A thermonuclear weapon, fusion weapon or hydrogen bomb (H bomb), is a second-generation nuclear weapon design. Its greater sophistication affords it vastly greater destructive power than first-generation atomic bombs, a more compact size, a lower mass or a combination of these benefits. Characteristics of nuclear fusion reactions make possible the use of non-fissile depleted uranium as the weapon's main fuel, thus allowing more efficient use of scarce fissile material such as uranium-235 (U-235) or plutonium-239 (Pu-239).
Modern fusion weapons consist essentially of two main components: a nuclear fission
primary stage (fueled by U-235 or Pu-239) and a separate nuclear fusion
secondary stage containing thermonuclear fuel: the heavy hydrogen
isotopes deuterium and tritium, or in modern weapons lithium deuteride. For this reason, thermonuclear weapons are often colloquially called hydrogen bombs or H-bombs.
A fusion explosion begins with the detonation of the fission
primary stage. Its temperature soars past approximately one hundred
million kelvins, causing it to glow intensely with thermal X-radiation. These X-rays flood the void (the "radiation channel" often filled with polystyrene foam)
between the primary and secondary assemblies placed within an enclosure
called a radiation case, which confines the X-ray energy and resists
its outward pressure. The distance separating the two assemblies ensures
that debris fragments from the fission primary (which move much slower
than X-ray photons) cannot disassemble the secondary before the fusion
explosion runs to completion.
The secondary fusion stage—consisting of outer pusher/tamper, fusion fuel filler and central plutonium
spark plug—is imploded by the X-ray energy impinging on its
pusher/tamper. This compresses the entire secondary stage and drives up
the density of the plutonium spark plug. The density of the plutonium
fuel rises to such an extent that the spark plug is driven into a
supercritical state, and it begins a nuclear fission
chain reaction. The fission products of this chain reaction heat the
highly compressed, and thus superdense, thermonuclear fuel surrounding
the spark plug to around 300 million kelvins, igniting fusion reactions
between fusion fuel nuclei. In modern weapons fueled by lithium
deuteride, the fissioning plutonium spark plug also emits free neutrons
which collide with lithium nuclei and supply the tritium component of
the thermonuclear fuel.
The secondary's relatively massive tamper (which resists outward
expansion as the explosion proceeds) also serves as a thermal barrier to
keep the fusion fuel filler from becoming too hot, which would spoil
the compression. If made of uranium, enriched uranium or plutonium, the tamper captures fast fusion neutrons
and undergoes fission itself, increasing the overall explosive yield.
Additionally, in most designs the radiation case is also constructed of a
fissile material
that undergoes fission driven by fast thermonuclear neutrons. Such
bombs are classified as three stage weapons, and most current
Teller–Ulam designs are such fission-fusion-fission weapons. Fast
fission of the tamper and radiation case is the main contribution to the
total yield and is the dominant process that produces radioactive fission product fallout.
The first full-scale thermonuclear test was carried out by the United States in 1952; the concept has since been employed by most of the world's nuclear powers in the design of their weapons. The design of all modern thermonuclear weapons in the United States is known as the Teller–Ulam configuration for its two chief contributors, Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam, who developed it in 1951 for the United States, with certain concepts developed with the contribution of physicist John von Neumann. Similar devices were developed by the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China.
As thermonuclear weapons represent the most efficient design for weapon energy yield in weapons with yields above 50 kilotons of TNT (210 TJ), virtually all the nuclear weapons of this size deployed by the five nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty today are thermonuclear weapons using the Teller–Ulam design.
Public knowledge concerning nuclear weapon design
Detailed knowledge of fission and fusion weapons is classified to some degree in virtually every industrialized nation. In the United States, such knowledge can by default be classified as "Restricted Data",
even if it is created by persons who are not government employees or
associated with weapons programs, in a legal doctrine known as "born secret" (though the constitutional standing of the doctrine has been at times called into question; see United States v. Progressive, Inc.). Born secret is rarely invoked for cases of private speculation. The official policy of the United States Department of Energy
has been not to acknowledge the leaking of design information, as such
acknowledgment would potentially validate the information as accurate.
In a small number of prior cases, the U.S. government has attempted to censor weapons information in the public press, with limited success. According to the New York Times, physicist Kenneth W. Ford defied government orders to remove classified information from his book, Building the H Bomb: A Personal History.
Ford claims he used only pre-existing information and even submitted a
manuscript to the government, which wanted to remove entire sections of
the book for concern that foreign nations could use the information.
Though large quantities of vague data have been officially
released, and larger quantities of vague data have been unofficially
leaked by former bomb designers, most public descriptions of nuclear
weapon design details rely to some degree on speculation, reverse engineering from known information, or comparison with similar fields of physics (inertial confinement fusion
is the primary example). Such processes have resulted in a body of
unclassified knowledge about nuclear bombs that is generally consistent
with official unclassified information releases, related physics, and is
thought to be internally consistent, though there are some points of
interpretation that are still considered open. The state of public
knowledge about the Teller–Ulam design has been mostly shaped from a few
specific incidents outlined in a section below.
Basic principle
The
basic principle of the Teller–Ulam configuration is the idea that
different parts of a thermonuclear weapon can be chained together in
"stages", with the detonation of each stage providing the energy to
ignite the next stage. At a bare minimum, this implies a primary section that consists of an implosion-type fission bomb (a "trigger"), and a secondary section that consists of fusion fuel. The energy released by the primary compresses the secondary through a process called "radiation implosion", at which point it is heated and undergoes nuclear fusion. This process could be continued, with energy from the secondary igniting a third fusion stage; Russia's AN602 "Tsar Bomba"
is thought to have been a three-stage fission-fusion-fusion device.
Theoretically by continuing this process thermonuclear weapons with
arbitrarily high yield could be constructed. This contrasts with fission weapons
which are limited in yield because only so much fission fuel can be
amassed in one place before the danger of its accidentally becoming supercritical becomes too great.
Surrounding the other components is a hohlraum or radiation case,
a container that traps the first stage or primary's energy inside
temporarily. The outside of this radiation case, which is also normally
the outside casing of the bomb, is the only direct visual evidence
publicly available of any thermonuclear bomb component's configuration.
Numerous photographs of various thermonuclear bomb exteriors have been
declassified.
The primary is thought to be a standard implosion method fission bomb, though likely with a core boosted by small amounts of fusion fuel (usually 50/50% deuterium/tritium gas) for extra efficiency; the fusion fuel releases excess neutrons
when heated and compressed, inducing additional fission. When fired,
the Pu-239 or U-235 core would be compressed to a smaller sphere by
special layers of conventional high explosives arranged around it in an explosive lens pattern, initiating the nuclear chain reaction that powers the conventional "atomic bomb".
