Millennials, also known as Generation Y (or simply Gen Y), are the demographic cohort following Generation X and preceding Generation Z. Researchers and popular media use the early 1980s as starting birth years and the mid-1990s to early 2000s as ending birth years, with 1981 to 1996 a widely accepted defining range for the generation.
Millennials are sometimes referred to as "echo boomers" due to a major surge in birth rates in the 1980s and 1990s, and because millennials are often the children of the baby boomers. This generation is generally marked by their coming of age in the Information Age, and they are comfortable in their usage of digital technology and social media. Millennials are often the parents of Generation Alpha.
Terminology
Members of this demographic cohort are known as millennials because they became adults around the turn of the millennium.Authors William Strauss and Neil Howe are widely credited with naming the millennials. They coined the term in 1987, around the time children born in 1982 were entering kindergarten, and the media were first identifying their prospective link to the impending new millennium as the high school graduating class of 2000. They wrote about the cohort in their books Generations: The History of America's Future, 1584 to 2069 (1991) and Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation (2000).
In August 1993, an Advertising Age editorial coined the phrase Generation Y to describe teenagers of the day, then aged 13–19 (born 1974–1980), who were at the time defined as different from Generation X. However, the 1974–1980 cohort was later reidentified as the last wave of Generation X, and by 2003 Ad Age had moved their Generation Y starting year up to 1982. According to journalist Bruce Horovitz, in 2012, Ad Age "threw in the towel by conceding that millennials is a better name than Gen Y", and by 2014, a past director of data strategy at Ad Age said to NPR "the Generation Y label was a placeholder until we found out more about them".
Millennials are sometimes called Echo Boomers, due to their being the offspring of the baby boomers and due to the significant increase in birth rates from the early 1980s to mid 1990s, mirroring that of their parents. In the United States, birth rates peaked in August 1990 and a 20th-century trend toward smaller families in developed countries continued. Psychologist Jean Twenge described millennials as "Generation Me" in her 2006 book Generation Me: Why Today’s Young Americans Are More Confident, Assertive, Entitled – and More Miserable Than Ever Before, which was updated in 2014. In 2013, Time magazine ran a cover story titled Millennials: The Me Me Me Generation. Newsweek used the term Generation 9/11 to refer to young people who were between the ages of 10 and 20 during the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. The first reference to "Generation 9/11" was made in the cover story of the 12 November 2001 issue of Newsweek. Alternative names for this group proposed include the Net Generation and The Burnout Generation.
American sociologist Kathleen Shaputis labeled millennials as the Boomerang Generation or Peter Pan generation because of the members' perceived tendency for delaying some rites of passage into adulthood for longer periods than most generations before them. These labels were also a reference to a trend toward members living with their parents for longer periods than previous generations. Kimberly Palmer regards the high cost of housing and higher education, and the relative affluence of older generations, as among the factors driving the trend. Questions regarding a clear definition of what it means to be an adult also impact a debate about delayed transitions into adulthood and the emergence of a new life stage, Emerging Adulthood. A 2012 study by professors at Brigham Young University found that college students were more likely to define "adult" based on certain personal abilities and characteristics rather than more traditional "rite of passage" events. Larry Nelson noted that "In prior generations, you get married and you start a career and you do that immediately. What young people today are seeing is that approach has led to divorces, to people unhappy with their careers … The majority want to get married […] they just want to do it right the first time, the same thing with their careers."
Date and age range definitions
Oxford Living Dictionaries describes a millennial as "a person reaching young adulthood in the early 21st century." Jonathan Rauch, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, wrote for The Economist in 2018 that "generations are squishy concepts", but the 1981 to 1996 birth cohort is a "widely accepted" definition for millennials. Reuters also states that millennials are "widely accepted as having been born between 1981 and 1996."The Pew Research Center defines millennials as born from 1981 to 1996, choosing these dates for "key political, economic and social factors", including the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Great Recession, and the Internet explosion. According to this definition, as of 2020 the oldest millennial is 39 years old, and the youngest will turn 24 this year. Many major media outlets and statistical organizations have cited Pew's definition including Time magazine, BBC, The Washington Post, Business Insider, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Pew has observed that "Because generations are analytical constructs, it takes time for popular and expert consensus to develop as to the precise boundaries that demarcate one generation from another" and has indicated that they would remain open to date recalibration.
The Federal Reserve Board defines millennials as "members of the generation born between 1981 and 1996", as does the American Psychological Association and Ernst and Young. The birth years of 1981 to 1996 have also been used to define millennials by PBS, CBS, ABC Australia, The Washington Post, The Washington Times, The Los Angeles Times.
Gallup Inc., MSW Research, and the Resolution Foundation use 1980–1996, while PricewaterhouseCoopers has used 1981 to 1995, and Nielsen Media Research has defined millennials as adults between the ages of 22 and 38 years old in 2019. In 2014, U.S PIRG described millennials as those born between 1983 and 2000. CNN reports that studies use 1981–1996 but sometimes 1980–2000. The United States Census Bureau used the birth years 1982 to 2000 in a 2015 news release to describe millennials, but they have stated that "there is no official start and end date for when millennials were born" and they do not define millennials.
Australia's McCrindle Research uses 1980–1994 as Generation Y birth years.
For the polling agency Ipsos-MORI, the term 'millennial' is a "working title" for the cohort born between 1980 and 1995. They further noted that while this cohort has its own unique characteristics, it is plagued by misunderstandings or plainly wrong descriptions.
In his 2008 book The Lucky Few: Between the Greatest Generation and the Baby Boom, author Elwood Carlson used the term "New Boomers" to describe this cohort. He identified the birth years of 1983–2001, based on the upswing in births after 1983 and finishing with the "political and social challenges" that occurred after the September 11th terrorist acts. Author Neil Howe, co-creator of the Strauss–Howe generational theory, defines millennials as being born between 1982–2004; however, Howe described the dividing line between millennials and the following generation, which he termed the Homeland Generation, as "tentative", saying "you can’t be sure where history will someday draw a cohort dividing line until a generation fully comes of age".
Individuals born in the Generation X and millennial cusp years of the late 1970s and early to mid 1980s have been identified as a "microgeneration" with characteristics of both generations. Names given to these "cuspers" include Xennials, Generation Catalano, and the Oregon Trail Generation.
General discussion
Psychologist Jean Twenge, the author of the 2006 book Generation Me, considers millennials, along with younger members of Generation X, to be part of what she calls "Generation Me". Twenge attributes millennials with the traits of confidence and tolerance, but also describes a sense of entitlement and narcissism, based on "Narcissistic Personality Inventory" surveys showing increased narcissism among millennials compared to preceding generations when they were teens and in their twenties. Psychologist Jeffrey Arnett of Clark University, Worcester has criticized Twenge's research on narcissism among millennials, stating "I think she is vastly misinterpreting or over-interpreting the data, and I think it’s destructive". He doubts that the Narcissistic Personality Inventory really measures narcissism at all. Arnett says that not only are millennials less narcissistic, they're “an exceptionally generous generation that holds great promise for improving the world”. A study published in 2017 in the journal Psychological Science found a small decline in narcissism among young people since the 1990s.Authors William Strauss and Neil Howe argue that each generation has common characteristics that give it a specific character with four basic generational archetypes, repeating in a cycle. According to their hypothesis, they predicted millennials would become more like the "civic-minded" G.I. Generation with a strong sense of community both local and global. Strauss and Howe ascribe seven basic traits to the millennial cohort: special, sheltered, confident, team-oriented, conventional, pressured, and achieving. However, Arthur E. Levine, author of When Hope and Fear Collide: A Portrait of Today's College Student, dismissed these generational images as "stereotypes". In addition, psychologist Jean Twenge says Strauss and Howe's assertions are overly-deterministic, non-falsifiable, and unsupported by rigorous evidence.
Polling agency Ipsos-MORI warned that the word 'millennials' is "misused to the point where it’s often mistaken for just another meaningless buzzword" because "many of the claims made about millennial characteristics are simplified, misinterpreted or just plain wrong, which can mean real differences get lost" and that "[e]qually important are the similarities between other generations – the attitudes and behaviours that are staying the same are sometimes just as important and surprising."
Cultural identity
Of millennials in the United States
Since the 2000 U.S. Census, millennials have taken advantage of the possibility of selecting more than one racial group in abundance. In 2015, the Pew Research Center also conducted research regarding generational identity that said a majority did not like the "Millennial" label. In 2015, the Pew Research Center conducted research regarding generational identity. It was discovered that millennials are less likely to strongly identify with the generational term when compared to Generation X or the Baby Boomers, with only 40% of those born between 1981 and 1997 identifying as part of the Millennial Generation. Among older millennials, those born 1981–1988, Pew Research found 43% personally identified as members of the older demographic cohort, Generation X, while only 35% identified as millennials. Among younger millennials (born 1989–1997), generational identity was not much stronger, with only 45% personally identifying as millennials. It was also found that millennials chose most often to define themselves with more negative terms such as self-absorbed, wasteful or greedy. In this 2015 report, Pew defined millennials with birth years ranging from 1981 onwards.Fred Bonner, a Samuel DeWitt Proctor Chair in Education at Rutgers University and author of Diverse Millennial Students in College: Implications for Faculty and Student Affairs, believes that much of the commentary on the Millennial Generation may be partially correct, but overly general and that many of the traits they describe apply primarily to "white, affluent teenagers who accomplish great things as they grow up in the suburbs, who confront anxiety when applying to super-selective colleges, and who multitask with ease as their helicopter parents hover reassuringly above them." During class discussions, Bonner listened to black and Hispanic students describe how some or all of the so-called core traits did not apply to them. They often said that the "special" trait, in particular, is unrecognizable. Other socioeconomic groups often do not display the same attributes commonly attributed to millennials. "It's not that many diverse parents don't want to treat their kids as special," he says, "but they often don't have the social and cultural capital, the time and resources, to do that."
American Millennials that have, or are, serving in the military may have drastically different views and opinions than their non-veteran counterparts. Because of this, some do not identify with their generation; this coincides with most millennials having a lack of exposure and knowledge of the military, yet trust its leadership. Yet, the view of some senior leadership of serving millennials are not always positive.
The University of Michigan's
"Monitoring the Future" study of high school seniors (conducted
continually since 1975) and the American Freshman Survey, conducted by
UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute of new college students since
1966, showed an increase in the proportion of students who consider
wealth a very important attribute, from 45% for Baby Boomers (surveyed
between 1967 and 1985) to 70% for Gen Xers, and 75% for millennials. The
percentage who said it was important to keep abreast of political
affairs fell, from 50% for Baby Boomers to 39% for Gen Xers, and 35% for
millennials. The notion of "developing a meaningful philosophy of life"
decreased the most across generations, from 73% for Boomers to 45% for
millennials. The willingness to be involved in an environmental cleanup
program dropped from 33% for Baby Boomers to 21% for millennials.
By the late 2010s, viewership of late-night American television
among adults aged 18 to 49, the most important demographic group for
advertisers, has fallen substantially despite an abundance of materials.
This is due in part to the availability and popularity of streaming
services. However, when delayed viewing within three days is taken into
account, the top shows all saw their viewership numbers boosted. This
development undermines the current business model of the television
entertainment industry. "If the sky isn't exactly falling on the
broadcast TV advertising model, it certainly seems to be a lot closer to
the ground than it once was," wrote reporter Anthony Crupi for Ad Age.
Despite having the reputation for "killing" many things of value
to the older generations, Millennials and Generation Z are nostalgically
preserving Polaroid cameras, vinyl records, needlepoint, and home gardening, to name just some.
Of millennials in general and in other countries
Elza Venter, an educational psychologist and lecturer at Unisa, South
Africa, in the Department of Psychology of Education, believes
Millennials are digital natives because they have grown up experiencing
digital technology and have known it all their lives. Prensky coined the
concept ‘digital natives’ because the members of the generation are
‘native speakers of the digital language of computers, video games and
the internet’. This generation's older members use a combination of face-to-face communication and computer mediated communication, while its younger members use mainly electronic and digital technologies for interpersonal communication.
A 2013 survey of almost a thousand Britons aged 18 to 24 found
that 62% had a favorable opinion of the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) and 70% felt proud of their national history. In 2017, nearly half of millennials living in the UK have attended a live music event.
Only 54% of Russian millennials were married in 2016.
Millennials came of age in a time where the entertainment industry began to be affected by the Internet. Using artificial intelligence, Joan Serra and his team at the Spanish National Research Council
studied the massive Million Song Dataset and found that between 1955
and 2010, popular music has gotten louder, while the chords, melodies,
and types of sounds used have become increasingly homogenized. While the
music industry has long been accused of producing songs that are louder
and blander, this is the first time the quality of songs is
comprehensively studied and measured.
Demographics
Asia
Chinese millennials are commonly called the post-80s and post-90s generations. At a 2015 conference in Shanghai organized by University of Southern California's
US-China Institute, millennials in China were examined and contrasted
with American millennials. Findings included millennials' marriage,
childbearing, and child raising preferences, life and career ambitions,
and attitudes towards volunteerism and activism.
As a result of cultural ideals, government policy, and modern
medicine, there has been severe gender imbalances in China and India.
According to the United Nations, in 2018, there were 112 Chinese males
aged 15 to 29 for every hundred females in that age group. That number
in India was 111. China had a total of 34 million excess males and India
37 million, more than the entire population of Malaysia. Such a
discrepancy fuels loneliness epidemics, human trafficking (from
elsewhere in Asia, such as Cambodia and Vietnam), and prostitution,
among other societal problems.
Singapore's birth rate has fallen below the replacement level of
2.1 since the 1980s before stabilizing by during the 2000s and 2010s. (It reached 1.14 in 2018, making it the lowest since 2010 and one of the lowest in the world.)
Government incentives such as the baby bonus have proven insufficient
to raise the birth rate. Singapore's experience mirrors those of Japan
and South Korea.
