Greenhouse gas emissions accounting

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

Greenhouse gas emissions accounting is a method of calculating the amount of greenhouse gases (GHG) emitted by a region in a given time-scale. A National Emissions Inventory (NEI) measuring a country's GHG emissions in a year is required by the UNFCCC to provide a benchmark for the country's emission reductions, and subsequently to evaluate international climate policies such as the Kyoto protocol (although the original has now expired, extensions have been agreed) as well as regional climate policies such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).

There are two conflicting ways of measuring GHG emissions: production-based (sometimes referred to as territorial-based) or consumption-based. Production-based emissions take place “within national territory and offshore areas over which the country has jurisdiction”. Consumption-based emissions encompass those emissions from domestic final consumption and those caused by the production of its imports. This means the importing country takes responsibility for emissions related to production of the exporting country's exports. By these definitions production-based emissions include exports but exclude imports and emissions embodied in international trade, whereas consumption-based emissions refer to the reverse (Table 1).

Which technique is applied by policymakers is fundamental as each can generate a very different NEI. Different NEIs would result in a country's choosing different optimal mitigation activities, the wrong choice based on wrong information being potentially damaging. The application of production-based emissions accounting is currently favoured in policy terms, although much of the literature favours consumption-based accounting. The former method is criticised in the literature principally for its inability to allocate emissions embodied in international trade/transportation and the potential for carbon leakage.

Rationale

Table 1. A comparison of the production-based and consumption-based NEI.

Criteria	Production-based NEI	Consumption-based NEI
Emissions covered	Administered territory	Global
Allocation	Domestic production	Domestic consumption
Allocation of trade	Includes exports, not imports	Includes imports, not exports
Mitigation focus	Domestic activities including exports	Domestic activities and imports (exports excluded)
Comparability	Consistent with GDP	Consistent with national consumption
Consistent with trade policy	No	Yes
Annex I emissions coverage	Lower	Higher
Complexity	Low	High
Transparency	High	Low
Uncertainty	Lower	Higher
Current country coverage	Relatively high	Low with current data
Mitigation analysis	Domestic mitigation only	Global mitigation

It is now overwhelmingly accepted that the release of GHG, predominantly from the anthropogenic burning of fossil fuels and the release of direct emissions from agricultural activities, is accelerating the growth of these gases in the atmosphere resulting in climate change. Over the last few decades emissions have grown at an increasing rate from 1.0% yr⁻¹ throughout the 1990s to 3.4% yr⁻¹ between 2000 and 2008. These increases have been driven not only by a growing global population and per-capita GDP, but also by global increases in the energy intensity of GDP (energy per unit GDP) and the carbon intensity of energy (emissions per unit energy). These drivers are most apparent in developing markets (Kyoto non-Annex B countries), but what is less apparent is that a substantial fraction of the growth in these countries is to satisfy the demand of consumers in developed countries (Kyoto Annex B countries). This is exaggerated by a process known as Carbon Leakage whereby Annex B countries decrease domestic production in place of increased importation of products from non-Annex B countries where emission policies are less strict. Although this may seem the rational choice for consumers when considering local pollutants, consumers are inescapably affected by global pollutants such as GHG, irrespective of where production occurs. Although emissions have slowed since 2007 as a result of the global financial crisis, the longer term trend of increased emissions is likely to resume. 

Today, much international effort is put into slowing the anthropogenic release of GHG and resulting climate change. In order to set benchmarks and emissions targets for - as well as monitor and evaluate the progress of - international and regional policies, the accurate measurement of each country's NEI becomes imperative.

Measuring GHG emissions

Production-based accounting

As production-based emissions accounting is currently favoured in policy terms, its methodology is well established. Emissions are calculated not directly but indirectly from fossil fuel usage and other relevant processes such as industry and agriculture according to 2006 guidelines issued by the IPCC for GHG reporting. The guidelines span numerous methodologies dependent on the level of sophistication (Tiers 1-3 in Table 2). The simplest methodology combines the extent of human activity with a coefficient quantifying the emissions from that activity, known as an ‘emission factor’. For example, to estimate emissions from the energy sector (typically contributing over 90% of CO2 emissions and 75% of all GHG emissions in developed countries) the quantity of fuels combusted is combined with an emission factor - the level of sophistication increasing with the accuracy and complexity of the emission factor. Table 2 outlines how the UK implements these guidelines to estimate some of its emissions-producing activities.

Table 2. Some emissions producing activities and methods used to estimate emissions. IPCC tier represents one of three tiers, each tier indicating an additional layer of sophistication. These tiers indicate which method of emissions calculations is used from the IPCC 1996 Guidelines.

Activity	GHG	IPCC Tier	Method used to estimate emissions
Public electricity and heat production	CO2	2	An emissions factor is applied to fuel consumption data from DUKES. Some data are also collected from individual point sources at generation facilities. The emissions factors are UK specific factors obtained by sampling average UK carbon content of fuels.
Road transportation	CO2, CH4, N2O	3	Emissions from road transport are estimated from a combination of total fuel consumption data taken from the Digest of UK Energy Statistics and fuel properties, and from a combination of drive related emission factors and road traffic data on fuel use, car type, miles driven, road types, and fuel type from the Department for Transport.
Domestic aviation	CO2, CH4, N2O	3	Data from the Department for Transport and CAA on aircraft movements is broken down by aircraft type at each UK airport. The model takes into account the lengths of time spent on different parts of an aircraft's take off and landing cycle and different types of aircraft used in the UK.
Refrigeration and air conditioning equipment	HFC	2	Data on the numbers of UK domestic and commercial refrigerators is obtained from the UK Market Transformation Programme and activity data supplied by industry. Data on mobile air conditioning systems is obtained from the UK Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. Once the numbers and size of refrigerators is known, an emissions factor which was derived to reflect UK refrigeration fluids applied to estimate emissions
Enteric Fermentation	CH4	2	Enteric fermentation is a digestive process in ruminant animals which produces methane. Emissions are estimated from animal production data from the June agricultural census. Emissions factors for milk producing cattle, lambs and deer are calculated using a tier 2 approach which takes into account the sizes, ages and types of UK animals.
Agricultural soils	N20	1 and 2	The method involves estimating the contributions from the use of inorganic fertilizer, biological fixation of nitrogen by crops, ploughing in crop residues, cultivation of organic soils, spreading animal manure on land, and manures dropped by animals grazing in the field using data from DEFRA and the British Survey of Fertiliser Practice. For some of these areas IPCC default methods are used and for other UK specific methods are used.
Wastewater handling	CH4, N2O	2	The estimate is based on the work of Hobson et al. (1996) who estimated emissions of methane for the years 1990-95. Subsequent years are extrapolated on the basis of population. Sewage disposed to landfill is included in landfill emissions

Consumption-based accounting

Consumption-based emissions accounting has an equally established methodology using Input-Output Tables. These “display the interconnection between different sectors of production and allow for a tracing of the production and consumption in an economy” and were originally created for national economies. However, as production has become increasingly international and the import/export market between nations has flourished, Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) models have been developed. The unique feature of MRIO is allowing a product to be traced across its production cycle, “quantifying the contributions to the value of the product from different economic sectors in various countries represented in the model. It hence offers a description of the global supply chains of products consumed”. From this, assuming regional- and industry-specific data for CO₂ emissions per unit of output are available, the total amount of emissions for the product can be calculated, and therefore the amount of emissions the final consumer is allocated responsibility for.