The secondary is usually shown as a column of fusion fuel and other components wrapped in many layers. Around the column is first a "pusher-tamper", a heavy layer of uranium-238 (U-238) or lead
that helps compress the fusion fuel (and, in the case of uranium, may
eventually undergo fission itself). Inside this is the fusion fuel
itself, usually a form of lithium deuteride, which is used because it is easier to weaponize than liquefied tritium/deuterium gas. This dry fuel, when bombarded by neutrons, produces tritium, a heavy isotope of hydrogen which can undergo nuclear fusion, along with the deuterium present in the mixture. (See the article on nuclear fusion for a more detailed technical discussion of fusion reactions.) Inside the layer of fuel is the "spark plug",
a hollow column of fissile material (Pu-239 or U-235) often boosted by
deuterium gas. The spark plug, when compressed, can itself undergo
nuclear fission (because of the shape, it is not a critical mass
without compression). The tertiary, if one is present, would be set
below the secondary and probably be made up of the same materials.
Separating the secondary from the primary is the interstage.
The fissioning primary produces four types of energy: 1) expanding hot
gases from high explosive charges that implode the primary; 2)
superheated plasma that was originally the bomb's fissile material and its tamper; 3) the electromagnetic radiation; and 4) the neutrons
from the primary's nuclear detonation. The interstage is responsible
for accurately modulating the transfer of energy from the primary to the
secondary. It must direct the hot gases, plasma, electromagnetic
radiation and neutrons toward the right place at the right time. Less
than optimal interstage designs have resulted in the secondary failing
to work entirely on multiple shots, known as a "fissile fizzle". The Castle Koon shot of Operation Castle
is a good example; a small flaw allowed the neutron flux from the
primary to prematurely begin heating the secondary, weakening the
compression enough to prevent any fusion.
There is very little detailed information in the open literature
about the mechanism of the interstage. One of the best sources is a
simplified diagram of a British thermonuclear weapon similar to the
American W80 warhead. It was released by Greenpeace in a report titled "Dual Use Nuclear Technology".
The major components and their arrangement are in the diagram, though
details are almost absent; what scattered details it does include likely
have intentional omissions or inaccuracies. They are labeled "End-cap
and Neutron Focus Lens" and "Reflector Wrap"; the former channels
neutrons to the U-235/Pu-239 Spark Plug while the latter refers to an X-ray
reflector; typically a cylinder made out of an X-ray opaque material
such as uranium with the primary and secondary at either end. It does
not reflect like a mirror; instead, it gets heated to a high temperature by the X-ray flux from the primary, then it emits more evenly spread X-rays that travel to the secondary, causing what is known as radiation implosion. In Ivy Mike, gold was used as a coating over the uranium to enhance the blackbody effect.
Next comes the "Reflector/Neutron Gun Carriage". The reflector seals
the gap between the Neutron Focus Lens (in the center) and the outer
casing near the primary. It separates the primary from the secondary and
performs the same function as the previous reflector. There are about
six neutron guns (seen here from Sandia National Laboratories)
each poking through the outer edge of the reflector with one end in
each section; all are clamped to the carriage and arranged more or less
evenly around the casing's circumference. The neutron guns are tilted so
the neutron emitting end of each gun end is pointed towards the central
axis of the bomb. Neutrons from each neutron gun pass through and are
focused by the neutron focus lens towards the centre of primary in order
to boost the initial fissioning of the plutonium. A "polystyrene Polarizer/Plasma Source" is also shown (see below).
The first U.S. government document to mention the interstage was
only recently released to the public promoting the 2004 initiation of
the Reliable Replacement Warhead
Program. A graphic includes blurbs describing the potential advantage
of a RRW on a part by part level, with the interstage blurb saying a new
design would replace "toxic, brittle material" and "expensive 'special'
material... [which require] unique facilities". The "toxic, brittle material" is widely assumed to be beryllium which fits that description and would also moderate the neutron flux from the primary. Some material to absorb and re-radiate the X-rays in a particular manner may also be used.
Candidates for the "special material" are polystyrene and a substance called "FOGBANK", an unclassified codename. FOGBANK's composition is classified, though aerogel has been suggested as a possibility. It was first used in thermonuclear weapons with the W-76 thermonuclear warhead, and produced at a plant in the Y-12 Complex at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, for use in the W-76. Production of FOGBANK lapsed after the
W-76 production run ended. The W-76 Life Extension Program required
more FOGBANK to be made. This was complicated by the fact that the
original FOGBANK's properties weren't fully documented, so a massive
effort was mounted to re-invent the process. An impurity crucial to the
properties of the old FOGBANK was omitted during the new process. Only
close analysis of new and old batches revealed the nature of that
impurity. The manufacturing process used acetonitrile as a solvent,
which led to at least three evacuations of the FOGBANK plant in 2006.
Widely used in the petroleum and pharmaceutical industries, acetonitrile
is flammable and toxic. Y-12 is the sole producer of FOGBANK.
Summary
A simplified summary of the above explanation is:
- An implosion assembly type of fission bomb explodes. This is the primary stage. If a small amount of deuterium/tritium gas is placed inside the primary's core, it will be compressed during the explosion and a nuclear fusion reaction will occur; the released neutrons from this fusion reaction will induce further fission in the Pu-239 or U-235 used in the primary stage. The use of fusion fuel to enhance the efficiency of a fission reaction is called boosting. Without boosting, a large portion of the fissile material will remain unreacted; the Little Boy and Fat Man bombs had an efficiency of only 1.4% and 17%, respectively, because they were unboosted.
- Energy released in the primary stage is transferred to the secondary (or fusion) stage. The exact mechanism whereby this happens is highly classified. This energy compresses the fusion fuel and sparkplug; the compressed sparkplug becomes critical and undergoes a fission chain reaction, further heating the compressed fusion fuel to a high enough temperature to induce fusion, and also supplying neutrons that react with lithium to create tritium for fusion.
- The fusion fuel of the secondary stage may be surrounded by uranium or enriched uranium, or plutonium. Fast neutrons generated by fusion can induce fission even in materials normally not prone to it, such as depleted uranium whose U-238 is not fissile and cannot sustain a chain reaction, but which is fissionable when bombarded by the high-energy neutrons released by fusion in the secondary stage. This process provides considerable energy yield (as much as half of the total yield in large devices). Although it is sometimes considered to be a separate stage, it should not be confused with a true tertiary stage. Tertiary stages are further fusion stages (see below), which have been put in only a handful of bombs, none of them in large-scale production.
Thermonuclear weapons may or may not use a boosted primary stage, use
different types of fusion fuel, and may surround the fusion fuel with beryllium (or another neutron reflecting material) instead of depleted uranium to prevent early premature fission from occurring before the secondary is optimally compressed.
Compression of the secondary
The
basic idea of the Teller–Ulam configuration is that each "stage" would
undergo fission or fusion (or both) and release energy, much of which
would be transferred to another stage to trigger it. How exactly the
energy is "transported" from the primary to the secondary has been the subject of some disagreement in the open press, but is thought to be transmitted through the X-rays and Gamma rays that are emitted from the fissioning primary. This energy is then used to compress the secondary. The crucial detail of how
the X-rays create the pressure is the main remaining disputed point in
the unclassified press. There are three proposed theories:
- Radiation pressure exerted by the X-rays. This was the first idea put forth by Howard Morland in the article in The Progressive.
