War crimes can be prosecuted in the United States through the War Crimes Act of 1996. However, the U.S. Government, which strongly opposes the International Criminal Court (ICC) treaty, arguing that the Court lacks checks and balances, and thus does not accept ICC jurisdiction over its nationals.
Mexican–American War
When Zachary Taylor
began leading American soldiers into Mexico the U.S troops under the
watchful eye of Taylor at first adhered to the rules of war for the most
part and almost exclusively engaged only with enemy soldiers. This
gained them some popularity with Mexican civilians who held the
occupying Americans in a degree of high regard compared to the Mexican
Army who left their wounded to be captured by the enemy as they
retreated from the area. In June 1846, this changed when American
reinforcements entered the area and began raiding local farms.
Many soldiers on garrison duty began committing crimes against
civilians such as robbery, rape and murder in order to cure their
boredom. This crime wave resulted in American soldiers murdering at
least 20 civilians during the first month of occupation. Taylor showed
little concern with the crimes his soldiers had been committing and made
no attempt to discipline the soldiers responsible for them. This led to
public opinion turning against the American troops and resulted in many
Mexicans taking up arms and forming guerrilla bands which attacked
patrols of U.S soldiers. The attacks continued to get more prevalent
especially after the Battle of Monterrey.
During this time anti-catholic
sentiment and racism fueled more attacks on civilians. It was estimated
that during this time US troops killed at least 100 civilians, with the
majority of them being killed by Col. John C. Hays' 1st Texas Mounted Volunteers. In response to the violence, Mexicans killed an American soldier outside of Monterrey.
American troops under the command of Capt. Mabry B. "Mustang" Gray
responded to the event by abducting and executing twenty-four unarmed
Mexican civilians.
In the coming months the boredom of occupation duties led to
additional violence against civilians. In November 1846, a detachment
from the 1st Kentucky regiment murdered a young Mexican boy, apparently
for sport. Afterwards, Taylor again refused to bring charges against any
of the soldiers involved.
The most infamous group of soldiers during this time were the ones serving under Joseph Lane. After Captain Samuel Hamilton Walker was killed in a skirmish there, Lane ordered his men to avenge the dead Texas Ranger by sacking the town of Huamantla.
The soldiers quickly became drunk after raiding a liquor store and
began targeting the townspeople. Reports described the soldiers raping
scores of women many of whom were young girls and murdering dozens of
Mexican civilians while they burned down homes. However, these reports of an American rampage were overshadowed by news of Mexican General Antonio López de Santa Anna's
resignation after the Huamantla attack, leading to no repercussions
against Lane or any of the soldiers involved in the massacre.
By the end of the war the number of Mexican civilians killed by American troops was estimated at being over 10,000.
Philippine–American War
Filipino casualties on the first day of war
General Jacob H. Smith's infamous order "Kill Everyone Over Ten" was the caption in the New York Journal
cartoon on May 5, 1902. The Old Glory draped an American shield on
which a vulture replaced the bald eagle. The caption at the bottom
proclaimed, "Criminals Because They Were Born Ten Years Before We Took the Philippines"
Following the end of the Spanish–American War in 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States as part of the peace settlement. This triggered a more than decade-long conflict between the United States Armed Forces and the First Philippine Republic under President Emilio Aguinaldo.
Execution of Moros illustrated on a 1911 commemorative postcard
War crimes committed by the United States Army include the March across Samar, which led to the court martial and forcible retirement of Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith.
Smith instructed Major Littleton Waller, commanding officer of a battalion of 315 U.S. Marines assigned to bolster his forces in Samar, regarding the conduct of pacification:
"I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States," General Jacob H. Smith said.
Since it was a popular belief among the Americans serving in the Philippines that native males were born with bolos in their hands, Major Littleton "Tony" Waller asked, "I would like to know the limit of age to respect, sir."
"Ten years", Smith said.
"Persons of ten years and older are those designated as being capable of bearing arms?"
"Yes." Smith confirmed his instructions a second time.
A sustained and widespread massacre of Filipino civilians followed.
Food and trade to Samar were cut off, intended to starve the
revolutionaries into submission. Smith's strategy on Samar involved
widespread destruction to force the inhabitants to stop supporting the
guerrillas and turn to the Americans from fear and starvation. He used
his troops in sweeps of the interior in search for guerrilla bands and
in attempts to capture Philippine General Vicente Lukbán,
but he did nothing to prevent contact between the guerrillas and the
townspeople. American columns marched across the island, destroying
homes and shooting people and draft animals.