Vietnam's median age in 2018 was 26 and rising. Between the 1970s and the late 2010s, life expectancy climbed from 60 to 76.
It is now the second highest in Southeast Asia. Vietnam's fertility
rate dropped from 5 in 1980 to 3.55 in 1990 and then to 1.95 in 2017. In
that same year, 23% of the Vietnamese population was 15 years of age or
younger, down from almost 40% in 1989. Other rapidly growing Southeast Asian countries, such as the Philippines, saw similar demographic trends.
Europe
From about 1750 to 1950, Western Europe
transitioned from having both high birth and death rates to low birth
and death rates. By the late 1960s or 1970s, the average woman had fewer
than two children, and, although demographers at first expected a
"correction," such a rebound never came. Despite a bump in the total
fertility rates (TFR) of some European countries in the very late
twentieth century (the 1980s and 1990s), especially France and Scandinavia,
they never returned to replacement level; the bump was largely due to
older women realizing their dreams of motherhood. At first, falling
fertility is due to urbanization and decreased infant mortality
rates, which diminished the benefits and increased the costs of raising
children. In other words, it became more economically sensible to
invest more in fewer children, as economist Gary Becker
argued. (This is the first demographic transition.) Falling fertility
then came from attitudinal shifts. By the 1960s, people began moving
from traditional and communal values towards more expressive and
individualistic outlooks due to access to and aspiration of higher
education, and to the spread of lifestyle values once practiced only by a
tiny minority of cultural elites. (This is the second demographic transition.)
Although the momentous cultural changes of the 1960s leveled off by the
1990s, the social and cultural environment of the very late
twentieth-century was quite different from that of the 1950s. Such
changes in values have had a major effect on fertility. Member states of
the European Economic Community
saw a steady increase in not just divorce and out-of-wedlock births
between 1960 and 1985 but also falling fertility rates. In 1981, a
survey of countries across the industrialized world
found that while more than half of people aged 65 and over thought that
women needed children to be fulfilled, only 35% of those between the
ages of 15 to 24 (younger Baby Boomers and older Generation X) agreed. In the early 1980s, East Germany, West Germany, Denmark, and the Channel Islands had some of the world's lowest fertility rates.
At the start of the twenty-first century, Europe suffers from an aging population. This problem is especially acute in Eastern Europe,
whereas in Western Europe, it is alleviated by international
immigration. In addition, an increasing number of children born in
Europe has been born to non-European parents. Because children of
immigrants in Europe tend to be about as religious as they are, this
could slow the decline of religion (or the growth of secularism) in the continent as the twenty-first century progresses.
In the United Kingdom, the number of foreign-born residents stood at 6%
of the population in 1991. Immigration subsequently surged and has not
fallen since (as of 2018). Researches by the demographers and political
scientists Eric Kaufmann, Roger Eatwell, and Matthew Goodwin suggest that such a fast ethno-demographic change is one of the key reasons behind public backlash in the form of national populism across the rich liberal democracies, an example of which is the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (Brexit).
Italy is a country where the problem of an aging population is
especially acute. The fertility rate dropped from about four in the
1960s down to 1.2 in the 2010s. This is not because young Italians do
not want to procreate. Quite the contrary, having many children is an
Italian ideal. But its economy has been floundering since the Great Recession of 2007–8, with the youth unemployment
rate at a staggering 35% in 2019. Many Italians have moved abroad –
150,000 did in 2018 – and many are young people pursuing educational and
economic opportunities. With the plunge in the number of births each
year, the Italian population is expected to decline in the next five
years. Moreover, the Baby Boomers are retiring in large numbers, and
their numbers eclipse those of the young people taking care of them.
Only Japan has an age structure more tilted towards the elderly.
Greece also suffers from a serious demographic problem as many
young people are leaving the country in search of better opportunities
elsewhere in the wake of the Great Recession. This brain drain and a rapidly aging population could spell disaster for the country.
As a result of the shocks due to the decline and dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's birth rates began falling in the late 1980s while death rates have risen, especially among men.
In the early 2000s, Russia had not only a falling birth rate but also a
declining population despite having an improving economy.
Between 1992 and 2002, Russia's population dropped from 149 million to
144 million. According to the "medium case scenario" of the U.N.'s
Population Division, Russia could lose another 20 million people by the
2020s.
Oceania
Australia's total fertility rate has fallen from above three in the
post-war era, to about replacement level (2.1) in the 1970s to below
that in the late 2010s. However, immigration has been offsetting the
effects of a declining birthrate. In the 2010s, among the residents of
Australia, 5% were born in the United Kingdom, 2.5% from China, 2.2%
from India, and 1.1% from the Philippines. 84% of new arrivals in the
fiscal year of 2016 were below 40 years of age, compared to 54% of those
already in the country. Like other immigrant-friendly countries, such
as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Australia's
working-age population is expected to grow till about 2025. However, the
ratio of people of working age to retirees (the dependency ratio)
has gone from eight in the 1970s to about four in the 2010s. It could
drop to two by the 2060s, depending in immigration levels.
"The older the population is, the more people are on welfare benefits,
we need more health care, and there's a smaller base to pay the taxes,"
Ian Harper of the Melbourne Business School told ABC News (Australia).
While the government has scaled back plans to increase the retirement
age, to cut pensions, and to raise taxes due to public opposition,
demographic pressures continue to mount as the buffering effects of
immigration are fading away.
United States
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965
(also known as the Hart-Cellar Act), passed at the urging of President
Lyndon B. Johnson, abolished national quotas for immigrants and replaced
it with a system that admits a fixed number of persons per year based
in qualities such as skills and the need for refuge. Immigration
subsequently surged from elsewhere in North America (especially Canada
and Mexico), Asia, Central America, and the West Indies.
By the mid-1980s, most immigrants originated from Asia and Latin
America. Some were refugees from Vietnam, Cuba, Haiti, and other parts
of the Americas while others came illegally by crossing the long and
largely undefended U.S.-Mexican border. Although Congress offered
amnesty to "undocumented immigrants" who had been in the country for a
long time and attempted to penalize employers who recruited them, their
influx continued. At the same time, the postwar baby boom and
subsequently falling fertility rate seemed to jeopardize America's
social security system as the Baby Boomers retire in the twenty-first
century.
Provisional data from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
reveal that U.S. fertility rates have fallen below the replacement level
of 2.1 since 1971. (In 2017, it fell to 1.765.)
Among women born during the late 1950s, one fifth had no children,
compared to 10% of those born in the 1930s, thereby leaving behind
neither genetic nor cultural legacy. 17.4% of women from the Baby Boomer
generation had only one child each and were responsible for only 7.8%
of the next generation. On the other hand, 11% of Baby Boomer women gave
birth to at least four children each, for a grand total of one quarter
of the Millennial generation. This will likely cause cultural,
political, and social changes in the future as parents wield a great
deal of influence on their children. For example, by the early 2000s, it
had already become apparent that mainstream American culture was
shifting from secular individualism towards religiosity.
Millennial population size varies, depending on the definition used.
In 2014, using dates ranging from 1982 to 2004, Neil Howe revised the
number to over 95 million people in the U.S. In a 2012 Time magazine article, it was estimated that there were approximately 80 million U.S. millennials. The United States Census Bureau, using birth dates ranging from 1982 to 2000, stated the estimated number of U.S. millennials in 2015 was 83.1 million people.
In 2017, fewer than 56% Millennial were non-Hispanic whites, compared with more than 84% of Americans in their 70s and 80s, 57% had never been married, and 67% lived in a metropolitan area. According to the Brookings Institution,
millennials are the “demographic bridge between the largely white older
generations (pre-millennials) and much more racially diverse younger
generations (post-millennials).”
By analyzing data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Pew Research
Center estimated that millennials, whom they define as people born
between 1981 and 1996, outnumbered baby boomers, born from 1946 to 1964,
for the first time in 2019. That year, there were 72.1 million
millennials compared to 71.6 million baby boomers, who had previously
been the largest living adult generation in the country. Data from the National Center for Health Statistics
shows that about 62 million millennials were born in the United States,
compared to 55 million members of Generation X, 76 million baby
boomers, and 47 million from the Silent Generation. Between 1981 and
1996, an average of 3.6 babies (millennials) were born each year,
compared to 3.4 million (Generation X) between 1965 and 1980. But
millennials continue to grow in numbers as a result of immigration and
naturalization. In fact, millennials form the largest group of
immigrants to the United States in the 2010s. Pew projected that the
millennial generation would reach around 74.9 million in 2033, after
which mortality would outweigh immigration.
Yet 2020 would be the first time millennials (who are between the ages
of 24 and 39) find their share of the electorate shrink as the leading
wave of Generation Z (aged 18 to 23) became eligible to vote. In other
words, their electoral power peaked in 2016. In absolute terms, however,
the number of foreign-born millennials continues to increase as they
become naturalized citizens. In fact, 10% of American voters were born
outside the country by the 2020 election, up from 6% in 2000. The fact
that people from different racial or age groups vote differently means
that this demographic change will influence the future of the American
political landscape. While younger voters hold significantly different
views from their elders, they are considerably less likely to vote.
Non-whites tend to favor candidates from the Democratic Party while
whites by and large prefer the Republican Party.
According to the Pew Research Center, "Among men, only 4% of millennials [ages 21 to 36 in 2017] are veterans, compared with 47%" of men in their 70s and 80s, "many of whom came of age during the Korean War and its aftermath." Some of these former military service members are combat veterans, having fought in Afghanistan and/or Iraq. As of 2016, millennials are the majority of the total veteran population.
According to the Pentagon in 2016, 19% of Millennials are interested in
serving in the military, and 15% have a parent with a history of
military service.
Economic prospects and trends
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO),
200 million people were unemployed in 2015. Of these, 73.3 million were
15 and 24 years of age. (That's 36.7%) Between 2009 and 2015, youth
unemployment increased considerably in the North Africa and the Middle
East, and slightly in East Asia. During the same period, it fell
noticeably in Europe (both within and without the E.U.), and the rest of
the developed world, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Central and
South America, but remained steady in South Asia. The ILO estimated that
some 475 million jobs will need to be created worldwide by the
mid-2020s in order to appreciably reduce the number of unemployed
youths.
In 2018, as the number of robots at work continued to increase,
the global unemployment rate fell to 5.2%, the lowest in 38 years.
Current trends suggest that developments in artificial intelligence and
robotics will not result in mass unemployment but can actually create
high-skilled jobs. However, in order to take advantage of this
situation, one needs to hone skills that machines have not yet mastered,
such as teamwork and effective communication.
By analyzing data from the United Nations and the Global Talent
Competitive Index, KDM Engineering found that as of 2019, the top five
countries for international high-skilled workers are Switzerland,
Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Sweden. Factors
taken into account included the ability to attract high-skilled foreign
workers, business-friendliness, regulatory environment, the quality of
education, and the standard of living. Switzerland is best at retaining
talents due to its excellent quality of life. Singapore is home to a
world-class environment for entrepreneurs. And the United States offers
the most opportunity for growth due to the sheer size of its economy and
the quality of higher education and training. As of 2019, these are also some of the world's most competitive economies, according to the World Economic Forum
(WEF). In order to determine a country or territory's economic
competitiveness, the WEF considers factors such as the trustworthiness
of public institutions, the quality of infrastructure, macro-economic
stability, the quality of healthcare, business dynamism, labor market
efficiency, and innovation capacity.
In Asia
Statistics from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) reveal that between 2014 and 2019, Japan's unemployment rate went
from about 4% to 2.4% and China's from almost 4.5% to 3.8%. These are
some of the lowest rates among the largest economies of the world.
According to IMF, "Vietnam is at risk of growing old before it grows rich." The share of working-age Vietnamese peaked in 2011, when the country's annual GDP per capita at purchasing power parity was $5,024, compared to $32,585 for South Korea, $31,718 for Japan, and $9,526 for China.
In Europe
Economic prospects for some millennials have declined largely due to the Great Recession in the late 2000s.
Several governments have instituted major youth employment schemes out
of fear of social unrest due to the dramatically increased rates of youth unemployment. In Europe, youth unemployment levels were very high (56% in Spain, 44% in Italy, 35% in the Baltic states, 19% in Britain
and more than 20% in many more countries). In 2009, leading
commentators began to worry about the long-term social and economic
effects of the unemployment.
A variety of names have emerged in various European countries hard hit following the financial crisis of 2007–2008 to designate young people with limited employment and career prospects.
These groups can be considered to be more or less synonymous with
millennials, or at least major sub-groups in those countries. The Generation of €700 is a term popularized by the Greek mass media and refers to educated Greek twixters of urban centers who generally fail to establish a career.
In Greece, young adults are being "excluded from the labor market" and
some "leave their country of origin to look for better options". They
are being "marginalized and face uncertain working conditions" in jobs
that are unrelated to their educational background, and receive the
minimum allowable base salary of €700 per month. This generation evolved in circumstances leading to the Greek debt crisis and some participated in the 2010–2011 Greek protests. In Spain, they are referred to as the mileurista (for €1,000 per month), in France "The Precarious Generation," and as in Spain, Italy also has the "milleurista"; generation of €1,000 (per month).
Between 2009 and 2018, about half a million Greek youths left
their country in search of opportunities elsewhere, and this phenomenon
has exacerbated the nation's demographic problem. Such brain drains
are rare among countries with good education systems. Greek millennials
benefit from tuition-free universities but suffer from their
government's mishandling of taxes and excessive borrowing. Greek youths
typically look for a career in finance in the United Kingdom, medicine
in Germany, engineering in the Middle East,
and information technology in the United States. Many also seek
advanced degrees abroad in order to ease the visa application process.
In 2016, research from the Resolution Foundation
found millennials in the United Kingdom earned £8,000 less in their 20s
than Generation X, describing millennials as "on course to become the
first generation to earn less than the one before".
Millennials
are the most highly educated and culturally diverse group of all
generations, and have been regarded as hard to please when it comes to
employers.
