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Saturday, October 15, 2022

Predestination

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Juan de la Abadía el Viejo: Saint Michael Weighing Souls

Predestination, in Christian theology, is the doctrine that all events have been willed by God, usually with reference to the eventual fate of the individual soul. Explanations of predestination often seek to address the paradox of free will, whereby God's omniscience seems incompatible with human free will. In this usage, predestination can be regarded as a form of religious determinism; and usually predeterminism, also known as theological determinism.

History

Pre-Christian period

Some have argued that the Book of Enoch contains a deterministic worldview that is combined with dualism. The book of Jubilees seems to harmonize or mix together a doctrine of free will and determinism.

Ben Sira affirms free will, where God allows a choice of bad or good before the human and thus they can choose which one to follow.

New Testament period

There is some disagreement among scholars regarding the views on predestination of first-century AD Judaism, out of which Christianity came. Josephus wrote during the first century that the three main Jewish sects differed on this question. He argued that the Essenes and Pharisees argued that God's providence orders all human events, but the Pharisees still maintained that people are able to choose between right and wrong. He wrote that the Sadducees did not have a doctrine of providence.

Biblical scholar N. T. Wright argues that Josephus's portrayal of these groups is incorrect, and that the Jewish debates referenced by Josephus should be seen as having to do with God's work to liberate Israel rather than philosophical questions about predestination. Wright asserts that Essenes were content to wait for God to liberate Israel while Pharisees believed Jews needed to act in cooperation with God. John Barclay responded that Josephus's description was an over-simplification and there were likely to be complex differences between these groups which may have been similar to those described by Josephus. Francis Watson has also argued on the basis of 4 Ezra, a document dated to the first century AD, that Jewish beliefs in predestination are primarily concerned with God's choice to save some individual Jews.

However some in the Qumran community possibly believed in predestination, for example 1QS states that "God has caused (his chosen ones) to inherit the lot of the Holy Ones".

In the New Testament, Romans 8–11 presents a statement on predestination. In Romans 8:28–30, Paul writes,

We know that in everything God works for good with those who love him, who are called according to his purpose. For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren. And those whom he predestined he also called; and those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also glorified.

Biblical scholars have interpreted this passage in several ways. Many say this only has to do with service, and is not about salvation. The Catholic biblical commentator Brendan Byrne wrote that the predestination mentioned in this passage should be interpreted as applied to the Christian community corporately rather than individuals. Another Catholic commentator, Joseph Fitzmyer, wrote that this passage teaches that God has predestined the salvation of all humans. Douglas Moo, a Protestant biblical interpreter, reads the passage as teaching that God has predestined a certain set of people to salvation, and predestined the remainder of humanity to reprobation (damnation). Similarly, Wright's interpretation is that in this passage Paul teaches that God will save those whom he has chosen, but Wright also emphasizes that Paul does not intend to suggest that God has eliminated human free will or responsibility. Instead, Wright asserts, Paul is saying that God's will works through that of humans to accomplish salvation.

Patristic period

Ante-Nicene period

Origen, writing in the third century, taught that God's providence extends to every individual. He believed God's predestination was based on God's foreknowledge of every individual's merits, whether in their current life or a previous life.

Gill and Gregg Alisson argued that Clement of Rome held to a predestinarian view of salvation.

Some verses in the Odes of Solomon, which was made by an Essene convert into Christianity, might possibly suggest a predestinarian worldview, where God chooses who are saved and go into heaven, although there is controversy about what it teaches. The Odes of Solomon talks about God "imprinting a seal on the face of the elect before they existed". The Thomasines saw themselves as children of the light, but the ones who were not part of the elect community were sons of darkness. The Thomasines thus had a belief in a type of election or predestination, they saw themselves as elect because they were born from the light.

Valentinus believed in a form of predestination, in his view humans are born into one of three natures, depending on which elements prevail in the person. In the views of Valentinus, a person born with a bad nature can never be saved because they are too inclined into evil, some people have a nature which is a mixture of good and evil, thus they can choose salvation, and others have a good nature, who will be saved, because they will be inclined into good.

Irenaeus also attacked the doctrine of predestination set out by Valentinus, arguing that it is unfair. For Irenaeus, humans were free to choose salvation or not.

Justin Martyr attacked predestinarian views held by some Greek philosophers.

Post-Nicene perioid

Later in the fourth and fifth centuries, Augustine of Hippo (354–430) also taught that God orders all things while preserving human freedom. Prior to 396, Augustine believed that predestination was based on God's foreknowledge of whether individuals would believe, that God's grace was "a reward for human assent". Later, in response to Pelagius, Augustine said that the sin of pride consists in assuming that "we are the ones who choose God or that God chooses us (in his foreknowledge) because of something worthy in us", and argued that it is God's grace that causes the individual act of faith. Scholars are divided over whether Augustine's teaching implies double predestination, or the belief that God chooses some people for damnation as well as some for salvation. Catholic scholars tend to deny that he held such a view while some Protestants and secular scholars affirm that Augustine did believe in double predestination.

Augustine's position raised objections. Julian of Eclanum expressed the view that Augustine was bringing Manichean thoughts into the church. For Vincent of Lérins, this was a disturbing innovation. This new tension eventually became obvious with the confrontation between Augustine and Pelagius culminating in condemnation of Pelagianism (as interpreted by Augustine) at the Council of Ephesus in 431. Pelagius denied Augustine's view of predestination in order to affirm that salvation is achieved by an act of free will.

The Council of Arles in the late fifth century condemned the position "that some have been condemned to death, others have been predestined to life", though this may seem to follow from Augustine's teaching. The Second Council of Orange in 529 also condemned the position that "some have been truly predestined to evil by divine power".

In the eighth century, John of Damascus emphasized the freedom of the human will in his doctrine of predestination, and argued that acts arising from peoples' wills are not part of God's providence at all. Damascene teaches that people's good actions are done in cooperation with God, but are not caused by him.

Prosper of Aquitaine (390 – c. 455 AD) defended Augustine's view of predestination against semi-Pelagians. Marius Mercator, who was a pupil of Augustine wrote five books against Pelagianism and one book about predestination. Fulgentius of Ruspe and Caesarius of Arles rejected the view that God gives free choice to believe and instead believed in predestination.

Cassian believed that despite predestination being a work that God does, God only decides to predestinate based on how human beings will respond.

Augustine himself stated thus:

And thus Christ’s Church has never failed to hold the faith of this predestination, which is now being defended with new solicitude against these modern heretics - Augustine.

Middle Ages

Gottschalk of Orbais, a ninth-century Saxon monk, argued that God predestines some people to hell as well as predestining some to heaven, a view known as double predestination. He was condemned by several synods, but his views remained popular. Irish theologian John Scotus Eriugena wrote a refutation of Gottschalk. Eriugena abandoned Augustine's teaching on predestination. He wrote that God's predestination should be equated with his foreknowledge of people's choices.

