Photon rocket

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photon_rocket 

A photon rocket is a rocket that uses thrust from the momentum of emitted photons (radiation pressure by emission) for its propulsion. Photon rockets have been discussed as a propulsion system that could make interstellar flight possible during a human lifetime, which requires the ability to propel spacecraft to speeds at least 10% of the speed of light, v ≈ 0.1c = 30,000 km/s. Photon propulsion has been considered to be one of the best available interstellar propulsion concepts, because it is founded on established physics and technologies. Traditional photon rockets are proposed to be powered by onboard generators, as in the nuclear photonic rocket. The standard textbook case of such a rocket is the ideal case where all of the fuel is converted to photons which are radiated in the same direction. In more realistic treatments, one takes into account that the beam of photons is not perfectly collimated, that not all of the fuel is converted to photons, and so on. A large amount of fuel would be required and the rocket would be a huge vessel.

The limitations posed by the rocket equation can be overcome, as long as the reaction mass is not carried by the spacecraft. In beamed laser propulsion (BLP), the photon generators and the spacecraft are physically separated and the photons are beamed from the photon source to the spacecraft using lasers. However, BLP is limited because of the extremely low thrust generation efficiency of photon reflection. One of the best ways to overcome the inherent inefficiency in producing thrust of the photon thruster is by amplifying the momentum transfer of photons by recycling photons between two high reflectance mirrors, one being stationary, or on a thruster, the other being the "sail".

Speed

The speed an ideal photon rocket will reach (in the reference frame in which the rocket was at rest initially), in the absence of external forces, depends on the ratio of its initial and final mass:

${\displaystyle v=c\frac{{\left(\frac{m_{\text{i}}}{m_{\text{f}}}\right)}^2-1}{{\left(\frac{m_{\text{i}}}{m_{\text{f}}}\right)}^2+1}}$

where ${\displaystyle m_{\text{i}}}$ is the initial mass and ${\displaystyle m_{\text{f}}}$ is the final mass.

For example, assuming a spaceship is equipped with a pure helium-3 fusion reactor and has an initial mass of 2300 kg, including 1000 kg of helium-3 – meaning, 2.3 kg will be converted to energy – and assuming all this energy is emitted as photons in the direction opposing the direction of travel, and assuming the fusion products (helium-4 and hydrogen) are kept on board, the final mass will be (2300 − 2.3) kg = 2297.7 kg and the spaceship will reach a speed of 1/1000 of the speed of light. If the fusion products are released into space, the speed will be higher, but the above equation cannot be used to compute it, because it assumes that all decrease in mass is converted into energy.

The gamma factor corresponding to a photon rocket speed has the simple expression:

${\displaystyle \gamma =\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{m_{\text{i}}}{m_{\text{f}}}+\frac{m_{\text{f}}}{m_{\text{i}}}\right)}$

At 10% the speed of light, the gamma factor is about 1.005, implying ${\displaystyle \frac{m_{\text{f}}}{m_{\text{i}}}}$ is very nearly 0.9.

Derivation

We denote the four-momentum of the rocket at rest as ${\displaystyle P_{\text{i}}}$, the rocket after it has burned its fuel as ${\displaystyle P_{\text{f}}}$, and the four-momentum of the emitted photons as ${\displaystyle P_{\text{ph}}}$. Conservation of four-momentum implies:

${\displaystyle P_{\text{ph}}=P_{\text{i}}-P_{\text{f}}}$

squaring both sides (i.e. taking the Lorentz inner product of both sides with themselves) gives:

${\displaystyle P_{\text{ph}}^2=P_{\text{i}}^2+P_{\text{f}}^2-2P_{\text{i}}\cdot P_{\text{f}}.}$

According to the energy-momentum relation ${\displaystyle E^2-(pc{)}^2=(m{c}^2{)}^2}$, the square of the four-momentum equals the square of the mass, and ${\displaystyle P_{\text{ph}}^2=0}$ because photons have zero mass.

As we start in the rest frame (i.e. the zero-momentum frame) of the rocket, the initial four-momentum of the rocket is:

${\displaystyle P_{\text{i}}=\left(\begin{array}{c}\frac{m_{\text{i}}{c}^2}{c}\\ 0\\ 0\\ 0\end{array}\right),}$

while the final four-momentum is:

${\displaystyle P_{\text{f}}=\left(\begin{array}{c}\gamma m_{\text{f}}c\\ \gamma m_{\text{f}}{v}_{\text{f}}\\ 0\\ 0\end{array}\right).}$

Therefore, taking the Minkowski inner product (see four-vector), we get:

${\displaystyle 0=m_{\text{i}}^2+m_{\text{f}}^2-2m_{\text{i}}{m}_{\text{f}}\gamma .}$

We can now solve for the gamma factor, obtaining:

${\displaystyle \gamma =\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{m_{\text{i}}}{m_{\text{f}}}+\frac{m_{\text{f}}}{m_{\text{i}}}\right).}$

Maximum speed limit

Standard theory says that the theoretical speed limit of a photon rocket is below the speed of light. Haug has recently suggested a maximum speed limit for an ideal photon rocket that is just below the speed of light. However, his claims have been contested by Tommasini et al., because such velocity is formulated for the relativistic mass and is therefore frame-dependent.

Regardless of the photon generator characteristics, onboard photon rockets powered with nuclear fission and fusion have speed limits from the efficiency of these processes. Here it is assumed that the propulsion system has a single stage. Suppose the total mass of the photon rocket/spacecraft is M that includes fuels with a mass of αM with α < 1.  Assuming the fuel mass to propulsion-system energy conversion efficiency γ and the propulsion-system energy to photon energy conversion efficiency δ ≪ 1, the maximum total photon energy generated for propulsion, E_p, is given by

${\displaystyle E_{\text{p}}=\alpha \gamma \delta M{c}^2}$

If the total photon flux can be directed at 100% efficiency to generate thrust, the total photon thrust, T_p, is given by

${\displaystyle T_{\text{p}}=\frac{E_{\text{p}}}{c}=\alpha \gamma \delta Mc}$

The maximum attainable spacecraft velocity, V_max, of the photon propulsion system for V_max ≪ c, is given by

${\displaystyle V_{\text{max}}=\frac{T_{\text{p}}}{M}=\alpha \gamma \delta c}$

For example, the approximate maximum velocities achievable by onboard nuclear powered photon rockets with assumed parameters are given in Table 1. The maximum velocity limits by such nuclear powered rockets are less than 0.02% of the light velocity (60 km/s). Therefore, onboard nuclear photon rockets are unsuitable for interstellar missions.