The two methodologies of emissions accounting begin to expose their key differences. Production-based accounting is transparently consistent with GDP, whereas consumption-based accounting (more complex and uncertain) is consistent with national consumption and trade. However, the most important difference is that the latter covers global emissions - including those ‘embodied’ emissions that are omitted in production-based accounting - and offers globally based mitigation options. Thus the attribution of emissions embodied in international trade is the crux of the matter.

Emissions embodied in international trade

Figure 1 and Table 3 show extent of emissions embodied in international trade and thus their importance when attempting emissions reductions. Figure 1 shows the international trade flows of the top 10 countries with largest trade fluxes in 2004 and illustrates the dominance of trade from developing countries (principally China, Russia and India) to developed countries (principally USA, EU and Japan). Table 3 supports this showing that the traded emissions in 2008 total 7.8 gigatonnes (Gt) with a net CO₂ emissions trade from developing to developed countries of 1.6 Gt.

Table 3 also shows how these processes of production, consumption and trade have changed from 1990 (commonly chosen for baseline levels) to 2008. Global emissions have risen 39%, but in the same period developed countries seem to have stabilized their domestic emissions, whereas developing countries’ domestic emissions have doubled. This ‘stabilization’ is arguably misleading, however, if the increased trade from developing to developed countries is considered. This has increased from 0.4 Gt CO₂ to 1.6 Gt CO₂ - a 17%/year average growth meaning 16 Gt CO₂ have been traded from developing to developed countries between 1990-2008. Assuming a proportion of the increased production in developing countries is to fulfil the consumption demands of developed countries, the process known as carbon leakage becomes evident. Thus, including international trade (i.e. the methodology of consumption-based accounting) reverses the apparent decreasing trend in emissions in developed countries, changing a 2% decrease (as calculated by production-based accounting) into a 7% increase across the time period. This point is only further emphasized when these trends are studied at a less aggregated scale. 

Table 3. Allocation of global emissions to Annex B and non-Annex B countries separated into domestic and internationally traded components.

	Component	1990 (Gt CO2)	2008 (Gt CO2)	Growth (%/y)
Annex B
Domestic	Annex B Domestic (Bdom)	11.3	10.8	-0.3
Trade component	Annex B to Annex B (B2B)	2.1	2.2	0.2
	Annex B to non-Annex B (B2nB)	0.7	0.9	1.8
Production	Annex B production (Bprod = Bdom + B2B + B2nB)	14.2	13.9	-0.1
Consumption	Annex B consumption (Bcons = Bdom + B2B + nB2B)	14.5	15.5	0.3
Non-Annex B
Domestic	Non-Annex B domestic (nBdom)	6.2	11.7	4.6
Trade component	Non-Annex B to Annex B (nB2B)	1.1	2.6	7.0
	Non-Annex B to non-Annex B (nB2nB)	0.4	2.2	21.5
Production	Non-Annex B production (nBprod = nBdom + nB2B + nB2nB)	7.7	16.4	5.9
Consumption	Non-Annex B consumption (nBcons = nBdom + B2nB + nB2nB)	7.4	14.8	5.3
Trade totals	Traded emissions (B2B + B2nB + nB2B + nB2nB)	4.3	7.8	4.3
	Trade balance (B2nB − nB2B)	-0.4	-1.6	16.9
	Global emissions (Bprod + nBprod = Bcons + nBcon)	21.9	30.3	2.0

Figure 2 shows the percentage surplus of emissions as calculated by production-based accounting over consumption-based accounting. In general, production-based accounting proposes lower emissions for the EU and OECD countries (developed countries) and higher emissions for BRIC and RoW (developing countries). However, consumption-based accounting proposes the reverse with lower emissions in BRIC and RoW, and higher emissions in EU and OECD countries. This led Boitier to term EU and OECD ‘CO₂ consumers’ and BRIC and RoW ‘CO₂ producers’. 

The large difference in these results is corroborated by further analysis. The EU-27 in 1994 counted emissions using the consumption-based approach at 11% higher than those counted using the production-based approach, this difference rising to 24% in 2008. Similarly OECD countries reached a peak variance of 16% in 2006 whilst dropping to 14% in 2008. In contrast, although RoW starts and ends relatively equal, in the intervening years it is a clear CO₂ producer, as are BRIC with an average consumption-based emissions deficit of 18.5% compared to production-based emissions.

Peters and Hertwich completed a MRIO study to calculate emissions embodied in international trade using data from the 2001 Global Trade Analysis Program (GTAP). After manipulation, although their numbers are slightly more conservative (EU 14%; OECD 3%; BRIC 16%; RoW 6%) than Boitier the same trend is evident - developed countries are CO₂ consumers and developing countries are CO₂ producers. This trend is seen across the literature and supporting the use of consumption-based emissions accounting in policy-making decisions.

Consumption-based accounting

Advantages

Consumption-based emissions accounting may be deemed superior as it incorporates embodied emissions currently ignored by the UNFCCC preferred production-based accounting. Other key advantages include: extending mitigation options, covering more global emissions through increased participation, and inherently encompassing policies such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

Extending mitigation options

Under the production-based system a country is punished for having a pollution intensive resource base. If this country has pollution intensive exports, such as Norway where 69% of its CO₂ emissions are the result of production for export, a simple way to meet its emissions reductions set out under Kyoto would be to reduce its exports. Although this would be environmentally advantageous, it would be economically and politically harmful as exports are an important part of a country's GDP. However, by having appropriate mechanisms in place, such as a harmonized global tax, border-tax adjustment or quotas, a consumption-based accounting system could shift the comparative advantage towards a decision that includes environmental factors. The tax most discussed is based on the carbon content of the fossil fuels used to produce and transport the product, the greater the level of carbon used the more tax being charged. If a country did not voluntarily participate then a border tax could be imposed on them. This system would have the effect of embedding the cost of environmental load in the price of the product and therefore market forces would shift production to where it is economically and environmentally preferable, thus reducing GHG emissions.

Increasing participation

In addition to reducing emissions directly this system may also alleviate competitiveness concerns in twofold ways: firstly, domestic and foreign producers are exposed to the same carbon tax; and secondly, if multiple countries are competing for the same export market they can promote environmental performance as a marketing tool. A loss of competitiveness resulting from the absence of legally binding commitments for non-Annex B countries was the principal reason the US and Australia, two heavily emitting countries, did not originally ratify the Kyoto protocol (Australia later ratified in 2007). By alleviating such concerns more countries may participate in future climate policies resulting in a greater percentage of global emissions being covered by legally binding reduction policies. Furthermore, as developed countries are currently expected to reduce their emissions more than developing countries, the more emissions are (fairly) attributed to developed countries the more they become covered by legally bound reduction policies. Peters argues that this last prediction means that consumption-based accounting would advantageously result in greater emissions reductions irrespective of increased participation.

