United States national missile defense

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A Payload Launch Vehicle (PLV) carrying a prototype exoatmospheric kill vehicle is launched from Meck Island at the Kwajalein Missile Range on 3 December 2001, for an intercept of a ballistic missile target over the central Pacific Ocean.

 

This is also used to refer to the American nationwide antimissile program the United States has had in development since the 1990s. After the renaming in 2002, the term now refers to the entire program, not just the ground-based interceptors and associated facilities. This article focuses mainly on this system and a brief history of earlier systems which led to it. 

Other elements yet to be integrated into NMD may include anti-ballistic missiles, or sea-based, space-based, laser, and high altitude missile systems. The NMD program is limited in scope and designed to counter a relatively small ICBM attack from a less sophisticated adversary. Unlike the earlier Strategic Defense Initiative program, it is not designed to be a robust shield against a large attack from a technically sophisticated adversary.

Definitions

The term "national missile defense" has several meanings:

• (Most common, but now deprecated:) U.S. National Missile Defense, the limited ground-based nationwide antimissile system in development since the 1990s. In 2002 this system was renamed to Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), to differentiate it from other missile defense programs, such as space-based, sea-based, laser, robotic, or high-altitude intercept programs. As of 2006, this system is operational with limited capability. It is designed to intercept a small number of nuclear-armed ICBMs in the mid-course phase, using interceptor missiles launched from within the United States in Alaska. They use non-nuclear kinetic warheads.
• Any national ICBM defense by any country, past or present. The U.S. Sentinel program was a planned national missile defense during the 1960s, but was never deployed. Elements of Sentinel were actually deployed briefly as the Safeguard Program, although it wasn't national in scope. The Russian A-135 anti-ballistic missile system is currently operational only around the city of Moscow, the national capital, and is far from being national in scope in Russia.
• Any national missile defense (against any missile type) by any country. Israel currently has a national missile defense against short and medium-range missiles using their Arrow missile system.

See trajectory phase for the types of anti-ballistic missiles, the advantages and the disadvantages of each implementation type. The role of defense against nuclear missiles has been a heated military and political topic for several decades. (See also nuclear strategy, Missile Defense Agency, and anti-ballistic missile.) But missile defense against a known ballistic missile trajectory has to be rethought in the face of a maneuverable threat (such as a hypersonic glide vehicle, which still has yet to be realized and proven, as of 2018).

History of national missile defense systems

When the United States Air Force was split from the United States Army in 1947, the Army retained the role of ground based air defenses that would evolve into National missile defense. The Army retained the lead role in this area until the success of the Aegis system shifted the focus to the United States Navy in the 21st century.

Nike-Zeus

In the 1950s, a series of anti-aircraft missiles were developed as part of Project Nike. The latest in the series, Nike-Zeus, offered extremely long-range interception and very high performance. In the late 1950s, the program investigated the use of Nike-Zeus missiles as interceptors against Soviet ICBMs. A Nike warhead would be detonated at high altitudes (over 100 km, or 60 statute miles) above the polar regions in the near vicinity of an incoming Soviet missile. 

The problem of how to quickly identify and track incoming missiles proved intractable, especially in light of easily envisioned countermeasures such as decoys and chaff. At the same time, the need for a high-performance anti-aircraft weapon was also seriously eroded by the obvious evolution of the Soviet nuclear force to one based almost entirely on ICBMs. The Nike-Zeus project was canceled in 1961.

Project Defender

The Nike-Zeus use of nuclear warheads was necessary given the available missile technology. However, it had significant technical limitations such as blinding defensive radars to subsequent missiles. Also, exploding nuclear warheads over friendly territory (albeit in space) was not ideal. In the 1960s Project Defender and the Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept (BAMBI) concept replaced land-launched Nike missiles with missiles to be launched from satellite platforms orbiting directly above the USSR. Instead of nuclear warheads, the BAMBI missiles would deploy huge wire meshes designed to disable Soviet ICBMs in their early launch phase (the "boost phase"). No solution to the problem of how to protect the proposed satellite platforms against attack was found, however, and the program was canceled in 1968.

Sentinel Program

In 1967, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announced the Sentinel Program, providing a defense against attack for most of the continental United States. The system consisted of a long range Spartan missile, the short range Sprint missile, and associated radar and computer system. However, U.S. military and political strategists recognized several problems with the system:

• Deployment of even a limited defensive ABM system might invite a preemptive nuclear attack before it could be implemented
• Deploying ABM systems would likely invite another expensive arms race for defensive systems, in addition to maintaining existing offensive expenditures
• Then-current technology did not permit a thorough defense against a sophisticated attack
• Defended coverage area was very limited due to the short range of the missiles used
• Use of nuclear warheads on antimissile interceptors would degrade capability of defensive radar, thus possibly rendering defense ineffective after the first few interceptions
• Political and public concern about detonating defensive nuclear warheads over friendly territory
• An ICBM defense could jeopardize the Mutual Assured Destruction concept, thus being a destabilizing influence

Safeguard Program

The Institute of Heraldry approved the shoulder sleeve insignia for Safeguard.

In 1969 Sentinel was renamed 'Safeguard'. It was from then on dedicated to the protection of some of the U.S. ICBM-silo areas from attack, promoting their ability to mount a retaliatory missile attack. Safeguard used the same Spartan and Sprint missiles, and the same radar technology as Sentinel. Safeguard solved some problems of Sentinel:

• It was less expensive to develop due to its limited geographic coverage and fewer required missiles.
• It avoided a lot of hazards to the public of defensive nuclear warheads detonated in the atmosphere nearby, since the Safeguard system was located in and near sparsely populated areas of the Dakotas, Montana, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta.
• It provided better interception probabilities due to dense coverage by the shorter-range Sprint missiles, which were unable to cover the entire defended area under the larger and earlier proposed Sentinel program.

However Safeguard still retained several of the previously listed political and military problems.