Maximum velocity obtainable by photon rockets with onboard nuclear photon generators with exemplary parameters

Energy source	α	γ	δ	vmax/c	vmax (m/s)
Fission	0.1	10−3	0.5	5 × 10−5	15 000
Fusion	0.1	4 × 10−3	0.5	2 × 10−4	60 000

The beamed laser propulsion, such as photonic laser thruster, however, in principle can provide the maximum spacecraft velocity approaching the speed of light, c.

Universal access to education

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_access_to_education

Students and teachers in Ghana in a parade for inclusive education.

Cienfuegos, a non-profit group teaching art to people with disabilities in Cuba.

Universal access to education is the ability of all people to have equal opportunity in education, regardless of their social class, race, gender, sexuality, ethnic background or physical and mental disabilities. The term is used both in college admission for the middle and lower classes, and in assistive technology for the disabled. Some critics feel that this practice in higher education, as opposed to a strict meritocracy, causes lower academic standards. In order to facilitate the access of education to all, countries have right to education.

Universal access to education encourages a variety of pedagogical approaches to accomplish the dissemination of knowledge across the diversity of social, cultural, economic, national and biological backgrounds. Initially developed with the theme of equal opportunity access and inclusion of students with learning or physical and mental disabilities, the themes governing universal access to education have now expanded across all forms of ability and diversity. However, as the definition of diversity is within itself a broad amalgamation, teachers exercising universal access will continually face challenges and incorporate adjustments in their lesson plan to foster themes of equal opportunity of education.

As universal access continues to be incorporated into the U.S. education system, professors and instructors at the college level are required (in some instances by law) to rethink methods of facilitating universal access in their classrooms. Universal access to college education may involve the provision of a variety of different assessment methods of learning and retention. For example, in order to determine how much of the material was learned, a professor may enlist multiple methods of assessment. Methods of assessment may include a comprehensive exam, unit exams, portfolios, research papers, literature reviews, an oral exam or homework assignments. Providing a variety of ways to assess the extent of learning and retention will help identify the gaps in universal access and may also elucidate the ways to improve universal access.

As part of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Universal Education for All (EFA) children were adopted according to the United Nations in 1989. The limitation of education existed for students living with disabilities despite international declarations.

Non-discrimination and equality in education

Examples of marginalized groups

Human rights are internationally recognized as universal rights, therefore meaning it applies to everyone equally and without discrimination. However, a significant number of individuals miss out on education due to discrimination preventing access to education.

Discrimination occurs most prominently in terms of accessing education. For example, girls can face gender-based barriers such as child marriage, pregnancy, and gender-based violence which often prevent them from going to school or contribute to them dropping-out of school. People with disabilities often face literal accessibility issues, such as a lack of ramps or insufficient school transportation, making it more difficult to get to school. Migrants often face administrative barriers that prevent them from enrolling, effectively barring them from education systems.

Girls are dropped out of school to assist their families with domestic labour. Due to limited resources, sons are sent to school rather than girls.. Uniforms, tuition fees, textbooks, teacher salaries and school maintenance are part of hindrances to education. Poverty is a significant barrier accessing education. In sub-Saharan Africa, children from the richest 20% of households reach ninth grade at eleven times the rate of those from the poorest 40% of households.

However, discrimination also occurs within education systems when certain groups receiving an inferior quality of education compared with others, for instance, the quality of education in urban schools tends to be higher than that found in rural areas.

Discrimination also happens after education where different groups of people are less likely to draw the same benefits from their schooling. For example, educated boys tend to leave school with higher wage potential than equally educated girls.

Colored Memorial School of Brunswick, Georgia was built in 1922

Non-discrimination and equality provisions found in international human rights law (IHRL) exist to ensure that the principle that international human rights are universal is applied in practice. Non-discrimination and equality are not abstract concepts under international human rights law (IHRL). They are elaborated human rights that have been developed over decades to address the discrimination that people face daily. Particularly education where the rights to non-discrimination and equality have been applied to the right to education across numerous human rights treaties, including one dedicated to the issue, known as UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education.

Despite the strength of non-discrimination and equality law, eliminating discrimination and inequalities is a challenge that individual states and the international community face. This was acknowledged in 2015 when the international community vowed to ‘leave no one behind’.

International and regional human rights treaties apply the rights to non-discrimination and equality to the right to education of specific marginalised groups. Marginalized groups are those who have suffered prolonged and historical discrimination, usually, but not exclusively, on the basis of identity (gender, for example), characteristics (ethnicity, race), or circumstance (refugees, migrants, internally displaced persons). Marginalized groups are very likely to be subject to multiple, compound, or intersectional forms of discrimination.

Examples of marginalised groups include:

• girls and women
• national, ethnic, and linguistic minorities
• people with disabilities
• indigenous people

• migrants
• refugees
• asylum-seekers
• stateless persons
• internally displaced persons (IDPs)
• persons in detention / persons deprived of liberty
• people living in poverty
• people living in rural areas
• people affected by HIV
• people affected by albinism
• LGBTQI
• older people and others
• pregnant girls and adolescent mothers
• people living in countries or areas affected by armed conflict

Access to education in racial minorities

In the context of post-secondary education, there exists a lack of access to education that disproportionately affects minority students. The number of students who pursue higher education heavily relies on the number of students that graduate from high school. Since the late 1970s, the rate in which young adults between the ages of 25 and 29 years old have graduated from high school and received a diploma or the equivalent has stagnated between 85 and 88 percent. In terms of race, there is a statistical gap between minority groups’ rates of graduation and white students’ rates of graduation. In 2006, the rate of high school graduation was 93 percent, for Black students was 86 percent, and for Hispanic students was 63 percent.

Although minority college attendance has increased throughout the years, the disparity has remained. In terms of completing high school, in 2010, white (47 percent) and Asian (66 percent) students were more likely to have graduated from high school. In comparison, only 39 percent of Pacific Islanders, 37 percent of Black students, 31 percent of Hispanics, and 28 percent of Native Americans completed high school. This transfers over to the numbers of students in minority groups who have enrolled in college, even though these students have great aspirations to attend college. When examining enrollment numbers, Black (23 percent) and Hispanic (19 percent) students enrolled into and attended 2-year and 4-year universities at lower rates, compared to white (45 percent), Asian (53 percent), and multiracial (37 percent) students. However, Black and Hispanic students are more likely to enroll into 2-year universities.

