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Tuesday, October 4, 2022

Dictatorship

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A dictatorship is a form of government characterized by an unelected leader or group of leaders that hold government power with few to no limitations. The leader of a dictatorship is called a dictator. Politics in a dictatorship take place between the dictator, the inner circle, and the opposition, which may be peaceful or violent. Dictatorships can be formed by a military coup that overthrows the previous government through force or by a self-coup in which elected leaders make their rule permanent. Dictatorships can be classified as military dictatorships, one-party dictatorships, personalist dictatorships, or absolute monarchies.

The term dictatorship originates from its use in Roman Republic. Early military dictatorships developed in the post-classical era, particularly in Shogun-era Japan. Modern dictatorships developed in the 19th century as caudillos seized power in Latin America. Fascist states and Communist states emerged in Europe the 1920s and 1930s. Fascism was eradicated in the aftermath of World War II, while Communism spread to other continents. Personalist dictatorships in Africa and military dictatorships in Latin America became prominent in the 1960s and 1970s. Many dictatorships fell during the end of the Cold War and the third wave of democratisation. Many dictatorships still exist, particularly in Africa and Asia.

Dictatorships often hold elections to establish legitimacy or to provide incentives for members of the ruling party, but these elections are not competitive for the opposition. Stability in a dictatorship is maintained through coercion, which involves the restriction of information, tracking of political opposition, and acts of violence. Strong opposition groups can result in the collapse of a dictatorship through a coup or a revolution.

Etymology

The word dictator comes from the Latin language word dictātor, agent noun from dictare (dictāt-, past participial stem of dictāre dictate v. + -or -or suffix). In Latin use, a dictator was a judge in the Roman Republic temporarily invested with absolute power. Typically, in a dictatorial regime, the leader of the country is identified with the title of dictator; although, their formal title may more closely resemble something similar to leader.

Structure

The leader of a dictatorship is called a dictator. The power structures of dictatorships vary, and different definitions of dictatorship consider different elements of this structure. Political scientists such as Juan José Linz and Samuel P. Huntington identify key attributes that define the power structure of a dictatorship, including a single leader or a small group of leaders, the exercise of power with few limitations, limited political pluralism, and limited mass mobilization. Dictatorship may also be defined as a lack of democracy.

The dictator exercises broad power over the government and society, but other individuals are necessary to carry out the dictator's rule. These individuals form an inner circle, making up a class of elites that hold a degree of power within the dictatorship and receive benefits in exchange for their support. They may be military officers, party members, or friends and family of the dictator. Elites are also the primary political threats of a dictator, as they can leverage their power to influence or overthrow the dictatorship. The inner circle's support is necessary for a dictator's orders to be carried out, causing elites to serve as a check on the dictator's power. To enact policy, a dictator must either appease the regime's elites or attempt to replace them. Elites must also compete to wield more power than one another, but the amount of power held by elites also depends on their unity. Factions or divisions among the elites will mitigate their ability to bargain with the dictator, resulting in the dictator having more unrestrained power. A unified inner circle has the capacity to overthrow a dictator, and the dictator must make greater concessions to the inner circle to stay in power. This is particularly true when the inner circle is made up of military officers that have the resources to carry out a military coup.

The opposition to a dictatorship represents all of the factions that are not part of the dictatorship and anyone that does not support the regime. Organized opposition is a threat to the stability of a dictatorship, as it seeks to undermine public support for the dictator and calls for regime change. A dictator may address the opposition by repressing it through force, modifying laws to restrict its power, or appeasing it with limited benefits. The opposition can be an external group, or it can also include current and former members of the dictator's inner circle.

Totalitarianism is a variation of dictatorship characterized by the presence of a single political party and more specifically, by a powerful leader who imposes personal and political prominence. Power is enforced through a steadfast collaboration between the government and a highly developed ideology. A totalitarian government has "total control of mass communications and social and economic organizations". Political philosopher Hannah Arendt describes totalitarianism as a new and extreme form of dictatorship composed of "atomized, isolated individuals" in which ideology plays a leading role in defining how the entire society should be organized. According to Linz, the distinction between an authoritarian regime and a totalitarian one is that an authoritarian regime seeks to suffocate politics and political mobilization while totalitarianism seeks to control and utilize them.

Formation

SEATO leaders, including dictators Nguyen Cao Ky from South Vietnam (first from left), Park Chung-Hee from South Korea (third from left), Ferdinand Marcos from the Philippines (fourth from the left), and Thanom Kittikachorn from Thailand (second from the right)

A dictatorship is formed when a specific group seizes power. The composition of this group affects how power is seized and how the eventual dictatorship will rule. The seizure group may be military or political, it may be organized or disorganized, and it may disproportionately represent a certain demographic. After power is seized, the group must determine what positions its members will hold in the new government and how this government will operate, sometimes resulting in disagreements that split the group. Members of the group will typically make up the elites in a dictator's inner circle at the beginning of a new dictatorship, though the dictator may remove them as a means to gain additional power. Unless they have undertaken a self-coup, seizure groups typically have little governmental experience and do not have a detailed policy plan before taking power. After a dictator seizes power, a political party may be formed to create a mechanism to reward supporters and to concentrate power in the hands of allies instead of armed supporters.

Most dictatorships are formed through military means or through a political party. Nearly half of dictatorships start as a military coup, though others have been started by foreign intervention, elected officials ending competitive elections, insurgent takeovers, popular uprisings by citizens, or a rule-change by autocratic elites to take power within their government. Between 1946 and 2010, 42% of dictatorships began by overthrowing a different dictatorship, and 26% began by declaring independence from a foreign government.

Several theories exist as to why dictatorships form. Mancur Olson suggests that dictatorships are an alternative to "roving bandits"; rather than moving from place to place and extracting wealth, dictators can monopolize banditry in one place while providing an illusion of security to increase productivity. Peter Alter suggests a value system perspective based on cultural & political nation, national consciousness, and nation-building.

Types

Political scientist Barbara Geddes describes three types of dictatorship. Military dictatorships are controlled by military officers, single-party dictatorships are controlled by the members of a political party, and personalist dictatorships are controlled by a single individual. Monarchies are also considered dictatorships in some circumstances if they hold significant political power. Hybrid dictatorships are regimes that have a combination of these classifications. Dictatorships can also be defined by the degree of authoritarianism, the use of loyalty or repression, how they interact with the organization that brought them to power.

Military dictatorships

Thailand's Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha in 2014

Military dictatorships are regimes in which one or more military officers holds power, determines who will lead the country, and exercises influence over policy. They are most common in developing nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. They are often unstable, and the average duration of a military dictatorship is only five years, but they are often followed by additional military coups and military dictatorships. While common in the 20th century, the prominence of military dictatorships declined in the 1970s and 1980s.

