Non-interventionism
is the diplomatic policy whereby a nation seeks to avoid alliances with
other nations in order to avoid being drawn into wars not related to
direct territorial self-defense, has had a long history among government
and popular opinion in the United States. At times, the degree and nature of this policy was better known as isolationism, such as the period between the world wars.
Background
Robert Walpole, Britain's first Whig
Prime Minister, proclaimed in 1723: "My politics are to keep free from
all engagements as long as we possibly can." He emphasized economic
advantage and rejected the idea of intervening in European affairs to
maintain a balance of power. Walpole's position was known to Americans. However, during the American Revolution, the Second Continental Congress debated about forming an alliance with France. It rejected non-interventionism when it was apparent that the American Revolutionary War could be won in no other manner than a military alliance with France, which Benjamin Franklin successfully negotiated in 1778.
After Britain and France went to war in 1792, George Washington declared neutrality, with unanimous support of his cabinet, after deciding that the treaty with France of 1778 did not apply.[3] Washington's Farewell Address of 1796 explicitly announced the policy of American non-interventionism:
- The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.
No entangling alliances (19th century)
President Thomas Jefferson extended Washington's ideas about foreign policy in his March 4, 1801 inaugural address.
Jefferson said that one of the "essential principles of our government"
is that of "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations,
entangling alliances with none." He also stated that "Commerce with all nations, alliance with none, should be" the motto of the United States.
In 1823, President James Monroe articulated what would come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine,
which some have interpreted as non-interventionist in intent: "In the
wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have
never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy, so to do. It is
only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced that we resent
injuries, or make preparations for our defense." It was applied to
Hawaii in 1842 in support of eventual annexation there, and to support U.S. expansion on the North American continent.
After Tsar Alexander II put down the 1863 January Uprising in Poland, French Emperor Napoleon III asked the United States to "join in a protest to the Tsar." Secretary of State William H. Seward
declined, "defending 'our policy of non-intervention—straight,
absolute, and peculiar as it may seem to other nations,'" and insisted
that "[t]he American people must be content to recommend the cause of
human progress by the wisdom with which they should exercise the powers
of self-government, forbearing at all times, and in every way, from
foreign alliances, intervention, and interference."
President Ulysses S. Grant attempted to Annex the Dominican Republic in 1870, but failed to get the support of the Radical Republicans in the Senate.[8] The United States' policy of non-intervention was wholly abandoned with the Spanish–American War, followed by the Philippine–American War from 1899–1902.
20th century non-interventionism
Wake Up, America! Civilization Calls, poster by James Montgomery Flagg, 1917
Theodore Roosevelt's administration is credited with inciting the Panamanian Revolt against Colombia in order to secure construction rights for the Panama Canal (begun in 1904).
The President of the United States Woodrow Wilson, after winning reelection with the slogan "He kept us out of war," was able to navigate neutrality in World War I
for about three years. Early on, their historic shunning of foreign
entanglements, and the presence in the US of immigrants with divided
loyalties in the conflict helped maintain neutrality. Various causes
compelled American entry into World War I, and Congress would vote to declare war on Germany; this would involve the nation on the side of the Triple Entente, but only as an "associated power" fighting the same enemy, not one officially allied with them.
A few months after the declaration of War, Wilson gave a speech to
congress outlining his aims to end the conflict, labeled the Fourteen Points.
While this American proclamation was less triumphalist than the aims of
some of its allies, it did propose in the final point, that a general
association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the
purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and
territorial integrity to great and small states alike. After the
war, Wilson traveled to Europe and stayed for months to labor on the
post-war treaty; no president had previously enjoined such sojourn
outside of the country. In that Treaty of Versailles, Wilson's association was formulated as the League of Nations.
Protest march to prevent American involvement in World War II before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Isolationism Between the World Wars
In the wake of the First World War, the non-interventionist tendencies gained ascendancy. The Treaty of Versailles, and thus, United States' participation in the League of Nations, even with reservations, was rejected by the Senate in the final months of Wilson's presidency.
Republican Senate leader Henry Cabot Lodge
supported the Treaty with reservations to be sure Congress had final
authority on sending the U.S. into war. Wilson and his Democratic
supporters rejected the Lodge Reservations.
The strongest opposition to American entry into the League of
Nations cam from the Senate where a tight-knit faction known as the Irreconcilables, led by William Borah and George Norris,
had great objections regarding the clauses of the treaty which
compelled America to come to the defense of other nations. Senator William Borah, of Idaho, declared that it would "purchase peace at the cost of any part of our [American] independence." Senator Hiram Johnson, of California, denounced the League of Nations as a "gigantic war trust."
While some of the sentiment was grounded in adherence to
Constitutional principles, most of the sentiment bore a reassertion of nativist and inward-looking policy.
