Wild animal suffering is the suffering experienced by nonhuman animals in nature through causes such as disease, injury, parasitism, starvation, natural disasters, and killings by other animals. Wild animal suffering has historically been discussed in the context of the philosophy of religion as an instance of the problem of evil.
More recently, a number of academics have considered the suspected
scope of the problem from a secular standpoint as a general moral issue,
one that humans might be able to take actions toward preventing.
There is considerable disagreement around this latter point, as
many believe that human interventions in nature, for this reason, would
be either unethical, unfeasible,
or both. Advocates of such interventions point out that humans
intervene in nature all the time—sometimes in very substantial ways—for
their own interests and to further environmentalist goals
and that there are many ways that humans already successfully intervene
to help wild animals such as vaccinating and healing injured and sick
animals, rescuing animals in fires and natural disasters, feeding hungry
animals, providing thirsty animals with water, and caring for orphaned
animals.
Advocates also argue that although wide-scale interventions may not be
possible with current knowledge, they could become feasible in the
future with increased knowledge and advanced technologies.
For these reasons, they claim it is important to raise awareness about
the issue of wild-animal suffering, spread the view that we should help
animals suffering in these situations and encourage research into
effective measures which can be taken to improve the welfare of wild animals without causing greater harms.
Extent of suffering in nature
In his autobiography, Charles Darwin acknowledged that the existence of extensive suffering in nature was fully compatible with the workings of natural selection, yet maintained that pleasure was the main driver of fitness-increasing behavior in organisms. Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins challenged Darwin's claim in his book River Out of Eden, wherein he argued that wild animal suffering must be extensive due to the interplay of the following evolutionary mechanisms:
- Selfish genes – genes are wholly indifferent to the well-being of individual organisms as long as DNA is passed on.
- The struggle for existence – competition over limited resources results in the majority of organisms dying before passing on their genes.
- Malthusian checks – even bountiful periods within a given ecosystem eventually lead to overpopulation and subsequent population crashes.
From this, Dawkins concludes that the natural world must necessarily
contain enormous amounts of animal suffering as an inevitable
consequence of Darwinian evolution. To illustrate this he wrote:
The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent contemplation. During the minute that it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive, many others are running for their lives, whimpering with fear, others are slowly being devoured from within by rasping parasites, thousands of all kinds are dying of starvation, thirst, and disease. It must be so. If there ever is a time of plenty, this very fact will automatically lead to an increase in the population until the natural state of starvation and misery is restored.
Building on this, others have argued that the prevalence of r-selected animals
in the wild indicates that the average life of a wild animal is likely
to be very short and end in a painful death. According to this view, the
average life of a wild animal should thus contain more suffering than
happiness, since a painful death would outweigh any short-lived moments
of happiness in their short lives.
In "Bambi or Bessie: Are Wild Animals Happier?", Christie Wilcox
argues that wild animals do not appear to be happier than domestic
animals, based on findings of wild animals having greater levels of
cortisol and elevated stress responses relative to domestic animals.
Additionally, unlike domestic animals, animals in the wild do not have
some of their needs provided for them by human caretakers. Welfare economist Yew-Kwang Ng
has written that evolutionary dynamics can lead to animal welfare which
is worse than necessary for a given population equilibrium.
Philosophical status
History of concern for wild animals
The idea that suffering is common in nature has been observed by several writers historically.
Italian polymath Leonardo da Vinci,
in his notebooks (written between 1487–1505) lamented the suffering
experienced by wild animals due to predation and reproduction,
questioning: "Why did nature not ordain that one animal should not live
by the death of another?"
Philosopher David Hume in his 1779 posthumous work Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
made reference to the antagonism experienced and inflicted by wild
animals upon each other, observing: "The stronger prey upon the weaker,
and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety."
One expression commonly used to express suffering in nature comes from Alfred Tennyson's poem "In Memoriam A.H.H.": "Nature, red in tooth and claw", published in 1850.
In 1851, the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer
also insisted on the extent of suffering in nature, drawing attention
to the asymmetry between the pleasure experienced by a carnivorous
animal and the suffering of the animal it consumes: "Whoever wants
summarily to test the assertion that the pleasure in the world outweighs
the pain, or at any rate that the two balance each other, should
compare the feelings of an animal that is devouring another with those
of that other".