Military dictatorships are typically formed by a military coup in which one or more senior officers uses the military to overthrow the government. In democracies, the threat of a military coup is associated with the period immediately after a democracy's creation but prior to large-scale military reforms. In oligarchies, the threat of a military coup comes from the strength of the military weighed against the concessions made to the military. Other factors associated with military coups include extensive natural resources, limited use of the military internationally, and use of the military as an oppressive force domestically. Military coups do not necessarily result in military dictatorships, as power may then be passed to an individual or the military may allow democratic elections to take place. Military dictatorships in the past have been significantly more common in Latin America.

Military dictatorships often have traits in common due to the shared background of military dictators. These dictators may view themselves as impartial in their oversight of a country due to their nonpartisan status, and they may view themselves as "guardians of the state". The predominance of violent force in military training manifests in an acceptance of violence as a political tool and the ability to organize violence on a large scale. Military dictators may also be less trusting or diplomatic and underestimate the use of bargaining and compromise in politics.

One-party dictatorships

One-party dictatorships are governments in which a single political party dominates politics. Single-party dictatorships are one-party states in which only the party in power is legalized and all opposition parties are banned. Dominant-party dictatorships or electoral authoritarian dictatorships are one-party states in which opposition parties are nominally legal but cannot meaningfully influence government. Single-party dictatorships were more common during the Cold War, but dominant-party dictatorships replaced them after the fall of the Soviet Union. One-party dictatorships are distinct from political parties that were created to serve a dictator; the ruling party in a one-party dictatorship permeates every level of society. One-party dictatorships became prominent in Asia and Eastern Europe during the Cold War as Communist governments were installed in several countries.

One-party dictatorships are more stable than other forms of authoritarian rule, as they are less susceptible to insurgency and see higher economic growth. Ruling parties allow a dictatorship to more broadly influence the populace and facilitate political agreement between party elites. Between 1950 and 2016, one-party dictatorships made up 57% of authoritarian regimes in the world. Due to the structure of their leadership, one-party dictatorships are significantly less likely to face civil conflict, insurgency, or terrorism than other forms of dictatorship. The use of ruling parties also provides more legitimacy to its leadership and elites than other forms of dictatorship.

A ruling party in a one-party dictatorship may rule under any ideology or it may have no guiding ideology. One-party states ruled by Marxist political parties are sometimes distinguished from other types of one-party dictatorship, but they are distinct in ideology rather than function. When a one-party dictatorship develops gradually through legal means, in can result in conflict between the party organization and the state apparatus and civil service as the party rules in parallel and increasingly appoints its own members to positions of power. Parties that take power through violence are often able to implement larger changes in a shorter period of time.

Personalist dictatorships

Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus

Personalist dictatorships are regimes in which all power lies in the hands of a single individual. They differ from other forms of dictatorships in their access to key political positions, other fruits of office, and depend much more on the discretion of the dictator. Personalist dictators may be members of the military or leaders of a political party, but neither the military nor the party exercises power independently from the dictator. In personalist dictatorships, the elite corps are usually made up of close friends or family members of the dictator, who typically handpicks these individuals to serve their posts. These dictatorships often emerge either from loosely organized seizures of power, giving the leader opportunity to consolidate power, or from democratically-elected leaders in countries with weak institutions, giving the leader opportunity to change the constitution. Personalist dictatorships are more common in Sub-Saharan Africa due to less established institutions in the region.

Personalist dictators typically favor loyalty over competence in their governments and have a general distrust of intelligentsia. Elites in personalist dictatorships often do not have a professional political career and are unqualified for positions they are given. A personalist dictator will manage these appointees by segmenting the government so that they cannot collaborate. The result is that such regimes have no internal checks and balances, and are thus unrestrained when exerting repression on their people, making radical shifts in foreign policy, or starting wars with other countries. Due to the lack of accountability and the smaller group of elites, personalist dictatorships are more prone to corruption than other forms of dictatorship. According to a 2019 study, personalist dictatorships are more repressive than other forms of dictatorship. Personalist dictatorships often collapse with the death of the dictator. They are more likely to end in violence and less likely to democratize than other forms of dictatorship.

The shift in the power relation between the dictator and its inner circle has severe consequences for the behavior of such regimes as a whole. Many scholars have identified ways in which personalist regimes diverge from other regimes when it comes to their longevity, methods of breakdown, levels of corruption, and proneness to conflicts. Personalist dictatorships on average last twice as long as military dictatorships but not as long as single-party dictatorships. Personalist dictatorships also experience growth differently, as they often lack the institutions or qualified leadership to sustain an economy. Without any checks and balances to their rule, such dictators are domestically unopposed when it comes to unleashing repression, or even starting wars.

Absolute monarchies

An absolute monarchy is a monarchy in which the monarch rules without legal limitations. This makes it distinct from constitutional monarchy and ceremonial monarchy. In an absolute monarchy, power is limited to the royal family, and legitimacy is established by historical factors. In the modern era, absolute monarchies are most common in the Middle East. Montesquieu made a distinction between despots that ruled unrestrained and monarchs that ruled within the laws of a kingdom. Political parties are relatively rare in monarchic dictatorships compared to military or civilian dictatorships. Monarchies may be dynastic, in which the royal family serves as a ruling institution similar to a political party in a one-party state, or they may be non-dynastic, in which the monarch rules independently of the royal family as a personalist dictator. Monarchies allow for strict rules of succession that produce a peaceful transfer of power on the monarch's death, but this can also result in succession disputes if multiple members of the royal family claim a right to succeed.

History

Dictators in the Roman Empire

During the Republican phase of Ancient Rome, a Roman dictator was the special magistrate who held well defined powers, normally for six months at a time, usually in combination with a consulship. These powers were granted during times of crisis in which a single leader was needed to command and restore stability. At least 85 such dictators were chosen over the course of the Roman Republic, the last of which was chosen to wage the Second Punic War. The dictatorship was revived 120 years later through a populist movement led by Sulla, and 33 years after that by Julius Caesar, under whose dictatorship the Roman Republic became the Roman Empire.

Post-classical and early modern dictatorships

Japan and Korea saw several military dictatorships during the post-classical era. During the early stages of the Goguryeo–Tang War in 642, Yeon Gaesomun organized a coup in the Goguryeo Kingdom and established himself as a military dictator. A coup took place in the Goryeo Kingdom in 1170, establishing the Goryeo military regime for the next century. Shogun was the title of the military dictators of Japan beginning with the Kamakura shogunate in 1185 and continuing through other shogunates for over six hundred years. While Shoguns nominally operated under the control of the Emperor of Japan, they served as de facto rulers of Japan and the Japanese military.

The Commonwealth of England under Oliver Cromwell, formed in 1649 after the Second English Civil War, has been described as a military dictatorship by its contemporary opponents and by some modern academics. Maximilien Robespierre has been similarly described as a military dictator while he controlled the National Convention in France and carried out the Reign of Terror in 1793 and 1794.