Causes of disparities

The disparity in access to higher education is primarily due to a difference in college readiness these students experience. College readiness refers to how prepared for higher education students are. Although there are several ways to define it, college readiness involves measuring four aspects of student performance: basic skills, knowledge of certain content areas, grade point averages (GPA), and college knowledge, also referred to as social capital. Basic skills include being able to read, write and think analytically about situations; content areas that students should have knowledge of include English and mathematics. Both aspects are crucial to college readiness because of their real-world application, and if a student is not proficient in these two areas, they are less likely to even pursue university. However, for many minority students they do not meet the basic requirements for colleges and universities.

In terms of GPA and college knowledge, racial disparities exist. Regarding GPA, the gap in school performance between minority and white students is significant. This gap can influence minority students’ aspirations towards attending college, which affects minority enrollment rates. In terms of college knowledge, many minority students do not have access to social capital because of the lack of resources catered to them to ensure their success. There also is a lack of knowledge among minority students about what resources are available, especially because many of them are first-generation students.

Work towards better access

Although racial disparities in college readiness exist, there are several ways to counteract them. One way involves the way that students’ communities support them. Their counselors, teachers, and parents must work with them to ensure that their school records, academic records, and such are accurately conveyed to colleges and universities. Other crucial factors that would contribute to higher rates of minority enrollment include encouraging students through policies and rewards for focusing on information pertaining to college, providing schools with the necessary resources, and cultivating the classroom environment to be encouraging of students’ skills so that they are better prepared for college. Organizations like the National Association for College Admission Counseling should also be more aware of this issue as well as do more to bring more attention to these disparities. Changes also must occur on an institution level for minority students to better succeed.

Programs like the ones developed at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County work towards eliminating disparities in higher education access in minority students. Their programs mostly focus on minorities having better access and getting more involved in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. One program, the Meyerhoff Scholars Program, aids students by addressing the social capital aspect college readiness. This program connects students to financial resources as well as academic and social support, and they also receive research opportunities and connect with on-campus staff members. Other programs like the ACTiVATE program and the Partnerships for Innovation Program have stemmed from the Meyerhoff Scholars Program. These have pushed minority students towards success in accessing and completing post-secondary education, especially in STEM fields. Other programs across the country have also aided minority students in succeeding in higher education.

Access to education by law

President George W. Bush signing the No Child Left Behind Act

In 2009, both the houses of the Indian Parliament and the President of India both signed and approved a bill that would grant free, legally-mandated education for children ages six to fourteen. It was considered a major step towards universal education for all. Muchkund Dubey author of the article “The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 : The Story of Missed Opportunity" discusses and highlights the issues of access, quality of education, financial implication, and discrimination.

In the United States, Brown vs. Board of Education was a landmark decision because it found and declared that, “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal”. This began the process of desegregation in many schools that had not desegregated yet. The significance of Brown vs. Board was the universal right of all students to attend educational institutions equally rather than using racial segregation to separate students. Jonathan Kozol, author of The Shame of the Nation, talks about how “physical conditions in these newly integrated schools were generally more cheerful…state of mind among the teachers and the children [was] more high-spirited” in the aftermath of desegregation.

Universal access

Joe Biden speaking with school children

Universal Access to education is defined as having equal opportunities to take part in any educational system. However, some individuals, groups, or ethnic groups face barriers to equal access. The United States is credited with the current idea of universal access as a concern for handicapped persons. Two international agencies (World Health Organization and World Bank) estimated that around one billion people all over the world have various types of disabilities. Between 93 and 150 million of them are children. Plan International revealed that these kids are less likely to attend school, and if enrolled, they are often separated from their peers. The Global Partnership for Education said approximately 90 percent of children with disabilities from low and middle income nations are out of school. Historically, these students have been excluded from the ordinary education system and referred to special learning schools.

Despite all improvements made, education up to this day is inaccessible to millions of schoolchildren globally. Over 72 million children of primary education age are out of school, and around 759 million adults are uneducated. They do not have the resources for developing the situation of themselves, their families, and their countries. Poverty leads to lack of education. In almost all countries (developing and developed), children face barriers to education as a result of inequalities that emanate from health, gender, and cultural identity like religion, language, and ethnic origin. Factors associated with poverty include unemployment, illiteracy among parents, and ailments increase the possibility of non-schooling and dropout rates. Universal primary education is widely known as a major issue for many nations. The majority of these developing states do not possess the financial resources needed to build schools, provide books and other materials, and recruit, train, and pay teachers. The Sub-Saharan African region is the most affected region in the world as roughly 32 million African children are still uneducated. This is followed by Central and East Asia as well as the Pacific with over 27 million children uneducated. However, observers noted that universal access to education remains an attainable goal by 2030.

Paranoia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paranoia

 

Paranoia
Other names	Paranoid (adjective)
Pronunciation	/ˌpærəˈnɔɪə/
Specialty	Psychiatry, clinical psychology
Symptoms	Distrust, false accusations, anxiety, suspicion

Paranoia is an instinct or thought process that is believed to be heavily influenced by anxiety, suspicion, or fear, often to the point of delusion and irrationality. Paranoid thinking typically includes persecutory beliefs, or beliefs of conspiracy concerning a perceived threat towards oneself (e.g., "Everyone is out to get me"). Paranoia is distinct from phobias, which also involve irrational fear, but usually no blame.

Making false accusations and the general distrust of other people also frequently accompany paranoia. For example, a paranoid person might believe an incident was intentional when most people would view it as an accident or coincidence. Paranoia is a central symptom of psychosis.

Signs and symptoms

A common symptom of paranoia is attribution bias. These individuals typically have a biased perception of reality, often exhibiting more hostile beliefs than average. A paranoid person may view someone else's accidental behavior as though it is intentional or signifies a threat.

An investigation of a non-clinical paranoid population found that characteristics such as feeling powerless and depressed, isolating oneself, and relinquishing activities, were associated with more frequent paranoia. Some scientists have created different subtypes for the various symptoms of paranoia, including erotic, persecutory, litigious, and exalted.

Most commonly paranoid individuals tend to be of a single status, perhaps because paranoia results in difficulty with interpersonal relationships.

Some researchers have arranged types of paranoia by commonality. The least common types of paranoia at the very top of the hierarchy would be those involving more serious threats. Social anxiety is at the bottom of this hierarchy as the most frequently exhibited level of paranoia.

Causes

Social and environmental

Social circumstances appear to be highly influential on paranoid beliefs. According to a mental health survey distributed to residents of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua (in Mexico) and El Paso, Texas (in the United States), paranoid beliefs seem to be associated with feelings of powerlessness and victimization, enhanced by social situations. Paranoid symptoms were associated with an attitude of mistrust and an external locus of control. Citing research showing that women and those with lower socioeconomic status are more prone to locating locus of control externally, the researchers suggested that women may be especially affected by the effects of socioeconomic status on paranoia.

