Critique of political economy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critique_of_political_economy

Critique of political economy or simply the first critique of economy is a form of social critique that rejects the conventional ways of distributing resources. The critique also rejects what its advocates believe are unrealistic axioms, faulty historical assumptions,  and taking conventional economic mechanisms as a given or as transhistorical (true for all human societies for all time). The critique asserts the conventional economy is merely one of many types of historically specific ways to distribute resources, which emerged along with modernity (post-Renaissance Western society).

Critics of political economy do not necessarily aim to create their own theories regarding how to administer economies. Critics of economy commonly view "the economy" as a bundle of concepts and societal and normative practices, rather than being the result of any self-evident economic laws. Hence, they also tend to consider the views which are commonplace within the field of economics as faulty, or simply as pseudoscience.

There are multiple critiques of political economy today, but what they have in common is critique of what critics of political economy tend to view as dogma, i.e. claims of the economy as a necessary and transhistorical societal category.

John Ruskin

John Ruskin portrayed in his thirties

In the 1860s, John Ruskin published his essay Unto This Last which he came to view as his central work. The essay was originally written as a series of publications in a magazine, which ended up having to suspend the publications, due to the severe controversy the articles caused. While Ruskin is generally known as an important art critic, his study of the history of art was a component that gave him some insight into the pre-modern societies of the Middle Ages, and their social organisation which he was able to contrast to his contemporary condition. Ruskin attempted to mobilize a methodological/scientific critique of new political economy, as it was envisaged by the classical economists.

Ruskin viewed the concept of "the economy" as a kind of "collective mental lapse or collective concussion", and he viewed the emphasis on precision in industry as a kind of slavery. Due to the fact that Ruskin regarded the political economy of his time as "mad", he said that it interested him as much as "a science of gymnastics which had as its axiom that human beings in fact didn't have skeletons." Ruskin declared that economics rests on positions that are exactly the same. According to Ruskin, these axioms resemble thinking, not that human beings do not have skeletons but rather that they consist entirely of skeletons. Ruskin wrote that he didn't oppose the truth value of this theory, he merely wrote that he denied that it could be successfully implemented in the world in the state it was in. He took issue with the ideas of "natural laws", "economic man", and the prevailing notion of value and aimed to point out the inconsistencies in the thinking of the economists. He critiqued John Stuart Mill for thinking that "the opinions of the public" was reflected adequately by market prices.

Ruskin coined illth to refer to unproductive wealth. Ruskin is not well known as a political thinker today but when in 1906 a journalist asked the first generation of Labour Party members of Parliament in the United Kingdom which book had most inspired them, Unto This Last emerged as an undisputed chart-topper.

"... the art of becoming 'rich,' in the common sense, is not absolutely nor finally the art of accumulating much money for ourselves, but also of contriving that our neighbours shall have less. In accurate terms, it is 'the art of establishing the maximum inequality in our own favour.'"

— John Ruskin, Unto This Last

Criticism

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels regarded much of Ruskin's critique as reactionary. His idealisation of the Middle Ages made them reject him as a "feudal utopian".

Karl Marx

Karl Marx is the author of Das Kapital (Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie) [Capital: A Critique of Political Economy].

In the 21st century, Marx is probably the most famous critic of political economy, with his three-volume magnum opus, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, as one of his most famous books. Marx's companion Engels also engaged in critique of political economy in his 1844 Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy, which helped lay down some of the foundation for what Marx was to take further.

Marx's critique of political economy encompasses the study and exposition of the mode of production and ideology of bourgeois society, and its critique of Realabstraktionen (real abstraction), that is, the fundamental economic, i.e. social categories present within what for Marx is the capitalist mode of production, for example abstract labour. In contrast to the classics of political economy, Marx was concerned with lifting the ideological veil of surface phenomena and exposing the norms, axioms, social relations, institutions, and so on, that reproduced capital.

The central works in Marx's critique of political economy are Grundrisse, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and Das Kapital. Marx's works are often explicitly named – for example: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, or Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Marx cited Engels' article Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy several times in Das Kapital. Trotskyists and other Leninists tend to implicitly or explicitly argue that these works constitute and or contain "economical theories", which can be studied independently. This was also the common understanding of Marx's work on economy that was put forward by Soviet orthodoxy. Since this is the case, it remains a matter of controversy whether Marx's critique of political economy is to be understood as a critique of the political economy or, according to the orthodox interpretation another theory of economics. The critique of political economy is considered the most important and central project within Marxism which has led to, and continues to lead to a large number of advanced approaches within and outside academic circles.

Foundational concepts

• Labour and capital are historically specific forms of social relations, and labour is not the source of all wealth.
• Labour is the other side of the same coin as capital, labour presupposes capital, and capital presupposes labour.
• Money is not in any way something transhistorical or natural, which goes for the whole economy as well as the other categories specific to the mode of production), and its gains in value are constituted due to social relations rather than any inherent qualities.
• The individual does not exist in some form of vacuum but is rather enmeshed in social relations.

Marx's critique of the quasi-religious and ahistorical methodology of economists

Marx described the view of contemporaneous economists and theologians on social phenomena as similarly unscientific.

"Economists have a singular method of procedure. There are only two kinds of institutions for them, artificial and natural. The institutions of feudalism are artificial institutions, those of the bourgeoisie are natural institutions. In this, they resemble the theologians, who likewise establish two kinds of religion. Every religion which is not theirs is an invention of men, while their own is an emanation from God. When the economists say that present-day relations – the relations of bourgeois production – are natural, they imply that these are the relations in which wealth is created and productive forces developed in conformity with the laws of nature. These relations, therefore, are themselves natural laws independent of the influence of time. They are eternal laws that must always govern society. Thus, there has been history, but there is no longer any. There has been history, since there were the institutions of feudalism, and in these institutions of feudalism we find quite different relations of production from those of bourgeois society, which the economists try to pass off as natural and as such, eternal."

— Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy

Marx continued to emphasize the ahistorical thought of the modern economists in the Grundrisse, where he among other endeavors, critiqued the liberal economist Mill. Marx also viewed the viewpoints which implicitly regarded the institutions of modernity as transhistorical as fundamentally deprived of historical understanding.

Individuals producing in society, and hence the socially determined production of individuals, is, of course, the point of departure. The solitary and isolated hunter or fisherman, who serves Adam Smith and Ricardo as a starting point, is one of the unimaginative fantasies of eighteenth-century romances a la Robinson Crusoe; and despite the assertions of social historians, these by no means signify simply a reaction against over-refinement and reversion to a misconceived natural life. No more is Rousseau's contract social, which by means of a contract establishes a relationship and connection between subjects that are by nature independent, based on this kind of naturalism. ... The individual in this society of free competition seems to be rid of natural ties, etc., which made him an appurtenance of a particular, limited aggregation of human beings in previous historical epochs. The prophets of the eighteenth century, on whose shoulders Adam Smith and Ricardo were still wholly standing, envisaged this 18th-century individual – a product of the dissolution of feudal society on the one hand and of the new productive forces evolved since the sixteenth century on the other – as an ideal whose existence belonged to the past. They saw this individual not as a historical result, but as the starting point of history; not as something evolving in the course of history, but posited by nature, because for them this individual was in conformity with nature, in keeping with their idea of human nature. This delusion has been characteristic of every new epoch hitherto.

— Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Introduction)

German edition of Das Kapital. It is a famous critique of political economy written by Marx.

According to the French philosopher Jacques Rancière, what Marx understood, and what the economists failed to recognise was that the value-form is not something essential, but merely a part of the capitalist mode of production.

On scientifically adequate research

Marx offered a critique regarding the idea of people being able to conduct scientific research in this domain. He wrote:

"In the domain of Political Economy, free scientific inquiry meets not merely the same enemies as in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the materials it deals with, summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean, and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest. The English Established Church, e.g., will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on 1/39 of its income. Nowadays atheism is culpa levis [a relatively slight sin, c.f. mortal sin], as compared with criticism of existing property relations."

— Karl Marx, Das Kapital (Preface to the First German Edition)

On vulgar economists

Marx criticized what he regarded as the false critique of political economy of his contemporaries, sometimes even more forcefully than when he critiqued the classical economists he described as vulgar economists. In Marx's view, the errors of some socialist authors led the workers' movement astray. He rejected Ferdinand Lassalle's iron law of wages, which he regarded as mere phraseology. He also rejected Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's attempts to do what Hegel did for religion, law, and so on for political economy, as well as regarding what is social as subjective, and what was societal as merely subjective abstractions.

Interpretations of Marx's critique of political economy

Some scholars view Marx's critique as being a critique of commodity fetishism and the manner in which this concept expresses a criticism of modernity and its modes of socialisation. Other scholars who engage with Marx's critique of political economy affirm the critique might assume a more Kantian sense, which transforms "Marx's work into a foray concerning the imminent antinomies that lie at the heart of capitalism, where politics and economy intertwine in impossible ways."

Contemporary Marxian

Regarding contemporary Marxian critiques of political economy, these are generally accompanied by a rejection of the more naturalistically influenced readings of Marx, as well as other readings later deemed weltanschaaungsmarxismus (worldview Marxism), that was popularised as late as toward the end of the 20th century.

According to some scholars in this field, contemporary critiques of political economy and contemporary German Ökonomiekritik have been at least partly neglected in the anglophone world.

Feminism

There has been a growing literature on feminist critiques of economics in the 21st century. But feminist critiques of economics can be found as early as the beginning of the 18th century. According to Julie A. Nelson, feminist critiques of economics should start from the premise that "economics, like any science, is socially constructed." These feminists therefore argue economics is a field socially constructed to privilege Western, and heterosexual persons that identify as male.

They generally incorporate feminist theory and frameworks to show how economics communities signal expectations regarding appropriate participants to the exclusion of outsiders. Such criticisms extend to the theories, methodologies and research areas of economics, in order to show that accounts of economic life are deeply influenced by biased histories, social structures, norms, cultural practices, interpersonal interactions, and politics. Feminists often also make a critical distinction that masculine bias in economics is primarily a result of gender, not sex. But feminist critiques of economics, and the economy, can also include other views such as concern with an ever increasing rate of environmental degradation.

Differences between critics of economy and critics of economical issues

One may differentiate between those who engage in critique of political economy, which takes on a more ontological character, where authors criticise the fundamental concepts and social categories which reproduce the economy as an entity. While other authors, which the critics of political economy would consider only to deal with the surface phenomena of the economy, have a naturalized understanding of these social processes. Hence the epistemological differences between critics of economy and economists can also at times be very large.

In the eyes of the critics of political economy, the critics of economic issues merely critique certain practices in attempts to implicitly or explicitly rescue the political economy; these authors might for example propose universal basic income or to implement a planned economy.

Illusory correlation

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusory_correlation

In psychology, illusory correlation is the phenomenon of perceiving a relationship between variables (typically people, events, or behaviors) even when no such relationship exists. A false association may be formed because rare or novel occurrences are more salient and therefore tend to capture one's attention. This phenomenon is one way stereotypes form and endure. Hamilton & Rose (1980) found that stereotypes can lead people to expect certain groups and traits to fit together, and then to overestimate the frequency with which these correlations actually occur. These stereotypes can be learned and perpetuated without any actual contact occurring between the holder of the stereotype and the group it is about.

