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Friday, July 21, 2023

Asymmetric warfare

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A Viet Cong base camp being burned during the Vietnam War. An American private first class (PFC) stands by.

Asymmetric warfare (or asymmetric engagement) is a type of war between belligerents whose relative military power, strategy, or tactics differ significantly. This type of warfare often, but not necessarily, involves insurgents or resistance movement militias who may have the status of unlawful combatants against a standing army. 

Asymmetrical warfare can also describe a conflict in which belligerents' resources are uneven, and consequently, they both may attempt to exploit each other's relative weaknesses. Such struggles often involve unconventional warfare, with the weaker side attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in the quantity or quality of their forces and equipment. Such strategies may not necessarily be militarized. This is in contrast to symmetrical warfare, where two powers have comparable military power, resources, and rely on similar tactics.

Asymmetric warfare is a form of irregular warfare – conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation-states. The term is frequently used to describe what is also called guerrilla warfare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, rebellion, terrorism, and counterterrorism.

Definition and differences

The popularity of the term dates from Andrew J. R. Mack's 1975 article "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars" in World Politics, in which "asymmetric" referred simply to a significant disparity in power between opposing actors in a conflict. "Power," in this sense, is broadly understood to mean material power, such as a large army, sophisticated weapons, an advanced economy, and so on. Mack's analysis was largely ignored in its day, but the end of the Cold War sparked renewed interest among academics. By the late 1990s, a new research building off Mack's works was beginning to mature; after 2004, the U.S. military began once again to prioritize responding to challenges presented by asymmetric warfare.

Since 2004, the discussion of asymmetric warfare has been complicated by the tendency of academic and military officials to use the term in different ways, as well as by its close association with guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. Military authors tend to use the term "asymmetric" to refer to the indirect nature of the strategies many weak actors adopt or to the adversary's nature itself (e.g., "asymmetric adversaries can be expected to …") rather than to the relative strength of adversarial forces.

Academic authors tend to focus on explaining two puzzles in asymmetric conflict. First, if "power" determines victory, there must be reasons why weaker actors decide to fight more powerful actors. Key explanations include:

  • Weaker actors may have secret weapons.
  • Weaker actors may have powerful allies.
  • Stronger actors are unable to make threats credible.
  • The demands of a stronger actor are extreme.
  • The weaker actor must consider its regional rivals when responding to threats from powerful actors.

Second, if "power," as generally understood, leads to victory in war, then there must be an explanation for why the "weak" can defeat the "strong." Key explanations include:

  • Strategic interaction.
  • Willingness of the weak to suffer more or bear higher costs.
  • External support of weak actors.
  • Reluctance to escalating violence on the part of strong actors.
  • Internal group dynamics.
  • Inflated strong actor war aims.
  • Evolution of asymmetric rivals' attitudes towards time.

Asymmetric conflicts include interstate and civil wars, and over the past two hundred years, have generally been won by strong actors. Since 1950, however, weak actors have won the majority of asymmetric conflicts.

Strategic basis

In most conventional warfare, the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type, and the outcome can be predicted by the quantity or quality of the opposing forces, for example, better command and control of theirs (c2). There are times when this is the case, and conventional forces are not easily compared, making it difficult for opposing sides to engage. An example of this is the standoff between the continental land forces of the French Army and the maritime forces of the United Kingdom's Royal Navy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In the words of Admiral Jervis during the campaigns of 1801, "I do not say, my Lords, that the French will not come. I say only they will not come by sea", and a confrontation that Napoleon Bonaparte described as that between the elephant and the whale.

Tactical basis

Oil-drum roadside IED in Northern Ireland removed from culvert in 1984

The tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions:

  • One side can have a technological advantage that outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy; the English longbow at the Battle of Crécy is an example.
  • Technological superiority usually is cancelled by the more vulnerable infrastructure, which can be targeted with devastating results. Destruction of multiple electric lines, roads, or water supply systems in highly populated areas could devastate the economy and morale. In contrast, the weaker side may not have these structures at all.
  • Training, tactics, and technology can prove decisive and allow a smaller force to overcome a much larger one. For example, for several centuries, the Greek hoplite's (heavy infantry) use of phalanx made them far superior to their enemies. The Battle of Thermopylae, which also involved good use of terrain, is a well-known example.
  • If the inferior power is in a position of self-defense, i.e., under attack or occupation, it may be possible to use unconventional tactics, such as hit-and-run and selective battles in which the superior power is weaker, as an effective means of harassment without violating the laws of war. Perhaps the classic historical examples of this doctrine may be found in the American Revolutionary War, movements in World War II, such as the French Resistance and Soviet and Yugoslav partisans. Against democratic aggressor nations, this strategy can be used to play on the electorate's patience with the conflict (as in the Vietnam War, and others since), provoking protests, and consequent disputes among elected legislators.
  • However, if the weaker power is in an aggressive position or turns to tactics prohibited by the laws of war (jus in bello), its success depends on the superior power's refraining from like tactics. For example, the law of land warfare prohibits the use of a flag of truce or marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush. Still, an asymmetric combatant using this prohibited tactic to its advantage depends on the superior power's obedience to the corresponding law. Similarly, warfare laws prohibit combatants from using civilian settlements, populations or facilities as military bases, but when an inferior force uses this tactic, it depends on the premise that the superior one will respect the law that the other is violating, and will not attack that civilian target, or if they do the propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss.