ABM treaty

These above issues drove the United States and the USSR to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Under the ABM treaty and the 1974 revision of it, each country was allowed to deploy a single ABM system with only 100 interceptors to protect a single target. The Soviets deployed a system named the A-35 "Galosh" missile system, and it was deployed to protect Moscow, its capital city. The U.S. deployed the Safeguard system to defend the ICBM launch sites around the Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, in 1975. The American Safeguard system was only briefly operational (for a matter of several months). The Soviet system (now called A-135) has been improved over the decades, and it is still operational around Moscow.

Homing Overlay Experiment

Homing Overlay Experiment open web

 

Given concerns about the previous programs using nuclear tipped interceptors, in the 1980s the U.S. Army began studies about the feasibility of hit-to-kill vehicles, where an interceptor missile would destroy an incoming ballistic missile just by colliding with it, the so-called "Kinetic Kill Vehicles", or KKV. 

The first program which actually tested a hit-to-kill missile interceptor was the Army's Homing Overlay Experiment. "Overlay" was the Army's term for exo-atmospheric interceptions, which would have to declutter any decoys, "underlay" was their term for high-altitude interceptions within the atmosphere. The KKV was equipped with an infrared seeker, guidance electronics and a propulsion system. Once in space, the KKV extended a 4 m (13 ft) diameter structure similar to an umbrella skeleton to enhance its effective cross section. This device would destroy the ICBM reentry vehicle on collision. After test failures with the first three flight tests, the fourth and final test on 10 June 1984 was successful, intercepting the Minuteman RV with a closing speed of about 6.1 km/s at an altitude of more than 160 km.

Strategic Defense Initiative

SDI insignia

On 23 March 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced a new national missile defense program formally called the Strategic Defense Initiative but soon nicknamed "Star Wars" by detractors. President Reagan's stated goal was not just to protect the U.S. and its allies, but to also provide the completed system to the USSR, thus ending the threat of nuclear war for all parties. SDI was technically very ambitious and economically very expensive. It would have included many space-based laser battle stations and nuclear-pumped X-ray laser satellites designed to intercept hostile ICBMs in space, along with very sophisticated command and control systems. Unlike the previous Sentinel program, the goal was to totally defend against a robust, all out nuclear attack by the USSR.

A partisan debate ensued in Congress, with Democrats questioning the feasibility and strategic wisdom of such a program, while Republicans talked about its strategic necessity and provided a number of technical experts who argued that it was in fact feasible (including Manhattan Project physicist Edward Teller). Advocates of SDI prevailed and funding was initiated in fiscal year 1984.

Withdrawal from ABM Treaty

In December 1999, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution aimed at pressing the United States to abandon its plans to build an anti-missile missile defense system. Voting against the draft, along with the United States, were three other countries, Albania, Israel, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Thirteen of the 15 members of the European Union abstained, and France and Ireland voted in favor of this resolution. The resolution called for continued efforts to strengthen and preserve the treaty. On 14 June 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty. On the following day, Russia responded by withdrawing from START II treaty (intended to ban MIRV ICBMs). More specifically, then President Bush stated that the USA withdrew from the treaty. There was no Senate "anti-ratification" treaty action similar to what was required by law to first ratify or accept the treaty.

Current NMD program

Goals

The logo of the Missile Defense division of the U.S. National Guard, part of the modern American missile defense system

 

In the 1990s and early 21st century, the stated mission of NMD has changed to the more modest goal of preventing the United States from being subject to nuclear blackmail or nuclear terrorism by a so-called rogue state. The feasibility of this more limited goal remains somewhat controversial. Under President Bill Clinton some testing continued, but the project received little funding despite Clinton's supportive remarks on 5 September 2000 that "such a system, if it worked properly, could give us an extra dimension of insurance in a world where proliferation has complicated the task of preserving peace." 

The system is administered by the Missile Defense Agency. There are several other agencies and military commands which play a role, such as the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

Components

The current NMD system consists of several components.

Ground-based interceptor missiles

One major component is Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), consisting of ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles and radar in the United States in Alaska, which would intercept incoming warheads in space. Currently some GBI missiles are located at Vandenberg AFB in California. These GBIs can be augmented by mid-course SM-3 interceptors fired from Navy ships. About ten interceptor missiles were operational as of 2006. In 2014, the Missile Defense Agency had 30 operational GBIs, with 14 additional ground-based interceptors requested for 2017 deployment, in the Fiscal Year 2016 budget.

Officially, the final deployment goal is the "C3" phase, intended to counter tens of complex warheads from two GMD locations utilizing 200 ABMs "or more". The system design permits further expansion and upgrades beyond the C3 level.

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System

A major component is a ship-based system called the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System. This was given major new importance by President Obama in September 2009, when he announced plans to scrap the plans for a missile defense site in Poland, in favor of missile defense systems located on US Navy warships. On 18 September 2009, Russian Prime Minister Putin welcomed Obama's plans for missile defense which may include stationing American Aegis armed warships in the Black Sea.

In 2009, several US Navy ships were fitted with SM-3 missiles to serve this function, complementing the Patriot systems already deployed by American units. Also, warships of Japan and Australia have been given weapons and technology to enable them to participate in the American defense plan as well.

On 12 November 2009, the Missile Defense Agency announced that six additional US Navy destroyers would be upgraded to participate in the program. In fiscal 2012, USS Carney (DDG-64), USS Ross (DDG-71), and USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) were upgraded. USS Cole (DDG-67), USS McFaul (DDG-74) and USS Porter (DDG-78) were be upgraded in fiscal 2013. The goal of the program was to have 21 ships upgraded by the end of 2010; 24 in 2012; and 27 around 2013.

All ships equipped with the Aegis combat system possess the SM-2 surface-to-air missile which, through recent upgrades, has terminal stage ballistic missile defense capabilities.

Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a program of the US Army, utilizing ground-based interceptor missiles which can intercept missiles in the upper part of the atmosphere and outside the atmosphere. THAAD has been deployed in Guam, the United Arab Emirates, and South Korea.

Airborne systems

Several airborne systems are being examined, which would then be utilized by the US Air Force. One major object of study is a boost-phase defense, meaning a system to intercept missiles while they are in their boost phase. One potential system for this use would be an airborne laser, which was tested on the Boeing YAL-1 and was later cancelled. Other ideas are also being studied.