In the twelfth century, Thomas Aquinas taught that God predestines certain people to the beatific vision based solely on his own goodness rather than that of creatures. Aquinas also believed that people are free in their choices, fully cause their own sin, and are solely responsible for it. According to Aquinas, there are several ways in which God wills actions. He directly wills the good, indirectly wills evil consequences of good things, and only permits evil. Aquinas held that in permitting evil, God does not will it to be done or not to be done.

In the thirteenth century, William of Ockham taught that God does not cause human choices and equated predestination with divine foreknowledge. Though Ockham taught that God predestines based on people's foreseen works, he maintained that God's will was not constrained to do this. Medieval theologians who believed in predestination include: John Wycliffe (1320s –1384), Gregory of Rimini (1300 – 1358), Johann Ruchrat von Wesel (died 1481), Johannes von Staupitz (1460 – 1524), Ratramnus (died 868), Thomas Bradwardine (1300 – 1349) and Girolamo Savonarola (1452 – 1498).

The medieval Cathars denied the free will of humans.

Reformation

John Calvin rejected the idea that God permits rather than actively decrees the damnation of sinners, as well as other evil. Calvin did not believe God to be guilty of sin, but rather he considered God inflicting sin upon his creations to be an unfathomable mystery. Though he maintained God's predestination applies to damnation as well as salvation, he taught that the damnation of the damned is caused by their sin, but that the salvation of the saved is solely caused by God. Other Protestant Reformers, including Huldrych Zwingli, also held double predestinarian views.

Views of Christian branches

Eastern Orthodoxy

The Eastern Orthodox view was summarized by Bishop Theophan the Recluse in response to the question, "What is the relationship between the Divine provision and our free will?"

Answer: The fact that the Kingdom of God is "taken by force" presupposes personal effort. When the Apostle Paul says, "it is not of him that willeth," this means that one's efforts do not produce what is sought. It is necessary to combine them: to strive and to expect all things from grace. It is not one's own efforts that will lead to the goal, because without grace, efforts produce little; nor does grace without effort bring what is sought, because grace acts in us and for us through our efforts. Both combine in a person to bring progress and carry him to the goal. (God's) foreknowledge is unfathomable. It is enough for us with our whole heart to believe that it never opposes God's grace and truth, and that it does not infringe man's freedom. Usually this resolves as follows: God foresees how a man will freely act and makes dispositions accordingly. Divine determination depends on the life of a man, and not his life upon the determination.

Roman Catholicism

Roman Catholicism teaches the doctrine of predestination. The Catechism of the Catholic Church says, "To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of "predestination", he includes in it each person's free response to his grace." Therefore, in the Roman Catholic conception of predestination, free will is not denied. However, Roman Catholic theology has discouraged beliefs that it is possible for anyone to know or predict anything about the operation and outcomes of predestination, and therefore it normally plays a very small role in Roman Catholic thinking.

The heretical seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sect within Roman Catholicism known as Jansenism preached the doctrine of double predestination, although Jansenism claimed that even members of the saved elect could lose their salvation by doing sinful, un-repented deeds, as implied in Ezekiel 18:21–28 in the Old Testament of the Bible. According to the Roman Catholic Church, God does not will anyone to mortally sin and so to deserve punishment in hell.

Pope John Paul II wrote:

The universality of salvation means that it is granted not only to those who explicitly believe in Christ and have entered the Church. Since salvation is offered to all, it must be made concretely available to all. But it is clear that today, as in the past, many people do not have an opportunity to come to know or accept the gospel revelation or to enter the Church. (...) For such people salvation in Christ is accessible by virtue of a grace which, while having a mysterious relationship to the Church, does not make them formally part of the Church but enlightens them in a way which is accommodated to their spiritual and material situation. This grace comes from Christ; it is the result of his Sacrifice and is communicated by the Holy Spirit. It enables each person to attain salvation through his or her free cooperation.

Augustine of Hippo laid the foundation for much of the later Roman Catholic teaching on predestination. His teachings on grace and free will were largely adopted by the Second Council of Orange (529), whose decrees were directed against the Semipelagians. Augustine wrote,

[God] promised not from the power of our will but from His own predestination. For He promised what He Himself would do, not what men would do. Because, although men do those good things which pertain to God’s worship, He Himself makes them to do what He has commanded; it is not they that cause Him to do what He has promised. Otherwise the fulfilment of God’s promises would not be in the power of God, but in that of men"

Augustine also teaches that people have free will. For example, in "On Grace and Free Will", (see especially chapters II–IV) Augustine states that "He [God] has revealed to us, through His Holy Scriptures, that there is in man a free choice of will," and that "God's precepts themselves would be of no use to a man unless he had free choice of will, so that by performing them he might obtain the promised rewards." (chap. II)

Thomas Aquinas' views concerning predestination are largely in agreement with Augustine and can be summarized by many of his writings in his Summa Theologiæ:

God does reprobate some. For it was said above (A[1]) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (Q[22], A[2]). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (Q[22], A[1]). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin."

Protestantism

Comparison

This table summarizes the classical views of three different Protestant beliefs.

Topic Lutheranism Calvinism Arminianism
Election Unconditional election to salvation only Unconditional election to salvation only, with reprobation (passing over) Conditional election in view of foreseen faith or unbelief

Lutheranism

Lutherans historically hold to unconditional election to salvation. However, some do not believe that there are certain people that are predestined to salvation, but salvation is predestined for those who seek God. Lutherans believe Christians should be assured that they are among the predestined. However, they disagree with those who make predestination the source of salvation rather than Christ's suffering, death, and resurrection. Unlike some Calvinists, Lutherans do not believe in a predestination to damnation. Instead, Lutherans teach eternal damnation is a result of the unbeliever's rejection of the forgiveness of sins and unbelief.

Martin Luther's attitude towards predestination is set out in his On the Bondage of the Will, published in 1525. This publication by Luther was in response to the published treatise by Desiderius Erasmus in 1524 known as On Free Will.

Calvinism

The Belgic Confession of 1561 affirmed that God "delivers and preserves" from perdition "all whom he, in his eternal and unchangeable council, of mere goodness hath elected in Christ Jesus our Lord, without respect to their works" (Article XVI). Calvinists believe that God picked those whom he will save and bring with him to Heaven before the world was created. They also believe that those people God does not save will go to Hell. John Calvin thought people who were saved could never lose their salvation and the "elect" (those God saved) would know they were saved because of their actions.