Terrorism

There are two opposing viewpoints on the relationship between asymmetric warfare and terrorism. In the modern context, asymmetric warfare is increasingly considered a component of fourth generation warfare. When practiced outside the laws of war, it is often defined as terrorism, though rarely by its practitioners or their supporters. The other view is that asymmetric warfare does not coincide with terrorism.

Use of terrain

Terrain that limits mobility, such as forests and mountains, can be used as a force multiplier by the smaller force and as a force inhibitor against the larger one, especially one operating far from its logistical base. Such terrain is called difficult terrain. Urban areas, though generally having good transport access, provide innumerable ready-made defensible positions with simple escape routes and can also become rough terrain if prolonged combat fills the streets with rubble.

The contour of the land is an aid to the army, sizing up opponents to determine victory and assessing dangers and distance. "Those who do battle without knowing these will lose."

The guerrillas must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.

— Mao Zedong.

An early example of terrain advantage is the Battle of Thermopylae, 480 BC, where the narrow terrain of a defile was used to funnel the Persian forces, who were numerically superior, to a point where they could not use their size as an advantage.

In the 12th century, irregulars known as the Assassins were successful in the Nizari Ismaili state. The "state" consisted of fortresses (such as the Alamut Castle) built on strategic mountaintops and highlands with difficult access, surrounded by hostile lands. The Assassins developed tactics to eliminate high-value targets, threatening their security, including the Crusaders.

In the American Revolutionary War, Patriot Lieutenant Colonel Francis Marion, known as the "Swamp Fox," took advantage of irregular tactics, interior lines, and the wilderness of colonial South Carolina to hinder larger British regular forces.

Yugoslav Partisans, starting as small detachments around mountain villages in 1941, fought the German and other Axis occupation forces, successfully taking advantage of the rough terrain to survive despite their small numbers. Over the next four years, they slowly forced their enemies back, recovering population centers and resources, eventually growing into the regular Yugoslav Army.

Role of civilians

Civilians can play a vital role in determining the outcome of an asymmetric war. In such conflicts, when it is easy for insurgents to assimilate into the population quickly after an attack, tips on the timing or location of insurgent activity can severely undermine the resistance. An information-central framework, in which civilians are seen primarily as sources of strategic information rather than resources, provides a paradigm to understand better the dynamics of such conflicts where civilian information-sharing is vital. The framework assumes that:

  • The consequential action of non-combatants (civilians) is information sharing rather than supplying resources, recruits, or shelter to combatants.
  • Information can be shared anonymously without endangering the civilian who relays it.

Given the additional assumption that the larger or dominant force is the government, the framework suggests the following implications:

  • Civilians receive services from government and rebel forces as an incentive to share valuable information.
  • Rebel violence can be reduced if the government provides services.
  • Provision of security and services are complementary in reducing violence.
  • Civilian casualties reduce civilian support to the perpetrating group.
  • Provision of information is strongly correlated with the level of anonymity that can be ensured.

A survey of the empirical literature on conflict, does not provide conclusive evidence on the claims. But the framework gives a starting point to explore the role of civilian information sharing in asymmetric warfare.

War by proxy

Where asymmetric warfare is carried out (generally covertly) by allegedly non-governmental actors who are connected to or sympathetic to a particular nation's (the "state actor's") interest, it may be deemed war by proxy. This is typically done to give the state actor deniability. The deniability can be crucial to keep the state actor from being tainted by the actions, to allow the state actor to negotiate in apparent good faith by claiming they are not responsible for the actions of parties who are merely sympathizers, or to avoid being accused of belligerent actions or war crimes. If proof emerges of the true extent of the state actor's involvement, this strategy can backfire; for example, see Iran-contra and Philip Agee.

Examples

American Revolutionary War

From its initiation, the American Revolutionary War was, necessarily, a showcase for asymmetric techniques. In the 1920s, Harold Murdock of Boston attempted to solve the puzzle of the first shots fired on Lexington Green and came to the suspicion that the few score militiamen who gathered before sunrise to await the arrival of hundreds of well-prepared British soldiers were sent to provoke an incident which could be used for Patriot propaganda purposes. The return of the British force to Boston following the search operations at Concord was subject to constant skirmishing by Patriot forces gathered from communities all along the route, making maximum use of the terrain (particularly, trees and stone field walls) to overcome the limitations of their weapons – muskets with an effective range of only about 50–70 meters. Throughout the war, skirmishing tactics against British troops on the move continued to be a key factor in the Patriots' success; particularly in the Western theater of the American Revolutionary War.