Encompassing policies such as the CDM

The CDM is a flexible mechanism set up under the Kyoto Protocol with the aim of creating ‘Carbon Credits’ for trade in trading schemes such as the EU ETS. Despite coming under heavy criticism (see Evans, p134-135; and Burniaux et al., p58-65), the theory is that as the marginal cost of environmental abatement is lower in non-Annex B countries a scheme like this will promote technology transfer from Annex B to non-Annex B countries resulting in cheaper emissions reductions. Because under consumption-based emissions accounting a country is responsible for the emissions caused by its imports, it is important for the importing country to encourage good environmental behaviour and promote the cleanest production technologies available in the exporting country. Therefore, unlike the Kyoto Protocol where the CDM was added later, consumption-based emissions accounting inherently promotes clean development in the foreign country because of the way it allocates emissions. One loophole that remains relevant is ‘carbon colonialism’ whereby developed countries do not mitigate the underlying problem but simply continue to increase consumption offsetting this by exploiting the abatement potential of developing countries.

Disadvantages and implementation

Despite its advantages consumption-based emissions accounting is not without its drawbacks. These were highlighted above and in Table 1 and are principally: greater uncertainty, greater complexity requiring more data not always available, and requiring greater international collaboration.

Greater uncertainty and complexity

Uncertainty derives from three main reasons: production-based accounting is much closer to statistical sources and GDP which are more assured; the methodology behind consumption-based accounting requires an extra step over production-based accounting, this step inherently incurring further doubt; and consumption-based accounting includes data from all trading partners of a particular country which will contain different levels of accuracy. The bulk of data required is its second pitfall as in some countries the lack of data means consumption-based accounting is not possible. However, it must be noted levels and accuracy of data will improve as more and better techniques are developed and the scientific community produce more data sets - examples including the recently launched global databases: EORA from the University of Sydney, EXIOPOL and WIOD databases from European consortia, and the Asian IDE-JETRO. In the short term it will be important to attempt to quantify the level of uncertainty more accurately.

Greater international co-operation

The third problem is that consumption-based accounting requires greater international collaboration to deliver effective results. A Government has the authority to implement policies only over emissions it directly generates. In consumption-based accounting emissions from different geo-political territories are allocated to the importing country. Although the importing country can indirectly oppose this by changing its importing habits or by applying a border tax as discussed, only by greater international collaboration, through an international dialogue such as the UNFCCC, can direct and meaningful emissions reductions be enforced.

Sharing emissions responsibility

Thus far it has been implied that one must implement either production-based accounting or consumption-based accounting. However, there are arguments that the answer lies somewhere in the middle i.e. emissions should be shared between the importing and exporting countries. This approach asserts that although it is the final consumer that ultimately initiates the production, the activities that create the product and associated pollution also contribute to the producing country's GDP. This topic is still developing in the literature principally through works by Rodrigues et al., Lenzen et al., Marques et al. as well as through empirical studies by such as Andrew and Forgie. Crucially it proposes that at each stage of the supply chain the emissions are shared by some pre-defined criteria between the different actors involved.

Whilst this approach of sharing emissions responsibility seems advantageous, the controversy arises over what these pre-defined criteria should be. Two of the current front runners are Lenzen et al. who say “the share of responsibility allocated to each agent should be proportional to its value added” and Rodrigues et al. who say it should be based on “the average between an agent's consumption-based responsibility and income-based responsibility” (quoted in Marques et al.). As no criteria set has been adequately developed and further work is needed to produce a finished methodology for a potentially valuable concept.

The future

Measuring a country's GHG emissions is critical to combat climate change. It is clear that production-based emissions accounting, the currently favoured method for policy-making, significantly underestimates the level of GHG emitted by excluding emissions embodied in international trade. Implementing consumption-based accounting which includes such emissions, developed countries take a greater share of GHG emissions and consequently the low level of emissions commitments for developing countries are not as important. Not only does consumption-based accounting encompass global emissions, it promotes good environmental behaviour and increases participation by reducing competitiveness. 

Despite these advantages the shift from production-based to consumption-based accounting arguably represents a shift from one extreme to another. The third option of sharing responsibility between importing and exporting countries represents a compromise between the two systems. However, as yet no adequately developed methodology exists for this third way, so further study is required before it can be implemented for policy-making decisions.

Today, given its lower uncertainty, established methodology and reporting, consistency between political and environmental boundaries, and widespread implementation, it is hard to see any movement away from the favoured production-based accounting. However, because of its key disadvantage of omitting emissions embodied in international trade, it is clear that consumption-based accounting provides invaluable information and should at least be used as a ‘shadow’ to production-based accounting. With further work into the methodologies of consumption-based accounting and sharing emissions responsibility, both can play greater roles in the future of climate policy.

Ecological footprint

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

World map of countries by their raw ecological footprint, relative to the world average biocapacity (2007).

 

National ecological surplus or deficit, measured as a country's biocapacity per person (in global hectares) minus its ecological footprint per person (also in global hectares). Data from 2013.

 

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The ecological footprint measures human demand on nature, i.e., the quantity of nature it takes to support people or an economy. It tracks this demand through an ecological accounting system. The accounts contrast the biologically productive area people use for their consumption to the biologically productive area available within a region or the world (biocapacity, the productive area that can regenerate what people demand from nature). In short, it is a measure of human impact on Earth's ecosystem and reveals the dependence of the human economy on natural capital.

Footprint and biocapacity can be compared at the individual, regional, national or global scale. Both footprint and biocapacity change every year with number of people, per person consumption, efficiency of production, and productivity of ecosystems. At a global scale, footprint assessments show how big humanity's demand is compared to what planet Earth can renew. Since 2003, Global Footprint Network has calculated the ecological footprint from UN data sources for the world as a whole and for over 200 nations (known as the National Footprint Accounts). Every year the calculations are updated with the newest data. The time series are recalculated with every update since UN statistics also change historical data sets. As shown in Lin et al. (2018) the time trends for countries and the world have stayed consistent despite data updates. Also, a recent study by the Swiss Ministry of Environment independently recalculated the Swiss trends and reproduced them within 1–4% for the time period that they studied (1996–2015). Global Footprint Network estimates that, as of 2014, humanity has been using natural capital 1.7 times as fast as Earth can renew it. This means humanity's ecological footprint corresponds to 1.7 planet Earths. 

Ecological footprint analysis is widely used around the Earth in support of sustainability assessments. It enables people to measure and manage the use of resources throughout the economy and explore the sustainability of individual lifestyles, goods and services, organizations, industry sectors, neighborhoods, cities, regions and nations. Since 2006, a first set of ecological footprint standards exist that detail both communication and calculation procedures. The latest version are the updated standards from 2009.

Footprint measurements and methodology

The natural resources of Earth are finite, and unsustainably strained by current levels of human activity.