In this common, loose sense of the term, to affirm or to deny predestination has particular reference to the Calvinist doctrine of unconditional election. In the Calvinist interpretation of the Bible, this doctrine normally has only pastoral value related to the assurance of salvation and the absolution of salvation by grace alone. However, the philosophical implications of the doctrine of election and predestination are sometimes discussed beyond these systematic bounds. Under the topic of the doctrine of God (theology proper), the predestinating decision of God cannot be contingent upon anything outside of himself, because all other things are dependent upon him for existence and meaning. Under the topic of the doctrines of salvation (soteriology), the predestinating decision of God is made from God's knowledge of his own will (Romans 9:15), and is therefore not contingent upon human decisions (rather, free human decisions are outworkings of the decision of God, which sets the total reality within which those decisions are made in exhaustive detail: that is, nothing left to chance). Calvinists do not pretend to understand how this works; but they are insistent that the Scriptures teach both the sovereign control of God and the responsibility and freedom of human decisions.

Calvinist groups use the term Hyper-Calvinism to describe Calvinistic systems that assert without qualification that God's intention to destroy some is equal to his intention to save others. Some forms of Hyper-Calvinism have racial implications, as when Dutch Calvinist theologian Franciscus Gomarus however argued that Jews, because of their refusal to worship Jesus Christ, were members of the non-elect, as also argued by John Calvin himself, based on I John 2:22–23 in The New Testament of the Bible. Some Dutch settlers in South Africa argued that black people were sons of Ham, whom Noah had cursed to be slaves, according to Genesis 9:18–19, or drew analogies between them and the Canaanites, suggesting a "chosen people" ideology similar to that espoused by proponents of the Jewish nation. This justified racial hierarchy on earth, as well as racial segregation of congregations, but did not exclude blacks from being part of the elect. Other Calvinists vigorously objected to these arguments (see Afrikaner Calvinism).

Expressed sympathetically, the Calvinist doctrine is that God has mercy or withholds it, with particular consciousness of who are to be the recipients of mercy in Christ. Therefore, the particular persons are chosen, out of the total number of human beings, who will be rescued from enslavement to sin and the fear of death, and from punishment due to sin, to dwell forever in his presence. Those who are being saved are assured through the gifts of faith, the sacraments, and communion with God through prayer and increase of good works, that their reconciliation with him through Christ is settled by the sovereign determination of God's will. God also has particular consciousness of those who are passed over by his selection, who are without excuse for their rebellion against him, and will be judged for their sins.

Calvinists typically divide on the issue of predestination into infralapsarians (sometimes called 'sublapsarians') and supralapsarians. Infralapsarians interpret the biblical election of God to highlight his love (1 John 4:8; Ephesians 1:4b–5a) and chose his elect considering the situation after the Fall, while supralapsarians interpret biblical election to highlight God's sovereignty (Romans 9:16) and that the Fall was ordained by God's decree of election. In infralapsarianism, election is God's response to the Fall, while in supralapsarianism the Fall is part of God's plan for election. In spite of the division, many Calvinist theologians would consider the debate surrounding the infra- and supralapsarian positions one in which scant Scriptural evidence can be mustered in either direction, and that, at any rate, has little effect on the overall doctrine.

Some Calvinists decline to describe the eternal decree of God in terms of a sequence of events or thoughts, and many caution against the simplifications involved in describing any action of God in speculative terms. Most make distinctions between the positive manner in which God chooses some to be recipients of grace, and the manner in which grace is consciously withheld so that some are destined for everlasting punishments.

Debate concerning predestination according to the common usage concerns the destiny of the damned: whether God is just if that destiny is settled prior to the existence of any actual volition of the individual, and whether the individual is in any meaningful sense responsible for his destiny if it is settled by the eternal action of God.

Arminianism

At the beginning of the 17th century, the Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius formulated Arminianism and disagreed with Calvin in particular on election and predestination. Arminianism is defined by God's limited mode of providence. This mode of providence affirms the compatibility between human free will and divine foreknowledge, but its incompatibility with theological determinism. Thus predestination in Arminianism is based on divine foreknowledge, unlike in Calvinism. It is therefore a predestination by foreknowledge.

From this perspective, comes the notion of a conditional election on the one who wills to have faith in God for salvation. This means that God does not predetermine, but instead infallibly knows who will believe and perseveringly be saved. Although God knows from the beginning of the world who will go where, the choice is still with the individual.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) rejects the doctrine of predestination, but does believe in foreordination. Foreordination, an important doctrine of the LDS Church, teaches that during the pre-mortal existence, God selected ("foreordained") particular people to fulfill certain missions ("callings") during their mortal lives. For example, prophets were foreordained to be the Lord's servants (see Jeremiah 1:5), all who receive the priesthood were foreordained to that calling, and Jesus was foreordained to enact the atonement.

The LDS Church teaches the doctrine of moral agency, the ability to choose and act for oneself, and decide whether to accept Christ's atonement.

Types of predestination

Conditional election

Conditional election is the belief that God chooses for eternal salvation those whom he foresees will have faith in Christ. This belief emphasizes the importance of a person's free will. The counter-view is known as unconditional election, and is the belief that God chooses whomever he will, based solely on his purposes and apart from an individual's free will. It has long been an issue in Calvinist–Arminian debate. An alternative viewpoint is Corporate election, which distinguishes God's election and predestination for corporate entities such as the community "in Christ," and individuals who can benefit from that community's election and predestination so long as they continue belonging to that community.

Supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism

Infralapsarianism (also called sublapsarianism) holds that predestination logically coincides with the preordination of Man's fall into sin. That is, God predestined sinful men for salvation. Therefore, according to this view, God is the ultimate cause, but not the proximate source or "author" of sin. Infralapsarians often emphasize a difference between God's decree (which is inviolable and inscrutable), and his revealed will (against which man is disobedient). Proponents also typically emphasize the grace and mercy of God toward all men, although teaching also that only some are predestined for salvation.

In common English parlance, the doctrine of predestination often has particular reference to the doctrines of Calvinism. The version of predestination espoused by John Calvin, after whom Calvinism is named, is sometimes referred to as "double predestination" because in it God predestines some people for salvation (i.e. unconditional election) and some for condemnation (i.e. Reprobation) which results by allowing the individual's own sins to condemn them. Calvin himself defines predestination as "the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. Not all are created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestined to life or to death."

On the spectrum of beliefs concerning predestination, Calvinism is the strongest form among Christians. It teaches that God's predestining decision is based on the knowledge of his own will rather than foreknowledge, concerning every particular person and event; and, God continually acts with entire freedom, in order to bring about his will in completeness, but in such a way that the freedom of the creature is not violated, "but rather, established".

Calvinists who hold the infralapsarian view of predestination usually prefer that term to "sublapsarianism," perhaps with the intent of blocking the inference that they believe predestination is on the basis of foreknowledge (sublapsarian meaning, assuming the fall into sin). The different terminology has the benefit of distinguishing the Calvinist double predestination version of infralapsarianism from Lutheranism's view that predestination is a mystery, which forbids the unprofitable intrusion of prying minds since God only reveals partial knowledge to the human race.