History

"Illusory correlation" was originally coined by Chapman and Chapman (1967) to describe people's tendencies to overestimate relationships between two groups when distinctive and unusual information is presented. The concept was used to question claims about objective knowledge in clinical psychology through Chapmans' refutation of many clinicians' widely used Wheeler signs for homosexuality in Rorschach tests.

Example

David Hamilton and Robert Gifford (1976) conducted a series of experiments that demonstrated how stereotypic beliefs regarding minorities could derive from illusory correlation processes. To test their hypothesis, Hamilton and Gifford had research participants read a series of sentences describing either desirable or undesirable behaviors, which were attributed to either Group A (the majority) or Group B (the minority). Abstract groups were used so that no previously established stereotypes would influence results. Most of the sentences were associated with Group A, and the remaining few were associated with Group B. The following table summarizes the information given.

Behaviors	Group A (majority)	Group B (minority)	Total
Desirable	18 (69%)	9 (69%)	27
Undesirable	8 (30%)	4 (30%)	12
Total	26	13	39

Each group had the same proportions of positive and negative behaviors, so there was no real association between behaviors and group membership. Results of the study show that positive, desirable behaviors were not seen as distinctive so people were accurate in their associations. On the other hand, when distinctive, undesirable behaviors were represented in the sentences, the participants overestimated how much the minority group exhibited the behaviors.

A parallel effect occurs when people judge whether two events, such as pain and bad weather, are correlated. They rely heavily on the relatively small number of cases where the two events occur together. People pay relatively little attention to the other kinds of observation (of no pain or good weather).

Theories

General theory

Most explanations for illusory correlation involve psychological heuristics: information processing short-cuts that underlie many human judgments. One of these is availability: the ease with which an idea comes to mind. Availability is often used to estimate how likely an event is or how often it occurs. This can result in illusory correlation, because some pairings can come easily and vividly to mind even though they are not especially frequent.

Information processing

Martin Hilbert (2012) proposes an information processing mechanism that assumes a noisy conversion of objective observations into subjective judgments. The theory defines noise as the mixing of these observations during retrieval from memory. According to the model, underlying cognitions or subjective judgments are identical with noise or objective observations that can lead to overconfidence or what is known as conservatism bias—when asked about behavior participants underestimate the majority or larger group and overestimate the minority or smaller group. These results are illusory correlations.

Working-memory capacity

In an experimental study done by Eder, Fiedler and Hamm-Eder (2011), the effects of working-memory capacity on illusory correlations were investigated. They first looked at the individual differences in working memory, and then looked to see if that had any effect on the formation of illusory correlations. They found that individuals with higher working memory capacity viewed minority group members more positively than individuals with lower working memory capacity. In a second experiment, the authors looked into the effects of memory load in working memory on illusory correlations. They found that increased memory load in working memory led to an increase in the prevalence of illusory correlations. The experiment was designed to specifically test working memory and not substantial stimulus memory. This means that the development of illusory correlations was caused by deficiencies in central cognitive resources caused by the load in working memory, not selective recall.

Attention theory of learning

Attention theory of learning proposes that features of majority groups are learned first, and then features of minority groups. This results in an attempt to distinguish the minority group from the majority, leading to these differences being learned more quickly. The Attention theory also argues that, instead of forming one stereotype regarding the minority group, two stereotypes, one for the majority and one for the minority, are formed.

Effect of learning

A study was conducted to investigate whether increased learning would have any effect on illusory correlations. It was found that educating people about how illusory correlation occurs resulted in a decreased incidence of illusory correlations.

Age

Johnson and Jacobs (2003) performed an experiment to see how early in life individuals begin forming illusory correlations. Children in grades 2 and 5 were exposed to a typical illusory correlation paradigm to see if negative attributes were associated with the minority group. The authors found that both groups formed illusory correlations.

A study also found that children create illusory correlations. In their experiment, children in grades 1, 3, 5, and 7, and adults all looked at the same illusory correlation paradigm. The study found that children did create significant illusory correlations, but those correlations were weaker than the ones created by adults. In a second study, groups of shapes with different colors were used. The formation of illusory correlation persisted showing that social stimuli are not necessary for creating these correlations.

Explicit versus implicit attitudes

Two studies performed by Ratliff and Nosek examined whether or not explicit and implicit attitudes affected illusory correlations. In one study, Ratliff and Nosek had two groups: one a majority and the other a minority. They then had three groups of participants, all with readings about the two groups. One group of participants received overwhelming pro-majority readings, one was given pro-minority readings, and one received neutral readings. The groups that had pro-majority and pro-minority readings favored their respective pro groups both explicitly and implicitly. The group that had neutral readings favored the majority explicitly, but not implicitly. The second study was similar, but instead of readings, pictures of behaviors were shown, and the participants wrote a sentence describing the behavior they saw in the pictures presented. The findings of both studies supported the authors' argument that the differences found between the explicit and implicit attitudes is a result of the interpretation of the covariation and making judgments based on these interpretations (explicit) instead of just accounting for the covariation (implicit).

Paradigm structure

Berndsen et al. (1999) wanted to determine if the structure of testing for illusory correlations could lead to the formation of illusory correlations. The hypothesis was that identifying test variables as Group A and Group B might be causing the participants to look for differences between the groups, resulting in the creation of illusory correlations. An experiment was set up where one set of participants were told the groups were Group A and Group B, while another set of participants were given groups labeled as students who graduated in 1993 or 1994. This study found that illusory correlations were more likely to be created when the groups were Group A and B, as compared to students of the class of 1993 or the class of 1994.