- X-rays creating a plasma in the radiation channel's filler (a polystyrene or "FOGBANK" plastic foam). This was a second idea put forward by Chuck Hansen and later by Howard Morland.
- Tamper/Pusher ablation. This is the concept best supported by physical analysis.
Radiation pressure
The radiation pressure exerted by the large quantity of X-ray photons inside the closed casing might be enough to compress the secondary. Electromagnetic radiation such as X-rays or light carries momentum
and exerts a force on any surface it strikes. The pressure of radiation
at the intensities seen in everyday life, such as sunlight striking a
surface, is usually imperceptible, but at the extreme intensities found
in a thermonuclear bomb the pressure is enormous.
For two thermonuclear bombs for which the general size and
primary characteristics are well understood, the Ivy Mike test bomb and
the modern W-80 cruise missile warhead variant of the W-61 design, the
radiation pressure was calculated to be 73 million bar (atmospheres) (7.3 T Pa) for the Ivy Mike design and 1,400 million bar (140 TPa) for the W-80.
Foam plasma pressure
Foam
plasma pressure is the concept that Chuck Hansen introduced during the
Progressive case, based on research that located declassified documents
listing special foams as liner components within the radiation case of
thermonuclear weapons.
The sequence of firing the weapon (with the foam) would be as follows:
- The high explosives surrounding the core of the primary fire, compressing the fissile material into a supercritical state and beginning the fission chain reaction.
- The fissioning primary emits thermal X-rays, which "reflect" along the inside of the casing, irradiating the polystyrene foam.
- The irradiated foam becomes a hot plasma, pushing against the tamper of the secondary, compressing it tightly, and beginning the fission chain reaction in the spark plug.
- Pushed from both sides (from the primary and the spark plug), the lithium deuteride fuel is highly compressed and heated to thermonuclear temperatures. Also, by being bombarded with neutrons, each lithium-6 atom splits into one tritium atom and one alpha particle. Then begins a fusion reaction between the tritium and the deuterium, releasing even more neutrons, and a huge amount of energy.
- The fuel undergoing the fusion reaction emits a large flux of high energy (17.6 MeV) neutrons, which irradiates the U-238 tamper (or the U-238 bomb casing), causing it to undergo a fast fission reaction, providing about half of the total energy.
This would complete the fission-fusion-fission sequence. Fusion,
unlike fission, is relatively "clean"—it releases energy but no harmful radioactive products or large amounts of nuclear fallout.
The fission reactions though, especially the last fission reactions,
release a tremendous amount of fission products and fallout. If the last
fission stage is omitted, by replacing the uranium tamper with one made
of lead, for example, the overall explosive force is reduced by approximately half but the amount of fallout is relatively low. The neutron bomb is a hydrogen bomb with an intentionally thin tamper, allowing most of the fast fusion neutrons as possible to escape.
Current technical criticisms of the idea of "foam plasma pressure"
focus on unclassified analysis from similar high energy physics fields
that indicate that the pressure produced by such a plasma would only be a
small multiplier of the basic photon pressure within the
radiation case, and also that the known foam materials intrinsically
have a very low absorption efficiency of the gamma ray and X-ray
radiation from the primary. Most of the energy produced would be
absorbed by either the walls of the radiation case or the tamper around
the secondary. Analyzing the effects of that absorbed energy led to the
third mechanism: ablation.
Tamper-pusher ablation
The
outer casing of the secondary assembly is called the "tamper-pusher".
The purpose of a tamper in an implosion bomb is to delay the expansion
of the reacting fuel supply (which is very hot dense plasma) until the
fuel is fully consumed and the explosion runs to completion. The same
tamper material serves also as a pusher in that it is the medium by
which the outside pressure (force acting on the surface area of the
secondary) is transferred to the mass of fusion fuel.
The proposed tamper-pusher ablation mechanism posits that the
outer layers of the thermonuclear secondary's tamper-pusher are heated
so extremely by the primary's X-ray flux that they expand violently and
ablate away (fly off). Because total momentum is conserved, this mass of
high velocity ejecta impels the rest of the tamper-pusher to recoil
inwards with tremendous force, crushing the fusion fuel and the spark
plug. The tamper-pusher is built robustly enough to insulate the fusion
fuel from the extreme heat outside; otherwise the compression would be
spoiled.
Rough calculations for the basic ablation effect are relatively
simple: the energy from the primary is distributed evenly onto all of
the surfaces within the outer radiation case, with the components coming
to a thermal equilibrium, and the effects of that thermal energy are then analyzed. The energy is mostly deposited within about one X-ray optical thickness
of the tamper/pusher outer surface, and the temperature of that layer
can then be calculated. The velocity at which the surface then expands
outwards is calculated and, from a basic Newtonian momentum balance, the velocity at which the rest of the tamper implodes inwards.
Applying the more detailed form of those calculations to the Ivy Mike
device yields vaporized pusher gas expansion velocity of 290 kilometers
per second and an implosion velocity of perhaps 400 kilometers per
second if 3/4 of the total tamper/pusher mass is ablated off, the most
energy efficient proportion. For the W-80
the gas expansion velocity is roughly 410 kilometers per second and the
implosion velocity 570 kilometers per second. The pressure due to the
ablating material is calculated to be 5.3 billion bar (530 T Pa) in the Ivy Mike device and 64 billion bar (6.4 P Pa) in the W-80 device.
Comparing implosion mechanisms
Comparing the three mechanisms proposed, it can be seen that:
Mechanism | Pressure (TPa) | |
---|---|---|
Ivy Mike | W80 | |
Radiation pressure | 7.3 | 140 |
Plasma pressure | 35 | 750 |
Ablation pressure | 530 | 6400 |
The calculated ablation pressure is one order of magnitude greater
than the higher proposed plasma pressures and nearly two orders of
magnitude greater than calculated radiation pressure. No mechanism to
avoid the absorption of energy into the radiation case wall and the
secondary tamper has been suggested, making ablation apparently
unavoidable. The other mechanisms appear to be unneeded.
United States Department of Defense
official declassification reports indicate that foamed plastic
materials are or may be used in radiation case liners, and despite the
low direct plasma pressure they may be of use in delaying the ablation until energy has distributed evenly and a sufficient fraction has reached the secondary's tamper/pusher.
Richard Rhodes' book Dark Sun stated that a 1-inch-thick (25 mm) layer of plastic foam was fixed to the lead liner of the inside of the Ivy Mike
steel casing using copper nails. Rhodes quotes several designers of
that bomb explaining that the plastic foam layer inside the outer case
is to delay ablation and thus recoil of the outer case: if the foam were
not there, metal would ablate from the inside of the outer case with a
large impulse, causing the casing to recoil outwards rapidly. The
purpose of the casing is to contain the explosion for as long as
possible, allowing as much X-ray ablation of the metallic surface of the
secondary stage as possible, so it compresses the secondary
efficiently, maximizing the fusion yield. Plastic foam has a low
density, so causes a smaller impulse when it ablates than metal does.