Supralapsarianism is the doctrine that God's decree of predestination for salvation and reprobation logically precedes his preordination of the human race's fall into sin. That is, God decided to save, and to damn; he then determined the means by which that would be made possible. It is a matter of controversy whether or not Calvin himself held this view, but most scholars link him with the infralapsarian position. It is known, however, that Calvin's successor in Geneva, Theodore Beza, held to the supralapsarian view.

Double predestination

Double predestination, or the double decree, is the doctrine that God actively reprobates, or decrees damnation of some, as well as salvation for those whom he has elected. During the Protestant Reformation John Calvin held this double predestinarian view: "By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death." Gottschalk of Orbais taught double predestination explicitly in the ninth century, and Gregory of Rimini in the fourteenth. Some trace this doctrine to statements made by Augustine in the early fifth century that on their own also seem to teach double predestination, but in the context of his other writings it is not clear whether he held this view. In "The City of God," Augustine describes all of humanity as being predestinated for salvation (i.e., the city of God) or damnation (i.e., the earthly city of man); but Augustine also held that all human beings were born "reprobate" but "need not necessarily remain" in that state of reprobation.

Corporate election

Corporate election is a non-traditional Arminian view of election. In corporate election, God does not choose which individuals he will save prior to creation, but rather God chooses the church as a whole. Or put differently, God chooses what type of individuals he will save. Another way the New Testament puts this is to say that God chose the church in Christ (Eph. 1:4). In other words, God chose from all eternity to save all those who would be found in Christ, by faith in God. This choosing is not primarily about salvation from eternal destruction either but is about God's chosen agency in the world. Thus individuals have full freedom in terms of whether they become members of the church or not. Corporate election is thus consistent with the open view's position on God's omniscience, which states that God's foreknowledge does not determine the outcomes of individual free will.

Middle Knowledge

Middle Knowledge is a concept that was developed by Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, and exists under a doctrine called Molinism. It attempts to deal with the topic of predestination by reconciling God's sovereign providence with the notion of libertarian free will. The concept of Middle Knowledge holds that God has a knowledge of true pre-volitional counterfactuals for all free creatures. That is, what any individual creature with a free will (e.g. a human) would do under any given circumstance. God's knowledge of counterfactuals is reasoned to occur logically prior to his divine creative decree (that is, prior to creation), and after his knowledge of necessary truths. Thus, Middle Knowledge holds that before the world was created, God knew what every existing creature capable of libertarian freedom (e.g. every individual human) would freely choose to do in all possible circumstances. It then holds that based on this information, God elected from a number of these possible worlds, the world most consistent with his ultimate will, which is the actual world that we live in.

For example:

  • if Free Creature A was to be placed in Circumstance B, God via his Middle Knowledge would know that Free Creature A will freely choose option Y over option Z.
  • if Free Creature A was to be placed in Circumstance C, God via his Middle Knowledge would know that Free Creature A will freely choose option Z over option Y.

Based on this Middle Knowledge, God has the ability to actualise the world in which A is placed in a circumstance that he freely chooses to do what is consistent with Gods ultimate will. If God determined that the world most suited to his purposes is a world in which A would freely choose Y instead of Z, God can actualise a world in which Free Creature A finds himself in Circumstance B.

In this way, Middle Knowledge is thought of by its proponents to be consistent with any theological doctrines that assert God as having divine providence and man having a libertarian freedom (e.g. Calvinism, Catholicism, Lutheranism), and to offer a potential solution to the concerns that God's providence somehow nullifies man from having true liberty in his choices.

Friday, October 14, 2022

Riot control

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Rank of Icelandic National Police officers in full riot gear during the 2008 Icelandic lorry driver protests.
 
Indonesian Mobile Brigade Corps riot control personnel and equipment

Riot control measures are used by law enforcement, military, paramilitary or security forces to control, disperse, and arrest people who are involved in a riot, unlawful demonstration or unlawful protest.

If a riot is spontaneous and irrational, actions which cause people to stop and think for a moment (e.g. loud noises or issuing instructions in a calm tone) can be enough to stop it. However, these methods usually fail when there is severe anger with a legitimate cause, or the riot was planned or organized. Riot control personnel have long used less lethal weapons such as batons and whips to disperse crowds and detain rioters. Since the 1980s, riot control officers have also used tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, stun grenades, and electric tasers. In some cases, riot squads may also use Long Range Acoustic Devices, water cannons, armoured fighting vehicles, aerial surveillance, police dogs or mounted police on horses. Persons performing riot control typically wear protective equipment such as riot helmets, face visors, body armor (vests, neck protectors, knee pads, etc.), gas masks and riot shields.

There have been cases where lethal weapons are used to violently suppress a protest or riot, as in the Boston Massacre, Haymarket Massacre, Banana Massacre, Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Kent State Shootings, Soweto Uprising, Mendiola Massacre, Bloody Sunday (1905), Ponce massacre, Bloody Sunday (1972), 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, 2017 Venezuelan protests, Tuticorin Massacre(2018), 2018–2019 Gaza border protests,Citizenship Amendment Act protests, 2020 Lekki Shooting, 2021 Colombian protests, 2022 Sri Lankan protests and Mahsa Amini protests.

History

GRM horse platoon and rioteers Paris - Place de la Concorde - 1934

Maintaining order during demonstrations and quenching riots has always been a challenge for governments and administrations. Until early in the 20th century, no dedicated force really existed in most countries and the traditional response when the regular police force proved inadequate was to call upon the army, often with disastrous results: either fraternization or use of excessive violence.

The terminology arguably first arises in the Keystone Cops short "A Hash House Fraud" in 1915.

In France, for example, several revolts were fueled by poor handling by the military. The National Gendarmerie created specialized "mobile" gendarmerie forces several times during the 19th century in times of trouble but these units were disbanded soon after the end of the troubles they had been tasked to handle and there was no permanent organization in place until it was finally decided in 1921 to create "Mobile Gendarmerie platoons" within the Departmental Gendarmerie. These platoons, either horse mounted or on foot were composed of 40 gendarmes each (60 in the Paris Region). In 1926, the platoons formed the "Garde Républicaine mobile" (mobile republican guard or GRM), which became a distinct branch of the Gendarmerie in 1927, the platoons becoming part of companies and legions. By 1940, the GRM was a force 21,000 strong, composed of 14 Légions, 54 company groups and 167 companies.

Long the only large force specialized in maintaining or restoring law and order in France during demonstrations or riots, the GRM progressively developed the doctrine and skills needed in that role: exercise restraint, avoid confrontation as long as possible, always leave an "exit door" for the crowd, etc. In 1940, after the fall of France, the German authorities had the GRM disbanded but it was reinstated in 1944 and renamed Mobile Gendarmerie in 1954.