To address these new challenges, many large firms are currently
studying the social and behavioral patterns of millennials and are
trying to devise programs that decrease intergenerational estrangement,
and increase relationships of reciprocal understanding between older
employees and millennials. The UK's Institute of Leadership & Management researched the gap in understanding between millennial recruits and their managers in collaboration with Ashridge Business School.
The findings included high expectations for advancement, salary and for
a coaching relationship with their manager, and suggested that
organizations will need to adapt to accommodate and make the best use of
millennials. In an example of a company trying to do just this, Goldman Sachs conducted training programs that used actors to portray millennials who assertively sought more feedback, responsibility,
and involvement in decision making. After the performance, employees
discussed and debated the generational differences which they saw played
out. In 2014, millennials were entering an increasingly multi-generational workplace.
Even though research has shown that millennials are joining the
workforce during a tough economic time, they still have remained
optimistic, as shown when about nine out of ten millennials surveyed by
the Pew Research Center said that they currently have enough money or that they will eventually reach their long-term financial goals.
Statistics from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) reveal that between 2014 and 2019, unemployment rates fell in
most of the world's major economies, many of which in Europe. Although
the unemployment rates of France and Italy remained relatively high,
they were markedly lower than previously. Meanwhile, the German
unemployment rate dipped below even that of the United States, a level
not seen since the German reunification almost three decades prior. Eurostat
reported in 2019 that overall unemployment rate across the European
Union dropped to its lowest level since January 2000, at 6.2% in August,
meaning about 15.4 million people were out of a job. The Czech Republic
(3%), Germany (3.1%) and Malta (3.3%) enjoyed the lowest levels of
unemployment. Member states with the highest unemployment rates were
Italy (9.5%), Spain (13.8%), and Greece (17%). Countries with higher
unemployment rates compared to 2018 were Denmark (from 4.9% to 5%),
Lithuania (6.1% to 6.6%), and Sweden (6.3% to 7.1%).
In November 2019, the European Commission
expressed concern over the fact that some member states have "failed to
put their finances in order." Belgium, France, and Spain had a debt-to-GDP ratio
of almost 100% each while Italy's was 136%. Under E.U. rules, member
nations must take steps to decrease public debt if it exceeds 60% of
GDP. The Commission commended Greece for making progress in economic
recovery.
According to the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), the European Union in the late 2010s suffers from shortages of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) specialists (including information and communications technology (ICT)
professionals), medical doctors, nurses, midwives and schoolteachers.
However, the picture varies depending on the country. In Italy,
environmentally friendly architecture is in high demand. Estonia and
France are running short of legal professionals. Ireland, Luxembourg,
Hungary, and the United Kingdom need more financial experts. All member
states except Finland need more ICT specialists, and all but Belgium,
Greece, Spain, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal and the
United Kingdom need more teachers. The supply of STEM graduates has been
insufficient because the dropout rate
is high and because of an ongoing brain drain from some countries. Some
countries need more teachers because many are retiring and need to be
replaced. At the same time, Europe's aging population necessitates the
expansion of the healthcare sector. Disincentives for (potential)
workers in jobs in high demand include low social prestige, low
salaries, and stressful work environments. Indeed, many have left the
public sector for industry while some STEM graduates have taken non-STEM
jobs.
Even though pundits
predicted that the uncertainty due to the 2016 Brexit Referendum would
cause the British economy to falter or even fall into a recession, the
unemployment rate has dipped below 4% while real wages have risen
slightly in the late 2010s, two percent as of 2019. In particular,
medical doctors and dentists saw their earnings bumped above the
inflation rate in July 2019. Despite the fact that the government
promised to an increase in public spending (£13 billion, or 0.6% of GDP)
in September 2019, public deficit continues to decline, as it has since
2010. Nevertheless, uncertainty surrounding Britain's international
trade policy suppressed the chances of an export boom despite the
depreciation of the pound sterling. According to the Office for National Statistics, the median income of the United Kingdom in 2018 was £29,588.
Since joining the European Union during the 2007 enlargement of the European Union,
Bulgaria has seen a significant portion of its population, many of whom
young and educated, leave for better opportunities elsewhere, notably
Germany. While the government has failed to keep reliable statistics,
economists have estimated that at least 60,000 Bulgarians leave their
homeland each year. 30,000 moved to Germany in 2017. As of 2019, an
estimated 1.1 million Bulgarians lived abroad. Bulgaria had a population
of about seven million in 2018, and this number is projected to
continue to decline not just due to low birth rates but also to
emigration.
In Canada
In Canada, the youth unemployment rate in July 2009 was 16%, the highest in 11 years. Between 2014 and 2019, Canada's overall unemployment rate fell from about 7% to below 6%.
However, a 2018 survey by accounting and advisory firm BDO Canada found
that 34% of millennials felt "overwhelmed" by their non-mortgage debt.
For comparison, this number was 26% for Generation X and 13% for the
Baby Boomers. Canada's average non-mortgage debt was CAN$20,000 in 2018.
About one in five millennials were delaying having children because of
financial worries. Many Canadian millennial couples are also struggling
with their student loan debts.
Despite expensive housing costs, Canada's largest cities, Vancouver,
Toronto, and Montreal, continue to attract millennials thanks to their
economic opportunities and cultural amenities. Research by the Royal Bank of Canada
(RBC) revealed that for every person in the 20-34 age group who leaves
the nation's top cities, Toronto gains seven while Vancouver and
Montreal gain up to a dozen each. In fact, there has been a surge in the
millennial populations of Canada's top three cities between 2015 and
2018. However, millennials' rate of home ownership will likely drop as
increasing numbers choose to rent instead.
By 2019, however, Ottawa emerged as a magnet for millennials with its
strong labor market and comparatively low cost of living, according to a
study by Ryerson University. Many of the millennials relocating to the
nation's capital were above the age of 25, meaning they were more likely
to be job seekers and home buyers rather than students.
An average Canadian home was worth CAN$484,500 in 2018. Despite
government legislation (mortgage stress test rules), such a price was
quite high compared to some decades before. Adjusted for inflation, it
was CAN$210,000 in 1976. Paul Kershaw of the University of British
Columbia calculated that the average amount of extra money needed for a
down payment in the late 2010s compared to one generation before was
equivalent to eating 17 avocado toasts each day for ten years.
Meanwhile, the option of renting in a large city is increasingly out of
reach for many young Canadians. In 2017, the average rent in Canada
cost $947 a month, according to the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
(CMHC). But, as is always the case in real-estate, location matters. An
average two-bedroom apartment cost CAN$1,552 per month in Vancouver and
CAN$1,404 per month in Toronto, with vacancy rates at about one
percent.
Canada's national vacancy rate was 2.4% in 2018, the lowest since 2009.
New supply – rental apartment complexes that are newly completed or
under construction – has not been able to keep up with rising demand.
Besides higher prices, higher interest rates and stricter mortgage rules
have made home ownership more difficult. International migration
contributes to rising demand for housing, especially rental apartments,
according to the CMHC, as new arrivals tend to rent rather than
purchase. Moreover, a slight decline in youth unemployment in 2018 also
drove up demand. While the Canadian housing market is growing, this growth is detrimental to the financial well-being of young Canadians.
In 2019, Canada's net public debt was CAN$768 billion. Meanwhile,
U.S. public debt amounted to US$22 trillion. The Canadian federal
government's official figure for the debt-to-GDP ratio was 30.9%.
However, this figure left out debts from lower levels of government.
Once these were taken into account, the figure jumped to 88%, according
to the International Monetary Fund. For comparison, that number was
237.5% for Japan, 106.7% for the United States, and 99.2% for France.
Canada's public debt per person was over CAN$18,000. For Americans, it
was US$69,000.
Since the Great Recession, Canadian households have accumulated
significantly more debt. According to Statistics Canada, the national
debt-to-disposable income ratio was 175% in 2019. It was 105% in the
U.S. Meanwhile, the national median mortgage debt rose from CAN$95,400
in 1999 to CAN$190,000 in 2016 (in 2016 dollars). Numbers are much
higher in the Greater Toronto Area, Vancouver, and Victoria, B.C.
A 2018 survey by Abacus Data
of 4,000 Canadian millennials found that 80% identified as members of
the middle class, 55% had pharmaceutical insurance, 53% dental
insurance, 36% a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP), and 29% an employer-sponsored pension plan.
A number of millennials have opted to save their money and retire early
while traveling rather than settling in an expensive North American
city. According to them, such a lifestyle costs less than living in a
large city.
In the United States
Employment and finances
The youth unemployment rate in the U.S. reached a record 19% in July 2010 since the statistic started being gathered in 1948. Underemployment
is also a major factor. In the U.S. the economic difficulties have led
to dramatic increases in youth poverty, unemployment, and the numbers of
young people living with their parents. In April 2012, it was reported that half of all new college graduates in the US were still either unemployed or underemployed. It has been argued that this unemployment rate and poor economic situation has given millennials a rallying call with the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement. However, according to Christine Kelly, Occupy is not a youth movement and has participants that vary from the very young to very old.
Millennials have benefited the least from the economic recovery following the Great Recession,
as average incomes for this generation have fallen at twice the general
adult population's total drop and are likely to be on a path toward
lower incomes for at least another decade. According to a Bloomberg L.P., "Three and a half years after the worst recession since the Great Depression,
the earnings and employment gap between those in the under-35
population and their parents and grandparents threatens to unravel the
American dream of each generation doing better than the last. The
nation's younger workers have benefited least from an economic recovery
that has been the most uneven in recent history."
In 2015, millennials in New York City were reported as earning 20% less
than the generation before them, as a result of entering the workforce
during the great recession.
Despite higher college attendance rates than Generation X, many were
stuck in low-paid jobs, with the percentage of degree-educated young
adults working in low-wage industries rising from 23% to 33% between
2000 and 2014.
According to a 2019 TD Ameritrade survey of 1,015 U.S. adults
aged 23 and older with at least US$10,000 in investable assets, two
thirds of people aged 23 to 38 (Millennials) felt they were not saving
enough for retirement, and the top reason why was expensive housing
(37%). This was especially true for Millennials with families. 21% said
student debt prevented them from saving for the future. For comparison,
this number was 12% for Generation X and 5% for the Baby Boomers. While millennials are well known for taking out large amounts of student loans, these are actually not
their main source of non-mortgage personal debt, but rather credit card
debt. According to a 2019 Harris poll, the average non-mortgage
personal debt of millennials was US$27,900, with credit card debt
representing the top source at 25%. For comparison, mortgages were the
top source of debt for the Baby Boomers and Generation X (28% and 30%,
respectively) and student loans for Generation Z (20%).
According to the U.S. Department of Labor, the unemployment rate in September 2019 was 3.5%, a number not seen since December 1969. For comparison, unemployment attained a maximum of 10% after the Great Recession in October 2009. At the same time, labor participation remained steady and most job growth tended to be full-time positions.
Economists generally consider a population with an unemployment rate
lower than 4% to be fully employed. In fact, even people with
disabilities or prison records are getting hired.
Between June 2018 and June 2019, the U.S. economy added a minimum of
56,000 jobs (February 2019) and a maximum of 312,000 jobs (January
2019). The average monthly job gain between the same period was about 213,600.
Tony Bedikian, managing director and head of global markets at Citizens
Bank, said this is the longest period of economic expansion on record. At the same time, wages continue to grow, especially for low-income earners. On average, they grew by 2.7% in 2016 and 3.3% in 2018.
However, the Pew Research Center found that the average wage in the
U.S. in 2018 remained more or less the same as it was in 1978, when the
seasons and inflation are taken into consideration. Real wages grew only
for the top 90th percentile of earners and to a lesser extent the 75th
percentile (in 2018 dollars). Nevertheless, these developments ease fears of an upcoming recession.
Moreover, economists believe that job growth could slow to an average
of just 100,000 per month and still be sufficient to keep up with
population growth and keep economic recovery going. As long as firms keep hiring and wages keep growing, consumer spending should prevent another recession. Millennials are expected to make up approximately half of the U.S. workforce by 2020.
Human capital is the engine of economic growth. With this in mind, urban researcher Richard Florida and his collaborators analyzed data from the U.S. Census
from between 2012 and 2017 and found that the ten cities with the
largest shares of adults with a bachelor's degree or higher are Seattle
(62.6%), San Francisco, the District of Columbia, Raleigh, Austin,
Minneapolis, Portland, Denver, Atlanta, and Boston (48.2%). More
specifically, the ten cities with the largest shares of people with
graduate degrees are the District of Columbia (33.4%), Seattle, San
Francisco, Boston, Atlanta, Minneapolis, Portland, Denver, Austin, and
San Diego (18.5%). These are the leading information technology hubs of
the United States. Cities with the lowest shares of college graduates
tend to be from the Rust Belt, such as Detroit, Memphis, and Milwaukee,
and the Sun Belt, such as Las Vegas, Fresno, and El Paso. Meanwhile, the
ten cities with the fastest growth in the shares of college-educated
adults are Miami (46.3%), Austin, Fort Worth, Las Vegas, Denver,
Charlotte, Boston, Mesa, Nashville, and Seattle (25.1%). More
specifically, those with the fastest growing shares of adults with
graduate degrees are Miami (47.1%), Austin, Raleigh, Charlotte, San
Jose, Omaha, Seattle, Fresno, Indianapolis, and Sacramento (32.0%).
Florida and his team also found, using U.S. Census data between
2005 and 2017, an increase in employment across the board for members of
the "creative class" – people in education, healthcare, law, the arts,
technology, science, and business, not all of whom have a university
degree – in virtually all U.S. metropolitan areas with a population of a
million or more. Indeed, the total number of the creative class grew
from 44 million in 2005 to over 56 million in 2017. Florida suggested
that this could be a "tipping point" in which talents head to places
with a high quality of life yet lower costs of living than
well-established creative centers, such as New York City and Los
Angeles, what he called the "superstar cities."