Surveys have revealed that paranoia can develop from difficult parental relationships and untrustworthy environments, for instance those that were highly disciplinary, strict, and unstable, could contribute to paranoia. Some sources have also noted that indulging and pampering the child could contribute to greater paranoia, via disrupting the child's understanding of their relationship with the world. Experiences found to enhance or create paranoia included frequent disappointment, stress, and a sense of hopelessness.

Discrimination has also been reported as a potential predictor of paranoid delusions. Such reports that paranoia seemed to appear more in older patients who had experienced greater discrimination throughout their lives. Immigrants are more subject to some forms of psychosis than the general population, which may be related to more frequent experiences of discrimination and humiliation.

Psychological

Many more mood-based symptoms, for example grandiosity and guilt, may underlie functional paranoia.

Colby (1981) defined paranoid cognition as "persecutory delusions and false beliefs whose propositional content clusters around ideas of being harassed, threatened, harmed, subjugated, persecuted, accused, mistreated, killed, wronged, tormented, disparaged, vilified, and so on, by malevolent others, either specific individuals or groups" (p. 518). Three components of paranoid cognition have been identified by Robins & Post: "a) suspicions without enough basis that others are exploiting, harming, or deceiving them; b) preoccupation with unjustified doubts about the loyalty, or trustworthiness, of friends or associates; c) reluctance to confide in others because of unwarranted fear that the information will be used maliciously against them" (1997, p. 3).

Paranoid cognition has been conceptualized by clinical psychology almost exclusively in terms of psychodynamic constructs and dispositional variables. From this point of view, paranoid cognition is a manifestation of an intra-psychic conflict or disturbance. For instance, Colby (1981) suggested that the biases of blaming others for one's problems serve to alleviate the distress produced by the feeling of being humiliated, and helps to repudiate the belief that the self is to blame for such incompetence. This intra-psychic perspective emphasizes that the cause of paranoid cognitions is inside the head of the people (social perceiver), and dismisses the possibility that paranoid cognition may be related to the social context in which such cognitions are embedded. This point is extremely relevant because when origins of distrust and suspicion (two components of paranoid cognition) are studied many researchers have accentuated the importance of social interaction, particularly when social interaction has gone awry. Even more, a model of trust development pointed out that trust increases or decreases as a function of the cumulative history of interaction between two or more persons.

Another relevant difference can be discerned among "pathological and non-pathological forms of trust and distrust". According to Deutsch, the main difference is that non-pathological forms are flexible and responsive to changing circumstances. Pathological forms reflect exaggerated perceptual biases and judgmental predispositions that can arise and perpetuate them, are reflexively caused errors similar to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It has been suggested that a "hierarchy" of paranoia exists, extending from mild social evaluative concerns, through ideas of social reference, to persecutory beliefs concerning mild, moderate, and severe threats.

Physical

A paranoid reaction may be caused from a decline in brain circulation as a result of high blood pressure or hardening of the arterial walls.

Drug-induced paranoia, associated with cannabis and stimulants like amphetamines or methamphetamine, has much in common with schizophrenic paranoia; the relationship has been under investigation since 2012. Drug-induced paranoia has a better prognosis than schizophrenic paranoia once the drug has been removed. For further information, see stimulant psychosis and substance-induced psychosis.

Based on data obtained by the Dutch NEMESIS project in 2005, there was an association between impaired hearing and the onset of symptoms of psychosis, which was based on a five-year follow up. Some older studies have actually declared that a state of paranoia can be produced in patients that were under a hypnotic state of deafness. This idea however generated much skepticism during its time.

Diagnosis

In the DSM-IV-TR, paranoia is diagnosed in the form of:

• Paranoid personality disorder (F60.0)
• Paranoid schizophrenia (a subtype of schizophrenia) (F20.0)
• The persecutory type of delusional disorder (F22.8)

According to clinical psychologist P. J. McKenna, "As a noun, paranoia denotes a disorder which has been argued in and out of existence, and whose clinical features, course, boundaries, and virtually every other aspect of which is controversial. Employed as an adjective, paranoid has become attached to a diverse set of presentations, from paranoid schizophrenia, through paranoid depression, to paranoid personality—not to mention a motley collection of paranoid 'psychoses', 'reactions', and 'states'—and this is to restrict discussion to functional disorders. Even when abbreviated down to the prefix para-, the term crops up causing trouble as the contentious but stubbornly persistent concept of paraphrenia".^[21]

At least 50% of the diagnosed cases of schizophrenia experience delusions of reference and delusions of persecution.^[22][23] Paranoia perceptions and behavior may be part of many mental illnesses, such as depression and dementia, but they are more prevalent in three mental disorders: paranoid schizophrenia, delusional disorder (persecutory type), and paranoid personality disorder.

Treatment

Paranoid delusions are often treated with antipsychotic medication, which exert a medium effect size. Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) lessens paranoid delusions relative to control conditions according to a meta-analysis. A meta-analysis of 43 studies reported that metacognitive training (MCT) reduces (paranoid) delusions at a medium to large effect size relative to control conditions.

History

The word paranoia comes from the Greek παράνοια (paránoia), "madness", and that from παρά (pará), "beside, by" and νόος (nóos), "mind". The term was used to describe a mental illness in which a delusional belief is the sole or most prominent feature. In this definition, the belief does not have to be persecutory to be classified as paranoid, so any number of delusional beliefs can be classified as paranoia. For example, a person who has the sole delusional belief that they are an important religious figure would be classified by Kraepelin as having "pure paranoia". The word "paranoia" is associated from the Greek word "para-noeo". Its meaning was "derangement", or "departure from the normal". However, the word was used strictly and other words were used such as "insanity" or "crazy", as these words were introduced by Aulus Cornelius Celsus. The term "paranoia" first made an appearance during plays of Greek tragedians, and was also used by philosophers such as Plato and Hippocrates. Nevertheless, the word "paranoia" was the equivalent of "delirium" or "high". Eventually, the term fell out of use for two millennia. "Paranoia" was revived in the 18th century, appearing in the works of nosologists such as François Boissier de Sauvage (1759) and Rudolph August Vogel (1772).

According to Michael Phelan, Padraig Wright, and Julian Stern (2000), paranoia and paraphrenia are debated entities that were detached from dementia praecox by Kraepelin, who explained paranoia as a continuous systematized delusion arising much later in life with no presence of either hallucinations or a deteriorating course, and paraphrenia as an identical syndrome to paranoia but with hallucinations. Even at the present time, a delusion need not be suspicious or fearful to be classified as paranoid. A person might be diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia without delusions of persecution, simply because the delusions refer mainly to the self.

