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Wednesday, March 25, 2020

Pain in invertebrates

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A monarch butterfly (Danaus plexippus) caterpillar

Pain in invertebrates is a contentious issue. Although there are numerous definitions of pain, almost all involve two key components. First, nociception is required. This is the ability to detect noxious stimuli which evokes a reflex response that moves the entire animal, or the affected part of its body, away from the source of the stimulus. The concept of nociception does not imply any adverse, subjective feeling; it is a reflex action. The second component is the experience of "pain" itself, or suffering—i.e., the internal, emotional interpretation of the nociceptive experience. Pain is therefore a private, emotional experience. Pain cannot be directly measured in other animals, including other humans; responses to putatively painful stimuli can be measured, but not the experience itself. To address this problem when assessing the capacity of other species to experience pain, argument-by-analogy is used. This is based on the principle that if a non-human animal's responses to stimuli are similar to those of humans, it is likely to have had an analogous experience. It has been argued that if a pin is stuck in a chimpanzee's finger and they rapidly withdraw their hand, then argument-by-analogy implies that like humans, they felt pain. It has been questioned why the inference does not then follow that a cockroach experiences pain when it writhes after being stuck with a pin. This argument-by-analogy approach to the concept of pain in invertebrates has been followed by others.

The ability to experience nociception has been subject to natural selection and offers the advantage of reducing further harm to the organism. While it might be expected therefore that nociception is widespread and robust, nociception varies across species. For example, the chemical capsaicin is commonly used as a noxious stimulus in experiments with mammals; however, the African naked mole-rat, Heterocephalus glaber, an unusual rodent species that lacks pain-related neuropeptides (e.g., substance P) in cutaneous sensory fibres, shows a unique and remarkable lack of pain-related behaviours to acid and capsaicin. Similarly, capsaicin triggers nociceptors in some invertebrates, but this substance is not noxious to Drosophila melanogaster (the common fruit fly). Criteria that may indicate a potential for experiencing pain include:
  1. Has a suitable nervous system and receptors
  2. Physiological changes to noxious stimuli
  3. Displays protective motor reactions that might include reduced use of an affected area such as limping, rubbing, holding or autotomy
  4. Has opioid receptors and shows reduced responses to noxious stimuli when given analgesics and local anaesthetics
  5. Shows trade-offs between stimulus avoidance and other motivational requirements
  6. Shows avoidance learning
  7. Exhibits high cognitive ability and sentience

Suitable nervous system

Central nervous system

Brain size does not necessarily equate to complexity of function. Moreover, weight for body-weight, the cephalopod brain is in the same size bracket as the vertebrate brain, smaller than that of birds and mammals, but as big or bigger than most fish brains.

Charles Darwin wrote of the interaction between size and complexity of invertebrate brains:
It is certain that there may be extraordinary activity with an extremely small absolute mass of nervous matter; thus the wonderfully diversified instincts, mental powers, and affections of ants are notorious, yet their cerebral ganglia are not so large as the quarter of a small pin's head. Under this point of view, the brain of an ant is one of the most marvellous atoms of matter in the world, perhaps more so than the brain of man.
Internal anatomy of a spider, showing the central nervous system in blue
 
Invertebrate nervous systems are very unlike those of vertebrates and this dissimilarity has sometimes been used to reject the possibility of a pain experience in invertebrates. In humans, the neocortex of the brain has a central role in pain and it has been argued that any species lacking this structure will therefore be incapable of feeling pain. However, it is possible that different structures may be involved in the pain experience of other animals in the way that, for example, crustacean decapods have vision despite lacking a human visual cortex.

 
Two groups of invertebrates have notably complex brains: arthropods (insects, crustaceans, arachnids, and others) and modern cephalopods (octopuses, squid, cuttlefish) and other molluscs. The brains of arthropods and cephalopods arise from twin parallel nerve cords that extend through the body of the animal. Arthropods have a central brain with three divisions and large optic lobes behind each eye for visual processing. The brains of the modern cephalopods in particular are highly developed, comparable in complexity to the brains of some vertebrates. Emerging results suggest that a convergent evolutionary process has led to the selection of vertebrate-like neural organization and activity-dependent long-term synaptic plasticity in these invertebrates. Cephalopods stand out by having a central nervous system that shares prime electrophysiological and neuroanatomical features with vertebrates like no other invertebrate taxon.

Nociceptors

Medicinal leech, Hirudo medicinalis
 
Nociceptors are sensory receptors that respond to potentially damaging stimuli by sending nerve signals to the brain. Although these neurons in invertebrates may have different pathways and relationships to the central nervous system than mammalian nociceptors, nociceptive neurons in invertebrates often fire in response to similar stimuli as mammals, such as high temperature (40 C or more), low pH, capsaicin, and tissue damage. The first invertebrate in which a nociceptive cell was identified was the medicinal leech, Hirudo medicinalis, which has the characteristic segmented body of an Annelida, each segment possessing a ganglion containing the T (touch), P (pressure) and N (noxious) cells. Later studies on the responses of leech neurones to mechanical, chemical and thermal stimulation motivated researchers to write "These properties are typical of mammalian polymodal nociceptors". 

A sea hare
 
There have been numerous studies of learning and memory using nociceptors in the sea hare, Aplysia. Many of these have focused on mechanosensory neurons innervating the siphon and having their somata (bulbous end) in the abdominal ganglion (LE cells). These LE cells display increasing discharge to increasing pressures, with maximal activation by crushing or tearing stimuli that cause tissue injury. Therefore, they satisfy accepted definitions of nociceptors. They also show similarities to vertebrate nociceptors, including a property apparently unique (among primary afferents) to nociceptors — sensitization by noxious stimulation. Either pinching or pinning the siphon decreased the threshold of the LE cells firing and enhanced soma excitability.

Nociceptors have been identified in a wide range of invertebrate species, including annelids, molluscs, nematodes and arthropods.

Physiological changes

In vertebrates, potentially painful stimuli typically produce vegetative modifications such as tachycardia, pupil dilation, defecation, arteriole blood gases, fluid and electrolyte imbalance, and changes in blood flow, respiratory patterns, and endocrine.

The crayfish Procambarus clarkii

At the cellular level, injury or wounding of invertebrates leads to the directed migration and accumulation of haematocytes (defence cells) and neuronal plasticity, much the same as the responses of human patients undergoing surgery or after injury. In one study, heart rate in the crayfish, Procambarus clarkii, decreased following claw autotomy during an aggressive encounter.

Recording physiological changes in invertebrates in response to noxious stimuli will enhance the findings of behavioural observations and such studies should be encouraged. However, careful control is required because physiological changes can occur due to noxious, but non-pain related events, e.g. cardiac and respiratory activity in crustaceans is highly sensitive and responds to changes in water level, various chemicals and activity during aggressive encounters.

Protective motor reactions

Invertebrates show a wide range of protective reactions to putatively painful stimuli. However, even unicellular animals will show protective responses to, for example, extremes of temperature. Many invertebrate protective reactions appear stereotyped and reflexive in action, perhaps indicating a nociceptive response rather than one of pain, but other responses are more plastic, especially when competing with other motivational systems (see section below), indicating a pain response analogous to that of vertebrates.

Mechanical stimulation

A selection of invertebrates that show avoidance of noxious mechanical stimulation
 
 
Drosophila larva
 
The sea hare, Aplysia

Rather than a simple withdrawal reflex, the flatworm, Notoplana aticola, displays a locomotory escape behaviour following pin pricks to the posterior end. Touching the larvae of fruit flies, Drosophila melanogaster, with a probe causes them to pause and move away from the stimulus, however, stronger mechanical stimulation evokes a more complex corkscrew-like rolling behaviour, i.e. the response is plastic.