As of 2009, the only anti-ballistic missile defense system with a boost-phase capability is the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System. There are several benefits to a sea-based boost-phase system, as it is fully mobile and has greater security by operating in international waters.

Shorter-range anti-ballistic missiles

Three shorter range tactical anti-ballistic missile systems are currently operational: the U.S. Army Patriot, U.S. Navy Aegis combat system/SM-2 missile, and the Israeli Arrow missile. In general short-range tactical ABMs cannot intercept ICBMs, even if within range (Arrow-3 can intercept ICBMs). The tactical ABM radar and performance characteristics do not allow it, as an incoming ICBM warhead moves much faster than a tactical missile warhead. However, the better-performance Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile could be upgraded to intercept ICBMs. The SM-3 missile may have some capability against ICBMs, as demonstrated by the 2008 satellite shootdown. 

Latest versions of the U.S. Hawk missile have a limited capability against tactical ballistic missiles, but is not usually described as an ABM. Similar claims have been made about the Russian long-range surface-to-air S-300 and S-400 series.

Multilateral and international participation

Several aspects of the defense program have either sought or achieved participation and assistance from other nations. Several foreign navies are participating in the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, including Japan and Australia. Also, the United States has considered establishing radar sites and missile sites in other nations as part of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. A missile defense site in Poland received much media attention when it was cancelled in favor of the Aegis BMD. A radar site in the United Kingdom is being upgraded, and another one is being built in Greenland. Other countries have contributed technological developments and various locations.

Taiwan has indicated that it is willing to host national missile defense radars to be tied into the American system, but is unwilling to pay for any further cost overruns in the systems.

The Wall Street Journal reported on 17 July 2012, that the Pentagon is building a missile-defense radar station at a secret site in Qatar. The Wall Street Journal report was later confirmed by a New York Times article from 8 August 2012, which stated that U.S. officials disclosed that a high-resolution, X-band missile defense radar would be located in Qatar. The radar site in Qatar will complete the backbone of a system designed to defend U.S. interests and allies such as Israel and European nations against Iranian rockets, officials told The Wall Street Journal. The Pentagon chose to place the new radar site in Qatar because it is home to the largest U.S. military air base in the region, Al Udeid Air Base, analysts said. The radar base in Qatar is slated to house a powerful AN/TPY-2 radar, also known as an X-Band radar, and supplement two similar arrays already in place in Israel's Negev Desert and in central Turkey, officials said. Together, the three radar sites form an arc that U.S. officials say can detect missile launches from northern, western and southern Iran. Those sites will enable U.S. officials and allied militaries to track missiles launched from deep inside Iran, which has an arsenal of missiles capable of reaching Israel and parts of Europe. The radar installations, in turn, are being linked to missile-interceptor batteries throughout the region and to U.S. ships with high-altitude interceptor rockets. The X-Band radar provides images that can be used to pinpoint rockets in flight.

U.S. official also stated that the U.S. military's Central Command, which is overseeing the buildup to counter Iran, also wants to deploy the Army's first Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile-interceptor system, known as THAAD, to the region in the coming months. The THAAD has its own radar, so deploying it separately from the X-Bands provides even more coverage and increases the system's accuracy, officials said. The X-Band radar and the THAAD will provide an "extra layer of defense," supplementing Patriot batteries that are used to counter lower-altitude rockets, said Riki Ellison, chairman of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance.

On 23 August 2012, the Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. is planning a major expansion of missile defenses in Asia. According to American officials this move is designed to contain threats from North Korea, but one that could also be used to counter China's military. The planned buildup is part of a defensive array that could cover large swaths of Asia, with a new radar in southern Japan and possibly another in Southeast Asia tied to missile-defense ships and land-based interceptors.

US Defence officials told the Wall Street Journal that the core of the new anti-missile shield would be a powerful early-warning radar, known as an X-Band, sited on a southern Japanese island. Discussions between Japan and the United States are currently underway. The new X-Band would join an existing radar that was installed in northern Japan in 2006 and a third X-Band could be placed in South East Asia. The resulting radar arc would cover North Korea, China and possibly even Taiwan. According to U.S. Navy officials and the Congressional Research Service the U.S. Navy has drawn up plans to expand its fleet of ballistic missile-defense-capable warships from 26 ships today to 36 by 2018. Officials said as many as 60% of those are likely to be deployed to Asia and the Pacific. In addition, the U.S. Army is considering acquiring additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, antimissile systems, said a senior defense official. Under current plans, the Army is building six THAADs.

In response to the Wall Street Journal U.S. General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on 23 August 2012 that the United States are in discussions with its close ally Japan about expanding a missile defense system in Asia by positioning an early warning radar in southern Japan. Dempsey however stated that no decisions have been reached on expanding the radar. The State Department said the U.S. is taking a phased approach to missile defense in Asia, as it is in Europe and the Middle East. "These are defensive systems. They don’t engage unless missiles have been fired," department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told a news conference. "In the case of Asian systems, they are designed against a missile threat from North Korea. They are not directed at China." Nuland said the U.S. has broad discussions with China through military and political channels about the systems’ intent.

In addition to one American X-band radar – officially known as the AN/TPY-2 – hosted by Japan the United States and Japan announced an agreement on 17 September 2012, to deploy a second, advanced missile-defense radar on Japanese territory. "The purpose of this is to enhance our ability to defend Japan," U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said at a news conference. "It’s also designed to help forward-deployed U.S. forces, and it also will be effective in protecting the U.S. homeland from the North Korean ballistic missile threat." In addition to detecting ballistic missiles the radars also provide the U.S. military and its allies a highly detailed view of ship traffic in the region. That capability is particularly desired by U.S. allies in the region that are engaged in territorial disputes with China over contested islands and fishing grounds.