Another feature of the long march from Concord was the urban warfare technique of using buildings along the route as additional cover for snipers. When revolutionary forces forced their way into Norfolk, Virginia and used waterfront buildings as cover for shots at British vessels out in the river, the response of destruction of those buildings was ingeniously used to the advantage of the rebels, who encouraged the spread of fire throughout the largely Loyalist town and spread propaganda blaming it on the British. Shortly afterwards, they destroyed the remaining houses because they might provide cover for British soldiers.

The rebels also adopted a form of asymmetric sea warfare by using small, fast vessels to avoid the Royal Navy and capturing or sinking large numbers of merchant ships; however the Crown responded by issuing letters of marque permitting private armed vessels to undertake similar attacks on Patriot shipping. John Paul Jones became notorious in Britain for his expedition from France in the little sloop of war Ranger in April 1778, during which, in addition to his attacks on merchant shipping, he made two landings on British soil. The effect of these raids, particularly when coupled with his capture of the Royal Navy's HMS Drake – the first such success in British waters, but not Jones' last – was to force the British government to increase resources for coastal defense, and to create a climate of fear among the British public which was subsequently fed by press reports of his preparations for the 1779 Bonhomme Richard mission.

From 1776, the conflict turned increasingly into a proxy war on behalf of France, following a strategy proposed in the 1760s but initially resisted by the idealistic young King Louis XVI, who came to the throne at the age of 19 a few months before Lexington. France ultimately drove Great Britain to the brink of defeat by entering the war(s) directly on several fronts throughout the world.

American Civil War

The American Civil War saw the rise of asymmetric warfare in the Border States, and in particular on the US Western Territorial Border after the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 opened the territories to vote on the expansion of slavery beyond the Missouri Compromise lines. Political implications of this broken 1820's compromise were nothing less than the potential expansion of slavery all across the North American continent, including the northern reaches of the annexed Mexican territories to California and Oregon. So the stakes were high, and it caused a flood of immigration to the border: some to grab land and expand slavery west, others to grab land and vote down the expansion of slavery. The pro-slavery land grabbers began asymmetric, violent attacks against the more pacifist abolitionists who had settled Lawrence and other territorial towns to suppress slavery. John Brown, the abolitionist, travelled to Osawatomie in the Kansas Territory expressly to foment retaliatory attacks back against the pro-slavery guerrillas who, by 1858, had twice ransacked both Lawrence and Osawatomie (where one of Brown's sons was shot dead).

The abolitionists would not return the attacks and Brown theorized that a violent spark set off on "the Border" would be a way to finally ignite his long hoped-for slave rebellion. Brown had broad-sworded slave owners at Potawatomi Creek, so the bloody civilian violence was initially symmetrical; however, once the American Civil War ignited in 1861, and when the state of Missouri voted overwhelmingly not to secede from the Union, the pro-slavers on the MO-KS border were driven either south to Arkansas and Texas, or underground—where they became guerrilla fighters and "Bushwhackers" living in the bushy ravines throughout northwest Missouri across the (now) state line from Kansas. The bloody "Border War" lasted all during the Civil War (and long after with guerrilla partisans like the James brothers cynically robbing and murdering, aided and abetted by lingering lost causers). Tragically the Western Border War was an asymmetric war: pro-slavery guerrillas and paramilitary partisans on the pro-Confederate side attacked pro-Union townspeople and commissioned Union military units, with the Union army trying to keep both in check: blocking Kansans and pro-Union Missourians from organizing militarily against the marauding Bushwhackers.

The worst act of domestic terror in U.S. history came in August 1863 when paramilitary guerrillas amassed 350 strong and rode all night 50 miles across eastern Kansas to the abolitionist stronghold of Lawrence (a political target) and destroyed the town, gunning down 150 civilians. The Confederate officer whose company had joined Quantrill's Raiders that day witnessed the civilian slaughter and forbade his soldiers from participating in the carnage. The commissioned officer refused to participate in Quantrill's asymmetric warfare on civilians.

Philippine–American War

The Philippine–American War (1899–1902) was an armed conflict between the United States and Filipino revolutionaries. Estimates of the Filipino forces vary between 100,000 and 1,000,000, with tens of thousands of auxiliaries. Lack of weapons and ammunition was a significant impediment to the Filipinos, so most of the forces were only armed with bolo knives, bows and arrows, spears and other primitive weapons that, in practice, proved vastly inferior to U.S. firepower.

Remnants of rifles used by Filipino soldiers during the War on display at Clark Museum