Relations to violence

It has generally been agreed upon that individuals with paranoid delusions will have the tendency to take action based on their beliefs. More research is needed on the particular types of actions that are pursued based on paranoid delusions. Some researchers have made attempts to distinguish the different variations of actions brought on as a result of delusions. Wessely et al. (1993) did just this by studying individuals with delusions of which more than half had reportedly taken action or behaved as a result of these delusions. However, the overall actions were not of a violent nature in most of the informants. The authors note that other studies such as one by Taylor (1985), have shown that violent behaviors were more common in certain types of paranoid individuals, mainly those considered to be offensive such as prisoners.

Other researchers have found associations between childhood abusive behaviors and the appearance of violent behaviors in psychotic individuals. This could be a result of their inability to cope with aggression as well as other people, especially when constantly attending to potential threats in their environment. The attention to threat itself has been proposed as one of the major contributors of violent actions in paranoid people, although there has been much deliberation about this as well. Other studies have shown that there may only be certain types of delusions that promote any violent behaviors, persecutory delusions seem to be one of these.

Having resentful emotions towards others and the inability to understand what other people are feeling seem to have an association with violence in paranoid individuals. This was based on a study of people with paranoid schizophrenia (one of the common mental disorders that exhibit paranoid symptoms) theories of mind capabilities in relation to empathy. The results of this study revealed specifically that although the violent patients were more successful at the higher level theory of mind tasks, they were not as able to interpret others' emotions or claims.

Paranoid social cognition

Social psychological research has proposed a mild form of paranoid cognition, paranoid social cognition, that has its origins in social determinants more than intra-psychic conflict. This perspective states that in milder forms, paranoid cognitions may be very common among normal individuals. For instance, it is not considered strange to have self-centered thoughts of being talked about, or to be suspicious of others' intentions, or to assume ill-will or hostility (e.g., a feeling of everything going against them). According to Kramer (1998), these milder forms of paranoid cognition may be considered an adaptive response to cope with or make sense of a disturbing and threatening social environment.

Paranoid cognition captures the idea that dysphoric self-consciousness may be related to the position a person occupies in a social system. This self-consciousness conduces to a hypervigilant and ruminative mode to process social information that finally will stimulate a variety of paranoid-like forms of social misperception and misjudgment. This model identifies four components that are essential to understanding paranoid social cognition: situational antecedents, dysphoric self-consciousness, hypervigilance and rumination, and judgmental biases.

Situational antecedents

Perceived social distinctiveness, perceived evaluative scrutiny and uncertainty about the social standing.

• Perceived social distinctiveness: According to the social identity theory, people categorize themselves in terms of characteristics that made them unique or different from others under certain circumstances. Gender, ethnicity, age, or experience may become extremely relevant to explain people's behavior when these attributes make them unique in a social group. This distinctive attribute may have influence not only in how people are perceived, but may also affect the way they perceive themselves.
• Perceived evaluative scrutiny: According to this model, dysphoric self-consciousness may increase when people feel under moderate or intensive evaluative social scrutiny such as when an asymmetric relationship is analyzed. For example, when asked about relationships, doctoral students remembered events that they interpreted as significant to their degree of trust in their advisors when compared with their advisors. This suggests that students are willing to pay more attention to their advisor than their advisor is to them. Also, students spent more time ruminating about behaviors, events, and their relationship in general.
• Uncertainty about social standing: Knowledge about social standing is another factor that may induce paranoid social cognition. Many researchers have argued that experiencing uncertainty about a social position in a social system constitutes an adverse psychological state, one which people are highly motivated to reduce.

Dysphoric self-consciousness

An aversive form of heightened 'public self-consciousness' is characterized by the feelings that one is under intensive evaluation or scrutiny. Becoming self-tormenting will increase the odds of interpreting others' behaviors in a self-referential way.

Hypervigilance and rumination

Self-consciousness was characterized as an aversive psychological state. According to this model, people experiencing self-consciousness will be highly motivated to reduce it, trying to make sense of what they are experiencing. These attempts promote hypervigilance and rumination in a circular relationship: more hypervigilance generates more rumination, whereupon more rumination generates more hypervigilance. Hypervigilance can be thought of as a way to appraise threatening social information, but in contrast to adaptive vigilance, hypervigilance will produce elevated levels of arousal, fear, anxiety, and threat perception. Rumination is another possible response to threatening social information. Rumination can be related to the paranoid social cognition because it can increase negative thinking about negative events, and evoke a pessimistic explanatory style.

Judgmental and cognitive biases

Three main judgmental consequences have been identified:

• The sinister attribution error: This bias captures the tendency that social perceivers have to overattribute lack of trustworthiness to others.
• The overly personalistic construal of social interaction: Refers to the inclination that paranoid perceiver has to interpret others' action in a disproportional self-referential way, increasing the belief that they are the target of others' thoughts and actions. A special kind of bias in the biased punctuation of social interaction, which entail an overperception of causal linking among independent events.
• The exaggerated perception of conspiracy: Refers to the disposition that the paranoid perceiver has to overattribute social coherence and coordination to others' actions.

Meta-analyses have confirmed that individuals with paranoia tend to jump to conclusions and are incorrigible in their judgements, even for delusion-neutral scenarios.

Pascal's wager

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)

Pascal's wager is a philosophical argument advanced by Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), a French mathematician, philosopher, physicist, and theologian. This argument posits that individuals essentially engage in a life-defining gamble regarding the belief in the existence of God.

Pascal contends that a rational person should adopt a lifestyle consistent with the existence of God and should strive to believe in God. The reasoning for this stance involves the potential outcomes: if God does not exist, the believer incurs only finite losses, potentially sacrificing certain pleasures and luxuries; if God does exist, the believer stands to gain immeasurably, as represented for example by an eternity in Heaven in Abrahamic tradition, while simultaneously avoiding boundless losses associated with an eternity in Hell.

The first written expression of this wager is in Pascal's Pensées ("Thoughts"), a posthumous compilation of previously unpublished notes. Pascal's wager is the first formal application of decision theory, existentialism, pragmatism, and voluntarism.

Critics of the wager question the ability to provide definitive proof of God's existence. The argument from inconsistent revelations highlights the presence of various belief systems, each claiming exclusive access to divine truths. Additionally, the argument from inauthentic belief raises concerns about the genuineness of faith in God if it is motivated solely by potential benefits and losses.

