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Sunday, February 17, 2019

Computer security

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Computer security, cybersecurity or information technology security (IT security) is the protection of computer systems from theft or damage to their hardware, software or electronic data, as well as from disruption or misdirection of the services they provide.
 
The field is growing in importance due to increasing reliance on computer systems, the Internet and wireless networks such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, and due to the growth of "smart" devices, including smartphones, televisions and the various tiny devices that constitute the Internet of things. Due to its complexity, both in terms of politics and technology, it is also one of the major challenges of the contemporary world.

Vulnerabilities and attacks

A vulnerability is a weakness in design, implementation, operation or internal control. Most of the vulnerabilities that have been discovered are documented in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. 

An exploitable vulnerability is one for which at least one working attack or "exploit" exists. Vulnerabilities are often hunted or exploited with the aid of automated tools or manually using customized scripts. 

To secure a computer system, it is important to understand the attacks that can be made against it, and these threats can typically be classified into one of these categories below:

Backdoor

A backdoor in a computer system, a cryptosystem or an algorithm, is any secret method of bypassing normal authentication or security controls. They may exist for a number of reasons, including by original design or from poor configuration. They may have been added by an authorized party to allow some legitimate access, or by an attacker for malicious reasons; but regardless of the motives for their existence, they create a vulnerability.

Denial-of-service attacks

Denial of service attacks (DoS) are designed to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users. Attackers can deny service to individual victims, such as by deliberately entering a wrong password enough consecutive times to cause the victims account to be locked, or they may overload the capabilities of a machine or network and block all users at once. While a network attack from a single IP address can be blocked by adding a new firewall rule, many forms of Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are possible, where the attack comes from a large number of points – and defending is much more difficult. Such attacks can originate from the zombie computers of a botnet, but a range of other techniques are possible including reflection and amplification attacks, where innocent systems are fooled into sending traffic to the victim.

Direct-access attacks

An unauthorized user gaining physical access to a computer is most likely able to directly copy data from it. They may also compromise security by making operating system modifications, installing software worms, keyloggers, covert listening devices or using wireless mice. Even when the system is protected by standard security measures, these may be able to be by-passed by booting another operating system or tool from a CD-ROM or other bootable media. Disk encryption and Trusted Platform Module are designed to prevent these attacks.

Eavesdropping

Eavesdropping is the act of surreptitiously listening to a private conversation, typically between hosts on a network. For instance, programs such as Carnivore and NarusInSight have been used by the FBI and NSA to eavesdrop on the systems of internet service providers. Even machines that operate as a closed system (i.e., with no contact to the outside world) can be eavesdropped upon via monitoring the faint electro-magnetic transmissions generated by the hardware; TEMPEST is a specification by the NSA referring to these attacks.

Multivector, polymorphic attacks

Surfacing in 2017, a new class of multi-vector, polymorphic cyber threats surfaced that combined several types of attacks and changed form to avoid cybersecurity controls as they spread. These threats have been classified as fifth generation cyberattacks.

Phishing

Phishing is the attempt to acquire sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card details directly from users. Phishing is typically carried out by email spoofing or instant messaging, and it often directs users to enter details at a fake website whose look and feel are almost identical to the legitimate one. Preying on a victim's trust, phishing can be classified as a form of social engineering.

Privilege escalation

Privilege escalation describes a situation where an attacker with some level of restricted access is able to, without authorization, elevate their privileges or access level. For example, a standard computer user may be able to fool the system into giving them access to restricted data; or even to "become root" and have full unrestricted access to a system.

Social engineering

Social engineering aims to convince a user to disclose secrets such as passwords, card numbers, etc. by, for example, impersonating a bank, a contractor, or a customer.

A common scam involves fake CEO emails sent to accounting and finance departments. In early 2016, the FBI reported that the scam has cost US businesses more than $2bn in about two years.

In May 2016, the Milwaukee Bucks NBA team was the victim of this type of cyber scam with a perpetrator impersonating the team's president Peter Feigin, resulting in the handover of all the team's employees' 2015 W-2 tax forms.

Spoofing

Spoofing is the act of masquerading as a valid entity through falsification of data (such as an IP address or username), in order to gain access to information or resources that one is otherwise unauthorized to obtain. There are several types of spoofing, including:

Tampering

Tampering describes a malicious modification of products. So-called "Evil Maid" attacks and security services planting of surveillance capability into routers are examples.

Information security culture

Employee behavior can have a big impact on information security in organizations. Cultural concepts can help different segments of the organization work effectively or work against effectiveness towards information security within an organization. ″Exploring the Relationship between Organizational Culture and Information Security Culture″ provides the following definition of information security culture: ″ISC is the totality of patterns of behavior in an organization that contribute to the protection of information of all kinds.″

Andersson and Reimers (2014) found that employees often do not see themselves as part of the organization Information Security "effort" and often take actions that ignore organizational Information Security best interests. Research shows Information security culture needs to be improved continuously. In ″Information Security Culture from Analysis to Change″, authors commented, ″It′s a never ending process, a cycle of evaluation and change or maintenance.″ To manage the information security culture, five steps should be taken: Pre-evaluation, strategic planning, operative planning, implementation, and post-evaluation.
  • Pre-Evaluation: to identify the awareness of information security within employees and to analyze the current security policy.
  • Strategic Planning: to come up with a better awareness program, clear targets need to be set. Clustering people is helpful to achieve it.
  • Operative Planning: a good security culture can be established based on internal communication, management-buy-in, and security awareness and a training program.
  • Implementation: four stages should be used to implement the information security culture. They are:
  1. Commitment of the management
  2. Communication with organizational members
  3. Courses for all organizational members
  4. Commitment of the employees.

Systems at risk

The growth in the number of computer systems, and the increasing reliance upon them of individuals, businesses, industries and governments means that there are an increasing number of systems at risk.

Financial systems

The computer systems of financial regulators and financial institutions like the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SWIFT, investment banks, and commercial banks are prominent hacking targets for cybercriminals interested in manipulating markets and making illicit gains. Web sites and apps that accept or store credit card numbers, brokerage accounts, and bank account information are also prominent hacking targets, because of the potential for immediate financial gain from transferring money, making purchases, or selling the information on the black market. In-store payment systems and ATMs have also been tampered with in order to gather customer account data and PINs.

Utilities and industrial equipment

Computers control functions at many utilities, including coordination of telecommmunications, the power grid, nuclear power plants, and valve opening and closing in water and gas networks. The Internet is a potential attack vector for such machines if connected, but the Stuxnet worm demonstrated that even equipment controlled by computers not connected to the Internet can be vulnerable. In 2014, the Computer Emergency Readiness Team, a division of the Department of Homeland Security, investigated 79 hacking incidents at energy companies. Vulnerabilities in smart meters (many of which use local radio or cellular communications) can cause problems with billing fraud.

Aviation

The aviation industry is very reliant on a series of complex systems which could be attacked. A simple power outage at one airport can cause repercussions worldwide, much of the system relies on radio transmissions which could be disrupted, and controlling aircraft over oceans is especially dangerous because radar surveillance only extends 175 to 225 miles offshore. There is also potential for attack from within an aircraft.

In Europe, with the (Pan-European Network Service) and NewPENS, and in the US with the NextGen program, air navigation service providers are moving to create their own dedicated networks. 

The consequences of a successful attack range from loss of confidentiality to loss of system integrity, air traffic control outages, loss of aircraft, and even loss of life.

Consumer devices

Desktop computers and laptops are commonly targeted to gather passwords or financial account information, or to construct a botnet to attack another target. Smartphones, tablet computers, smart watches, and other mobile devices such as quantified self devices like activity trackers have sensors such as cameras, microphones, GPS receivers, compasses, and accelerometers which could be exploited, and may collect personal information, including sensitive health information. Wifi, Bluetooth, and cell phone networks on any of these devices could be used as attack vectors, and sensors might be remotely activated after a successful breach.

The increasing number of home automation devices such as the Nest thermostat are also potential targets.

Large corporations

Large corporations are common targets. In many cases this is aimed at financial gain through identity theft and involves data breaches such as the loss of millions of clients' credit card details by Home Depot, Staples, Target Corporation, and the most recent breach of Equifax.

Some cyberattacks are ordered by foreign governments, these governments engage in cyberwarfare with the intent to spread their propaganda, sabotage, or spy on their targets. Many people believe the Russian government played a major role in the US presidential election of 2016 by using Twitter and Facebook to affect the results of the election.

Medical records have been targeted for use in general identify theft, health insurance fraud, and impersonating patients to obtain prescription drugs for recreational purposes or resale. Although cyber threats continue to increase, 62% of all organizations did not increase security training for their business in 2015.

Not all attacks are financially motivated however; for example security firm HBGary Federal suffered a serious series of attacks in 2011 from hacktivist group Anonymous in retaliation for the firm's CEO claiming to have infiltrated their group, and in the Sony Pictures attack of 2014 the motive appears to have been to embarrass with data leaks, and cripple the company by wiping workstations and servers.

Automobiles

Vehicles are increasingly computerized, with engine timing, cruise control, anti-lock brakes, seat belt tensioners, door locks, airbags and advanced driver-assistance systems on many models. Additionally, connected cars may use WiFi and Bluetooth to communicate with onboard consumer devices and the cell phone network. Self-driving cars are expected to be even more complex.