 

For 2014, Global Footprint Network estimated humanity's ecological footprint as 1.7 planet Earths. This means that, according to their calculations, humanity's demands were 1.7 times faster than what the planet's ecosystems renewed.

Ecological footprints can be calculated at any scale: for an activity, a person, a community, a city, a town, a region, a nation, or humanity as a whole. Cities, due to their population concentration, have large ecological footprints and have become ground zero for footprint reduction.

The ecological footprint accounting method at the national level is described on the web page of Global Footprint Network  or in greater detail in academic papers, including Borucke et al.

The National Accounts Review Committee has also published a research agenda on how to improve the accounts.

Overview

The first academic publication about ecological footprints was by William Rees in 1992. The ecological footprint concept and calculation method was developed as the PhD dissertation of Mathis Wackernagel, under Rees' supervision at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, from 1990–1994. Originally, Wackernagel and Rees called the concept "appropriated carrying capacity". To make the idea more accessible, Rees came up with the term "ecological footprint", inspired by a computer technician who praised his new computer's "small footprint on the desk". In early 1996, Wackernagel and Rees published the book Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth with illustrations by Phil Testemale.

Footprint values at the end of a survey are categorized for Carbon, Food, Housing, and Goods and Services as well as the total footprint number of Earths needed to sustain the world's population at that level of consumption. This approach can also be applied to an activity such as the manufacturing of a product or driving of a car. This resource accounting is similar to life-cycle analysis wherein the consumption of energy, biomass (food, fiber), building material, water and other resources are converted into a normalized measure of land area called global hectares (gha). 

The focus of Ecological Footprint accounting is biological resources. Rather than non-renewable resources like oil or minerals, it is the biological resources that are the materially most limiting resources for the human enterprise. For instance, while the amount of fossil fuel still underground is limited, even more limiting is the biosphere's ability to cope with the CO₂ emitted when burning it. This ability is one of the competing uses of the planet's biocapacity. Similarly, minerals are limited by the energy available to extract them from the lithosphere and concentrate them. The limits of ecosystems' ability to renew biomass is given by factors such as water availability, climate, soil fertility, solar energy, technology and management practices. This capacity to renew, driven by photosynthesis, is called biocapacity. 

Per capita ecological footprint (EF), or ecological footprint analysis (EFA), is a means of comparing consumption and lifestyles, and checking this against biocapacity - nature's ability to provide for this consumption. The tool can inform policy by examining to what extent a nation uses more (or less) than is available within its territory, or to what extent the nation's lifestyle would be replicable worldwide. The footprint can also be a useful tool to educate people about carrying capacity and overconsumption, with the aim of altering personal behavior. Ecological footprints may be used to argue that many current lifestyles are not sustainable. Such a global comparison also clearly shows the inequalities of resource use on this planet at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 

In 2007, the average biologically productive area per person worldwide was approximately 1.8 global hectares (gha) per capita. The U.S. footprint per capita was 9.0 gha, and that of Switzerland was 5.6 gha, while China's was 1.8 gha. The WWF claims that the human footprint has exceeded the biocapacity (the available supply of natural resources) of the planet by 20%. Wackernagel and Rees originally estimated that the available biological capacity for the 6 billion people on Earth at that time was about 1.3 hectares per person, which is smaller than the 1.8 global hectares published for 2006, because the initial studies neither used global hectares nor included bioproductive marine areas.

A number of NGOs offer ecological footprint calculators.

Global trends in humanity's ecological footprint

According to the 2018 edition of the National Footprint Accounts, humanity's total ecological footprint has exhibited an increasing trend since 1961, growing an average of 2.1% per year (SD= 1.9). Humanity's ecological footprint was 7.0 billion gha in 1961 and increased to 20.6 billion gha in 2014. The world-average ecological footprint in 2014 was 2.8 global hectares per person. The carbon footprint is the fastest growing part of the ecological footprint and accounts currently for about 60% of humanity's total ecological footprint.

The Earth's biocapacity has not increased at the same rate as the ecological footprint. The increase of biocapacity averaged at only 0.5% per year (SD = 0.7). Because of agricultural intensification, biocapacity was at 9.6 billion gha in 1961 and grew to 12.2 billion gha in 2016.

Therefore, the Earth has been in ecological overshoot (where humanity is using more resources and generating waste at a pace that the ecosystem can't renew) since the 1970s. In 2018, Earth Overshoot Day, the date where humanity has used more from nature than the planet can renew in the entire year, was estimated to be August 1. Now more than 85% of humanity lives in countries that run an ecological deficit. This means their ecological footprint for consumption exceeds the biocapacity of that country.

Studies in the United Kingdom

The UK's average ecological footprint is 5.45 global hectares per capita (gha) with variations between regions ranging from 4.80 gha (Wales) to 5.56 gha (East England).

Two recent studies have examined relatively low-impact small communities. BedZED, a 96-home mixed-income housing development in South London, was designed by Bill Dunster Architects and sustainability consultants BioRegional for the Peabody Trust. Despite being populated by relatively "mainstream" home-buyers, BedZED was found to have a footprint of 3.20 gha due to on-site renewable energy production, energy-efficient architecture, and an extensive green lifestyles program that included on-site London's first carsharing club. The report did not measure the added footprint of the 15,000 visitors who have toured BedZED since its completion in 2002. Findhorn Ecovillage, a rural intentional community in Moray, Scotland, had a total footprint of 2.56 gha, including both the many guests and visitors who travel to the community to undertake residential courses there and the nearby campus of Cluny Hill College. However, the residents alone have a footprint of 2.71 gha, a little over half the UK national average and one of the lowest ecological footprints of any community measured so far in the industrialized world. Keveral Farm, an organic farming community in Cornwall, was found to have a footprint of 2.4 gha, though with substantial differences in footprints among community members.

Ecological footprint at the individual level

In a 2012 study of consumers acting "green" vs. "brown" (where green people are «expected to have significantly lower ecological impact than “brown” consumers»), the conclusion was "the research found no significant difference between the carbon footprints of green and brown consumers". A 2013 study concluded the same.

A 2017 study published in Environmental Research Letters posited that the most significant way individuals could reduce their own carbon footprint is to have fewer children, followed by living without a vehicle, forgoing air travel and adopting a plant-based diet. The 2017 World Scientists' Warning to Humanity: A Second Notice, co-signed by over 15,000 scientists around the globe, urges human beings to "re-examine and change our individual behaviors, including limiting our own reproduction (ideally to replacement level at most) and drastically diminishing our per capita ­consumption of fossil fuels, meat, and other resources." According to a 2018 study published in Science, avoiding animal products altogether, including meat and dairy, is the most significant way individuals can reduce their overall ecological impact on earth, meaning "not just greenhouse gases, but global acidification, eutrophication, land use and water use".

Reviews and critiques

Early criticism was published by van den Bergh and Verbruggen in 1999, which was updated in 2014. Another criticism was published in 2008. A more complete review commissioned by the Directorate-General for the Environment (European Commission) was published in June 2008. The review found Ecological Footprint "a useful indicator for assessing progress on the EU’s Resource Strategy" the authors noted that Ecological Footprint analysis was unique "in its ability to relate resource use to the concept of carrying capacity." The review noted that further improvements in data quality, methodologies and assumptions were needed.

