Civilian control of the military is a doctrine in military and political science that places ultimate responsibility for a country's strategic decision-making in the hands of the civilian political leadership, rather than professional military officers. The reverse situation, where professional military officers control national politics, is called a military dictatorship. A lack of control over the military may result in a state within a state. One author, paraphrasing Samuel P. Huntington's writings in The Soldier and the State,
 has summarized the civilian control ideal as "the proper subordination 
of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as 
determined by civilian authority".
Civilian control is often seen as a prerequisite feature of a stable liberal democracy. Use of the term in scholarly analyses tends to take place in the context of a democracy governed by elected officials, though the subordination of the military to political control is not unique to these societies. One example is the People's Republic of China. Mao Zedong stated that "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party," reflecting the primacy of the Communist Party of China (and communist parties in general) as decision-makers in Marxist–Leninist and Maoist theories of democratic centralism.
As noted by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill professor Richard H. Kohn, "civilian control is not a fact but a process". Affirmations of respect for the values of civilian control notwithstanding, the actual level of control sought or achieved by the civilian leadership may vary greatly in practice, from a statement of broad policy goals that military commanders are expected to translate into operational plans, to the direct selection of specific targets for attack on the part of governing politicians. National Leaders with limited experience in military matters often have little choice but to rely on the advice of professional military commanders trained in the art and science of warfare to inform the limits of policy; in such cases, the military establishment may enter the bureaucratic arena to advocate for or against a particular course of action, shaping the policy-making process and blurring any clear cut lines of civilian control.
Civilian control is often seen as a prerequisite feature of a stable liberal democracy. Use of the term in scholarly analyses tends to take place in the context of a democracy governed by elected officials, though the subordination of the military to political control is not unique to these societies. One example is the People's Republic of China. Mao Zedong stated that "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party," reflecting the primacy of the Communist Party of China (and communist parties in general) as decision-makers in Marxist–Leninist and Maoist theories of democratic centralism.
As noted by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill professor Richard H. Kohn, "civilian control is not a fact but a process". Affirmations of respect for the values of civilian control notwithstanding, the actual level of control sought or achieved by the civilian leadership may vary greatly in practice, from a statement of broad policy goals that military commanders are expected to translate into operational plans, to the direct selection of specific targets for attack on the part of governing politicians. National Leaders with limited experience in military matters often have little choice but to rely on the advice of professional military commanders trained in the art and science of warfare to inform the limits of policy; in such cases, the military establishment may enter the bureaucratic arena to advocate for or against a particular course of action, shaping the policy-making process and blurring any clear cut lines of civilian control.
Rationales
Admiral John B. Nathman (far right) and Admiral William J. Fallon salute during honors arrival of Secretary of the Navy Gordon R. England at a change of command ceremony in 2005. A subordinate of the civilian Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy is the civilian Head of the Department of the Navy, which includes the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps.
Advocates of civilian control generally take a Clausewitzian view of war, emphasizing its political character.  The words of Georges Clemenceau, "War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men" (also frequently rendered as "War is too important to be left to the generals"), wryly reflect this view. Given that broad strategic decisions, such as the decision to declare a war, start an invasion, or end a conflict, have a major impact on the citizens of the country, they are seen by civilian control advocates as best guided by the will of the people (as expressed by their political representatives), rather than left solely to an elite group of tactical experts. The military serves as a special government agency, which is supposed to implement, rather than formulate, policies that require the use of certain types of physical force. Kohn succinctly summarizes this view when he writes that:
The point of civilian control is to make security subordinate to the larger purposes of a nation, rather than the other way around. The purpose of the military is to defend society, not to define it.
A state's
 effective use of force is an issue of great concern for all national 
leaders, who must rely on the military to supply this aspect of their authority. The danger of granting military leaders full autonomy
 or sovereignty is that they may ignore or supplant the democratic 
decision-making process, and use physical force, or the threat of 
physical force, to achieve their preferred outcomes; in the worst cases,
 this may lead to a coup or military dictatorship. A related danger is the use of the military to crush domestic political opposition through intimidation or sheer physical force, interfering with the ability to have free and fair elections,
 a key part of the democratic process. This poses the paradox that 
"because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect 
us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection".
 Also, military personnel, because of the nature of their job, are much 
more willing to use force to settle disputes than civilians because they
 are trained military personnel that specialize strictly in warfare. The
 military is authoritative and hierarchical, rarely allowing discussion 
and prohibiting dissention. For instance, in the Empire of Japan, prime ministers and almost everyone in high positions were military people like Hideki Tojo,
 and advocated and basically pressured the leaders to start military 
conflicts against China and others because they believed that they would
 ultimately be victorious.