In the 1874 posthumous essay "On Nature", utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote about suffering in nature and the imperative of struggling against it:
In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's every day performances. [...] The phrases which ascribe perfection to the course of nature can only be considered as the exaggerations of poetic or devotional feeling, not intended to stand the test of a sober examination. No one, either religious or irreligious, believes that the hurtful agencies of nature, considered as a whole, promote good purposes, in any other way than by inciting human rational creatures to rise up and struggle against them. [...] Whatsoever, in nature, gives indication of beneficent design proves this beneficence to be armed only with limited power; and the duty of man is to cooperate with the beneficent powers, not by imitating, but by perpetually striving to amend, the course of nature - and bringing that part of it over which we can exercise control more nearly into conformity with a high standard of justice and goodness.
In his 1892 book Animals' Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress, the English writer and naturalist Henry Stephens Salt focused an entire chapter on the plight of wild animals, "The Case of Wild Animals". Salt wrote that:
It is of the utmost importance to emphasize the fact that, whatever the legal fiction may have been, or may still be, the rights of animals are not morally dependent on the so-called rights of property; it is not to owned animals merely that we must extend our sympathy and protection. [...] To take advantage of the sufferings of animals, whether wild or tame, for the gratification of sport, or gluttony, or fashion, is quite incompatible with any possible assertion of animals' rights.
Salt argued that humans are justified in killing wild animals in
self-defense, but that "[...] we are not justified in unnecessarily
killing—still less in torturing—any harmless beings whatsoever." English writer. In 1782, Member of Parliament Soame Jenyns
argued that this should apply to insects as well: "We are unable to
give life, and therefore ought not to take it away from the meanest
insect without sufficient reason."
In his 1906 book The Universal Kinship, J. Howard Moore argued that the egoism of sentient beings—a
product of natural selection—which leads them to exploit their sentient
fellows, was the "most mournful and immense fact in the phenomena of
conscious life", and speculated whether a sufficiently sympathetic human
could significantly improve this situation if given the chance: "[One]
cannot help wondering whether an ordinary human being with only
common-sense and insight and an average concern for the welfare of the
world would not make a great improvement in terrestrial affairs if he
only had the opportunity for a while."
In 1991, the environmental philosopher Arne Næss
critiqued what he termed the "cult of nature" of contemporary and
historical attitudes of indifference towards suffering in nature. He
argued that we should confront the reality of the wilderness and that we
should be prepared to disturb natural processes—when feasible—to
relieve suffering.
Ecology as intrinsically valuable
Holmes Rolston III
argues that only unnatural animal suffering is a morally bad thing and
that humans do not have a duty to intervene in natural cases.
He celebrates carnivores in nature because of the significant
ecological role they play. Others have argued that the reason that
humans have a duty to protect other humans from predation is because
humans are part of the cultural world rather than the natural world and
so different rules apply to them in these situations.
Others argue that prey animals are fulfilling their natural function,
and thus flourishing, when they are preyed upon or otherwise die, since
this allows natural selection to work. This can be seen by some as an appeal to nature.
Wild animal suffering as a reductio ad absurdum
That people would also be obliged to intervene in nature has been used as a reductio ad absurdum against the position that animals have rights.
This is because if animals such as prey animals did have rights, people
would be obliged to intervene in nature to protect them, but this is
claimed to be absurd.
An objection to this argument is that people do not see intervening in
the natural world to save other people from predation as absurd and so
this could be seen to involve treating non-human animals differently in
this situation without justification, which is due to speciesism.
However, this argument already grants the premise in question that
animals should have rights, and that preferring human interests is
wrong, and therefore it is begging the question.
Relevance to the theological problem of evil
The problem of evil has been extended beyond human troubles to include the suffering of animals over the course of evolution.
Interventions to reduce suffering
Arguments for intervention
Some
theorists have reflected on whether we should accept the harms that
animals suffer in nature or try to do something to mitigate them.