The first squad trained in modern techniques of riot control in Asia was formed in 1925 in colonial Shanghai as a response to the mismanaged riot of the May Thirtieth Movement.

New policing methods, including combat pistol shooting, hand to hand combat skills, and knife fight training, were pioneered by British Assistant Commissioner William E. Fairbairn and officer Eric Anthony Sykes of the Shanghai Municipal Police as a response to a staggering rise in armed crime in the 1920s —Shanghai had become one of the world's most dangerous cities due to a breakdown in law and order in the country and the growth of organised crime and the opium trade.

Under Fairbairn, the SMP developed a myriad of riot control measures. These riot control techniques led to the introduction of Shanghai's "Reserve Unit"— the first modern SWAT team. As a reserve unit, it was used to forcibly disband riots as well as to respond to high-level criminality like kidnappings and armed robberies.

The skills developed in Shanghai have been adopted and adapted by both international police forces and clandestine warfare units. William Fairbairn was again the central figure, not only leading the Reserve Unit, but teaching his methods around the world, including in the United States, and the colonial regimes of Cyprus and Singapore.

Equipment

Colombian Police armored riot control vehicle with water cannon ISBI
 
Polish riot police squad in the 1930s, with opaque riot shields and no helmet visors, as polycarbonate had not been invented yet

For protection, officers that are trained in police anti-riot schools performing riot control will often wear protective helmets and carry riot shields. These are designed to protect the wearer from those dangers that come from direct melee and hurled objects such as bottles and bricks. The gear frequently worn by riot control officers protects the entire body with no vulnerable spots to exploit. For example, the helmets worn by riot control officers have an additional outward-extending part that protects the back of the neck from assault. To provide even greater protection, the protective equipment often provides ballistic protection. If tear gas or other riot control agents are to be used, gas masks may also be worn.

One of many additional concerns is to prevent people in the crowd from snatching officers' side arms, which may be stolen or even used against the police. In a very heavy crowd, the officer may not be able to see who is responsible for snatching a weapon, and may not even notice that it has happened. For this reason, riot police may have holsters with positive locking mechanisms or other extra means of retention, if their agencies can afford such tools. However, this can be a trade-off that increases the amount of time needed to draw the sidearm in an emergency. Alternately, riot police may not carry sidearms at all.

The initial choice of tactics determines the type of offensive equipment used. The base choice is between lethal (e.g. 12 gauge shotgun) and less-than-lethal weaponry (e.g. tear gas, pepper spray, plastic bullets, tasers, batons, and other incapacitants). The decision is based on the perceived level of threat and the existing laws; in many countries it is illegal to use lethal force to control riots in all but the most extreme circumstances.

Special riot hand weapons include the wooden or rubber baton; the African sjambok, a heavy leather or plastic whip, and the Indian lathi, a 6 to 8 foot (1.8 to 2.4 m) long cane with a blunt metal tip. Vehicle-mounted water cannons may serve to augment personal weapons. Some water cannons let police add dye to mark rioters or tear gas to help disperse the crowds.

In major unrest, police in armoured vehicles may be sent in following an initial subduing with firepower. Occasionally, police dogs, fire hoses, or mounted police are deployed.

Riot control agent (RCA)

Riot control agents (sometimes called RCAs) are “ non-lethal lachrymatory agents “ used for riot control. Most commonly used riot control agents are pepper spray and various kinds of tear gas. These chemicals disperse a crowd that could be protesting or rioting, or to clear a building. They can rapidly produce sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which usually disappear within 15 minutes (for tear gas) and up to 2 hours (for pepper spray) following termination of exposure. They can also be used for chemical warfare defense training, although their use in warfare itself is a violation of Article I.5 of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Article II.9 of the CWC specifically authorizes their use for domestic law enforcement.

Pepper spray

A German SEK operator in riot gear holding a Tac700 Pepperball Launcher
 

The active ingredient in pepper-spray is capsaicin, which is a chemical derived from the fruit of plants in the Capsicum genus, including chilies. Desmethyl­dihydro­capsaicin, a synthetic analogue of capsaicin also known as pelargonic acid vanillylamide or PAVA, is used in another version of pepper spray known as PAVA spray and used in the United Kingdom. Another synthetic counterpart of pepper spray, pelargonic acid morpholide, was developed and is widely used in Russia. Its effectiveness compared to natural pepper spray is uncertain and it reportedly has caused some injuries. When undesirables threaten an area, such as a riot after a soccer game, riot police are called in to subdue them. In these situations, the police may use pepper spray, or water cannons to neutralize the threat.

Gendarmes mobiles carrying gas masks and a grenade launcher for deploying tear gas canisters

Pepper spray typically comes in canisters, which are often small enough to be carried or concealed in a pocket or purse. Pepper spray can also be bought concealed in items such as rings. There are also pepper spray projectiles available, which can be fired from a paintball gun. Having been used for years against demonstrators, it is increasingly being used by police in routine interventions.

Tear gas

Tear gas is a non-specific term for any chemical that is used to temporarily incapacitate through irritation of eyes and/or respiratory system. It is used as a hand-held spray or can be fired in canisters that heat up spewing out an aerosol cloud at a steady rate.

Whilst the use of tear gas in warfare is prohibited by various international treaties that most states have signed, however police and private self-defense use is not banned in an international manner.

Popular tear gases include the eye irritants ortho-chlorobenzylidene-malononitrile (CS gas), chloroacetophenone (CN gas), and dibenz (b,f)-1,4-oxazepine (CR gas). Among a long list of substances, these three have become of greater importance than the others because of their effectiveness and low risks when used. Today, CS has largely replaced CN as the most widely used tear gas internationally.

Decontamination

At room temperature, tear gases are white solids. They are stable when heated and have low vapor pressure. Consequently, they are usually dispersed as aerosols. All of them have low solubility in water but can be dissolved in several organic solvents. Hydrolysis of CN is very slow in a water solution, especially if alkali is added. CS is rapidly hydrolyzed in water solution (half-life at pH 7 is about 15 min. at room temperature) and extremely rapid when alkali is added (half-life at pH 9 is about 1 min.). CR is hydrolyzed only to a negligible extent in water solution.

CN and CR are, thus, difficult to decompose under practical conditions, whereas CS can easily be inactivated by means of a water solution. Skin is suitably decontaminated of CS and CN gas by thorough washing with soap and water. CS is then decomposed, whereas CN is only removed via soap and water. The effects of CR gas are greatly increased by water, causing any attempt to DECON CR via soap and water to increase the severity and duration of the effects. When decontamination of CR is attempted with soap and water the effects of CR can last up to 48 hours

Decontamination of material after contamination with CR gas is not possible for up to 45 days. CS can be decontaminated l with a 5–10 percent soda solution or 2 percent alkaline solution. If this type of decontamination cannot be accomplished (e.g., contaminated rooms and furniture), then the only other means is by intensive air exchange—preferably with hot air. Exposed streets and sidewalks will have toxic and irritating CS powder that will be stirred into the air by traffic and pedestrians long after the cloud has dissipated, and should be washed away with water. In contrast to human beings, domesticated animals generally have lower sensitivity to tear gases. Dogs and horses can therefore be used by police for riot control even when tear gas is used.