The exact number of Filipino civilians killed by US troops will
never be known. Littleton Waller, in a report, stated that over an
eleven-day period his men burned 255 dwellings, shot 13 carabaos and killed 39 people.
An exhaustive research made by a British writer in the 1990s put the
figure at about 2,500 dead; Filipino historians believe it to be around
50,000. As a consequence of his order in Samar, Smith became known as "Howling Wilderness Smith".
Moro crater massacre
Regarding the massacres in Bud Dajo, Major Hugh Scott, the District Governor of Sulu Province,
where the incidents occurred, recounted that those who fled to the
crater "declared they had no intention of fighting, - ran up there only
in fright, [and] had some crops planted and desired to cultivate them."
The description of the engagement as a "battle" is disputed
because of both the overwhelming firepower of the attackers and the
lopsided casualties. The author Vic Hurley wrote, "By no stretch of the imagination could Bud Dajo be termed a 'battle'". Mark Twain condemned the incident strongly in articles
and commented, "In what way was it a battle? It has no resemblance to a
battle ... We cleaned up our four days' work and made it complete by
butchering these helpless people."
A higher percentage of Moros were killed than in other incidents now
considered massacres. For example, the highest estimate of Native
Americans killed at the Wounded Knee Massacre
is 300 out of 350 (a death rate of 85 percent), whereas in Bud Dajo
there were only six Moro survivors out of a group estimated at 1,000 (a
death rate of over 99 percent). As at Wounded Knee, the Moro group
included women and children.
Moro men in the crater who had arms possessed melee weapons. While
fighting was limited to ground action on Jolo, use of naval gunfire
contributed significantly to the overwhelming firepower brought to bear
against the Moros.
During the engagement, 750 men and officers, under the command of Colonel J.W. Duncan, assaulted the volcanic crater of Bud Dajo (Tausūg: Būd Dahu), which was populated by 800 to 1,000 Tausug villagers.
On March 2, 1906, Wood ordered Colonel J.W. Duncan of the 6th Infantry Regiment (stationed at Zamboanga,
the provincial capital) to lead an expedition against Bud Dajo. The
assault force consisted of "272 men of the 6th Infantry, 211
[dismounted] men of the 4th Cavalry, 68 men of the 28th Artillery Battery, 51 Philippine Constabulary, 110 men of the 19th Infantry and 6 sailors from the gunboat Pampanga." The battle began on March 5, as mountain guns fired 40 rounds of shrapnel into the crater. During the night, the Americans hauled mountain guns to the crater's edge with block and tackle. At daybreak, the American guns (both the mountain guns and the guns of the Pampanga)
opened up on the Moros' fortifications in the crater. American forces
then placed a "Machine Gun... in position where it could sweep the crest
of the mountain between us and the cotta," killing all Moros in the
crater.
One account claims that the Moros, armed with krises and spears,
refused to surrender and held their positions. Some of the defenders
rushed the Americans and were cut down. The Americans charged the
surviving Moros with fixed bayonets, and the Moros fought back with
their kalis, barung, improvised grenades made with black powder and seashells.
Despite the inconsistencies among various accounts of the battle (one
in which all occupants of Bud Dajo were gunned down, another in which
defenders resisted in fierce hand-to-hand combat), all accounts agree
that few, if any, Moros survived.
In response to criticism, Wood's explanation of the high number
of women and children killed stated that the women of Bud Dajo dressed
as men and joined in the combat, and that the men used children as
living shields. Hagedorn supports this explanation, by giving an account of Lt. Gordon Johnston, who was severely wounded by a woman warrior. A second explanation was given by the Governor-General of the Philippines, Henry Clay Ide, who reported that the women and children were collateral damage, having been killed during the artillery barrages.
These conflicting explanations of the high number of women and child
casualties brought accusations of a cover-up, adding to the criticism.
Furthermore, Wood's and Ide's explanation are at odds with Col. J.W.
Duncan's March 12, 1906 post-action report describing the placement of a
machine-gun at the edge of the crater to fire upon the occupants.