A recent critique of the concept is due to Blomqvist et al., 2013a, with a reply from Rees and Wackernagel, 2013, and a rejoinder by Blomqvist et al., 2013b.

An additional strand of critique is due to Giampietro and Saltelli (2014a), with a reply from Goldfinger et al., 2014, a rejoinder by Giampietro and Saltelli (2014a), and additional comments from van den Bergh and Grazi (2015).

A number of countries have engaged in research collaborations to test the validity of the method. This includes Switzerland, Germany, United Arab Emirates, and Belgium.

Grazi et al. (2007) have performed a systematic comparison of the ecological footprint method with spatial welfare analysis that includes environmental externalities, agglomeration effects and trade advantages. They find that the two methods can lead to very distinct, and even opposite, rankings of different spatial patterns of economic activity. However this should not be surprising, since the two methods address different research questions. 

Newman (2006) has argued that the ecological footprint concept may have an anti-urban bias, as it does not consider the opportunities created by urban growth. Calculating the ecological footprint for densely populated areas, such as a city or small country with a comparatively large population — e.g. New York and Singapore respectively — may lead to the perception of these populations as "parasitic". This is because these communities have little intrinsic biocapacity, and instead must rely upon large hinterlands. Critics argue that this is a dubious characterization since mechanized rural farmers in developed nations may easily consume more resources than urban inhabitants, due to transportation requirements and the unavailability of economies of scale. Furthermore, such moral conclusions seem to be an argument for autarky. Some even take this train of thought a step further, claiming that the Footprint denies the benefits of trade. Therefore, the critics argue that the Footprint can only be applied globally.

The method seems to reward the replacement of original ecosystems with high-productivity agricultural monocultures by assigning a higher biocapacity to such regions. For example, replacing ancient woodlands or tropical forests with monoculture forests or plantations may improve the ecological footprint. Similarly, if organic farming yields were lower than those of conventional methods, this could result in the former being "penalized" with a larger ecological footprint. Of course, this insight, while valid, stems from the idea of using the footprint as one's only metric. If the use of ecological footprints are complemented with other indicators, such as one for biodiversity, the problem might be solved. Indeed, WWF's Living Planet Report complements the biennial Footprint calculations with the Living Planet Index of biodiversity.^[51] Manfred Lenzen and Shauna Murray have created a modified Ecological Footprint that takes biodiversity into account for use in Australia.

Although the ecological footprint model prior to 2008 treated nuclear power in the same manner as coal power, the actual real world effects of the two are radically different. A life cycle analysis centered on the Swedish Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant estimated carbon dioxide emissions at 3.10 g/kW⋅h and 5.05 g/kW⋅h in 2002 for the Torness Nuclear Power Station. This compares to 11 g/kW⋅h for hydroelectric power, 950 g/kW⋅h for installed coal, 900 g/kW⋅h for oil and 600 g/kW⋅h for natural gas generation in the United States in 1999. Figures released by Mark Hertsgaard, however, show that because of the delays in building nuclear plants and the costs involved, investments in energy efficiency and renewable energies have seven times the return on investment of investments in nuclear energy.

The Swedish utility Vattenfall did a study of full life-cycle greenhouse-gas emissions of energy sources the utility uses to produce electricity, namely: Nuclear, Hydro, Coal, Gas, Solar Cell, Peat and Wind. The net result of the study was that nuclear power produced 3.3 grams of carbon dioxide per kW⋅h of produced power. This compares to 400 for natural gas and 700 for coal (according to this study). The study also concluded that nuclear power produced the smallest amount of CO₂ of any of their electricity sources.

Claims exist that the problems of nuclear waste do not come anywhere close to approaching the problems of fossil fuel waste. A 2004 article from the BBC states: "The World Health Organization (WHO) says 3 million people are killed worldwide by outdoor air pollution annually from vehicles and industrial emissions, and 1.6 million indoors through using solid fuel." In the U.S. alone, fossil fuel waste kills 20,000 people each year. A coal power plant releases 100 times as much radiation as a nuclear power plant of the same wattage. It is estimated that during 1982, US coal burning released 155 times as much radioactivity into the atmosphere as the Three Mile Island incident. In addition, fossil fuel waste causes global warming, which leads to increased deaths from hurricanes, flooding, and other weather events. The World Nuclear Association provides a comparison of deaths due to accidents among different forms of energy production. In their comparison, deaths per TW-yr of electricity produced (in UK and USA) from 1970 to 1992 are quoted as 885 for hydropower, 342 for coal, 85 for natural gas, and 8 for nuclear.

The Western Australian government State of the Environment Report included an Ecological Footprint measure for the average Western Australian seven times the average footprint per person on the planet in 2007, a total of about 15 hectares.

Footprint by country

Ecological footprint for different nations compared to their Human Development Index.

The world-average ecological footprint in 2013 was 2.8 global hectares per person. The average per country ranges from over 10 to under 1 global hectares per person. There is also a high variation within countries, based on individual lifestyle and economic possibilities.

The GHG footprint or the more narrow carbon footprint are a component of the ecological footprint. Often, when only the carbon footprint is reported, it is expressed in weight of CO2 (or CO2e representing GHG warming potential (GGWP)), but it can also be expressed in land areas like ecological footprints. Both can be applied to products, people or whole societies.

Implications

. . . the average world citizen has an eco-footprint of about 2.7 global average hectares while there are only 2.1 global hectare of bioproductive land and water per capita on earth. This means that humanity has already overshot global biocapacity by 30% and now lives unsustainabily by depleting stocks of "natural capital"

Paris Agreement

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

State parties   Signatories   Parties covered by EU ratification
Drafted	30 November – 12 December 2015 in Le Bourget, France
Signed	22 April 2016
Location	New York City, United States
Sealed	12 December 2015
Effective	4 November 2016
Condition	Ratification and accession by 55 UNFCCC parties, accounting for 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions
Signatories	195
Parties	187
Depositary	Secretary-General of the United Nations
Languages	Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish and Afrikaans

The Paris Agreement (French: Accord de Paris) is an agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), dealing with greenhouse-gas-emissions mitigation, adaptation, and finance, signed in 2016. The agreement's language was negotiated by representatives of 196 state parties at the 21st Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC in Le Bourget, near Paris, France, and adopted by consensus on 12 December 2015. As of March 2019, 195 UNFCCC members have signed the agreement, and 187 have become party to it.

The Paris Agreement's long-term temperature goal is to keep the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels; and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 °C, recognizing that this would substantially reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. This should be done by peaking emissions as soon as possible, in order to "achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases" in the second half of the 21st century. It also aims to increase the ability of parties to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change, and make "finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development."