All of these systems carry some security risk, and such issues have gained wide attention. Simple examples of risk include a malicious compact disc being used as an attack vector, and the car's onboard microphones being used for eavesdropping. However, if access is gained to a car's internal controller area network, the danger is much greater – and in a widely publicized 2015 test, hackers remotely carjacked a vehicle from 10 miles away and drove it into a ditch.

Manufacturers are reacting in a number of ways, with Tesla in 2016 pushing out some security fixes "over the air" into its cars' computer systems.

In the area of autonomous vehicles, in September 2016 the United States Department of Transportation announced some initial safety standards, and called for states to come up with uniform policies.

Government

Government and military computer systems are commonly attacked by activists and foreign powers. Local and regional government infrastructure such as traffic light controls, police and intelligence agency communications, personnel records, student records, and financial systems are also potential targets as they are now all largely computerized. Passports and government ID cards that control access to facilities which use RFID can be vulnerable to cloning.

Internet of things and physical vulnerabilities

The Internet of things (IoT) is the network of physical objects such as devices, vehicles, and buildings that are embedded with electronics, software, sensors, and network connectivity that enables them to collect and exchange data – and concerns have been raised that this is being developed without appropriate consideration of the security challenges involved.

While the IoT creates opportunities for more direct integration of the physical world into computer-based systems, it also provides opportunities for misuse. In particular, as the Internet of Things spreads widely, cyber attacks are likely to become an increasingly physical (rather than simply virtual) threat. If a front door's lock is connected to the Internet, and can be locked/unlocked from a phone, then a criminal could enter the home at the press of a button from a stolen or hacked phone. People could stand to lose much more than their credit card numbers in a world controlled by IoT-enabled devices. Thieves have also used electronic means to circumvent non-Internet-connected hotel door locks.

Medical systems

Medical devices have either been successfully attacked or had potentially deadly vulnerabilities demonstrated, including both in-hospital diagnostic equipment and implanted devices including pacemakers and insulin pumps. There are many reports of hospitals and hospital organizations getting hacked, including ransomware attacks, Windows XP exploits, viruses, and data breaches of sensitive data stored on hospital servers. On 28 December 2016 the US Food and Drug Administration released its recommendations for how medical device manufacturers should maintain the security of Internet-connected devices – but no structure for enforcement.

Energy sector

In distributed generation systems, the risk of cyber attacks is real, according to Daily Energy Insider. An attack could cause a loss of power in a large area for a long period of time, and such an attack could have just as severe consequences as a natural disaster. The District of Columbia is considering creating a Distributed Energy Resources (DER) Authority within the city, with the goal being for customers to have more insight into their own energy use and giving the local electric utility, Pepco, the chance to better estimate energy demand. The D.C. proposal, however, would "allow third-party vendors to create numerous points of energy distribution, which could potentially create more opportunities for cyberattackers to threaten the electric grid."

Impact of security breaches

Serious financial damage has been caused by security breaches, but because there is no standard model for estimating the cost of an incident, the only data available is that which is made public by the organizations involved. "Several computer security consulting firms produce estimates of total worldwide losses attributable to virus and worm attacks and to hostile digital acts in general. The 2003 loss estimates by these firms range from $13 billion (worms and viruses only) to $226 billion (for all forms of covert attacks). The reliability of these estimates is often challenged; the underlying methodology is basically anecdotal." Security breaches continue to cost businesses billions of dollars but a survey revealed that 66% of security staffs do not believe senior leadership takes cyber precautions as a strategic priority.

However, reasonable estimates of the financial cost of security breaches can actually help organizations make rational investment decisions. According to the classic Gordon-Loeb Model analyzing the optimal investment level in information security, one can conclude that the amount a firm spends to protect information should generally be only a small fraction of the expected loss (i.e., the expected value of the loss resulting from a cyber/information security breach).

Attacker motivation

As with physical security, the motivations for breaches of computer security vary between attackers. Some are thrill-seekers or vandals, some are activists, others are criminals looking for financial gain. State-sponsored attackers are now common and well resourced, but started with amateurs such as Markus Hess who hacked for the KGB, as recounted by Clifford Stoll, in The Cuckoo's Egg.

A standard part of threat modelling for any particular system is to identify what might motivate an attack on that system, and who might be motivated to breach it. The level and detail of precautions will vary depending on the system to be secured. A home personal computer, bank, and classified military network face very different threats, even when the underlying technologies in use are similar.

Computer protection (countermeasures)

In computer security a countermeasure is an action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can be taken.

Some common countermeasures are listed in the following sections:

Security by design

Security by design, or alternately secure by design, means that the software has been designed from the ground up to be secure. In this case, security is considered as a main feature.

Some of the techniques in this approach include:
  • The principle of least privilege, where each part of the system has only the privileges that are needed for its function. That way even if an attacker gains access to that part, they have only limited access to the whole system.
  • Automated theorem proving to prove the correctness of crucial software subsystems.
  • Code reviews and unit testing, approaches to make modules more secure where formal correctness proofs are not possible.
  • Defense in depth, where the design is such that more than one subsystem needs to be violated to compromise the integrity of the system and the information it holds.
  • Default secure settings, and design to "fail secure" rather than "fail insecure" (see fail-safe for the equivalent in safety engineering). Ideally, a secure system should require a deliberate, conscious, knowledgeable and free decision on the part of legitimate authorities in order to make it insecure.
  • Audit trails tracking system activity, so that when a security breach occurs, the mechanism and extent of the breach can be determined. Storing audit trails remotely, where they can only be appended to, can keep intruders from covering their tracks.
  • Full disclosure of all vulnerabilities, to ensure that the "window of vulnerability" is kept as short as possible when bugs are discovered.

Security architecture

The Open Security Architecture organization defines IT security architecture as "the design artifacts that describe how the security controls (security countermeasures) are positioned, and how they relate to the overall information technology architecture. These controls serve the purpose to maintain the system's quality attributes: confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability and assurance services".

Techopedia defines security architecture as "a unified security design that addresses the necessities and potential risks involved in a certain scenario or environment. It also specifies when and where to apply security controls. The design process is generally reproducible." The key attributes of security architecture are:
  • the relationship of different components and how they depend on each other.
  • the determination of controls based on risk assessment, good practice, finances, and legal matters.
  • the standardization of controls.

Security measures

A state of computer "security" is the conceptual ideal, attained by the use of the three processes: threat prevention, detection, and response. These processes are based on various policies and system components, which include the following:
  • User account access controls and cryptography can protect systems files and data, respectively.
  • Firewalls are by far the most common prevention systems from a network security perspective as they can (if properly configured) shield access to internal network services, and block certain kinds of attacks through packet filtering. Firewalls can be both hardware- or software-based.
  • Intrusion Detection System (IDS) products are designed to detect network attacks in-progress and assist in post-attack forensics, while audit trails and logs serve a similar function for individual systems.
  • "Response" is necessarily defined by the assessed security requirements of an individual system and may cover the range from simple upgrade of protections to notification of legal authorities, counter-attacks, and the like. In some special cases, a complete destruction of the compromised system is favored, as it may happen that not all the compromised resources are detected.
Today, computer security comprises mainly "preventive" measures, like firewalls or an exit procedure. A firewall can be defined as a way of filtering network data between a host or a network and another network, such as the Internet, and can be implemented as software running on the machine, hooking into the network stack (or, in the case of most UNIX-based operating systems such as Linux, built into the operating system kernel) to provide real-time filtering and blocking. Another implementation is a so-called "physical firewall", which consists of a separate machine filtering network traffic. Firewalls are common amongst machines that are permanently connected to the Internet

Some organizations are turning to big data platforms, such as Apache Hadoop, to extend data accessibility and machine learning to detect advanced persistent threats.

However, relatively few organizations maintain computer systems with effective detection systems, and fewer still have organized response mechanisms in place. As a result, as Reuters points out: "Companies for the first time report they are losing more through electronic theft of data than physical stealing of assets". The primary obstacle to effective eradication of cyber crime could be traced to excessive reliance on firewalls and other automated "detection" systems. Yet it is basic evidence gathering by using packet capture appliances that puts criminals behind bars.

Vulnerability management

Vulnerability management is the cycle of identifying, and remediating or mitigating vulnerabilities, especially in software and firmware. Vulnerability management is integral to computer security and network security.

Vulnerabilities can be discovered with a vulnerability scanner, which analyzes a computer system in search of known vulnerabilities, such as open ports, insecure software configuration, and susceptibility to malware

Beyond vulnerability scanning, many organizations contract outside security auditors to run regular penetration tests against their systems to identify vulnerabilities. In some sectors, this is a contractual requirement.

Reducing vulnerabilities

While formal verification of the correctness of computer systems is possible, it is not yet common. Operating systems formally verified include seL4, and SYSGO's PikeOS – but these make up a very small percentage of the market.

Two factor authentication is a method for mitigating unauthorized access to a system or sensitive information. It requires "something you know"; a password or PIN, and "something you have"; a card, dongle, cellphone, or other piece of hardware. This increases security as an unauthorized person needs both of these to gain access.

Social engineering and direct computer access (physical) attacks can only be prevented by non-computer means, which can be difficult to enforce, relative to the sensitivity of the information. Training is often involved to help mitigate this risk, but even in a highly disciplined environments (e.g. military organizations), social engineering attacks can still be difficult to foresee and prevent.