Some U.S. officials have noted that defenses built up against North Korean missiles would also be positioned to track a Chinese ballistic missile. A land-based radar would also free the Navy to reposition its ship-based radar to other regional hot-spots, officials said. A U.S. team landed in Japan in September 2012 to discuss where the second facility will be located, according to a U.S. defense official. Officials have said they want to locate the radar, formally known as AN/TPY2, in the southern part of Japan, but not on Okinawa, where the U.S. military presence is deeply controversial. During a joint news conference in Tokyo, Panetta and Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto said a joint U.S.-Japanese team would begin searching immediately for a site for the new radar. On 15 November 2012, Australia and the United States announced that the US military will station a powerful radar and a space telescope in Australia as part of its strategic shift towards Asia. "It will give us visibility into things that are leaving the atmosphere, entering the atmosphere, really all throughout Asia", including China's rocket and missile tests, a US defence official told reporters on condition of anonymity.

Program planning, goals and discussions

Missile Defense Agency logo

 

Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)

 

On 14 October 2002, a ground based interceptor launched from the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site destroyed a mock warhead 225 km above the Pacific. The test included three decoy balloons.

On 16 December 2002 President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 23 which outlined a plan to begin deployment of operational ballistic missile defense systems by 2004. The following day the U.S. formally requested from the UK and Denmark use of facilities in Fylingdales, England, and Thule, Greenland, respectively, as a part of the NMD program. The projected cost of the program for the years 2004 to 2009 will be $53 billion, making it the largest single line in The Pentagon's budget.

Since 2002, the US has been in talks with Poland and other European countries over the possibility of setting up a European base to intercept long-range missiles. A site similar to the US base in Alaska would help protect the US and Europe from missiles fired from the Middle East or North Africa. Poland's prime minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz said in November 2005 he wanted to open up the public debate on whether Poland should host such a base.

In 2002, NMD was changed to Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), to differentiate it from other missile defense programs, such as space-based, sea-based, and defense targeting the boost phase and the reentry phase.

On 22 July 2004, the first ground-based interceptor was deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska (63.954°N 145.735°W). By the end of 2004, a total of six had been deployed at Ft. Greely and another two at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Two additional were installed at Ft. Greely in 2005. The system will provide "rudimentary" protection.

On 15 December 2004, an interceptor test in the Marshall Islands failed when the launch was aborted due to an "unknown anomaly" in the interceptor, 16 minutes after launch of the target from Kodiak Island, Alaska. 

"I don't think that the goal was ever that we would declare it was operational. I think the goal was that there would be an operational capability by the end of 2004," Pentagon representative Larry DiRita said on 2005-01-13 at a Pentagon press conference. However, the problem is and was funding. "There has been some expectation that there will be some point at which it is operational and not something else these expectations are not unknown, if Congress pours more attention and funding to this system, it can be operational relatively quick." 

On 18 January 2005, the Commander, United States Strategic Command issued direction to establish the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD). The JFCC IMD, once activated, will develop desired characteristics and capabilities for global missile defense operations and support for missile defense. 

On 14 February 2005, another interceptor test failed due to a malfunction with the ground support equipment at the test range on Kwajalein Island, not with the interceptor missile itself.

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System logo

 

On 24 February 2005, the Missile Defense Agency, testing the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, successfully intercepted a mock enemy missile. This was the first test of an operationally configured RIM-161 Standard missile 3 (SM-3) interceptor and the fifth successful test intercept using this system. On 10 November 2005, the USS Lake Erie detected, tracked, and destroyed a mock two-stage ballistic missile within two minutes of the ballistic missile launch.

On 1 September 2006, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System was successfully tested. An interceptor was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base to hit a target missile launched from Alaska, with ground support provided by a crew at Colorado Springs. This test was described by Missile Defense Agency director Lieutenant General Trey Obering as "about as close as we can come to an end-to-end test of our long-range missile defense system." The target missile carried no decoys or other countermeasures.

Deployment of the Sea-based X-band Radar system is presently underway.

On 24 February 2007, The Economist reported that the United States ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, had written to her fellow envoys to advise them regarding the various options for missile-defense sites in Europe. She also confirmed that "The United States has also been discussing with the UK further potential contributions to the system."

On 23 February 2008, the United States successfully shot down a malfunctioning American spy satellite.

 

The Ustka-Wicko base (54.553748°N 16.620255°E) of the Polish Army is mentioned as a possible site of US missile interceptors. Russia objects; its suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe may be related. 

Russia threatened to place short-range nuclear missiles on the Russia’s border with NATO if the United States refuses to abandon plans to deploy 10 interceptor missiles and a radar in Poland and the Czech Republic. In April 2007, Putin warned of a new Cold War if the Americans deployed the shield in Central Europe. Putin also said that Russia is prepared to abandon its obligations under a Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 with the United States. In 2014 Russia announced plans to install more radar and missile defense systems across the country to counter U.S. plans for a missile defense system in Eastern Europe.

As of January 2017, the top 3 candidate sites for a proposed Eastern United States missile defense site are now New York, Michigan, and Ohio.

Missile defense sites in Central Europe

Previously, a controversial initiative existed for placing GMD missile defense installations in Central Europe, namely in Poland and Czech Republic. As a result of strong Russian opposition, the plan has been abandoned in favor of Aegis-class missile defense based in the Black Sea and eventually in Romania. 

In February 2007, the US started formal negotiations with Poland and Czech Republic concerning placement of a site of Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. The announced objective was to protect most of Europe from long-range missile strikes from Iran. Public opinion in both countries opposed: 57% of Poles disagreed, while 21% supported the plans; in Czech Republic it was 67% versus 15%. More than 130,000 Czechs signed a petition for a referendum about the base, which is by far the largest citizen initiative (Ne základnám – No to Bases) since the Velvet Revolution.

The Ustka-Wicko base of the Polish Army was mentioned as a possible site of 10 American interceptor missiles. Russia objected; its suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe may be related. Putin warned of a possible new Cold War. Russia threatened to place short-range nuclear missiles on its border with NATO if the United States refused to abandon the plan.

A radar and tracking system site placement was agreed with the Czech Republic. After long negotiations, on 20 August 2008, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski signed in Warsaw the "Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Poland Concerning the Deployment of Ground-Based Ballistic Missile Defense Interceptors in the Territory of the Republic of Poland", a deal that would implement the missile defense system in Polish territory. Russia warned Poland that it is exposing itself to attack—even a nuclear one—by accepting U.S. missile interceptors on its soil. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn the deputy chief of staff of Russia's armed forces said "Poland, by deploying (the system) is exposing itself to a strike – 100 percent".