The moral basis for interventions aimed at reducing wild animal
suffering can be rights-based or welfare-based. From a rights-based
perspective, if animals have a moral right to life or bodily integrity,
intervention may be required to prevent such rights from being violated
by other animals.
From a welfare-based perspective, a requirement to intervene may
arise insofar as it is possible to prevent some of the suffering
experienced by wild animals without causing even more suffering.
Advocates of intervention in nature argue that nonintervention is
inconsistent with either of these approaches. Some proposed courses of
action include removing predators from wild areas, refraining from reintroducing predators, providing medical care to sick or injured animals, and rescuing wild animals from natural disasters.
Practicality of intervening in nature
A
common objection to intervening in nature is that it would be
impractical, either because of the amount of work involved, or because
the complexity of ecosystems would make it difficult to know whether or not an intervention would be net beneficial on balance. Aaron Simmons argues that we should not intervene to save animals in nature because doing so would result in unintended consequences such as damaging the ecosystem, interfering with human projects, or resulting more animal deaths overall. Philosopher Peter Singer
has argued that intervention in nature would be justified if one could
be reasonably confident that this would greatly reduce wild animal
suffering and death in the long run. In practice, however, Singer
cautions against interfering with ecosystems because he fears that doing
so would cause more harm than good.
Other authors dispute Singer's empirical claim about the likely
consequences of intervening in the natural world, and argue that some
types of intervention can be expected to produce good consequences
overall. Economist Tyler Cowen
cites examples of animal species whose extinction is not generally
regarded as having been on balance bad for the world. Cowen also notes
that insofar as humans are already intervening in nature, the relevant
practical question is not whether we should intervene at all, but what
particular forms of intervention we should favor. Philosopher Oscar Horta
similarly writes that there are already many cases in which we
intervene in nature for other reasons, such as for human interest in
nature and environmental preservation as something valuable in their own
rights.
Horta has also proposed that courses of action aiming at helping wild
animals should be carried out and adequately monitored first in urban,
suburban, industrial, or agricultural areas. Likewise, moral philosopher Jeff McMahan
argues that since humans "are already causing massive, precipitate
changes in the natural world," we should favor those changes that would
promote the survival "of herbivorous rather than carnivorous species."
Peter Vallentyne
suggests that, while humans should not eliminate predators in nature,
they can intervene to help prey in more limited ways. In the same way
that we help humans in need when the cost to us is small, we might help
some wild animals at least in limited circumstances.
Potential conflict between animal rights and environmentalism
It
has been argued that the environmentalist goal of preserving certain
abstract entities such as species and ecosystems and policy of
non-interference in regard to natural processes is incompatible with
animal rights views which place the welfare and interests of nonhuman
animals at the center of concern. Examples include environmentalists supporting hunting for species population control, while animal rights advocates oppose it; animal rights advocates arguing for the extinction or reengineering of carnivores or r-strategist species, while deep ecologists defend their right to be and flourish as they are;
animal rights advocates defending the reduction of wildlife habitats or
arguing against their expansion out of concern that most animal
suffering takes place within them, while environmentalists want to
safeguard and expand them.
Oscar Horta has argued that there are instances where environmentalists
and animal rights advocates may both support approaches which would
consequently reduce wild animal suffering.
Welfare biology
Welfare biology is a proposed research field for studying the welfare of nonhuman animals, with a particular focus on their relationship with natural ecosystems.
It was first advanced in 1995 by Yew-Kwang Ng, who defined it as "the
study of living things and their environment with respect to their
welfare (defined as net happiness, or enjoyment minus suffering)".
Such research is intended to promote concern for nonhuman animal
suffering in the wild and to establish effective actions that can be
undertaken to help these individuals.
History of interventions
In 2016, 350 starving hippos and buffaloes at Kruger National Park were killed by park rangers. One of the motives for the action was to prevent the animals from suffering as they died.
In 2018, a team of BBC filmmakers dug a ramp in the snow to allow a group of penguins to escape a ravine.
In 2019, 2000 baby flamingos were rescued after they were abandoned by their parents in a drought in South Africa.
Wildlife contraception has been used successfully to reduce and stabilize populations of wild horses, white-tailed deer, American bison and African elephants.