19th century dictatorships

Antonio López de Santa Anna wearing a Mexican military uniform

Dictatorship developed as a major form of government in the 19th century, though in Europe it was often thought of in terms of Bonapartism and Caesarism. The concept of dictatorship was not universally seen pejoratively at the time, with both a tyrannical concept and a quasi-constitutional concept of dictatorship understood to exist. The Spanish American wars of independence took place in the early-19th century, creating many new Latin American governments. Many of these governments fell under the control of caudillos, or personalist strongmen dictators. Most caudillos came from a military background, and their rule was typically associated with pageantry and glamor. Caudillos were often nominally constrained by a constitution, but the caudillo had the power to draft a new constitution as he wished. Many are noted for their cruelty, while others are honored as national heroes.

Many Latin American countries experienced dictatorships by caudillos shortly after their formation in the early-19th century. Juan Manuel de Rosas was a major figure in the formation of Argentina, ruling as dictator from 1829 to 1852. In Guatemala, Rafael Carrera ruled as dictator from 1839 to 1865. In Venezuela, José Antonio Páez ruled in the decades following the country's founding. José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia ruled Paraguay from its founding until 1840. President Antonio López de Santa Anna of Mexico established himself as a military dictator, and he gave himself the title of His Serene Highness in 1853. He was overthrown and exiled in 1855. President Porfirio Díaz of Mexico took power in 1876 and served as the military dictator until the Mexican Revolution in a period known as the Porfiriato.

Dictatorships of the World Wars

European dictatorships of the World Wars

Benito Mussolini (left) and Adolf Hitler (right)

Dictatorship expanded in early-20th century Europe through a combination of far-left and far-right takeovers. The aftermath of World War I resulted in a major shift in European government, establishing new governments, facilitating internal change in other governments, and redrawing the boundaries between countries. These changes provided opportunities for extremist far-left and far-right political movements to take power.

Vladimir Lenin established Soviet Russia in 1917 as a dictatorship of the proletariat. The Bolshevik government during the Russian Civil War had democratic elements, but following poor electoral performance, Lenin dissolved the Constituent Assembly. The Soviet Union was formed as a dictatorship in 1922 under the control of Lenin and the other Bolsheviks, whose power was enforced through secret police organizations such as the Cheka. Following Lenin's death in 1924, the party chose Joseph Stalin to be its next leader, and Stalin gained total control by 1929. In the following decades, Stalin carried out a totalitarian rule in which all threats to his power were eliminated through purges, eliminating democracy even within the one party system. A Soviet government was briefly established in Hungary in 1919, but it fell the same year.

Benito Mussolini was the first fascist dictator. He carried out the March on Rome in 1922, forcing King Victor Emmanuel III to appoint him as Prime Minister of Italy. In 1925, he began implementing his system of fascism, based on totalitarianism, fealty to the state, expansionism, corporatism, and anti-communism, though its application varied and was often inconsistent. Adolf Hitler was appointed chancellor of the Weimar Republic in 1933, his rise to power coinciding with weakening democracy in the country. Over the following six months, Hitler and the Nazi Party obtained absolute power through a combination of electoral victory, violence, and emergency powers, assuming the office of president in addition to chancellor and taking the title of Führer. Austria briefly underwent a period of dictatorship under Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt Schuschnigg before being annexed by Germany.

Miguel Primo de Rivera was appointed Prime Minister of Spain in 1923 following a military coup, and he ruled as a dictator. By 1930, Primo de Rivera had alienated every major faction of Spanish politics and was convinced to step down. His government was replaced by the Second Spanish Republic. In 1926, Manuel Gomes da Costa led a military coup and established the Ditadura Nacional in Portugal. His successor, Óscar Carmona, chose to give control of finances to economics professor António de Oliveira Salazar. Salazar became Prime Minister of Portugal in 1932 and established the Estado Novo. Francisco Franco took power in Spain after leading the Nationalist faction to victory in the Spanish Civil War and became a dictator in 1939.

The Baltic states all became dictatorships between the World Wars. Antanas Smetona took power in Lithuania in 1926, Konstantin Päts took power in Estonia in 1934, and Kārlis Ulmanis took power in Latvia in 1934. The dictatorships in the Baltic states were considered to be milder than those in other European countries, with private enterprise and the press being relatively free. These dictatorships ended after they were occupied in World War II.

Several right-wing dictatorships also emerged in the Balkans during the interwar period. Bulgaria underwent a period of several dictatorships following a military coup in 1923. Ahmed Zogu overthrew the government in Albania in 1924, and he proclaimed himself King Zog I in 1928. He was dictator until Albania was occupied in World War II. King George II of Greece appointed Ioannis Metaxas as Prime Minister of Greece in 1936, and Metaxas ruled as a dictator until his death in 1941. In 1940, King Michael I of Romania granted Ion Antonescu dictatorial powers, and Antonescu declared himself the Conducător of Romania.

During World War II, Germany and Italy occupied several European countries and established fascist client states. These include Albania, Belgium, the Czech lands, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Norway, the Slovak Republic, Yugoslavia and The Soviet Union. Poland was occupied by both Germany and the Soviet Union. Allied victory in Europe and the fall of Nazi Germany resulted in the liberation of Nazi-occupied territories and the dissolving of fascist governments.

Latin American dictatorships of the World Wars

Augusto B. Leguía ruled as a dictator in Peru from 1919 to 1930. Juan Vicente Gómez ruled Venezuela as a dictator from 1908 until his death in 1935. Rafael Trujillo took power as a "nearly totalitarian" dictator of the Dominican Republic in the 1930s and ruled for 30 years. The 1930 Argentine coup d'état was the first in a series of coups and military dictatorships that would affect the country for decades. Jorge Ubico took power in Guatemala in 1931 and ruled until he was deposed by a pro-democracy uprising in 1944. In 1931, a coup was organized against the government of Arturo Araujo, causing the period of military dictatorship in El Salvador, starting with the Civic Directory. The government committed several crimes against humanity, such as those of La Matanza. The dictatorship ended with the 1979 Salvadoran coup d'état and the start of the Salvadoran Civil War. President Tiburcio Carías Andino carried out a self-coup in Honduras after the election of 1932 and served as a dictator until 1949. A self-coup in Uruguay established Gabriel Terra as dictator in 1933. Getúlio Vargas led a coup in 1937 that established him as a dictator in Brazil under an Estado Novo system. In Paraguay, Higinio Morínigo established himself as a military dictator in 1940 and ruled until 1948.

Dictatorships of the Cold War

African dictatorships of the Cold War

Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire's longtime dictator

Many dictatorships formed in Africa, with most forming after countries gained independence during decolonisation. Mobutu Sese Seko ruled the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a dictator for decades, renaming it Zaire. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has ruled Equatorial Guinea as a dictator since he led a military coup in 1979. In 1973, King Sobhuza II of Swaziland suspended the constitution and ruled as an absolute monarch. Samuel Doe established a military dictatorship in Liberia in the 1980s. Libya was ruled by Muammar Gaddafi for several decades following a military coup. Moussa Traoré ruled as a dictator in Mali. Habib Bourguiba ruled as a dictator in Tunisia until he was deposed by a coup led by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 1987, who in turn ruled as a dictator until the Tunisian Revolution in 2011. Robert Mugabe ruled as a dictator in Zimbabwe.