According to the Department of Education,
people with technical or vocational trainings are slightly more likely
to be employed than those with a bachelor's degree and significantly
more likely to be employed in their fields of specialty. The United
States currently suffers from a shortage of skilled tradespeople.
As of 2019, the most recent data from the U.S. government reveals that
there are over half a million vacant manufacturing jobs in the country, a
record high, thanks to an increasing number of Baby Boomers entering
retirement. But in order to attract new workers to overcome this "Silver Tsunami,"
manufacturers need to debunk a number of misconceptions about their
industries. For example, the American public tends to underestimate the
salaries of manufacturing workers. Nevertheless, the number of people
doubting the viability of American manufacturing has declined to 54% in
2019 from 70% in 2018, the L2L Manufacturing Index measured.
After the Great Recession, the number of U.S. manufacturing jobs
reached a minimum of 11.5 million in February 2010. It rose to
12.8 million in September 2019. It was 14 million in March 2007.
As of 2019, manufacturing industries made up 12% of the U.S. economy,
which is increasingly reliant on service industries, as is the case for
other advanced economies around the world.
Nevertheless, twenty-first-century manufacturing is increasingly
sophisticated, using advanced robotics, 3D printing, cloud computing,
among other modern technologies, and technologically savvy employees are
precisely what employers need. Four-year university degrees are
unnecessary; technical or vocational training, or perhaps
apprenticeships would do.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the occupations with the highest median annual pay in the United States in 2018 included medical doctors (especially psychiatrists, anesthesiologists, obstetricians and gynecologists, surgeons, and orthodontists), chief executives, dentists, information system managers, chief architects and engineers, pilots and flight engineers, petroleum engineers,
and marketing managers. Their median annual pay ranged from about
US$134,000 (marketing managers) to over US$208,000 (aforementioned
medical specialties). Meanwhile, the occupations with the fastest projected growth rate between 2018 and 2028 are solar cell and wind turbine technicians, healthcare and medical aides, cyber security experts, statisticians, speech-language pathologists, genetic counselors, mathematicians, operations research analysts, software engineers, forest fire inspectors and prevention specialists, post-secondary health instructors, and phlebotomists.
Their projected growth rates are between 23% (medical assistants) and
63% (solar cell installers); their annual median pays range between
roughly US$24,000 (personal care aides) to over US$108,000 (physician
assistants).
Occupations with the highest projected numbers of jobs added between
2018 and 2028 are healthcare and personal aides, nurses, restaurant
workers (including cooks and waiters), software developers, janitors and cleaners, medical assistants, construction workers, freight laborers, marketing researchers and analysts, management analysts, landscapers and groundskeepers, financial managers, tractor and truck drivers, and medical secretaries.
The total numbers of jobs added ranges from 881,000 (personal care
aides) to 96,400 (medical secretaries). Annual median pays range from
over US$24,000 (fast-food workers) to about US$128,000 (financial
managers).
Despite economic recovery and despite being more likely to have a
bachelor's degree or higher, millennials are at a financial
disadvantage compared to the Baby Boomers and Generation X because of
the Great Recession and expensive higher education. Income has become
less predictable due to the rise of short-term and freelance positions.
According to a 2019 report from the non-partisan non-profit think tank
New America, a household headed by a person under 35 in 2016 had an
average net worth of almost US$11,000, compared to US$20,000 in 1995.
According to the St. Louis Federal Reserve,
an average millennial (20 to 35 in 2016) owned US$162,000 of assets,
compared to US$198,000 for Generation X at the same age (20 to 35 in
2001). Risk management specialist and business economist Olivia S. Mitchell
of the University of Pennsylvania calculated that in order to retire at
50% of their last salary before retirement, millennials will have to
save 40% of their incomes for 30 years. She told CNBC, "Benefits from
Social Security are 76% higher if you claim at age 70 versus 62, which
can substitute for a lot of extra savings." Maintaining a healthy
lifestyle – avoiding smoking, over-drinking, and sleep deprivation –
should prove beneficial.
Housing
Economist Tim Wojan and his colleagues at the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
analyzed 11,000 businesses using data collected in 2014 and classified
them into three groups: substantive innovators, nominal innovators, and
non-innovators. They found that 20% of the establishments hailed from
rural areas compared to 30% from urban areas. In addition, large
innovative firms were more likely to be found in rural areas while small
and medium firms tended to come from the metropolitan areas. This is
because large patent-intensive manufacturing firms – such as those
manufacturing chemicals, electronic components, automotive parts, or
medical equipment – were generally based in rural areas while those that
provide services tend to cluster in the cities. Nevertheless, rural
creative centers tend to be relatively close to large urban centers. The
National Endowment for the Arts
reported in 2017 that a rural county's probability of having a
performing arts organization increased by 60% if it is located near a
forest or a national park.
Urban researcher Richard Florida concluded that there is no compelling
reason to believe that rural America is not as innovative as urban
America.
Nevertheless, despite the availability of affordable housing, and
broadband Internet, the possibility of telecommuting, the reality of
high student loan debts and the stereotype of living in their parents'
basement, millennials were steadily leaving rural counties for urban
areas for lifestyle and economic reasons in the early 2010s. At that time, millennials were responsible for the so-called "back-to-the-city" trend.
Between 2000 and 2010, the number of Americans living in urban areas
grew from 79% to 80.7% while that in rural areas dropped from 21% to
19.3%. At the same time, many new cities were born, especially in the
Midwest, and others, such as Charlotte, North Carolina, and Austin,
Texas, were growing enormously.
According to demographer William Frey of the Brookings Institution, the
population of young adults (18-34 years of age) in U.S. urban cores
increased 4.9% between 2010 and 2015, the bulk of which can be
attributed to ethnic-minority millennials, especially in places like
Atlanta, Boston, Houston, San Antonio, and San Francisco. In fact, this
demographic trend was making American cities and their established
suburbs more ethnically diverse. On the other hand, white millennials
were the majority in emerging suburbs and exurbs.
Mini-apartments, initially found mainly in Manhattan, became more and
more common in other major urban areas as a strategy for dealing with
high population density and high demand for housing, especially among
people living alone. The number of single-person households in the U.S.
reached 27% in 2010 from 8% in 1940 and 18% in 1970; in places such as
Atlanta, Cincinnati, Denver, Pittsburgh, Seattle, St. Louis and
Washington, D.C, it can even exceed 40%, according to Census data. The
size of a typical mini-apartment is 300 square feet (28 square meters),
or roughly the size of a standard garage and one eighth the size of an
average single-family home in the U.S. as of 2013. Many young city
residents were willing to give up space in exchange for living in a
location they liked. Such apartments are also common in Tokyo and some
European capitals.
Data from the Census Bureau reveals that in 2018, 33.7% of American
adults below the age of 35 owned a home, compared to the national
average of almost 64%.
Yet by the late 2010s, things changed. Like older generations,
millennials reevaluate their life choices as they age. Millennials no
longer felt attracted by cosmopolitan metropolitan areas the way they
once did. A 2018 Gallup poll found that despite living in a highly
urbanized country, most Americans would rather live in rural counties
than the cities. While rural America lacked the occupational diversity
offered by urban America, multiple rural counties can still match one
major city in terms of economic opportunities. In addition, rural towns
suffered from shortages of certain kinds of professionals, such as
medical doctors, and young people moving in, or back, could make a
difference for both themselves and their communities. The slower pace of
life and lower costs of living were both important.
By analyzing U.S. Census data, demographer William H. Frey at the Brookings Institution found that, following the Great Recession,
American suburbs grew faster than dense urban cores. For example, for
every one person who moved to New York City, five moved out to one of
its suburbs. Data released by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2017 revealed
that Americans aged 25–29 were 25% more likely to move from a city to a
suburb than the other way around; for older millennials, that number was
50%. Economic recovery and easily obtained mortgages help explain this
phenomenon.
Millennial homeowners are more likely to be in the suburbs than the
cities. This trend will likely continue as more and more millennials
purchase a home. 2019 was the fourth year in a row where the number of
millennials living in the major American cities declined measurably. In 2018, 80,000 millennials left the nation's largest cities.
While 14% of the U.S. population relocate at least once each
year, Americans in their 20s and 30s are more likely to move than
retirees, according to Frey. Besides the cost of living, including
housing costs, people are leaving the big cities in search of warmer
climates, lower taxes, better economic opportunities, and better school
districts for their children.
Places in the South and Southwestern United States are especially
popular. In some communities, millennials and their children are moving
in so quickly that schools and roads are becoming overcrowded. This
rising demand pushes prices upwards, making affordable housing options
less plentiful.
Historically, between the 1950s and 1980s, Americans left the cities
for the suburbs because of crime. Suburban growth slowed because of the
Great Recession but picked up pace afterwards.
According to the Brookings Institution, overall, American cities with
the largest net losses in their millennial populations were New York
City, Los Angeles, and Chicago, while those with the top net gains were
Houston, Denver, and Dallas. According to Census data, Los Angeles County in particular lost 98,608 people in 2018, the single biggest loss in the nation. Moving trucks (U-Haul) are in extremely high demand in the area.
High taxes and high cost of living are also reasons why people are leaving entire states behind.
As is the case with cities, young people are the most likely to
relocate. For example, a 2019 poll by Edelman Intelligence of 1,900
residents of California found that 63% of millennials said they were
thinking about leaving the Golden State and 55% said they wanted to do
so within five years. 60% of millennials said the reason why they
wanted to move as the cost and availability of housing. In 2018, the
median home price in California was US$547,400, about twice the national
median. California also has the highest marginal income tax rate of all
U.S. states, 12.3%, plus a subcharge of 1% for those earning a million
dollars a year or more. Popular destinations include Oregon, Nevada,
Arizona, and Texas, according to California's Legislative Analyst's
Office. By analyzing data provided by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), finance company SmartAsset
found that for wealthy millennials, defined as those no older than 35
years of age earning at least US$100,000 per annum, the top states of
departure were New York, Illinois, Virginia, Massachusetts, and
Pennsylvania, while the top states of destination were California,
Washington State, Texas, Colorado, and Florida.[214]
SmartAsset also found that the cities with the largest percentages of
millennial homeowners in 2018 were Anchorage, AK; Gilbert and Peoria,
AZ; Palmdale, Moreno Valley, Hayward, and Garden Grove, CA; Cape Floral,
FL; Sioux Falls, SD; and Midland, TX. Among these cities, millennial
home-owning rates were between 56.56% (Gilbert, AZ) and 34.26% (Hayward,
CA).
The median price of a home purchased by millennials in 2019 was
$256,500, compared to $160,600 for Generation Z. Broadly speaking, the
two demographic cohorts are migrating in opposite directions, with the
millennials moving North and Generation Z going South.
Education
For information on public support for higher education (for domestic students) in the OECD in 2011, see chart below.
In continental Europe
In Sweden, universities are tuition-free, as is the case in Norway,
Denmark, Iceland, and Finland. However, Swedish students typically
graduate very indebted due to the high cost of living in their country,
especially in the large cities such as Stockholm. The ratio of debt to
expected income after graduation for Swedes was about 80% in 2013. In
the U.S., despite incessant talk of student debt reaching epic
proportions, that number stood at 60%. Moreover, about seven out of
eight Swedes graduate with debt, compared to one half in the U.S. In the
2008–9 academic year, virtually all Swedish students take advantage of
state-sponsored financial aid packages from a govern agency known as the
Centrala Studiestödsnämnden
(CSN), which include low-interest loans with long repayment schedules
(25 years or until the student turns 60). In Sweden, student aid is
based on their own earnings whereas in some other countries, such as
Germany or the United States, such aid is premised on parental income as
parents are expected to help foot the bill for their children's
education. In the 2008–9 academic year, Australia, Austria, Japan, the
Netherlands, and New Zealand saw an increase in both the average tuition
fees of their public universities for full-time domestic students and
the percentage of students taking advantage of state-sponsored student
aid compared to 1995. In the United States, there was an increase in the
former but not the latter.
In 2005, judges in Karlsruhe, Germany, struck down a ban on
university fees as unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the
constitutional right of German states to regulate their own higher
education systems. This ban was introduced in order to ensure equality
of access to higher education regardless of socioeconomic class.
Bavarian Science Minister Thomas Goppel told the Associated Press, "Fees
will help to preserve the quality of universities." Supporters of fees
argued that they would help ease the financial burden on universities
and would incentivize students to study more efficiently, despite not
covering the full cost of higher education, an average of €8,500 as of
2005. Opponents believed fees would make it more difficult for people to
study and graduate on time.
Germany also suffered from a brain drain, as many bright researchers
moved abroad while relatively few international students were interested
in coming to Germany. This has led to the decline of German research
institutions.
In English-speaking countries
In the 1990s, due to a combination of financial hardship and the fact
that universities elsewhere charged tuition, British universities
pressed the government to allow them to take in fees. A nominal tuition
fee of £1,000 was introduced in autumn 1998. Because not all parents
would be able to pay all the fees in one go, monthly payment options,
loans, and grants were made available. Some were concerned that making
people pay for higher education may deter applicants. This turned out
not to be the case. The number of applications fell by only 2.9% in
1998, and mainly due to mature students rather than 18-year-olds.
In 2012, £9,000 worth of student fees were introduced. Despite
this, the number of people interested in pursuing higher education grew
at a faster rate than the UK population. In 2017, almost half of Britons
have received higher education by the age of 30. Prime Minister Tony
Blair introduced the goal of having half of young Britons having a
university degree in 1999, though he missed the 2010 deadline. Demand
for higher education in the United Kingdom remains strong, driven by the
need for high-skilled workers from both the public and private sectors.
There is, however, a widening gender gap. As of 2017, women were more
likely to attend or have attended university than men, 55% to 43%, a 12%
difference.
In Australia, university tuition fees were introduced in 1989.
Regardless, the number of applicants has risen considerably. By the
1990s, students and their families were expected to pay 37% of the cost,
up from a quarter in the late 1980s. The most expensive subjects were
law, medicine, and dentistry, followed by the natural sciences, and then
by the arts and social studies. Under the new funding scheme, the
Government of Australia also capped the number of people eligible for
higher education, enabling schools to recruits more well-financed
(though not necessarily bright) students.