Enoculation, derived from inoculation theory, seeks to prevent social engineering and other fraudulent tricks or traps by instilling a resistance to persuasion attempts through exposure to similar or related attempts.

It is possible to reduce an attacker's chances by keeping systems up to date with security patches and updates, using a security scanner or/and hiring competent people responsible for security.(This statement is ambiguous. Even systems developed by "competent" people get penetrated) The effects of data loss/damage can be reduced by careful backing up and insurance.

Hardware protection mechanisms

While hardware may be a source of insecurity, such as with microchip vulnerabilities maliciously introduced during the manufacturing process, hardware-based or assisted computer security also offers an alternative to software-only computer security. Using devices and methods such as dongles, trusted platform modules, intrusion-aware cases, drive locks, disabling USB ports, and mobile-enabled access may be considered more secure due to the physical access (or sophisticated backdoor access) required in order to be compromised. Each of these is covered in more detail below.
  • USB dongles are typically used in software licensing schemes to unlock software capabilities, but they can also be seen as a way to prevent unauthorized access to a computer or other device's software. The dongle, or key, essentially creates a secure encrypted tunnel between the software application and the key. The principle is that an encryption scheme on the dongle, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) provides a stronger measure of security, since it is harder to hack and replicate the dongle than to simply copy the native software to another machine and use it. Another security application for dongles is to use them for accessing web-based content such as cloud software or Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). In addition, a USB dongle can be configured to lock or unlock a computer.
  • Trusted platform modules (TPMs) secure devices by integrating cryptographic capabilities onto access devices, through the use of microprocessors, or so-called computers-on-a-chip. TPMs used in conjunction with server-side software offer a way to detect and authenticate hardware devices, preventing unauthorized network and data access.
  • Computer case intrusion detection refers to a device, typically a push-button switch, which detects when a computer case is opened. The firmware or BIOS is programmed to show an alert to the operator when the computer is booted up the next time.
  • Drive locks are essentially software tools to encrypt hard drives, making them inaccessible to thieves. Tools exist specifically for encrypting external drives as well.
  • Disabling USB ports is a security option for preventing unauthorized and malicious access to an otherwise secure computer. Infected USB dongles connected to a network from a computer inside the firewall are considered by the magazine Network World as the most common hardware threat facing computer networks.
  • Disconnecting or disabling peripheral devices ( like camera, GPS, removable storage etc.), that are not in use. 
  • Mobile-enabled access devices are growing in popularity due to the ubiquitous nature of cell phones. Built-in capabilities such as Bluetooth, the newer Bluetooth low energy (LE), Near field communication (NFC) on non-iOS devices and biometric validation such as thumb print readers, as well as QR code reader software designed for mobile devices, offer new, secure ways for mobile phones to connect to access control systems. These control systems provide computer security and can also be used for controlling access to secure buildings.

Secure operating systems

One use of the term "computer security" refers to technology that is used to implement secure operating systems. In the 1980s the United States Department of Defense (DoD) used the "Orange Book" standards, but the current international standard ISO/IEC 15408, "Common Criteria" defines a number of progressively more stringent Evaluation Assurance Levels. Many common operating systems meet the EAL4 standard of being "Methodically Designed, Tested and Reviewed", but the formal verification required for the highest levels means that they are uncommon. An example of an EAL6 ("Semiformally Verified Design and Tested") system is Integrity-178B, which is used in the Airbus A380 and several military jets.

Secure coding

In software engineering, secure coding aims to guard against the accidental introduction of security vulnerabilities. It is also possible to create software designed from the ground up to be secure. Such systems are "secure by design". Beyond this, formal verification aims to prove the correctness of the algorithms underlying a system; important for cryptographic protocols for example.

Capabilities and access control lists

Within computer systems, two of many security models capable of enforcing privilege separation are access control lists (ACLs) and capability-based security. Using ACLs to confine programs has been proven to be insecure in many situations, such as if the host computer can be tricked into indirectly allowing restricted file access, an issue known as the confused deputy problem. It has also been shown that the promise of ACLs of giving access to an object to only one person can never be guaranteed in practice. Both of these problems are resolved by capabilities. This does not mean practical flaws exist in all ACL-based systems, but only that the designers of certain utilities must take responsibility to ensure that they do not introduce flaws.

Capabilities have been mostly restricted to research operating systems, while commercial OSs still use ACLs. Capabilities can, however, also be implemented at the language level, leading to a style of programming that is essentially a refinement of standard object-oriented design. An open source project in the area is the E language.

End user security training

The end-user is widely recognized as the weakest link in the security chain and it is estimated that more than 90% of security incidents and breaches involve some kind of human error. Among the most commonly recorded forms of errors and misjudgment are poor password management, the inability to recognize misleading URLs and to identify fake websites and dangerous email attachments. 

As the human component of cyber risk is particularly relevant in determining the global cyber risk an organization is facing, security awareness training, at all levels, does not only provides formal compliance with regulatory and industry mandates but is considered essential in reducing cyber risk and protecting individuals and companies from the great majority of cyber threats.

The focus on the end-user represents a profound cultural change for many security practitioners, who have traditionally approached cybersecurity exclusively from a technical perspective, and moves along the lines suggested by major security centers to develop a culture of cyber awareness within the organization, recognizing that a security aware user provides an important line of defense against cyber attacks.

Response to breaches

Responding forcefully to attempted security breaches (in the manner that one would for attempted physical security breaches) is often very difficult for a variety of reasons:
  • Identifying attackers is difficult, as they are often in a different jurisdiction to the systems they attempt to breach, and operate through proxies, temporary anonymous dial-up accounts, wireless connections, and other anonymizing procedures which make backtracing difficult and are often located in yet another jurisdiction. If they successfully breach security, they are often able to delete logs to cover their tracks.
  • The sheer number of attempted attacks is so large that organizations cannot spend time pursuing each attacker (a typical home user with a permanent (e.g., cable modem) connection will be attacked at least several times per day, so more attractive targets could be presumed to see many more). Note however, that most of the sheer bulk of these attacks are made by automated vulnerability scanners and computer worms.
  • Law enforcement officers are often unfamiliar with information technology, and so lack the skills and interest in pursuing attackers. There are also budgetary constraints. It has been argued that the high cost of technology, such as DNA testing, and improved forensics mean less money for other kinds of law enforcement, so the overall rate of criminals not getting dealt with goes up as the cost of the technology increases. In addition, the identification of attackers across a network may require logs from various points in the network and in many countries, the release of these records to law enforcement (with the exception of being voluntarily surrendered by a network administrator or a system administrator) requires a search warrant and, depending on the circumstances, the legal proceedings required can be drawn out to the point where the records are either regularly destroyed, or the information is no longer relevant.
  • The United States government spends the largest amount of money every year on cyber security. The United States has a yearly budget of 28 billion dollars. Canada has the 2nd highest annual budget at 1 billion dollars. Australia has the third highest budget with only 70 million dollars.

Types of security and privacy

Incident response planning

Incident response is an organized approach to addressing and managing the aftermath of a computer security incident or compromise with the goal of preventing a breach or thwarting a cyberattack. An incident that is not identified and managed at the time of intrusion, typically escalates to a more impactful event such as a data breach or system failure. The intended outcome of a computer security incident response plan is to limit damage and reduce recovery time and costs. Responding to compromises quickly can mitigate exploited vulnerabilities, restore services and processes and minimize impact and losses.

Incident response planning allows an organization to establish a series of best practices to stop an intrusion before it causes damage. Typical incident response plans contain a set of written instructions that outline the organization’s response to a cyberattack. Without a documented plan in place, an organization may not successfully detect an intrusion or compromise and stakeholders may not understand their roles, processes and procedures during an escalation, slowing the organizations response and resolution. 

There are four key components of a computer security incident response plan:
  1. Preparation: Preparing stakeholders on the procedures for handling computer security incidents or compromises
  2. Detection & Analysis: Identifying and investigating suspicious activity to confirm a security incident, prioritizing the response based on impact and coordinating notification of the incident
  3. Containment, Eradication & Recovery: Isolating affected systems to prevent escalation and limit impact, pinpointing the genesis of the incident, removing malware, affected systems and bad actors from the environment and restoring systems and data when a threat no longer remains
  4. Post Incident Activity: Post mortem analysis of the incident, its root cause and the organization’s response with the intent of improving the incident response plan and future response efforts

Notable attacks and breaches

Some illustrative examples of different types of computer security breaches are given below.

Robert Morris and the first computer worm

In 1988, only 60,000 computers were connected to the Internet, and most were mainframes, minicomputers and professional workstations. On 2 November 1988, many started to slow down, because they were running a malicious code that demanded processor time and that spread itself to other computers – the first internet "computer worm". The software was traced back to 23-year-old Cornell University graduate student Robert Tappan Morris, Jr. who said 'he wanted to count how many machines were connected to the Internet'.

Rome Laboratory

In 1994, over a hundred intrusions were made by unidentified crackers into the Rome Laboratory, the US Air Force's main command and research facility. Using trojan horses, hackers were able to obtain unrestricted access to Rome's networking systems and remove traces of their activities. The intruders were able to obtain classified files, such as air tasking order systems data and furthermore able to penetrate connected networks of National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Goddard Space Flight Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, some Defense contractors, and other private sector organizations, by posing as a trusted Rome center user.