Formal fallacy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_fallacy

In philosophy, a formal fallacy, deductive fallacy, logical fallacy or non sequitur (/ˌnɒn ˈsɛkwɪtər/; Latin for "[it] does not follow") is a pattern of reasoning rendered invalid by a flaw in its logical structure that can neatly be expressed in a standard logic system, for example propositional logic. It is defined as a deductive argument that is invalid. The argument itself could have true premises, but still have a false conclusion. Thus, a formal fallacy is a fallacy where deduction goes wrong, and is no longer a logical process. This may not affect the truth of the conclusion, since validity and truth are separate in formal logic.

While a logical argument is a non sequitur if, and only if, it is invalid, the term "non sequitur" typically refers to those types of invalid arguments which do not constitute formal fallacies covered by particular terms (e.g., affirming the consequent). In other words, in practice, "non sequitur" refers to an unnamed formal fallacy.

A special case is a mathematical fallacy, an intentionally invalid mathematical proof, often with the error subtle and somehow concealed. Mathematical fallacies are typically crafted and exhibited for educational purposes, usually taking the form of spurious proofs of obvious contradictions.

A formal fallacy is contrasted with an informal fallacy which may have a valid logical form and yet be unsound because one or more premises are false. A formal fallacy; however, may have a true premise, but a false conclusion.

Taxonomy

Prior Analytics is Aristotle's treatise on deductive reasoning and the syllogism. The standard Aristotelian logical fallacies are:

• Fallacy of four terms (Quaternio terminorum);
• Fallacy of the undistributed middle;
• Fallacy of illicit process of the major or the minor term;
• Affirmative conclusion from a negative premise.

Other logical fallacies include:

• The self-reliant fallacy

In philosophy, the term logical fallacy properly refers to a formal fallacy—a flaw in the structure of a deductive argument, which renders the argument invalid.

It is often used more generally in informal discourse to mean an argument that is problematic for any reason, and encompasses informal fallacies as well as formal fallacies—valid but unsound claims or poor non-deductive argumentation.

The presence of a formal fallacy in a deductive argument does not imply anything about the argument's premises or its conclusion (see fallacy fallacy). Both may actually be true, or even more probable as a result of the argument (e.g. appeal to authority), but the deductive argument is still invalid because the conclusion does not follow from the premises in the manner described. By extension, an argument can contain a formal fallacy even if the argument is not a deductive one; for instance an inductive argument that incorrectly applies principles of probability or causality can be said to commit a formal fallacy.

Affirming the consequent

Main article: Affirming the consequent

Any argument that takes the following form is a non sequitur:

1. If A is true, then B is true.
2. B is true.
3. Therefore, A is true.

Even if the premise and conclusion are both true, the conclusion is not a necessary consequence of the premise. This sort of non sequitur is also called affirming the consequent.

An example of affirming the consequent would be:

1. If Jackson is a human (A), then Jackson is a mammal. (B)
2. Jackson is a mammal. (B)
3. Therefore, Jackson is a human. (A)

While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise:

1. Humans are mammals.
2. Jackson is a mammal.
3. Therefore, Jackson is a human.

The truth of the conclusion is independent of the truth of its premise – it is a 'non sequitur', since Jackson might be a mammal without being human. He might be an elephant.

Affirming the consequent is essentially the same as the fallacy of the undistributed middle, but using propositions rather than set membership.

Denying the antecedent

Main article: Denying the antecedent

Another common non sequitur is this:

1. If A is true, then B is true.
2. A is false.
3. Therefore, B is false.

While B can indeed be false, this cannot be linked to the premise since the statement is a non sequitur. This is called denying the antecedent.

An example of denying the antecedent would be:

1. If I am Japanese, then I am Asian.
2. I am not Japanese.
3. Therefore, I am not Asian.

While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise. The statement's declarant could be another ethnicity of Asia, e.g., Chinese, in which case the premise would be true but the conclusion false. This argument is still a fallacy even if the conclusion is true.

Affirming a disjunct

Main article: Affirming a disjunct

Affirming a disjunct is a fallacy when in the following form:

1. A or B is true.
2. B is true.
3. Therefore, A is not true.*

The conclusion does not follow from the premise as it could be the case that A and B are both true. This fallacy stems from the stated definition of or in propositional logic to be inclusive.

An example of affirming a disjunct would be:

1. I am at home or I am in the city.
2. I am at home.
3. Therefore, I am not in the city.

While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise. For all the reader knows, the declarant of the statement very well could be in both the city and their home, in which case the premises would be true but the conclusion false. This argument is still a fallacy even if the conclusion is true.

*Note that this is only a logical fallacy when the word "or" is in its inclusive form. If the two possibilities in question are mutually exclusive, this is not a logical fallacy. For example,

1. I am either at home or I am in the city. (but not both)
2. I am at home.
3. Therefore, I am not in the city.

Denying a conjunct

Denying a conjunct is a fallacy when in the following form:

1. It is not the case that A and B are both true.
2. B is not true.
3. Therefore, A is true.

The conclusion does not follow from the premise as it could be the case that A and B are both false.

An example of denying a conjunct would be:

1. I cannot be both at home and in the city.
2. I am not at home.
3. Therefore, I am in the city.

While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise. For all the reader knows, the declarant of the statement very well could neither be at home nor in the city, in which case the premise would be true but the conclusion false. This argument is still a fallacy even if the conclusion is true.

Illicit commutativity

Illicit commutativity is a fallacy when in the following form:

1. If A is the case, then B is the case.
2. Therefore, if B is the case, then A is the case.

The conclusion does not follow from the premise as unlike other logical connectives, the implies operator is one-way only. "P and Q" is the same as "Q and P", but "P implies Q" is not the same as "Q implies P".

An example of this fallacy is as follows:

1. If it is raining, then I have my umbrella.
2. If I have my umbrella, then it is raining.

While this may appear to be a reasonable argument, it is not valid because the first statement does not logically guarantee the second statement. The first statement says nothing like "I do not have my umbrella otherwise", which means that having my umbrella on a sunny day would render the first statement true and the second statement false.