Early socialist dictatorships in Africa mainly developed as personalist dictatorships, in which a single socialist would take power instead of a ruling party. Later in the Cold War, the Soviet Union increased its influence in Africa as Marxist-Leninist dictatorships developed in several African countries. One-party Marxist states in Africa included Angola under the MPLA, Benin under Mathieu Kérékou, Cape Verde under the PAICV, the Congo under the Congolese Party of Labour, Ethiopia under the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, Madagascar under AREMA, Mozambique under FRELIMO, and Somalia under Siad Barre.

Many African countries underwent several military coups that installed a series of military dictatorships throughout the Cold War. These include Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Uganda, each undergoing at least three successful military coups between 1959 and 2001.

Some leaders of African countries abolished opposition parties, establishing one-party dictatorships. These include the National Liberation Front in Algeria, the Chadian Progressive Party under François Tombalbaye in Chad, the Gabonese Democratic Party under Omar Bongo in Gabon, the Democratic Party under Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea, the Malawi Congress Party under Hastings Banda in Malawi, the MNSD under Ali Saibou in Niger, MRND under Juvénal Habyarimana in Rwanda, the Socialist Party under Léopold Sédar Senghor in Senegal, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, the RPT under Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo, and the United National Independence Party under Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia. The KANU in Kenya ruled under a de facto one-party state.

Asian dictatorships of the Cold War

Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China as a one-party Communist state at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, removing the Nationalist Chinese government from power. Mao implemented his governing ideology of Maoism. The country maintained a strained relationship with the Soviet Union, and relations deteriorated as the Soviet Union underwent de-Stalinization in the late-1950s. In the 1960s, amid fear that he would lose control of the Communist Party, Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution, which involved the destruction of any elements of capitalism in China while also establishing relations with Japan and the United States. Deng Xiaoping took power as the de facto leader of China after Mao's death and implemented reforms to restore stability following the Cultural Revolution and reestablish free market economics. Chiang Kai-shek continued to rule as dictator of the National government's rump state in Taiwan until his death in 1975.

North Korea and South Korea both emerged from World War II as dictatorships. North Korea was established under Soviet influence, and Kim Il-sung led the country as a one-party Marxist state. South Korea was under the dictatorship of Syngman Rhee in the 1950s, but his rule ended following the April Revolution. The country became a military dictatorship under Chun Doo-hwan in the 1980s, but the June Democratic Struggle in 1987 led to democratization. In Southern Asia, Ayub Khan established himself as a military dictator of Pakistan during the 1958 coup, and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq established himself as a military dictator in the 1977 coup. Hussain Muhammad Ershad took power in Bangladesh in a 1982 military coup and ruled until 1991. Nepal was an absolute monarchy until the 1990 Nepalese revolution created a constitutional monarchy.

Southeast Asia was influenced by China during the Cold War, and three Communist dictatorships were formed in the region: North Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam at the end of the Vietnam War, and the two merged into a single Communist country. Anti-Communist dictators also ruled in the region. Suharto became dictator in Indonesia, taking power in 1967 until a violent unrest in 1998 forced him to resign. Ngo Dinh Diem ruled South Vietnam as a dictator until the 1963 military coup. Ferdinand Marcos ruled Philippines as a dictator until the People Power Revolution in 1986. A socialist military dictatorship was also created separately from the Communist governments in Burma until it was overthrown in 1988 and replaced by a new military dictatorship.

The Middle East was decolonized during the Cold War, and many nationalist movements gained strength post-independence. A 1953 coup overseen by the American and British governments restored Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as the absolute monarch of Iran, who in turn was overthrown during the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that established Ruhollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader of Iran under an Islamist government. Several Middle Eastern countries were the subject of military coups in the 1950s and 1960s, including Iraq, Syria, North Yemen, and South Yemen. Afghanistan became a one-party dictatorship after the 1973 coup, and it became a Marxist dictatorship after the Saur Revolution in 1978.

European dictatorships of the Cold War

Josip Broz Tito, President of Yugoslavia

During World War II, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had been occupied by the Soviet Union. When the war ended, these countries were incorporated into the Soviet sphere of influence, and the Soviet Union exercised control over their governments. Soviet occupation of Bulgaria and Poland allowed for the immediate establishment of a new government. The Soviet occupation of East Germany resulted in the creation of a new one-party state controlled by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. The Czechoslovak government was replaced by the Ninth-of-May Constitution, which maintained a facade of democracy while the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia held authority. Following the liberation of Hungary, Communists gained influence in the country by infiltrating its government and carrying out a Communist takeover, implementing a new constitution to implement one party rule. The Soviet government pressured King Michael I of Romania to appoint Petru Groza as Prime Minister of Romania, and Groza's government enacted a new constitution to implement Communist rule.

Josip Broz Tito declared a Communist government in Yugoslavia during World War II, and Soviet occupation established this government as the sole authority in the country. Tito's government was initially aligned with the Soviet Union, but relations between the countries were strained by Soviet attempts to influence Yugoslavia. Albania was established as a Communist dictatorship under Enver Hoxha in 1944. It was initially aligned with Yugoslavia, but its alignment shifted throughout the Cold War between Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China. The stability of the Soviet Union weakened in the 1980s. The Soviet economy became unsustainable, and Communist governments lost the support of intellectuals. In 1989, the Soviet Union was dissolved, and Communism was abandoned by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Of the new and reformed governments created by the fall of Communism in Europe, only Belarus remained a dictatorship, under the control of Alexander Lukashenko.

Latin American dictatorships of the Cold War

Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier succeeded his father François "Papa Doc" Duvalier as the ruler of Haiti after his death in 1971.

Military dictatorships remained prominent in Latin America during the Cold War, though the number of coups declined starting in the 1980s. Between 1967 and 1991, Haiti and Honduras both underwent three military coups, and Bolivia underwent eight. Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay also underwent at least one military coup during the same period.

In the Caribbean, former President of Cuba Fulgencio Batista carried out a 1952 military coup in Cuba after he determined that he was not going to win the upcoming presidential election. Batista ruled until the Cuban Revolution overthrew his government and established a one-party Marxist state led by Fidel Castro. Jean-Claude Duvalier consolidated his power as a dictator in Haiti during his presidency in the 1970s, and upon his death in 1971, he passed his position to his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, who would rule until 1986.

In Central America, Carlos Castillo Armas took power in Guatemala with a 1954 coup with American-trained troops and held power until his assassination in 1957, which in turn resulted in a series of dictatorships during the Guatemalan Civil War. Omar Torrijos took power in Panama with a 1968 military coup until his death in 1981. Several military dictators briefly held power in Panama until Manuel Noriega took power in 1983, but he was deposed by the United States invasion of Panama in 1989. The Somoza family ruled Nicaragua either directly or indirectly until they were overthrown during the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979.