TJX customer credit card details

In early 2007, American apparel and home goods company TJX announced that it was the victim of an unauthorized computer systems intrusion and that the hackers had accessed a system that stored data on credit card, debit card, check, and merchandise return transactions.

Stuxnet attack

In 2010 the computer worm known as Stuxnet reportedly ruined almost one-fifth of Iran's nuclear centrifuges. It did so by disrupting industrial programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in a targeted attack. This is generally believed to have been launched by Israel and the United States – although neither has publicly admitted this.

Global surveillance disclosures

In early 2013, documents provided by Edward Snowden were published by The Washington Post and The Guardian exposing the massive scale of NSA global surveillance. There were also indications that the NSA may have inserted a backdoor in a NIST standard for encryption. This standard was later withdrawn due to widespread criticism. The NSA additionally were revealed to have tapped the links between Google's data centers.

Target and Home Depot breaches

In 2013 and 2014, a Russian/Ukrainian hacking ring known as "Rescator" broke into Target Corporation computers in 2013, stealing roughly 40 million credit cards, and then Home Depot computers in 2014, stealing between 53 and 56 million credit card numbers. Warnings were delivered at both corporations, but ignored; physical security breaches using self checkout machines are believed to have played a large role. "The malware utilized is absolutely unsophisticated and uninteresting," says Jim Walter, director of threat intelligence operations at security technology company McAfee – meaning that the heists could have easily been stopped by existing antivirus software had administrators responded to the warnings. The size of the thefts has resulted in major attention from state and Federal United States authorities and the investigation is ongoing.

Office of Personnel Management data breach

In April 2015, the Office of Personnel Management discovered it had been hacked more than a year earlier in a data breach, resulting in the theft of approximately 21.5 million personnel records handled by the office. The Office of Personnel Management hack has been described by federal officials as among the largest breaches of government data in the history of the United States. Data targeted in the breach included personally identifiable information such as Social Security Numbers, names, dates and places of birth, addresses, and fingerprints of current and former government employees as well as anyone who had undergone a government background check. It is believed the hack was perpetrated by Chinese hackers.

Ashley Madison breach

In July 2015, a hacker group known as "The Impact Team" successfully breached the extramarital relationship website Ashley Madison, created by Avid Life Media. The group claimed that they had taken not only company data but user data as well. After the breach, The Impact Team dumped emails from the company's CEO, to prove their point, and threatened to dump customer data unless the website was taken down permanently." When Avid Life Media did not take the site offline the group released two more compressed files, one 9.7GB and the second 20GB. After the second data dump, Avid Life Media CEO Noel Biderman resigned; but the website remained functioning.

Legal issues and global regulation

International legal issues of cyber attacks are complicated in nature. There is no global base of common rules to judge, and eventually punish, cyber crimes and cyber criminals - and where security firms or agencies do locate the cybercriminal behind the creation of a particular piece of malware or form of cyber attack, often the local authorities cannot take action due to lack of laws under which to prosecute. Proving attribution for cyber crimes and cyber attacks is also a major problem for all law enforcement agencies. "Computer viruses switch from one country to another, from one jurisdiction to another – moving around the world, using the fact that we don't have the capability to globally police operations like this. So the Internet is as if someone [had] given free plane tickets to all the online criminals of the world." The use of techniques such as dynamic DNS, fast flux and bullet proof servers add to the difficulty of investigation and enforcement.

Role of government

The role of the government is to make regulations to force companies and organizations to protect their systems, infrastructure and information from any cyberattacks, but also to protect its own national infrastructure such as the national power-grid.

Government's regulatory role in cyberspace is complicated. For some, cyberspace was seen virtual space that was to remain free of government intervention, as can be seen in many of today's libertarian blockchain and bitcoin discussions.

Many government officials and experts think that the government should do more and that there is a crucial need for improved regulation, mainly due to the failure of the private sector to solve efficiently the cybersecurity problem. R. Clarke said during a panel discussion at the RSA Security Conference in San Francisco, he believes that the "industry only responds when you threaten regulation. If the industry doesn't respond (to the threat), you have to follow through." On the other hand, executives from the private sector agree that improvements are necessary, but think that the government intervention would affect their ability to innovate efficiently. Daniel R. McCarthy analyzed this public-private partnership in cybersecurity and reflected on the role of cybersecurity in the broader constitution of political order.

International actions

Many different teams and organizations exist, including:

Europe

On 14 April 2016 the European Parliament and Council of the European Union adopted The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679. GDPR, which became enforceable beginning 25 May 2018, provides for data protection and privacy for all individuals within the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA). GDPR requires that business processes that handle personal data be built with data protection by design and by default. GDPR also requires that certain organizations appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO).

National actions

Computer emergency response teams

Most countries have their own computer emergency response team to protect network security.

Canada

Since 2010, Canada has had a Cyber Security Strategy. This functions as a counterpart document to the National Strategy and Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure. The strategy has three main pillars: securing government systems, securing vital private cyber systems, and helping Canadians to be secure online. There is also a Cyber Incident Management Framework to provide a coordinated response in the event of a cyber incident.

The Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre (CCIRC) is responsible for mitigating and responding to threats to Canada's critical infrastructure and cyber systems. It provides support to mitigate cyber threats, technical support to respond and recover from targeted cyber attacks, and provides online tools for members of Canada's critical infrastructure sectors. It posts regular cyber security bulletins and operates an online reporting tool where individuals and organizations can report a cyber incident.

To inform the general public on how to protect themselves online, Public Safety Canada has partnered with STOP.THINK.CONNECT, a coalition of non-profit, private sector, and government organizations, and launched the Cyber Security Cooperation Program. They also run the GetCyberSafe portal for Canadian citizens, and Cyber Security Awareness Month during October.

Public Safety Canada aims to begin an evaluation of Canada's Cyber Security Strategy in early 2015.

China

China's Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization (Chinese: 中央网络安全和信息化领导小组) was established on 27 February 2014. This Leading Small Group (LSG) of the Communist Party of China is headed by General Secretary Xi Jinping himself and is staffed with relevant Party and state decision-makers. The LSG was created to overcome the incoherent policies and overlapping responsibilities that characterized China's former cyberspace decision-making mechanisms. The LSG oversees policy-making in the economic, political, cultural, social and military fields as they relate to network security and IT strategy. This LSG also coordinates major policy initiatives in the international arena that promote norms and standards favored by the Chinese government and that emphasize the principle of national sovereignty in cyberspace.

Germany

Berlin starts National Cyber Defense Initiative: On 16 June 2011, the German Minister for Home Affairs, officially opened the new German NCAZ (National Center for Cyber Defense) Nationales Cyber-Abwehrzentrum located in Bonn. The NCAZ closely cooperates with BSI (Federal Office for Information Security) Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BKA (Federal Police Organisation) Bundeskriminalamt (Deutschland), BND (Federal Intelligence Service) Bundesnachrichtendienst, MAD (Military Intelligence Service) Amt für den Militärischen Abschirmdienst and other national organizations in Germany taking care of national security aspects. According to the Minister the primary task of the new organization founded on 23 February 2011, is to detect and prevent attacks against the national infrastructure and mentioned incidents like Stuxnet.

India

Some provisions for cyber security have been incorporated into rules framed under the Information Technology Act 2000.

The National Cyber Security Policy 2013 is a policy framework by Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) which aims to protect the public and private infrastructure from cyber attacks, and safeguard "information, such as personal information (of web users), financial and banking information and sovereign data". CERT- In is the nodal agency which monitors the cyber threats in the country. The post of National Cyber Security Coordinator has also been created in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO)

The Indian Companies Act 2013 has also introduced cyber law and cyber security obligations on the part of Indian directors. Some provisions for cyber security have been incorporated into rules framed under the Information Technology Act 2000 Update in 2013.

South Korea

Following cyber attacks in the first half of 2013, when the government, news media, television station, and bank websites were compromised, the national government committed to the training of 5,000 new cybersecurity experts by 2017. The South Korean government blamed its northern counterpart for these attacks, as well as incidents that occurred in 2009, 2011, and 2012, but Pyongyang denies the accusations.

United States

Legislation

The 1986 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is the key legislation. It prohibits unauthorized access or damage of "protected computers" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2). Although various other measures have been proposed – none has succeeded. 

In 2013, executive order 13636 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity was signed, which prompted the creation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Standardized Government Testing Services

The General Services Administration (GSA) has standardized the "penetration test" service as a pre-vetted support service, to rapidly address potential vulnerabilities, and stop adversaries before they impact US federal, state and local governments. These services are commonly referred to as Highly Adaptive Cybersecurity Services (HACS) and are listed at the US GSA Advantage website.

Agencies

The Department of Homeland Security has a dedicated division responsible for the response system, risk management program and requirements for cybersecurity in the United States called the National Cyber Security Division. The division is home to US-CERT operations and the National Cyber Alert System. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center brings together government organizations responsible for protecting computer networks and networked infrastructure.

The third priority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is to: "Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes", and they, along with the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) are part of the multi-agency task force, The Internet Crime Complaint Center, also known as IC3.

In addition to its own specific duties, the FBI participates alongside non-profit organizations such as InfraGard.

In the criminal division of the United States Department of Justice operates a section called the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section. The CCIPS is in charge of investigating computer crime and intellectual property crime and is specialized in the search and seizure of digital evidence in computers and networks. In 2017, CCIPS published A Framework for a Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Online Systems to help organizations "clearly describe authorized vulnerability disclosure and discovery conduct, thereby substantially reducing the likelihood that such described activities will result in a civil or criminal violation of law under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030)."