According to the Pew Research Center, 53% of American Millennials
attended or were enrolled in university in 2002. The number of young
people attending university was 44% in 1986.
Historically, university students were more likely to be male than
female. The difference was especially great during the second half of
the twentieth century, when enrollment rose dramatically compared to the
1940s. This trend continues into the twenty-first century. But things
started to change by the turn of the new millennium. By the late 2010s,
the situation has reversed. Women are now more likely to enroll in
university than men. In 2018, upwards of one third of each sex is a
university student.
In the United States today, high school students are generally
encouraged to attend college or university after graduation while the
options of technical school and vocational training are often neglected.
Historically, high schools separated students on career tracks, with
programs aimed at students bound for higher education and those bound
for the workforce. Students with learning disabilities or behavioral
issues were often directed towards vocational or technical schools. All
this changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s thanks to a major effort
in the large cities to provide more abstract academic education to
everybody. The mission of high schools became preparing students for
college, referred to as "high school to Harvard."
However, this program faltered in the 2010s, as institutions of higher
education came under heightened skepticism due to high costs and
disappointing results. People became increasingly concerned about debts
and deficits. No longer were promises of educating "citizens of the
world" or estimates of economic impact coming from abstruse calculations
sufficient. Colleges and universities found it necessary to prove their
worth by clarifying how much money from which industry and company
funded research, and how much it would cost to attend.
Because jobs (that suited what one studied) were so difficult to
find in the few years following the Great Recession, the value of
getting a liberal arts degree
and studying the humanities at an American university came into
question, their ability to develop a well-rounded and broad-minded
individual notwithstanding. As of 2019, the total college debt has exceeded US$1.5 trillion, and two out of three college graduates are saddled with debt.
The average borrower owes US$37,000, up US$10,000 from ten years
before. A 2019 survey by TD Ameritrade found that over 18% of
Millennials (and 30% of Generation Z) said they have considered taking a
gap year between high school and college.
In 2019, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis published research (using data from the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances)
demonstrating that after controlling for race and age cohort families
with heads of household with post-secondary education and who born
before 1980 there have been wealth and income premiums, while for
families with heads of household with post-secondary education but born
after 1980 the wealth premium has weakened to point of statistical insignificance (in part because of the rising cost of college)
and the income premium while remaining positive has declined to
historic lows (with more pronounced downward trajectories with heads of
household with postgraduate degrees).
Data from the National Center for Education Statistics
revealed that between 2008 and 2017, the number of people majoring in
English plummeted by just over a quarter. At the same time, those in
philosophy and religion fell 22% and those who studied foreign languages
dropped 16%. Meanwhile, the number of university students majoring in
homeland security, science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), and healthcare skyrocketed.
According to the U.S. Department of Education,
people with technical or vocational trainings are slightly more likely
to be employed than those with a bachelor's degree and significantly
more likely to be employed in their fields of specialty. The United States currently suffers from a shortage of skilled tradespeople.
Despite the fact that educators and political leaders, such as
President Barack Obama, have been trying to years to improve the quality
of STEM education in the United States, and that various polls have
demonstrated that more students are interested in these subjects,
graduating with a STEM degree is a different kettle of fish altogether.
Data collected by the University of California, Los Angeles,
(UCLA) in 2011 showed that although these students typically came in
with excellent high school GPAs and SAT scores, among science and
engineering students, including pre-medical students, 60% changed their
majors or failed to graduate, twice the attrition rate of all other
majors combined. Despite their initial interest in secondary school,
many university students find themselves overwhelmed by the reality of a
rigorous STEM education. Some are mathematically unskilled, while
others are simply lazy. The National Science Board
raised the alarm all the way back in the mid-1980s that students often
forget why they wanted to be scientists and engineers in the first
place. Many bright students had an easy time in high school and failed
to develop good study habits. In contrast, Chinese, Indian, and
Singaporean students are exposed to mathematics and science at a high
level from a young age. Moreover, given two students who are equally
prepared, the one who goes to a more prestigious university is less
likely to graduate with a STEM degree than the one who attends a less
difficult school. Competition can defeat even the top students.
Meanwhile, grade inflation is a real phenomenon in the humanities,
giving students an attractive alternative if their STEM ambitions prove
too difficult to achieve. Whereas STEM classes build on top of each
other – one has to master the subject matter before moving to the next
course – and have black and white answers, this is not the case in the
humanities, where things are a lot less clear-cut.
Historical knowledge
A February 2018 survey of 1,350 individuals found that 66% of the
American millennials (and 41% of all U.S. adults) surveyed did not know
what Auschwitz was, while 41% incorrectly claimed that 2 million Jews or fewer were killed during the Holocaust, and 22% said that they had never heard of the Holocaust. Over 95% of American millennials were unaware that a portion of the Holocaust occurred in the Baltic states, which lost over 90% of their pre-war Jewish population, and 49% were not able to name a single Nazi concentration camp or ghetto in German-occupied Europe.
However, at least 93% surveyed believed that teaching about the
Holocaust in school is important and 96% believed the Holocaust
happened.
The YouGov survey found that 42% of American millennials have never heard of Mao Zedong, who ruled China from 1949 to 1976 and was responsible for the deaths of 20–45 million people; another 40% are unfamiliar with Che Guevara.
Political views and participation
American millennials
A 2004 Gallup poll of Americans aged 13 to 17 found that 71% said
their social and political views were more or less the same as those of
their parents. 21% thought they were more liberal and 7% more
conservative. According to demographer and public policy analyst Philip Longman,
"even among baby boomers, those who wound up having children have
turned out to be remarkably similar to their parents in their attitudes
about 'family' values."
In the postwar era, most returning servicemen looked forward to "making
a home and raising a family" with their wives and lovers, and for many
men, family life was a source of fulfillment and a refuge from the
stress of their careers. Life in the late 1940s and 1950s was centered
about the family and the family was centered around children.
Researchers found that while only 9% of teenagers who identified with
the Republican Party considered themselves more conservative than their
parents, compared to 77% who shared their parents' views, 25% of
adolescents who identified with the Democratic Party and 28% of
politically independent teens said they were more liberal than their
parents. Another 2004 Gallup poll of the same age group found that a
clear majority of teenagers considered themselves to be politically
moderate, 56%. Only 7% and 18% deemed themselves very conservative or
conservative, respectively, and 10% and 6% believed they were liberal or
very liberal, respectively. (The bar plot roughly resembles a Gaussian distribution
or an isosceles triangle centered around moderates. See right.) By
comparing with a 2004 poll of Americans aged 18 and over, Gallup
discovered that teens were substantially more moderate then adults (56%
to 38%), less conservative (25% to 40%), and just about as liberal (16%
to 19%).
However, political scientist Elias Dinas discovered, by studying the
results from the Political Socialisation Panel Study and further data
from the United Kingdom and the United States, that while children born
to politically engaged parents tended to be politically engaged
themselves, those who absorbed their parents' views the earliest were
also the most likely to abandon them later in life.
Millennials are more willing to vote than previous generations when
they were at the same age. With voter rates being just below 50% for the
four presidential cycles before 2017, they have already surpassed
members of Generation X of the same age who were at just 36%.
In 2018, Gallup conducted a survey of almost 14,000 Americans from
all 50 states and the District of Columbia aged 18 and over on their
political sympathies. They found that overall, younger adults tended to
lean liberal while older adults tilted conservative. More specifically,
groups with strong conservative leanings included the elderly, residents
of the Midwest and the South, and people with some or no college
education. Groups with strong liberal leanings were adults with advanced
degrees, whereas those with moderate liberal leanings included younger
adults (18 to 29 and 30 to 49), women, and residents of the East. Gallup
found little variations by income groups compared to the national
average. Among adults between the ages of 18 and 29 – older Generation Z
and younger Millennials – Gallup found that 30% identified as liberals,
40% as moderates, and 26% as conservatives. Among adults aged 30 to 49 –
older Millennials and younger Generation X – they found that 30%
considered themselves liberals, 37% moderates, and 29%
conservatives.(See above.) Between 1992 and 2018, the number of people
identifying as liberals steadily increased, 17% to 26%, mainly at the
expense of the group identifying as moderates. Meanwhile, the proportion
of conservatives remained largely unchanged, albeit with fluctuations.
Between 1994 and 2018, the number of members of the Democratic Party
identifying as liberal rose from 25% to 51%, as the number of both
moderates and conservatives gradually fell. Liberals became a majority
in this political party for the first time in 2018. During the same
period, in the Republican Party, the proportion of people calling
themselves conservatives climbed from 58% to 73% while the numbers of
moderates and liberals both dropped. In other words, this political
party saw its conservative majority expanding. Meanwhile, among
political independents, the percentage of moderates, the dominant group,
remained largely unchanged.
The Economist observed in 2013 that, like their British
counterparts, millennials in the United States held more positive
attitudes towards recognizing same-sex marriage than older demographic
cohorts. However, a 2018 poll conducted by Harris on behalf of the LGBT advocacy group GLAAD
found that despite being frequently described as the most tolerant
segment of society, people aged 18 to 34—most Millennials and the oldest
members of Generation Z—have become less accepting LGBT individuals
compared to previous years. In 2016, 63% of Americans in that age group
said they felt comfortable interacting with members of the LGBT
community; that number dropped to 53% in 2017 and then to 45% in 2018.
On top of that, more people reported discomfort learning that a family
member was LGBT (from 29% in 2017 to 36% in 2018), having a child
learning LGBT history (30% to 39%), or having an LGBT doctor (27% to
34%). Harris found that young women were driving this development; their
overall comfort levels dived from 64% in 2017 to 52% in 2018. In
general, the fall of comfort levels was the steepest among people aged
18 to 34 between 2016 and 2018. (Seniors aged 72 or above became more
tolerant of LGBT doctors or having their (grand) children taking LGBT
history lessons during the same period, albeit with a bump in discomfort
levels in 2017.) Results from this Harris poll were released on the 50th anniversary of the riots that broke out in Stonewall Inn, New York City, in June 1969, thought to be the start of the LGBT rights movement. At that time, homosexuality was considered a mental illness or a crime in many U.S. states.
2018 surveys of American teenagers 13 to 17 and adults aged 18 or
over conducted by the Pew Research Center found that Millennials and
Generation Z held similar views on various political and social issues.
More specifically, 56% of Millennials believed that climate change is
real and is due to human activities while only 8% reject the scientific consensus on climate change.
64% wanted the government to play a more active role in solving their
problems. 65% were indifferent towards pre-nuptial cohabitation. 48%
considered single motherhood to be neither a positive or a negative for
society. 61% saw increased ethnic or racial diversity as good for
society. 47% did the same for same-sex marriage, and 53% interracial
marriage. (See chart.) In most cases, Millennials tended hold quite
different views from the Silent Generation, with the Baby Boomers and
Generation X in between. In the case of financial responsibility in a
two-parent household, though, majorities from across the generations
answered that it should be shared, with 58% for the Silent Generation,
73% for the Baby Boomers, 78% for Generation X, and 79% for both the
Millennials and Generation Z. Across all the generations surveyed, at
least 84% thought that both parents ought to be responsible for rearing
children. Very few thought that fathers should be the ones mainly
responsible for taking care of children.
In 2015, a Pew Research
study found 40% of millennials in the United States supported
government restriction of public speech offensive to minority groups.
Support for restricting offensive speech was lower among older
generations, with 27% of Gen Xers, 24% of Baby Boomers, and only 12% of
the Silent Generation supporting such restrictions. Pew Research noted
similar age related trends in the United Kingdom, but not in Germany and
Spain, where millennials were less supportive of restricting offensive
speech than older generations. In France, Italy, and Poland no
significant age differences were observed. In the U.S. and UK during the mid-2010s, younger millennials brought changes to higher education via drawing attention to microaggressions and advocating for implementation of safe spaces and trigger warnings in the university setting. Critics of such changes have raised concerns regarding their impact on free speech, asserting these changes can promote censorship, while proponents have described these changes as promoting inclusiveness.
A 2018 Gallup poll found that people aged 18 to 29 have a more favorable view of socialism
than capitalism, 51% to 45%. Nationally, 56% of Americans prefer
capitalism compared to 37% who favor socialism. Older Americans
consistently prefer capitalism to socialism. Whether the current
attitudes of millennials and Generation Z on capitalism and socialism
will persist or dissipate as they grow older remains to be seen.
Gallup polls conducted in 2019 revealed that 62% of people aged 18 to
29—older members of Generation Z and younger Millennials—support giving
women access to abortion
while 33% opposed. In general, the older someone was, the less likely
that they supported abortion. 56% of people aged 65 or over did not
approve of abortion compared to 37% who did. (See chart to the right.)
Gallup found in 2018 that nationwide, Americans are split on the issue
of abortion, with equal numbers of people considering themselves
"pro-life" or "pro-choice", 48%.
Polls conducted by Gallup and the Pew Research Center found that
support for stricter gun laws among people aged 18 to 29 and 18 to 36,
respectively, is statistically no different from that of the general
population. According to Gallup, 57% of Americans are in favor of
stronger gun control legislation.
In a 2017 poll, Pew found that among the age group 18 to 29, 27%
personally owned a gun and 16% lived with a gun owner, for a total of
43% living in a household with at least one gun. Nationwide, a similar
percentage of American adults lived in a household with a gun (41%).
In 2019, the Pew Research Center interviewed over 2,000 Americans
aged 18 and over on their views of various components of the federal
government. They found that 54% of the people between the ages of 18 and
29 wanted larger government and larger compared to 43% who preferred
smaller government and fewer services. Meanwhile, 46% of those between
the ages of 30 and 49 favored larger government compared to 49% who
picked the other option. Older people were more likely to dislike larger
government. Overall, the American people remain divided over the size
and scope of government, with 48% preferring smaller government with
fewer services and 46% larger government and more services. They found
that the most popular federal agencies were the U.S. Postal Service (90% favorable), the National Park Service (86%), NASA (81%), the CDC (80%), the FBI (70%), the Census Bureau (69%), the SSA
(66%), the CIA, and the Federal Reserve (both 65%). There is very
little to no partisan divide on the Postal Service, the National Park
Service, NASA, the CIA, the Census Bureau.