Rather than a simple withdrawal reflex, the flatworm, Notoplana aticola, displays a locomotory escape behaviour following pin pricks to the posterior end. Touching the larvae of fruit flies, Drosophila melanogaster, with a probe causes them to pause and move away from the stimulus, however, stronger mechanical stimulation evokes a more complex corkscrew-like rolling behaviour, i.e. the response is plastic. When a weak tactile stimulus is applied to the siphon of the sea-hare Aplysia californica, the animal rapidly withdraws the siphon between the parapodia. It is sometimes claimed this response is an involuntary reflex (e.g. see Aplysia gill and siphon withdrawal reflex), however, the complex learning associated with this response (see 'Learned Avoidance' below) suggests this view might be overly simplistic.

] When a weak tactile stimulus is applied to the siphon of the sea-hare Aplysia californica, the animal rapidly withdraws the siphon between the parapodia. It is sometimes claimed this response is an involuntary reflex (e.g. see Aplysia gill and siphon withdrawal reflex), however, the complex learning associated with this response (see 'Learned Avoidance' below) suggests this view might be overly simplistic.

In 2001, Walters and colleagues published a report that described the escape responses of the tobacco hornworm caterpillar (Manduca sexta) to mechanical stimulation. These responses, particularly their plasticity, were remarkably similar to vertebrate escape responses.

A set of defensive behavior patterns in larval Manduca sexta is described and shown to undergo sensitization following noxious mechanical stimulation. The striking response is a rapid bending that accurately propels the head towards sharply poking or pinching stimuli applied to most abdominal segments. The strike is accompanied by opening of the mandibles and, sometimes, regurgitation. The strike may function to dislodge small attackers and startle larger predators. When the same stimuli are applied to anterior segments, the head is pulled away in a withdrawal response. Noxious stimuli to anterior or posterior segments can evoke a transient withdrawal (cocking) that precedes a strike towards the source of stimulation and may function to maximize the velocity of the strike. More intense noxious stimuli evoke faster, larger strikes and may also elicit thrashing, which consists of large, cyclic, side-to-side movements that are not directed at any target. These are sometimes also associated with low-amplitude quivering cycles. Striking and thrashing sequences elicited by obvious wounding are sometimes followed by grooming-like behavior.
 
Tobacco hornworm larva, Manduca sexta

Autotomy

Over 200 species of invertebrates are capable of using autotomy (self amputation) as an avoidance or protective behaviour including -
These animals can voluntarily shed appendages when necessary for survival. Autotomy can occur in response to chemical, thermal and electrical stimulation, but is perhaps most frequently a response to mechanical stimulation during capture by a predator. Autotomy serves either to improve the chances of escape or to reduce further damage occurring to the remainder of the animal such as the spread of a chemical toxin after being stung, but the 'decision' to shed a limb or part of a body and the considerable costs incurred by this suggests a pain response rather than simply a nociceptive reflex.

Thermal stimulation

A heated probe (»42 °C or 108 °F) evokes a complex, corkscrew-like rolling avoidance behaviour in Drosophila larvae which occurs in as little as 0.4 seconds; a non-heated probe does not cause this avoidance behaviour. In contrast, cold stimuli (≤14°C or 57.2°F) primarily elicit a bilateral full-body contraction along the head-to-tail axis; larvae might also respond by lifting their head and/or tail, but these responses occur less frequently with decreasing temperatures. Land snails show an avoidance response to being placed on a hotplate (»40 °C or 104 °F) by lifting the anterior portion of the extended foot. A 2015 study found that crayfish (Procambarus clarkii) respond adversely to high temperatures, but not to low temperatures.

Chemical stimulation

Crustaceans are known to respond to acids in ways that indicate nociception and/or pain. The prawn Palaemon elegans shows protective motor reactions when their antennae are treated with the irritants acetic acid or sodium hydroxide. The prawns specifically groom the treated antennae and rub them against the tank, showing they are aware of the location of the noxious stimulus on their body rather than exhibiting a generalised response to stimulation. In Carcinus maenas, the common shore crab, acetic acid induces a number of behavioral changes, including movement of the mouthparts, rubbing with the claws, and increased attempts to escape from an enclosure.

Wasp stinger, with droplet of venom

Under natural conditions, orb-weaving spiders (Argiope spp.) undergo autotomy (self-amputation) if they are stung in a leg by wasps or bees. Under experimental conditions, when spiders were injected in the leg with bee or wasp venom, they shed this appendage. But if they are injected with only saline, they rarely autotomize the leg, indicating it is not the physical insult or the ingress of fluid per se that causes autotomy. Spiders injected with venom components which cause injected humans to report pain (serotonin, histamine, phospholipase A2 and melittin) autotomize the leg, but if the injections contain venom components which do not cause pain to humans, autotomy does not occur.

Drosophila melanogaster larvae respond to acids and menthol with a stereotyped nociceptive rolling response, identical to the behavior seen in response to high-temperature and mechanical insult. The electrophilic chemical allyl isothiocyanate causes nociceptive sensitization in larvae. Adult flies find menthol, AITC, and a number of other chemicals to be aversive, affecting both the proboscis extension reflex and egg-lay site preference.

Acids are also known to activate nociceptors in the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans and in Hirudo medicinalis, commonly known as the medicinal leech.

Electrical stimulation

The sea-slug, Tritonia diomedia, possesses a group of sensory cells, "S-cells", situated in the pleural ganglia, which initiate escape swimming if stimulated by electric shock. Similarly, the mantis shrimp Squilla mantis shows avoidance of electric shocks with a strong tail-flick escape response. Both these responses appear to be rather fixed and reflexive, however, other studies indicate a range of invertebrates exhibit considerably more plastic responses to electric shocks. 

Because of their soft bodies, hermit crabs rely on shells for their survival, but, when they are given small electric shocks within their shells, they evacuate these. The response, however, is influenced by the attractiveness of the shell; more preferred shells are only evacuated when the crabs are given a higher voltage shock, indicating this is not a simple, reflex behaviour.

In studies on learning and the Aplysia gill and siphon withdrawal reflex, Aplysia received an electric shock on the siphon each time their gill relaxed below a criterion level. Aplysia learned to keep their gills contracted above the criterion level—an unlikely outcome if the response was due to a nociceptive experience.

Drosophila feature widely in studies of invertebrate nociception and pain. It has been known since 1974 that these fruit-flies can be trained with sequential presentations of an odour and electric shock (odour–shock training) and will subsequently avoid the odour because it predicts something "bad". A similar response has been found in the larvae of this species. In an intriguing study, Drosophila learned two kinds of prediction regarding a 'traumatic' experience. If an odour preceded an electric shock during training, it predicted shock and the flies subsequently avoided it. When the sequence of events during training was reversed, i.e. odour followed shock, the odour predicted relief from shock and flies approached it. The authors termed this latter effect "relief" learning.

Many invertebrate species learn to withdraw from, or alter their behaviour in response to, a conditioned stimulus when this has been previously paired with an electric shock—cited by Sherwin—and include snails, leeches, locusts, bees and various marine molluscs.

If vertebrate species are used in studies on protective or motor behaviour and they respond in similar ways to those described above, it is usually assumed that the learning process is based on the animal experiencing a sensation of pain or discomfort from the stimulus, e.g. an electric shock. Argument-by-analogy suggests an analogous experience occurs in invertebrates.

Opioid receptors, effects of local anaesthetics or analgesics

In vertebrates, opiates modulate nociception and opioid receptor antagonists, e.g. naloxone and CTOP, reverse this effect. So, if opiates have similar effects in invertebrates as vertebrates, they should delay or reduce any protective response and the opioid antagonist should counteract this. It has been found that molluscs and insects have opioid binding sites or opioid general sensitivity. Certainly there are many examples of neuropeptides involved in vertebrate pain responses being found in invertebrates; for example, endorphins have been found in platyhelminthes, molluscs, annelids, crustaceans and insects. Apart from analgesia, there are other effects of exogenous opiates specifically being involved in feeding behaviour and activation of immunocytes. These latter functions might explain the presence of opioids and opioid receptors in extremely simple invertebrates and unicellular animals.

