The USS Growler,
one of two submarines designed to provide a nuclear deterrence using
cruise missiles with a 500 miles (800 km) range—placed on patrol
carrying the Regulus I missile (shown at Pier 86 in New York, its home as a museum ship).
Deterrence theory is the idea that an inferior force, by
virtue of the destructive power of the force's weapons, could deter a
more powerful adversary, provided that this force could be protected
against destruction by a surprise attack. This doctrine gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons and is related to, but distinct from, the concept of Mutual assured destruction, which models the preventative nature of full-scale nuclear attack that would devastate both parties in a nuclear war. Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started by means of threat of reprisal, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires. The strategy is based on the psychological concept of the same name. A credible nuclear deterrent, Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959, must be always at the ready, yet never used.
In Thomas Schelling's
(1966) classic work on deterrence, the concept that military strategy
can no longer be defined as the science of military victory is
presented. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now equally,
if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence.[3]
Schelling says the capacity to harm another state is now used as a
motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another
state's behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must
be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be
summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the
foundation of deterrence theory, and is most successful when it is held
in reserve.
In 2004 Frank C. Zagare
made the case that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, not
empirically accurate, and that it is deficient as a theory. In place of
classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for perfect deterrence,
which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics
and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation.
In a January 2007 article in the Wall Street Journal, veteran cold-war policy makers Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, George Shultz, and Sam Nunn
reversed their previous position and asserted that far from making the
world safer, nuclear weapons had become a source of extreme risk.
Their rationale and conclusion was not based on the old world with only
a few nuclear players, but on the instability in many states possessing
the technologies and the lack of wherewithal to properly maintain and
upgrade existing weapons in many states:
The risk of accidents, misjudgments or unauthorised launches, they argued, was growing more acute in a world of rivalries between relatively new nuclear states that lacked the security safeguards developed over many years by America and the Soviet Union. The emergence of pariah states, such as North Korea (possibly soon to be joined by Iran), armed with nuclear weapons was adding to the fear as was the declared ambition of terrorists to steal, buy or build a nuclear device.
— The Economist, June 16, 2011
According to The Economist, "Senior European statesmen and women" called for further action in 2010 in addressing problems of nuclear weapons proliferation.
They said: "Nuclear deterrence is a far less persuasive strategic
response to a world of potential regional nuclear arms races and nuclear
terrorism than it was to the cold war".
Concept
The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of international security research for at least 200 years.
Research has predominantly focused on the theory of rational deterrence
to analyze the conditions under which conventional deterrence is likely
to succeed or fail. Alternative theories however have challenged the
rational deterrence theory and have focused on organizational theory and
cognitive psychology.
The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats by
one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some
course of action.
A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its
target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and
losses that target would incur. In international security, a policy of
deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed
by the leaders of one state to the leaders of another in an attempt to
prevent the other state from resorting to the threat of use of military
force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.
As outlined by Huth,
a policy of deterrence can fit into two broad categories being (i)
preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as
direct deterrence); or (ii) preventing an armed attack against another
state (known as extended deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence
often occur when there is a territorial dispute
between neighboring states in which major powers like the United States
do not directly intervene. On the other hand, situations of extended
deterrence often occur when a great power
becomes involved. It is the latter that has generated the majority of
interest in academic literature. Building on these two broad categories,
Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be implemented in
response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate deterrence)
or as strategy to prevent a military conflict or short term threat from
arising (known as general deterrence).
A successful deterrence policy must be considered in not only
military terms, but also in political terms; specifically International
Relations (IR), foreign policy and diplomacy. In military terms,
deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing
military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and
military cooperation into a crisis or militarized confrontation which
threatens armed conflict and possibly war. The prevention of crises of
wars however is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending
states must be able to resist the political and military demands of a
potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of
diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential
attacking nation under the threat of war, then it cannot be claimed that
deterrence has succeeded.
Furthermore, as Jentleson et al.
argue, two key sets of factors for successful deterrence are important
being (i) a defending state strategy that firstly balances credible
coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of
proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility, and secondly
minimizes international and domestic constraints; and (ii) the extent of
an attacking state's vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political
and economic conditions. In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a
strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of
non-compliance it can impose on, and the benefits of compliance it can
offer to, another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance
and the costs of compliance.
Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to
deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through
the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction (MAD). Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces; for example, the doctrine of massive retaliation threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks.
A successful nuclear deterrent requires that a country preserve
its ability to retaliate, either by responding before its own weapons
are destroyed or by ensuring a second strike capability. A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a nuclear triad, as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the United States, Russia, the People's Republic of China and India. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have only sea- and air-based nuclear weapons.
