Two
 hundred years ago this month, Karl Marx was born in Trier, Germany, a 
small town in the western part of the country. To celebrate his 
bicentennial, the People’s Republic of China donated a larger-than-life 
statue of the founder of Communism to the city of his birth, which the 
Trier City Council voted to accept. It goes without saying that this 
memorialization was controversial, not only because of the devastation 
caused throughout the world during the twentieth century in the name of 
Marxism, but also because of the still living memory of Communist rule 
in East Germany. Henceforth when one thinks of Trier, one should 
remember Tiananmen Square.
As if the China connection were not sufficiently provocative, the 
Marx commemoration in Trier included a panegyric delivered in the town’s
 cathedral by none other than Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the 
European Commission and effective head of the European Union. Juncker is
 hardly known as a deep philosophical thinker and his efforts to present
 Marx as a “philosopher who thought into the future” were the insipid 
ramblings of a career Eurocrat. But his very presence at the event 
became a scandal because he casually dismissed the letters of protest he
 admitted having received from concerned members of the public in 
central and eastern Europe—the territories which had suffered most under
 Communist rule and where the memory of that dictatorship is still very 
much alive.
In Juncker’s telling, Marx was a mild social democrat. But Juncker 
failed to explore the implications of what was done in Marx’s name. What
 was it in Marx’s writings that lent itself to the interpretations—or 
misinterpretations, according to Juncker—of his Stalinist followers?  
There is of course a legitimate tension between judging a work—Marx’s 
work—on its own merits and judging it based on its impact. But Juncker 
cannot praise Marx for “thinking into the future” while simultaneously 
trying to insulate Marx from his own legacy.
As we approach the thirty-year anniversary of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, it is astonishing that Marx continues to be a popular 
figure, and not just among people like Juncker. Of course, there are the
 dogmatists in the few remaining Communist countries  such as China 
and Cuba,  who continue to cling onto his sclerotic ideas. But there are 
also, closer to home, intellectuals and academics who purvey versions of
 Marxism in the humanities departments of many college campuses. 
Meanwhile outside of the universities, popularized versions of Marx’s 
ideas circulate among left-wing populists, like those of the “Occupy 
Wall Street” movement. 
All the more reason to review what was rotten about Marx’s 
ideas—ideas that gave rise to brutal dictatorships and the killing 
machines of the gulags.  
If you read nearly any passage in Marx’s oeuvre, it’s hard not to be 
struck by his sense of absolute certainty. He pronounces statements in 
an apodictic manner, laying claim to an unquestionable sense of truth, 
with no opportunity to doubt. He is therefore always on the attack as he
 decimates opponents with unyielding polemic—and he was a master of 
polemical style, to be sure. Meanwhile there is no self-reflection, no 
interrogation of his own views, and no sense that he might possibly be 
wrong.  
Marx channels a voice of infallibility, making sweeping claims with 
no margin of error and no exploration of evidence: “All history is the 
history of class struggle ” begins the Communist Manifesto, which he co-authored with Friedrich Engels. All
 history? Was there really nothing else than conflicts between different
 economic groups? For Marx, apparently, there was never any other 
dimension of human experience worthy of independent consideration: no 
history of technology, of ideas, of culture, or faith. He comes to this 
one-dimensional schema by deflating the philosophy of history he had 
found in his teacher, the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. In place of 
Hegelian complexity, he offered simplistic claims to predict the future 
in the form of “developmental laws of capitalism.”
Perhaps the kindest judgment on Marx is that he was just one more 
economist who thought he could predict the future. His delusion about 
his own predictive capacities is what made Marx so distasteful to a 
thinker like Friedrich von Hayek, who recognized that humans can get 
things wrong, so best not to endow any single human with too much power,
 and certainly not the government. Not so Marx, who claimed direct 
access to incontrovertible insights into the logic of history. For that 
reason he could conclude his Manifesto with a series of 
crushing verdicts on competing radical movements, denounced and 
condemned, without a shadow of doubt. These concluding diatribes against
 other socialist currents that dared to differ from Marx’s Communism are
 perhaps the most symptomatic elements of his work, setting up a pattern
 of defaming one’s opponents, especially those closest to him. Marx’s 
Bolshevik heirs would transform  that confidence in condemnation into 
rationale to send political competitors to their deaths. On the long 
list of victims of Marxism, companions on the left figured prominently.