Design variations
A number of possible variations to the weapon design have been proposed:
- Either the tamper or the casing have been proposed to be made of U-235 (highly enriched uranium) in the final fission jacket. The far more expensive U-235 is also fissionable with fast neutrons like the U-238 in depleted or natural uranium, but its fission-efficiency is higher. This is because U-235 nuclei also undergo fission by slow neutrons (U-238 nuclei require a minimum energy of about 1 mega-electron volt), and because these slower neutrons are produced by other fissioning U-235 nuclei in the jacket (in other words, U-235 supports the nuclear chain reaction whereas U-238 does not). Furthermore, a U-235 jacket fosters neutron multiplication, whereas U-238 nuclei consume fusion neutrons in the fast-fission process. Using a final fissionable/fissile jacket of U-235 would thus increase the yield of a Teller–Ulam bomb above a depleted uranium or natural uranium jacket. This has been proposed specifically for the W87 warheads retrofitted to currently deployed LGM-30 Minuteman III ICBMs.
- In some descriptions, additional internal structures exist to protect the secondary from receiving excessive neutrons from the primary.
- The inside of the casing may or may not be specially machined to "reflect" the X-rays. X-ray "reflection" is not like light reflecting off of a mirror, but rather the reflector material is heated by the X-rays, causing the material itself to emit X-rays, which then travel to the secondary.
Two special variations exist that will be discussed in a subsequent section: the cryogenically cooled liquid deuterium device used for the Ivy Mike test, and the putative design of the W88 nuclear warhead—a small, MIRVed version of the Teller–Ulam configuration with a prolate (egg or watermelon shaped) primary and an elliptical secondary.
Most bombs do not apparently have tertiary "stages"—that is,
third compression stage(s), which are additional fusion stages
compressed by a previous fusion stage. (The fissioning of the last
blanket of uranium, which provides about half the yield in large bombs,
does not count as a "stage" in this terminology.)
The U.S. tested three-stage bombs in several explosions
but is thought to have fielded only one such tertiary model, i.e., a
bomb in which a fission stage, followed by a fusion stage, finally
compresses yet another fusion stage. This U.S. design was the heavy but
highly efficient (i.e., nuclear weapon yield per unit bomb weight) 25 Mt B41 nuclear bomb.
The Soviet Union is thought to have used multiple stages (including
more than one tertiary fusion stage) in their 50 megaton (100 Mt in
intended use) Tsar Bomba
(however, as with other bombs, the fissionable jacket could be replaced
with lead in such a bomb, and in this one, for demonstration, it was).
If any hydrogen bombs have been made from configurations other than
those based on the Teller–Ulam design, the fact of it is not publicly
known. (A possible exception to this is the Soviet early Sloika design).
In essence, the Teller–Ulam configuration relies on at least two
instances of implosion occurring: first, the conventional (chemical)
explosives in the primary would compress the fissile core, resulting in a
fission explosion many times more powerful than that which chemical
explosives could achieve alone (first stage). Second, the radiation from
the fissioning of the primary would be used to compress and ignite the
secondary fusion stage, resulting in a fusion explosion many times more
powerful than the fission explosion alone. This chain of compression
could conceivably be continued with an arbitrary number of tertiary
fusion stages, each igniting more fusion fuel in the next stage although this is debated. Finally, efficient bombs (but not so-called neutron bombs) end with the fissioning of the final natural uranium tamper, something that could not normally be achieved without the neutron flux
provided by the fusion reactions in secondary or tertiary stages. Such
designs are suggested to be capable of being scaled up to an arbitrary
large yield (with apparently as many fusion stages as desired), potentially to the level of a "doomsday device."
However, usually such weapons were not more than a dozen megatons,
which was generally considered enough to destroy even most hardened
practical targets (for example, a control facility such as the Cheyenne Mountain Complex). Even such large bombs have been replaced by smaller-yield bunker buster type nuclear bombs (see more: nuclear bunker buster).
As discussed above, for destruction of cities and non-hardened
targets, breaking the mass of a single missile payload down into smaller
MIRV bombs, in order to spread the energy of the explosions into a
"pancake" area, is far more efficient in terms of area-destruction per
unit of bomb energy. This also applies to single bombs deliverable by
cruise missile or other system, such as a bomber, resulting in most
operational warheads in the U.S. program having yields of less than 500
kilotons.
History
United States
The idea of a thermonuclear fusion bomb ignited by a smaller fission bomb was first proposed by Enrico Fermi to his colleague Edward Teller in 1941 at the start of what would become the Manhattan Project.
Teller spent most of the Manhattan Project attempting to figure out how
to make the design work, to some degree neglecting his assigned work on
the fission bomb program. His difficult and devil's advocate attitude in discussions led Robert Oppenheimer to sidetrack him and other "problem" physicists into the super program to smooth his way.
Stanislaw Ulam,
a co-worker of Teller, made the first key conceptual leaps towards a
workable fusion design. Ulam's two innovations that rendered the fusion
bomb practical were that compression of the thermonuclear fuel before
extreme heating was a practical path towards the conditions needed for
fusion, and the idea of staging or placing a separate thermonuclear
component outside a fission primary component, and somehow using the
primary to compress the secondary. Teller then realized that the gamma
and X-ray radiation produced in the primary could transfer enough energy
into the secondary to create a successful implosion and fusion burn, if
the whole assembly was wrapped in a hohlraum or radiation case.
Teller and his various proponents and detractors later disputed the
degree to which Ulam had contributed to the theories underlying this
mechanism. Indeed, shortly before his death, and in a last-ditch effort
to discredit Ulam's contributions, Teller claimed that one of his own
"graduate students" had proposed the mechanism.
The "George" shot of Operation Greenhouse
of 9 May 1951 tested the basic concept for the first time on a very
small scale. As the first successful (uncontrolled) release of nuclear
fusion energy, which made up a small fraction of the 225 kt total yield, it raised expectations to a near certainty that the concept would work.
On November 1, 1952, the Teller–Ulam configuration was tested at full scale in the "Ivy Mike" shot at an island in the Enewetak Atoll, with a yield of 10.4 megatons (over 450 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki during World War II). The device, dubbed the Sausage, used an extra-large fission bomb as a "trigger" and liquid deuterium—kept in its liquid state by 20 short tons (18 metric tons) of cryogenic equipment—as its fusion fuel and weighed around 80 short tons (70 metric tons) altogether.
The liquid deuterium fuel of Ivy Mike was impractical for a deployable weapon, and the next advance was to use a solid lithium deuteride fusion fuel instead. In 1954 this was tested in the "Castle Bravo" shot (the device was code-named Shrimp), which had a yield of 15 megatons (2.5 times expected) and is the largest U.S. bomb ever tested.