Following Duncan's reports, the high number of non-combatants killed
can be explained as the result of indiscriminate machine-gun fire.
Despite President McKinley's proclamation of "benevolent
assimilation" of the Philippines as a U.S. Territory, American treatment
of Philippine soldiers and civilians was far from benevolent.
General Elwell Stephen Otis
controlled the flow of information by journalists, often through
violent methods, in order to maintain American support for the war.
Following the Battle of Manila,
Aguinaldo switched his tactics from conventional warfare to guerrilla
warfare, causing American generals to establish harsher methods of
warfare as well.
Orders given by Otis and General Arthur MacArthur Jr.
oversaw the complete destruction of many villages, and the capture and
execution of their civilians, in order to incite conflict by Philippine
soldiers. Despite Otis' restriction on journalism, many reports by both
American and Filipino journalists indicate that American treatment of
Filipino prisoners was very harsh, as many were starved and tortured,
and many others were executed.
A report written by General J.M. Bell
in 1901 states: "I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2,500 men
who will be used in columns of about fifty men each. I take so large a
command for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley and
mountain peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy
everything I find outside of towns. All able bodied men will be killed
or captured. ... These people need a thrashing to teach them some good
common sense; and they should have it for the good of all concerned."
World War II
Pacific theater
On January 26, 1943, the submarine USS Wahoo fired on survivors in lifeboats from the Japanese transport Buyo Maru. Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood asserted that the survivors were Japanese soldiers who had turned machine-gun and rifle fire on the Wahoo after she surfaced, and that such resistance was common in submarine warfare.
According to the submarine's executive officer, the fire was intended
to force the Japanese soldiers to abandon their boats and none of them
were deliberately targeted. Historian Clay Blair stated that the submarine's crew fired first and the shipwrecked survivors returned fire with handguns.
The survivors were later determined to have included Allied POWs of the
Indian 2nd Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment, who were guarded by
Japanese Army Forces from the 26th Field Ordnance Depot. Of 1,126 men originally aboard Buyo Maru, 195 Indians and 87 Japanese died, some killed during the torpedoing of the ship and some killed by the shootings afterwards.
During and after the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 3–5, 1943), U.S. PT boats
and Allied aircraft attacked Japanese rescue vessels as well as
approximately 1,000 survivors from eight sunken Japanese troop transport
ships.
The stated justification was that the Japanese personnel were close to
their military destination and would be promptly returned to service in
the battle. Many of the Allied aircrew accepted the attacks as necessary, while others were sickened.
American servicemen in the Pacific War
sometimes deliberately killed Japanese soldiers who had surrendered,
according to Richard Aldrich, a professor of history at the University of Nottingham. Aldrich published a study of diaries kept by United States and Australian soldiers, wherein it was stated that they sometimes massacred prisoners of war. According to John Dower, in "many instances ... Japanese who did become prisoners were killed on the spot or en route to prison compounds." According to Professor Aldrich, it was common practice for U.S. troops not to take prisoners. His analysis is supported by British historian Niall Ferguson,
who also says that, in 1943, "a secret [U.S.] intelligence report noted
that only the promise of ice cream and three days leave would ...
induce American troops not to kill surrendering Japanese."
Ferguson states that such practices played a role in the ratio of
Japanese prisoners to dead being 1:100 in late 1944. That same year,
efforts were taken by Allied high commanders to suppress "take no
prisoners" attitudes
among their personnel (because it hampered intelligence gathering), and
to encourage Japanese soldiers to surrender. Ferguson adds that
measures by Allied commanders to improve the ratio of Japanese prisoners
to Japanese dead resulted in it reaching 1:7, by mid-1945.
Nevertheless, "taking no prisoners" was still "standard practice" among
U.S. troops at the Battle of Okinawa, in April–June 1945.
Ferguson also suggests that "it was not only the fear of disciplinary
action or of dishonor that deterred German and Japanese soldiers from
surrendering. More important for most soldiers was the perception that
prisoners would be killed by the enemy anyway, and so one might as well
fight on."
Ulrich Straus, a U.S. Japanologist,
suggests that Allied troops on the front line intensely hated Japanese
military personnel and were "not easily persuaded" to take or protect
prisoners, because they believed, reasonably, that Allied personnel who
surrendered got "no mercy" from the Japanese. Allied troops were told that Japanese soldiers were inclined to feign surrender in order to make surprise attacks, a practice which was outlawed by the Hague Convention of 1907.