The United States Cyber Command, also known as USCYBERCOM, is tasked with the defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and ensures "the security, integrity, and governance of government and military IT infrastructure and assets" It has no role in the protection of civilian networks.

The U.S. Federal Communications Commission's role in cybersecurity is to strengthen the protection of critical communications infrastructure, to assist in maintaining the reliability of networks during disasters, to aid in swift recovery after, and to ensure that first responders have access to effective communications services.

The Food and Drug Administration has issued guidance for medical devices, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is concerned with automotive cybersecurity. After being criticized by the Government Accountability Office, and following successful attacks on airports and claimed attacks on airplanes, the Federal Aviation Administration has devoted funding to securing systems on board the planes of private manufacturers, and the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System. Concerns have also been raised about the future Next Generation Air Transportation System.

Computer emergency readiness team

"Computer emergency response team" is a name given to expert groups that handle computer security incidents. In the US, two distinct organization exist, although they do work closely together.

Modern warfare

There is growing concern that cyberspace will become the next theater of warfare. As Mark Clayton from the Christian Science Monitor described in an article titled "The New Cyber Arms Race":
In the future, wars will not just be fought by soldiers with guns or with planes that drop bombs. They will also be fought with the click of a mouse a half a world away that unleashes carefully weaponized computer programs that disrupt or destroy critical industries like utilities, transportation, communications, and energy. Such attacks could also disable military networks that control the movement of troops, the path of jet fighters, the command and control of warships.
This has led to new terms such as cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism. The United States Cyber Command was created in 2009 and many other countries have similar forces.

Careers

Cybersecurity is a fast-growing field of IT concerned with reducing organizations' risk of hack or data breach. According to research from the Enterprise Strategy Group, 46% of organizations say that they have a "problematic shortage" of cybersecurity skills in 2016, up from 28% in 2015. Commercial, government and non-governmental organizations all employ cybersecurity professionals. The fastest increases in demand for cybersecurity workers are in industries managing increasing volumes of consumer data such as finance, health care, and retail. However, the use of the term "cybersecurity" is more prevalent in government job descriptions.

Typical cyber security job titles and descriptions include:

Security analyst

Analyzes and assesses vulnerabilities in the infrastructure (software, hardware, networks), investigates using available tools and countermeasures to remedy the detected vulnerabilities, and recommends solutions and best practices. Analyzes and assesses damage to the data/infrastructure as a result of security incidents, examines available recovery tools and processes, and recommends solutions. Tests for compliance with security policies and procedures. May assist in the creation, implementation, or management of security solutions.

Security engineer

Performs security monitoring, security and data/logs analysis, and forensic analysis, to detect security incidents, and mounts the incident response. Investigates and utilizes new technologies and processes to enhance security capabilities and implement improvements. May also review code or perform other security engineering methodologies.

Security architect

Designs a security system or major components of a security system, and may head a security design team building a new security system.

Security administrator

Installs and manages organization-wide security systems. May also take on some of the tasks of a security analyst in smaller organizations.

Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)

A high-level management position responsible for the entire information security division/staff. The position may include hands-on technical work.

Chief Security Officer (CSO)

A high-level management position responsible for the entire security division/staff. A newer position now deemed needed as security risks grow.

Security Consultant/Specialist/Intelligence

Broad titles that encompass any one or all of the other roles or titles tasked with protecting computers, networks, software, data or information systems against viruses, worms, spyware, malware, intrusion detection, unauthorized access, denial-of-service attacks, and an ever increasing list of attacks by hackers acting as individuals or as part of organized crime or foreign governments.
Student programs are also available to people interested in beginning a career in cybersecurity. Meanwhile, a flexible and effective option for information security professionals of all experience levels to keep studying is online security training, including webcasts. A wide range of certified courses are also available.

In the United Kingdom, a nationwide set of cyber security forums, known as the U.K Cyber Security Forum, were established supported by the Government's cyber security strategy in order to encourage start-ups and innovation and to address the skills gap identified by the U.K Government.

Terminology

The following terms used with regards to computer security are explained below:
  • Access authorization restricts access to a computer to a group of users through the use of authentication systems. These systems can protect either the whole computer, such as through an interactive login screen, or individual services, such as a FTP server. There are many methods for identifying and authenticating users, such as passwords, identification cards, smart cards, and biometric systems.
  • Anti-virus software consists of computer programs that attempt to identify, thwart, and eliminate computer viruses and other malicious software (malware).
  • Applications are executable code, so general practice is to disallow users the power to install them; to install only those which are known to be reputable – and to reduce the attack surface by installing as few as possible. They are typically run with least privilege, with a robust process in place to identify, test and install any released security patches or updates for them.
  • Authentication techniques can be used to ensure that communication end-points are who they say they are.]
  • Automated theorem proving and other verification tools can enable critical algorithms and code used in secure systems to be mathematically proven to meet their specifications.
  • Backups are one or more copies kept of important computer files. Typically, multiple copies will be kept at different locations so that if a copy is stolen or damaged, other copies will still exist.
  • Capability and access control list techniques can be used to ensure privilege separation and mandatory access control. Capabilities vs. ACLs discusses their use.
  • Chain of trust techniques can be used to attempt to ensure that all software loaded has been certified as authentic by the system's designers.
  • Confidentiality is the nondisclosure of information except to another authorized person.
  • Cryptographic techniques can be used to defend data in transit between systems, reducing the probability that data exchanged between systems can be intercepted or modified.
  • Cyberwarfare is an internet-based conflict that involves politically motivated attacks on information and information systems. Such attacks can, for example, disable official websites and networks, disrupt or disable essential services, steal or alter classified data, and cripple financial systems.
  • Data integrity is the accuracy and consistency of stored data, indicated by an absence of any alteration in data between two updates of a data record.
Cryptographic techniques involve transforming information, scrambling it so it becomes unreadable during transmission. The intended recipient can unscramble the message; ideally, eavesdroppers cannot.
  • Encryption is used to protect the confidentiality of a message. Cryptographically secure ciphers are designed to make any practical attempt of breaking them infeasible. Symmetric-key ciphers are suitable for bulk encryption using shared keys, and public-key encryption using digital certificates can provide a practical solution for the problem of securely communicating when no key is shared in advance.
  • Endpoint security software aids networks in preventing malware infection and data theft at network entry points made vulnerable by the prevalence of potentially infected devices such as laptops, mobile devices, and USB drives.
  • Firewalls serve as a gatekeeper system between networks, allowing only traffic that matches defined rules. They often include detailed logging, and may include intrusion detection and intrusion prevention features. They are near-universal between company local area networks and the Internet, but can also be used internally to impose traffic rules between networks if network segmentation is configured.
  • A hacker is someone who seeks to breach defenses and exploit weaknesses in a computer system or network.
  • Honey pots are computers that are intentionally left vulnerable to attack by crackers. They can be used to catch crackers and to identify their techniques.
  • Intrusion-detection systems are devices or software applications that monitor networks or systems for malicious activity or policy violations.
  • A microkernel is an approach to operating system design which has only the near-minimum amount of code running at the most privileged level – and runs other elements of the operating system such as device drivers, protocol stacks and file systems, in the safer, less privileged user space.
  • Pinging. The standard "ping" application can be used to test if an IP address is in use. If it is, attackers may then try a port scan to detect which services are exposed.
  • A port scan is used to probe an IP address for open ports with the purpose of identifying accessible network services.
  • Social engineering is the use of deception to manipulate individuals to breach security.

IT risk

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Information technology risk, IT risk, IT-related risk, or cyber risk is any risk related to information technology. While information has long been appreciated as a valuable and important asset, the rise of the knowledge economy and the Digital Revolution has led to organizations becoming increasingly dependent on information, information processing and especially IT. Various events or incidents that compromise IT in some way can therefore cause adverse impacts on the organization's business processes or mission, ranging from inconsequential to catastrophic in scale.

Assessing the probability of likelihood of various types of event/incident with their predicted impacts or consequences should they occur is a common way to assess and measure IT risks. Alternative methods of measuring IT risk typically involve assessing other contributory factors such as the threats, vulnerabilities, exposures, and asset values.

Definitions

ISO

IT risk: the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization. It is measured in terms of a combination of the probability of occurrence of an event and its consequence.

Committee on National Security Systems

The Committee on National Security Systems of United States of America defined risk in different documents:
  • From CNSS Instruction No. 4009 dated 26 April 2010 the basic and more technical focused definition:
    Risk - Possibility that a particular threat will adversely impact an IS by exploiting a particular vulnerability.
  • National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Instruction (NSTISSI) No. 1000, introduces a probability aspect, quite similar to NIST SP 800-30 one:
    Risk - A combination of the likelihood that a threat will occur, the likelihood that a threat occurrence will result in an adverse impact, and the severity of the resulting impact
  • The loss potential that exists as the result of threat-vulnerability pairs. Reducing either the threat or the vulnerability reduces the risk.
  • The uncertainty of loss expressed in terms of probability of such loss.
  • The probability that a hostile entity will successfully exploit a particular telecommunications or COMSEC system for intelligence purposes; its factors are threat and vulnerability.
  • A combination of the likelihood that a threat shall occur, the likelihood that a threat occurrence shall result in an adverse impact, and the severity of the resulting adverse impact.
  • the probability that a particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability of the system.