Proportionality
Jentleson et al. provide further detail in relation to these factors.
Firstly, proportionality refers to the relationship between the
defending state's scope and nature of the objectives being pursued, and
the instruments available for use to pursue this. The more the defending
state demands of another state, the higher that state's costs of
compliance and the greater need for the defending state's strategy to
increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance. This
is a challenge, as deterrence is, by definition, a strategy of limited
means. George (1991) goes on to explain that deterrence may, but is not
required to, go beyond threats to the actual use of military force; but
if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall short of
full-scale use or war otherwise it fails. The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to regime change.
This has been seen in the cases of Libya, Iraq, and North Korea where
defending states have sought to change the leadership of a state in
addition to policy changes relating primarily to their nuclear weapons
programs.
Reciprocity
Secondly, Jentleson et al.
outline that reciprocity involves an explicit understanding of linkage
between the defending state's carrots and the attacking state's
concessions. The balance lies neither in offering too little too late or
for too much in return, not offering too much too soon or for too
little return.
Coercive credibility
Finally,
coercive credibility requires that, in addition to calculations about
costs and benefits of cooperation, the defending state convincingly
conveys to the attacking state that non-cooperation has consequences.
Threats, uses of force, and other coercive instruments such as economic sanctions
must be sufficiently credible to raise the attacking state's perceived
costs of noncompliance. A defending state having a superior military
capability or economic strength in itself is not enough to ensure
credibility. Indeed, all three elements of a balanced deterrence
strategy are more likely to be achieved if other major international
actors like the United Nations or NATO are supportive and if opposition within the defending state's domestic politics is limited.
The other important consideration outlined by Jentleson et al.
that must be taken into consideration is the domestic political and
economic conditions within the attacking state affecting its
vulnerability to deterrence policies, and the attacking state's ability
to compensate unfavourable power balances. The first factor is whether
internal political support and regime security are better served by
defiance, or if there are domestic political gains to be made from
improving relations with the defending state. The second factor is an
economic calculation of the costs that military force, sanctions, and
other coercive instruments can impose, and the benefits that trade and
other economic incentives may carry. This in part is a function of the
strength and flexibility of the attacking state's domestic economy and
its capacity to absorb or counter the costs being imposed. The third
factor is the role of elites and other key domestic political figures
within the attacking state. To the extent these actors' interests are
threatened with the defending state's demands, they act to prevent or
block the defending state's demands.
Rational deterrence theory
The
predominant approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the
use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making (see
game theory).
Deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success
is more likely if a defending state's deterrent threat is credible to an
attacking state. Huth
outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state
possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on
an attacking state in an armed conflict, and if the attacking state
believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available
military forces. Huth
goes on to explain the four key factors for consideration under
rational deterrence theory being (i) the military balance; (ii)
signaling and bargaining power; (iii) reputations for resolve; and (iv)
interests at stake.
The military balance
Deterrence
is often directed against state leaders who have specific territorial
goals that they seek to attain either by seizing disputed territory in a
limited military attack or by occupying disputed territory after the
decisive defeat of the adversary's armed forces. In either case, the
strategic orientation of potential attacking states is generally short
term and driven by concerns about military cost and effectiveness. For
successful deterrence, defending states need the military capacity to
respond quickly and in strength to a range of contingencies. Where
deterrence often fails is when either a defending state or an attacking
state under or overestimate the others' ability to undertake a
particular course of action.
Signaling and bargaining power
The
central problem for a state that seeks to communicate a credible
deterrent threat through diplomatic or military actions is that all
defending states have an incentive to act as if they are determined to
resist an attack, in the hope that the attacking state will back away
from military conflict with a seemingly resolved adversary. If all
defending states have such incentives, then potential attacking states
may discount statements made by defending states along with any movement
of military forces as merely bluffs. In this regards, rational
deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to
communicate the credibility of a defending state's resolve. Costly
signals are those actions and statements that clearly increase the risk
of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a
deterrent threat. States that are bluffing are unwilling to cross a
certain threshold of threat and military action for fear of committing
themselves to an armed conflict.