Therefore, according to Straus, "Senior officers opposed the taking of
prisoners on the grounds that it needlessly exposed American troops to
risks ..."
When prisoners were taken at Guadalcanal, Army interrogator Captain
Burden noted that many times POWs were shot during transport because "it
was too much bother to take [them] in".
U.S. historian James J. Weingartner attributes the very low number of Japanese in U.S. prisoner of war compounds
to two important factors, namely (1) a Japanese reluctance to
surrender, and (2) a widespread American "conviction that the Japanese
were 'animals' or 'subhuman' and unworthy of the normal treatment
accorded to prisoners of war.
The latter reason is supported by Ferguson, who says that "Allied
troops often saw the Japanese in the same way that Germans regarded
Russians — as Untermenschen (i.e., "subhuman").
Rape
It has been claimed that some U.S. military personnel raped Okinawan women during the Battle of Okinawa in 1945.
Based on several years of research, Okinawan historian Oshiro
Masayasu (former director of the Okinawa Prefectural Historical
Archives) writes:
Soon after the U.S. Marines landed, all the women of a village on Motobu Peninsula fell into the hands of American soldiers. At the time, there were only women, children, and old people in the village, as all the young men had been mobilized for the war. Soon after landing, the Marines "mopped up" the entire village, but found no signs of Japanese forces. Taking advantage of the situation, they started 'hunting for women' in broad daylight, and women who were hiding in the village or nearby air raid shelters were dragged out one after another.
According to interviews carried out by the New York Times
and published by them in 2000, several elderly people from an Okinawan
village confessed that after the United States had won the Battle of Okinawa,
three armed marines kept coming to the village every week to force the
villagers to gather all the local women, who were then carried off into
the hills and raped. The article goes deeper into the matter and claims
that the villagers' tale — true or not — is part of a "dark, long-kept
secret" the unraveling of which "refocused attention on what historians
say is one of the most widely ignored crimes of the war": 'the
widespread rape of Okinawan women by American servicemen."
Although Japanese reports of rape were largely ignored at the time,
academic estimates have been that as many as 10,000 Okinawan women may
have been raped. It has been claimed that the rape was so prevalent that
most Okinawans over age 65 around the year 2000 either knew or had
heard of a woman who was raped in the aftermath of the war.
Professor of East Asian Studies and expert on Okinawa, Steve Rabson,
said: "I have read many accounts of such rapes in Okinawan newspapers
and books, but few people know about them or are willing to talk about
them."
He notes that plenty of old local books, diaries, articles and other
documents refer to rapes by American soldiers of various races and
backgrounds. An explanation given for why the US military has no record
of any rapes is that few Okinawan women reported abuse, mostly out of
fear and embarrassment. According to an Okinawan police spokesman: "Victimized women feel too ashamed to make it public."
Those who did report them are believed by historians to have been
ignored by the U.S. military police. Many people wondered why it never
came to light after the inevitable American-Japanese babies the many
women must have given birth to. In interviews, historians and Okinawan
elders said that some of those Okinawan women who were raped and did not
commit suicide did give birth to biracial children, but that many of
them were immediately killed or left behind out of shame, disgust or
fearful trauma. More often, however, rape victims underwent crude
abortions with the help of village midwives. A large scale effort to
determine the possible extent of these crimes has never been conducted.
Over five decades after the war had ended, in the late-1990s, the women
who were believed to have been raped still overwhelmingly refused to
give public statements, instead speaking through relatives and a number
of historians and scholars.
There is substantial evidence that the U.S. had at least some
knowledge of what was going on. Samuel Saxton, a retired captain,
explained that the American veterans and witnesses may have
intentionally kept the rape a secret, largely out of shame: "It would be
unfair for the public to get the impression that we were all a bunch of
rapists after we worked so hard to serve our country." Military officials formally denied the mass rapes, and all surviving related veterans refused the New York Times
request for an interview. Masaie Ishihara, a sociology professor,
supports this: "There is a lot of historical amnesia out there, many
people don't want to acknowledge what really happened." Author George Feifer noted in his book Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb,
that by 1946 there had been fewer than 10 reported cases of rape in
Okinawa. He explained it was "partly because of shame and disgrace,
partly because Americans were victors and occupiers. In all there were
probably thousands of incidents, but the victims' silence kept rape
another dirty secret of the campaign."