NIST

Many NIST publications define risk in IT context in different publications: FISMApedia term provide a list. Between them:
  • According to NIST SP 800-30:
    Risk is a function of the likelihood of a given threat-source’s exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the resulting impact of that adverse event on the organization.
  • From NIST FIPS 200
    Risk - The level of impact on organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals resulting from the operation of an information system given the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of that threat occurring.
NIST SP 800-30 defines:
IT-related risk

The net mission impact considering:
  1. the probability that a particular threat-source will exercise (accidentally trigger or intentionally exploit) a particular information system vulnerability and
  2. the resulting impact if this should occur. IT-related risks arise from legal liability or mission loss due to:
    1. Unauthorized (malicious or accidental) disclosure, modification, or destruction of information
    2. Unintentional errors and omissions
    3. IT disruptions due to natural or man-made disasters
    4. Failure to exercise due care and diligence in the implementation and operation of the IT system.

Risk management insight

IT risk is the probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss.

ISACA

ISACA published the Risk IT Framework in order to provides an end-to-end, comprehensive view of all risks related to the use of IT. There, IT risk is defined as:
The business risk associated with the use, ownership, operation, involvement, influence and adoption of IT within an enterprise
According to Risk IT, IT risk has a broader meaning: it encompasses not just only the negative impact of operations and service delivery which can bring destruction or reduction of the value of the organization, but also the benefit\value enabling risk associated to missing opportunities to use technology to enable or enhance business or the IT project management for aspects like overspending or late delivery with adverse business impact

Measuring IT risk

You can't effectively and consistently manage what you can't measure, and you can't measure what you haven't defined.
Measuring IT risk (or cyber risk) can occur at many levels. At a business level the risks are managed categorically. Front line IT departments and NOC's tend to measure more discreet, individual risks. Managing the nexus between them is a key role for modern CISO's. 

When measuring risk of any kind, selecting the correct equation for a given threat, asset, and available data is an important step. Doing so is subject unto itself, but there are common components of risk equations that are helpful to understand.
There are four fundamental forces involved in risk management, which also apply to cybersecurity. They are assets, impact, threats, and likelihood. You have internal knowledge of and a fair amount of control over assets, which are tangible and intangible things that have value. You also have some control over impact, which refers to loss of, or damage to, an asset. However, threats that represent adversaries and their methods of attack are external to your control. Likelihood is the wild card in the bunch. Likelihoods determine if and when a threat will materialize, succeed, and do damage. While never fully under your control, likelihoods can be shaped and influenced to manage the risk.
Mathematically, the forces can be represented in a formula such as: where p() is the likelihood that a Threat will materialize/succeed against an Asset, and d() is the likelihood of various levels of damage that may occur.
The field of IT risk management has spawned a number of terms and techniques which are unique to the industry. Some industry terms have yet to be reconciled. For example, the term vulnerability is often used interchangeably with likelihood of occurrence, which can be problematic. Oft encountered IT risk management terms and techniques include:
Information security event
 
An identified occurrence of a system, service or network state indicating a possible breach of information security policy or failure of safeguards, or a previously unknown situation that may be security relevant.
Occurrence of a particular set of circumstances
  • The event can be certain or uncertain.
  • The event can be a single occurrence or a series of occurrences. :(ISO/IEC Guide 73)
Information security incident

is indicated by a single or a series of unwanted information security events that have a significant probability of compromising business operations and threatening information security
An event [G.11] that has been assessed as having an actual or potentially adverse effect on the security or performance of a system.
 
Impact
 
The result of an unwanted incident [G.17].(ISO/IEC PDTR 13335-1)
 
Consequence
 
Outcome of an event [G.11]
  • There can be more than one consequence from one event.
  • Consequences can range from positive to negative.
  • Consequences can be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively (ISO/IEC Guide 73)
The risk R is the product of the likelihood L of a security incident occurring times the impact I that will be incurred to the organization due to the incident, that is:
R = L × I
The likelihood of a security incident occurrence is a function of the likelihood that a threat appears and the likelihood that the threat can successfully exploit the relevant system vulnerabilities.

The consequence of the occurrence of a security incident are a function of likely impact that the incident will have on the organization as a result of the harm the organization assets will sustain. Harm is related to the value of the assets to the organization; the same asset can have different values to different organizations.

So R can be function of four factors:
  1. A = Value of the assets
  2. T = the likelihood of the threat
  3. V = the nature of vulnerability i.e. the likelihood that can be exploited (proportional to the potential benefit for the attacker and inversely proportional to the cost of exploitation)
  4. I = the likely impact, the extent of the harm
If numerical values (money for impact and probabilities for the other factors), the risk can be expressed in monetary terms and compared to the cost of countermeasures and the residual risk after applying the security control. It is not always practical to express this values, so in the first step of risk evaluation, risk are graded dimensionless in three or five steps scales.

OWASP proposes a practical risk measurement guideline based on:
  • Estimation of Likelihood as a mean between different factors in a 0 to 9 scale:
    • Threat agent factors
      • Skill level: How technically skilled is this group of threat agents? No technical skills (1), some technical skills (3), advanced computer user (4), network and programming skills (6), security penetration skills (9)
      • Motive: How motivated is this group of threat agents to find and exploit this vulnerability? Low or no reward (1), possible reward (4), high reward (9)
      • Opportunity: What resources and opportunity are required for this group of threat agents to find and exploit this vulnerability? full access or expensive resources required (0), special access or resources required (4), some access or resources required (7), no access or resources required (9)
      • Size: How large is this group of threat agents? Developers (2), system administrators (2), intranet users (4), partners (5), authenticated users (6), anonymous Internet users (9)
    • Vulnerability Factors: the next set of factors are related to the vulnerability involved. The goal here is to estimate the likelihood of the particular vulnerability involved being discovered and exploited. Assume the threat agent selected above.
      • Ease of discovery: How easy is it for this group of threat agents to discover this vulnerability? Practically impossible (1), difficult (3), easy (7), automated tools available (9)
      • Ease of exploit: How easy is it for this group of threat agents to actually exploit this vulnerability? Theoretical (1), difficult (3), easy (5), automated tools available (9)
      • Awareness: How well known is this vulnerability to this group of threat agents? Unknown (1), hidden (4), obvious (6), public knowledge (9)
      • Intrusion detection: How likely is an exploit to be detected? Active detection in application (1), logged and reviewed (3), logged without review (8), not logged (9)
  • Estimation of Impact as a mean between different factors in a 0 to 9 scale
    • Technical Impact Factors: technical impact can be broken down into factors aligned with the traditional security areas of concern: confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability. The goal is to estimate the magnitude of the impact on the system if the vulnerability were to be exploited.
      • Loss of confidentiality: How much data could be disclosed and how sensitive is it? Minimal non-sensitive data disclosed (2), minimal critical data disclosed (6), extensive non-sensitive data disclosed (6), extensive critical data disclosed (7), all data disclosed (9)
      • Loss of integrity: How much data could be corrupted and how damaged is it? Minimal slightly corrupt data (1), minimal seriously corrupt data (3), extensive slightly corrupt data (5), extensive seriously corrupt data (7), all data totally corrupt (9)
      • Loss of availability: How much service could be lost and how vital is it? Minimal secondary services interrupted (1), minimal primary services interrupted (5), extensive secondary services interrupted (5), extensive primary services interrupted (7), all services completely lost (9)
      • Loss of accountability: Are the threat agents' actions traceable to an individual? Fully traceable (1), possibly traceable (7), completely anonymous (9)
    • Business Impact Factors: The business impact stems from the technical impact, but requires a deep understanding of what is important to the company running the application. In general, you should be aiming to support your risks with business impact, particularly if your audience is executive level. The business risk is what justifies investment in fixing security problems.
      • Financial damage: How much financial damage will result from an exploit? Less than the cost to fix the vulnerability (1), minor effect on annual profit (3), significant effect on annual profit (7), bankruptcy (9)
      • Reputation damage: Would an exploit result in reputation damage that would harm the business? Minimal damage (1), Loss of major accounts (4), loss of goodwill (5), brand damage (9)
      • Non-compliance: How much exposure does non-compliance introduce? Minor violation (2), clear violation (5), high-profile violation (7)
      • Privacy violation: How much personally identifiable information could be disclosed? One individual (3), hundreds of people (5), thousands of people (7), millions of people (9)
    • If the business impact is calculated accurately use it in the following otherwise use the Technical impact
  • Rate likelihood and impact in a LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH scale assuming that less than 3 is LOW, 3 to less than 6 is MEDIUM, and 6 to 9 is HIGH.
Calculate the risk using the following table:
 
Overall Risk Severity
Impact HIGH Medium High Critical
MEDIUM Low Medium High
LOW None Low Medium
  LOW MEDIUM HIGH
  Likelihood

IT risk management

Risk Management Elements

IT risk management can be considered a component of a wider enterprise risk management system.

The establishment, maintenance and continuous update of an Information security management system (ISMS) provide a strong indication that a company is using a systematic approach for the identification, assessment and management of information security risks.

Different methodologies have been proposed to manage IT risks, each of them divided into processes and steps.