Dispensing large quantities

Backpack dispensers for riot control agents, when the intent is to use a larger quantity than possible with grenades, are one type of device used by organizations that might, for example, need to cover a prison yard. Dispensers are also made for attachment to helicopters; see CBU-19.

Tactics

Mounted riot police as crowd control during protests in Edinburgh

The front-line officers in a riot control are often fully armored and carry weapons such as batons, designed to be in direct contact with the crowd. These officers subdue rioters and subsequently allow the less heavily armoured, more mobile officers to make arrests where it is deemed necessary. In face of a greater threat, the riot police will be backed up with other officers equipped with riot guns to fire tear gas, rubber bullets, plastic bullets or "beanbag" rounds.

As a less aggressive step, mounted police may first be sent into the crowd. The might and height offered by the horse are combined with its training, allowing an officer to more safely infiltrate a crowd. Usually, when front-facing a riot, officers slowly walk in a line parallel to the riot's front, extending to both its ends, as they noisily and simultaneously march and beat their shields with their batons, to cause fear and psychological effects on the crowd.

German police deploy an armoured riot control vehicle at a demonstration in Hamburg.

Since the advent of artillery, straight roads have been of notable importance in city defense and control. Upon coming to power, Napoleon III built great avenues, referred to as anti-riot streets, into the troublesome quarters of Paris. The wide straight roads also allowed for cavalry charges to subdue rioters.

In the United Kingdom, usually when large demonstrations take place that are deemed unstable, the territorial police force responsible for the demonstration in that area will usually deploy Police Support Unit personnel who are trained in riot tactics, along with normal divisional officers. If the demonstration turns violent, police will seal roads and other exits to contain protesters in a single area (known as kettling) to prevent widespread damage and wait until the protesters tire. These tactics were seen during the 2009 G-20 London summit protests and the 2010 student protests in London. Tear gas and other more offensive tactics are used as a last resort. Throughout police will be videoing or photographing protesters for future arrests, "snatch squad" tactics might also be used where several police officers, usually in protective riot gear, rush forwards, occasionally in flying wedge formation to break through the front of a crowd, with the objective of snatching one or more individuals from a riot that are attempting to control the demonstration at which they are present; the target may be a leader or a speaker, or someone who seems to be leading the crowd. This tactic was used in the 2011 England Riots, most notably by Greater Manchester Police who deployed this tactic in Manchester city centre on 9 August 2011.

A more straightforward tactic police may use is a baton charge which involves police officers charging at a crowd of people with batons and in some cases, riot shields. They run at the crowd hitting people with their batons, and in some situations use riotshields to push them away. Baton charging is designed to cause the maximum amount of pain, in the hope that they would be compelled to move away from the scene, dispersing the crowd.

Research

A New York City Police Department officer stands ready with a sonic weapon, the LRAD 500X

Research into weapons that are more effective for riot control continues. Netguns are non-lethal weapons designed to fire a net which entangles the target. Netguns have a long history of being used to capture wildlife, without injury, for research purposes. A netgun is currently in development for non-lethal riot control. Pepper-spray projectile launchers are projectile weapons that launch a fragile ball which breaks upon impact and releases an irritant powder called PAVA (capsaicin II) pepper. The launchers are often slightly modified .68 caliber paintball guns.

Stink bombs are devices designed to create an extremely unpleasant smell for riot control and area denial purposes. Stink bombs are believed to be less dangerous than other riot control chemicals, since they are effective at low concentrations. Sticky foam weapons are being tested, which cover and immobilize rioters with a gooey foam.

Low frequency sound cannons are weapons of various types that use sound to injure or incapacitate subjects using a focused beam of sound or infrasound. Active denial systems (ADS) are a non-lethal, directed-energy weapon developed by the U.S. military. The ADS directs electromagnetic radiation, specifically, high-frequency microwave radiation, at a frequency of 95 GHz, which causes the water in the upper epidermis to boil, stimulating a "burning" sensation in the nerve endings and generating intense pain. Dazzler lasers are directed-energy weapons that use intense light to cause temporary blindness or disorientation of rioters.

Intentionality

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intentionality

Intentionality is the power of minds to be about something: to represent or to stand for things, properties and states of affairs. Intentionality is primarily ascribed to mental states, like perceptions, beliefs or desires, which is why it has been regarded as the characteristic mark of the mental by many philosophers. A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of intentional inexistence: to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states.

An early theory of intentionality is associated with Anselm of Canterbury's ontological argument for the existence of God, and with his tenets distinguishing between objects that exist in the understanding and objects that exist in reality. The idea fell out of discussion with the end of the medieval scholastic period, but in recent times was resurrected by empirical psychologist Franz Brentano and later adopted by contemporary phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl. Today, intentionality is a live concern among philosophers of mind and language. A common dispute is between naturalism about intentionality, the view that intentional properties are reducible to natural properties as studied by the natural sciences, and the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that intentionality is grounded in consciousness.

Overview

The concept of intentionality was reintroduced in 19th-century contemporary philosophy by Franz Brentano (a German philosopher and psychologist who is generally regarded as the founder of act psychology, also called intentionalism) in his work Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874). Brentano described intentionality as a characteristic of all acts of consciousness that are thus "psychical" or "mental" phenomena, by which they may be set apart from "physical" or "natural" phenomena.

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.

— Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, edited by Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 68.

Brentano coined the expression "intentional inexistence" to indicate the peculiar ontological status of the contents of mental phenomena. According to some interpreters the "in-" of "in-existence" is to be read as locative, i.e. as indicating that "an intended object ... exists in or has in-existence, existing not externally but in the psychological state" (Jacquette 2004, p. 102), while others are more cautious, stating: "It is not clear whether in 1874 this ... was intended to carry any ontological commitment" (Chrudzimski and Smith 2004, p. 205).

A major problem within discourse on intentionality is that participants often fail to make explicit whether or not they use the term to imply concepts such as agency or desire, i.e. whether it involves teleology. Dennett (see below) explicitly invokes teleological concepts in the "intentional stance". However, most philosophers use "intentionality" to mean something with no teleological import. Thus, a thought of a chair can be about a chair without any implication of an intention or even a belief relating to the chair. For philosophers of language, what is meant by intentionality is largely an issue of how symbols can have meaning. This lack of clarity may underpin some of the differences of view indicated below.