Some other authors have noted that Japanese civilians "were often
surprised at the comparatively humane treatment they received from the
American enemy." According to Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power by Mark Selden, the Americans "did not pursue a policy of torture, rape, and murder of civilians as Japanese military officials had warned."
There were also 1,336 reported rapes during the first 10 days of the occupation of Kanagawa prefecture after the Japanese surrender.
European theater
In the Laconia massacre, U.S. aircraft attacked Germans rescuing survivors from the sinking British troopship in the Atlantic Ocean. Pilots of a United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) B-24 Liberator bomber, despite knowing the U-boat's location, intentions, and the presence of British seamen, killed dozens of Laconia's survivors with bombs and strafing attacks, forcing U-156 to cast its remaining survivors into the sea and crash dive to avoid being destroyed.
The "Canicattì massacre"
involved the killing of Italian civilians by Lieutenant Colonel George
Herbert McCaffrey. A confidential inquiry was made, but McCaffrey was
never charged with any offense relating to the massacre. He died in
1954. This fact remained virtually unknown in the U.S. until 2005, when
Joseph S. Salemi of New York University, whose father witnessed it,
reported it.
In the "Biscari massacre", which consisted of two instances of mass murder, U.S. troops of the 45th Infantry Division killed roughly 75 prisoners of war, mostly Italian.
According to an article in Der Spiegel by Klaus Wiegrefe, many personal memoirs of Allied soldiers have been wilfully ignored by historians until now because they were at odds with the "greatest generation" mythology surrounding World War II. However, this has recently started to change, with books such as The Day of Battle, by Rick Atkinson, in which he describes Allied war crimes in Italy, and D-Day: The Battle for Normandy, by Antony Beevor. Beevor's latest work suggests that Allied war crimes in Normandy were much more extensive "than was previously realized".
Historian Peter Lieb has found that many U.S. and Canadian units were ordered not to take enemy prisoners during the D-Day landings in Normandy.
If this view is correct, it may explain the fate of 64 German prisoners
(out of the 130 captured) who did not make it to the POW collecting
point on Omaha Beach on the day of the landings.
Near the French village of Audouville-la-Hubert, 30 Wehrmacht prisoners were massacred by U.S. paratroopers.
In the aftermath of the 1944 Malmedy massacre,
in which 80 American POWs were murdered by their German captors, a
written order from the headquarters of the 328th U.S. Army Infantry
Regiment, dated 21 December 1944, stated: "No SS troops or paratroopers will be taken prisoner but [rather they] will be shot on sight."
Major-General Raymond Hufft (U.S. Army) gave instructions to his troops
not to take prisoners when they crossed the Rhine in 1945. "After the
war, when he reflected on the war crimes he authorized, he admitted, 'if
the Germans had won, I would have been on trial at Nuremberg instead of
them.'" Stephen Ambrose
related: "I've interviewed well over 1000 combat veterans. Only one of
them said he shot a prisoner ... Perhaps as many as one-third of the
veterans...however, related incidents in which they saw other GIs
shooting unarmed German prisoners who had their hands up."
"Operation Teardrop" involved eight surviving captured crewmen from the sunken German submarine U-546 being tortured by U.S. military personnel. Historian Philip K. Lundeberg has written that the beating and torture of U-546's
survivors was a singular atrocity motivated by the interrogators' need
to quickly get information on what the U.S. believed were potential
missile attacks on the continental U.S. by German submarines.
SS concentration camp guards being executed at Dachau concentration camp on its day of liberation (U.S. Army soldier photograph/National Archives)
The "Dachau massacre" involved the killing of German prisoners of war and surrendering SS soldiers at the Dachau concentration camp.
Among American WWII veterans who admitted to having committed war crimes was former Mafia hitman Frank Sheeran. In interviews with his biographer Charles Brandt, Sheeran recalled his war service with the Thunderbird Division
as the time when he first developed a callousness to the taking of
human life. By his own admission, Sheeran participated in numerous
massacres and summary executions of German POWs, acts which violated the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the 1929 Geneva Convention on POWs. In his interviews with Brandt, Sheeran divided such massacres into four different categories.