In September 2009, President Barack Obama announced that plans for missile defense sites in Central Europe would be scrapped in favor of systems located on US Navy warships. On 18 September 2009, Russian Prime Minister Putin decided to welcome Obama's plans for stationing American Aegis defense warships in the Black Sea. The deployment occurred the same month, consisting of warships equipped with the Aegis RIM-161 SM-3 missile system, which complements the Patriot missile systems already deployed by American units.

On 4 February 2010, Romania agreed to host the SM-3 missiles starting in 2015. The missile defense system in Deveselu became operational on 18 December 2015.

However, once USS Monterey was actually deployed to the Black Sea the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement voicing concern about the deployment.

Technical criticism

There has been controversy among experts about whether it is technically feasible to build an effective missile defense system and, in particular, if the GMD will work.

An April 2000 study by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology concluded that "[a]ny country capable of deploying a long-range missile would also be able to deploy countermeasures that would defeat the planned NMD system." Countermeasures studied in detail were bomblets containing biological or chemical agents, aluminized balloons to serve as decoys and to disguise warheads, and cooling warheads to reduce the kill vehicle’s ability to detect them.

In April 2004, a General Accounting Office report concluded that "MDA does not explain some critical assumptions—such as an enemy’s type and number of decoys—underlying its performance goals." It recommended that "DOD carry out independent, operationally realistic testing of each block being fielded" but DOD responded that "formal operational testing is not required before entry into full-rate production."

Proponents did not suggest how to discriminate between empty and warhead-enclosing balloons, for instance, but said that these "simple" countermeasures are actually hard to implement, and that defense technology is rapidly advancing to defeat them. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) said decoy discrimination techniques were classified, and emphasized its intention to provide future boost and terminal defense to diminish the importance of mid-course decoys. In summer 2002 MDA ceased providing detailed intercept information and declined to answer technical questions about decoys on grounds of national security.

China is developing a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), now called the DF-ZF, capable of penetrating US missile defenses. The US Department of Defense denotes this HGV as the WU-14.

Boost-phase defense

As of boost-phase interceptions, these would be desired as an initial layer of defense. It is the only layer that can cost-effectively destroy MIRV missiles.

Currently only Aegis has a possible boost-phase capability, but—in the case of the SM-2—it needs to be within 40 km of a launch point. This is acceptable for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), but not likely for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Boost-phase defense against solid-fueled ICBMs

Boost-phase defense is significantly harder against the current solid-fuel rocket ICBMs, because their boost phase is shorter. Current solid-fueled ICBMs include Russian Topol, and Chinese DF-31 and DF-41, along with the US Minuteman and Trident. 

There is no theoretical perspective for economically viable boost-phase defense against the latest solid-fueled ICBMs, no matter if it would be ground-based missiles, space-based missiles, or airborne laser (ABL).

Boost-phase defense against older ICBMs

A ground-based boost-phase defense might be possible, if the goals were somewhat limited: to counter older liquid-fuel propelled ICBMs, and to counter simple solid-propellant missiles launched from "easier" locations (such as North Korea). 

Using orbital launchers to provide a reliable boost-phase defense against liquid-fueled ICBMs is not likely, as it was found to require at least 700 large interceptors in orbit. Using two or more interceptors per target, or countering solid fueled missiles, would require many more orbital launchers. The old Brilliant Pebbles project—although it did not apply to the boost phase—estimated the number at 4,000 smaller orbital launchers.

The airborne laser (ABL) is possibly capable of intercepting a liquid fuel missile if within 600 km from a launch point.

Mutual assured destruction

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Aftermath of the atomic bomb explosion over Hiroshima, August 6, 1945

 

Mutual assured destruction or mutually assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender (see pre-emptive nuclear strike and second strike). It is based on the theory of deterrence, which holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy's use of those same weapons. The strategy is a form of Nash equilibrium in which, once armed, neither side has any incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm.

Theory

Under MAD, each side has enough nuclear weaponry to destroy the other side and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate, irreversible escalation of hostilities resulting in both combatants' mutual, total, and assured destruction. The doctrine requires that neither side construct shelters on a massive scale. If one side constructed a similar system of shelters, it would violate the MAD doctrine and destabilize the situation, because it would have less to fear from a second strike. The same principle is invoked against missile defense. 

The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a first strike because the other side would launch on warning (also called fail-deadly) or with surviving forces (a second strike), resulting in unacceptable losses for both parties. The payoff of the MAD doctrine was and still is expected to be a tense but stable global peace.

The primary application of this doctrine started during the Cold War (1940s to 1991), in which MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union while they engaged in smaller proxy wars around the world. It was also responsible for the arms race, as both nations struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain second-strike capability. Although the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the MAD doctrine continues to be applied. 

Proponents of MAD as part of U.S. and USSR strategic doctrine believed that nuclear war could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive a full-scale nuclear exchange as a functioning state. Since the credibility of the threat is critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial capital in their nuclear arsenals even if they were not intended for use. In addition, neither side could be expected or allowed to adequately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles. This led both to the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems (such as nuclear missile silos, ballistic missile submarines, and nuclear bombers kept at fail-safe points) and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 

This MAD scenario is often referred to as nuclear deterrence. The term "deterrence" is now used in this context; originally, its use was limited to legal terminology.

History

Pre-1945

One of the earliest references to the concept comes from the English author Wilkie Collins, writing at the time of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870: "I begin to believe in only one civilizing influence—the discovery one of these days of a destructive agent so terrible that War shall mean annihilation and men's fears will force them to keep the peace."

Richard Jordan Gatling patented his namesake rotary gun in 1862 with the partial intention of illustrating the futility of war.

After his 1867 invention of dynamite, Alfred Nobel stated that "The day when two army corps can annihilate each other in one second, all civilized nations, it is to be hoped, will recoil from war and discharge their troops."

Jan Gotlib Bloch in The Future of War, published in 1898, argued that the state could not fight a war "under modern conditions with any prospect of being able to carry that war to a conclusion by defeating its adversary by force of arms on the battlefield. No decisive war is possible that will not entail even upon the victorious Power, the destruction of its resources and the breakup of society. War has therefore become impossible, except at the price of suicide."