Efforts in the United States soon shifted towards developing miniaturized Teller–Ulam weapons that could fit into intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. By 1960, with the W47 warhead deployed on Polaris ballistic missile submarines,
megaton-class warheads were as small as 18 inches (0.5 m) in diameter
and 720 pounds (320 kg) in weight. Further innovation in miniaturizing
warheads was accomplished by the mid-1970s, when versions of the
Teller–Ulam design were created that could fit ten or more warheads on
the end of a small MIRVed missile (see the section on the W88 below).
Soviet Union
The Soviet thermonuclear weapons program was aided heavily by Klaus Fuchs.
Fuchs’ most valuable contribution to the Soviet weapons program
concerned the hydrogen bomb. The idea of a hydrogen bomb arose from
discussions between Enrico Fermi and Edward Teller in 1941. From 1943
Teller lectured at Los Alamos on what he called the "super".
Following their meeting, Fermi was convinced by Teller to present a
series of lectures detailing the current state of research into
thermonuclear weapons.
In September 1945 Fuchs passed a synopsis of these lectures to the
Soviets. This information was important to the Soviets, but not solely
for the information about the US bomb project. The importance of this
material was in that it confirmed that the United States were working on
their own thermonuclear weapon research.
Although the information provided by Fuchs regarding the thermonuclear
weapons research was not seen as entirely beneficial, it still provided
the Soviet Union with knowledge such as the properties of tritium.
Tritium is an isotope of hydrogen with two neutrons, which allows for
more efficient fusion reactions to occur during the detonation of a
nuclear weapon. Discovering the properties of this radioactive material
would allow the Soviet Union to develop a more powerful weapon that
requires less fuel. Following Fuchs's return, experts from the Soviet
Union spent a great deal of time researching his findings for
themselves. Even though the Soviets did obtain some original ideas, the
findings of this research served to confirm Fuchs's notes from the
American lectures on the matter. After his return to England in
mid-1946, Fuchs was not again in touch with Soviet intelligence until
September 1947, when his controller confirmed the Soviet interest in
thermonuclear weapons. In response Fuchs provided details of the
"ongoing theoretical superbomb studies in the U.S. under the direction
of Teller and Enrico Fermi at the University of Chicago." Fuchs obtained information regardless of the American McMahon Act,
which prevented Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear weapons research.
Under this act, Fuchs did not have routine access to American
collaborators like Fermi and Teller. Fuchs was very close to Teller at
Los Alamos, and while there Fuchs had worked on thermonuclear weapons.
As Teller later recalled, "he [Fuchs] talked with me and others
frequently in depth about our intensive efforts… it was easy and
pleasant to discuss my work with him. He also made impressive
contributions, and I learned many technical facts from him."
The information Fuchs obtained energized the Soviets to direct new
intelligence activities against research in Chicago. In February 1948
the Soviet Union formally began its hydrogen bomb program. A month later
Fuchs again met with Feklisov, an event which "played an exceptional
role in the subsequent course of the Soviet thermonuclear bomb program."
A report of June 1953 warned that, although no indication of Soviet
development of hydrogen bombs had been found, "Soviet research,
development and even field testing of thermonuclear reactions based on
the disclosures of Fuchs may take place by mid-1953."
U.S. intelligence thus recognized for the first time that Fuchs'
material held invaluable information for the Soviet thermonuclear
weapons program.
The first Soviet fusion design, developed by Andrei Sakharov and Vitaly Ginzburg in 1949 (before the Soviets had a working fission bomb), was dubbed the Sloika, after a Russian layer cake,
and was not of the Teller–Ulam configuration. It used alternating
layers of fissile material and lithium deuteride fusion fuel spiked with
tritium
(this was later dubbed Sakharov's "First Idea"). Though nuclear fusion
might have been technically achievable, it did not have the scaling
property of a "staged" weapon. Thus, such a design could not produce
thermonuclear weapons whose explosive yields could be made arbitrarily
large (unlike U.S. designs at that time). The fusion layer wrapped
around the fission core could only moderately multiply the fission
energy (modern Teller–Ulam designs can multiply it 30-fold).
Additionally, the whole fusion stage had to be imploded by conventional
explosives, along with the fission core, substantially multiplying the
amount of chemical explosives needed.
The first Sloika design test, RDS-6s, was detonated in 1953 with a yield equivalent to 400 kilotons of TNT (15–20% from fusion). Attempts to use a Sloika design to achieve megaton-range results proved unfeasible. After the United States tested the "Ivy Mike"
thermonuclear device in November 1952, proving that a multimegaton bomb
could be created, the Soviets searched for an additional design. The
"Second Idea", as Sakharov referred to it in his memoirs, was a previous
proposal by Ginzburg in November 1948 to use lithium deuteride in the
bomb, which would, in the course of being bombarded by neutrons, produce
tritium and free deuterium. In late 1953 physicist Viktor Davidenko achieved the first breakthrough, that of keeping the primary and secondary parts of the bombs in separate pieces ("staging"). The next breakthrough was discovered and developed by Sakharov and Yakov Zel'dovich, that of using the X-rays from the fission bomb to compress the secondary
before fusion ("radiation implosion"), in early 1954. Sakharov's "Third
Idea", as the Teller–Ulam design was known in the USSR, was tested in
the shot "RDS-37" in November 1955 with a yield of 1.6 megatons.
The Soviets demonstrated the power of the "staging" concept in October 1961, when they detonated the massive and unwieldy Tsar Bomba,
a 50 megaton hydrogen bomb that derived almost 97% of its energy from
fusion. It was the largest nuclear weapon developed and tested by any
country.
United Kingdom
In 1954 work began at Aldermaston to develop the British fusion bomb, with Sir William Penney
in charge of the project. British knowledge on how to make a
thermonuclear fusion bomb was rudimentary, and at the time the United
States was not exchanging any nuclear knowledge because of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. However, the British were allowed to observe the U.S. Castle tests and used sampling aircraft in the mushroom clouds, providing them with clear, direct evidence of the compression produced in the secondary stages by radiation implosion.
Because of these difficulties, in 1955 British prime minister Anthony Eden
agreed to a secret plan, whereby if the Aldermaston scientists failed
or were greatly delayed in developing the fusion bomb, it would be
replaced by an extremely large fission bomb.
In 1957 the Operation Grapple tests were carried out. The first test, Green Granite
was a prototype fusion bomb, but failed to produce equivalent yields
compared to the U.S. and Soviets, achieving only approximately 300
kilotons. The second test Orange Herald
was the modified fission bomb and produced 720 kilotons—making it the
largest fission explosion ever. At the time almost everyone (including
the pilots of the plane that dropped it) thought that this was a fusion
bomb. This bomb was put into service in 1958. A second prototype fusion
bomb Purple Granite was used in the third test, but only produced approximately 150 kilotons.