The wager

The wager uses the following logic (excerpts from Pensées, part III, §233):

• "God is, or God is not. Reason cannot decide between the two alternatives"
• "A Game is being played ... where heads or tails will turn up"
• "You must wager; it is not optional"
• "Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing"
• "Wager, then, without hesitation that He is. ... There is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. And so our proposition is of infinite force when there is the finite to stake in a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain."
• "But some cannot believe. They should then 'at least learn your inability to believe...' and 'Endeavour then to convince' themselves."

Pascal asks the reader to analyze humankind's position, where our actions can be enormously consequential, but our understanding of those consequences is flawed. While we can discern a great deal through reason, we are ultimately forced to gamble. Pascal cites a number of distinct areas of uncertainty in human life:

Category	Quotation(s)
Uncertainty in all	"This is what I see, and what troubles me. I look on all sides, and everywhere I see nothing but obscurity. Nature offers me nothing that is not a matter of doubt and disquiet."
Uncertainty in man's purpose	"For after all what is man in nature? A nothing in relation to infinity, all in relation to nothing, a central point between nothing and all and infinitely far from understanding either."
Uncertainty in reason	"There is nothing so conformable to reason as this disavowal of reason."
Uncertainty in science	"There is no doubt that natural laws exist, but once this fine reason of ours was corrupted, it corrupted everything."
Uncertainty in religion	"If I saw no signs of a divinity, I would fix myself in denial. If I saw everywhere the marks of a Creator, I would repose peacefully in faith. But seeing too much to deny Him, and too little to assure me, I am in a pitiful state, and I would wish a hundred times that if a god sustains nature it would reveal Him without ambiguity." "We understand nothing of the works of God unless we take it as a principle that He wishes to blind some and to enlighten others."
Uncertainty in skepticism	"It is not certain that everything is uncertain."

Pascal describes humanity as a finite being trapped within divine incomprehensibility, briefly thrust into being from non-being, with no explanation of "Why?" or "What?" or "How?" On Pascal's view, human finitude constrains our ability to achieve truth reliably.

Given that reason alone cannot determine whether God exists, Pascal concludes that this question functions as a coin toss. However, even if we do not know the outcome of this coin toss, we must base our actions on some expectation about the consequence. We must decide whether to live as though God exists, or whether to live as though God does not exist, even though we may be mistaken in either case.

In Pascal's assessment, participation in this wager is not optional. Merely by existing in a state of uncertainty, we are forced to choose between the available courses of action for practical purposes.

Pascal's description of the wager

The Pensées passage on Pascal's wager is as follows:

If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is. ...

... "God is, or He is not." But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here. There is infinite chaos that separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can do neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither of the propositions.

Do not, then, reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you know nothing about it. "No, but I blame them for having made, not this choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The true course is not to wager at all."

Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.

"That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much." Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to change your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite.

Pascal begins by painting a situation where both the existence and non-existence of God are impossible to prove by human reason. So, supposing that reason cannot determine the truth between the two options, one must "wager" by weighing the possible consequences. Pascal's assumption is that, when it comes to making the decision, no one can refuse to participate; withholding assent is impossible because we are already "embarked", effectively living out the choice.

We only have two things to stake, our "reason" and our "happiness". Pascal considers that if there is "equal risk of loss and gain" (i.e. a coin toss), then human reason is powerless to address the question of whether God exists. That being the case, then human reason can only decide the question according to possible resulting happiness of the decision, weighing the gain and loss in believing that God exists and likewise in believing that God does not exist.

He points out that if a wager were between the equal chance of gaining two lifetimes of happiness and gaining nothing, then a person would be a fool to bet on the latter. The same would go if it were three lifetimes of happiness versus nothing. He then argues that it is simply unconscionable by comparison to bet against an eternal life of happiness for the possibility of gaining nothing. The wise decision is to wager that God exists, since "If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing", meaning one can gain eternal life if God exists, but if not, one will be no worse off in death than if one had not believed. On the other hand, if you bet against God, win or lose, you either gain nothing or lose everything. You are either unavoidably annihilated (in which case, nothing matters one way or the other) or miss the opportunity of eternal happiness. In note 194, speaking about those who live apathetically betting against God, he sums up by remarking, "It is to the glory of religion to have for enemies men so unreasonable".

Inability to believe

Pascal addressed the difficulty that reason and rationality pose to genuine belief by proposing that "acting as if [one] believed" could "cure [one] of unbelief":

But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavor then to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.

Analysis with decision theory

The possibilities defined by Pascal's wager can be thought of as a decision under uncertainty with the values of the following decision matrix.

	God exists (G)	God does not exist (¬G)
Belief (B)	+∞ (infinite gain)	−c (finite loss)
Disbelief (¬B)	−∞ (infinite loss)	+c (finite gain)

Given these values, the option of living as if God exists (B) dominates the option of living as if God does not exist (¬B), as long as one assumes a positive probability that God exists. In other words, the expected value gained by choosing B is greater than or equal to that of choosing ¬B.

In fact, according to decision theory, the only value that matters in the above matrix is the +∞ (infinitely positive). Any matrix of the following type (where f₁, f₂, and f₃ are all negative or finite positive numbers) results in (B) as being the only rational decision.

	God exists (G)	God does not exist (¬G)
Belief (B)	+∞	f1
Disbelief (¬B)	f2	f3

Misunderstanding of the wager

Pascal's intent was not to provide an argument to convince atheists to believe, but (a) to show the fallacy of attempting to use logical reasoning to prove or disprove God, and (b) to persuade atheists to sinlessness, as an aid to attaining faith ("it is this which will lessen the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks"). As Laurent Thirouin writes (note that the numbering of the items in the Pensees is not standardized; Thirouin's 418 is this article's 233):

The celebrity of fragment 418 has been established at the price of mutilation. By titling this text "the wager", readers have been fixated only on one part of Pascal's reasoning. It doesn't conclude with a QED at the end of the mathematical part. The unbeliever who had provoked this long analysis to counter his previous objection ("Maybe I bet too much") is still not ready to join the apologist on the side of faith. He put forward two new objections, undermining the foundations of the wager: the impossibility to know, and the obligation of playing.

To be put at the beginning of Pascal's planned book, the wager was meant to show that logical reasoning cannot support faith or lack thereof:

We have to accept reality and accept the reaction of the libertine when he rejects arguments he is unable to counter. The conclusion is evident: if men believe or refuse to believe, it is not how some believers sometimes say and most unbelievers claim because their own reason justifies the position they have adopted. Belief in God doesn't depend upon rational evidence, no matter which position.

Frederick Copleston writes that Pascal did not intend the wager as proof of God's existence or even a substitute for such proofs. He argues that the wager must be understood in the context of Pascal addressing the wager to those who "though they are also unconvinced by the arguments of sceptics and atheists" also "remain in a state of suspended judgment". Pascal's aim was to prepare "their minds and the production of dispositions favourable to belief".