Liberal theory and the American Founding Fathers
Many of the Founding Fathers of the United States were suspicious of standing militaries.  As Samuel Adams
 wrote in 1768, "Even when there is a necessity of the military power, 
within a land, a wise and prudent people will always have a watchful and
 jealous eye over it". Even more forceful are the words of Elbridge Gerry, a delegate to the American Constitutional Convention,
 who wrote that "[s]tanding armies in time of peace are inconsistent 
with the principles of republican Governments, dangerous to the 
liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive 
engines for establishing despotism."
In Federalist No. 8, one of The Federalist papers documenting the ideas of some of the Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton
 expressed concern that maintaining a large standing army would be a 
dangerous and expensive undertaking.  In his principal argument for the 
ratification of the proposed constitution, he argued that only by 
maintaining a strong union could the new country avoid such a pitfall.  
Using the European experience as a negative example and the British 
experience as a positive one, he presented the idea of a strong nation 
protected by a navy with no need of a standing army.  The implication 
was that control of a large military force is, at best, difficult and 
expensive, and at worst invites war and division.  He foresaw the 
necessity of creating a civilian government that kept the military at a 
distance.
James Madison, another writer of many of The Federalist papers, expressed his concern about a standing military in comments before the Constitutional Convention in June 1787:
In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of War, has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive, will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense against foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.
The United States Constitution placed considerable limitations on the legislature.  Coming from a tradition of legislative superiority in government,
 many were concerned that the proposed Constitution would place so many 
limitations on the legislature that it would become impossible for such a
 body to prevent an executive from starting a war.  Hamilton argued in 
Federalist No. 26 that it would be equally as bad for a legislature to 
be unfettered by any other agency and that restraints would actually be 
more likely to preserve liberty.  James Madison, in Federalist No. 47,
 continued Hamilton's argument that distributing powers among the 
various branches of government would prevent any one group from gaining 
so much power as to become unassailable.  In Federalist No. 48,
 however, Madison warned that while the separation of powers is 
important, the departments must not be so far separated as to have no 
ability to control the others.
Finally, in Federalist No. 51,
 Madison argued that to create a government that relied primarily on the
 good nature of the incumbent to ensure proper government was folly.  
Institutions must be in place to check incompetent or malevolent 
leaders.  Most importantly, no single branch of government ought to have
 control over any single aspect of governing.  Thus, all three branches 
of government must have some control over the military, and the system 
of checks and balances maintained among the other branches would serve 
to help control the military.
Hamilton and Madison thus had two major concerns: (1) the 
detrimental effect on liberty and democracy of a large standing army and
 (2) the ability of an unchecked legislature or executive to take the 
country to war precipitously.  These concerns drove American military 
policy for the first century and a half of the country's existence.  
While armed forces were built up during wartime, the pattern after every
 war up to and including World War II was to demobilize quickly and 
return to something approaching pre-war force levels.  However, with the
 advent of the Cold War
 in the 1950s, the need to create and maintain a sizable peacetime 
military force "engendered new concerns" of militarism and about how 
such a large force would affect civil–military relations in the United States.
Domestic law enforcement
The United States' Posse Comitatus Act,
 passed in 1878, prohibits any part of the Army or the Air Force (since 
the U.S. Air Force evolved from the U.S. Army) from engaging in domestic
 law enforcement activities unless they do so pursuant to lawful 
authority.  Similar prohibitions apply to the Navy and Marine Corps by 
service regulation, since the actual Posse Comitatus Act does not apply 
to them.  The Coast Guard is exempt from Posse Comitatus since it 
normally operates under the Department of Homeland Security versus the Department of Defense and enforces U.S. laws, even when operating as a service with the U.S. Navy.
The act is often misunderstood to prohibit any use of federal 
military forces in law enforcement, but this is not the case.  For 
example, the President has explicit authority under the Constitution and
 federal law to use federal forces or federalized militias to enforce 
the laws of the United States.  The act's primary purpose is to prevent 
local law enforcement officials from utilizing federal forces in this 
way by forming a "posse" consisting of federal Soldiers or Airmen.
There are, however, practical political concerns in the United 
States that make the use of federal military forces less desirable for 
use in domestic law enforcement.  Under the U.S. Constitution, law and 
order is primarily a matter of state concern.  As a practical matter, 
when military forces are necessary to maintain domestic order and 
enforce the laws, state militia forces under state control i.e., that state's Army National Guard and/or Air National Guard
 are usually the force of first resort, followed by federalized state 
militia forces i.e., the Army National Guard and/or Air National Guard 
"federalized" as part of the U.S. Army and/or U.S. Air Force, with 
active federal forces (to include "federal" reserve component forces 
other than the National Guard) being the least politically palatable 
option.