Fallacy of the undistributed middle

Main article: Fallacy of the undistributed middle

The fallacy of the undistributed middle is a fallacy that is committed when the middle term in a categorical syllogism is not distributed. It is a syllogistic fallacy. More specifically it is also a form of non sequitur.

The fallacy of the undistributed middle takes the following form:

1. All Zs are Bs.
2. Y is a B.
3. Therefore, Y is a Z.

It may or may not be the case that "all Zs are Bs", but in either case it is irrelevant to the conclusion. What is relevant to the conclusion is whether it is true that "all Bs are Zs," which is ignored in the argument.

An example can be given as follows, where B=mammals, Y=Mary and Z=humans:

1. All humans are mammals.
2. Mary is a mammal.
3. Therefore, Mary is a human.

Note that if the terms (Z and B) were swapped around in the first co-premise then it would no longer be a fallacy and would be correct.

In contrast to informal fallacy

Main article: Informal fallacy

Formal logic is not used to determine whether or not an argument is true. Formal arguments can either be valid or invalid. A valid argument may also be sound or unsound:

• A valid argument has a correct formal structure. A valid argument is one where if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true.
• A sound argument is a formally correct argument that also contains true premises.

Ideally, the best kind of formal argument is a sound, valid argument.

Formal fallacies do not take into account the soundness of an argument, but rather its validity. Premises in formal logic are commonly represented by letters (most commonly p and q). A fallacy occurs when the structure of the argument is incorrect, despite the truth of the premises.

As modus ponens, the following argument contains no formal fallacies:

1. If P then Q
2. P
3. Therefore, Q

A logical fallacy associated with this format of argument is referred to as affirming the consequent, which would look like this:

1. If P then Q
2. Q
3. Therefore, P

This is a fallacy because it does not take into account other possibilities. To illustrate this more clearly, substitute the letters with premises:

1. If it rains, the street will be wet.
2. The street is wet.
3. Therefore, it rained.

Although it is possible that this conclusion is true, it does not necessarily mean it must be true. The street could be wet for a variety of other reasons that this argument does not take into account. If we look at the valid form of the argument, we can see that the conclusion must be true:

1. If it rains, the street will be wet.
2. It rained.
3. Therefore, the street is wet.

This argument is valid and, if it did rain, it would also be sound.

If statements 1 and 2 are true, it absolutely follows that statement 3 is true. However, it may still be the case that statement 1 or 2 is not true. For example:

1. If Albert Einstein makes a statement about science, it is correct.
2. Albert Einstein states that all quantum mechanics is deterministic.
3. Therefore, it's true that quantum mechanics is deterministic.

In this case, statement 1 is false. The particular informal fallacy being committed in this assertion is argument from authority. By contrast, an argument with a formal fallacy could still contain all true premises:

1. If an animal is a dog, then it has four legs.
2. My cat has four legs.
3. Therefore, my cat is a dog.

Although 1 and 2 are true statements, 3 does not follow because the argument commits the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent.

An argument could contain both an informal fallacy and a formal fallacy yet lead to a conclusion that happens to be true, for example, again affirming the consequent, now also from an untrue premise:

1. If a scientist makes a statement about science, it is correct.
2. It is true that quantum mechanics is deterministic.
3. Therefore, a scientist has made a statement about it.

Common examples

Main article: List of fallacies

"Some of your key evidence is missing, incomplete, or even faked! That proves I'm right!"

"The vet can't find any reasonable explanation for why my dog died. See! See! That proves that you poisoned him! There’s no other logical explanation!"

An Euler diagram illustrating a fallacy:
Statement 1: Most of the green is touching the red.
Statement 2: Most of the red is touching the blue.
Logical fallacy: Since most of the green is touching red, and most of the red is touching blue, most of the green must be touching blue. This, however, is a false statement.

In the strictest sense, a logical fallacy is the incorrect application of a valid logical principle or an application of a nonexistent principle:

1. Most Rimnars are Jornars.
2. Most Jornars are Dimnars.
3. Therefore, most Rimnars are Dimnars.

This is fallacious. And so is this:

1. People in Kentucky support a border fence.
2. People in New York do not support a border fence.
3. Therefore, people in New York do not support people in Kentucky.

Indeed, there is no logical principle that states:

1. For some x, P(x).
2. For some x, Q(x).
3. Therefore, for some x, P(x) and Q(x).

An easy way to show the above inference as invalid is by using Venn diagrams. In logical parlance, the inference is invalid, since under at least one interpretation of the predicates it is not validity preserving.

People often have difficulty applying the rules of logic. For example, a person may say the following syllogism is valid, when in fact it is not:

1. All birds have beaks.
2. That creature has a beak.
3. Therefore, that creature is a bird.

"That creature" may well be a bird, but the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Certain other animals also have beaks, for example: an octopus and a squid both have beaks, some turtles and cetaceans have beaks. Errors of this type occur because people reverse a premise. In this case, "All birds have beaks" is converted to "All beaked animals are birds." The reversed premise is plausible because few people are aware of any instances of beaked creatures besides birds—but this premise is not the one that was given. In this way, the deductive fallacy is formed by points that may individually appear logical, but when placed together are shown to be incorrect.

Non sequitur in everyday speech

Main article: Non sequitur (literary device)

See also: Derailment (thought disorder)

In everyday speech, a non sequitur is a statement in which the final part is totally unrelated to the first part, for example:

Life is life and fun is fun, but it's all so quiet when the goldfish die.