Under the Paris Agreement, each country must determine, plan, and regularly report on the contribution that it undertakes to mitigate global warming. No mechanism forces a country to set a specific target by a specific date, but each target should go beyond previously set targets. In June 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the agreement. Under the agreement, the earliest effective date of withdrawal for the U.S. is November 2020, shortly before the end of President Trump's current term. In practice, changes in United States policy that are contrary to the Paris Agreement have already been put in place.

Content

Aims

The aim of the agreement is to decrease global warming described in its Article 2, "enhancing the implementation" of the UNFCCC through:

(a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
(b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production;
(c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

This strategy involved energy and climate policy including the so-called 20/20/20 targets, namely the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by 20%, the increase of renewable energy's market share to 20%, and a 20% increase in energy efficiency.

Countries furthermore aim to reach "global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible". The agreement has been described as an incentive for and driver of fossil fuel divestment.

The Paris deal is the world's first comprehensive climate agreement.

Nationally determined contributions

Global carbon dioxide emissions by jurisdiction.

 

Contributions each individual country should make to achieve the worldwide goal are determined by all countries individually and are called nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Article 3 requires them to be "ambitious", "represent a progression over time" and set "with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement". The contributions should be reported every five years and are to be registered by the UNFCCC Secretariat. Each further ambition should be more ambitious than the previous one, known as the principle of 'progression'. Countries can cooperate and pool their nationally determined contributions. The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions pledged during the 2015 Climate Change Conference serve—unless provided otherwise—as the initial Nationally determined contribution. 

The level of NDCs set by each country will set that country's targets. However the 'contributions' themselves are not binding as a matter of international law, as they lack the specificity, normative character, or obligatory language necessary to create binding norms. Furthermore, there will be no mechanism to force a country to set a target in their NDC by a specific date and no enforcement if a set target in an NDC is not met. There will be only a "name and shame" system or as János Pásztor, the U.N. assistant secretary-general on climate change, told CBS News (US), a "name and encourage" plan. As the agreement provides no consequences if countries do not meet their commitments, consensus of this kind is fragile. A trickle of nations exiting the agreement could trigger the withdrawal of more governments, bringing about a total collapse of the agreement.

The NDC Partnership was launched at COP22 in Marrakesh to enhance cooperation so that countries have access to the technical knowledge and financial support they need to achieve large-scale climate and sustainable development targets. The NDC Partnership is guided by a Steering Committee composed of developed and developing nations and international institutions, and facilitated by a Support Unit hosted by World Resources Institute and based in Washington, DC and Bonn, Germany. The NDC Partnership is co-chaired by the governments of Costa Rica and the Netherlands and includes 93 member countries,21 institutional partners and ten associate members.

Effects on global temperature

The negotiators of the agreement, however, stated that the NDCs and the target of no more than 2 °C increase were insufficient; instead, a target of 1.5 °C maximum increase is required, noting "with concern that the estimated aggregate greenhouse gas emission levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the intended nationally determined contributions do not fall within least-cost 2 °C scenarios but rather lead to a projected level of 55 gigatonnes in 2030", and recognizing furthermore "that much greater emission reduction efforts will be required in order to hold the increase in the global average temperature to below 2 °C by reducing emissions to 40 gigatonnes or to 1.5 °C."

Though not the sustained temperatures over the long term that the Agreement addresses, in the first half of 2016 average temperatures were about 1.3 °C (2.3 degrees Fahrenheit) above the average in 1880, when global record-keeping began.

When the agreement achieved enough signatures to cross the threshold on 5 October 2016, US President Barack Obama claimed that "Even if we meet every target ... we will only get to part of where we need to go." He also said that "this agreement will help delay or avoid some of the worst consequences of climate change. It will help other nations ratchet down their emissions over time, and set bolder targets as technology advances, all under a strong system of transparency that allows each nation to evaluate the progress of all other nations."

Global stocktake

Map of cumulative per capita anthropogenic atmospheric CO2 emissions by country. Cumulative emissions include land use change, and are measured between the years 1950 and 2000.

 

The global stocktake will kick off with a "facilitative dialogue" in 2018. At this convening, parties will evaluate how their NDCs stack up to the nearer-term goal of peaking global emissions and the long-term goal of achieving net zero emissions by the second half of this century.

The implementation of the agreement by all member countries together will be evaluated every 5 years, with the first evaluation in 2023. The outcome is to be used as input for new nationally determined contributions of member states. The stocktake will not be of contributions/achievements of individual countries but a collective analysis of what has been achieved and what more needs to be done. 

The stocktake works as part of the Paris Agreement's effort to create a "ratcheting up" of ambition in emissions cuts. Because analysts have agreed that the current NDCs will not limit rising temperatures below 2 degrees Celsius, the global stocktake reconvenes parties to assess how their new NDCs must evolve so that they continually reflect a country's "highest possible ambition".

While ratcheting up the ambition of NDCs is a major aim of the global stocktake, it assesses efforts beyond mitigation. The 5-year reviews will also evaluate adaptation, climate finance provisions, and technology development and transfer.

Structure

The Paris Agreement has a 'bottom up' structure in contrast to most international environmental law treaties, which are 'top down', characterised by standards and targets set internationally, for states to implement. Unlike its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, which sets commitment targets that have legal force, the Paris Agreement, with its emphasis on consensus-building, allows for voluntary and nationally determined targets. The specific climate goals are thus politically encouraged, rather than legally bound. Only the processes governing the reporting and review of these goals are mandated under international law. This structure is especially notable for the United States—because there are no legal mitigation or finance targets, the agreement is considered an "executive agreement rather than a treaty". Because the UNFCCC treaty of 1992 received the consent of the Senate, this new agreement does not require further legislation from Congress for it to take effect.

Another key difference between the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol is their scopes. While the Kyoto Protocol differentiated between Annex-1 and non-Annex-1 countries, this bifurcation is blurred in the Paris Agreement, as all parties will be required to submit emissions reductions plans. While the Paris Agreement still emphasizes the principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibility and Respective Capabilities"—the acknowledgement that different nations have different capacities and duties to climate action—it does not provide a specific division between developed and developing nations. It therefore appears that negotiators will have to continue to deal with this issue in future negotiation rounds, even though the discussion on differentiation may take on a new dynamic.

Mitigation provisions and carbon markets

Article 6 has been flagged as containing some of the key provisions of the Paris Agreement. Broadly, it outlines the cooperative approaches that parties can take in achieving their nationally determined carbon emissions reductions. In doing so, it helps establish the Paris Agreement as a framework for a global carbon market.

Linkage of trading systems and international transfer of mitigation outcomes (ITMOs)

Paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 establish a framework to govern the international transfer of mitigation outcomes (ITMOs). The Agreement recognizes the rights of Parties to use emissions reductions outside of their own jurisdiction toward their NDC, in a system of carbon accounting and trading.

This provision requires the "linkage" of various carbon emissions trading systems—because measured emissions reductions must avoid "double counting", transferred mitigation outcomes must be recorded as a gain of emission units for one party and a reduction of emission units for the other. Because the NDCs, and domestic carbon trading schemes, are heterogeneous, the ITMOs will provide a format for global linkage under the auspices of the UNFCCC. The provision thus also creates a pressure for countries to adopt emissions management systems—if a country wants to use more cost-effective cooperative approaches to achieve their NDCs, they will need to monitor carbon units for their economies.