NATO and EU member states
Strong democratic control of the military is a prerequisite for membership in NATO. Strong democracy and rule of law, implying democratic control of the military, are prerequisites for membership in the European Union.
Maoist approach
Maoist military-political theories of people's war and democratic centralism also support the subordination of military forces to the directives of the communist party (although the guerrilla experience of many early leading Communist Party of China figures may make their status as civilians somewhat ambiguous). In a 1929 essay On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, Mao
 explicitly refuted "comrades [who] regard military affairs and politics
 as opposed to each other and [who] refuse to recognize that military 
affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks", 
prescribing increased scrutiny of the People's Liberation Army by the Party and greater political training of officers and enlistees as a means of reducing military autonomy. In Mao's theory, the military—which serves both as a symbol of the revolution and an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat—is not merely expected to defer to the direction of the ruling non-uniformed Party members (who today exercise control in the People's Republic of China through the Central Military Commission), but also to actively participate in the revolutionary political campaigns of the Maoist era.
Methods of asserting civilian control
An immensely popular hero of World War II, General Douglas MacArthur's public insistence on the need to expand the Korean War, over the objections of President Harry S. Truman, led to the termination of his command.
Civilian leaders cannot usually hope to challenge their militaries by
 means of force, and thus must guard against any potential usurpation of
 powers through a combination of policies, laws, and the inculcation of 
the values of civilian control in their armed services. The presence of a
 distinct civilian police force, militia, or other paramilitary group may mitigate to an extent the disproportionate strength that a country's military possesses; civilian gun
 ownership has also been justified on the grounds that it prevents 
potential abuses of power by authorities (military or otherwise). 
Opponents of gun control have cited the need for a balance of power in order to enforce the civilian control of the military.
A civilian commander-in-chief
The establishment of a civilian head of state, head of government or other government figure as the military's commander-in-chief within the chain of command is one legal construct for the propagation of civilian control.
In the United States, Article I of the Constitution gives the Congress the power to declare war (in the War Powers Clause), while Article II of the Constitution establishes the President as the commander-in-chief.  Ambiguity over when the President could take military action without declaring war resulted in the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
American presidents have used the power to dismiss high-ranking 
officers as a means to assert policy and strategic control.  Three 
examples include Abraham Lincoln's dismissal of George McClellan in the American Civil War when McClellan failed to pursue the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia following the Battle of Antietam, Harry S. Truman relieving Douglas MacArthur of command in the Korean War after MacArthur repeatedly contradicted the Truman administration's stated policies on the war's conduct, and Barack Obama's acceptance of Stanley McChrystal's resignation in the War in Afghanistan after a Rolling Stone article was published where he mocked several members of the Obama administration, including Vice President Joe Biden.
Composition of the military
Differing opinions exist as to the desirability of distinguishing the military as a body separate from the larger society. In The Soldier and the State, Huntington
 argued for what he termed "objective civilian control", "focus[ing] on a
 politically neutral, autonomous, and professional officer corps". This autonomous professionalism, it is argued, best inculcates an esprit de corps
 and sense of distinct military corporateness that prevents political 
interference by sworn servicemen and -women. Conversely, the tradition 
of the citizen-soldier
 holds that "civilianizing" the military is the best means of preserving
 the loyalty of the armed forces towards civilian authorities, by 
preventing the development of an independent "caste"
 of warriors that might see itself as existing fundamentally apart from 
the rest of society. In the early history of the United States, 
according to Michael Cairo,
[the] principle of civilian control... embodied the idea that every qualified citizen was responsible for the defense of the nation and the defense of liberty, and would go to war, if necessary. Combined with the idea that the military was to embody democratic principles and encourage citizen participation, the only military force suitable to the Founders was a citizen militia, which minimized divisions between officers and the enlisted.
In a less egalitarian practice, societies may also blur the line between "civilian" and "military" leadership by making direct appointments of non-professionals (frequently social elites benefitting from patronage or nepotism) to an officer rank. A more invasive method, most famously practiced in the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, involves active monitoring of the officer corps through the appointment of political commissars,
 posted parallel to the uniformed chain of command and tasked with 
ensuring that national policies are carried out by the armed forces. The
 regular rotation
 of soldiers through a variety of different postings is another 
effective tool for reducing military autonomy, by limiting the potential
 for soldiers' attachment to any one particular military unit. Some governments place responsibility for approving promotions or officer candidacies with the civilian government, requiring some degree of deference on the part of officers seeking advancement through the ranks.
Technological developments
During the term of Lyndon B. Johnson, the President and his advisors often chose specific bombing targets in Vietnam on the basis of larger geopolitical
 calculations, without professional knowledge of the weapons or tactics.