Reputations for resolve
There
are three different arguments that have been developed in relation to
the role of reputations in influencing deterrence outcomes. The first
argument focuses on a defending state's past behaviour in international
disputes and crises, which creates strong beliefs in a potential
attacking state about the defending state's expected behaviour in future
conflicts. The credibilities of a defending state's policies are
arguably linked over time, and reputations for resolve have a powerful
causal impact on an attacking state's decision whether to challenge
either general or immediate deterrence. The second approach argues that
reputations have a limited impact on deterrence outcomes because the
credibility of deterrence is heavily determined by the specific
configuration of military capabilities, interests at stake, and
political constraints faced by a defending state in a given situation of
attempted deterrence. The argument of this school of thought is that
potential attacking states are not likely to draw strong inferences
about a defending states resolve from prior conflicts because potential
attacking states do not believe that a defending state's past behaviour
is a reliable predictor of future behaviour. The third approach is a
middle ground between the first two approaches. It argues that potential
attacking states are likely to draw reputational inferences about
resolve from the past behaviour of defending states only under certain
conditions. The insight is the expectation that decision makers will use
only certain types of information when drawing inferences about
reputations, and an attacking state updates and revises its beliefs when
the unanticipated behaviour of a defending state cannot be explained by
case-specific variables.
An example both shows that the problem extends to the perception of the
third parties as well as main adversaries and underlies the way in which
attempts at deterrence can not only fail but backfire if the
assumptions about the others' perceptions are incorrect.
Interests at stake
Although
costly signaling and bargaining power are more well established
arguments in rational deterrence theory, the interests of defending
states are not as well known, and attacking states may look beyond the
short term bargaining tactics of a defending state and seek to determine
what interests are at stake for the defending state that would justify
the risks of a military conflict. The argument here is that defending
states that have greater interests at stake in a dispute are more
resolved to use force and be more willing to endure military losses to
secure those interests. Even less well established arguments are the
specific interests that are more salient to state leaders such as
military interests versus economic interests.
Furthermore, Huth
argues that both supporters and critics of rational deterrence theory
agree that an unfavourable assessment of the domestic and international
status quo by state leaders can undermine or severely test the success
of deterrence. In a rational choice approach, if the expected utility of
not using force is reduced by a declining status quo position, then
deterrence failure is more likely, since the alternative option of using
force becomes relatively more attractive.
Nuclear weapons and deterrence
In 1966 Schelling
is prescriptive in outlining the impact of the development of nuclear
weapons in the analysis of military power and deterrence. In his 1966
analysis, before the widespread use of assured second strike capability,
or immediate reprisal, in the form of SSBN submarines, Schelling argues that nuclear weapons
give nations the potential to not only destroy their enemies but
humanity itself without drawing immediate reprisal because of the lack
of a conceivable defense system and the speed with which nuclear weapons
can be deployed. A nation's credible threat of such severe damage
empowers their deterrence policies and fuels political coercion and
military deadlock, which in turn can produce proxy warfare.
Historical analysis of nuclear weapons deterrent capabilities has led modern researchers to the concept of the stability-instability paradox,
whereby nuclear weapons confer large scale stability between nuclear
weapon states, as in over 60 years none have engaged in large direct
warfare due primarily to nuclear weapons deterrence capabilities, but
instead are forced into pursuing political aims by military means in the
form of comparatively smaller scale acts of instability, such as proxy wars and minor conflicts.
Stages of the US policy of deterrence
The US policy of deterrence during the Cold War underwent significant variations.
Containment
The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by containment of communism, an aggressive stance on behalf of the US especially on developing nations under its sphere of influence. This period was characterized by numerous proxy wars throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. A notable such conflict was the Korean War. George F. Kennan, who is taken to be the founder of this ideology in his Long Telegram,
asserted that he never advocated military intervention, merely economic
support; and that his ideas were misinterpreted when espoused by the
general public.
Détente
With the U.S. drawdown from Vietnam, the normalization of U.S. relations with China, and the Sino-Soviet Split, the policy of Containment was abandoned and a new policy of détente
was established, whereby peaceful coexistence was sought between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Although all factors listed above
contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the
rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear
capability of Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general
reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States
and a thawing of the Cold War, lasting from the late 1960s until the
start of the 1980s. The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence
characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
during this period, and relations with Russia until the onset of the New Cold War in the early 2010s. Since then, the relations have been less clear.
Reagan era
A third shift occurred with President Ronald Reagan's
arms build-up during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify this policy
in part due to concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America
and the new republic of Iran, established after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Similar to the old policy of containment, the United States funded several proxy wars, including support for Saddam Hussein of Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan,
who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several
anti-communist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The funding of the Contras in Nicaragua led to the Iran-Contra Affair, while overt support led to a ruling from the International Court of Justice against the United States in Nicaragua v. United States.
While the army was dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union
and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United
States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader
multinational dimension. The U.S. policy on post–Cold War deterrence was
outlined in 1995 in a document called "Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence".
This document explains that while relations with Russia continue to
follow the traditional characteristics of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence, due
to both nations continuing MAD, U.S. policy of deterrence towards
nations with minor nuclear capabilities should ensure through threats of
immense retaliation (or even preemptive action)
that they do not threaten the United States, its interests, or allies.