The goal, or end-state, sought by the First Philippine Republic was a sovereign, independent, socially stable Philippines led by the ilustrado (intellectual) oligarchy. Local chieftains, landowners, and businessmen were the principales who controlled local politics. The war was strongest when illustrados, principales, and peasants were unified in opposition to annexation. The peasants, who provided the bulk of guerrilla forces, had interests different from their illustrado leaders and the principales of their villages. Coupled with the ethnic and geographic fragmentation, unity was a daunting task. The challenge for Aguinaldo and his generals was to sustain unified Filipino public opposition; this was the revolutionaries' strategic centre of gravity. The Filipino operational center of gravity was the ability to sustain its force of 100,000 irregulars in the field. The Filipino General Francisco Macabulos described the Filipinos' war aim as "not to vanquish the U.S. Army but to inflict on them constant losses." They initially sought to use conventional tactics and an increasing toll of U.S. casualties to contribute to McKinley's defeat in the 1900 presidential election. Their hope was that as president the avowedly anti-imperialist future Secretary of state William Jennings Bryan would withdraw from the Philippines. They pursued this short-term goal with guerrilla tactics better suited to a protracted struggle. While targeting McKinley motivated the revolutionaries in the short term, his victory demoralized them and convinced many undecided Filipinos that the United States would not depart precipitously. For most of 1899, the revolutionary leadership had viewed guerrilla warfare strategically only as a tactical option of final recourse, not as a means of operation which better suited their disadvantaged situation. On 13 November 1899, Emilio Aguinaldo decreed that guerrilla war would henceforth be the strategy. This made the American occupation of the Philippine archipelago more difficult over the next few years. In fact, during just the first four months of the guerrilla war, the Americans had nearly 500 casualties. The Philippine Revolutionary Army began staging bloody ambushes and raids, such as the guerrilla victories at Paye, Catubig, Makahambus, Pulang Lupa, Balangiga and Mabitac. At first, it seemed like the Filipinos would fight the Americans to a stalemate and force them to withdraw. President McKinley even considered this at the beginning of the phase. The shift to guerrilla warfare drove the U.S. Army to adopt counterinsurgency tactics. Civilians were given identification and forced into concentration camps with a publicly announced deadline, after which all persons found outside camps without identification would be shot on sight. Thousands of civilians died in these camps due to poor conditions.

20th century

Second Boer War

Asymmetric warfare featured prominently during the Second Boer War. After an initial phase, which was fought by both sides as a conventional war, the British captured Johannesburg, the Boers' largest city, and captured the capitals of the two Boer Republics. The British then expected the Boers to accept peace as dictated in the traditional European manner. However, the Boers fought a protracted guerrilla war instead of capitulating. 20,000-30,000 Boer guerrillas were only defeated after the British brought to bear 450,000 imperial troops, about ten times as many as were used in the conventional phase of the war. The British began constructing blockhouses built within machine gun range of one another and flanked by barbed wire to slow the Boers' movement across the countryside and block paths to valuable targets. Such tactics eventually evolved into today's counterinsurgency tactics.

The Boer commando raids deep into the Cape Colony, which were organized and commanded by Jan Smuts, resonated throughout the century as the British adopted and adapted the tactics first used against them by the Boers.

World War I

Between the World Wars

World War II

Improvised molotov cocktails
Britain
United States

After World War II

Cold War (1945–1992)

The end of World War II established the two strongest victors, the United States of America (the United States, or just the U.S.) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or just the Soviet Union) as the two dominant global superpowers.

Cold War examples of proxy wars

In Southeast Asia, specifically Vietnam, the Viet Minh, NLF and other insurgencies engaged in asymmetrical guerrilla warfare with France. The war between the Mujahideen and the Soviet Armed Forces during the Soviet–Afghan War of 1979 to 1989, though claimed as a source of the term "asymmetric warfare," occurred years after Mack wrote of "asymmetric conflict." (Note that the term "asymmetric warfare" became well-known in the West only in the 1990s.) The aid given by the U.S. to the Mujahideen during the war was only covert at the tactical level; the Reagan Administration told the world that it was helping the "freedom-loving people of Afghanistan." Many countries, including the U.S., participated in this proxy war against the USSR during the Cold War. It was considered cost-effective and politically successful, as it caused a drain on the resources and manpower of the USSR and turned out to be a contributing factor to the collapse of that polity in 1991.

Post-Cold War

The Kosovo War, which pitted Yugoslav security forces (Serbian police and Yugoslav army) against Albanian separatists of the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army, is an example of asymmetric warfare, due to Yugoslav forces' superior firepower and manpower, and due to the nature of insurgency/counter-insurgency operations. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (1999), which pitted NATO air power against the Yugoslav armed forces during the Kosovo war, can also be classified as asymmetric, exemplifying international conflict with asymmetry in weapons and strategy/tactics.

21st century

Israel/Palestine

The ongoing conflict between Israel and some Palestinian organizations (such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad) is a classic case of asymmetric warfare. Israel has a powerful army, air force and navy, while the Palestinian organizations have no access to large-scale military equipment with which to conduct operations; instead, they utilize asymmetric tactics, such as knife attacks, small gunfights, cross-border sniping, rocket attacks, and suicide bombings.

Sri Lanka

The Sri Lankan Civil War, which raged on and off from 1983 to 2009, between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) saw large-scale asymmetric warfare. The war started as an insurgency and progressed to a large-scale conflict with the mixture of guerrilla and conventional warfare, seeing the LTTE use suicide bombing (male/female suicide bombers) both on and off the battlefield use of explosive-filled boats for suicide attacks on military shipping; and use of light aircraft targeting military installations.

Iraq

This Cougar in Al Anbar, Iraq, was hit by a directed charge IED approximately 300–500 lb (140–230 kg) in size.

