
through introspection, or our experience of consciousness,
we have no way of moving to conclude the existence of any
third-personal fact, to conceive of which would require something above
and beyond just the purely subjective contents of the mind.
Heidegger
As
a critic of Cartesian subjectivity, Heidegger sought to ground human
subjectivity in death as that certainty which individualizes and
authenticates our being. As he wrote in 1927:
"This certainty, that "I myself am in that I will die," is the
basic certainty of Dasein itself. It is a genuine statement of Dasein,
while cogito sum is only the semblance of such a statement. If
such pointed formulations mean anything at all, then the appropriate
statement pertaining to Dasein in its being would have to be sum moribundus [I am in dying], moribundus not as someone gravely ill or wounded, but insofar as I am, I am moribundus. The MORIBUNDUS first gives the SUM its sense."
John Macmurray
The Scottish philosopher John Macmurray rejects the cogito
outright in order to place action at the center of a philosophical
system he entitles the Form of the Personal. "We must reject this, both
as standpoint and as method. If this be philosophy, then philosophy is a
bubble floating in an atmosphere of unreality." The reliance on thought creates an irreconcilable dualism between thought and action in which the unity
of experience is lost, thus dissolving the integrity of our selves, and
destroying any connection with reality. In order to formulate a more
adequate cogito, Macmurray proposes the substitution of "I do"
for "I think", ultimately leading to a belief in God as an agent to
whom all persons stand in relation.