In 1937, Nikola Tesla published The Art of Projecting Concentrated Non-dispersive Energy through the Natural Media, a treatise concerning charged particle beam weapons. Tesla described his device as a "superweapon that would put an end to all war." 

In March 1940, the Frisch–Peierls memorandum anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combating an enemy with nuclear weapons.

Early Cold War

Atomic bomb explosions over Hiroshima, Japan, 6 August 1945 (left) and over Nagasaki, Japan, 9 August 1945 (right).

 

In August 1945, the United States accepted the surrender of Japan after the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Four years later, on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its own nuclear device. At the time, both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against each other. However, with the development of aircraft like the American Convair B-36 and the Soviet Tupolev Tu-95, both sides were gaining a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country. The official nuclear policy of the United States became one of "massive retaliation", as coined by President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, which called for massive attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.

By the time of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed the capability of launching a nuclear-tipped missile from a submerged submarine, which completed the third leg of the nuclear triad weapons strategy necessary to fully implement the MAD doctrine. Having a three-branched nuclear capability eliminated the possibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a first-strike attack; this, in turn, ensured the credible threat of a devastating retaliatory strike against the aggressor, increasing a nation's nuclear deterrence.

Two doomsday devices

The RAND corporation futurist and cold war strategist Herman Kahn (1922–1982) believed that although MAD was useful as a metaphor, when pushed to its logical conclusion it became absurd. In his 1960 book On Thermonuclear War he advocated a more reasoned approach to nuclear warfare and was understood by some of his critics to be a nuclear war hawk in his writings. (He did however hold a profound belief in the possibility of success in the event of a nuclear war.) He used the concept of the Doomsday Machine as an "idealized device" to illustrate the danger of taking MAD to its extreme. He writes, "I used to be wary of discussing the concept for fear that some colonel would get out a General Operating Requirement or Development Planning Objective for the device". The term, "mutual assured destruction", was coined by Donald Brennan, a strategist working in Kahn's Hudson Institute, in 1962.

The 1964 film Dr. Strangelove parodies some of Kahn's work, and the titular character makes parodic references to Kahn's research, as in this quote from the film (after the United States mistakenly launched a nuclear attack on the USSR): "Under the authority granted me as director of weapons research and development, I commissioned last year a study of this project [of a doomsday machine] by the Bland Corporation. Based on the findings of the report, my conclusion was that this idea was not a practical deterrent, for reasons which, at this moment, must be all too obvious." 

Sometime in the 1980s, a second, but real, doomsday device, called The Dead Hand, entered the picture in the Soviet Union. Unlike Kahn's device, it was not based on radioactive cobalt, but it was self-activated and could not be stopped.

Strategic Air Command

Boeing B-47B Stratojet Rocket-Assisted Take Off (RATO) on April 15, 1954

 

B-52D Stratofortress being refueled by a KC-135 Stratotanker, 1965

 

Beginning in 1955, the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC) kept one-third of its bombers on alert, with crews ready to take off within fifteen minutes and fly to designated targets inside the Soviet Union and destroy them with nuclear bombs in the event of a Soviet first-strike attack on the United States. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy increased funding for this program and raised the commitment to 50 percent of SAC aircraft.

During periods of increased tension in the early 1960s, SAC kept part of its B-52 fleet airborne at all times, to allow an extremely fast retaliatory strike against the Soviet Union in the event of a surprise attack on the United States. This program continued until 1969. Between 1954 and 1992, bomber wings had approximately one-third of their assigned aircraft on quick reaction ground alert and were able to take off within a few minutes. SAC also maintained the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP, pronounced "kneecap"), also known as "Looking Glass," which consisted of several EC-135s, one of which was airborne at all times from 1961 through 1990. During the Cuban missile crisis the bombers were dispersed to several different airfields, and also were sometimes airborne. For example, some were sent to Wright Patterson, which normally did not have B-52s.

During the height of the tensions between the US and the USSR in the 1960s, two popular films were made dealing with what could go terribly wrong with the policy of keeping nuclear-bomb carrying airplanes at the ready: Dr. Strangelove (1964) and Fail Safe (1964).

Retaliation capability (second strike)

Robert McNamara

 

The strategy of MAD was fully declared in the early 1960s, primarily by United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. In McNamara's formulation there was the very real danger that a nation with nuclear weapons could attempt to eliminate another nation's retaliatory forces with a surprise, devastating first strike and theoretically "win" a nuclear war relatively unharmed. True second-strike capability could be achieved only when a nation had a guaranteed ability to fully retaliate after a first-strike attack.

The United States had achieved an early form of second-strike capability by fielding continual patrols of strategic nuclear bombers, with a large number of planes always in the air, on their way to or from fail-safe points close to the borders of the Soviet Union. This meant the United States could still retaliate, even after a devastating first-strike attack. The tactic was expensive and problematic because of the high cost of keeping enough planes in the air at all times and the possibility they would be shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft missiles before reaching their targets. In addition, as the idea of a missile gap existing between the US and the Soviet Union developed, there was increasing priority being given to ICBMs over bombers.

The USS George Washington (SSBN-598), the lead ship of the US Navy's first class of Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines, Nuclear (SSBN)

 

It was only with the advent of ballistic missile submarines, starting with the George Washington class in 1959, that a genuine survivable nuclear force became possible and a retaliatory second strike capability guaranteed. 

The deployment of fleets of ballistic missile submarines established a guaranteed second-strike capability because of their stealth and by the number fielded by each Cold War adversary—it was highly unlikely that all of them could be targeted and preemptively destroyed (in contrast to, for example, a missile silo with a fixed location that could be targeted during a first strike). Given their long range, high survivability and ability to carry many medium- and long-range nuclear missiles, submarines were credible and effective means for full-scale retaliation even after a massive first strike.

This deterrence strategy and program has continued into the 21st century, with nuclear submarines carrying Trident II ballistic missiles as one leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent and as the sole deterrent of the United Kingdom. The USA's other such deterrent comprises the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)s on alert in the continental United States. Ballistic missile submarines are also operated by the navies of China, France, India and Russia.