According to a 2019 CBS News poll on 2,143 U.S. residents, 72% of
Americans 18 to 44 years of age — Generations X, Y (Millennials), and Z —
believed that it is a matter of personal responsibility to tackle
climate change while 61% of older Americans did the same. In addition,
42% of American adults under 45 years old thought that the U.S. could
realistically transition to 100% renewable energy
by 2050 while 29% deemed it unrealistic and 29% were unsure. Those
numbers for older Americans are 34%, 40%, and 25%, respectively.
Differences in opinion might be due to education as younger Americans
are more likely to have been taught about climate change in schools than
their elders.
As of 2019, only 17% of electricity in the U.S. is generated from
renewable energy, of which, 7% is from hydroelectric dams, 6% from wind
turbines, and 1% solar panels. There are no rivers for new dams.
Meanwhile, nuclear power plants generate about 20%, but their number is
declining as they are being deactivated but not replaced.
In early 2019, Harvard University's Institute of Politics Youth
Poll asked voters aged 18 to 29 – younger millennials and the first wave
of Generation Z – what they would like to be priorities for U.S.
foreign policy. They found that the top issues for these voters were
countering terrorism and protecting human rights (both 39%), and
protecting the environment (34%). Preventing nuclear proliferation and
defending U.S. allies were not as important to young American voters.
The Poll found that support for single-payer universal healthcare and free college dropped, down 8% to 47% and down 5% to 51%, respectively, if cost estimates were provided.
Pew Research described millennials as playing a significant role in the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States. Millennials were between 12 and 27 during the 2008 U.S Presidential election.
That year, the number of voters aged 18 to 29 who chose the Democratic
candidate was 66%, a record since 1980. The total share of voters who
backed the President's party was 53%, another record. For comparison,
only 31% of voters in that age group backed John McCain, who got only
46% of the votes. Among millennials, Obama received votes from 54% of
whites, 95% of blacks, and 72% of Hispanics. There was no significant
difference between those with college degrees and those without, but
millennial women were more likely to vote for Obama than men (69% vs.
62%). Among voters between the ages of 18 and 29, 45% identified with
the Democratic Party while only 26% sided with the Republican Party, a
gap of 19%. Back in 2000, the two main American political parties split
the vote of this age group. This was a significant shift in the American
political landscape. Millennials not only provided their votes but also
the enthusiasm that marked the 2008 election. They volunteered in
political campaigns and donated money. But that millennial enthusiasm all but vanished by the next election cycle while older voters showed more interest.
In 2012, when Americans reelected Barack Obama, the voter participation
gap between people above the age of 65 and those aged 18 to 24 was 31%.
Pew polls conducted a year prior showed that while Millennials
preferred Barack Obama to Mitt Romney (61% to 37%), members of the
Silent Generation leaned towards Romney rather than Obama (54% to 41%).
But when looking at white millennials only, Pew found that Obama's
advantage which he enjoyed in 2008 ceased to be, as they were split
between the two candidates.
Although Millennials are one of the largest voting blocs in the
United States, their voting turnout rates have been subpar. Between the
mid-2000s and the mid-2010s, Millennial voting participation was
consistently below those of their elders, fluctuating between 46% and
51%. For comparison, turnout rates for Generation X and the Baby Boomers
rose during the same period, 60% to 69% and 41% to 63%, respectively,
while those of the oldest of voters remained consistently at 69% or
more. Millennials may still be a potent force at the ballot box, but it
may be years before their participation rates reach their numerical
potential as young people are consistently less likely to vote than
their elders.
In addition, despite the hype surrounding the political engagement and
possible record turnout among young voters, millennials' voting power is
even weaker than first appeared due to the comparatively higher number
of them who are non-citizens (12%, as of 2019), according to William
Frey of the Brookings Institution.
In general, the phenomenon of growing political distrust and
de-alignment in the United States is similar to what has been happening
in Europe since the last few decades of the twentieth century, even
though events like the Watergate scandal or the threatened impeachment
of President Bill Clinton are unique to the United States. Such an
atmosphere depresses turnouts among younger voters. Among voters in the
18-to-24 age group, turnout dropped from 51% in 1964 to 38% in 2012.
Although people between the ages of 25 and 44 were more likely to vote,
their turnout rate followed a similarly declining trend during the same
period. Political scientists Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin argued
that it was therefore unrealistic for Hillary Clinton to expect high
turnout rates among millennials in 2016. This political environment also
makes voters more likely to consider political outsiders such as Bernie
Sanders and Donald Trump.
The Brookings Institution predicted that after 2016, millennials could
affect how politics is conducted in the two-party system of the United
States, given that they were more likely to identify as liberals or
conservatives than Democrats or Republicans, respectively. In
particular, while Trump supporters were markedly enthusiastic about
their chosen candidate, the number of young voters identifying with the
GOP has not increased.
Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed democratic socialist and Democratic candidate in the 2016 United States presidential election, was the most popular candidate among millennial voters in the primary phase, having garnered more votes from people under 30 in 21 states than the major parties' candidates, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, did combined.
According to the Brookings Institution, turnout among voters aged 18 to
29 in the 2016 election was 50%. Hillary Clinton won 55% of the votes
from this age group while Donald Trump secured 37%. Polls conducted
right before the election showed that millennial blacks and Hispanics
were concerned about a potential Trump presidency. By contrast, Trump
commanded support among young whites, especially men. There was also an
enthusiasm gap for the two main candidates. While 32% of young Trump
supporters felt excited about the possibility of him being President,
only 18% of Clinton supporters said the same about her. The Bookings
Institution found that among Trump voters in the 18-to-29 age group, 15%
were white women with college degrees, 18% were the same without, 14%
were white men with college degrees, and 32% were the same without, for a
grand total of 79%. These groups were only 48% of Clinton voters of the
same age range in total. On the other hand, a total of 52% of Clinton
voters aged 18 to 29 were non-whites with college degrees (17%) and
non-whites without them (35%).
Clinton's chances of success were hampered by low turnouts among
minorities and millennials with university degrees and students.
Meanwhile, Trump voters included 41% of white millennials. These people
tended to be non-degree holders with full time jobs and were markedly less
likely to be financially insecure than those who did not support Trump.
Contrary to the claim that young Americans felt comfortable with the
ongoing transformation of the ethnic composition of their country due to
immigration, not all of them approve of this change despite the fact
that they are an ethnically diverse cohort. In the end, Trump won more votes from whites between the ages of 18 and 29 than early polls suggested.
As is the case with many European countries, empirical evidence
poses real challenges to the popular argument that the surge of
nationalism and populism is an ephemeral phenomenon due to 'angry white
old men' who would inevitably be replaced by younger and more liberal
voters. Especially since the 1970s, working-class voters, who had previously formed the backbone of support for the New Deal
introduced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, have been turning away
from the left-leaning Democratic Party in favor of the right-leaning
Republican Party. As the Democratic Party attempted to make itself
friendlier towards the university-educated and women during the 1990s,
more blue-collar workers and non-degree holders left. Political
scientist Larry Bartels
argued because about one quarter of Democrat supporters held social
views more in-tune with Republican voters and because there was no
guarantee Millennials would maintain their current political attitudes
due to life-cycle effects, this process of political re-alignment would
likely continue. As is the case with Europe, there are potential pockets
of support for national populism among younger generations.
A Reuters-Ipsos survey of 16,000 registered voters aged 18 to 34 conducted in the first three months of 2018 (and before the 2018 midterm election)
showed that overall support for Democratic Party among such voters fell
by nine percent between 2016 and 2018 and that an increasing number
favored the Republican Party's approach to the economy. Pollsters found
that white millennials, especially men, were driving this change. In
2016, 47% of young whites said they would vote for the Democratic Party,
compared to 33% for the Republican Party, a gap of 14% in favor of the
Democrats. But in 2018, that gap vanished, and the corresponding numbers
were 39% for each party. For young white men the shift was even more
dramatic. In 2016, 48% said they would vote for the Democratic Party and
36% for the Republican Party. But by 2018, those numbers were 37% and
46%, respectively. This is despite the fact that almost two thirds of
young voters disapproved of the performance of Republican President
Donald J. Trump. According to the Pew Research Center, only 27% of Millennials approved of the Trump presidency while 65% disapproved that year.
British millennials
The Economist
reported in 2013 that surveys of political attitudes among millennials
in the United Kingdom revealed that they held more liberal views on
social and economic matters than older demographic groups. They favored
individual liberty, small government, low taxes, limited welfare
programs, and personal responsibility. While support for increased
welfare programs for the poor at the cost of potentially higher taxes
has declined steadily since the 1980s among all living demographic
cohorts in the U.K., Generation Y disapproved of such spending schemes
the most, according to data from Ipsos MORI and the British Social Attitudes Survey. On the other hand, they had a more relaxed attitude towards alcohol consumption, euthanasia, same-sex marriage and the legalization of drugs. They disliked immigration, though less than their elders. They were more likely then their elders to support public debt reduction.
They cared about the environment, but not at the expense of economic
prosperity, and they supported privatizing utilities. In other words,
they were classical liberals or libertarians. Ipsos pollster Ben Page told The Economist, "Every successive generation is less collectivist than the last."
A 2013 YouGov poll of almost a thousand people aged 18 to 24 in the
United Kingdom found that 73% in total supported the legalization of same-sex marriage and only 15% opposed. 41% either strongly or somewhat supported legalizing "soft" drugs, such as cannabis
while 46% strongly or somewhat opposed. The five most popular political
parties for young Britons were the Labour Party (23%), the Conservative
Party (12%), the Liberal Democratic Party (7%), the Green Party (7%),
and the United Kingdom Independence Party (6%). 19% of British youths
identified with no party whatsoever. When asked which politician they
admired, 77% picked the 'none' option, followed by Boris Johnson
(4%). 59% had signed a petition. 47% had voted in a local or national
election, and 19% had contacted a politician representing them. Overall,
60% had an unfavorable of the British political system. 12% thought
British immigration laws were too tough, 54% said they were too lax, and
16% deemed them appropriate. About one third opined that taxes and
public spending were too high. 22% said they were insufficient and one
fifth thought they were about right. 34% believed welfare benefits were
too generous and should be cut. 22% argued they were not enough and
should be increased and 24% thought they struck the right balance.
Almost three quarters agreed that the welfare system was frequently
abused and 63% thought those who genuinely needed it were branded as
'scroungers'. A total of 40% were proud and 46% not proud of Britain's
current welfare system. Some 39% thought that the current welfare system
is financially untenable and needs to be slashed while 49% thought the
status quo is fine. A total of 65% were either very or fairly proud of
the United Kingdom Armed Forces, 62% the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), 77% the National Health Service
(NHS). 57% thought that it would be possible to keep the NHS free at
the point of service and 26% thought the NHS would eventually need to
charge people in order to stay afloat.
According to a YouGov poll conducted right before the referendum
on the possible departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Brexit) in 2016, almost three quarters of voters aged 18 to 24 opposed leaving the E.U. while just under one fifth supported leaving. 64% of Britons aged 25 to 29 and 61% between the ages of 30 to 35 supported remaining in the E.U. Meanwhile, 34% of pensioners wanted to remain and 59% wanted to leave. Older people were more likely to vote, and vote to leave.
One of the reasons behind this generational gap is the fundamentally
different environment that millennial voters grew up in. Many older
voters came of age when Britain was a majority-white country, when
collective memory of the British Empire and its victory in World War II
was strong, when most people did not attend university, when abortion
and homosexuality were illegal and the death penalty remained in place
till the 1960s. By contrast, millennials, many of whom support the
left-wing politician Jeremy Corbyn,
grew up at a time when the United Kingdom was a member of the EU, when
graduation from university was common, and when the political consensus
favors immigration and EU membership. But age is not the only reason, as
voter data shows.
By analyzing polling data, the Wall Street Journal found
that 19% of voters aged 18 to 24 either did not vote or were unsure, as
did 17% of voters aged 25 to 49. Meanwhile, 10% of voters aged 50 to 64
and 6% of voters aged 65 and over abstained or were undecided. Overall,
52% (or 17.4 million) of British voters chose to leave and 48% (or
16.1 million) to remain in the E.U.
Voter turnout was 72.2%, a sizeable figure, though not the largest on
record after World War II, which was 83.9% in 1950. However, only
28.8 million people voted in 1950, compared to about 33.6 million in
2016. Still, it is the highest since 1992, as of 2019.
That turnouts in millennial-majority constituencies were subpar while
those in working-class neighborhoods were above average contributed to
the outcome of the Brexit Referendum. Public opinion polls often
underestimated the political power of working-class voters because these
people are typically underrepresented in samples. Commonly made
predictions of a victory for the Remain side created a sense of
complacency among those who wanted the U.K. to remain in the European
Union and a sense of urgency among those who wanted to leave.
While young people tend to view the European Union more
favorably, it is erroneous to believe that they all oppose Brexit for
all the same reasons. For example, someone from Northern Ireland is
probably more concerned about the prospects of a physical border
between that part of the U.K. and the Republic of Ireland than, say,
losing the ability to study abroad in continental Europe under the
E.U.-sponsored Erasmus Program.
Nor is it accurate to say that the proponents of Brexit form a
homogeneous group. Besides many wealthy retirees, immigrants, and
children of immigrants, one third of university graduates voted to
leave.
As of 2017, about half of young British adults under 30 years of age
have attended or are attending an institution of higher education, a
number higher than previous generations.
A YouGov poll conducted in the spring of 2018 revealed that 58%
of Britons between the ages of 25 and 49 thought that immigration to
their country was 'too high', compared to 41% of those aged 18 to 24.