- 1. Revenge killings in the heat of battle. Sheeran told Brandt that, when a German soldier had just killed his close friends and then tried to surrender, he would often "send him to hell, too." He described often witnessing similar behavior by fellow GIs.
- 2. Orders from unit commanders during a mission. When describing his first murder for organized crime, Sheeran recalled: "It was just like when an officer would tell you to take a couple of German prisoners back behind the line and for you to 'hurry back'. You did what you had to do."
- 3. The Dachau massacre and other reprisal killings of concentration camp guards and trustee inmates.
- 4. Calculated attempts to dehumanize and degrade German POWs. While Sheeran's unit was climbing the Harz Mountains, they came upon a Wehrmacht mule train carrying food and drink up the mountainside. The female cooks were first allowed to leave unmolested, then Sheeran and his fellow GI's "ate what we wanted and soiled the rest with our waste." Then the Wehrmacht mule drivers were given shovels and ordered to "dig their own shallow graves." Sheeran later joked that they did so without complaint, likely hoping that he and his buddies would change their minds. But the mule drivers were shot and buried in the holes they had dug. Sheeran explained that by then, "I had no hesitation in doing what I had to do."
Rape
Secret wartime files made public only in 2006 reveal that American
GIs committed 400 sexual offenses in Europe, including 126 rapes in
England, between 1942 and 1945.
A study by Robert J. Lilly estimates that a total of 14,000 civilian
women in England, France and Germany were raped by American GIs during
World War II.
It is estimated that there were around 3,500 rapes by American
servicemen in France between June 1944 and the end of the war and one
historian has claimed that sexual violence against women in liberated
France was common.
Korean War
No Gun Ri Massacre
The No Gun Ri massacre refers to an incident of mass killing of an undetermined number of South Korean refugees by U.S. soldiers of the 7th Cavalry Regiment (and in a U.S. air attack) between 26–29 July 1950 at a railroad bridge near the village of Nogeun-ri, 100 miles (160 km) southeast of Seoul. In 2005, the South Korean
government certified the names of 163 dead or missing (mostly women,
children, and old men) and 55 wounded. It said that many other victims'
names were not reported. Over the years survivors' estimates of the dead have ranged from 300 to 500. This episode early in the Korean War gained widespread attention when the Associated Press (AP) published a series of articles in 1999 that subsequently won a Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting.
Vietnam War
The Vietnam War Crimes Working Group Files is a collection of (formerly secret) documents compiled by Pentagon investigators in the early 1970s, confirming that atrocities by U.S. forces during the Vietnam War were more extensive than had been officially acknowledged. The documents are housed by the United States National Archives and Records Administration, and detail 320 alleged incidents that were substantiated by United States Army investigators (not including the 1968 My Lai Massacre).
My Lai Massacre
My Lai Massacre
The My Lai Massacre was the mass murder of 347 to 504 unarmed citizens in South Vietnam, almost entirely civilians, most of them women and children, conducted by U.S. soldiers from the Company C of the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade of the 23rd (Americal) Infantry Division,
on 16 March 1968. Some of the victims were raped, beaten, tortured, or
maimed, and some of the bodies were found mutilated. The massacre took
place in the hamlets of Mỹ Lai and My Khe of Sơn Mỹ village during the Vietnam War. Of the 26 U.S. soldiers initially charged with criminal offenses or war crimes for actions at My Lai, only William Calley
was convicted. Initially sentenced to life in prison, Calley had his
sentence reduced to ten years, then was released after only three and a
half years under house arrest.
The incident prompted widespread outrage around the world, and reduced
U.S. domestic support for the Vietnam War. Three American Servicemen (Hugh Thompson, Jr., Glenn Andreotta, and Lawrence Colburn),
who made an effort to halt the massacre and protect the wounded, were
sharply criticized by U.S. Congressmen, and received hate mail, death
threats, and mutilated animals on their doorsteps. Thirty years after the event their efforts were honored.
Gulf War
At a 1992 symposium at Albany Law School, international law professor Francis Boyle argued that the Coalition air campaign during the Gulf War fit the definition of genocide due to alleged indiscriminate targeting of civilians and non-military infrastructure.