A second set of tests was scheduled, with testing recommencing in
September 1957. The first test was based on a "… new simpler design. A
two stage thermonuclear bomb that had a much more powerful trigger".
This test Grapple X Round C was exploded on November 8 and yielded
approximately 1.8 megatons. On April 28, 1958 a bomb was dropped that
yielded 3 megatons—Britain's most powerful test. Two final air burst
tests on September 2 and September 11, 1958, dropped smaller bombs that
yielded around 1 megaton each.
American observers had been invited to these kinds of tests.
After Britain's successful detonation of a megaton-range device (and
thus demonstrating a practical understanding of the Teller–Ulam design
"secret"), the United States agreed to exchange some of its nuclear
designs with the United Kingdom, leading to the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement. Instead of continuing with its own design, the British were given access to the design of the smaller American Mk 28 warhead and were able to manufacture copies.
The United Kingdom had worked closely with the Americans on the
Manhattan Project. British access to nuclear weapons information was
cut-off by the United States at one point due to concerns about Soviet
espionage. Full cooperation was not reestablished until an agreement
governing the handling of secret information and other issues was
signed.
China
Mao Zedong decided to begin a Chinese nuclear-weapons program during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis
of 1954–1955. The People's Republic of China detonated its first
hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb on June 17, 1967, 32 months after
detonating its first fission weapon, with a yield of 3.31 Mt. It took
place in the Lop Nor Test Site, in northwest China. China had received extensive technical help from the Soviet Union to jump-start their nuclear program, but by 1960, the rift between the Soviet Union and China had become so great that the Soviet Union ceased all assistance to China.
A story in The New York Times by William Broad reported that in 1995, a supposed Chinese double agent delivered information indicating that China knew secret details of the U.S. W88 warhead, supposedly through espionage. (This line of investigation eventually resulted in the abortive trial of Wen Ho Lee.)
France
France's
journey in building nuclear weapons began prior to World War II in
1939. The development of nuclear weapons was slowed during the country's
German invasion. The United States did not want France to acquire
expert knowledge about nuclear weaponry, which ultimately led to the Alsos Mission.
The missions followed closely behind the advancing forward-front to
obtain information about how close Germany was to building an atomic
weapon. Following the surrender of the Nazis, Germany was divided into
"zones of occupation". The "zone" given to the French was suspected to
contain several nuclear research facilities. The United States conducted
Operation Harborage
to seize any and all information about nuclear weaponry from the
French. The Operation strategized to have American troops intercede
advancing French army, allowing the Americans to seize any German
scientists or records as well as destroy the remaining functional
facilities.
In 1945, the French Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique, CEA) was founded under Charles de Gaulle;
the CEA served as the country's atomic energy authority, overseeing
commercial, military, and scientific uses of atomic power. However it
was not until 1952 that a tangible goal of building plutonium reactors
progressed. Two years later, a reactor was being built and a plutonium
separating plant began construction shortly after. In 1954 the question
about continuing to explore building an atomic bomb was raised.
The French cabinet seemed to be favoring less the building of an atomic
bomb. Ultimately, the Prime Minister decided to continue efforts
developing an atomic bomb in secret. In late 1956, tasks were delegated
between the CEA and Defense Ministry to propel atomic development such
as finding a test site, providing the necessary uranium, and physical
device assembly.
Charles de Gaulle returned to power and was elected France's
Fifth Republic's first president in 1958. De Gaulle, a strong believer
in the nuclear weapons program, approved the country's first nuclear
test to take place in one of the early months of 1960. The country's
first nuclear explosion took place on 13 February at Reggane Oasis in the Sahara Desert in French Algeria of the time. It was called "Gerboise Bleue", translating to "Blue jerboa".
The first explosion was detonated at a tower height of 105 meters. The
bomb used a plutonium implosion design with a yield of 70 kilotons. The Reggane Oasis
test site was used for three more atmospheric tests before testing
activity moved to a second site, Ecker, to carry out a total of 13
underground tests into 1967.
The French nuclear testing site was moved to the unpopulated
French atolls in the Pacific Ocean. The first test conducted at these
new sites was the "Canopus" test in the Fangataufa atoll in French Polynesia
on 24 August 1968, the country's first multistage thermonuclear weapon
test. The bomb was detonated from a balloon at a height of 520 meters.
The result of this test was significant atmospheric contamination. Very little is known about France's development of the Teller–Ulam design, beyond the fact that France detonated a 2.6 Mt device in the 'Canopus" test.
France reportedly had great difficulty with its initial development of
the Teller-Ulam design, but it later overcame these, and is believed to
have nuclear weapons equal in sophistication to the other major nuclear
powers.
France and China did not sign or ratify the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, underwater, or in outer space. Between 1966 and 1996 France carried out more than 190 nuclear tests.
France's final nuclear test took place on January 27, 1996, and then
the country dismantled its Polynesian test sites. France signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that same year, and then ratified the Treaty within two years.
France confirmed that its nuclear arsenal contains about 300 warheads, carried by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and fighter-bombers in 2015. France has four Triomphant-class
ballistic missile submarines. One ballistic missile submarine is
deployed in the deep ocean, but a total of three must be in operational
use at all times. The three older submarines are armed with 16 M45 missiles. The newest submarine, "Le Terrible", was commissioned in 2010, and it has M51 missiles capable of carrying TN 75 thermonuclear warheads. The air fleet is four squadrons at four different bases. In total, there are 23 Mirage 2000N aircraft and 20 Rafales capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
The M51.1 missiles are intended to be replaced with the new M51.2
warhead beginning in 2016, which has a 3,000 km greater range than the
M51.1.
President François Hollande announced 180 billion euros would be used from the annual defense budget to improve the country's nuclear deterrence.
France contains 13 International Monitoring System facilities that
monitor for nuclear explosive activity on Earth through the use of
seismic, infrasound, and hydroacoustic monitors.
France also has about 60 air-launched missiles tipped with TN 80/TN 81
warheads with a yield of about 300 kilotons each. France's nuclear
program has been carefully designed to ensure that these weapons remain
usable decades into the future.
Currently, France is no longer deliberately producing critical mass
materials such as plutonium and enriched uranium, but it still relies on
nuclear energy for electricity, with Pu-239 as a byproduct.
India
On May 11, 1998, India announced that it had detonated a thermonuclear bomb in its Operation Shakti tests ("Shakti-I", specifically). Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, a Pakistani nuclear physicist, asserted that if Shakti-I had been a thermonuclear test, the device had failed to fire. However, Dr. Harold M. Agnew, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, said that India's assertion of having detonated a staged thermonuclear bomb was believable.
India says that their thermonuclear device was tested at a controlled
yield of 45 kt because of the close proximity of the Khetolai village at
about 5 km, to ensure that the houses in that village do not suffer
significant damage. Another cited reason was that radioactivity released from yields significantly more than 45 Kilotons might not have been contained fully. After the Pokhran-II tests, Dr. Rajagopal Chidambaram, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India said that India has the capability to build thermonuclear bombs of any yield at will.