Criticism

Criticism of Pascal's wager began soon after it was published. Non-believers questioned the "benefits" of a deity whose "realm" is beyond reason and the religiously orthodox, who primarily took issue with the wager's deistic and agnostic language. Believers criticized it for not proving God's existence, the encouragement of false belief, and the problem of which religion and which God should be worshipped.

Laplace

The probabilist mathematician Pierre Simon de Laplace ridiculed the use of probability in theology, believing that even following Pascal's reasoning, it is not worth making a bet, for the hope of profit – equal to the product of the value of the testimonies (infinitely small) and the value of the happiness they promise (which is significant but finite) – must necessarily be infinitely small.

Failure to prove the existence of God

Voltaire (another prominent French writer of the age of Enlightenment), a generation after Pascal, regarded the idea of the wager as a "proof of God" as "indecent and childish", adding, "the interest I have to believe a thing is no proof that such a thing exists". Pascal, however, did not advance the wager as a proof of God's existence but rather as a necessary pragmatic decision which is "impossible to avoid" for any living person. He argued that abstaining from making a wager is not an option and that "reason is incapable of divining the truth"; thus, a decision of whether to believe in the existence of God must be made by "considering the consequences of each possibility".

Voltaire's critique concerns not the nature of the Pascalian wager as proof of God's existence, but the contention that the very belief Pascal tried to promote is not convincing. Voltaire hints at the fact that Pascal, as a Jansenist, believed that only a small, and already predestined, portion of humanity would eventually be saved by God.

Voltaire explained that no matter how far someone is tempted with rewards to believe in Christian salvation, the result will be at best a faint belief. Pascal, in his Pensées, agrees with this, not stating that people can choose to believe (and therefore make a safe wager), but rather that some cannot believe.

As Étienne Souriau explained, in order to accept Pascal's argument, the bettor needs to be certain that God seriously intends to honour the bet; he says that the wager assumes that God also accepts the bet, which is not proved; Pascal's bettor is here like the fool who seeing a leaf floating on a river's waters and quivering at some point, for a few seconds, between the two sides of a stone, says: "I bet a million with Rothschild that it takes finally the left path." And, effectively, the leaf passed on the left side of the stone, but unfortunately for the fool Rothschild never said "I [will take that] bet".

Argument from inconsistent revelations

Main article: Argument from inconsistent revelations

Since there have been many religions throughout history, and therefore many conceptions of God (or gods), some assert that all of them need to be factored into the wager, in an argumentation known as the argument from inconsistent revelations. This, its proponents argue, would lead to a high probability of believing in "the wrong god" and would eliminate the mathematical advantage Pascal claimed with his wager. Denis Diderot, a contemporary of Voltaire, expressed this opinion when asked about the wager, saying "an Imam could reason the same way". J. L. Mackie writes that "the church within which alone salvation is to be found is not necessarily the Church of Rome, but perhaps that of the Anabaptists or the Mormons or the Muslim Sunnis or the worshipers of Kali or of Odin."

Pascal considers this type of objection briefly in the notes compiled into the Pensées, and dismisses it:

What say [the unbelievers] then? "Do we not see," say they, "that the brutes live and die like men, and Turks like Christians? They have their ceremonies, their prophets, their doctors, their saints, their monks, like us," etc. If you care but little to know the truth, that is enough to leave you in repose. But if you desire with all your heart to know it, it is not enough; look at it in detail. That would be sufficient for a question in philosophy; but not here, where everything is at stake. And yet, after a superficial reflection of this kind, we go to amuse ourselves, etc. Let us inquire of this same religion whether it does not give a reason for this obscurity; perhaps it will teach it to us.

Pascal says that the skepticism of unbelievers who rest content with the many-religions objection has seduced them into a fatal "repose". If they were really bent on knowing the truth, they would be persuaded to examine "in detail" whether Christianity is like any other religion, but they just cannot be bothered. Their objection might be sufficient were the subject concerned merely some "question in philosophy", but not "here, where everything is at stake". In "a matter where they themselves, their eternity, their all are concerned", they can manage no better than "a superficial reflection" ("une reflexion légère") and, thinking they have scored a point by asking a leading question, they go off to amuse themselves.

As Pascal scholars observe, Pascal regarded the many-religions objection as a rhetorical ploy, a "trap" that he had no intention of falling into.

David Wetsel notes that Pascal's treatment of the pagan religions is brisk: "As far as Pascal is concerned, the demise of the pagan religions of antiquity speaks for itself. Those pagan religions which still exist in the New World, in India, and in Africa are not even worth a second glance. They are obviously the work of superstition and ignorance and have nothing in them which might interest "les gens habiles" ('clever men'). Islam warrants more attention, being distinguished from paganism (which for Pascal presumably includes all the other non-Christian religions) by its claim to be a revealed religion. Nevertheless, Pascal concludes that the religion founded by Mohammed can on several counts be shown to be devoid of divine authority, and that therefore, as a path to the knowledge of God, it is as much a dead end as paganism." Judaism, in view of its close links to Christianity, he deals with elsewhere.

The many-religions objection is taken more seriously by some later apologists of the wager, who argue that of the rival options only those awarding infinite happiness affect the wager's dominance. In the opinion of these apologists "finite, semi-blissful promises such as Kali's or Odin's" therefore drop out of consideration. Also, the infinite bliss that the rival conception of God offers has to be mutually exclusive. If Christ's promise of bliss can be attained concurrently with Jehovah's and Allah's (all three being identified as the God of Abraham), there is no conflict in the decision matrix in the case where the cost of believing in the wrong conception of God is neutral (limbo/purgatory/spiritual death), although this would be countered with an infinite cost in the case where not believing in the correct conception of God results in punishment (hell).

Ecumenical interpretations of the wager argue that it could even be suggested that believing in a generic God, or a god by the wrong name, is acceptable so long as that conception of God has similar essential characteristics of the conception of God considered in Pascal's wager (perhaps the God of Aristotle). Proponents of this line of reasoning suggest that either all of the conceptions of God or gods throughout history truly boil down to just a small set of "genuine options", or that if Pascal's wager can simply bring a person to believe in "generic theism", it has done its job.

Pascal argues implicitly for the uniqueness of Christianity in the wager itself, writing: "If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible ... Who then can blame the Christians for not being able to give reasons for their beliefs, professing as they do a religion which they cannot explain by reason?"