The United States acted independently to become a major player in
the 1920s in international negotiations and treaties. The Harding
Administration achieved naval disarmament among the major powers through
the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22. The Dawes Plan refinanced war debts and helped restore prosperity to Germany, In August 1928, fifteen nations signed the Kellogg–Briand Pact, brainchild of American Secretary of State Frank Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand.
This pact that was said to have outlawed war and showed the United
States commitment to international peace had its semantic flaws.
For example, it did not hold the United States to the conditions of any
existing treaties, it still allowed European nations the right to
self-defense, and it stated that if one nation broke the Pact, it would
be up to the other signatories to enforce it.
The Kellogg–Briand Pact was more of a sign of good intentions on the
part of the US, rather than a legitimate step towards the sustenance of
world peace.
The economic depression that ensued after the Crash of 1929,
also continued to abet non-intervention. The attention of the country
focused mostly on addressing the problems of the national economy. The
rise of aggressive expansionism policies by Fascist Italy and the Empire of Japan led to conflicts such as the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.
These events led to ineffectual condemnations by the League of Nations.
Official American response was muted. America also did not take sides
in the brutal Spanish Civil War.
Non-interventionism before entering World War II
As Europe moved closer to war in the late 1930s, the United States Congress
continued to demand American neutrality. Between 1936 and 1937, much to
the dismay of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts.
For example, in the final Neutrality Act, Americans could not sail on
ships flying the flag of a belligerent nation or trade arms with warring
nations. Such activities had played a role in American entrance into
World War I.
On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland; Britain and France
subsequently declared war on Germany, marking the start of World War
II. In an address to the American People two days later, President
Roosevelt assured the nation that he would do all he could to keep them
out of war.
However, his words showed his true goals. "When peace has been broken
anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger," Roosevelt
said.
Even though he was intent on neutrality as the official policy of the
United States, he still echoed the dangers of staying out of this war.
He also cautioned the American people to not let their wish to avoid war
at all costs supersede the security of the nation.
The war in Europe split the American people into two camps:
non-interventionists and interventionists. The two sides argued over
America's involvement in this World War II. The basic principle of the
interventionist argument was fear of German invasion. By the summer of
1940, France suffered a stunning defeat by Germans, and Britain was the only democratic enemy of Germany.
In a 1940 speech, Roosevelt argued, "Some, indeed, still hold to the
now somewhat obvious delusion that we … can safely permit the United
States to become a lone island … in a world dominated by the philosophy
of force."
A national survey found that in the summer of 1940, 67% of Americans
believed that a German-Italian victory would endanger the United States,
that if such an event occurred 88% supported "arm[ing] to the teeth at
any expense to be prepared for any trouble", and that 71% favored "the
immediate adoption of compulsory military training for all young men".
Ultimately, the ideological rift between the ideals of the United
States and the goals of the fascist powers empowered the
interventionist argument. Writer Archibald MacLeish asked, "How could we sit back as spectators of a war against ourselves?"
In an address to the American people on December 29, 1940, President
Roosevelt said, "the Axis not merely admits but proclaims that there can
be no ultimate peace between their philosophy of government and our
philosophy of government."
However, there were still many who held on to
non-interventionism. Although a minority, they were well organized, and
had a powerful presence in Congress. Pro-German or anti-British opinion contributed to non-interventionism. Roosevelt's national share of the 1940 presidential vote
declined by seven percentage points from 1936. Of the 20 counties in
which his share declined by 35 points or more, 19 were largely
German-speaking. Of the 35 counties in which his share declined by 25 to
34 points, German was the largest or second-largest original
nationality in 31.
Non-interventionists rooted a significant portion of their arguments in
historical precedent, citing events such as Washington's farewell
address and the failure of World War I. "If we have strong defenses and understand and believe in what we are defending, we need fear nobody in this world," Robert Maynard Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, wrote in a 1940 essay. Isolationists believed that the safety of the nation was more important than any foreign war.
As 1940 became 1941, the actions of the Roosevelt administration
made it more and more clear that the United States was on a course to
war. This policy shift, driven by the President, came in two phases. The
first came in 1939 with the passage of the Fourth Neutrality Act, which
permitted the United States to trade arms with belligerent nations, as
long as these nations came to America to retrieve the arms, and pay for
them in cash. This policy was quickly dubbed, 'Cash and Carry.' The second phase was the Lend-Lease
Act of early 1941. This act allowed the President "to lend, lease,
sell, or barter arms, ammunition, food, or any 'defense article' or any
'defense information' to 'the government of any country whose defense
the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.'" American public opinion supported Roosevelt's actions. As United States involvement in the Battle of the Atlantic grew with incidents such as the sinking of the USS Reuben James (DD-245),
by late 1941 72% of Americans agreed that "the biggest job facing this
country today is to help defeat the Nazi Government", and 70% thought
that defeating Germany was more important than staying out of the war.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor caused America to enter the war in December 1941, isolationists such as Charles Lindbergh's America First Committee and Herbert Hoover announced their support of the war effort. Isolationist families' sons fought in the war as much as others.