The U.S. Department of Defense anticipates a continued need for a sea-based strategic nuclear force. The first of the current Ohio-class SSBNs are expected to be retired by 2029, meaning that a replacement platform must already be seaworthy by that time. A replacement may cost over $4 billion per unit compared to the USS Ohio's $2 billion. The U.S. Navy is exploring two options. The first is a variant of the Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines. The second is a dedicated SSBN, either with a new hull or based on an overhaul of the current Ohio-class.

ABMs threaten MAD

In the 1960s both the Soviet Union (A-35 anti-ballistic missile system) and the United States (LIM-49 Nike Zeus) developed anti-ballistic missile systems. Had such systems been able to effectively defend against a retaliatory second strike, MAD would have been undermined.

MIRVs

A time exposure of seven MIRVs from Peacekeeper missile passing through clouds

MIRVs as counter against ABM

The multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) was another weapons system designed specifically to aid with the MAD nuclear deterrence doctrine. With a MIRV payload, one ICBM could hold many separate warheads. MIRVs were first created by the United States in order to counterbalance the Soviet A-35 anti-ballistic missile systems around Moscow. Since each defensive missile could be counted on to destroy only one offensive missile, making each offensive missile have, for example, three warheads (as with early MIRV systems) meant that three times as many defensive missiles were needed for each offensive missile. This made defending against missile attacks more costly and difficult. One of the largest U.S. MIRVed missiles, the LGM-118A Peacekeeper, could hold up to 10 warheads, each with a yield of around 300 kilotons of TNT (1.3 PJ)—all together, an explosive payload equivalent to 230 Hiroshima-type bombs. The multiple warheads made defense untenable with the available technology, leaving the threat of retaliatory attack as the only viable defensive option. MIRVed land-based ICBMs tend to put a premium on striking first. The START II agreement was proposed to ban this type of weapon, but never entered into force. 

In the event of a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, NATO planned to use tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union countered this threat by issuing a statement that any use of nuclear weapons (tactical or otherwise) against Soviet forces would be grounds for a full-scale Soviet retaliatory strike (massive retaliation). Thus it was generally assumed that any combat in Europe would end with apocalyptic conclusions.

Land-based MIRVed ICBMs threaten MAD

MIRVed land-based ICBMs are generally considered suitable for a first strike (inherently counterforce) or a counterforce second strike, due to:

1. Their high accuracy (low circular error probable), compared to submarine-launched ballistic missiles which used to be less accurate, and more prone to defects;
2. Their fast response time, compared to bombers which are considered too slow;
3. Their ability to carry multiple MIRV warheads at once, useful for destroying a whole missile field or several cities with one missile.

Unlike a decapitation strike or a countervalue strike, a counterforce strike might result in a potentially more constrained retaliation. Though the Minuteman III of the mid-1960s was MIRVed with three warheads, heavily MIRVed vehicles threatened to upset the balance; these included the SS-18 Satan which was deployed in 1976, and was considered to threaten Minuteman III silos, which led some neoconservatives to conclude a Soviet first strike was being prepared for. This led to the development of the aforementioned Pershing II, the Trident I and Trident II, as well as the MX missile, and the B-1 Lancer. 

MIRVed land-based ICBMs are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on striking first. When a missile is MIRVed, it is able to carry many warheads (up to eight in existing U.S. missiles, limited by New START, though Trident II is capable of carrying up to 12) and deliver them to separate targets. If it is assumed that each side has 100 missiles, with five warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing two warheads at each silo, then the attacking side can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about five by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. As such, this type of weapon was intended to be banned under the START II agreement; however, the START II agreement was never brought into force, and neither Russia nor the United States ratified the agreement.

Late Cold War

The original U.S. MAD doctrine was modified on July 25, 1980, with U.S. President Jimmy Carter's adoption of countervailing strategy with Presidential Directive 59. According to its architect, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "countervailing strategy" stressed that the planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb Soviet population centers and cities primarily, but first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military targets, in the hope of a Soviet surrender before total destruction of the Soviet Union (and the United States). This modified version of MAD was seen as a winnable nuclear war, while still maintaining the possibility of assured destruction for at least one party. This policy was further developed by the Reagan administration with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, nicknamed "Star Wars"), the goal of which was to develop space-based technology to destroy Soviet missiles before they reached the United States.

SDI was criticized by both the Soviets and many of America's allies (including Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher) because, were it ever operational and effective, it would have undermined the "assured destruction" required for MAD. If the United States had a guarantee against Soviet nuclear attacks, its critics argued, it would have first-strike capability, which would have been a politically and militarily destabilizing position. Critics further argued that it could trigger a new arms race, this time to develop countermeasures for SDI. Despite its promise of nuclear safety, SDI was described by many of its critics (including Soviet nuclear physicist and later peace activist Andrei Sakharov) as being even more dangerous than MAD because of these political implications. Supporters also argued that SDI could trigger a new arms race, forcing the USSR to spend an increasing proportion of GDP on defense—something which has been claimed to have been an indirect cause of the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

Proponents of ballistic missile defense (BMD) argue that MAD is exceptionally dangerous in that it essentially offers a single course of action in the event of nuclear attack: full retaliatory response. The fact that nuclear proliferation has led to an increase in the number of nations in the "nuclear club", including nations of questionable stability (e.g. North Korea), and that a nuclear nation might be hijacked by a despot or other person or persons who might use nuclear weapons without a sane regard for the consequences, presents a strong case for proponents of BMD who seek a policy which both protects against attack, but also does not require an escalation into what might become global nuclear war. Russia continues to have a strong public distaste for Western BMD initiatives, presumably because proprietary operative BMD systems could exceed their technical and financial resources and therefore degrade their larger military standing and sense of security in a post-MAD environment. Russian refusal to accept invitations to participate in NATO BMD may be indicative of the lack of an alternative to MAD in current Russian war fighting strategy due to dilapidation of conventional forces after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Post-Cold War

A payload launch vehicle carrying a prototype exoatmospheric kill vehicle is launched from Meck Island at the Kwajalein Missile Range on December 3, 2001, for an intercept of a ballistic missile target over the central Pacific Ocean.