Sustainable Development Mechanism

Paragraphs 6.4-6.7 establish a mechanism "to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gases and support sustainable development". Though there is no specific name for the mechanism as yet, many Parties and observers have informally coalesced around the name "Sustainable Development Mechanism" or "SDM". The SDM is considered to be the successor to the Clean Development Mechanism, a flexible mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, by which parties could collaboratively pursue emissions reductions for their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. The Sustainable Development Mechanism lays the framework for the future of the Clean Development Mechanism post-Kyoto (in 2020). 

In its basic aim, the SDM will largely resemble the Clean Development Mechanism, with the dual mission to 1. contribute to global GHG emissions reductions and 2. support sustainable development. Though the structure and processes governing the SDM are not yet determined, certain similarities and differences from the Clean Development Mechanism can already be seen. Notably, the SDM, unlike the Clean Development Mechanism, will be available to all parties as opposed to only Annex-1 parties, making it much wider in scope.

Since the Kyoto Protocol went into force, the Clean Development Mechanism has been criticized for failing to produce either meaningful emissions reductions or sustainable development benefits in most instances. It has also suffered from the low price of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), creating less demand for projects. These criticisms have motivated the recommendations of various stakeholders, who have provided through working groups and reports, new elements they hope to see in SDM that will bolster its success. The specifics of the governance structure, project proposal modalities, and overall design were expected to come during the 2016 Conference of the Parties in Marrakesh.

Adaptation provisions

Adaptation issues garnered more focus in the formation of the Paris Agreement. Collective, long-term adaptation goals are included in the Agreement, and countries must report on their adaptation actions, making adaptation a parallel component of the agreement with mitigation. The adaptation goals focus on enhancing adaptive capacity, increasing resilience, and limiting vulnerability.

Ensuring finance

At the Paris Conference in 2015 where the Agreement was negotiated, the developed countries reaffirmed the commitment to mobilize $100 billion a year in climate finance by 2020, and agreed to continue mobilizing finance at the level of $100 billion a year until 2025. The commitment refers to the pre-existing plan to provide US$100 billion a year in aid to developing countries for actions on climate change adaptation and mitigation.

Though both mitigation and adaptation require increased climate financing, adaptation has typically received lower levels of support and has mobilised less action from the private sector. A 2014 report by the OECD found that just 16 percent of global finance was directed toward climate adaptation in 2014. The Paris Agreement called for a balance of climate finance between adaptation and mitigation, and specifically underscoring the need to increase adaptation support for parties most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, including Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States. The agreement also reminds parties of the importance of public grants, because adaptation measures receive less investment from the public sector. John Kerry, as Secretary of State, announced that the U.S. would double its grant-based adaptation finance by 2020.

Some specific outcomes of the elevated attention to adaptation financing in Paris include the G7 countries' announcement to provide US$420 million for Climate Risk Insurance, and the launching of a Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) Initiative. In early March 2016, the Obama administration gave a $500 million grant to the "Green Climate Fund" as "the first chunk of a $3 billion commitment made at the Paris climate talks." So far, the Green Climate Fund has now received over $10 billion in pledges. Notably, the pledges come from developed nations like France, the US, and Japan, but also from developing countries such as Mexico, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

Loss and damage

A new issue that emerged as a focal point in the Paris negotiations rose from the fact that many of the worst effects of climate change will be too severe or come too quickly to be avoided by adaptation measures. The Paris Agreement specifically acknowledges the need to address loss and damage of this kind, and aims to find appropriate responses. It specifies that loss and damage can take various forms—both as immediate impacts from extreme weather events, and slow onset impacts, such as the loss of land to sea-level rise for low-lying islands.

The push to address loss and damage as a distinct issue in the Paris Agreement came from the Alliance of Small Island States and the Least Developed Countries, whose economies and livelihoods are most vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change. Developed countries, however, worried that classifying the issue as one separate and beyond adaptation measures would create yet another climate finance provision, or might imply legal liability for catastrophic climate events. 

In the end, all parties acknowledged the need for "averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage" but notably, any mention of compensation or liability is excluded. The agreement also adopts the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, an institution that will attempt to address questions about how to classify, address, and share responsibility for loss.

Enhanced transparency framework

While each Party's NDC is not legally binding, the Parties are legally bound to have their progress tracked by technical expert review to assess achievement toward the NDC, and to determine ways to strengthen ambition. Article 13 of the Paris Agreement articulates an "enhanced transparency framework for action and support" that establishes harmonized monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) requirements. Thus, both developed and developing nations must report every two years on their mitigation efforts, and all parties will be subject to both technical and peer review.

Flexibility mechanisms

While the enhanced transparency framework is universal, along with the global stocktaking to occur every 5 years, the framework is meant to provide "built-in flexibility" to distinguish between developed and developing countries' capacities. In conjunction with this, the Paris Agreement has provisions for an enhanced framework for capacity building. The agreement recognizes the varying circumstances of some countries, and specifically notes that the technical expert review for each country consider that country's specific capacity for reporting. The agreement also develops a Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency to assist developing countries in building the necessary institutions and processes for complying with the transparency framework.

There are several ways that flexibility mechanisms can be incorporated into the enhanced transparency framework. The scope, level of detail, or frequency of reporting may all be adjusted and tiered based on a country's capacity. The requirement for in-country technical reviews could be lifted for some less developed or small island developing countries. Ways to assess capacity include financial and human resources in a country necessary for NDC review.

Adoption

The Paris Agreement was opened for signature on 22 April 2016 (Earth Day) at a ceremony in New York. After several European Union states ratified the agreement in October 2016, there were enough countries that had ratified the agreement that produce enough of the world's greenhouse gases for the agreement to enter into force. The agreement went into effect on 4 November 2016.

Negotiations

Within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, legal instruments may be adopted to reach the goals of the convention. For the period from 2008 to 2012, greenhouse gas reduction measures were agreed in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The scope of the protocol was extended until 2020 with the Doha Amendment to that protocol in 2012.

During the 2011 United Nations Climate Change Conference, the Durban Platform (and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action) was established with the aim to negotiate a legal instrument governing climate change mitigation measures from 2020. The resulting agreement was to be adopted in 2015.

Adoption

Heads of delegations at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris.

 

At the conclusion of COP 21 (the 21st meeting of the Conference of the Parties, which guides the Conference), on 12 December 2015, the final wording of the Paris Agreement was adopted by consensus by all of the 195 UNFCCC participating member states and the European Union to reduce emissions as part of the method for reducing greenhouse gas. In the 12-page Agreement, the members promised to reduce their carbon output "as soon as possible" and to do their best to keep global warming "to well below 2 °C" [3.6 °F].

Signature and entry into force

Signing by John Kerry in United Nations General Assembly Hall for the United States

 

The Paris Agreement was open for signature by states and regional economic integration organizations that are parties to the UNFCCC (the Convention) from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017 at the UN Headquarters in New York.