 Apropos of LBJ's direction of the bombing campaign in Vietnam, no air 
warfare specialists attended the Tuesday lunches at which the targeting 
decisions were made.
Historically, direct control over military forces deployed for war was hampered by the technological limits of command, control, and communications; national leaders, whether democratically elected or not, had to rely on local commanders to execute the details of a military campaign, or risk centrally-directed orders' obsolescence by the time they reached the front lines.
 The remoteness of government from the action allowed professional 
soldiers to claim military affairs as their own particular sphere of 
expertise and influence; upon entering a state of war, it was often 
expected that the generals and field marshals would dictate strategy and tactics, and the civilian leadership would defer to their informed judgments.
Improvements in information technology and its application to wartime command and control (a process sometimes labeled the "Revolution in Military Affairs") has allowed civilian leaders removed from the theater of conflict to assert greater control over the actions of distant military forces. Precision-guided munitions and real-time videoconferencing with field commanders now allow the civilian leadership to intervene even at the tactical
 decision-making level, designating particular targets for destruction 
or preservation based on political calculations or the counsel of 
non-uniformed advisors.
Restrictions on Political Activities
In the United States the Hatch Act of 1939
 does not directly apply to the military, however, Department of Defense
 Directive 1344.10 (DoDD 1344.10) essentially applies the same rules to 
the military. This helps to ensure a non-partisan military and ensure 
smooth and peaceful transitions of power.
Political officers
Political officers screened for appropriate ideology have been 
integrated into supervisory roles within militaries as a way to maintain
 the control by political rulers. Historically they are associated most 
strongly with the Soviet Union and China rather than liberal democracies.
Military dislike of political directives
While civilian control forms the normative standard in almost every society outside of military dictatorships,
 its practice has often been the subject of pointed criticism from both 
uniformed and non-uniformed observers, who object to what they view as 
the undue "politicization" of military affairs, especially when elected 
officials or political appointees micromanage the military, rather than 
giving the military general goals and objectives (like "Defeat Country 
X"), and letting the military decide how best to carry those orders out.
 By placing responsibility for military decision-making in the hands of 
non-professional civilians, critics argue, the dictates of military 
strategy are subsumed to the political, with the effect of unduly 
restricting the fighting capabilities of the nation's armed forces for 
what should be immaterial or otherwise lower priority concerns.
Case study: United States
The "Revolt of the Admirals"
 that occurred in 1949 was an attempt by senior US Navy personnel, to 
force a change in budgets directly opposed to the directives given by 
the Civilian leadership.
U.S. President Bill Clinton faced frequent allegations throughout his time in office (particularly after the Battle of Mogadishu) that he was ignoring military goals out of political and media pressure—a phenomenon termed the "CNN effect".
 Politicians who personally lack military training and experience but 
who seek to engage the nation in military action may risk resistance and
 being labeled "chickenhawks" by those who disagree with their political goals. 
In contesting these priorities, members of the professional 
military leadership and their non-uniformed supporters may participate 
in the bureaucratic bargaining process of the state's policy-making 
apparatus, engaging in what might be termed a form of regulatory capture
 as they attempt to restrict the policy options of elected officials 
when it comes to military matters. An example of one such set of 
conditions is the "Weinberger Doctrine", which sought to forestall another American intervention like that which occurred in the Vietnam War (which had proved disastrous for the morale and fighting integrity of the U.S. military) by proposing that the nation should only go to war in matters of "vital national interest", "as a last resort", and, as updated by Weinberger's disciple Colin Powell, with "overwhelming force". The process of setting military budgets forms another contentious intersection of military and non-military policy, and regularly draws active lobbying by rival military services for a share of the national budget.
Nuclear weapons in the U.S. are controlled by the civilian United States Department of Energy, not by the Department of Defense.
During the 1990s and 2000s, public controversy over LGBT policy in the U.S. military
 led to many military leaders and personnel being asked for their 
opinions on the matter and being given deference although the decision 
was ultimately not theirs to make.
During his tenure, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
 raised the ire of the military by attempting to reform its structure 
away from traditional infantry and toward a lighter, faster, more 
technologically driven force. In April 2006, Rumsfeld was severely 
criticized by some retired military officers for his handling of the Iraq War,
 while other retired military officers came out in support of Rumsfeld. 
Although no active military officers have spoken out against Rumsfeld, 
the actions of these officers is still highly unusual. Some news 
accounts have attributed the actions of these generals to the Vietnam war
 experience, in which officers did not speak out against the 
administration's handling of military action. Later in the year, 
immediately after the November elections in which the Democrats gained 
control of the Congress, Rumsfeld resigned.



 