 

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation emerged as a sovereign entity encompassing most of the territory of the former USSR. Relations between the United States and Russia were, at least for a time, less tense than they had been with the Soviet Union. 

The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June 2002, claiming that the limited national missile defense system which they proposed to build was designed only to prevent nuclear blackmail by a state with limited nuclear capability and was not planned to alter the nuclear posture between Russia and the United States.

While relations have improved and an intentional nuclear exchange is more unlikely, the decay in Russian nuclear capability in the post-Cold War era may have had an effect on the continued viability of the MAD doctrine. A 2006 article by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press stated that the United States could carry out a nuclear first strike on Russia and would "have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM." This was attributed to reductions in Russian nuclear stockpiles and the increasing inefficiency and age of that which remains. Lieber and Press argued that the MAD era is coming to an end and that the United States is on the cusp of global nuclear primacy.

However, in a follow-up article in the same publication, others criticized the analysis, including Peter Flory, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, who began by writing "The essay by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press contains so many errors, on a topic of such gravity, that a Department of Defense response is required to correct the record." Regarding reductions in Russian stockpiles, another response stated that "a similarly one-sided examination of [reductions in] U.S. forces would have painted a similarly dire portrait". 

A situation in which the United States might actually be expected to carry out a "successful" attack is perceived as a disadvantage for both countries. The strategic balance between the United States and Russia is becoming less stable, and the objective, technical possibility of a first strike by the United States is increasing. At a time of crisis, this instability could lead to an accidental nuclear war. For example, if Russia feared a U.S. nuclear attack, Moscow might make rash moves (such as putting its forces on alert) that would provoke a U.S. preemptive strike.

An outline of current U.S. nuclear strategy toward both Russia and other nations was published as the document "Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence" in 1995.

Official policy

Whether MAD was the officially accepted doctrine of the United States military during the Cold War is largely a matter of interpretation. The United States Air Force, for example, has retrospectively contended that it never advocated MAD as a sole strategy, and that this form of deterrence was seen as one of numerous options in U.S. nuclear policy. Former officers have emphasized that they never felt as limited by the logic of MAD (and were prepared to use nuclear weapons in smaller-scale situations than "assured destruction" allowed), and did not deliberately target civilian cities (though they acknowledge that the result of a "purely military" attack would certainly devastate the cities as well). However, according to a declassified 1959 Strategic Air Command study, U.S. nuclear weapons plans specifically targeted the populations of Beijing, Moscow, Leningrad, East Berlin, and Warsaw for systematic destruction. MAD was implied in several U.S. policies and used in the political rhetoric of leaders in both the United States and the USSR during many periods of the Cold War.

To continue to deter in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, it is necessary to have nuclear (as well as conventional) forces such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory or any plausible definition of victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical, if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack.

— President Jimmy Carter in 1980, Presidential Directive 59, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy

The doctrine of MAD was officially at odds with that of the USSR, which had, contrary to MAD, insisted survival was possible. The Soviets believed they could win not only a strategic nuclear war, which they planned to absorb with their extensive civil defense planning, but also the conventional war that they predicted would follow after their strategic nuclear arsenal had been depleted. Official Soviet policy, though, may have had internal critics towards the end of the Cold War, including some in the USSR's own leadership.

Nuclear use would be catastrophic.

— 1981, the Soviet General Staff

Criticism

Nuclear weapon test Apache (yield 1.85 Mt or 7.7 PJ)

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence depends on several challengeable assumptions

Second-strike capability

• A first strike must not be capable of preventing a retaliatory second strike or else mutual destruction is not assured. In this case, a state would have nothing to lose with a first strike, or might try to preempt the development of an opponent's second-strike capability with a first strike (i.e., a decapitation strike). To avoid this, countries may design their nuclear forces to make decapitation strike almost impossible, by dispersing launchers over wide areas and using a combination of sea-based, air-based, underground, and mobile land-based launchers.

Perfect detection

• No false positives (errors) in the equipment and/or procedures that must identify a launch by the other side. The implication of this is that an accident could lead to a full nuclear exchange. During the Cold War there were several instances of false positives, as in the case of Stanislav Petrov.
• No possibility of camouflaging a launch. The use of stealth technology in aircraft such as the B-2 bomber makes this assumption less likely to be fulfilled.
• No means of delivery that does not have the characteristics of a long-range missile delivery, i.e. detectable far ahead of detonation. Again, this assumption is challengeable with, for instance, stealth aircraft, but also with other means, such as smuggling weapons to the target undetected (using devices like a suitcase nuke). A close-range missile attack from a submarine would also negate this assumption, as would positioning the weapons close to the intended target.
• Perfect attribution. If there is a launch from the Sino-Russian border, it could be difficult to distinguish which nation is responsible—both Russia and China have the capability—and, hence, against which nation retaliation should occur.

Perfect rationality

• No rogue commanders will have the ability to corrupt the launch decision process. Such an incident very nearly occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis when an argument broke out aboard a nuclear-armed submarine cut off from radio communication. The second-in-command, Vasili Arkhipov, refused to launch despite an order from Captain Savitsky to do so.
• All leaders with launch capability care about the survival of their subjects (an extremist leader may welcome Armageddon and launch an unprovoked attack). Winston Churchill warned that any strategy will not "cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dugout."

Inability to defend

• No fallout shelter networks of sufficient capacity to protect large segments of the population and/or industry.
• No development of anti-missile technology or deployment of remedial protective gear.

Nuclear Weapons are Morally Indefensible, Oxford Union debate, 1985

At an Oxford Union debate in 1985, debating the proposition that Nuclear Weapons are Morally Indefensible, former New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange argued "that the fear [nuclear weapons] inspire is not a justification for their existence," arguing instead that nuclear armament is irrational, morally indefensible and makes us insecure.

There is, Mr President, a quality of irrationality about nuclear weapons which does not sit well with good intentions. A system of defense serves its purpose if it guarantees the security of those it protects. A system of nuclear defense guarantees only insecurity. The means of defense terrorize as much as the threat of attack.