Nematodes

Movement of wild-type C. elegans

Nematodes avoid extremes of temperature. Morphine increases the latency of this defensive response in the parasitic Ascaris suum. In a study on the effects of opiates in Caenorhabditis elegans, 76% of a non-treated group exhibited a rapid, reflexive withdrawal to heat, whereas 47%, 36% and 39% of morphine, endomorphin 1 and endomorphin 2 treated worms (respectively) withdrew. These effects were reversed with the opioid receptor antagonists naloxone and CTOP, leading the authors to conclude that thermonocifensive behaviour in C. elegans was modulated by opioids.

Molluscs

Helix pomatia, a species of land snail

Slugs and snails have an opioid receptor system. In experiments on different terrestrial snails, morphine prolonged the latency of the snails' raising their foot in response to being placed on a hot (40 °C) surface. The analgesic effects of the morphine were eliminated by naloxone as is seen in humans and other vertebrates. There was also habituation to morphine. Snails administered with morphine for four days did not differ from the control ones in tests on pain sensitivity and analgesia was achieved only at a higher dose.

Crustaceans

Two crustaceans that show responses to analgesics and their agonists
A mantis shrimp, Squilla mantis
 
The grass prawn, Penaeus monodon
 
Evidence of the capacity for invertebrates to experience nociception and pain has been widely studied in crustaceans. In the crab Neohelice granulata, electric shocks delivered via small holes in the carapace elicited a defensive threat display. Injection of morphine reduced the crabs' sensitivity to the shock in a dose-dependent manner, with the effect declining with increasing duration between morphine injection and shock. Naloxone injection inhibited the effects of morphine, as is seen in vertebrates. Morphine also had inhibitory effects on the escape tail-flick response to electric shock in the mantis shrimp, Squilla mantis, that was reversed by naloxone, indicating that the effect is found in crustacean groups other than decapods. When the irritants acetic acid or sodium hydroxide were applied to the antennae of grass prawns, Penaeus monodon, there was an increase in rubbing and grooming of the treated areas which was not seen if they had previously been treated with a local anaesthetic, benzocaine, however, the benzocaine did not eliminate the level of rubbing seen in response to mechanical stimulation with forceps. There was no effect of benzocaine on the general locomotion of the prawns, so the reduction in rubbing and grooming was not simply due to inactivity of the animal. Another local anaesthetic, xylocaine, reduced the stress of eyestalk ablation in female whiteleg shrimps, Litopenaeus vannamei, as indicated by levels of feeding and swimming.

It has not always been possible to replicate these findings in crustaceans. In one study, three decapod crustacean species, Louisiana red swamp crayfish, white shrimp and grass shrimp, were tested for nociceptive behaviour by applying sodium hydroxide, hydrochloric acid, or benzocaine to the antennae. This caused no change in behaviour in these three species compared to controls. Animals did not groom the treated antenna, and there was no difference in movement of treated individuals and controls. Extracellular recordings of antennal nerves in the Louisiana red swamp crayfish revealed continual spontaneous activity, but no neurons that were reliably excited by the application of sodium hydroxide or hydrochloric acid. The authors concluded there was no behavioural or physiological evidence that the antennae contained specialized nociceptors that responded to pH. It could be argued that differences in the findings between studies may be due to responses to extreme pH being inconsistently evoked across species. 

It has been argued that the analgesic effects of morphine should not be used as a criterion of the ability of animals, at least crustaceans, to experience pain. In one study, shore crabs, Carcinus maenas received electric shocks in a preferred dark shelter but not if they remained in an unpreferred light area. Analgesia from morphine should have enhanced movement to the preferred dark area because the crabs would not have experienced 'pain' from the electric shock. However, morphine inhibited rather than enhanced this movement, even when no shock was given. Morphine produced a general effect of non-responsiveness rather than a specific analgesic effect, which could also explain previous studies claiming analgesia. However, the researchers argued that other systems such as the enkephalin or steroid systems might be used in pain modulation by crustaceans and that behavioural responses should be considered rather than specific physiological and morphological features.

Insects

The house cricket, Acheta domestica

Morphine extends the period that crickets remain on the heated surface of a hotplate.

Trade-offs between stimulus avoidance and other motivational requirements

This is a particularly important criterion for assessing whether an animal has the capacity to experience pain rather than only nociception. Nociceptive responses do not require consciousness or higher neural processing; this results in relatively fixed, reflexive actions. However, the experience of pain does involve higher neural centres which also take into account other factors of relevance to the animal, i.e. competing motivations. This means that a response to the experience of pain is likely to be more plastic than a nociceptive response when there are competing factors for the animal to consider.

Hermit crabs fighting over a shell

Robert Elwood and Mirjam Appel at the Queen's University of Belfast argue that pain may be inferred when the responses to a noxious stimulus are not reflexive but are traded off against other motivational requirements, the experience is remembered and the situation is avoided in the future. They investigated this by giving hermit crabs small electric shocks within their shells. Only crabs given shocks evacuated their shells indicating the aversive nature of the stimulus, but fewer crabs evacuated from a preferred species of shell demonstrating a motivational trade-off. Most crabs, however, did not evacuate at the shock level used, but when these shocked crabs were subsequently offered a new shell, they were more likely to approach and enter the new shell. They approached the new shell more quickly, investigated it for a shorter time and used fewer cheliped probes within the aperture prior to moving in. This demonstrates the experience of the electric shock altered future behaviour in a manner consistent with a marked shift in motivation to get a new shell to replace the one previously occupied.

Learned avoidance

Learning to avoid a noxious stimulus indicates that prior experience of the stimulus is remembered by the animal and appropriate action taken in the future to avoid or reduce potential damage. This type of response is therefore not the fixed, reflexive action of nociceptive avoidance.

Habituation and sensitization

Habituation and sensitisation are two simple, but widespread, forms of learning. Habituation refers to a type of non-associative learning in which repeated exposure to a stimulus leads to decreased responding. Sensitization is another form of learning in which the progressive amplification of a response follows repeated administrations of a stimulus.

When a tactile stimulus is applied to the skin of Aplysia californica, the animal withdraws the siphon and gill between the parapodia. This defensive withdrawal, known as the Aplysia gill and siphon withdrawal reflex, has been the subject of much study on learning behaviour. Generally, these studies have involved only weak, tactile stimulation and are therefore more relevant to the question of whether invertebrates can experience nociception, however, some studies have used electric shocks to examine this response (See sections on "Electrical stimulation" and "Operant conditioning"). 

Other researchers working with Aplysia were sufficiently impressed by the similarity between invertebrate and mammalian responses to write:
Persistent nociceptive sensitization of nociceptors in Aplysia displays many functional similarities to alterations in mammalian nociceptors associated with the clinical problem of chronic pain. Moreover, in Aplysia and mammals the same cell signaling pathways trigger persistent enhancement of excitability and synaptic transmission following noxious stimulation, and these highly conserved pathways are also used to induce memory traces in neural circuits of diverse species
– Walters, E.T. and Moroz, L.L. (2009)

Location avoidance

Avoidance learning was examined in the crab Neohelice granulata by placing the animals in a dark compartment of a double-chamber device and allowing them to move towards a light compartment. Experimental crabs received a shock in the light compartment, whilst controls did not. After 1 min, both experimental and control crabs were free to return to the dark compartment. The learned outcome was not a faster escape response to the stimulus but rather refraining from re-entering the light compartment. A single trial was enough to establish an association between light and shock that was detected up to 3 hours later.

Studies on crayfish, Procambarus clarkia, demonstrated that they learned to associate the turning on of a light with a shock that was given 10 seconds later. They learned to respond by walking to a safe area in which the shock was not delivered. However, this only occurred if the crayfish were facing the area to which they could retreat to avoid the shock. If they were facing away from the safe area the animal did not walk but responded to the shock by a tail-flick escape response. Despite repeated pairings of light and shock the animals did not learn to avoid the shock by tail-flicking in response to light. Curiously, when the animals that had experienced shocks whilst facing away from the safe area were subsequently tested facing towards the safe area they showed a very rapid avoidance of the shock upon the onset of the light. Thus, they seemed to have learned the association although they had not previously used it to avoid the shock - much like mammalian latent learning. These studies show an ability in decapods that fulfils several criteria for pain experience rather than nociception.