The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that
nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear
weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining chemical or biological weapons.
The current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear
programs are due in part to the continuation of this policy of
deterrence.
Modern Deterrence
Modern Deterrence is the application of deterrence theory to non-nuclear and post-nuclear challenges, including hybrid warfare.
As with nuclear deterrence, the aim of modern deterrence is to
"dissuade an adversary from taking aggressive action by persuading that
actor that the costs would outweigh the potential gains." However, the unattributable nature of some new forms of attacks, including propaganda and cyber attacks, and the fact that they may be below the threshold of an armed response pose a particular challenge for deterrence. CSIS have concluded that modern deterrence is made most effective at reducing the threat of non-nuclear attacks by:
- Establishing norms of behavior;
- Tailoring deterrence threats to individual actors;
- Adopting an all of government and society response; and
- Building credibility with adversaries, for example by always following through on threats.
Criticism
Deterrence theory is criticized for its assumptions about opponent rationales.
First, it is argued that suicidal or psychotic opponents may not be deterred by either forms of deterrence. Second, if two enemy states both possess nuclear weapons, Country X may try to gain a first-strike advantage by suddenly launching weapons at Country Y, with a view to destroying its enemy's nuclear launch silos thereby rendering Country Y
incapable of a response. Third, diplomatic misunderstandings and/or
opposing political ideologies may lead to escalating mutual perceptions
of threat, and a subsequent arms race that elevates the risk of actual war, a scenario illustrated in the movies WarGames (1983) and Dr. Strangelove (1964). An arms race is inefficient in its optimal output,
as all countries involved expend resources on armaments that would not
have been created if the others had not expended resources, a form of positive feedback. Fourth, escalation of perceived threat can make it easier for certain measures to be inflicted on a population by its government, such as restrictions on civil liberties, the creation of a military–industrial complex, and military expenditures resulting in higher taxes and increasing budget deficits.
In recent years, many mainstream politicians, academic analysts,
and retired military leaders have also criticized deterrence and
advocated nuclear disarmament. Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz have all called upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and in three Wall Street Journal
op-eds proposed an ambitious program of urgent steps to that end. The
four have created the Nuclear Security Project to advance this agenda.
Organisations such as Global Zero,
an international non-partisan group of 300 world leaders dedicated to
achieving nuclear disarmament, have also been established. In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitled Nuclear Tipping Point.
The film is a visual and historical depiction of the ideas laid forth
in the Wall Street Journal op-eds and reinforces their commitment to a
world without nuclear weapons and the steps that can be taken to reach
that goal.
Former Secretary Kissinger puts the new danger, which cannot be
addressed by deterrence, this way: "The classical notion of deterrence
was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and
evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation
doesn't operate in any comparable way."
Shultz has said, "If you think of the people who are doing suicide
attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by
definition not deterrable".
As opposed to the extreme mutually assured destruction form of deterrence, the concept of minimum deterrence
in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to
deter an adversary from attacking is presently the most common form of
deterrence practiced by nuclear weapon states, such as China, India, Pakistan, Britain, and France. Pursuing minimal deterrence during arms negotiations between United States and Russia allows each state to make nuclear stockpile
reductions without the state becoming vulnerable, however it has been
noted that there comes a point where further reductions may be
undesirable, once minimal deterrence is reached, as further reductions
beyond this point increase a state's vulnerability and provide an
incentive for an adversary to secretly expand its nuclear arsenal.
"Senior European statesmen and women" called for further action in addressing problems of nuclear weapons proliferation
in 2010. They said: "Nuclear deterrence is a far less persuasive
strategic response to a world of potential regional nuclear arms races
and nuclear terrorism than it was to the cold war".
Paul Virilio has criticized nuclear deterrence as anachronistic in the age of information warfare since disinformation and kompromat
are the current threats to suggestible populations. The wound inflicted
on unsuspecting populations he calls an "integral accident":
- The first deterrence, nuclear deterrence, is presently being superseded by the second deterrence: a type of deterrence based on what I call 'the information bomb' associated with the new weaponry of information and communications technologies. Thus, in the very near future, and I stress this important point, it will no longer be war that is the continuation of politics by other means, it will be what I have dubbed 'the integral accident' that is the continuation of politics by other means.
Former deputy defense secretary and strategic arms treaty negotiator Paul Nitze
stated in a Washington Post op-ed in 1994 that nuclear weapons were
obsolete in the "new world disorder" following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, and advocated reliance on precision guided munitions to
secure a permanent military advantage over future adversaries.