— West with the Night, Beryl Markham

False dilemma

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_dilemma

 

Young America's dilemma: Shall I be wise and great, or rich and powerful? (poster from 1901)

A false dilemma, also referred to as false dichotomy or false binary, is an informal fallacy based on a premise that erroneously limits what options are available. The source of the fallacy lies not in an invalid form of inference but in a false premise. This premise has the form of a disjunctive claim: it asserts that one among a number of alternatives must be true. This disjunction is problematic because it oversimplifies the choice by excluding viable alternatives, presenting the viewer with only two absolute choices when in fact, there could be many.

For example, a false dilemma is committed when it is claimed that "Stacey spoke out against capitalism; therefore, she must be a communist". One of the options excluded is that Stacey may be neither communist nor capitalist.

False dilemmas often have the form of treating two contraries, which may both be false, as contradictories, of which one is necessarily true. Various inferential schemes are associated with false dilemmas, for example, the constructive dilemma, the destructive dilemma or the disjunctive syllogism. False dilemmas are usually discussed in terms of deductive arguments, but they can also occur as defeasible arguments.

Our liability to commit false dilemmas may be due to the tendency to simplify reality by ordering it through either-or-statements, which is to some extent already built into our language. This may also be connected to the tendency to insist on clear distinction while denying the vagueness of many common expressions.

Definition

A false dilemma is an informal fallacy based on a premise that erroneously limits what options are available. In its most simple form, called the fallacy of bifurcation, all but two alternatives are excluded. A fallacy is an argument, i.e. a series of premises together with a conclusion, that is unsound, i.e. not both valid and true. Fallacies are usually divided into formal and informal fallacies. Formal fallacies are unsound because of their structure, while informal fallacies are unsound because of their content. The problematic content in the case of the false dilemma has the form of a disjunctive claim: it asserts that one among a number of alternatives must be true. This disjunction is problematic because it oversimplifies the choice by excluding viable alternatives. Sometimes a distinction is made between a false dilemma and a false dichotomy. On this view, the term "false dichotomy" refers to the false disjunctive claim while the term "false dilemma" refers not just to this claim but to the argument based on this claim.

Types

Disjunction with contraries

In its most common form, a false dilemma presents the alternatives as contradictories, while in truth they are merely contraries. Two propositions are contradictories if it has to be the case that one is true and the other is false. Two propositions are contraries if at most one of them can be true. But this leaves open the option that both of them might be false, which is not possible in the case of contradictories. Contradictories follow the law of the excluded middle but contraries do not. For example, the sentence "the exact number of marbles in the urn is either 10 or not 10" presents two contradictory alternatives. The sentence "the exact number of marbles in the urn is either 10 or 11" presents two contrary alternatives: the urn could also contain 2 marbles or 17 marbles or... A common form of using contraries in false dilemmas is to force a choice between extremes on the agent: someone is either good or bad, rich or poor, normal or abnormal. Such cases ignore that there is a continuous spectrum between the extremes that is excluded from the choice. While false dilemmas involving contraries, i.e. exclusive options, are a very common form, this is just a special case: there are also arguments with non-exclusive disjunctions that are false dilemmas. For example, a choice between security and freedom does not involve contraries since these two terms are compatible with each other.

Logical forms

In logic, there are two main types of inferences known as dilemmas: the constructive dilemma and the destructive dilemma. In their most simple form, they can be expressed in the following way:

• simple constructive: ${\displaystyle \frac{(P\to Q),(R\to Q),(P\vee R)}{\therefore Q}}$
• simple destructive: ${\displaystyle \frac{(P\to Q),(P\to R),(\mathrm{\neg }Q\vee \mathrm{\neg }R)}{\therefore \mathrm{\neg }P}}$

The source of the fallacy is found in the disjunctive claim in the third premise, i.e. ${\displaystyle P\vee R}$ and ${\displaystyle \mathrm{\neg }Q\vee \mathrm{\neg }R}$ respectively. The following is an example of a false dilemma with the simple constructive form: (1) "If you tell the truth, you force your friend into a social tragedy; and therefore, are an immoral person". (2) "If you lie, you are an immoral person (since it is immoral to lie)". (3) "Either you tell the truth, or you lie". Therefore "[y]ou are an immoral person (whatever choice you make in the given situation)". This example constitutes a false dilemma because there are other choices besides telling the truth and lying, like keeping silent.

A false dilemma can also occur in the form of a disjunctive syllogism:

• disjunctive syllogism: ${\displaystyle \frac{(P\vee Q),(\mathrm{\neg }P)}{\therefore Q}}$

In this form, the first premise (${\displaystyle P\vee Q}$) is responsible for the fallacious inference. Lewis's trilemma is a famous example of this type of argument involving three disjuncts: "Jesus was either a liar, a lunatic, or Lord". By denying that Jesus was a liar or a lunatic, one is forced to draw the conclusion that he was God. But this leaves out various other alternatives, for example, that Jesus was a prophet, as claimed by the Muslims.

Deductive and defeasible arguments

False dilemmas are usually discussed in terms of deductive arguments. But they can also occur as defeasible arguments. A valid argument is deductive if the truth of its premises ensures the truth of its conclusion. For a valid defeasible argument, on the other hand, it is possible for all its premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. The premises merely offer a certain degree of support for the conclusion but do not ensure it. In the case of a defeasible false dilemma, the support provided for the conclusion is overestimated since various alternatives are not considered in the disjunctive premise.

Explanation and avoidance

Part of understanding fallacies involves going beyond logic to empirical psychology in order to explain why there is a tendency to commit or fall for the fallacy in question. In the case of the false dilemma, the tendency to simplify reality by ordering it through either-or-statements may play an important role. This tendency is to some extent built into our language, which is full of pairs of opposites. This type of simplification is sometimes necessary to make decisions when there is not enough time to get a more detailed perspective.