Conditioned suppression

A drone bee

Honeybees extend their proboscis when learning about novel odours. In one study on this response, bees learnt to discriminate between two odours, but then learned to suppress the proboscis extension response when one of the odours was paired with an electric shock. This indicates the sensation was aversive to the bee, however, the response was plastic rather than simply reflexive, indicating pain rather than nociception.

Operant conditioning

Operant studies using vertebrates have been conducted for many years. In such studies, an animal operates or changes some part of the environment to gain a positive reinforcement or avoid a negative one. In this way, animals learn from the consequence of their own actions, i.e. they use an internal predictor. Operant responses indicate a voluntary act; the animal exerts control over the frequency or intensity of its responses, making these distinct from reflexes and complex fixed action patterns. A number of studies have revealed surprising similarities between vertebrates and invertebrates in their capacity to use operant responses to gain positive reinforcements, but also to avoid negative reinforcement that in vertebrates would be described as 'pain'.

Underside of a snail climbing a blade of grass, showing the muscular foot

Snail

It has been shown that snails will operate a manipulandum to electrically self-stimulate areas of their brain. Balaban and Maksimova surgically implanted fine wire electrodes in two regions of the brains of snails (Helix sp.). To receive electrical stimulation of the brain, the snail was required to displace the end of a rod. When pressing the rod delivered self-stimulation to the mesocerebrum (which is involved in sexual activity) the snails increased the frequency of operating the manipulandum compared to the baseline spontaneous frequency of operation. However, when stimulation was delivered to the parietal ganglion, the snails decreased the frequency of touching the rod compared to the baseline spontaneous frequency. These increases and decreases in pressing are positive and negative reinforcement responses typical of those seen with vertebrates.

Aplysia

To examine the gill and siphon withdrawal response to a putatively painful stimulus, Aplysia were tested in pairs. During the initial training period, the experimental animal received a siphon shock each time its gill relaxed below a criterion level, and the yoked control animal received a shock whenever the experimental animal did, regardless of its own gill position. The experimental animals spent more time with their gills contracted above the criterion level than did the control animals during each period, demonstrating operant conditioning.

Drosophila

A fly-controlled heat-box has been designed to study operant conditioning in several studies of Drosophila. Each time a fly walks into the designated half of the tiny dark chamber, the whole space is heated. As soon as the animal leaves the punished half, the chamber temperature reverts to normal. After a few minutes, the animals restrict their movements to one-half of the chamber, even if the heat is switched off. 

A Drosophila flight simulator has been used to examine operant conditioning. The flies are tethered in an apparatus that measures the yaw torque of their flight attempts and stabilizes movements of the panorama. The apparatus controls the fly's orientation based on these attempts. When the apparatus was set up to direct a heat beam on the fly if it "flew" to certain areas of its panorama, the flies learned to prefer and avoid certain flight orientations in relation to the surrounding panorama. The flies "avoided" areas that caused them to receive heat.

These experiments show that Drosophila can use operant behaviour and learn to avoid noxious stimuli. However, these responses were plastic, complex behaviours rather than simple reflex actions, consistent more with the experience of pain rather than simply nociception.

Cognitive abilities

Atta colombica workers transporting leaves

It could be argued that a high cognitive ability is not necessary for the experience of pain, otherwise, it could be argued that humans with less cognitive capacity have a lower likelihood of experiencing pain. However, most definitions of pain indicate some degree of cognitive ability. Several of the learned and operant behaviours described above indicate that invertebrates have high cognitive abilities. Other examples include:

Non-stereotyped behavior

Charles Darwin was interested in worms and "how far they acted consciously, and how much mental power they displayed." In The Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Worms, Darwin described complex behaviors by worms when plugging their burrows. He suggested that worms appear to "have the power of acquiring some notion, however crude, of the shape of an object and of their burrows" and if so, "they deserve to be called intelligent; for they then act in nearly the same manner as would a man under similar circumstances."

Charles Darwin:
One alternative alone is left, namely, that worms, although standing low in the scale of organization, possess some degree of intelligence. This will strike every one as very improbable; but it may be doubted whether we know enough about the nervous system of the lower animals to justify our natural distrust of such a conclusion. With respect to the small size of the cerebral ganglia, we should remember what a mass of inherited knowledge, with some power of adapting means to an end, is crowded into the minute brain of a worker-ant.
Donald Griffin's 1984 Animal Thinking defends the idea that invertebrate behavior is complex, intelligent, and somewhat general. He points to examples in W. S. Bristowe's 1976 The World of Spiders detailing how spiders respond adaptively to novel conditions. For instance, a spider can eat a fly held in front of it by an experimenter, bypassing the usual step of moving toward an insect caught on its web. A spider may adapt the shape of its web to abnormal circumstances, suggesting that the web is not just built with a fixed template. Griffin also considers leaf-cutter ants, with central nervous systems "less than a millimeter in diameter," and asks: "Can the genetic instructions stored in such a diminutive central nervous system prescribe all of the detailed motor actions carried out by one of these ants? Or is it more plausible to suppose that their DNA programs the development of simple generalizations [...]?"

In other instances invertebrates display more "dumb," pre-programmed behavior. Darwin himself cites examples involving ants, sphexes, and bees. Dean Wooldridge described how a sphex wasp brings a paralyzed cricket to its burrow and then goes inside to inspect the burrow before coming back out and bringing the cricket in. If the cricket is moved slightly while the wasp is away making its first inspection, the wasp upon returning from the burrow reorients the cricket to its proper position and then proceeds to check the burrow again, even though it was already checked just before. If the cricket is moved again, the routine repeats once more. This process has been repeated up to 40 times in a row. Based on this example, Douglas Hofstadter coined the term "sphexish" to mean deterministic or pre-programmed.

Social interaction

Social behavior is widespread in invertebrates, including cockroaches, termites, aphids, thrips, ants, bees, Passalidae, Acari, spiders, and more. Social interaction is particularly salient in eusocial species but applies to other invertebrates as well.

Jeffrey A. Lockwood, citing previous authors, argues that awareness of how other minds operate may be an important requirement for social interaction. Social behavior indicates that insects can recognize information conveyed by other insects, and this suggests they may also have some self-awareness. Lockwood asserts: "it is rather implausible to contend that through sensory mechanisms an insect is aware of the environment, other insects, and the needs of conspecifics but through some neural blockage, the same insect is selectively unconscious of sensory input about itself."

Protective legislation

In the UK from 1993 to 2012, the common octopus (Octopus vulgaris) was the only invertebrate protected under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. In 2012, this legislation was extended to include all cephalopods in accordance with a general EU directive which states "...there is scientific evidence of their [cephalopods] ability to experience pain, suffering, distress and lasting harm.

Robert Kegan

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Robert Kegan (born August 24, 1946) is an American developmental psychologist, author, and consultant. He was the William and Miriam Meehan Professor in Adult Learning and Professional Development at Harvard Graduate School of Education, where he taught for forty years until his retirement in 2016. Additionally he was the Educational Chair for the Institute for Management and Leadership in Education and the Co-director for the Change Leadership Group. He is a licensed psychologist and practicing therapist, has lectured widely to professional and lay audiences, and consults in the area of professional development and organization development.

Education and early career

Born in Minnesota, Kegan attended Dartmouth College, graduating summa cum laude in 1968. He described the civil rights movement and the movement against the Vietnam War as formative experiences during his college years. He took his "collection of interests in learning from a psychological and literary and philosophical point of view" to Harvard University, where he earned his Ph.D. in 1977.

The Evolving Self

In his book The Evolving Self (1982), Kegan explored human life problems from the perspective of a single process which he called meaning-making, the activity of making sense of experience through discovering and resolving problems. "Thus it is not that a person makes meaning, as much as that activity of being a person is the activity of meaning-making", Kegan wrote. The purpose of the book is primarily to give professional helpers (such as counselors, psychotherapists, and coaches) a broad, developmental framework for empathizing with their clients' different ways of making sense of their problems.