In South America, a 1948 military coup in Venezuela established the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez who ruled until 1958. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla took power in a 1953 coup and ruled until 1957. Alfredo Stroessner carried out a 1954 military coup in Paraguay that established the El Stronato military dictatorship until 1989. A 1964 coup established a military dictatorship in Brazil that lasted until 1985. A 1968 military coup established a military dictatorship in Peru until 1980, and in 1992, Alberto Fujimori carried out a self-coup in Peru. Hugo Banzer was the military dictator of Bolivia from 1971 to 1978, and he would later go on to be the country's democratically elected president two decades later. In 1972, Guillermo Rodríguez established a dictatorial government in Ecuador and called his government the "Nationalist Revolution". It entered OPEC in 1973 and also imposed agrarian reforms. In 1973, Augusto Pinochet carried out a coup and established a military dictatorship in Chile that lasted until 1990.

Operation Condor was a secret intelligence agreement developed by Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet with his secret police and intelligence organizations. It included the governments of military dictatorships in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Peru. Under this organization, these governments were able to collaborate with one another in the elimination of political enemies. Operation Condor received tacit and sometimes explicit support from the United States in exchange for support against Communist dictators, and the United States declassified information on Operation Condor after the Cold War.

21st century dictatorships

Russian President Vladimir Putin with Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2008

The nature of dictatorship changed in much of the world at the onset of the 21st century. Between the 1990s and the 2000s, most dictators moved away from being "larger-than-life figures" that controlled the populace through terror and isolated themselves from the global community. This was replaced by a trend of developing a positive public image to maintain support among the populace and moderating rhetoric to integrate with the global community.

Only a small number of one-party states exist in the 21st century. As of 2022, China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam are Communist one-party states, and Eritrea is a nationalist one-party state. Opposition parties were legalized in Syria and Turkmenistan, but they are still de facto one-party states as of 2022. Other countries with dominant-party systems also exist. Iraq was a one-party state until the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As of 2022, Brunei, Eswatini, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Vatican City are absolute monarchies, and the United Arab Emirates is a federation of monarchies. Bhutan was an absolute monarchy until the 2008 Bhutanese National Assembly election. Tonga was an absolute monarchy until the 2010 Tongan general election. Belarus under the rule of Alexander Lukashenko has been described as "the last European dictatorship", though the rule of Vladimir Putin in Russia has also been described as a dictatorship.

Measurement

Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020. Green countries are democratic, yellow are hybrid regimes, and red are authoritarian governments.

One of the tasks in political science is to measure and classify regimes as either dictatorships or democracies. Freedom House, the Polity data series, and the Democracy-Dictatorship Index are three of the most used data series by political scientists. Generally, two research approaches exist: the minimalist approach, which focuses on whether a country has continued elections that are competitive, and the substantive approach, which expands the concept of democracy to include human rights, freedom of the press, and the rule of law. The Democracy-Dictatorship Index is seen as an example of the minimalist approach, whereas the Polity data series is more substantive.

Economics

Most dictatorships exist in countries with high levels of poverty. Poverty has a destabilizing effect on government, causing democracy to fail and regimes to fall more often. The form of government does not correlate with the amount of economic growth, and dictatorships on average grow at the same rate as democracies, though dictatorships have been found to have larger fluctuations. Dictators are more likely to implement long-term investments into the country's economy if they feel secure in their power. Exceptions to the pattern of poverty in dictatorships include oil-rich Middle Eastern dictatorships and the East Asian Tigers during their periods of dictatorship.

The type of economy in a dictatorship can affect how it functions. Economies based on natural resources allow dictators more power, as they can easily extract rents without strengthening or cooperating with other institutions. More complex economies require additional cooperation between the dictator and other groups. The economic focus of a dictatorship often depends on the strength of the opposition, as a weaker opposition allows a dictator to extract additional wealth from the economy through corruption.

Legitimacy and stability

Several factors determine the stability of a dictatorship. They must maintain some degree of popular support to prevent resistance groups from growing. This may be ensured through incentives, such as distribution of financial resources or promises of security, or it may be through repression, in which failing to support the regime is punished. Stability can be weakened when opposition groups grow and unify or when elites are not loyal to the regime. One-party dictatorships are generally more stable and last longer than military or personalist dictatorships.

A dictatorship may fall because of a military coup, foreign intervention, negotiation, or popular revolution. A military coup is often carried out when a regime is threatening the country's stability or during periods of societal unrest. Foreign intervention takes place when another country seeks to topple a regime by invading the country or supporting the opposition. A dictator may negotiate the end of a regime if it has lost legitimacy or if a violent removal seems likely. Revolution takes place when the opposition group grows large enough that elites in the regime cannot suppress it or choose not to. Negotiated removals are more likely to end in democracy, while removals by force are more likely to result in a new dictatorial regime. A dictator that has concentrated significant power is more likely to be exiled, imprisoned, or killed after ouster, and accordingly they are more likely to refuse negotiation and cling to power.

Dictatorships are typically more aggressive than democracy when in conflict with other nations, as dictators do not have to fear electoral costs of war. Military dictatorships are more prone to conflict due to the inherent military strength associated with such a regime, and personalist dictatorships are more prone to conflict due to the weaker institutions to check the dictator's power. In the 21st century, dictatorships have moved toward greater integration with the global community and increasingly attempt to present themselves as democratic. Dictatorships are often recipients of foreign aid on the condition that they make advances toward democratization. A study found that dictatorships that engage in oil drilling are more likely to remain in power, with 70.63% of the dictators who engage in oil drilling still being in power after 5 years of dictatorship, while only 59.92% of the non-oil producing dictators survive the first 5 years.

Elections

An electoral slip in the 1936 German parliamentary election. Adolf Hitler and his inner circle are the only option.

Most dictatorships hold elections to maintain legitimacy and stability, but these elections are typically uncompetitive and the opposition is not permitted to win. Elections allow a dictatorship to exercise some control over the opposition by setting the terms under which the opposition challenges the regime. Elections are also used to control elites within the dictatorship by requiring them to compete with one another and incentivizing them to build support with the populace, allowing the most popular and most competent elites to be promoted in the regime. Elections also support the legitimacy of a dictatorship by presenting the image of a democracy, establishing plausible deniability of its status as a dictatorship for both the populace and foreign governments. Should a dictatorship fail, elections also permit dictators and elites to accept defeat without fearing violent recourse. Dictatorships may influence the results of an election through electoral fraud, intimidation or bribing of candidates and voters, use of state resources such as media control, manipulation of electoral laws, restricting who may run as a candidate, or disenfranchising demographics that may oppose the dictatorship.

Before 1990, most dictatorships held elections in which voters could only choose to support the dictatorship. Since the end of the Cold War, more dictatorships have established "semi-competitive" elections in which opposition parties are allowed to participate but they are not allowed to win. This may be done by preventing the opposition from campaigning, banning more popular opposition parties, preventing opposition members from forming a party, or requiring that candidates be a member of the ruling party. Dictatorships may hold semi-competitive elections to qualify for foreign aid or to incentivize the party to expand its information-gathering capacity, particularly at the local level. Semi-competitive elections also have the effect of incentivizing members of the ruling party to provide better treatment of citizens so they will be chosen as party nominees due to their popularity.