The victory by the US-led coalition forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrated that training, tactics and technology could provide overwhelming victories in the field of battle during modern conventional warfare. After Saddam Hussein's regime was removed from power, the Iraq campaign moved into a different type of asymmetric warfare where the coalition's use of superior conventional warfare training, tactics and technology was of much less use against continued opposition from the various partisan groups operating inside Iraq.

Syria

Much of the 2012–present Syrian Civil War has been asymmetrical. The Syrian National Coalition, Mujahideen, and Kurdish Democratic Union Party have been engaging with the forces of the Syrian government through asymmetric means. The conflict has seen large-scale asymmetric warfare across the country, with the forces opposed to the government unable to engage symmetrically with the Syrian government and resorting instead to other asymmetric tactics such as suicide bombings and targeted assassinations.

Ukraine

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a classical asymmetrical warfare scenario. Russia's superior military might, including its vast nuclear arsenal and seemingly superior armored forces have not helped Russia surmount fierce opposition from the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which has inflicted severe blows against the Russian Armed Forces by relying on technologically advanced weaponry supplied by the west.

Semi-symmetric warfare

A new understanding of warfare has emerged amidst the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although this type of warfare does not oppose an insurgency to a counter-insurgency force, it does involve two actors with substantially asymmetrical means of waging war. Notably, as technology has improved war-fighting capabilities, it has also made them more complex, thus requiring greater expertise, training, flexibility and decentralization. The nominally weaker military can exploit those complexities and seek to eliminate the asymmetry. This has been observed in Ukraine, as defending forces used a rich arsenal of anti-tank and anti-air missiles to negate the invading forces' apparent mechanized and aerial superiority, thus denying their ability to conduct combined arms operations. The success of this strategy will be compounded by access to real-time intelligence and the adversary's inability to utilize its forces to the maximum of their potential due to factors such as the inability to plan, brief and execute complex, full-spectrum operations.

Civilian casualty ratio

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In armed conflicts, the civilian casualty ratio (also civilian death ratio, civilian-combatant ratio, etc.) is the ratio of civilian casualties to combatant casualties, or total casualties. The measurement can apply either to casualties inflicted by or to a particular belligerent, casualties inflicted in one aspect or arena of a conflict or to casualties in the conflict as a whole. Casualties usually refer to both dead and injured. In some calculations, deaths resulting from famine and epidemics are included.

Starting in the 1980s, it was often claimed that 90 percent of the victims of modern wars were civilians, repeated in academic publications as recently as 2014. These claims, though widely believed, are not supported by detailed examination of the evidence, particularly that relating to wars (such as those in former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan) that are central to the claims. Some of the citations can be traced back to a 1991 monograph from Uppsala University which includes refugees and internally displaced persons as casualties. Other authors cite Ruth Leger Sivard's 1991 monograph in which the author states "In the decade of the 1980s, the proportion of civilian deaths jumped to 74 percent of the total and in 1990 it appears to have been close to 90 percent."

The most comprehensive examination of civilian war deaths throughout history is by William Eckhardt, in which Eckhardt states:

On the average, half of the deaths caused by war happened to civilians, only some of whom were killed by famine associated with war...The civilian percentage share of war-related deaths remained at about 50% from century to century. (p. 97)

Mexican Revolution (1910–20)

Although it is estimated that over 1 million people died in the Mexican Revolution, most died from disease and hunger as an indirect result of the war. Combat deaths are generally agreed to have totaled about 250,000. According to Eckhardt, these included 125,000 civilian deaths and 125,000 combatant deaths, creating a civilian-combatant death ratio of 1:1 among combat deaths.

World War I

Some 7 million combatants on both sides are estimated to have died during World War I, along with an estimated 10 million non-combatants, including 6.6 million civilians. The civilian casualty ratio in this estimate would be about 59%. Boris Urlanis notes a lack of data on civilian losses in the Ottoman Empire, but estimates 8.6 million military killed and dead and 6 million civilians killed and dead in the other warring countries. The civilian casualty ratio in this estimate would be about 42%. Most of the civilian fatalities were due to famine, typhus, or Spanish flu rather than combat action. The relatively low ratio of civilian casualties in this war is due to the fact that the front lines on the main battlefront, the Western Front, were static for most of the war, so that civilians were able to avoid the combat zones.

Chemical weapons were widely used by all sides during the conflict and wind frequently carried poison gas into nearby towns where civilians did not have access to gas masks or warning systems. An estimated 100,000-260,000 civilian casualties were affected by the use of chemical weapons during the conflict and tens of thousands more died from the effects of such weapons in the years after the conflict ended.

Germany suffered 750,000 civilian dead during and after the war due to famine caused by the Allied blockade. Russia and Turkey suffered civilian casualties in the millions in the Russian Civil War and invasion of Anatolia respectively. Armenia suffered up to 1.5 million civilians dead in the Armenian genocide.