Kegan described meaning-making as a lifelong activity that begins in earliest infancy and can evolve in complexity through a series of "evolutionary truces" (or "evolutionary balances") that establish a balance between self and other (in psychological terms), or subject and object (in philosophical terms), or organism and environment (in biological terms). Each evolutionary truce is both an achievement of and a constraint on meaning-making, possessing both strengths and limitations. Each subsequent evolutionary truce is a new, more refined, solution to the lifelong tension between how people are connected, attached, and included (integrated with other people and the world), and how people are distinct, independent, and autonomous (differentiated from other people and the rest of the world).

Kegan adapted Donald Winnicott's idea of the holding environment and proposed that the evolution of meaning-making is a life history of holding environments, or cultures of embeddedness. Kegan described cultures of embeddedness in terms of three processes: confirmation (holding on), contradiction (letting go), and continuity (staying put for reintegration).

For Kegan, "the person is more than an individual"; developmental psychology studies the evolution of cultures of embeddedness, not the study of isolated individuals. "One of the most powerful features of this psychology, in fact, is its capacity to liberate psychological theory from the study of the decontextualized individual. Constructive-developmental psychology reconceives the whole question of the relationship between the individual and the social by reminding that the distinction is not absolute, that development is intrinsically about the continual settling and resettling of this very distinction."

Kegan argued that some of the psychological distress that people experience (including some depression and anxiety) are a result of the "natural emergencies" that happen when "the terms of our evolutionary truce must be renegotiated" and a new, more refined, culture of embeddedness must emerge.

The Evolving Self attempted a theoretical integration of three different intellectual traditions in psychology. The first is the humanistic and existential-phenomenological tradition (which includes Martin Buber, Prescott Lecky, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, Ludwig Binswanger, Andras Angyal, and Carl Rogers). The second is the neo-psychoanalytic tradition (which includes Anna Freud, Erik Erikson, Ronald Fairbairn, Donald Winnicott, Margaret Mahler, Harry Guntrip, John Bowlby, and Heinz Kohut). The third is what Kegan calls the constructive-developmental tradition (which includes James Mark Baldwin, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, William G. Perry, and Jane Loevinger). The book is also strongly influenced by dialectical philosophy and psychology and by Carol Gilligan's psychology of women.

Kegan presented a sequence of six evolutionary balances: incorporative, impulsive, imperial, interpersonal, institutional, and interindividual. The following table is a composite of several tables in The Evolving Self that summarize these balances. The object (O) of each balance is the subject (S) of the preceding balance. The process of emergence of each evolutionary balance is described in detail in the text of the book; as Kegan said, his primary interest is the ontogeny of these balances, not just their taxonomy.

The final chapter of The Evolving Self, titled "Natural Therapy", is a meditation on the philosophical and ethical fundamentals of the helping professions. Kegan argued, similarly to later theorists of asset-based community development, that professional helpers should base their practice on people's existing strengths and "natural" capabilities. The careful practice of "unnatural" (self-conscious) professional intervention may be important and valuable, said Kegan; nevertheless "rather than being the panacea for modern maladies, it is actually a second-best means of support, and arguably a sign that the natural facilitation of development has somehow and for some reason broken down". Helping professionals need a way of evaluating the quality of people's evolving cultures of embeddedness so as to provide opportunities for problem-solving and growth, while acknowledging that the evaluators too have their own evolving cultures of embeddedness. Kegan warned that professional helpers should not delude themselves into thinking that their conceptions of health and development are unbiased by their particular circumstances or partialities. Kegan acknowledged the importance of Thomas Szasz's "suggestion that mental illness is a kind of myth", and he said that we need a way to address what Szasz calls "problems in living" while protecting clients as much as possible from the helping professional's partialities and limitations.

The Evolving Self has been cited favorably by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Ronald A. Heifetz, Ruthellen Josselson, and George Vaillant. Despite the book's wealth of human stories, some readers have found it difficult to read due to the density of Kegan's writing and its conceptual complexity.

In Over Our Heads

Kegan's book In Over Our Heads (1994) extends his perspective on psychological development formulated in The Evolving Self. What Kegan earlier called "evolutionary truces" of increasing subject–object complexity are now called "orders of consciousness". In Over Our Heads explores what happens, and how people feel, when new orders of consciousness emerge, or fail to emerge, in the domains of parenting (families), partnering (couples), working (companies), healing (psychotherapies), and learning (schools). He connects the idea of orders of consciousness with the idea of a hidden curriculum of everyday life. Kegan repeatedly points to the suffering that can result when people are presented with challenging tasks and expectations without the necessary support to master them.

In addition, Kegan now distinguishes between orders of consciousness (cognitive complexity) and styles (stylistic diversity). Theories of style describe "preferences about the way we know, rather than competencies or capacities in our knowing, as is the case with subject–object principles". Kegan's writing in this book continues the same combination of detailed storytelling and theoretical analysis found in his earlier book, but presents a "more complex bi-theoretical approach" rather than the single subject–object theory he presented in The Evolving Self.

In the last chapter of In Over Our Heads, titled "On Being Good Company for the Wrong Journey", Kegan warns that it is easy to misconceive the nature of the mental transformations that a person needs or seeks to make. Whatever the virtues of higher orders of consciousness, no one should expect us to master them when we are not ready or when we are without the necessary support; and we are unlikely to be helped by someone who assumes that we are engaged at a certain order of consciousness when we are not. He ends the book with an epilogue on the value of passionate engagement and the creative unpredictability of human lives.

In Over Our Heads has been cited favorably by Morton Deutsch, John Heron, David A. Kolb, and Jack Mezirow.

Immunity to Change

Kegan's next book, How the Way We Talk Can Change the Way We Work (2001), co-authored with Lisa Laskow Lahey, jettisons the theoretical framework of his earlier books The Evolving Self and In Over Our Heads and instead presents a practical method, called the immunity map, intended to help readers overcome an immunity to change. An immunity to change is the "processes of dynamic equilibrium, which, like an immune system, powerfully and mysteriously tend to keep things pretty much as they are".

The immunity map continues the general dialectical pattern of Kegan's earlier thinking but without any explicit use of the concept of "evolutionary truces" or "orders of consciousness". The map primarily consists of a four-column worksheet that is gradually filled in by individuals or groups of people during a structured process of self-reflective inquiry. This involves asking questions such as: "What are the changes that we think we need to make?" "What are we doing or not doing to prevent ourselves (immunize ourselves) from making those changes?" "What anxieties and big assumptions does our doing or not doing imply?" "How can we test those big assumptions so as to disturb our immunity to change and make possible new learning and change?"

Kegan and Lahey progressively introduce each of the four columns of the immunity map in four chapters that show how to transform people's way of talking to themselves and others. In each case, the transformation in people's way of talking is a shift from a habitual and unreflective pattern to a more deliberate and self-reflective pattern. The four transformations, each of which corresponds to a column of the immunity map, are:
  • "From the language of complaint to the language of commitment"
  • "From the language of blame to the language of personal responsibility"
  • "From the language of New Year's resolutions to the language of competing commitments"
  • "From the language of big assumptions that hold us to the language of assumptions we hold"
In three subsequent chapters, Kegan and Lahey present three transformations that groups of people can make in their social behavior, again from a lesser to greater self-reflective pattern:
  • "From the language of prizes and praising to the language of ongoing regard"
  • "From the language of rules and policies to the language of public agreement"
  • "From the language of constructive criticism to the language of deconstructive criticism"
Immunity to Change (2009), the next book by Kegan and Lahey, revisits the immunity map of their previous book. The authors describe three dimensions of immunity to change: the change-preventing system (thwarting challenging aspirations), the feeling system (managing anxiety), and the knowing system (organizing reality). They further illustrate their method with a number of actual case studies from their experiences as consultants, and they connect the method to a dialectic of three mindsets, called socialized mind, self-authoring mind, and self-transforming mind. (These correspond to three of the "evolutionary truces" or "orders of consciousness" in Kegan's earlier books.) Kegan and Lahey also borrow and incorporate some frameworks and methods from other thinkers, including Ronald A. Heifetz's distinction between technical and adaptive learning, Chris Argyris's ladder of inference, and a reworded version of the four stages of competence. They also provide more detailed guidance on how to test big assumptions.