Violence

Violence is used in dictatorships to coerce any opposition to the dictator's rule, often through institutions such as military or police forces. The use of violence by a dictator is often most severe in the first few years of a dictatorship, as the regime has not yet solidified its rule and more detailed information for targeted coercion is not yet available. As the dictatorship becomes more established, it moves away from violence toward other coercive measures, such as restriction of information and tracking of political opposition. Institutions that coerce the opposition through violence may serve different roles or be used to counterbalance one another to prevent one from growing too powerful. Secret police are used to gather information on and carry out targeted acts of violence against specific political opponents, and paramilitary forces defend the regime from coups, and formal militaries defend the dictatorship during foreign invasion and major civil conflicts.

Terrorism is less common in dictatorships. Allowing the opposition to have representation in the regime, such as through a legislature, further reduces the likelihood of terrorist attacks in a dictatorship. Military and one-party dictatorships are more likely to experience terrorism than personalist dictatorships, as these regimes are under more pressure to undergo institutional change in response to terrorism.

In-group favoritism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In-group_favoritism

In-group favoritism, sometimes known as in-group–out-group bias, in-group bias, intergroup bias, or in-group preference, is a pattern of favoring members of one's in-group over out-group members. This can be expressed in evaluation of others, in allocation of resources, and in many other ways.

This effect has been researched by many psychologists and linked to many theories related to group conflict and prejudice. The phenomenon is primarily viewed from a social psychology standpoint. Studies have shown that in-group favoritism arises as a result of the formation of cultural groups.These cultural groups can be divided based on seemingly trivial observable traits, but with time, populations grow to associate certain traits with certain behavior, increasing covariation. This then incentivizes in-group bias.

Two prominent theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of in-group favoritism are realistic conflict theory and social identity theory. Realistic conflict theory proposes that intergroup competition, and sometimes intergroup conflict, arises when two groups have opposing claims to scarce resources. In contrast, social identity theory posits a psychological drive for positively distinct social identities as the general root cause of in-group favoring behavior.

Origins of the research tradition

In 1906, the sociologist William Sumner posited that humans are a species that join together in groups by their very nature. However, he also maintained that humans had an innate tendency to favor their own group over others, proclaiming how "each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exists in its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders". This is seen on the group level with ingroup–outgroup bias. When experienced in larger groups such as tribes, ethnic groups, or nations, it is referred to as ethnocentrism.

Explanations

Competition

Realistic conflict theory (or realistic group conflict) posits that competition between groups for resources is the cause of in-group bias and the corresponding negative treatment of members of the out-group. Muzafer Sherif's Robbers Cave Experiment is the most widely known demonstration of realistic conflict theory. In the experiment, 22 eleven-year-old boys with similar backgrounds were studied in a mock summer camp situation, with researchers posing as camp personnel.

The boys were divided into two equal groups and encouraged to bond, with the aim of fostering an in-group mentality. The researchers then introduced a series of competitive activities which pitted groups against each other for a valuable prize. Hostility and out-group negativity ensued. Lastly, researchers attempted to reverse the hostility by engaging the boys in situations of mutual interdependence, an effort which eventually resulted in relative harmony between the two groups.

Sherif concluded from this experiment that negative attitudes toward out-groups arise when groups compete for limited resources. However, he also theorized that inter-group frictions could be reduced and positive relations created, but only in the presence of an overarching goal, which could only be achieved with the two groups' cooperation.

Self-esteem

According to social identity theory, one of the key determinants of group biases is the need to improve self-esteem. The desire to view one's self positively is transferred onto the group, creating a tendency to view one's own group in a positive light, and by comparison, outside groups in a negative light. That is, individuals will find a reason, no matter how insignificant, to prove to themselves why their own group is superior. This phenomenon was pioneered and studied most extensively by Henri Tajfel, a British social psychologist who looked at the psychological root of in-group/out-group bias. To study this in the lab, Tajfel and colleagues created minimal groups (see minimal group paradigm), which occur when "complete strangers are formed into groups using the most trivial criteria imaginable". In Tajfel's studies, participants were split into groups by flipping a coin, and each group then was told to appreciate a certain style of painting none of the participants were familiar with when the experiment began. What Tajfel and his colleagues discovered was that—regardless of the facts that a) participants did not know each other, b) their groups were completely meaningless, and c) none of the participants had any inclination as to which "style" they like better—participants almost always "liked the members of their own group better and they rated the members of their in-group as more likely to have pleasant personalities". By having a more positive impression of individuals in the in-group, individuals are able to boost their own self-esteem as members of that group.

Robert Cialdini and his research team looked at the number of university T-shirts being worn on college campuses following either a win or loss at the football game. They found that the Monday after a win, there were more T-shirts being worn, on average, than following a loss.

In another set of studies, done in the 1980s by Jennifer Crocker and colleagues using the minimal group paradigm, individuals with high self-esteem who suffered a threat to the self-concept exhibited greater ingroup biases than did people with low self-esteem who suffered a threat to the self-concept. While some studies have supported this notion of a negative correlation between self-esteem and in-group bias, other researchers have found that individuals with low self-esteem showed more bias toward both in-group and out-group members. Some studies have even shown that high-self-esteem groups showed more bias than did lower self-esteem groups. This research may suggest that there is an alternative explanation and additional reasoning as to the relationship between self-esteem and in-group/out-group biases. Alternatively, it is possible that researchers have used the wrong sort of self-esteem measures to test the link between self-esteem and in-group bias (global personal self-esteem rather than specific social self-esteem).

Biological basis as an effect of oxytocin

In a meta-analysis and review of the effect of oxytocin on social behavior done by Carsten De Dreu, the research reviewed shows that oxytocin enables the development of trust, specifically towards individuals with similar characteristics—categorized as 'in-group' members—promoting cooperation with and favoritism towards such individuals. This bias of oxytocin-induced goodwill towards those with features and characteristics perceived to be similar may have evolved as a biological basis for sustaining in-group cooperation and protection, fitting with the Darwinian insight that acts of self-sacrifice and cooperation contribute to the functioning of the group and hence improve the odds of survival for members of said group.

Race can be used as an example of in-group and out-group tendencies because society often categorizes individuals into groups based on race (Caucasian, African American, Latino, etc.). One study that examined race and empathy found that participants receiving nasally administered oxytocin had stronger reactions to pictures of in-group members making pained faces than to pictures of out-group members with the same expression. This shows that oxytocin may be implicated in our ability to empathize with individuals of different races, with individuals of one race potentially biased towards helping individuals of the same race than individuals of another race when they are experiencing pain.

Oxytocin has also been implicated in lying when lying would prove beneficial to other in-group members. In a study where such a relationship was examined, it was found that when individuals were administered oxytocin, rates of dishonesty in the participants' responses increased for their in-group members when a beneficial outcome for their group was expected. Both of these examples show the tendency to act in ways that benefit in-group members.