The Certified Information Systems Auditor Review Manual 2006 produced by ISACA, an international professional association focused on IT Governance, provides the following definition of risk management:
Risk management is the process of identifying vulnerabilities and threats to the information resources used by an organization in achieving business objectives, and deciding what countermeasures, if any, to take in reducing risk to an acceptable level, based on the value of the information resource to the organization.
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework encourages organizations to manage IT risk as part the Identify (ID) function:

Risk Assessment (ID.RA): The organization understands the cybersecurity risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, and individuals.
  • ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented
  • ID.RA-2: Cyber threat intelligence and vulnerability information is received from information sharing forums and source
  • ID.RA-3: Threats, both internal and external, are identified and documented
  • ID.RA-4: Potential business impacts and likelihoods are identified
  • ID.RA-5: Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are used to determine risk
  • ID.RA-6: Risk responses are identified and prioritized
Risk Management Strategy (ID.RM): The organization’s priorities, constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions are established and used to support operational risk decisions.
  • ID.RM-1: Risk management processes are established, managed, and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
  • ID.RM-2: Organizational risk tolerance is determined and clearly expressed
  • ID.RM-3: The organization’s determination of risk tolerance is informed by its role in critical infrastructure and sector specific risk analysis

IT risk laws and regulations

In the following a brief description of applicable rules organized by source.

OECD

OECD issued the following:

European Union

The European Union issued the following, divided by topic:
  • Privacy
    • Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data provide an internal regulation which is a practical application of the principles of the Privacy Directive described below. Furthermore, article 35 of the Regulation requires the Community institutions and bodies to take similar precautions with regard to their telecommunications infrastructure, and to properly inform the users of any specific risks of security breaches.
    • Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data require that any personal data processing activity undergoes a prior risk analysis in order to determine the privacy implications of the activity, and to determine the appropriate legal, technical and organization measures to protect such activities;is effectively protected by such measures, which must be state of the art keeping into account the sensitivity and privacy implications of the activity (including when a third party is charged with the processing task) is notified to a national data protection authority, including the measures taken to ensure the security of the activity. Furthermore, article 25 and following of the Directive requires Member States to ban the transfer of personal data to non-Member States, unless such countries have provided adequate legal protection for such personal data, or barring certain other exceptions.
    • Commission Decision 2001/497/EC of 15 June 2001 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC; and Commission Decision 2004/915/EC of 27 December 2004 amending Decision 2001/497/EC as regards the introduction of an alternative set of standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries. Topic: Export of personal data to third countries, specifically non-E.U. countries which have not been recognized as having a data protection level that is adequate (i.e. equivalent to that of the E.U.). Both Commission Decisions provide a set of voluntary model clauses which can be used to export personal data from a data controller (who is subject to E.U. data protection rules) to a data processor outside the E.U. who is not subject to these rules or to a similar set of adequate rules.
    • International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (see below USA and International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles )
    • Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector
  • National Security
    • Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (‘Data Retention Directive’). Topic: Requirement for the providers of public electronic telecommunications service providers to retain certain information for the purposes of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime
    • Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. Topic: Identification and protection of European Critical Infrastructures. Scope: Applicable to Member States and to the operators of European Critical Infrastructure (defined by the draft directive as ‘critical infrastructures the disruption or destruction of which would significantly affect two or more Member States, or a single Member State if the critical infrastructure is located in another Member State. This includes effects resulting from cross-sector dependencies on other types of infrastructure’). Requires Member States to identify critical infrastructures on their territories, and to designate them as ECIs. Following this designation, the owners/operators of ECIs are required to create Operator Security Plans (OSPs), which should establish relevant security solutions for their protection
  • Civil and Penal law
    • Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems. Topic: General decision aiming to harmonise national provisions in the field of cyber crime, encompassing material criminal law (i.e. definitions of specific crimes), procedural criminal law (including investigative measures and international cooperation) and liability issues. Scope: Requires Member States to implement the provisions of the Framework Decision in their national legal frameworks. Framework decision is relevant to RM/RA because it contains the conditions under which legal liability can be imposed on legal entities for conduct of certain natural persons of authority within the legal entity. Thus, the Framework decision requires that the conduct of such figures within an organization is adequately monitored, also because the Decision states that a legal entity can be held liable for acts of omission in this regard.

Council of Europe

  • Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest, 23.XI.2001, European Treaty Series-No. 185. Topic: General treaty aiming to harmonize national provisions in the field of cyber crime, encompassing material criminal law (i.e. definitions of specific crimes), procedural criminal law (including investigative measures and international cooperation), liability issues and data retention. Apart from the definitions of a series of criminal offenses in articles 2 to 10, the Convention is relevant to RM/RA because it states the conditions under which legal liability can be imposed on legal entities for conduct of certain natural persons of authority within the legal entity. Thus, the Convention requires that the conduct of such figures within an organization is adequately monitored, also because the Convention states that a legal entity can be held liable for acts of omission in this regard.

USA

United States issued the following, divided by topic:
  • Civil and Penal law
    • Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to electronic discovery. Topic: U.S. Federal rules with regard to the production of electronic documents in civil proceedings. The discovery rules allow a party in civil proceedings to demand that the opposing party produce all relevant documentation (to be defined by the requesting party) in its possession, so as to allow the parties and the court to correctly assess the matter. Through the e-discovery amendment, which entered into force on 1 December 2006, such information may now include electronic information. This implies that any party being brought before a U.S. court in civil proceedings can be asked to produce such documents, which includes finalized reports, working documents, internal memos and e-mails with regard to a specific subject, which may or may not be specifically delineated. Any party whose activities imply a risk of being involved in such proceedings must therefore take adequate precautions for the management of such information, including the secure storage. Specifically: The party must be capable of initiating a ‘litigation hold’, a technical/organizational measure which must ensure that no relevant information can be modified any longer in any way. Storage policies must be responsible: while deletion of specific information of course remains allowed when this is a part of general information management policies (‘routine, good-faith operation of the information system’, Rule 37 (f)), the wilful destruction of potentially relevant information can be punished by extremely high fines (in one specific case of 1.6 billion US$). Thus, in practice, any businesses who risk civil litigation before U.S. courts must implement adequate information management policies, and must implement the necessary measures to initiate a litigation hold.
  • Privacy
    • Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA)
    • USA PATRIOT Act, Title III
    • Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) From an RM/RA perspective, the Act is particularly known for its provisions with regard to Administrative Simplification (Title II of HIPAA). This title required the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to draft specific rule sets, each of which would provide specific standards which would improve the efficiency of the health care system and prevent abuse. As a result, the HHS has adopted five principal rules: the Privacy Rule, the Transactions and Code Sets Rule, the Unique Identifiers Rule, the Enforcement Rule, and the Security Rule. The latter, published in the Federal Register on 20 February 2003 (see: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/SecurityStandard/Downloads/securityfinalrule.pdf), is specifically relevant, as it specifies a series of administrative, technical, and physical security procedures to assure the confidentiality of electronic protected health information. These aspects have been further outlined in a set of Security Standards on Administrative, Physical, Organizational and Technical Safeguards, all of which have been published, along with a guidance document on the basics of HIPAA risk management and risk assessment <http://www.cms.hhs.gov/EducationMaterials/04_SecurityMaterials.asp>. European or other countries health care service providers will generally not be affected by HIPAA obligations if they are not active on the U.S. market. However, since their data processing activities are subject to similar obligations under general European law (including the Privacy Directive), and since the underlying trends of modernization and evolution towards electronic health files are the same, the HHS safeguards can be useful as an initial yardstick for measuring RM/RA strategies put in place by European health care service providers, specifically with regard to the processing of electronic health information. HIPAA security standards include the following:
      • Administrative safeguards:
        • Security Management Process
        • Assigned Security Responsibility
        • Workforce Security
        • Information Access Management
        • Security Awareness and Training
        • Security Incident Procedures
        • Contingency Plan
        • Evaluation
        • Business Associate Contracts and Other Arrangements
      • Physical safeguards
        • Facility Access Controls
        • Workstation Use
        • Workstation Security
        • Device and Media Controls
      • Technical safeguards
        • Access Control
        • Audit Controls
        • Integrity
        • Person or Entity Authentication
        • Transmission Security
      • Organisational requirements
        • Business Associate Contracts & Other Arrangements
        • Requirements for Group Health Plans
    • International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles issued by the US Department of Commerce on July 21, 2000 Export of personal data from a data controller who is subject to E.U. privacy regulations to a U.S. based destination; before personal data may be exported from an entity subject to E.U. privacy regulations to a destination subject to U.S. law, the European entity must ensure that the receiving entity provides adequate safeguards to protect such data against a number of mishaps. One way of complying with this obligation is to require the receiving entity to join the Safe Harbor, by requiring that the entity self-certifies its compliance with the so-called Safe Harbor Principles. If this road is chosen, the data controller exporting the data must verify that the U.S. destination is indeed on the Safe Harbor list
  • Sarbanes–Oxley Act
  • FISMA

Standards organizations and standards

Short description of standards

The list is chiefly based on:

ISO

  • ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004 - Information technology—Security techniques—Management of information and communications technology security—Part 1: Concepts and models for information and communications technology security management http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=39066. Standard containing generally accepted descriptions of concepts and models for information and communications technology security management. The standard is a commonly used code of practice, and serves as a resource for the implementation of security management practices and as a yardstick for auditing such practices.
  • ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2005 – Information technology—Security techniques—A framework for IT security assurance reference:http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=39733 (Note: this is a reference to the ISO page where the standard can be acquired. However, the standard is not free of charge, and its provisions are not publicly available. For this reason, specific provisions cannot be quoted). Topic: Security assurance – the Technical Report (TR) contains generally accepted guidelines which can be used to determine an appropriate assurance method for assessing a security service, product or environmental factor
  • ISO/IEC 15816:2002 - Information technology—Security techniques—Security information objects for access control reference:http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=29139 (Note: this is a reference to the ISO page where the standard can be acquired. However, the standard is not free of charge, and its provisions are not publicly available. For this reason, specific provisions cannot be quoted). Topic: Security management – Access control. The standard allows security professionals to rely on a specific set of syntactic definitions and explanations with regard to SIOs, thus avoiding duplication or divergence in other standardization efforts.
  • ISO/IEC TR 15947:2002 - Information technology—Security techniques—IT intrusion detection framework reference:http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=29580 (Note: this is a reference to the ISO page where the standard can be acquired. However, the standard is not free of charge, and its provisions are not publicly available. For this reason, specific provisions cannot be quoted). Topic: Security management – Intrusion detection in IT systems. The standard allows security professionals to rely on a specific set of concepts and methodologies for describing and assessing security risks with regard to potential intrusions in IT systems. It does not contain any RM/RA obligations as such, but it is rather a tool for facilitating RM/RA activities in the affected field.
  • ISO/IEC 15408-1/2/3:2005 - Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 1: Introduction and general model (15408-1) Part 2: Security functional requirements (15408-2) Part 3: Security assurance requirements (15408-3) reference: http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2489/Ittf_Home/PubliclyAvailableStandards.htm Topic: Standard containing a common set of requirements for the security functions of IT products and systems and for assurance measures applied to them during a security evaluation. Scope: Publicly available ISO standard, which can be voluntarily implemented. The text is a resource for the evaluation of the security of IT products and systems, and can thus be used as a tool for RM/RA. The standard is commonly used as a resource for the evaluation of the security of IT products and systems; including (if not specifically) for procurement decisions with regard to such products. The standard can thus be used as an RM/RA tool to determine the security of an IT product or system during its design, manufacturing or marketing, or before procuring it.
  • ISO/IEC 17799:2005 - Information technology—Security techniques—Code of practice for information security management. reference: http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=39612&ICS1=35&ICS2=40&ICS3= (Note: this is a reference to the ISO page where the standard can be acquired. However, the standard is not free of charge, and its provisions are not publicly available. For this reason, specific provisions cannot be quoted). Topic: Standard containing generally accepted guidelines and general principles for initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management in an organization, including business continuity management. The standard is a commonly used code of practice, and serves as a resource for the implementation of information security management practices and as a yardstick for auditing such practices. (See also ISO/IEC 17799)
  • ISO/IEC TR 15446:2004 – Information technology—Security techniques—Guide for the production of Protection Profiles and Security Targets. reference: http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2489/Ittf_Home/PubliclyAvailableStandards.htm Topic: Technical Report (TR) containing guidelines for the construction of Protection Profiles (PPs) and Security Targets (STs) that are intended to be compliant with ISO/IEC 15408 (the "Common Criteria"). The standard is predominantly used as a tool for security professionals to develop PPs and STs, but can also be used to assess the validity of the same (by using the TR as a yardstick to determine if its standards have been obeyed). Thus, it is a (nonbinding) normative tool for the creation and assessment of RM/RA practices.
  • ISO/IEC 18028:2006 - Information technology—Security techniques—IT network security reference: http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=40008 (Note: this is a reference to the ISO page where the standard can be acquired. However, the standard is not free of charge, and its provisions are not publicly available. For this reason, specific provisions cannot be quoted). Topic: Five part standard (ISO/IEC 18028-1 to 18028-5) containing generally accepted guidelines on the security aspects of the management, operation and use of information technology networks. The standard is considered an extension of the guidelines provided in ISO/IEC 13335 and ISO/IEC 17799 focusing specifically on network security risks. The standard is a commonly used code of practice, and serves as a resource for the implementation of security management practices and as a yardstick for auditing such practices.
  • ISO/IEC 27001:2005 - Information technology—Security techniques—Information security management systems—Requirements reference: http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=42103 (Note: this is a reference to the ISO page where the standard can be acquired. However, the standard is not free of charge, and its provisions are not publicly available. For this reason, specific provisions cannot be quoted). Topic: Standard containing generally accepted guidelines for the implementation of an Information Security Management System within any given organization. Scope: Not publicly available ISO standard, which can be voluntarily implemented. While not legally binding, the text contains direct guidelines for the creation of sound information security practices The standard is a very commonly used code of practice, and serves as a resource for the implementation of information security management systems and as a yardstick for auditing such systems and/or the surrounding practices. Its application in practice is often combined with related standards, such as BS 7799-3:2006 which provides additional guidance to support the requirements given in ISO/IEC 27001:2005 <http://www.bsiglobal.com/en/Shop/Publication-Detail/?pid=000000000030125022&recid=2491>
  • ISO/IEC 27001:2013, the updated standard for information security management systems.
  • ISO/IEC TR 18044:2004 – Information technology—Security techniques—Information security incident management reference: http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=35396 (Note: this is a reference to the ISO page where the standard can be acquired. However, the standard is not free of charge, and its provisions are not publicly available. For this reason, specific provisions cannot be quoted). Topic: Technical Report (TR) containing generally accepted guidelines and general principles for information security incident management in an organization.Scope: Not publicly available ISO TR, which can be voluntarily used.While not legally binding, the text contains direct guidelines for incident management. The standard is a high level resource introducing basic concepts and considerations in the field of incident response. As such, it is mostly useful as a catalyst to awareness raising initiatives in this regard.
  • ISO/IEC 18045:2005 - Information technology—Security techniques—Methodology for IT security evaluation reference: http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2489/Ittf_Home/PubliclyAvailableStandards.htm Topic: Standard containing auditing guidelines for assessment of compliance with ISO/IEC 15408 (Information technology—Security techniques—Evaluation criteria for IT security) Scope Publicly available ISO standard, to be followed when evaluating compliance with ISO/IEC 15408 (Information technology—Security techniques—Evaluation criteria for IT security). The standard is a ‘companion document’, which is thus primarily of used for security professionals involved in evaluating compliance with ISO/IEC 15408 (Information technology—Security techniques—Evaluation criteria for IT security). Since it describes minimum actions to be performed by such auditors, compliance with ISO/IEC 15408 is impossible if ISO/IEC 18045 has been disregarded.
  • ISO/TR 13569:2005 - Financial services—Information security guidelines reference: http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=37245 (Note: this is a reference to the ISO page where the standard can be acquired. However, the standard is not free of charge, and its provisions are not publicly available. For this reason, specific provisions cannot be quoted). Topic: Standard containing guidelines for the implementation and assessment of information security policies in financial services institutions. The standard is a commonly referenced guideline, and serves as a resource for the implementation of information security management programs in institutions of the financial sector, and as a yardstick for auditing such programs. (See also http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/secpubs/otherpubs/reviso-faq.pdf)
  • ISO/IEC 21827:2008 - Information technology—Security techniques—Systems Security Engineering—Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM): ISO/IEC 21827:2008 specifies the Systems Security Engineering - Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), which describes the essential characteristics of an organization's security engineering process that must exist to ensure good security engineering. ISO/IEC 21827:2008 does not prescribe a particular process or sequence, but captures practices generally observed in industry. The model is a standard metric for security engineering practices.

BSI

  • BS 25999-1:2006 - Business continuity management Part 1: Code of practice Note: this is only part one of BS 25999, which was published in November 2006. Part two (which should contain more specific criteria with a view of possible accreditation) is yet to appear. reference: http://www.bsi-global.com/en/Shop/Publication-Detail/?pid=000000000030157563. Topic: Standard containing a business continuity code of practice. The standard is intended as a code of practice for business continuity management, and will be extended by a second part that should permit accreditation for adherence with the standard. Given its relative newness, the potential impact of the standard is difficult to assess, although it could be very influential to RM/RA practices, given the general lack of universally applicable standards in this regard and the increasing attention to business continuity and contingency planning in regulatory initiatives. Application of this standard can be complemented by other norms, in particular PAS 77:2006 - IT Service Continuity Management Code of Practice <http://www.bsi-global.com/en/Shop/Publication-Detail/?pid=000000000030141858>.The TR allows security professionals to determine a suitable methodology for assessing a security service, product or environmental factor (a deliverable). Following this TR, it can be determined which level of security assurance a deliverable is intended to meet, and if this threshold is actually met by the deliverable.
  • BS 7799-3:2006 - Information security management systems—Guidelines for information security risk management reference: http://www.bsi-global.com/en/Shop/Publication-Detail/?pid=000000000030125022&recid=2491 (Note: this is a reference to the BSI page where the standard can be acquired. However, the standard is not free of charge, and its provisions are not publicly available. For this reason, specific provisions cannot be quoted). Topic: Standard containing general guidelines for information security risk management.Scope: Not publicly available BSI standard, which can be voluntarily implemented. While not legally binding, the text contains direct guidelines for the creation of sound information security practices. The standard is mostly intended as a guiding complementary document to the application of the aforementioned ISO 27001:2005, and is therefore typically applied in conjunction with this standard in risk assessment practices

Bayesian inference

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference Bayesian inference ( / ...