The revised immunity map worksheet in Immunity to Change has the following structure: (0) Generating ideas. (1) Commitment (improvement) goals. (2) Doing / not doing. (3) Hidden competing commitment (and worry box). (4) Big assumption. (5) First S-M-A-R-T test: Safe, Modest, Actionable, Research stance (not a self-improvement stance), Test.

The immunity to change framework has been cited favorably by Chris Argyris, Kenneth J. Gergen, Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries, and Tony Schwartz.

An Everyone Culture

The book An Everyone Culture: Becoming a Deliberately Developmental Organization (2016) was co-authored by Robert Kegan, Lisa Laskow Lahey, Matthew L. Miller, Andy Fleming, and Deborah Helsing. The authors connect the concept of the deliberately developmental organization with adult development theory and argue that creating conditions for employees to successfully navigate through the transitions from socialized mind to self-authoring mind to self-transforming mind (described in Kegan's earlier works) "has a business value", at least in part because they expect demand for employees with more complex mindsets "will intensify in the years ahead".

Criticism

Adult education professor Ann K. Brooks criticized Kegan's book In Over Our Heads. She claimed that Kegan fell victim to a cultural "myopia" that "perfectly reflects the rationalist values of modern academia". Brooks also said that Kegan excluded "the possibility of a developmental trajectory aimed at increased connection with others", which is contradicted by Ruthellen Josselson's statement that Kegan "has made the most heroic efforts" to balance individuality and connection with others in his work.

In an interview with Otto Scharmer in 2000, Kegan expressed self-criticism toward his earlier writings; Kegan told Scharmer: "I can go back and look at things I've written and think, ugh, this is a pretty raw and distorted way of stating what I think I understand much better now."

Psychologists Michael Basseches and Michael Mascolo's 2009 book Psychotherapy as a Developmental Process, which Kegan called "the closest thing we have to a 'unified field theory' for psychotherapy", stated that Basseches and Mascolo "embrace both Piagetian models of psychological change and their organization into justifications of what constitutes epistemic progress (the development of more adequate knowledge)", but they rejected theories of global developmental stages, such as Kegan's earlier writings, in favor of a more finely differentiated conception of development that focuses on "the emergence of specific skills, experiences, and behavioral dispositions over the course of psychotherapy as a developmental process".

Key publications

  • Kegan, Robert; Lahey, Lisa Laskow; Miller, Matthew L.; Fleming, Andy; Helsing, Deborah (2016). An everyone culture: becoming a deliberately developmental organization. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press. ISBN 9781625278623. OCLC 907194200.
  • Kegan, Robert; Lahey, Lisa Laskow (2009). Immunity to change: how to overcome it and unlock potential in yourself and your organization. Boston: Harvard Business Press. ISBN 978-0787963781. OCLC 44972130.
  • Wagner, Tony; Kegan, Robert (2006). Change leadership: a practical guide to transforming our schools. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. ISBN 978-0787977559. OCLC 61748276.
  • Kegan, Robert; Lahey, Lisa Laskow (2001). How the way we talk can change the way we work: seven languages for transformation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. ISBN 978-0787963781. OCLC 44972130.
  • Kegan, Robert (1994). In over our heads: the mental demands of modern life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674445888. OCLC 29565488.
  • Kegan, Robert (1982). The evolving self: problem and process in human development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674272316. OCLC 7672087.
  • Kegan, Robert (1976). The sweeter welcome: voices for a vision of affirmation—Bellow, Malamud, and Martin Buber. Needham Heights, MA: Humanitas Press. ISBN 978-0911628258. OCLC 2952603.
  • Dunning–Kruger effect

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
     
    In the field of psychology, the Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people assess their cognitive ability as greater than it is. It is related to the cognitive bias of illusory superiority and comes from the inability of people to recognize their lack of ability. Without the self-awareness of metacognition, people cannot objectively evaluate their competence or incompetence.

    As described by social psychologists David Dunning and Justin Kruger, the cognitive bias of illusory superiority results from an internal illusion in people of low ability and from an external misperception in people of high ability; that is, "the miscalibration of the incompetent stems from an error about the self, whereas the miscalibration of the highly competent stems from an error about others."

    Original study

    The psychological phenomenon of illusory superiority was identified as a form of cognitive bias in Kruger and Dunning's 1999 study, "Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments". The identification derived from the cognitive bias evident in the criminal case of McArthur Wheeler, who robbed banks while his face was covered with lemon juice, which he believed would make it invisible to the surveillance cameras. This belief was based on his misunderstanding of the chemical properties of lemon juice as an invisible ink.

    Other investigations of the phenomenon, such as "Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own Incompetence" (2003), indicate that much incorrect self-assessment of competence derives from the person's ignorance of a given activity's standards of performance. Dunning and Kruger's research also indicates that training in a task, such as solving a logic puzzle, increases people's ability to accurately evaluate how good they are at it.

    In Self-insight: Roadblocks and Detours on the Path to Knowing Thyself (2005), Dunning described the Dunning–Kruger effect as "the anosognosia of everyday life", referring to a neurological condition in which a disabled person either denies or seems unaware of his or her disability. He stated: "If you're incompetent, you can't know you're incompetent ... The skills you need to produce a right answer are exactly the skills you need to recognize what a right answer is."

    In 2011, David Dunning wrote about his observations that people with substantial, measurable deficits in their knowledge or expertise lack the ability to recognize those deficits and, therefore, despite potentially making error after error, tend to think they are performing competently when they are not: "In short, those who are incompetent, for lack of a better term, should have little insight into their incompetence—an assertion that has come to be known as the Dunning–Kruger effect". In 2014, Dunning and Helzer described how the Dunning–Kruger effect "suggests that poor performers are not in a position to recognize the shortcomings in their performance".

    Later studies

    Dunning and Kruger tested the hypotheses of the cognitive bias of illusory superiority on undergraduate students of introductory courses in psychology by examining the students' self-assessments of their intellectual skills in logical reasoning (inductive, deductive, abductive), English grammar, and personal sense of humor. After learning their self-assessment scores, the students were asked to estimate their ranks in the psychology class. The competent students underestimated their class rank, and the incompetent students overestimated theirs, but the incompetent students did not estimate their class rank as higher than the ranks estimated by the competent group. Across four studies, the research indicated that the study participants who scored in the bottom quartile on tests of their sense of humor, knowledge of grammar, and logical reasoning, overestimated their test performance and their abilities; despite test scores that placed them in the 12th percentile, the participants estimated they ranked in the 62nd percentile.

    Moreover, competent students tended to underestimate their own competence, because they erroneously presumed that tasks easy for them to perform were also easy for other people to perform. Incompetent students improved their ability to estimate their class rank correctly after receiving minimal tutoring in the skills they previously lacked, regardless of any objective improvement gained in said skills of perception. The study "Mind-Reading and Metacognition: Narcissism, not Actual Competence, Predicts Self-estimated Ability" (2004) extended the cognitive-bias premise of illusory superiority to test subjects' emotional sensitivity toward other people and their perceptions of other people.

    The study "How Chronic Self-Views Influence (and Potentially Mislead) Estimates of Performance" (2003) indicated a shift in the participants' view of themselves when influenced by external cues. The participants' knowledge of geography was tested; some tests were intended to affect the participants' self-view positively and some were intended to affect it negatively. The participants then were asked to rate their performances; the participants given tests with a positive intent reported better performance than did the participants given tests with a negative intent.

    To test Dunning and Kruger's hypotheses, "that people, at all performance levels, are equally poor at estimating their relative performance", the study "Skilled or Unskilled, but Still Unaware of It: How Perceptions of Difficulty Drive Miscalibration in Relative Comparisons" (2006) investigated three studies that manipulated the "perceived difficulty of the tasks, and, hence, [the] participants' beliefs about their relative standing". The investigation indicated that when the experimental subjects were presented with moderately difficult tasks, there was little variation among the best performers and the worst performers in their ability to predict their performance accurately. With more difficult tasks, the best performers were less accurate in predicting their performance than were the worst performers. Therefore, judges at all levels of skill are subject to similar degrees of error in the performance of tasks.