To bear out further the diversity of sentiment evoked from the notion of intentionality, Husserl followed on Brentano, and gave the concept of intentionality more widespread attention, both in continental and analytic philosophy. In contrast to Brentano's view, French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness) identified intentionality with consciousness, stating that the two were indistinguishable. German philosopher Martin Heidegger (Being and Time), defined intentionality as "care" (Sorge), a sentient condition where an individual's existence, facticity, and being in the world identifies their ontological significance, in contrast to that which is merely ontic ("thinghood").

Other 20th-century philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle and A.J. Ayer were critical of Husserl's concept of intentionality and his many layers of consciousness. Ryle insisted that perceiving is not a process, and Ayer that describing one's knowledge is not to describe mental processes. The effect of these positions is that consciousness is so fully intentional that the mental act has been emptied of all content, and that the idea of pure consciousness is that it is nothing. (Sartre also referred to "consciousness" as "nothing").

Platonist Roderick Chisholm has revived the Brentano thesis through linguistic analysis, distinguishing two parts to Brentano's concept, the ontological aspect and the psychological aspect. Chisholm's writings have attempted to summarize the suitable and unsuitable criteria of the concept since the Scholastics, arriving at a criterion of intentionality identified by the two aspects of Brentano's thesis and defined by the logical properties that distinguish language describing psychological phenomena from language describing non-psychological phenomena. Chisholm's criteria for the intentional use of sentences are: existence independence, truth-value indifference, and referential opacity.

In current artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind, intentionality is sometimes linked with questions of semantic inference, with both skeptical and supportive adherents. John Searle argued for this position with the Chinese room thought experiment, according to which no syntactic operations that occurred in a computer would provide it with semantic content. Others are more skeptical of the human ability to make such an assertion, arguing that the kind of intentionality that emerges from self-organizing networks of automata will always be undecidable because it will never be possible to make our subjective introspective experience of intentionality and decision making coincide with our objective observation of the behavior of a self-organizing machine.

The problem of intentional inexistence

A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of intentional inexistence: to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states. This is particularly relevant for cases involving objects that have no existence outside the mind, as in the case of mere fantasies or hallucinations.

For example, assume that Mary is thinking about Superman. On the one hand, it seems that this thought is intentional: Mary is thinking about something. On the other hand, Superman doesn't exist. This suggests that Mary either is not thinking about something or is thinking about something that doesn't exist (that Superman fiction exists is beside the point). Various theories have been proposed in order to reconcile these conflicting intuitions. These theories can roughly be divided into eliminativism, relationalism, and adverbialism. Eliminativists deny that this kind of problematic mental state is possible. Relationalist try to solve the problem by interpreting intentional states as relations while adverbialists interpret them as properties.

Eliminativism

Eliminativists deny that the example above is possible. It might seem to us and to Mary that she is thinking about something but she is not really thinking at all. Such a position could be motivated by a form of semantic externalism, the view that the meaning of a term, or in this example the content of a thought, is determined by factors external to the subject. If meaning depends on successful reference then failing to refer would result in a lack of meaning. The difficulty for such a position is to explain why it seems to Mary that she is thinking about something and how seeming to think is different from actual thinking.

Relationalism

Relationalists hold that having an intentional state involves standing in a relation to the intentional object. This is the most natural position for non-problematic cases. So if Mary perceives a tree, we might say that a perceptual relation holds between Mary, the subject of this relation, and the tree, the object of this relation. Relations are usually assumed to be existence-entailing: the instance of a relation entails the existence of its relata. This principle rules out that we can bear relations to non-existing entities. One way to solve the problem is to deny this principle and argue for a kind of intentionality exceptionalism: that intentionality is different from all other relations in the sense that this principle doesn't apply to it.

A more common relationalist solution is to look for existing objects that can play the role that the non-existing object was supposed to play. Such objects are sometimes called "proxies", "traces", or "ersatz objects". It has been suggested that abstract objects or Platonic forms can play this role. Abstract objects have actual existence but they exist outside space and time. So when Mary thinks about Superman, she is standing in a thinking relation to the abstract object or the Platonic form that corresponds to Superman. A similar solution replaces abstract objects with concrete mental objects. In this case, there exists a mental object corresponding to Superman in Mary's mind. As Mary starts to think about Superman, she enters into a relationship with this mental object. One problem for both of these theories is that they seem to mischaracterize the experience of thinking. As Mary is thinking about Superman, she is neither thinking about a Platonic form outside space-time nor about a mental object. Instead, she is thinking about a concrete physical being. A related solution sees possible objects as intentional objects. This involves a commitment to modal realism, for example in the form of the Lewisian model or as envisioned by Takashi Yagisawa.

Adverbialism

Adverbialists hold that intentional states are properties of subjects. So no independent objects are needed besides the subject, which is how adverbialists avoid the problem of non-existence. This approach has been termed "adverbialism" since the object of the intentional state is seen as a modification of this state, which can be linguistically expressed through adverbs. Instead of saying that Mary is thinking about Superman, it would be more precise, according to adverbialists, to say that Mary is thinking in a superman-ly manner or that Mary is thinking superman-ly. Adverbialism has been challenged on the grounds that it puts a strain on natural language and the metaphysical insights encoded in it. Another objection is that, by treating intentional objects as mere modifications of intentional states, adverbialism loses the power to distinguish between different complex intentional contents, the so-called many-property-problem.

Dennett's taxonomy of current theories about intentionality

Daniel Dennett offers a taxonomy of the current theories about intentionality in Chapter 10 of his book The Intentional Stance. Most, if not all, current theories on intentionality accept Brentano's thesis of the irreducibility of intentional idiom. From this thesis the following positions emerge:

  • intentional idiom is problematic for science;
  • intentional idiom is not problematic for science, which is divided into:

Roderick Chisholm (1956), G.E.M. Anscombe (1957), Peter Geach (1957), and Charles Taylor (1964) all adhere to the former position, namely that intentional idiom is problematic and cannot be integrated with the natural sciences. Members of this category also maintain realism in regard to intentional objects, which may imply some kind of dualism (though this is debatable).

The latter position, which maintains the unity of intentionality with the natural sciences, is further divided into three standpoints:

  • Eliminative materialism, supported by W.V. Quine (1960) and Churchland (1981)
  • Realism, advocated by Jerry Fodor (1975), as well as Burge, Dretske, Kripke, and the early Hilary Putnam
  • those who adhere to the Quinean double standard.

Proponents of the eliminative materialism, understand intentional idiom, such as "belief", "desire", and the like, to be replaceable either with behavioristic language (e.g. Quine) or with the language of neuroscience (e.g. Churchland).

Holders of realism argue that there is a deeper fact of the matter to both translation and belief attribution. In other words, manuals for translating one language into another cannot be set up in different yet behaviorally identical ways and ontologically there are intentional objects. Famously, Fodor has attempted to ground such realist claims about intentionality in a language of thought. Dennett comments on this issue, Fodor "attempt[s] to make these irreducible realities acceptable to the physical sciences by grounding them (somehow) in the 'syntax' of a system of physically realized mental representations" (Dennett 1987, 345).