In order to avoid false dilemmas, the agent should become aware of additional options besides the prearranged alternatives. Critical thinking and creativity may be necessary to see through the false dichotomy and to discover new alternatives.

Relation to distinctions and vagueness

Some philosophers and scholars believe that "unless a distinction can be made rigorous and precise it isn't really a distinction". An exception is analytic philosopher John Searle, who called it an incorrect assumption that produces false dichotomies. Searle insists that "it is a condition of the adequacy of a precise theory of an indeterminate phenomenon that it should precisely characterize that phenomenon as indeterminate; and a distinction is no less a distinction for allowing for a family of related, marginal, diverging cases." Similarly, when two options are presented, they often are, although not always, two extreme points on some spectrum of possibilities; this may lend credence to the larger argument by giving the impression that the options are mutually exclusive, even though they need not be. Furthermore, the options in false dichotomies typically are presented as being collectively exhaustive, in which case the fallacy may be overcome, or at least weakened, by considering other possibilities, or perhaps by considering a whole spectrum of possibilities, as in fuzzy logic. This issue arises from real dichotomies in nature, the most prevalent example is the occurrence of an event. It either happened or it did not happen. This ontology sets a logical construct that cannot be reasonably applied to epistemology.

Examples

False choice

The presentation of a false choice often reflects a deliberate attempt to eliminate several options that may occupy the middle ground on an issue. A common argument against noise pollution laws involves a false choice. It might be argued that in New York City noise should not be regulated, because if it were, a number of businesses would be required to close. This argument assumes that, for example, a bar must be shut down to prevent disturbing levels of noise emanating from it after midnight. This ignores the fact that law could require the bar to lower its noise levels, or install soundproofing structural elements to keep the noise from excessively transmitting onto others' properties.

Black-and-white thinking

See also: Splitting (psychology) and Binary opposition

In psychology, a phenomenon related to the false dilemma is "black-and-white thinking" or "thinking in black and white". There are people who routinely engage in black-and-white thinking, an example of which is someone who categorizes other people as all good or all bad.

Similar concepts

Various different terms are used to refer to false dilemmas. Some of the following terms are equivalent to the term "false dilemma", some refer to special forms of false dilemmas and others refer to closely related concepts.

• bifurcation fallacy
• black-or-white fallacy
• denying a conjunct (similar to a false dichotomy: see Formal fallacy § Denying a conjunct)
• double bind
• either/or fallacy
• fallacy of exhaustive hypotheses
• fallacy of the excluded middle
• fallacy of the false alternative
• false binary
• false choice
• false dichotomy
• invalid disjunction
• no middle ground

Begging the question

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In classical rhetoric and logic, begging the question or assuming the conclusion (Latin: petitio principii) is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion. A question-begging inference is valid, in the sense that the conclusion is as true as the premise, but it is not a valid argument.

For example, the statement that "wool sweaters are superior to nylon jackets because wool sweaters have higher wool content" begs the question because this statement does not explain why higher wool content makes a garment superior. Begging the question is a type of circular reasoning, and often occurs in an indirect way such that the fallacy's presence is hidden, or at least not easily apparent.

The phrase "begs the question" is also commonly used to mean "prompts a question" or "raises a question".

History

Bust of Aristotle, whose Prior Analytics contained an early discussion of this fallacy

The original phrase used by Aristotle from which begging the question descends is: τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς (or sometimes ἐν ἀρχῇ) αἰτεῖν, "asking for the initial thing". Aristotle's intended meaning is closely tied to the type of dialectical argument he discusses in his Topics, book VIII: a formalized debate in which the defending party asserts a thesis that the attacking party must attempt to refute by asking yes-or-no questions and deducing some inconsistency between the responses and the original thesis.

In this stylized form of debate, the proposition that the answerer undertakes to defend is called "the initial thing" (τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ) and one of the rules of the debate is that the questioner cannot simply ask for it (that would be trivial and uninteresting). Aristotle discusses this in Sophistical Refutations and in Prior Analytics book II, (64b, 34–65a 9, for circular reasoning see 57b, 18–59b, 1).

The stylized dialectical exchanges Aristotle discusses in the Topics included rules for scoring the debate, and one important issue was precisely the matter of asking for the initial thing—which included not just making the actual thesis adopted by the answerer into a question, but also making a question out of a sentence that was too close to that thesis (for example, PA II 16).

The term was translated into English from Latin in the 16th century. The Latin version, petitio principii, "asking for the starting point", can be interpreted in different ways. Petitio (from peto), in the post-classical context in which the phrase arose, means assuming or postulating, but in the older classical sense means petition, request or beseeching. Principii, genitive of principium, means beginning, basis or premise (of an argument). Literally petitio principii means "assuming the premise" or "assuming the original point".

The Latin phrase comes from the Greek τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι (tò en archêi aiteîsthai, "asking the original point") in Aristotle's Prior Analytics II xvi 64b28–65a26:

Begging or assuming the point at issue consists (to take the expression in its widest sense) [in] failing to demonstrate the required proposition. But there are several other ways in which this may happen; for example, if the argument has not taken syllogistic form at all, he may argue from premises which are less known or equally unknown, or he may establish the antecedent utilizing its consequents; for demonstration proceeds from what is more certain and is prior. Now begging the question is none of these. [...] If, however, the relation of B to C is such that they are identical, or that they are clearly convertible, or that one applies to the other, then he is begging the point at issue.... [B]egging the question is proving what is not self-evidently employing itself...either because identical predicates belong to the same subject, or because the same predicate belongs to identical subjects.