Highway of Death
Highway of Death
During the American led coalition offensive in the Gulf War, American, Canadian,
British and French aircraft and ground forces attacked retreating Iraqi
military personnel and fleeing civilian convoys attempting to head
towards Baghdad on the night of February 26–27, 1991, resulting in the
destruction of thousands of vehicles and 200 to 1,000+ deaths.
Additionally, journalist Seymour Hersh, citing American witnesses, alleged that a platoon of U.S. Bradley Fighting Vehicles from the 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division
opened fire on a large group of more than 350 disarmed Iraqi soldiers
who had surrendered at a makeshift military checkpoint after fleeing the
devastation on Highway 8. Journalist Georgie Anne Geyer
criticized Hersh's article, saying that he offered "no real proof at
all that such charges—which were aired, investigated and then dismissed
by the military after the war—are true."
War on Terror
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. Government
adopted several new measures in the classification and treatment of
prisoners captured in the War on Terror, including applying the status
of unlawful combatant to some prisoners, conducting extraordinary renditions, and using torture ("enhanced interrogation techniques"). Human Rights Watch and others described the measures as being illegal under the Geneva Conventions.
Command responsibility
A presidential memorandum of February 7, 2002, authorized U.S. interrogators of prisoners captured during the War in Afghanistan
to deny the prisoners basic protections required by the Geneva
Conventions, and thus according to Jordan J. Paust, professor of law and
formerly a member of the faculty of the Judge Advocate General's School, "necessarily authorized and ordered violations of the Geneva Conventions, which are war crimes." Based on the president's memorandum, U.S. personnel carried out cruel and inhumane treatment on captured enemy fighters,
which necessarily means that the president's memorandum was a plan to
violate the Geneva Convention, and such a plan constitutes a war crime
under the Geneva Conventions, according to Professor Paust.
U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and others have argued that detainees should be considered "unlawful combatants" and as such not be protected by the Geneva Conventions in multiple memoranda regarding these perceived legal gray areas.
Gonzales' statement that denying coverage under the Geneva
Conventions "substantially reduces the threat of domestic criminal
prosecution under the War Crimes Act"
suggests, to some authors, an awareness by those involved in crafting
policies in this area that U.S. officials are involved in acts that
could be seen to be war crimes. The U.S. Supreme Court challenged the premise on which this argument is based in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which it ruled that Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions applies to detainees in Guantanamo Bay and that the military tribunals used to try these suspects were in violation of U.S. and international law.
Human Rights Watch claimed in 2005 that the principle of "command responsibility" could make high-ranking officials within the Bush administration guilty of the numerous war crimes committed during the War on Terror, either with their knowledge or by persons under their control. On April 14, 2006, Human Rights Watch said that Secretary Donald Rumsfeld could be criminally liable for his alleged involvement in the abuse of Mohammed al-Qahtani. On November 14, 2006, invoking universal jurisdiction, legal proceedings were started in Germany – for their alleged involvement of prisoner abuse – against Donald Rumsfeld, Alberto Gonzales, John Yoo, George Tenet and others.
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 is seen by some as an amnesty law for crimes committed in the War on Terror by retroactively rewriting the War Crimes Act and by abolishing habeas corpus, effectively making it impossible for detainees to challenge crimes committed against them.
Luis Moreno-Ocampo told The Sunday Telegraph in 2007 that he was willing to start an inquiry by the International Criminal Court (ICC), and possibly a trial, for war crimes committed in Iraq involving British Prime Minister Tony Blair and American President George W. Bush. Though under the Rome Statute,
the ICC has no jurisdiction over Bush, since the U.S. is not a State
Party to the relevant treaty—unless Bush were accused of crimes inside a
State Party, or the UN Security Council
(where the U.S. has a veto) requested an investigation. However, Blair
does fall under ICC jurisdiction as Britain is a State Party.
Shortly before the end of President Bush's second term in 2009,
newsmedia in countries other than the U.S. began publishing the views of
those who believe that under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, the U.S. is obligated to hold those responsible for prisoner abuse to account under criminal law. One proponent of this view was the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Professor Manfred Nowak) who, on January 20, 2009, remarked on German television that former president George W. Bush had lost his head of state immunity and under international law the U.S. would now be mandated to start criminal proceedings against all those involved in these violations of the UN Convention Against Torture. Law professor Dietmar Herz
explained Nowak's comments by opining that under U.S. and international
law former President Bush is criminally responsible for adopting
torture as an interrogation tool.