World War II

According to most sources, World War II was the most lethal war in world history, with some 70 million killed in six years. The civilian to combatant fatality ratio in World War II lies somewhere between 3:2 and 2:1, or from 60% to 67%. The high ratio of civilian casualties in this war was due in part to the increasing effectiveness and lethality of strategic weapons which were used to target enemy industrial or population centers, and famines caused by economic disruption. An estimated 2.1–3 million Indians died in the Bengal famine of 1943 in India during World War II. A substantial number of civilians in this war were also deliberately killed by Axis Powers as a result of genocide such as the Holocaust or other ethnic cleansing campaigns.

Korean War

The median total estimated Korean civilian deaths in the Korean War is 2,730,000. The total estimated North Korean combatant deaths is 213,000 and the estimated Chinese combatant deaths is over 400,000. In addition to this the Republic of Korea combatant deaths is around 134,000 dead and the combatant deaths for the United Nations side is around 49,000 dead and missing (40,000 dead, 9,000 missing). The estimated total Korean war military dead is around 793,000 deaths. The civilian-combatant death ratio in the war is approximately 2:1 or 67%. One source estimates that 20% of the total population of North Korea perished in the war.

Vietnam War

The Vietnamese government has estimated the number of Vietnamese civilians killed in the Vietnam War at two million, and the number of NVA and Viet Cong killed at 1.1 million—estimates which approximate those of a number of other sources. This would give a civilian-combatant fatality ratio of approximately 2:1, or 67%. These figures do not include civilians killed in Cambodia and Laos. However, the lowest estimate of 411,000 civilians killed during the war (including civilians killed in Cambodia and Laos) would give a civilian-combatant fatality ratio of approximately 1:3, or 25%. Using the lowest estimate of Vietnamese military deaths, 400,000, the ratio is about 1:1.

Chechen wars

During the First Chechen War, 4,000 separatist fighters and 40,000 civilians are estimated to have died, giving a civilian-combatant ratio of 10:1. The numbers for the Second Chechen War are 3,000 fighters and 13,000 civilians, for a ratio of 43:10. The combined ratio for both wars is 76:10. Casualty numbers for the conflict are notoriously unreliable. The estimates of the civilian casualties during the First Chechen war range from 20,000 to 100,000, with remaining numbers being similarly unreliable. The tactics employed by Russian forces in both wars were heavily criticized by human rights groups, which accused them of indiscriminate bombing and shelling of civilian areas and other crimes.

NATO in Yugoslavia

In 1999, NATO intervened in the Kosovo War with a bombing campaign against Yugoslav forces, who were alleged to be conducting a campaign of ethnic cleansing. The bombing lasted about 2½ months, until forcing the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Kosovo.

Estimates for the number of casualties caused by the bombing vary widely depending on the source. NATO unofficially claimed a toll of 5,000 enemy combatants killed by the bombardment; the Yugoslav government, on the other hand, gave a figure of 638 of its security forces killed in Kosovo. Estimates for the civilian toll are similarly disparate. Human Rights Watch counted approximately 500 civilians killed by the bombing; the Yugoslav government estimated between 1,200 and 5,000.

If the NATO figures are to be believed, the bombings achieved a civilian to combatant kill ratio of about 1:10, on the Yugoslav government's figures, conversely, the ratio would be between 4:1 and 10:1. If the most conservative estimates from the sources cited above are used, the ratio was around 1:1.

According to military historian and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Oren, for every Serbian soldier killed by NATO in 1999 (the period in which Operation Allied Force took place), four civilians died, a civilian to combatant casualty ratio of 4:1. Oren cites this figure as evidence that "even the most moral army can make mistakes, especially in dense urban warfare".

Afghanistan War

According to the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, as of January 2015 roughly 92,000 people had been killed in the Afghanistan war, of which over 26,000 were civilians, for a civilian to combatant ratio of 0.4:1.

Iraq War

According to a 2010 assessment by John Sloboda of Iraq Body Count, a United Kingdom-based organization, American and Coalition forces had killed at least 28,736 combatants as well as 13,807 civilians in the Iraq War, indicating a civilian to combatant casualty ratio inflicted by coalition forces of 1:2. However, overall, figures by the Iraq Body Count from 20 March 2003 to 14 March 2013 indicate that of 174,000 casualties only 39,900 were combatants, resulting in a civilian casualty rate of 77%.

US drone strikes in Pakistan

The civilian casualty ratio for U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan is notoriously difficult to quantify. The U.S. itself puts the number of civilians killed from drone strikes in the last two years at no more than 20 to 30, a total that is far too low according to a spokesman for the NGO CIVIC. At the other extreme, Daniel L. Byman of the Brookings Institution suggests that drone strikes may kill "10 or so civilians" for every militant killed, which would represent a civilian to combatant casualty ratio of 10:1. Byman argues that civilian killings constitute a humanitarian tragedy and create dangerous political problems, including damage to the legitimacy of the Pakistani government and alienation of the Pakistani populace from America. An ongoing study by the New America Foundation finds non-militant casualty rates started high but have declined steeply over time, from about 60% (3 out of 5) in 2004–2007 to less than 2% (1 out of 50) in 2012. The study puts the overall non-militant casualty rate since 2004 at 15–16%, or a 1:5 ratio, out of a total of between 1,908 and 3,225 people killed in Pakistan by drone strikes since 2004.

Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Estimates of civilian casualties from the Israeli–Palestinian conflict differ. A 2007 report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) found that, from the beginning of the second intifada in September 2000 until the end of July 2007, at least 5,848 people were killed in the conflict, over half of whom were civilians. Amongst those killed in that period, 69% of Israelis were civilians, while the report estimated 59% of Palestinian casualties were civilians.

In May 2012 B'Tselem decided to stop addressing the question of participation in combat, with respect to Palestinians killed in the West Bank, stating that, "while in the past there were complicated incidents in the West Bank that might have met the definition of "combat incidents," in recent years the incidents meeting that definition have been almost nil." B'Tselem does not address or count the number of Israelis killed or maimed by Palestinians or Palestinian forces. B'Tselem has also established a separate category for recording Palestinian police officers killed by Israel; according to B'Tselem, Israel counts the Gaza police force as a non-civilian when calculating the civilian casualty ratio, and states that such a definition is not compatible with the ICRC interpretation of international law. The International Committee of the Red Cross regards persons as civilians if they do not fulfill a "continuous combat function" (for example, many police officers) and do not participate directly in hostilities. Analysts state that in addition to their civilian roles such as policing traffic, police in Gaza are active in counter-intelligence and fighting dissent.

Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip

The head of the Shin Bet reported to the Israeli Cabinet that of the 810 Palestinians killed in Gaza in 2006 and 2007, 200 were civilians (a ratio of approximately 1:3). Haaretz assessed this to be an underestimation of civilian casualties. Using figures from Israeli human rights organisation B'Tselem, they calculated that 816 Palestinians had been killed in Gaza during the two-year period, 360 of whom were civilians. Military journalist Amos Harel wrote in Haaretz that the ratio between military targets and civilians was 1:1 in 2002–2003, when half the casualties in air assaults on the Gaza Strip were civilians. He attributed this to an Israeli Air Force (IAF) practice of attacking militants even when they had deliberately located themselves in densely populated areas. The ratio improved to 1:28 ratio in late 2005, meaning one civilian killed for every 28 combatants. It lowered, however, to 1:10 in 2006. In 2007, the ratio was at its lowest ever, more than 1:30. Figures showing an improvement from 1:1 in 2002 to 1:30 in 2008 were also cited by The Jerusalem Post journalist Yaakov Katz. However, in operations in Gaza since 2008, the ratio again dropped, as low as 5:2 during the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict.

On its web blog, the IDF stated that the IDF's civilian-to-terrorist death ratio is the lowest in the world. It says that civilian deaths are caused by the use of human shields by Gazan militant groups, such as Hamas. The IDF blog lists various counter-terrorism methods used by the IDF to minimize civilian casualties and lower the civilian casualty ratio, including pinpoint targeting, aborting strikes due to risk of civilian casualties, and smartbombs with the ability to cancel a strike whilst in midair.

Israel in the 2008–09 Gaza War

Several analysts have attempted to calculate the Israel Defense Forces's civilian casualty ratio in the 2008–09 Gaza War. All have noted that the ratio differs significantly depending on which figures are used regarding the total number of casualties and their identity. The main sets of figures are those published by the IDF, essentially corroborated by Hamas, the opposing belligerent in the conflict, on the one hand; and those published by B'Tselem on the other hand. The final IDF report identified 709 militants out of a total of 1,161 Gaza fatalities, with another 162 whose status could not be confirmed (300 were ID'd as civilians). B'Tselem say 1,391 Palestinians were killed, of whom 759 of them did not take part in the hostilities while 350 did take part in the hostilities, 248 were police officers who were killed inside police stations, and it is not known if 32 who were killed did take part in the hostilities.

The Goldstone Report into the conflict concluded that while there were many individual Gaza policemen who were members of militant groups, the Gaza police forces were a civilian police force and "cannot be said to have been taking a direct part in hostilities and thus did not lose their civilian immunity from direct attack as civilians".

Journalist Yaakov Katz states in The Jerusalem Post that the ratio is 1:3 according to the Israeli figures and 60% civilians (3:2) according to B'Tselem's figures. Katz describes the IDF's civilian casualty ratio in the Gaza War and in the year preceding it as low.

Katz says that over 81 percent of the 5,000 missiles the IDF dropped in the Gaza Strip during the operation were smart bombs, a percentage which he states is unprecedented in modern warfare. Journalist and commentator Evelyn Gordon writes in Commentary that the civilian casualty ratio in the 2008–09 Gaza War was 39 percent (2:3), using however only the preliminary Israeli estimates, but that 56 or 74 percent were civilians according to B'Tselem's figures, depending on whether 248 Hamas policemen are considered combatants or civilians; and 65 or 83 percent according to the figures of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. Gordon says that all of these ratios, even if the worse were correct, are lower than the normal civilian-to-combatant wartime fatality ratio in wars elsewhere, as given by the Red Cross, and states that the comparison shows that the IDF was unusually successful at minimizing civilian casualties.