Despite reports of a surge in turnouts among young voters in the
2015 and 2017 United Kingdom general elections, statistical scrutiny by
the British Elections Study
revealed that the margin of error was too large to determine whether or
not there was a significant increase or decrease in the number of young
participants. In both cases, turnouts among those aged 18 to 24 was
between 40% and 50%. Winning the support of young people does not
necessarily translate to increasing young voters' turnouts, and positive reactions on social media may not lead to success at the ballot box.
Initial reports of a youth surge came from constituency-level survey
data, which has a strong chance of over-representing voters rather than
the Kingdom as a whole. In addition, higher turnouts generally came from
constituencies where there were already large proportions of young
people, both toddlers and young adults, and such surges did not
necessarily come from young voters. In 2017, there was indeed an
increase in overall voter turnout, but only by 2.5%.
A consistent trend in the U.K. and many other countries is that older
people are more likely to vote than their younger countrymen, and they
tend to vote for more right-leaning (or conservative) candidates.
Canadian millennials
Historically, political participation among young Canadian voters has been low, no higher than 40%. However, the 2015 federal election was an exception, when 57% of the people aged 18 to 34 voted. Canadian millennials played a key role in the election of Justin Trudeau as Prime Minister of Canada. While Stephen Harper
and the Conservative Party received approximately the same number of
votes as they did in 2011, the surge in the youth vote was enough to
push Trudeau to the top. His core campaign message centered around
gender equality, tolerance, legalizing marijuana, addressing climate
change, and governmental transparency while Harper focused on tax cuts.
Nevertheless, political scientist Melanee Thomas at the University of
Calgary warned that the electoral power of this demographic group should
not be overestimated, since millennials do not vote as a single bloc.
Even though millennials tend to vote for left-leaning candidates,
certain items from right-leaning platforms can resonate with them, such
as high but affordable standards of living.
A 2018 survey of 4,000 Canadian millennials by Abacus Data found
that 54% of the people asked favored socialism and 46% capitalism. Most
want to address climate change, alleviate poverty, and adopt a more open
immigration policy, but most important were micro-economic concerns,
such as housing affordability, the cost of living, healthcare, and
job-market uncertainties.
Housing affordability is a key political issue for young Canadians,
regardless of where they live, urban, suburban, or rural Canada. Because
clear majorities are in favor of government interventionism, they
generally tolerate deficit spending.
According to Sean Simpsons of Ipsos,
people are more likely to vote when they have more at stake, such as
children to raise, homes to maintain, and income taxes to pay.
Continental European millennials
In France, while year-long mandatory military service for men was abolished in 1996 by President Jacques Chirac, who wanted to build a professional all-volunteer military, all citizens between 17 and 25 years of age must still participate in the Defense and Citizenship Day (JAPD), when they are introduced to the French Armed Forces, and take language tests.
A 2015 IFOP poll revealed that 80% of the French people supported some
kind of mandatory service, military, or civilian. The rationale for the
reintroduction of national service was that "France needs powerful tools
to help promote integration, mix young people of different social
backgrounds and levels, and to instill Republican values and national
cohesion." At the same time, returning to conscription was also popular; supporters included 90% of the UMP party, 89% of the National Front (now the National Rally), 71% of the Socialist Party, and 67% of people aged 18 to 24, even though they would be affected the most. This poll was conducted after the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks. In previous years, it averaged 60%.
The period between the middle to the late twentieth century could
be described as an era of 'mass politics', meaning people were
generally loyal to a chosen political party. Political debates were
mostly about economic questions, such as wealth redistribution,
taxation, jobs, and the role of government. But as countries
transitioned from having industrial economies to a post-industrial and
globalized world, and as the twentieth century became the twenty-first,
topics of political discourse changed to other questions and
polarization due to competing values intensified. While this new period
of political evolution was taking place, a new cohort of voters –
Millennials – entered the scene and these people tend to think
differently about the old issues than their elders. Moreover, they are
less inclined than previous generations to identify (strongly) with a
particular political party.
But scholars such as Ronald Inglehart
traced the roots of this new 'culture conflict' all the way back to the
1960s, which witnessed the emergence of the Baby Boomers, who were
generally university-educated middle-class voters. Whereas their
predecessors in the twentieth century – the Lost Generation, the
Greatest Generation, and the Silent Generation – who had to endure
severe poverty and world wars, focused on economic stability or simple
survival, the Baby Boomers benefited from an economically secure, if not
affluent, upbringing and as such tended to be drawn to
'post-materialist' values. Major topics for political discussion at that
time were things like the sexual revolution, civil rights, nuclear
weaponry, ethnocultural diversity, environmental protection, European
integration, and the concept of 'global citizenship'. Some mainstream
parties, especially the social democrats, moved to the left in order to
accommodate these voters. In the twenty-first century, supporters of
post-materialism lined up behind causes such as LGBT rights, climate
change, multiculturalism, and various political campaigns on social media.
Inglehart called this the "Silent Revolution." But not everyone
approved, giving rise to what Piero Ignazi called the "Silent
Counter-Revolution."
The university-educated and non-degree holders have very different
upbringing, live very different lives, and as such hold very different
values.
Education plays a role in this 'culture conflict' as national populism
appeals most strongly to those who finished high school but did not
graduate from university while the experience of higher education has
been shown to be linked to having a socially liberal mindset. Degree
holders tend to favor tolerance, individual rights, and group identities
whereas non-degree holders lean towards conformity, and maintaining
order, customs, and traditions.
While the number of university-educated Western voters continues to
grow, in many democracies non-degree holders still form a large share of
the electorate. According to the OECD, in 2016, the average share of
voters between the ages of 25 and 64 without tertiary education in the
European Union was 66% of the population. In Italy, it exceeded 80%. In
many major democracies, such as France, although the representation of
women and ethnic minorities in the corridors of power has increased, the
same cannot be said for the working-class and non-degree holders.
By analyzing voter data, political scientists Roger Eatwell and
Matthew Goodwin came to the conclusion that the popular narrative that
the rise of national-populist movements seen across much of the Western
world is due largely to angry old white men who would soon be replaced
by younger and more liberal voters is flawed. In many European
democracies, national-populist politicians and political parties tend to
be the most popular among voters below the age of 40. In France, Marine Le Pen and her National Rally
(formerly the National Front) won more votes from people between the
ages of 18 and 35 during the first round of the 2017 Presidential
election than any other candidates. In Italy, Matteo Salvini and his League
have a base of support with virtually no generational gap. In Austria,
more than one in two men between the ages of 18 and 29 voted for the Freedom Party in 2016. The Alternative for Germany's strongest support came not from senior citizens but voters between 25 and 50 years of age. The Sweden Democrats were the second most popular political party for voters aged 18 to 24 and the most popular for those between 35 and 54 in 2018.
Preferred modes of transportation
Millennials in the U.S. were initially not keen on getting a driver's
license or owning a vehicle thanks to new licensing laws and the state
of the economy when they came of age, but the oldest among them have
already begun buying cars in great numbers. In 2016, Millennials
purchased more cars and trucks than any living generation except the
Baby Boomers; in fact, Millennials overtook Baby Boomers in car
ownership in California that year.
A working paper by economists Christopher Knittel and Elizabeth Murphy
then at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the National Bureau of Economic Research
analyzed data from the U.S. Department of Transportation's National
Household Transportation Survey, the U.S. Census Bureau, and American
Community Survey in order to compare the driving habits of the Baby
Boomers, Generation X, and the oldest millennials (born between 1980 and
1984). That found that on the surface, the popular story is true:
American Millennials on average own 0.4 fewer cars than their elders.
But when various factors – including income, marital status, number of
children, and geographical location – were taken into account, such a
distinction ceased to be. In addition, once those factors are accounted
for, millennials actually drive longer distances than the Baby Boomers.
Economic forces, namely low gasoline prices, higher income, and suburban
growth, result in millennials having an attitude towards cars that is
no different from that of their predecessors. An analysis of the
National Household Travel Survey by the State Smart Transportation
Initiative revealed that higher-income millennials drive less than their
peers probably because they are able to afford the higher costs of
living in large cities, where they can take advantage of alternative
modes of transportation, including public transit and ride-hailing
services.
According to the Pew Research Center, young people are more likely to ride public transit.
In 2016, 21% of adults aged 18 to 21 took public transit on a daily,
almost daily, or weekly basis. By contrast, this number of all U.S.
adults was 11%. Nationwide, about three quarters of American commuters drive their own cars. Also according to Pew, 51% of U.S. adults aged 18 to 29 used a ride-hailing service
such as Lyft or Uber in 2018 compared to 28% in 2015. That number for
all U.S. adults were 15% in 2015 and 36% in 2018. In general,
ride-hailing service users tend to be urban residents, young (18-29),
university graduates, and high income earners ($75,000 a year or more).
Urban researcher Richard Florida and his colleague Charlotta
Mellander studied data from the American Community Survey's five-year
estimates for 2017 covering all 382 U.S. metropolitan areas and
developed a Metro Car-free Index based on the percentages of households
that do not own a vehicle, and of commuters who ride public transit,
bike, or walk to work. They found that the largest clusters of
metropolitan areas in which it was feasible to not own a car were the Northeast Corridor (Boston to Washington, D.C.) and the Pacific Northwest Corridor (Seattle to Portland, Oregon). Outside of these, there were Chicagoland
and Los Angeles County. All of these places were densely populated with
high costs of living. Mellander discovered that living in a car-free
metropolitan area was positively correlated with having university
degrees (.54), and being a member of the creative class (.48), while
negatively correlated with being a member of the working class (.45). (Correlation does not mean causation.)
Religious beliefs
In virtually all Western countries, the proportions of religious
people began declining when the first wave of the Baby Boomers entered
adulthood in the 1960s and has declined ever since. Children of the Baby
Boomers tend to be even less religious than they are. Even the United
States of America, which is quite religious by Western standards, is not
an exception to this trend, though the decline there was slower than in
Europe.
In the U.S., millennials are the least likely to be religious when compared to older generations. There is a trend towards irreligion that has been increasing since the 1940s.
According to a 2012 study by Pew Research, 32 percent of Americans aged
18–29 are irreligious, as opposed to 21 percent aged 30–49, 15 percent
aged 50–64, and only 9 percent born aged 65 and above.
A 2005 study looked at 1,385 people aged 18 to 25 and found that more
than half of those in the study said that they pray regularly before a
meal. One-third said that they discussed religion
with friends, attended religious services, and read religious material
weekly. Twenty-three percent of those studied did not identify
themselves as religious practitioners.
A 2010 Pew Research Center study on millennials shows that of those
between 18–29 years old, only 3% of these emerging adults
self-identified as "atheists" and only 4% self-identified as "agnostics". Overall, 25% of millennials are "Nones" and 75% are religiously affiliated.
According to a 2013 YouGov poll of almost a thousand Britons between the
ages of 18 and 24, 56% said they had never attended a place of worship,
other than for a wedding or a funeral. 25% said they believed in God,
19% in a "spiritual greater power" while 38% said they did not believe
in God nor any other "greater spiritual power". The poll also found that
14% thought religion was a "cause of good" in the world while 41%
thought religion was "the cause of evil". 34% answered "neither". The British Social Attitudes Survey found that 71% of British 18–24 year-olds were not religious, with just 3% affiliated to the once-dominant Church of England.
A 2016 U.S. study found that church attendance during young adulthood
was 41% among Generation Z, 18% for the millennials, 21% for Generation
X, and 26% for the Baby Boomers when they were at the same age.
A 2016 survey by Barna and Impact 360 Institute on about 1,500
Americans aged 13 and up suggests that the proportion of atheists and
agnostics was 21% among Generation Z, 15% for millennials, 13% for
Generation X, and 9% for Baby Boomers. 59% of Generation Z were
Christians (including Catholics), as were 65% for the Millennials, 65%
for Generation X, and 75% for the Baby Boomers. 41% of teens believed
that science and the Bible are fundamentally at odds with one another,
with 27% taking the side of science and 17% picking religion. For
comparison, 45% of Millennials, 34% of Generation X, and 29% of the Baby
Boomers believed such a conflict exists. 31% of Generation Z believed
that science and religion refer to different aspects of reality, on par
with Millennials and Generation X (both 30%), and above the Baby Boomers
(25%). 28% of Generation Z thought that science and religion are
complementary, compared to 25% of Millennials, 36% of Generation X, and
45% for Baby Boomers.
Globally, religion is in decline in North America and Western Europe, but is growing in the rest of the world. Political and religious demographer Eric Kaufmann told CNN in 2006 at the height of the New Atheism
movement that he had already spotted signs of a religious renaissance
in the early 2000s because young people from the developing world had
been rejecting secularism and because Western Europe, home to some of
the most secular societies on Earth, had been admitting religious
immigrants. (Also see the religious tendencies of Generation Z.)
Although the number of atheists, agnostics, and people not affiliated
with organized religion continues to grow in Europe and the United
States, their percentage of the world population is falling because of
their comparatively low fertility rate (1.7). In general, the growth or decline of a given religion is due more to age and fertility rather than conversion.
According to the World Religious Database, the proportion of the human
population identifying with a religion increased from 81% in 1970 to 85%
in 2000 (and is predicted to rise to 87% in 2025).
Besides the level of education and income, how religious a woman is
determines how many children she will bear in her lifetime. For example,
in the cities of the Middle East, women who supported Sharia law had a
50% fertility advantage over those who opposed it the most in the early
twenty-first century.
In 2018, Muslims had a median age of 23, Hindus 26, Christians 30,
Buddhists and the religiously unaffiliated 34, and Jews 36. For
comparison, the median age of the global population was 28 in 2018.
Overall, Christians have a fertility rate of 2.6, and Muslims 2.9. Islam
is the world's fastest growing religion. Meanwhile, the expansion of secularism will slow in Europe as the twenty-first century progresses.
Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, religious attendance
nosedived 40% throughout England except in London, where 57% of
Christians were in their 20s. London is a gateway for immigrants coming
to the United Kingdom, and many of them were highly religious.
Indeed, the deceleration of secularization is also apparent in other
European cities with a large migrant population, such as Amsterdam,
Brussels, Malmö, Marseilles, and Paris.
In France, the number of Protestants rose from 50,000 in the middle of
the twentieth century to 400,000 by the start of the twenty-first.
According to a 2007 study, across Europe, many young Muslims were
finding themselves attracted by transnational Islam; those under the age
of 25 were more likely to support Muslim-only schools, and Sharia law,
and to condone violence to defend their religion than their counterparts
over the age of 55. Immigration from the Middle East and Africa is an
engine of religious growth in Europe. Children of immigrants tend to be
about as religious as their parents and consider their religion to be a
marker of their ethnic identity, thereby insulating themselves from the
secularizing forces of the host society. Religion can indeed grow even
in otherwise secular societies, and such religious demographic changes
will bring about social and political ramifications later in the
century.
A 2017 study conducted by the Pew Research Center on 70 countries
showed that between 2010 and 2015, among people aged 15 to 29, the
irreligious grew by 23%, Muslims 0.3%, while Christians lost 0.7% due to
religious conversion or switching. In particular, the unaffiliated
gained eight million people and Muslims half a million while Christians
lost nine million due to religious switching.
Social tendencies
A 2013 joint study by sociologists at the University of Virginia and Harvard University found that the decline and disappearance of stable full-time jobs with health insurance and pensions for people who lack a college degree has had profound effects on working-class Americans, who now are less likely to marry and have children within marriage than those with college degrees.
Data from a 2014 study of U.S. millennials revealed over 56% of this
cohort considers themselves as part of the working class, with only
approximately 35% considering themselves as part of the middle class;
this class identity is the lowest polling of any generation.
In March 2014, the Pew Research Center issued a report about how
"millennials in adulthood" are "detached from institutions and networked
with friends."
The report said millennials are somewhat more upbeat than older adults
about America's future, with 49% of millennials saying the country's
best years are ahead, though they're the first in the modern era to have
higher levels of student loan debt and unemployment.
Research by the Urban Institute
conducted in 2014, projected that if current trends continue,
millennials will have a lower marriage rate compared to previous
generations, predicting that by age 40, 31% of millennial women will
remain single, approximately twice the share of their single Gen X
counterparts. The data showed similar trends for males. A 2016 study from Pew Research
showed millennials delay some activities considered rites of passage of
adulthood with data showing young adults aged 18–34 were more likely to
live with parents than with a relationship partner, an unprecedented
occurrence since data collection began in 1880. Data also showed a
significant increase in the percentage of young adults living with
parents compared to the previous demographic cohort, Generation X,
with 23% of young adults aged 18–34 living with parents in 2000, rising
to 32% in 2014. Additionally, in 2000, 43% of those aged 18–34 were
married or living with a partner, with this figure dropping to 32% in
2014. High student debt is described as one reason for continuing to
live with parents, but may not be the dominant factor for this shift as
the data shows the trend is stronger for those without a college
education. Richard Fry, a senior economist for Pew Research said of
millennials, "they're the group much more likely to live with their
parents," further stating that "they're concentrating more on school,
careers and work and less focused on forming new families, spouses or
partners and children".
According to a cross-generational study comparing millennials to Generation X conducted at Wharton School of Business,
more than half of millennial undergraduates surveyed do not plan to
have children. The researchers compared surveys of the Wharton
graduating class of 1992 and 2012. In 1992, 78% of women planned to
eventually have children dropping to 42% in 2012. The results were
similar for male students. The research revealed among both genders the
proportion of undergraduates who reported they eventually planned to
have children had dropped in half over the course of a generation.
Sports and fitness
Fewer American millennials follow sports than their Generation X predecessors, with a McKinsey survey finding that 38 percent of millennials in contrast to 45 percent of Generation X are committed sports fans. However, the trend is not uniform across all sports; the gap disappears for National Basketball Association, Ultimate Fighting Championship, English Premier League and college sports. For example, a survey in 2013 found that engagement with mixed martial arts
had increased in the 21st century and was more popular than boxing and
wrestling for Americans aged 18 to 34 years old, in contrast to those
aged 35 and over who preferred boxing. In the United States, while the popularity of American football and the National Football League has declined among millennials, the popularity of Association football and Major League Soccer
has increased more among millennials than for any other generation, and
as of 2018 was the second most popular sport among those aged 18 to 34. The other popular activities included outdoor jogging or running.
The Physical Activity Council's 2018 Participation Report found
that in the U.S., millennials were more likely than other generations to
participate in water sports such as stand up paddling, board-sailing
and surfing. According to the survey of 30,999 Americans, which was
conducted in 2017, approximately half of U.S. millennials participated
in high caloric activities while approximately one quarter were
sedentary. The 2018 report from the Physical Activity Council found
millennials were more active than Baby Boomers in 2017. Thirty-five
percent of both millennials and Generation X were reported to be "active
to a healthy level", with Millennial's activity level reported as
higher overall than that of Generation X in 2017.
According to a 2018 report from Cancer Research UK, millennials in the United Kingdom are on track to have the highest rates of overweight and obesity,
with current data trends indicating millennials will overtake the Baby
boomer generation in this regard, making millennials the heaviest
generation since current records began. Cancer Research UK reports that
more than 70% of millennials will be overweight or obese by ages 35–45,
in comparison to 50% of Baby boomers who were overweight or obese at the
same ages.
Workplace attitudes
In 2010 the Journal of Business and Psychology,
contributors Myers and Sadaghiani find millennials "expect close
relationships and frequent feedback from supervisors" to be a main point
of differentiation.
Multiple studies observe millennials’ associating job satisfaction with
free flow of information, strong connectivity to supervisors, and more
immediate feedback. Hershatter and Epstein, researchers from Emory University,
argue many these traits can be linked to millennials entering the
educational system on the cusp of academic reform, which created a much
more structured educational system. Some argue in the wake of these reforms, such as the No Child Left Behind Act,
millennials have increasingly sought the aid of mentors and advisers,
leading to 66% of millennials seeking a flat work environment.
Hershatter and Epstein also stress a growing importance on
work-life balance. Studies show nearly one-third of students' top
priority is to "balance personal and professional life".
The Brain Drain Study shows nearly 9 out of 10 millennials place an
importance on work-life balance, with additional surveys demonstrating
the generation to favor familial over corporate values. Studies also show a preference for work-life balance, which contrasts to the Baby Boomers' work-centric attitude.
Data also suggests millennials are driving a shift towards the public
service sector. In 2010, Myers and Sadaghiani published research in the
Journal of Business and Psychology stating heightened participation in the Peace Corps and AmeriCorps as a result of millennials, with volunteering being at all-time highs.
Volunteer activity between 2007 and 2008 show the millennial age group
experienced almost three-times the increase of the overall population,
which is consistent with a survey of 130 college upperclassmen depicting
an emphasis on altruism in their upbringing.
This has led, according to a Harvard University Institute of Politics,
six out of ten millennials to consider a career in public service.
The 2014 Brookings publication shows a generational adherence to
corporate social responsibility, with the National Society of High
School Scholars (NSHSS) 2013 survey and Universum's 2011 survey,
depicting a preference to work for companies engaged in the betterment
of society. Millennials' shift in attitudes has led to data depicting 64% of
millennials would take a 60% pay cut to pursue a career path aligned
with their passions, and financial institutions have fallen out of favor
with banks comprising 40% of the generation's least liked brands.
In 2008, author Ron Alsop called the millennials "Trophy Kids,"
a term that reflects a trend in competitive sports, as well as many
other aspects of life, where mere participation is frequently enough for
a reward. It has been reported that this is an issue in corporate
environments. Some employers are concerned that millennials have too great expectations from the workplace. Some studies predict they will switch jobs frequently, holding many more jobs than Gen Xers due to their great expectations.
Psychologist Jean Twenge reports data suggesting there are differences
between older and younger millennials regarding workplace expectations,
with younger millennials being "more practical" and "more attracted to
industries with steady work and are more likely to say they are willing
to work overtime" which Twenge attributes to younger millennials coming
of age following the financial crisis of 2007–2008.
There is also a contention that the major differences are found
solely between millennials and Generation X. Researchers from the University of Missouri and The University of Tennessee conducted a study based on measurement equivalence to determine if such a difference does in fact exist.
The study looked at 1,860 participants who had completed the
Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile (MWEP), a survey aimed at measuring
identification with work-ethic characteristics, across a 12-year period
spanning from 1996 to 2008.
The results of the findings suggest the main difference in work ethic
sentiments arose between the two most recent generational cohorts,
Generation X and millennials, with relatively small variances between
the two generations and their predecessor, the Baby Boomers.
A meta study conducted by researchers from The George Washington University and The U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences questions the
validity of workplace differences across any generational cohort.
According to the researchers, disagreement in which events to include
when assigning generational cohorts, as well as varied opinions on which
age ranges to include in each generational category are the main
drivers behind their skepticism.
The analysis of 20 research reports focusing on the three work-related
factors of job satisfaction, organizational commitment and intent to
turn over proved any variation was too small to discount the impact of
employee tenure and aging of individuals.
Newer research shows that millennials change jobs for the same reasons
as other generations—namely, more money and a more innovative work
environment. They look for versatility and flexibility in the workplace,
and strive for a strong work–life balance in their jobs
and have similar career aspirations to other generations, valuing
financial security and a diverse workplace just as much as their older
colleagues.
Use of digital technology
Marc Prensky coined the term "digital native"
to describe "K through college" students in 2001, explaining they
"represent the first generations to grow up with this new technology." In their 2007 book Connecting to the Net.Generation: What Higher Education Professionals Need to Know About Today's Students,
authors Reynol Junco and Jeanna Mastrodicasa expanded on the work of
William Strauss and Neil Howe to include research-based information
about the personality profiles of millennials, especially as it relates
to higher education. They conducted a large-sample (7,705) research
study of college students. They found that Net Generation college students, born 1982 onwards, were frequently in touch with their parents and they used technology at higher rates than people from other generations. In their survey, they found that 97% of these students owned a computer, 94% owned a mobile phone, and 56% owned an MP3 player.
They also found that students spoke with their parents an average of
1.5 times a day about a wide range of topics. Other findings in the
Junco and Mastrodicasa survey revealed 76% of students used instant messaging, 92% of those reported multitasking while instant messaging, 40% of them used television to get most of their news, and 34% of students surveyed used the Internet as their primary news source.
One of the most popular forms of media use by millennials is social networking. Millennials use social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, to create a different sense of belonging, make acquaintances, and to remain connected with friends. In 2010, research was published in the Elon Journal of Undergraduate Research which claimed that students who used social media and decided to quit showed the same withdrawal symptoms of a drug addict who quit their stimulant. In the PBS Frontline
episode "Generation Like" there is discussion about millennials, their
dependence on technology, and the ways the social media sphere is commoditized. Some millennials enjoy having hundreds of channels from cable TV. However, some other millennials do not even have a TV, so they watch media over the Internet using smartphones and tablets. Jesse Singal of New York
magazine argues that this technology has created a rift within the
generation; older millennials, defined here as those born 1988 and
earlier, came of age prior to widespread usage and availability of smartphones, in contrast to younger millennials, those born in 1989 and later, who were exposed to this technology in their teen years.
A 2015 study found that the frequency of nearsightedness
has doubled in the United Kingdom within the last 50 years.
Ophthalmologist Steve Schallhorn, chairman of the Optical Express
International Medical Advisory Board, noted that research have pointed
to a link between the regular use of handheld electronic devices and
eyestrain. The American Optometric Association sounded the alarm on a similar vein. According to a spokeswoman, digital eyestrain, or computer vision syndrome,
is "rampant, especially as we move toward smaller devices and the
prominence of devices increase in our everyday lives." Symptoms include
dry and irritated eyes, fatigue, eye strain, blurry vision, difficulty
focusing, headaches. However, the syndrome does not cause vision loss or
any other permanent damage. In order to alleviate or prevent eyestrain,
the Vision Council
recommends that people limit screen time, take frequent breaks, adjust
screen brightness, change the background from bright colors to gray,
increase text sizes, and blinking more often.
Offspring
As their economic prospects improve, most millennials say they desire marriage, children, and home ownership. Demographer and futurist Mark McCrindle suggested the name "Generation Alpha" (or Generation ) for the offspring of millennials, people born after Generation Z, noting that scientific disciplines often move to the Greek alphabet after exhausting the Roman alphabet.
McCrindle predicted that modern electronic communication technologies
will be more integrated into their lives than ever before, and that Generation
will most likely delay standard life markers such as marriage,
childbirth, and retirements, as did the few previous generations. He also predicted that they will have a longer life expectancy and smaller family sizes. The first wave of Generation
will reach adulthood by the 2030s. By that time, the human population
will be about nine billion, and the world will have the highest
proportion of people over 60 years of age in history, meaning this demographic cohort will bear the burden of an aging population.
By 2016, the cumulative number of American women of the
millennial generation who had given birth at least once reached 17.3
million.
Globally, there are some two and a half million people belonging to
Generation Alpha born every week and their number is expected to reach
two billion by 2025.
However, most of the human population growth in the 2010s comes from
Africa and Asia, as nations in Europe and the Americas tend to have too
few children to replace themselves.
According to the United Nations, the global annual rate of growth has
been declining steadily since the late twentieth century, dropping to
about one percent in 2019. They also discovered that fertility rates
were falling faster in the developing world than previously thought, and
subsequently revised their projection of human population in 2050 down
to 9.7 billion.
Fertility rates have been falling around the world thanks to rising
standards of living, better access to contraceptives, and improved
educational and economic opportunities. The global average fertility
rate was 2.4 in 2017, down from 4.7 in 1950,[348] while the global average life expectancy rose from 52 in 1960 to 72 in 2017.