Self-identity and social identity

As noted in two recent theoretical reviews, the theoretical basis for the inclusion of self-identity in the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior has many similarities to social identity theory and its extension, self-categorization theory. According to social identity theory, an important component of the self-concept is derived from memberships in social groups and categories. When people define and evaluate themselves in terms of a self-inclusive social category (e.g., sex, class, team) two processes come into play: (1) categorization, which perceptually accentuates differences between the in-group and out-group, and similarities among in-group members (including the self) on stereotypical dimensions; and (2) self-enhancement which, because the self-concept is defined in terms of group membership, seeks behaviorally and perceptually to favor the in-group over the out-group. Social identities are cognitively represented as group prototypes that describe and prescribe beliefs, attitudes, feelings and behaviors that optimize a balance between minimization of in-group differences and maximization of intergroup differences.

More specifically, according to social identity theory, there is a continuum between personal and social identity shifts along this continuum that determine the extent to which group-related or personal characteristics influence a person's feelings and actions. If a particular social identity is a salient basis for self-conception, then the self is assimilated to the perceived in-group prototype which can be thought of as a set of perceived in-group norms such that self-perception, beliefs, attitudes, feelings and behaviors are defined in terms of the group prototype. Thus, social identities should influence behavior through the mediating role of group norms. People will be more likely to engage in a particular behavior if it is in accord with the norms of a behaviorally relevant group membership, particularly if the identity is a salient basis for self-definition. If the group membership is not salient, then people's behavior and feelings should be in accord with their own personal and idiosyncratic characteristics rather than group norms.

On the other hand, the self-identity theory poses that the self is often a reflection of expected norms and practices in a person's social role. At the center of it is the proposition that the self is made up of multi-faceted and differentiated components that exist in an organized manner for the sake of filling in roles in society. People are able to create an identity for themselves only through talking to others, and often what roles they are taking on differ from one group to another. These differing roles and positions people fill are a result of their interactions with others and are called role identities. Role identities may be self-realized, or may be facts like being a mother, a social worker, or a blood donor. Role identities lead people to act in certain ways due to assumed expectations for the roles. Because there is satisfaction in complying with expectations of the role, there is often distress behind an inability to appear congruent to one's identity as defined by societal norms. There is also an existing hierarchy of importance for roles that individuals take on, and according to the hierarchical standing of roles, people become more representative of roles that stand higher hierarchically, according to them.

Identity salience, the likelihood of role identities being invoked in different situations, is the result of role identities being placed hierarchically in different orders from person to person. People who hold the same roles may act differently because some roles are valued over others. For example, a working mother may have less time to spend with her child as opposed to a mother that does not work. Behaviors are reflective of the identities that are held higher hierarchically by people, so people act out in self-worth and self-meaning according to these hierarchies. Someone who holds the identity of being a psychologist higher than the identity of being a linguist will find that while he/she may become competitive when meeting another person that is better at psychology than he/she, he/she won't care when in contact with someone who is much better at being a linguist than he/she. In a similar way, social relationships are influenced by this salience. Self-identity often places individuals in social contexts and a commitment to the role within that context becomes a big part of perpetrating the idea of self. It also finds people relating more to others that hold similar role identities at the top of their hierarchies.

Because people have self-concepts that are derived from a role they define for themselves within the context of a group, when staying within their roles, intergroup similarities are accentuated while intergroup differences are diminished. In an attempt to assimilate oneself according to the tendencies of a group, often people reconfigure their intragroup representations or identities. Certain prototypes form about these groups that reaffirm rules that members of the group are encouraged to follow. Shared information and views are discussed more often than novel and unshared information within a group, therefore a norm is established where the majority views are perpetuated and others silenced. This norm is fluid and changing according to different contexts, but those within the group who want to keep up with the majority views in all matters have to keep an active role in affirming the views of the in-group in contest to out-groups.

Evolution of in-groups

Formation of cultural groups

Studies have shown that in-group favoritism arises endogenously, through the formation of cultural groups. Symbolic markers in certain conditions can result in trivial groupings developing into cultural groups. The formation of such cultural groups then results in a higher degree of in-group favoritism.

Efferson, Lalive and Fehr published such a study in 2008, utilizing a series of coordination games to mimic cooperation between individuals. The study found that cultural groups were able to form endogenously through creation of a linkage between a payoff-relevant behavior and a payoff-irrelevant marker. Subsequently, in-group favoritism occurred in ensuing social interactions.

Participants were first divided into one of several populations of 10 people, and then further divided into subpopulations of 5. Each group had different payoff for coordinating on one of 2 choices, behavior A or behavior B. In group 1, participants were awarded 41 points for coordinating (choosing A themselves and choosing another participant who also chose A) on A and 21 for coordinating on B. The payoffs were switched in the 2nd group. In both groups participants were awarded just 1 point for mis-coordinating. During each turn participants were also allowed to choose a payoff-irrelevant marker (circle or triangle). Players from both subpopulations were mixed to create a coordination problem, and every turn, an unidentified player from each subpopulation would be randomly switched.

The experiment created a situation in which participants were strongly incentivized to develop a sense of expected behaviors in his or her subpopulation, but occasionally would find themselves in a totally new situation in which their behaviors were not in-line with social norms.

The results showed that players generally developed an inclination to pair behavior with a marker, especially if it had resulted in a positive payoff. As linkages at an individual level increase, covariation (of marker and behavior) at an aggregate level also increases. In the experiment, there was a significant increase in participants requesting for partners with the same-shape choice as it progressed, although the initial choice of shape had no effect on payoffs. Toward the end of the experiment, this number stood at a substantial 87%, indicating the presence of in-group favoritism.

Their study supported the hypothesis that the formation of cultural groups alters selective pressure facing individuals, and thus leads to certain behavioral traits being advantageous. Thus, if such selective pressures were present in past civilizations, where membership in a certain group is correlated with a certain behavioral norm, the emergence of in-group biases where it is beneficial to act in differing manners to members of the same group is certainly plausible.

Gender differences

Automatic bias for own gender

Rudman and Goodwin conducted research on gender bias that measured gender preferences without directly asking the participants. Subjects at Purdue and Rutgers University participated in computerized tasks that measured automatic attitudes based on how quickly a person categorizes pleasant and unpleasant attributes with each gender. Such a task was done to discover whether people associate pleasant words (good, happy, and sunshine) with women, and unpleasant words (bad, trouble, and pain) with men.

This research found that while both women and men have more favorable views of women, women's in-group biases were 4.5 times stronger than those of men and only women (not men) showed cognitive balance among in-group bias, identity, and self-esteem, revealing that men lack a mechanism that bolsters automatic preference for their own gender.

Competition

Using a publics-goods game, Van Vugt, De Cremer, and Janssen found that men contributed more to their group in the face of outside competition from another group; there was no distinct difference amongst women's contributions.