While we might associate Marx with politics, in fact he lacked any 
real appreciation for a political sphere in which one would interact 
productively with advocates of varying programs.  While for others, 
politics represents a realm of compromise and negotiation, for Marx, it 
was really the pursuit of power and the obligation to command. He 
described the state simply as “the executive committee of the 
bourgeoisie,” meaning that politics was secondary to the economy. 
Moreover he promised to abolish the state, and therefore politics, once 
Communism would eliminate class difference—or so the story went, as the 
ultimate outcome of Communism would be a libertarian utopia of 
statelessness. 
Nothing, however, would be further from the truth. In practice, what Communism provided for was the development of a nomenklatura,
 a new class elite which talked the egalitarian talk while claiming for 
itself the privilege of dictators. The Communist cadre always knew 
better than the unenlightened populace, and therefore the cadre would 
claim the power to impose their views and programs on the rest of 
society. The real political legacy of Marxism was not the abolition of 
the state but, on the contrary, the expansion of the state over society,
 and the elevation of a Marxist elite over the populace. No wonder the 
East Germans calling for the end of their Communist government in 
November 1989 chanted, “We are the people,” a people which the 
Communists, when all is said and done, simply deplored. Marxism was not 
about achieving an egalitarian society: it was the vehicle through which
 party activists and thugs could pursue their own will to power. (For 
this reason, the young radical Max Eastman described the Communist 
revolutionaries in Russia as “Nietzschean.”)
The Marxist pursuit of power also meant denouncing all religion, 
which Marx described as an opiate, a drug intended to lull its consumers
 into passivity and false consciousness, so as to keep them from the 
truth (his truth). Because Marxism emphasized labor and the primacy of 
human experience, it could appeal to various twentieth-century 
philosophers, existentialists among others, who emphasized the problem 
of alienation. Yet Marxism, which treated all thought in a reductionist 
manner as an expression of economy, could never shake its own 
anti-intellectual legacy, famously expressed in Marx’s Eleventh Thesis 
on Feuerbach: “Philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point 
however is to change it.” 
Discussion of the meaning of life—interpreting the world—turn out to 
be of negligible import for Marxists, easily dismissed as only 
“epiphenomenal.” Marx’s alternative to reflective thought was changing 
the world, but without any room for the sort of ethical guidance that 
philosophical thinking might offer: change at all costs, change with no 
limits. The result was a modernizing fantasy of thorough-going 
transformation with scant attention to the human costs. As Hannah Arendt
 showed a century later in her Origins of Totalitarianism, this
 would lead to systematic violence in “experiments” to fashion a “new 
man,” no matter how much suffering would ensue. Ultimately, Marx had 
offered a false alternative: philosophical thinking or changing
 the world. In fact, what defines the human condition is the ability to 
engage in both, deep thinking and intentional action, and indeed we 
should prefer action to be guided by thinking, just as thinking should 
be informed by the experience of prior action.
The claim of infallibility, the will to political power, and the 
dismissal of ethical thought: such was the legacy that Karl Marx 
bequeathed to the Communist movement that once ruled half the world. 
President Juncker, in his celebration of Marx, recalled none of this, 
revealing himself to be just one more of Marx’s defenders who still 
insist on the fantasy of a good Marx motivated by sympathy for the 
poverty of the workers during the industrial revolution.
But Marx was hardly the only thinker to write about nineteenth 
century social conditions, and he was surely not the most interesting. A
 page of Dickens is worth a volume of Das Kapital.  Wherever 
Marxism dominated working class movements—by suppressing competing 
reform movements or manipulating unions—blue collar workers fared worse.
 Had Marx not been appropriated as the ideological figurehead of the 
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 in order to justify the dictatorship in 
Russia, he would be barely remembered today. (A Google N-gram search 
shows that “Marxism” only takes off as a term after Lenin came to 
power.) Instead, he has become the symbol of decades of terror.
For those who want to talk about Marx, to erect statues in his memory
 or to defend him as a philosopher, it is high time to discover some 
intellectual integrity and face up to the crimes committed in his name. 
It is wrong to say, as one commonly hears in some circles, that his 
program of Communism was a good idea, but poorly implemented. On the 
contrary, it was a bad idea from the start and the brutality that always
 accompanied it was a consequence of its core character.