Non-interventionism after World War II
Ohio Senator Robert A Taft
was a leading opponent of interventionism after 1945, although it
always played a secondary role to his deep interest in domestic affairs.
Historian George Fujii, citing the Taft papers, argues:
- Taft fought a mostly losing battle to reduce government expenditures and to curtail or prevent foreign aid measures such as the British loan of 1945 and the Marshall Plan. He feared that these measures would "destroy the freedom of the individual, freedom of States and local communities, freedom of the farmer to run his own farm and the workman to do his own job" (p. 375), thereby threatening the foundations of American prosperity and leading to a "totalitarian state" (p. 377).
In 1951, in the midst of bitter partisan debate over the Korean War,
Taft increasingly spoke out on foreign policy issues. According to his
biographer James T. Patterson:
- Two basic beliefs continued to form a fairly consistent core of Taft's thinking on foreign policy. First, he insisted on limiting America's overseas commitments. [Taft said] "Nobody today can be an isolationist.... The only question is the degree to which we shall take action throughout the entire world." America had obligations that it had to honor – such as NATO – and it could not turn a blind eye to such countries as Formosa or Israel. But the United States had limited funds and problems at home and must therefore curb its commitments....This fear of overcommitment was rooted in Taft's even deeper faith in liberty, which made him shrink from a foreign policy that would cost large sums of money, increase the power of the military, and transform American society into what he called a garrison state.
Norman A. Graebner argues:
- Differences over collective security in the G.O.P. were real in 1952, but Taft tried during his pre-convention campaign to moderate his image as a "go-it-aloner" in foreign policy. His whole effort proved unsuccessful, largely because by spring the internationalist camp had a formidable candidate of its own in Dwight D. Eisenhower. As the personification of post-1945 American commitment to collective security, particularly in Europe, General Eisenhower had decided to run because he feared, apparently, that Taft's election would lead to repudiation of the whole collective security effort, including NATO.
Eisenhower won the nomination and secured Taft's support by promising
Taft a dominant voice in domestic policies, while Eisenhower's
internationalism would set the foreign-policy agenda.
Graebner argues that Eisenhower succeeded in moving the conservative
Republicans away from their traditional attacks on foreign aid and
reciprocal trade policies, and collective security arrangements, to
support for those policies. By 1964 the Republican conservatives rallied behind Barry Goldwater who was an aggressive advocate of an anti-communist internationalist foreign policy. Goldwater wanted to roll back Communism and win the Cold War, asking "Why Not Victory?"
Non-interventionism in the 21st century
During the presidency of Barack Obama, some members of the United States federal government, including President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, considered intervening militarily in the Syrian Civil War.
A poll from late April 2013 found that 62% of Americans thought that
the "United States has no responsibility to do something about the
fighting in Syria between government forces and antigovernment groups,"
with only twenty-five percent disagreeing with that statement. A writer for The New York Times referred to this as "an isolationist streak," a characterization international relations scholar Stephen Walt strongly objected to, calling the description "sloppy journalism." According to Walt, "the overwhelming majority of people who have doubts about the wisdom of deeper involvement in Syria—including
yours truly—are not 'isolationist.' They are merely sensible people who
recognize that we may not have vital interests there, that deeper
involvement may not lead to a better outcome and could make things
worse, and who believe that the last thing the United States needs to do
is to get dragged into yet another nasty sectarian fight in the
Arab/Islamic world."
In December 2013, the Pew Research Center
reported that their newest poll, "American's Place in the World 2013,"
had revealed that 52 percent of respondents in the national poll said
that the United States "should mind its own business internationally and
let other countries get along the best they can on their own."
This was the most people to answer that question this way in the
history of the question, one which pollsters began asking in 1964. Only about a third of respondents felt this way a decade ago.
A July 2014 poll of "battleground voters" across the United
States found "77 percent in favor of full withdrawal from Afghanistan by
the end of 2016; only 15 percent and 17 percent interested in more
involvement in Syria and Ukraine, respectively; and 67 percent agreeing
with the statement that, 'U.S. military actions should be limited to
direct threats to our national security.'"
Conservative policies
Rathbun (2008) compares three separate themes in conservative policies since the 1980s: conservatism, neoconservatism, and isolationism. These approaches are similar in that they all invoked the mantle of "realism"
and pursued foreign policy goals designed to promote national
interests. Conservatives, however, were the only group that was
"realist" in the academic sense in that they defined the national
interest narrowly, strove for balances of power internationally, viewed international relations as amoral, and especially valued sovereignty. By contrast, neoconservatives based their foreign policy on nationalism, and isolationists sought to minimize any involvement in foreign affairs and raise new barriers to immigration.
Former Republican Congressman Ron Paul favored a return to the non-interventionist policies of Thomas Jefferson and frequently opposed military intervention in countries like Iran and Iraq.