Ethnicity-based favoritism

In 2001 Fershtman and Gneezy found that men showed in-group biases in a "trust" game based on ethnicity, whereas this tendency was not present in women. The study aims to identify ethnic discrimination in Israeli Jewish society, and was conducted on 996 Israeli undergraduates. Groups were separated based on whether the participant's name was typically ethnically Eastern or Ashkenazic. Similar to a dictator game, subjects were instructed to divide a sum of money (20 NIS) between themselves and another player. Player A was told that any money sent over to Player B would be tripled, and Player B would receive details of the experiment, including the name of Player A and the transferred sum. Subsequently, Player B would have a choice of whether to send any money back.

The experiment found that despite sharing similar average transfer values (10.63 for women and 11.42 for men), women did not display significant in-group biases when it came to recipients with either Ashkenazic or Eastern sounding names. However, a bias against Eastern sounding names was present amongst men.

Furthermore, men showed more bias for Ashkenazic men compared to women, but the opposite was true for Eastern names. This result may seem counter-intuitive, as participants appear to share more in common if they were both male. Thus, we would expect Eastern females to be more marginalized, but is actually consistent with other studies which studied discrimination against Afro-American women.

Developmental age

In 2008 Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach, in a study conducted on children, found that boys displayed in-group favoritism from ages 3–8, whereas girls did not display such tendencies. The experiment involved usage of an "envy game", a modified version of the dictator game. A possible explanation posited by researchers relied on an evolutionary basis.

They theorized that parochialism and favoring members of the same group may have been particularly advantageous as it strengthened the individuals group position in intergroup conflicts. As males were the ones who were frequently at the forefront of such conflicts in the past, and thus bore the majority of the costs of conflicts in terms of injury or death, evolution may have favored a greater sensitivity in males in situations which resulted in an advantageous payoff for their in-group. Thus males tended to show in-group biases from a younger age than females, as was evident in the experiment.

Real-world examples

Armenian Genocide denial

A 2013 study found that Turks with a stronger in-group bias were less likely to acknowledge the in-group responsibility for the Armenian genocide.

2008 US Presidential elections

A study conducted during the 2008 Presidential elections showcased how group identities were dynamic. The study was carried out among 395 Democrats from Cambridge, MA, using an Economics dictator game. Subjects were given $6 to divide between themselves and another person. The recipients remained anonymous, apart from which candidate they supported in the Democratic Primaries.

Data were collected in three separate periods. June 10 to 18 (after Hillary Clinton's concession speech on June 7); August 9 to 14, before the Democratic National Convention on the 25; and September 2 to 5, in the buildup to the Presidential elections. The results showed that men displayed significant in-group favoritism from June all the way to the DNC in August. This in-group bias, however, was not present in September. Women displayed no significant in-group favoritism throughout.

The experiment suggested that group identities are flexible and can change over time. Researchers theorized that in-group bias was strong in June, as the competition to be the Democratic nominee in the elections was still recent and thus salient. A lack of actual electoral conflict (against the Republicans) caused perception of salient groupings to remain throughout August. Only in September did the in-group favoritism subside as a superordinate goal shared between groups was now present.

Wikipedia

Research analyzing articles about 35 inter-group conflicts (e.g., Falklands War) by comparing the corresponding language versions of Wikipedia (e.g., English, Spanish) found evidence for in-group favoritism: While the "in-group" was systematically preferred and presented in a more favorable light, the "out-group" was presented as more immoral and more responsible for the conflict. There were substantial variations between conflicts, however, and additional analyses revealed in-group favoritism to be more pronounced in more recent conflicts and in articles written predominantly by "in-group" members.

Versus out-group negativity

Social psychologists have long made the distinction between ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity, where outgroup negativity is the act of punishing or placing burdens upon the outgroup. Indeed, a significant body of research exists that attempts to identify the relationship between ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity, as well as conditions that will lead to outgroup negativity. For example, Struch and Schwartz found support for the predictions of belief congruence theory. The belief congruence theory concerns itself with the degree of similarity in beliefs, attitudes, and values perceived to exist between individuals. This theory also states that dissimilarity increases negative orientations towards others. When applied to racial discrimination, the belief congruence theory argues that the perceived dissimilarity of beliefs has more of an impact on racial discrimination than does race itself.

Research finds evidence of in-group bias in police investigations and judicial decisions.

Biological relationship

Oxytocin is not only correlated with the preferences of individuals to associate with members of their own group, but it is also evident during conflicts between members of different groups. During conflict, individuals receiving nasally administered oxytocin demonstrate more frequent defense-motivated responses toward in-group members than out-group members. Further, oxytocin was correlated with participant desire to protect vulnerable in-group members, despite that individual's attachment to the conflict. Similarly, it has been demonstrated that when oxytocin is administered, individuals alter their subjective preferences in order to align with in-group ideals over out-group ideals. These studies demonstrate that oxytocin is associated with intergroup dynamics.

Further, oxytocin influences the responses of individuals in a particular group to those of another group. The in-group bias is evident in smaller groups; however, it can also be extended to groups as large as one's entire country leading toward a tendency of strong national zeal. A study done in the Netherlands showed that oxytocin increased the in-group favoritism of their nation while decreasing acceptance of members of other ethnicities and foreigners. People also show more affection for their country's flag while remaining indifferent to other cultural objects when exposed to oxytocin. It has thus been hypothesized that this hormone may be a factor in xenophobic tendencies secondary to this effect. Thus, oxytocin appears to affect individuals at an international level where the in-group becomes a specific "home" country and the out-group grows to include all other countries.

In-group derogation

Cross-cultural studies have found that in-group derogation, the tendency to criticize members of one's own group or culture more harshly than members of outside groups, is more common among members of disadvantaged and minority groups than among members of the majority or dominant group. According to Ma-Kellams, Spencer-Rodgers and Peng, system justification theory seeks to explain why "minorities sometimes endorse system-justifying views of their group". They said their research into in-group favoritism and derogation partially supported this theory, but that the theory failed to address all of the nuances.

Ma-Kellams et al. also found that, compared to individualist cultures, people from collectivist cultures, such as East Asian cultures, tended to judge their own group members less favorably than they judged outsiders, whereas people from individualist cultures were inclined to judge members of their own group more favorably than they judged outsiders. Social identity theory and Freudian theorists explain in-group derogation as the result of a negative self-image, which they believe is then extended to the group. Ma-Kellams et al. theorized that "ingroup derogation may be more culturally normative and less troubling for East Asians" as evidenced by the fact that East Asians were also likely to report high levels of positive affect (emotion) towards members of their in-group, demonstrating ambivalence towards the unfavorable characteristics they had acknowledged about their in-group. According to Ma-Kellam et al., culturally-ingrained attitudes and beliefs, rather than low self-esteem, may play a role in collectivist cultures' in-group derogation, due to their ability to tolerate holding seemingly contradictory views.

Operator (computer programming)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operator_(computer_programmin...