The yield of India's hydrogen bomb test remains highly debatable
among the Indian science community and the international scholars. The question of politicisation and disputes between Indian scientists further complicated the matter.
In an interview in August 2009, the director for the 1998 test
site preparations, Dr. K. Santhanam claimed that the yield of the
thermonuclear explosion was lower than expected and that India should
therefore not rush into signing the CTBT. Other Indian scientists involved in the test have disputed Dr. K. Santhanam's claim, arguing that Santhanam's claims are unscientific.
British seismologist Roger Clarke argued that the magnitudes suggested a
combined yield of up to 60 kilotonnes, consistent with the Indian
announced total yield of 56 kilotonnes.
U.S. seismologist Jack Evernden has argued that for correct estimation
of yields, one should ‘account properly for geological and seismological
differences between test sites’.
India officially maintains that it can build thermonuclear
weapons of various yields up to around 200 kilotons on the basis of the Shakti-1 thermonuclear test.
Israel
Israel is alleged to possess thermonuclear weapons of the Teller–Ulam design, but it is not known to have tested any nuclear devices, although it is widely speculated that the Vela Incident of 1979 may have been a joint Israeli–South African nuclear test.
It is well established that Edward Teller advised and guided the Israeli establishment on general nuclear matters for some twenty years. Between 1964 and 1967, Teller made six visits to Israel where he lectured at the Tel Aviv University on general topics in theoretical physics. It took him a year to convince the CIA about Israel's capability and finally in 1976, Carl Duckett of the CIA testified to the U.S. Congress, after receiving credible information from an "American scientist" (Teller), on Israel's nuclear capability.
During the 1990s, Teller eventually confirmed speculations in the media
that it was during his visits in the 1960s that he concluded that
Israel was in possession of nuclear weapons. After he conveyed the matter to the higher level of the U.S. government,
Teller reportedly said: "They [Israel] have it, and they were clever
enough to trust their research and not to test, they know that to test
would get them into trouble."
Pakistan
According to the scientific data received and published by PAEC, the Corps of Engineers, and Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), in May 1998, Pakistan carried out six underground nuclear tests in Chagai Hills and Kharan Desert in Balochistan Province (see the code-names of the tests, Chagai-I and Chagai-II). None of these boosted fission devices was the thermonuclear weapon design, according to KRL and PAEC.
North Korea
North Korea claimed to have tested its miniaturised thermonuclear
bomb on 6 January 2016. North Korea's first three nuclear tests (2006,
2009 and 2013) were relatively low yield and do not appear to have been
of a thermonuclear weapon design. In 2013, the South Korean Defense Ministry
speculated that North Korea may be trying to develop a "hydrogen bomb"
and such a device may be North Korea's next weapons test. In January 2016, North Korea claimed to have successfully tested a hydrogen bomb, although only a magnitude 5.1 seismic event was detected at the time of the test,
a similar magnitude to the 2013 test of a 6–9 kt atomic bomb. These
seismic recordings cast doubt upon North Korea's claim that a hydrogen
bomb was tested and suggest it was a non-fusion nuclear test.
On 3 September 2017, the country's state media reported that a hydrogen bomb test
was conducted which resulted in "perfect success". According to the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the blast resulted in an earthquake with a
magnitude of 6.3, 10 times more powerful than previous nuclear tests
conducted by North Korea. U.S. Intelligence released an early assessment that the yield estimate was 140 kilotons, with an uncertainty range of 70 to 280 kilotons.
On 12 September, NORSAR revised its estimate of the earthquake magnitude upward to 6.1, matching that of the CTBTO, but less powerful than the USGS
estimate of 6.3. Its yield estimate was revised to 250 kilotons, while
noting the estimate had some uncertainty and an undisclosed margin of
error.
On 13 September, an analysis of before and after synthetic-aperture radar
satellite imagery of the test site was published suggesting the test
occurred under 900 metres (3,000 ft) of rock and the yield "could have
been in excess of 300 kilotons".
Public knowledge
The
Teller–Ulam design was for many years considered one of the top nuclear
secrets, and even today it is not discussed in any detail by official
publications with origins "behind the fence" of classification. United States Department of Energy
(DOE) policy has been, and continues to be, that they do not
acknowledge when "leaks" occur, because doing so would acknowledge the
accuracy of the supposed leaked information. Aside from images of the
warhead casing, most information in the public domain about this design
is relegated to a few terse statements by the DOE and the work of a few
individual investigators.
DOE statements
In
1972 the United States government declassified a document stating "[I]n
thermonuclear (TN) weapons, a fission 'primary' is used to trigger a TN
reaction in thermonuclear fuel referred to as a 'secondary'", and in
1979 added, "[I]n thermonuclear weapons, radiation from a fission
explosive can be contained and used to transfer energy to compress and
ignite a physically separate component containing thermonuclear fuel."
To this latter sentence the US government specified that "Any elaboration of this statement will be classified." The only information that may pertain to the spark plug
was declassified in 1991: "Fact that fissile or fissionable materials
are present in some secondaries, material unidentified, location
unspecified, use unspecified, and weapons undesignated." In 1998 the DOE
declassified the statement that "The fact that materials may be present
in channels and the term 'channel filler,' with no elaboration", which
may refer to the polystyrene foam (or an analogous substance).
Whether these statements vindicate some or all of the models
presented above is up for interpretation, and official U.S. government
releases about the technical details of nuclear weapons have been
purposely equivocating in the past.
Other information, such as the types of fuel used in some of the early
weapons, has been declassified, though precise technical information has
not been.
The Progressive case
Most of the current ideas on the workings of the Teller–Ulam design came into public awareness after the Department of Energy (DOE) attempted to censor a magazine article by U.S. antiweapons activist Howard Morland
in 1979 on the "secret of the hydrogen bomb". In 1978, Morland had
decided that discovering and exposing this "last remaining secret" would
focus attention onto the arms race and allow citizens to feel empowered to question official statements on the importance of nuclear weapons and nuclear secrecy.
Most of Morland's ideas about how the weapon worked were compiled from
highly accessible sources—the drawings that most inspired his approach
came from none other than the Encyclopedia Americana. Morland also interviewed (often informally) many former Los Alamos scientists (including Teller and Ulam, though neither gave him any useful information), and used a variety of interpersonal strategies
to encourage informative responses from them (i.e., asking questions
such as "Do they still use spark plugs?" even if he was not aware what
the latter term specifically referred to).
Morland eventually concluded that the "secret" was that the primary and secondary were kept separate and that radiation pressure from the primary compressed the secondary before igniting it. When an early draft of the article, to be published in The Progressive
magazine, was sent to the DOE after falling into the hands of a
professor who was opposed to Morland's goal, the DOE requested that the
article not be published, and pressed for a temporary injunction. The
DOE argued that Morland's information was (1) likely derived from
classified sources, (2) if not derived from classified sources, itself
counted as "secret" information under the "born secret" clause of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, and (3) was dangerous and would encourage nuclear proliferation.