    In testing alternative explanations for the cognitive bias of illusory superiority, the study "Why the Unskilled are Unaware: Further Explorations of (Absent) Self-insight Among the Incompetent" (2008), reached the same conclusions as previous studies of the Dunning–Kruger effect: that, in contrast to high performers, "poor performers do not learn from feedback suggesting a need to improve".

    Individuals of relatively high social class are more overconfident than lower-class individuals.

    Mathematical critique

    The Dunning-Kruger Effect is a statement about a particular disposition of human behavior, but the Effect also makes quantitative assertions that rest on mathematical arguments. In this section, we focus on the mathematical arguments. 

    The Effect relies on the quantifying of paired measures consisting of: (a) the measure of the competence that people can demonstrate when put to the test (actual competence) and (b) the measure of competence that people believe that they have (self-assessed competence). Researchers express the measures either as percentages that range from 0% to 100% or as percentile scores that are scaled either from 0 to 1 or from 0 to 100. By convention, researchers express the differences between the two measures as (self-assessed competence - actual competence). In such a convention, negative numbers signify erring toward underconfidence, positive numbers signify erring toward overconfidence, and a value of zero expresses the value of perfectly accurate self-assessment with no error. 

    Ehrlinger et al. summarized the major assertions of the Effect that had first appeared in the 1999 seminal paper and that continued to be supported by many studies after 9 years of research.

    "People are typically overly optimistic when evaluating the quality of their performance on social and intellectual tasks. In particular, poor performers grossly overestimate their performances…." (Ehrlinger et al. 2008, p. 98).
     
    The Effect asserts that most people are overconfident about their actual abilities and being accurate or underconfident is atypical. Further, the Effect asserts that the least competent people are the most overconfident. Support for both assertions rests upon interpreting the patterns produced from graphing the paired measures.

    The most common graphical convention is the Kruger-Dunning type graph typified by Figure 1 in the seminal paper. That paper depicted college students' accuracy in self-assessing their competencies in humor, logical reasoning, and grammar. Later researchers adopted that convention in the subsequent papers that studied the Effect. Additional graphs used by other researchers who argued for the legitimacy of the Effect include (y-x) versus (x) cross plots (Figure 5 of Pazicni and Bauer, 2015), bar charts (Figure 3 of Bell and Volckman, 2011) and histograms (Figure 1 of Stinson and Xiaofeng, 2008). The first two of these studies depicted college students' accuracy in self-assessing their competence in introductory chemistry, and the third listed depicted college students' accuracy in self-assessing their competence in business classes.

    Recent researchers who focused on the mathematical reasoning behind the Effect studied 1154 participants' accuracy to self assess their competence in understanding the nature of science. These researchers graphed their data in all of the varied conventions of the earlier papers, and explained how the numerical reasoning used to argue for the Effect are similar in all. When graphed in these established conventions, the researchers' own data also supported the assertions of the Effect. Had the researchers ended their study at this point, their results would have added to the established consensus that validated the Effect. However, their deeper analyses led them to conclude that the numerical procedures used repeatedly in all prior work were the likely source of misleading conclusions.

    To expose the source of the misleading conclusions, the researchers employed their own real data set of paired measures from 1154 participants, and they created a second simulated data set that employed random numbers to simulate random guessing by an equal number of simulated participants. The simulated data set contained only random noise that was meaningless nonsense, without any measures of human behavior.

    The researchers then used the simulated data set and the graphical conventions of the behavioral scientists to produce patterns like those described as validating the Dunning-Kruger Effect. They traced the origin of the patterns, not to the dominant literature's claimed psychological disposition of humans, but instead to the nature of graphing data bounded by limits of 0 and 100 and to the process of ordering and grouping the paired measures to create the graphs. These patterns are mathematical artifacts that random noise devoid of any human influence can produce. Further, they showed that the graphs used to establish the Effect in three of the four case examples presented in the seminal paper are the patterns characteristic of purely random noise. These patterns are numerical artifacts that behavioral scientists and educators seem to have interpreted as evidence for a human psychological disposition toward overconfidence.

    However, the graphic presented on the case study on humor in the seminal paper and the Numeracy researchers' real data (Figure 4 of Nuhfer et al.) were not the patterns of purely random noise. Although the data was noisy, that human-derived data exhibited some order that could not be credited to random noise. The researchers credited that order to human influence and called it the "self-assessment signal."

    The researchers went on to characterize the signal and worked to determine what human disposition it revealed. To do so, the Numeracy researchers employed different kinds of graphics that suppress or eliminate the noise responsible for most of the artifacts and distortions. The authors discovered that the different graphics refuted the assertions made for the Effect. Instead, they showed that most people are reasonably accurate in their self-assessments. About half of the 1154 participants in their studies accurately estimated their performance within ±10 percentage points (ppts). Two-thirds of these participants self-assessed their competency scores within ±15 ppts accuracy. Only about 6% of participants studied displayed wild overconfidence and were unable to accurately self-assess their abilities within 30 ppts. All groups of people studied displayed that they overestimated and underestimated their actual ability with equal frequency. No marked tendency toward overconfidence, as predicted by the Effect, occurs, even in the most novice groups. In 2020, with an updated database of over 5000 participants, this relationship still held true. The revised mathematical interpretation of data confirmed that people typically have no pronounced tendency to overestimate their actual proficiency.

    The mean self-assessments of groups of people prove more than an order of magnitude more accurate than do isolated individuals. In randomly selected groups of fifty participants, 81% of individual groups' self-assessed mean scores were within 3 ppts of that group's actual measured mean competency score. The discovery that groups of people are accurate in their self-assessments opens an entirely new way to study groups of people with respect to paired measures of cognitive competence and affective self-assessed competence. A third Numeracy paper by these researchers  reports from a database of over 3000 participants to illuminate the effects of privilege on different ethnic and gender groups of college students. The paper confirms that minority groups are, on average, less privileged and score lower in the cognitive test scores and self-assessed confidence ratings on the instruments used in this research. They verified that women, on average, self-assessed more accurately than men, and they did so across all ethnic groups that had sufficient representation in the researchers' database.

    Cultural differences in self-perception

    Studies of the Dunning–Kruger effect usually have been of North Americans, but studies of Japanese people suggest that cultural forces have a role in the occurrence of the effect. The study "Divergent Consequences of Success and Failure in Japan and North America: An Investigation of Self-improving Motivations and Malleable Selves" (2001) indicated that Japanese people tended to underestimate their abilities, and tended to see underachievement (failure) as an opportunity to improve their abilities at a given task, thereby increasing their value to the social group.

    Popular recognition

    In 2000, Kruger and Dunning were awarded an Ig Nobel Prize in recognition of the scientific work recorded in "their modest report". "The Dunning–Kruger Song" is part of The Incompetence Opera, a mini-opera that premiered at the Ig Nobel Prize ceremony in 2017. The mini-opera is billed as "a musical encounter with the Peter principle and the Dunning–Kruger Effect".

    Journalists have often cited the Dunning–Kruger effect in discussions of political incompetence. In 2018, the British Brexit withdrawal deal was described by Bonnie Greer as 'the supreme example of the Dunning–Kruger effect....Dunning-Kruger implies that we may be in the midst of an epidemic of incompetence.' At the same time, Martie Sirois wrote that President Donald Trump was 'the Dunning Kruger effect personified.' In 2020, Otto English discussed Priti Patel's defence of the death penalty on a TV debate in which she appeared 'completely unfazed by the inherent contradictions in her responses....Here is the very essence of the Dunning Kruger effect in motion.'