— Aristotle, Hugh Tredennick (trans.) Prior Analytics

Aristotle's distinction between apodictic science and other forms of nondemonstrative knowledge rests on an epistemology and metaphysics wherein appropriate first principles become apparent to the trained dialectician:

Aristotle's advice in S.E. 27 for resolving fallacies of Begging the Question is brief. If one realizes that one is being asked to concede the original point, one should refuse to do so, even if the point being asked is a reputable belief. On the other hand, if one fails to realize that one has conceded the point at issue and the questioner uses the concession to produce the apparent refutation, then one should turn the tables on the sophistical opponent by oneself pointing out the fallacy committed. In dialectical exchange, it is a worse mistake to be caught asking for the original point than to have inadvertently granted such a request. The answerer in such a position has failed to detect when different utterances mean the same thing. The questioner, if he did not realize he was asking the original point, has committed the same error. But if he has knowingly asked for the original point, then he reveals himself to be ontologically confused: he has mistaken what is non-self-explanatory (known through other things) to be something self-explanatory (known through itself). In pointing this out to the false reasoner, one is not just pointing out a tactical psychological misjudgment by the questioner. It is not simply that the questioner falsely thought that the original point is placed under the guise of a semantic equivalent, or a logical equivalent, or a covering universal, or divided up into exhaustive parts, would be more persuasive to the answerer. Rather, the questioner falsely thought that a non-self-explanatory fact about the world was an explanatory first principle. For Aristotle, that certain facts are self-explanatory while others are not is not a reflection solely of the cognitive abilities of humans. It is primarily a reflection of the structure of noncognitive reality. In short, a successful resolution of such a fallacy requires a firm grasp of the correct explanatory powers of things. Without a knowledge of which things are self-explanatory and which are not the reasoner is liable to find a question-begging argument persuasive.

— Scott Gregory Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning: Language and the World in the Sophistical Refutations

Thomas Fowler believed that petitio principii would be more properly called petitio quæsiti, which is literally "begging the question".

Definition

To "beg the question" (also called petitio principii) is to attempt to support a claim with a premise that itself restates or presupposes the claim. It is an attempt to prove a proposition while simultaneously taking the proposition for granted.

When the fallacy involves only a single variable, it is sometimes called a hysteron proteron (Greek for "later earlier"), a rhetorical device, as in the statement:

Opium induces sleep because it has a soporific quality.

Reading this sentence, the only thing one can learn is a new word in a more classical style (soporific), for referring to a more common action (induces sleep), but it does not explain why it causes that effect. A sentence attempting to explain why opium induces sleep, or the same, why opium has soporific quality, would be the following one:

Opium induces sleep because it contains Morphine-6-glucuronide, which inhibits the brain's receptors for pain, causing a pleasurable sensation that eventually induces sleep.

A less obvious example from Fallacies and Pitfalls of Language: The Language Trap by S. Morris Engel:

Free trade will be good for this country. The reason is patently clear. Isn't it obvious that unrestricted commercial relations will bestow on all sections of this nation the benefits which result when there is an unimpeded flow of goods between countries?

This form of the fallacy may not be immediately obvious. Linguistic variations in syntax, sentence structure, and the literary device may conceal it, as may other factors involved in an argument's delivery. It may take the form of an unstated premise which is essential but not identical to the conclusion, or is "controversial or questionable for the same reasons that typically might lead someone to question the conclusion":

...[S]eldom is anyone going to simply place the conclusion word-for-word into the premises ... Rather, an arguer might use phraseology that conceals the fact that the conclusion is masquerading as a premise. The conclusion is rephrased to look different and is then placed in the premises.

— Paul Herrick

For example, one can obscure the fallacy by first making a statement in concrete terms, then attempting to pass off an identical statement, delivered in abstract terms, as evidence for the original. One could also "bring forth a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin", as here:

To allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State, for it is highly conducive to the interests of the community that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited of expressing his sentiments."

When the fallacy of begging the question is committed in more than one step, some authors dub it circulus in probando (reasoning in a circle) or, more commonly, circular reasoning.

Begging the question is not considered a formal fallacy (an argument that is defective because it uses an incorrect deductive step). Rather, it is a type of informal fallacy that is logically valid but unpersuasive, in that it fails to prove anything other than what is already assumed.

Related fallacies

Main articles: Circular reasoning, Complex question, and Ignoratio elenchi

Closely connected with begging the question is the fallacy of circular reasoning (circulus in probando), a fallacy in which the reasoner begins with the conclusion. The individual components of a circular argument can be logically valid because if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true, and does not lack relevance. However, circular reasoning is not persuasive because a listener who doubts the conclusion also doubts the premise that leads to it.

Begging the question is similar to the complex question (also known as trick question or fallacy of many questions): a question that, to be valid, requires the truth of another question that has not been established. For example, "Which color dress is Mary wearing?" may be fallacious because it presupposes that Mary is wearing a dress. Unless it has previously been established that her outfit is a dress, the question is fallacious because she could be wearing an outfit that was not a dress, such as pants and no dress.

Another related fallacy is ignoratio elenchi or irrelevant conclusion: an argument that fails to address the issue in question, but appears to do so. An example might be a situation where A and B are debating whether the law permits A to do something. If A attempts to support his position with an argument that the law ought to allow him to do the thing in question, then he is guilty of ignoratio elenchi.

Vernacular

In vernacular English, begging the question (or equivalent rephrasing thereof) often occurs in place of "raises the question", "invites the question", "suggests the question", "leaves unanswered the question" etc.. Such preface is then followed with the question, as in:

• "[...] personal letter delivery is at an all-time low... Which begs the question: are open letters the only kind the future will know?"
• "Hopewell's success begs the question: why aren't more companies doing the same?"
• "Spending the summer traveling around India is a great idea, but it does beg the question of how we can afford it."

Sometimes it is further confused with "dodging the question", an attempt to avoid it, or perhaps more often begging the question is simply used to mean leaving the question unanswered.