Morland and his lawyers disagreed on all points, but the
injunction was granted, as the judge in the case felt that it was safer
to grant the injunction and allow Morland, et al., to appeal, which they
did in United States v. The Progressive (1979).
Through a variety of more complicated circumstances, the DOE case
began to wane as it became clear that some of the data they were
attempting to claim as "secret" had been published in a students'
encyclopedia a few years earlier. After another H-bomb speculator, Chuck Hansen,
had his own ideas about the "secret" (quite different from Morland's)
published in a Wisconsin newspaper, the DOE claimed that The Progressive
case was moot, dropped its suit, and allowed the magazine to publish
its article, which it did in November 1979. Morland had by then,
however, changed his opinion of how the bomb worked, suggesting that a
foam medium (the polystyrene) rather than radiation pressure was used to
compress the secondary, and that in the secondary there was a spark plug
of fissile material as well. He published these changes, based in part
on the proceedings of the appeals trial, as a short erratum in The Progressive a month later.
In 1981, Morland published a book about his experience, describing in
detail the train of thought that led him to his conclusions about the
"secret".
Morland's work is interpreted as being at least partially correct
because the DOE had sought to censor it, one of the few times they
violated their usual approach of not acknowledging "secret" material
that had been released; however, to what degree it lacks information, or
has incorrect information, is not known with any confidence. The
difficulty that a number of nations had in developing the Teller–Ulam
design (even when they apparently understood the design, such as with
the United Kingdom), makes it somewhat unlikely that this simple
information alone is what provides the ability to manufacture
thermonuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the ideas put forward by Morland in
1979 have been the basis for all the current speculation on the
Teller–Ulam design.
Nuclear reduction
In January 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev publicly proposed a three-stage program for abolishing the world's nuclear weapons by the end of the 20th century.
Two years before his death in 1989, Andrei Sakharov's comments at a
scientists’ forum helped begin the process for the elimination of
thousands of nuclear ballistic missiles from the US and Soviet arsenals.
Sakharov (1921–89) was recruited into the Soviet Union's nuclear
weapons program in 1948, a year after he completed his doctorate. In
1949 the US detected the first Soviet test of a fission bomb, and the
two countries embarked on a desperate race to design a thermonuclear
hydrogen bomb that was a thousand times more powerful. Like his US
counterparts, Sakharov justified his H-bomb work by pointing to the
danger of the other country's achieving a monopoly. But also like some
of the US scientists who had worked on the Manhattan Project, he felt a
responsibility to inform his nation's leadership and then the world
about the dangers from nuclear weapons.
Sakharov's first attempt to influence policy was brought about by his
concern about possible genetic damage from long-lived radioactive
carbon-14 created in the atmosphere from nitrogen-14 by the enormous
fluxes of neutrons released in H-bomb tests.
In 1968, a friend suggested that Sakharov write an essay about the role
of the intelligentsia in world affairs. Self-publishing was the method
at the time for spreading unapproved manuscripts in the Soviet Union.
Many readers would create multiple copies by typing with multiple sheets
of paper interleaved with carbon paper. One copy of Sakharov's essay,
"Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual
Freedom", was smuggled out of the Soviet Union and published by the New
York Times. More than 18 million reprints were produced during 1968–69.
After the essay was published, Sakharov was barred from returning to
work in the nuclear weapons program and took a research position in
Moscow.
In 1980, after an interview with the New York Times in which he
denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the government put him
beyond the reach of Western media by exiling him and his wife to Gorky.
In March 1985, Gorbachev became general secretary of the Soviet
Communist Party. More than a year and a half later, he persuaded the
Politburo, the party's executive committee, to allow Sakharov and Bonner
to return to Moscow. Sakharov was elected as an opposition member to
the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies in 1989. Later that year he had
a cardiac arrhythmia and died in his apartment. He left behind a draft of a new Soviet constitution that emphasized democracy and human rights.
Notable accidents
On 5 February 1958, during a training mission flown by a B-47, a Mark 15 nuclear bomb, also known as the Tybee Bomb, was lost off the coast of Tybee Island near Savannah, Georgia. The bomb was thought by the Department of Energy to lie buried under several feet of silt at the bottom of Wassaw Sound.
On 17 January 1966, a fatal collision occurred between a B-52G and a KC-135 Stratotanker over Palomares, Spain. The conventional explosives in two of the Mk28-type hydrogen bombs
detonated upon impact with the ground, dispersing plutonium over nearby
farms. A third bomb landed intact near Palomares while the fourth fell
12 miles (19 km) off the coast into the Mediterranean sea.
On 21 January 1968, a B-52G, with four B28FI thermonuclear bombs aboard as part of Operation Chrome Dome, crashed on the ice of the North Star Bay while attempting an emergency landing at Thule Air Base in Greenland. The resulting fire caused extensive radioactive contamination. One of the bombs remains lost.
Variations
Ivy Mike
In his 1995 book Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, author Richard Rhodes describes in detail the internal components of the "Ivy Mike" Sausage
device, based on information obtained from extensive interviews with
the scientists and engineers who assembled it. According to Rhodes, the
actual mechanism for the compression of the secondary was a combination
of the radiation pressure, foam plasma pressure, and tamper-pusher
ablation theories described above; the radiation from the primary heated
the polyethylene foam lining the casing to a plasma, which then
re-radiated radiation into the secondary's pusher, causing its surface
to ablate and driving it inwards, compressing the secondary, igniting
the sparkplug, and causing the fusion reaction. The general
applicability of this principle is unclear.
W88
In 1999 a reporter for the San Jose Mercury News reported that the U.S. W88 nuclear warhead, a small MIRVed warhead used on the Trident II SLBM, had a prolate (egg or watermelon shaped) primary (code-named Komodo) and a spherical secondary (code-named Cursa) inside a specially shaped radiation case (known as the "peanut" for its shape).
The reentry cones for the W88 and W87 are the same size, 1.75 meters (69 in) long, with a maximum diameter of 55 cm. (22 in).
The higher yield of the W88 implies a larger secondary, which produces
most of the yield. Putting the secondary, which is heavier than the
primary, in the wider part of the cone allows it to be larger, but it
also moves the center of mass aft, potentially causing aerodynamic stability problems during reentry. Dead-weight ballast must be added to the nose to move the center of mass forward.
To make the primary small enough to fit into the narrow part of the cone, its bulky insensitive high explosive charges must be replaced with more compact "non-insensitive" high explosives that are more hazardous to handle.
The higher yield of the W88, which is the last new warhead produced by
the United States, thus comes at a price of higher warhead weight and
higher workplace hazard. The W88 also contains tritium, which has a half life of only 12.32 years and must be repeatedly replaced.
If these stories are true, it would explain the reported higher yield
of the W88, 475 kilotons, compared with only 300 kilotons for the
earlier W87 warhead.