Argument from inauthentic belief

Some critics argue that Pascal's wager, for those who cannot believe, suggests feigning belief to gain eternal reward. Richard Dawkins argues that this would be dishonest and immoral and that, in addition to this, it is absurd to think that God, being just and omniscient, would not see through this deceptive strategy on the part of the "believer", thus nullifying the benefits of the wager. William James in his 'Will to Believe' states that "We feel that a faith in masses and holy water adopted wilfully after such a mechanical calculation would lack the inner soul of faith's reality; and if we were ourselves in the place of the Deity, we should probably take particular pleasure in cutting off believers of this pattern from their infinite reward. It is evident that unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy water, the option offered to the will by Pascal is not a living option".

Since these criticisms are concerned not with the validity of the wager itself, but with its possible aftermath—namely that a person who has been convinced of the overwhelming odds in favor of belief might still find themself unable to sincerely believe—they are tangential to the thrust of the wager. What such critics are objecting to is Pascal's subsequent advice to an unbeliever who, having concluded that the only rational way to wager is in favor of God's existence, points out, reasonably enough, that this by no means makes them a believer. This hypothetical unbeliever complains, "I am so made that I cannot believe. What would you have me do?" Pascal, far from suggesting that God can be deceived by outward show, says that God does not regard it at all: "God looks only at what is inward." For a person who is already convinced of the odds of the wager but cannot seem to put their heart into the belief, he offers practical advice.

Explicitly addressing the question of inability to believe, Pascal argues that if the wager is valid, the inability to believe is irrational, and therefore must be caused by feelings: "your inability to believe, because reason compels you to [believe] and yet you cannot, [comes] from your passions." This inability, therefore, can be overcome by diminishing these irrational sentiments: "Learn from those who were bound like you. ... Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.—'But this is what I am afraid of.'—And why? What have you to lose?"

An uncontroversial doctrine in both Roman Catholic and Protestant theology is that mere belief in God is insufficient to attain salvation, the standard cite being James 2:19 (the following is from the KJV): "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble." Salvation requires "faith" not just in the sense of belief, but of trust and obedience. Pascal and his sister, a nun, were among the leaders of Roman Catholicism's Jansenist school of thought whose doctrine of salvation was close to Protestantism in emphasizing faith over works. Both Jansenists and Protestants followed St. Augustine in this emphasis (Martin Luther belonged to the Augustinian Order of monks). Augustine wrote

So our faith has to be distinguished from the faith of the demons. Our faith, you see, purifies the heart, their faith makes them guilty. They act wickedly, and so they say to the Lord, "What have you to do with us?" When you hear the demons saying this, do you imagine they don't recognize him? "We know who you are," they say. "You are the Son of God" (Lk 4:34). Peter says this and he is praised for it; the demon says it, and is condemned. Why's that, if not because the words may be the same, but the heart is very different? So let us distinguish our faith, and see that believing is not enough. That's not the sort of faith that purifies the heart.

Since Pascal's position was that "saving" belief in God required more than logical assent, accepting the wager could only be a first step. Hence his advice on what steps one could take to arrive at belief.

Some other critics have objected to Pascal's wager on the grounds that he wrongly assumes what type of epistemic character God would likely value in his rational creatures if he existed.

Earlier versions and other wager arguments

• The sophist Protagoras had an agnostic position regarding the gods, but he nevertheless continued to worship the gods. This could be considered as an early version of the Wager.
• In the famous tragedy of Euripides Bacchae, Kadmos states an early version of Pascal's wager. It is noteworthy that at the end of the tragedy Dionysos, the god to whom Kadmos referred, appears and punishes him for thinking in this way. Euripides, quite clearly, considered and dismissed the wager in this tragedy.
• The stoic philosopher and Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius expressed a similar sentiment in the second book of Meditations, saying "Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of Providence?"
• The early Buddhist texts contain passages which defend a Buddhist wager argument for believing in an afterlife.
• In the Sanskrit classic Sārasamuccaya, Vararuci makes a similar argument to Pascal's wager.
• Muslim Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq is recorded to have postulated variations of the wager on several occasions in different forms, including his famed 'Tradition of the Myrobalan Fruit.' In the Shi'i hadith book al-Kafi, al-Sadiq declares to an atheist "If what you say is correct – and it is not – then we will both succeed. But if what I say is correct – and it is – then I will succeed, and you will be destroyed."
• An instantiation of this argument, within the Islamic kalam tradition, was discussed by Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085) in his Kitab al-irshad ila-qawati al-adilla fi usul al-i'tiqad, or A Guide to the Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief.
• The Christian apologist Arnobius of Sicca (d. 330) stated an early version of the argument in his book Against the Pagans, arguing "is it not more rational, of two things uncertain and hanging in doubtful suspense, rather to believe that which carries with it some hopes, than that which brings none at all?"
• A close parallel just before Pascal's time occurred in the Jesuit Antoine Sirmond's On the Immortality of the Soul (1635), which explicitly compared the choice of religion to playing dice and argued "However long and happy the space of this life may be, while ever you place it in the other pan of the balance against a blessed and flourishing eternity, surely it will seem to you ... that the pan will rise on high."
• The Atheist's Wager, popularised by the philosopher Michael Martin and published in his 1990 book Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, is an atheistic wager argument in response to Pascal's wager.
• A 2008 philosophy book, How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time, presents a secular revision of Pascal's wager: "What does it hurt to pursue value and virtue? If there is value, then we have everything to gain, but if there is none, then we haven’t lost anything.... Thus, we should seek value."
• Pascal's mugging, a dialogue written by philosopher Nick Bostrom, shows that a rational victim can be made to give up his wallet in exchange for a weakly credible promise of astronomical repayment. As in Pascal's Wager, a small but certain downside is outweighed by a large but unlikely upside.
• Roko's basilisk is a hypothetical future superintelligence that punishes everyone who failed to help bring it into existence.
• In a 2014 article, philosopher Justin McBrayer argued we ought to remain agnostic about the existence of God but nonetheless believe because of the good that comes in the present life from believing in God. "The gist of the renewed wager is that theists do better than non-theists regardless of whether or not God exists."

Climate change

Since at least 1992, some scholars have analogized Pascal's wager to decisions about climate change. Two differences from Pascal's wager are posited regarding climate change: first, climate change is more likely than Pascal's God to exist, as there is scientific evidence for one but not the other. Secondly, the calculated penalty for unchecked climate change would be large, but is not generally considered to be infinite. Magnate Warren Buffett has written that climate change "bears a similarity to Pascal's Wager on the Existence of God. Pascal, it may be recalled, argued that if there were only a tiny probability that God truly existed, it made sense to behave as if He did because the rewards could be infinite whereas the lack of belief risked eternal misery. Likewise, if there is only a 1% chance the planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is foolhardy."