The agreement stated that it would enter into force (and thus become fully effective) only if 55 countries that produce at least 55% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions (according to a list produced in 2015) ratify, accept, approve or accede to the agreement. On 1 April 2016, the United States and China, which together represent almost 40% of global emissions, issued a joint statement confirming that both countries would sign the Paris Climate Agreement. 175 Parties (174 states and the European Union) signed the agreement on the first date it was open for signature. On the same day, more than 20 countries issued a statement of their intent to join as soon as possible with a view to joining in 2016. With ratification by the European Union, the Agreement obtained enough parties to enter into effect as of 4 November 2016.

European Union and its member states

Both the EU and its member states are individually responsible for ratifying the Paris Agreement. A strong preference was reported that the EU and its 28 member states deposit their instruments of ratification at the same time to ensure that neither the EU nor its member states engage themselves to fulfilling obligations that strictly belong to the other, and there were fears that disagreement over each individual member state's share of the EU-wide reduction target, as well as Britain's vote to leave the EU might delay the Paris pact. However, the European Parliament approved ratification of the Paris Agreement on 4 October 2016, and the EU deposited its instruments of ratification on 5 October 2016, along with several individual EU member states.

Implementation

The process of translating the Paris Agreement into national agendas and implementation has started. One example is the commitment of the least developed countries (LDCs). The LDC Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Initiative for Sustainable Development, known as LDC REEEI, is set to bring sustainable, clean energy to millions of energy-starved people in LDCs, facilitating improved energy access, the creation of jobs and contributing to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Per analysis from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) a carbon "budget" based upon total carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere (versus the rate of annual emission) to limit global warming to 1.5 °C was estimated to be 2.25 trillion tonnes of overall emitted carbon dioxide from the period since 1870. This number is a notable increase from the number estimated by the original Paris Climate accord estimates (of around 2 trillion tonnes total) total carbon emission limit to meet the 1.5 °C global warming target, a target that would be met in the year 2020 at current rates of emission. Additionally, the annual emission of carbon is estimated to be currently at 40 billion tonnes emitted per year. The revised IPCC budget for this was based upon CMIP5 climate model. Estimate models using different base-years also provide other slightly adjusted estimates of a carbon "budget".

Parties and signatories

As of February 2019, 194 states and the European Union have signed the Agreement. 186 states and the EU, representing more than 87% of global greenhouse gas emissions, have ratified or acceded to the Agreement, including China, the United States and India, the countries with three of the four largest greenhouse gas emissions of the UNFCCC members total (about 42% together).

Withdrawal from Agreement

Article 28 of the agreement enables parties to withdraw from the agreement after sending a withdrawal notification to the depositary, but notice can be given no earlier than three years after the agreement goes into force for the country. Withdrawal is effective one year after the depositary is notified. Alternatively, the Agreement stipulates that withdrawal from the UNFCCC, under which the Paris Agreement was adopted, would also withdraw the state from the Paris Agreement. The conditions for withdrawal from the UNFCCC are the same as for the Paris Agreement. The agreement does not specify provisions for non-compliance. 

On 4 August 2017, the Trump administration delivered an official notice to the United Nations that the U.S. intends to withdraw from the Paris Agreement as soon as it is legally eligible to do so. The formal notice of withdrawal cannot be submitted until the agreement is in force for 3 years for the US, in 2019. In accordance with Article 28, as the agreement entered into force in the United States on 4 November 2016, the earliest possible effective withdrawal date for the United States is 4 November 2020 if notice is provided on 4 November 2019. If it chooses to withdraw by way of withdrawing from the UNFCCC, notice could be given immediately (the UNFCCC entered into force for the US in 1994), and be effective one year later.

Criticism

Effectiveness

Global CO2 emissions and probabilistic temperature outcomes of Paris

 

Paris climate accord emission reduction targets and current real-life reductions offered

 

A pair of studies in Nature have said that, as of 2017, none of the major industrialized nations were implementing the policies they had envisioned and have not met their pledged emission reduction targets, and even if they had, the sum of all member pledges (as of 2016) would not keep global temperature rise "well below 2 °C". According to UNEP the emission cut targets in November 2016 will result in temperature rise by 3 °C above pre-industrial levels, far above the 2 °C of the Paris climate agreement.

In addition, an MIT News article written on 22 April 2016 discussed recent MIT studies on the true impact that the Paris Agreement had on global temperature increase. Using their Integrated Global System Modeling (IGSM) to predict temperature increase results in 2100, they used a wide range of scenarios that included no effort towards climate change past 2030, and full extension of the Paris Agreement past 2030. They concluded that the Paris Agreement would cause temperature decrease by about 0.6 to 1.1 degrees Celsius compared to a no-effort-scenario, with only a 0.1 °C change in 2050 for all scenarios. They concluded that, although beneficial, there was strong evidence that the goal provided by the Paris Agreement could not be met in the future; under all scenarios, warming would be at least 3.0 °C by 2100.

How well each individual country is on track to achieving its Paris agreement commitments can be continuously followed on-line.

A 2018 published study points at a threshold at which temperatures could rise to 4 or 5 degrees compared to the pre-industrial levels, through self-reinforcing feedbacks in the climate system, suggesting this threshold is below the 2-degree temperature target, agreed upon by the Paris climate deal. Study author Katherine Richardson stresses, "We note that the Earth has never in its history had a quasi-stable state that is around 2 °C warmer than the pre-industrial and suggest that there is substantial risk that the system, itself, will 'want' to continue warming because of all of these other processes – even if we stop emissions. This implies not only reducing emissions but much more."

At the same time, another 2018 published study notes that even at a 1.5 °C level of warming, important increases in the occurrence of high river flows would be expected in India, South and Southeast Asia. Yet, the same study points out that under a 2.0 °C of warming various areas in South America, central Africa, western Europe, and the Mississippi area in the United States would see more high flows; thus increasing flood risks.

Lack of binding enforcement mechanism

Although the agreement was lauded by many, including French President François Hollande and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, criticism has also surfaced. For example, James Hansen, a former NASA scientist and a climate change expert, voiced anger that most of the agreement consists of "promises" or aims and not firm commitments. He called the Paris talks a fraud with 'no action, just promises' and feels that only an across the board tax on CO
2 emissions, something not part of the Paris Agreement, would force CO
2 emissions down fast enough to avoid the worst effects of global warming.

Institutional asset owners associations and think-tanks have also observed that the stated objectives of the Paris Agreement are implicitly "predicated upon an assumption – that member states of the United Nations, including high polluters such as China, the US, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Indonesia and Mexico, which generate more than half the world's greenhouse gas emissions, will somehow drive down their carbon pollution voluntarily and assiduously without any binding enforcement mechanism to measure and control CO
2 emissions at any level from factory to state, and without any specific penalty gradation or fiscal pressure (for example a carbon tax) to discourage bad behaviour." Emissions taxes (such as a carbon tax) can be integrated into the country's NDC however.