Soviet military advisers planning operations during the Angolan Civil War
A proxy war is an armed conflict between two states or non-state actors which act on the instigation or on behalf of other parties that are not directly involved in the hostilities.
In order for a conflict to be considered a proxy war, there must be a
direct, long-term relationship between external actors and the
belligerents involved.The aforementioned relationship usually takes the form of funding,
military training, arms, or other forms of material assistance which
assist a belligerent party in sustaining its war effort.
History
During classical antiquity and the Middle Ages,
many non-state proxies were external parties which were introduced to
an internal conflict and aligned themselves with a belligerent in order
to gain influence and further their own interests in the region.
Proxies could be introduced by an external or local power and most
commonly took the form of irregular armies which were used to achieve
their sponsor's goals in a contested region. Some medieval states such as the Byzantine Empire
used proxy warfare as a foreign policy tool by deliberately cultivating
intrigue among hostile rivals and then backing them when they went to
war with each other. Other states regarded proxy wars as merely a useful extension of a preexisting conflict, such as France and England during the Hundred Years' War, both of which initiated a longstanding practice of supporting piracy which targeted the other's merchant shipping. The Ottoman Empire likewise used the Barbary pirates as proxies to harass Western European powers in the Mediterranean Sea.
Since the early twentieth century, proxy wars have most commonly
taken the form of states assuming the role of sponsors to non-state
proxies, essentially using them as fifth columns to undermine an adversarial power. This type of proxy warfare includes external support for a faction engaged in a civil war, terrorists, national liberation movements, and insurgent groups, or assistance to a national revolt against foreign occupation. For example, the British partly organized and instigated the Arab Revolt to undermine the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Many proxy wars began assuming a distinctive ideological dimension after the Spanish Civil War, which pitted the fascist political ideology of Italy and National Socialist ideology of Nazi Germany against the communist ideology of the Soviet Union without involving these states in open warfare with each other. Sponsors of both sides also used the Spanish conflict as a proving ground for their own weapons and battlefield tactics.
During the Cold War, proxy warfare was motivated by fears that a conventional war between the United States and Soviet Union would result in nuclear holocaust, rendering the use of ideological proxies a safer way of exercising hostilities. The Soviet government found that supporting parties antagonistic to the US and Western nations was a cost-effective way to combat NATO influence in lieu of direct military engagement.
In addition, the proliferation of televised media and its impact on
public perception made the US public especially susceptible to war-weariness and skeptical of risking American life abroad. This encouraged the American practice of arming insurgent forces, such as the funneling of supplies to the mujahideen during the Soviet–Afghan War.
Abstract
A member of the U.S.–backed Southern Front prepares to launch a BGM-71 TOW at a Syrian Army position in southern Syria, December 2014
A significant disparity in the belligerents' conventional military
strength may motivate the weaker party to begin or continue a conflict
through allied nations or non-state actors. Such a situation arose
during the Arab–Israeli conflict, which continued as a series of proxy wars following Israel's decisive defeat of the Arab coalitions in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War.
The coalition members, upon failing to achieve military dominance via
direct conventional warfare, have since resorted to funding armed
insurgent and paramilitary organizations, such as Hezbollah, to engage in irregular combat against Israel.
Additionally, the governments of some nations, particularly liberal democracies,
may choose to engage in proxy warfare (despite military superiority)
when a majority of their citizens oppose declaring or entering a
conventional war. This featured prominently in US strategy following the Vietnam War, due to the so-called "Vietnam Syndrome" of extreme war weariness among the American population. This was also a significant factor in motivating the US to enter conflicts such as the Syrian Civil War via proxy actors, after a series of costly, drawn-out direct engagements in the Middle East spurred a recurrence of war weariness, a so-called "War on Terror syndrome".
Nations may also resort to proxy warfare to avoid potential
negative international reactions from allied nations, profitable trading
partners, or intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations.
This is especially significant when standing peace treaties, acts of
alliance, or other international agreements ostensibly forbid direct
warfare: breaking such agreements could lead to a variety of negative
consequences due to either negative international reaction (see above),
punitive provisions listed in the prior agreement, or retaliatory action
by the other parties and their allies.
Major Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict locations
In some cases, nations may be motivated to engage in proxy warfare
due to financial concerns: supporting irregular troops, insurgents,
non-state actors, or less-advanced allied militaries (often with
obsolete or surplus equipment) can be significantly cheaper than
deploying national armed forces, and the proxies usually bear the brunt
of casualties and economic damage resulting from prolonged conflict.
Another common motivating factor is the existence of a security dilemma. Leaders
that feel threatened by a rival nation's military power may respond
aggressively to perceived efforts by the rival to strengthen their
position, such as military intervention to install a more favorable
government in a third-party state.
They may respond by attempting to undermine such efforts, often by
backing parties favorable to their own interests (such as those directly
or indirectly under their control, sympathetic to their cause, or
ideologically aligned). In this case, if one or both rivals come to
believe that their favored faction is at a disadvantage, they will often
respond by escalating military and/or financial support.
If their counterpart(s), perceiving a material threat or desiring to
avoid the appearance of weakness or defeat, follow suit, a proxy war
ensues between the two powers. This was a major factor in many of the
proxy wars during the Cold War between the US and USSR, as well as in the ongoing series of conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially in Yemen and Syria.
Effects
Proxy
wars can have a huge impact, especially on the local area. A proxy war
with significant effects occurred between the United States and the USSR
during the Vietnam War. In particular, the bombing campaign Operation Rolling Thunder destroyed significant amounts of infrastructure, making life more difficult for North Vietnamese
citizens. In addition, unexploded bombs dropped during the campaign
have killed tens of thousands since the war ended, not only in Vietnam, but also in Cambodia and Laos. Also significant was the Soviet–Afghan War, which cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars, bankrupting the Soviet Union and contributing to its collapse.
The proxy war in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran is another example of the destructive impact of proxy wars. This conflict has resulted in, among other things, the Syrian Civil War, the rise of ISIL, the current civil war in Yemen, and the reemergence of the Taliban. Since 2003, more than 800,000 have died in Iraq. Since 2011, more than 220,000 have died in Syria. In Yemen, over 1,000 have died in just one month. In Afghanistan, more than 17,000 have been killed since 2009. In Pakistan, more than 57,000 have been killed since 2003.
In general, the lengths, intensities, and scales of armed
conflicts are often greatly increased when belligerents' capabilities
are augmented by external support. Belligerents are often less likely to
engage in diplomatic negotiations, peace talks are less likely to bear
fruit, and damage to infrastructure can be many times greater.