    Tuesday, March 24, 2020

    Encephalitis lethargica

    Encephalitis lethargica
    Other namesNellysa disease; Economo's disease
    Economo1918h.PNG
    Brain tissue of a monkey infected with E. lethargica as seen under a microscope (from von Economo's Die Encephalitis lethargica (1918))
    SpecialtyInfectious disease Edit this on Wikidata
    CausesUnknown
    FrequencyUnknown

    Encephalitis lethargica is an atypical form of encephalitis. Also known as "sleeping sickness" or "sleepy sickness" (distinct from tsetse fly-transmitted sleeping sickness), it was first described in 1917 by the neurologist Constantin von Economo and the pathologist Jean-René Cruchet.

    The disease attacks the brain, leaving some victims in a statue-like condition, speechless and motionless. Between 1915 and 1926, an epidemic of encephalitis lethargica spread around the world. Nearly five million people were affected, a third of whom died in the acute stages. Many of those who survived never returned to their pre-existing "aliveness".
    They would be conscious and aware – yet not fully awake; they would sit motionless and speechless all day in their chairs, totally lacking energy, impetus, initiative, motive, appetite, affect or desire; they registered what went on about them without active attention, and with profound indifference. They neither conveyed nor felt the feeling of life; they were as insubstantial as ghosts, and as passive as zombies.
    No recurrence of the epidemic has since been reported, though isolated cases continue to occur.

    Signs and symptoms

    Encephalitis lethargica is characterized by high fever, sore throat, headache, lethargy, double vision, delayed physical and mental response, sleep inversion and catatonia. In severe cases, patients may enter a coma-like state (akinetic mutism). Patients may also experience abnormal eye movements ("oculogyric crises"), Parkinsonism, upper body weakness, muscular pains, tremors, neck rigidity, and behavioral changes including psychosis. Klazomania (a vocal tic) is sometimes present.

    Cause

    Encephalitis lethargica. Its sequelae and treatment - Constantin Von Economo, 1931: front page

    The causes of encephalitis lethargica are uncertain.

    Some studies have explored its origins in an autoimmune response, and, separately or in relation to an immune response, links to pathologies of infectious disease — viral and bacterial, e.g., in the case of influenza, where a link with encephalitis is clear. Postencephalitic parkinsonism was clearly documented to have followed an outbreak of encephalitis lethargica following 1918 influenza pandemic; evidence for viral causation of the Parkinson's symptoms is circumstantial (epidemiologic, and finding influenza antigens in encephalitis lethargica patients), while evidence arguing against this cause is of the negative sort (e.g., lack of viral RNA in postencephalitic parkinsonian brain material). In reviewing the relationship between influenza and encephalitis lethargica (EL), McCall and coworkers conclude, as of 2008, that while "the case against influenza [is] less decisive than currently perceived… there is little direct evidence supporting influenza in the etiology of EL," and that "[a]lmost 100 years after the EL epidemic, its etiology remains enigmatic." Hence, while opinions on the relationship of encephalitis lethargica to influenza remain divided, the preponderance of literature appears skeptical.

    German neurologist Felix Stern, who examined hundreds of encephalitis lethargica patients during the 1920s, pointed out that the encephalitis lethargica typically evolved over time. The early symptom would be dominated by sleepiness or wakefulness. A second symptom would lead to an oculogyric crisis. The third symptom would be recovery, followed by a Parkinson-like symptom. If patients of Stern followed this course of disease, he diagnosed them with encephalitis lethargica. Stern suspected encephalitis lethargica to be close to polio without evidence. Nevertheless, he experimented with the convalescent serum of survivors of the first acute symptom. He vaccinated patients with early stage symptoms and told them that it might be successful. Stern is author of the 1920s definitive book Die Epidemische Encephalitis (1920 and 2nd ed. 1928). Stern was driven to suicide during the Holocaust by the German state, his research forgotten.

    In 2010, in a substantial Oxford University Press compendium reviewing the historic and contemporary views on EL, its editor, Joel Vilensky of the Indiana University School of Medicine, quotes Pool, writing in 1930, who states, "we must confess that etiology is still obscure, the causative agent still unknown, the pathological riddle still unsolved…", and goes on to offer the following conclusion, as of that publication date:
    Does the present volume solve the "riddle" of EL, which… has been referred to as the greatest medical mystery of the 20th century? Unfortunately, no: but inroads are certainly made here pertaining to diagnosis, pathology, and even treatment."
    Subsequent to publication of this compendium, an enterovirus was discovered in encephalitis lethargica cases from the epidemic. In 2012, Oliver Sacks acknowledged this virus as the probable cause of the disease. Other sources have suggested Diplococcus as a cause.

    Diagnosis

    There have been several proposed diagnostic criteria for encephalitis lethargica. One, which has been widely accepted, includes an acute or subacute encephalitic illness where all other known causes of encephalitis have been excluded. Another diagnostic criterion, suggested more recently, says that the diagnosis of encephalitis lethargica "may be considered if the patient’s condition cannot be attributed to any other known neurological condition and that they show the following signs: Influenza-like signs; hypersomnolence (hypersomnia), wakeability, ophthalmoplegia (paralysis of the muscles that control the movement of the eye), and psychiatric changes."

    The Great Encephalitis Pandemic (1915-1926)

    In the winter of 1916–1917, a "new" illness suddenly appeared in Vienna and other cities, and rapidly spread world-wide over the next three years. Earlier reports appeared throughout Europe as early as the winter of 1915–1916, but communication about the disease was slow and chaotic, given the varied manifestation of symptoms and difficulties disseminating information in wartime. Until Constantin von Economo identified a unique pattern of damage among the brains of deceased patients and introduced the unifying name encephalitis lethargica, reports of the protean disease came in under a range of names: botulism, toxic ophthalmoplegia, epidemic stupor, epidemic lethargic encephalitis, acute polioencephalitis, Heine-Medin disease, bulbar paralysis, hystero-epilepsy, acute dementia, and sometimes just "an obscure disease with cerebral symptoms." Just ten days before von Economo's breakthrough in Vienna, Jean-René Cruchet described forty cases of "subacute encephalomyelitis" in France.

    In the ten years that the pandemic raged, nearly five million people's lives were taken or ravaged. Encephalitis lethargica assumed its most virulent form between October 1918 and January 1919. The pandemic disappeared in 1927 as abruptly and mysteriously as it first appeared. The great encephalitis pandemic coincided with the 1918 influenza pandemic, and it is likely that the influenza virus potentiated the effects of the encephalitis virus or lowered resistance to it in a catastrophic way.

    Aftermath of the Pandemic (1927-1967)

    In the aftermath of the pandemic (between 1927 and 1967), many surviving patients seemed to make a complete recovery and return to their normal lives. However, the majority of them subsequently developed neurological or psychiatric disorders, often after years or decades of seemingly perfect health. Post-encephalitic syndromes varied widely: sometimes they proceeded rapidly, leading to profound disability or death; sometimes very slowly; sometimes they progressed to a certain point and then stayed at this point for years or decades; and sometimes, following their initial onslaught, they remitted and disappeared.

    Treatment


    Modern treatment approaches to encephalitis lethargica include immunomodulating therapies, and treatments to remediate specific symptoms.

    There is little evidence so far of a consistent effective treatment for the initial stages, though some patients given steroids have seen improvement. The disease becomes progressive, with evidence of brain damage similar to Parkinson's disease.

    Treatment is then symptomatic. Levodopa (L-DOPA) and other anti-Parkinson drugs often produce dramatic responses; however, most people given L-DOPA experience improvements that are short lived.

    Notable cases

    Notable cases include:
    • Muriel "Kit" Richardson (née Hewitt), first wife of actor Sir Ralph Richardson, died of the condition in October 1942, having first shown symptoms in 1927–28.
    • There is speculation that Adolf Hitler may have had encephalitis lethargica when he was a young adult (in addition to the more substantial case for Parkinsonism in his later years).
    • Mervyn Peake (1911–1968), author of the Gormenghast books, began his decline towards death which was initially attributed to encephalitis lethargica with Parkinson's disease-like symptoms, although others have later suggested his decline in health and eventual death may have been due to Lewy body dementia.
    • Rosita Renard (1894–1949), Chilean pianist, contemporary of Claudio Arrau and student of Martin Krause.
    • Those described in the book Awakenings by the British neurologist Oliver Sacks.

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