Those who adhere to the so-called Quinean double standard (namely that ontologically there is nothing intentional, but that the language of intentionality is indispensable), accept Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation and its implications, while the other positions so far mentioned do not. As Quine puts it, indeterminacy of radical translation is the thesis that "manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another" (Quine 1960, 27). Quine (1960) and Wilfrid Sellars (1958) both comment on this intermediary position. One such implication would be that there is, in principle, no deeper fact of the matter that could settle two interpretative strategies on what belief to attribute to a physical system. In other words, the behavior (including speech dispositions) of any physical system, in theory, could be interpreted by two different predictive strategies and both would be equally warranted in their belief attribution. This category can be seen to be a medial position between the realists and the eliminativists since it attempts to blend attributes of both into a theory of intentionality. Dennett, for example, argues in True Believers (1981) that intentional idiom (or "folk psychology") is a predictive strategy and if such a strategy successfully and voluminously predicts the actions of a physical system, then that physical system can be said to have those beliefs attributed to it. Dennett calls this predictive strategy the intentional stance.

They are further divided into two theses:

  • adherence to the Normative Principle
  • adherence to the Projective Principle

Advocates of the former, the Normative Principle, argue that attributions of intentional idioms to physical systems should be the propositional attitudes that the physical system ought to have in those circumstances (Dennett 1987, 342). However, exponents of this view are still further divided into those who make an Assumption of Rationality and those who adhere to the Principle of Charity. Dennett (1969, 1971, 1975), Cherniak (1981, 1986), and the more recent work of Putnam (1983) recommend the Assumption of Rationality, which unsurprisingly assumes that the physical system in question is rational. Donald Davidson (1967, 1973, 1974, 1985) and Lewis (1974) defend the Principle of Charity.

The latter is advocated by Grandy (1973) and Stich (1980, 1981, 1983, 1984), who maintain that attributions of intentional idioms to any physical system (e.g. humans, artifacts, non-human animals, etc.) should be the propositional attitude (e.g. "belief", "desire", etc.) that one would suppose one would have in the same circumstances (Dennett 1987, 343).

Basic intentionality types according to Le Morvan

Working on the intentionality of vision, belief, and knowledge, Pierre Le Morvan (2005) has distinguished between three basic kinds of intentionality that he dubs "transparent", "translucent", and "opaque" respectively. The threefold distinction may be explained as follows. Let's call the "intendum" what an intentional state is about, and the "intender" the subject who is in the intentional state. An intentional state is transparent if it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) it is genuinely relational in that it entails the existence of not just the intender but the intendum as well, and (ii) substitutivity of identicals applies to the intendum (i.e. if the intentional state is about a, and a = b, then the intentional state is about b as well). An intentional state is translucent if it satisfies (i) but not (ii). An intentional state is opaque if it satisfies neither (i) nor (ii).

Intentionalism

Intentionalism is the thesis that all mental states are intentional, i.e. that they are about something: about their intentional object. This thesis has also been referred to as "representationalism". Intentionalism is entailed by Brentano's claim that intentionality is "the mark of the mental": if all and only mental states are intentional then it is surely the case that all mental states are intentional.

Discussions of intentionalism often focus on the intentionality of conscious states. One can distinguish in such states their phenomenal features, or what it is like for a subject to have such a state, from their intentional features, or what they are about. These two features seem to be closely related to each other, which is why intentionalists have proposed various theories in order to capture the exact form of this relatedness.

Forms of intentionalism

These theories can roughly be divided into three categories: pure intentionalism, impure intentionalism, and qualia theories. Both pure and impure intentionalism hold that there is a supervenience relation between phenomenal features and intentional features, for example, that two intentional states can't differ regarding their phenomenal features without differing at the same time in their intentional features. Qualia theories, on the other hand, assert that among the phenomenal features of a mental state there are at least some non-intentional phenomenal properties, so-called "Qualia", which are not determined by intentional features. Pure and impure intentionalism disagree with each other concerning which intentional features are responsible for determining the phenomenal features. Pure intentionalists hold that only intentional content is responsible, while impure intentionalists assert that the manner or mode how this content is presented also plays a role.

Tim Crane, himself an impure intentionalist, explains this difference by distinguishing three aspects of intentional states: the intentional object, the intentional content, and the intentional mode. For example, seeing that an apple is round and tasting that this apple is sweet both have the same intentional object: the apple. But they involve different contents: the visual perception ascribes the property of roundness to the apple while the gustatory perception ascribes the property of sweetness to the apple. Touching the apple will also result in a perceptual experience ascribing roundness to the apple, but the roundness is presented in a different manner. So the visual perception and the haptic perception agree in both intentional object and intentional content but differ in intentional mode. Pure intentionalists may not agree with this distinction. They may argue, for example, that the difference in the last case also belongs to intentional content, because two different properties are ascribed to the apple: seen-roundness and felt-roundness.

Mental states without intentionality

Critics of intentionalism, so-called anti-intentionalists, have proposed various apparent counterexamples to intentionalism: states that are considered mental but lack intentionality.

Some anti-intentionalist theories, such as that of Ned Block, are based on the argument that phenomenal conscious experience or qualia is also a vital component of consciousness, and that it is not intentional. (The latter claim is itself disputed by Michael Tye.)

Another form of anti-intentionalism associated with John Searle regards phenomenality itself as the "mark of the mental" and sidelines intentionality.

A further form argues that some unusual states of consciousness are non-intentional, although an individual might live a lifetime without experiencing them. Robert K.C. Forman argues that some of the unusual states of consciousness typical of mystical experience are pure consciousness events in which awareness exists, but has no object, is not awareness "of" anything.

Phenomenal intentionality

Phenomenal intentionality is the type of intentionality grounded in phenomenal or conscious mental states. It contrasts with non-phenomenal intentionality, which is often ascribed to e.g. language and unconscious states. The distinction is important to philosophers who hold that phenomenal intentionality has a privileged status over non-phenomenal intentionality. This position is known as the phenomenal intentionality theory. This privileged status can take two forms. In the moderate version, phenomenal intentionality is privileged because other types of intentionality depend on it or are grounded in it. They are therefore not intrinsically intentional. The stronger version goes further and denies that there are other types of intentionality. Phenomenal intentionality theory is commonly contrasted with naturalism about intentionality, the view that intentional properties are reducible to natural properties as studied by the natural sciences.

Intentionality and self-consciousness

Several authors have attempted to construct philosophical models describing how intentionality relates to the human capacity to be self-conscious. Cedric Evans contributed greatly to the discussion with his "The Subject of Self-Consciousness" in 1970. He centered his model on the idea that executive attention need not be propositional in form.

Inequality (mathematics)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inequality...