13 Israelis were killed during the conflict, including 10 IDF soldiers (4 killed by friendly fire), giving a civilian casualty ratio for Palestinian forces of 24% or 3:10.

Israel in the 2014 Gaza war

Reports of casualties in the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict have been made available by a variety of sources. Most media accounts have used figures provided by the government in Gaza or non-governmental organizations. Differing methodologies have resulted in varied reports of both the overall death toll and the civilian casualty ratio.

According to the main estimates between 2,125 and 2,310 Gazans were killed and between 10,626 and 10,895 were wounded (including 3,374 children, of whom over 1,000 were left permanently disabled). 66 Israeli soldiers, 5 Israeli civilians (including one child) and one Thai civilian were killed and 469 IDF soldiers and 261 Israeli civilians were injured. The Gaza Health Ministry, UN and some human rights groups reported that 69–75% of the Palestinian casualties were civilians; Israeli officials estimated that around 50% of those killed were civilians, giving Israeli forces a ratio between 1:1 and 3:1 during the conflict.

In March 2015, OCHA reported that 2,220 Palestinians had been killed in the conflict, of whom 1,492 were civilians (551 children and 299 women), 605 militants and 123 of unknown status, giving Israeli forces a ratio of 5:2.

Source Total killed Civilians Militants Unidentified Percent civilians Last updated Notes
Hamas GHM 2,310 ≈1,617 ≈693 70% 3 January 2015 Defines as a civilian anyone who is not claimed by an armed group as a member.
UN HRC 2,251 1,462 789 65% 22 June 2015 Total killed referenced information from Hamas GHM. Cross-referenced information from GHM with other sources for civilian percentage
Israel MFA 2,125 761 936 428 36% of the total
45% of identified
14 June 2015 Uses its own intelligence reports as well as Palestinian sources and media reports to determine combatant deaths.

1982 Lebanon War

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with the stated aim of driving the PLO away from its northern borders. The war culminated in a seven-week-long Israeli naval, air and artillery bombardment of Lebanon's capital, Beirut, where the PLO had retreated. The bombardment eventually came to an end with an internationally brokered settlement in which the PLO forces were given safe passage to evacuate the country.

According to the International Red Cross, by the end of the first week of the war alone, some 10,000 people, including 2,000 combatants, had been killed, and 16,000 wounded—a civilian-combatant fatality ratio of 5:1. Lebanese government sources later estimated that by the end of the siege of Beirut, a total of about 18,000 had been killed, an estimated 85% of whom were civilians. This gives a civilian to military casualty ratio of about 6:1.

According to Richard A. Gabriel between 1,000 and 3,000 civilians were killed in the southern campaign. He states that an additional 4,000 to 5,000 civilians died from all actions of all sides during the siege of Beirut, and that some 2,000 Syrian soldiers were killed during the Lebanon campaign and a further 2,400 PLO guerillas were also killed. Of these, 1,000 PLO guerrillas were killed during the siege. According to Gabriel the ratio of civilian deaths to combatants during the siege was about 6 to 1 but this ratio includes civilian deaths from all actions of all sides.

Concerned about aspartame? Beware of this other “probable carcinogen” on your plate

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While aspartame’s classification as a possible carcinogen grabbed headlines, the classification of another ubiquitous chemical slid silently beneath the diet cola outrage. The Lyons, France based International Association for Research on Cancer, the IARC, classified the artificial sweetener aspartame as a group 2B “possible” carcinogen in last week’s published evaluation.

Social and traditional media erupted with calls for bans of its use, and freaked-out moms everywhere dumped bottles of soda down the drain and emptied their drawers of Trident Gum to protect their families. Decades of research, and the fact that you’d have to pound down about 14 two liters of diet soda a day to approach a risk threshold, be damned. The IARC rating sent environmental activists into high gear.

And within hours, tort lawyer firms who make their living off exploiting public misunderstandings about science to shake down companies fearful of billion-dollar jury verdicts were trolling the internet for victims.

While distracted by Mountain Dews and don’ts, the same evaluation by the IARC classified an unrelated scary-sounding chemical — methyl eugenol  — as a group 2A “probable carcinogen”: which means it poses even a greater cancer threat than aspartame.

Based on Twitter logic, since glyphosate is a dangerous Group 2A “probable carcinogen”, methyl eugenol must also be some deadly poison. After all, that’s  the same category as glyphosate, an herbicide lauded by farmers as effective and by an overwhelming number of scientists, including every independent chemical risk agency in the world as safe, yet condemned in social media and trial lawyers as a toxic carcinogen of doom.

If the reaction to glyphosate’s classification is a guide, the companies that sell methyl eugenol will be sued into financial duress. Activists will clammer for products containing methyl eugenol to be labeled as ‘cancer causing’, especially in California. There will be calls for bans, and lawyers will hammer big checks with class action lawsuits against the crooked Merchants of Poison that produce… essential oils, aromatherapy candles and pesto sauce. According to the National Institutes of Health, pesto-eaters could be exposed to some of the highest levels of methyl eugenol, because fresh pesto is prepared from a large quantity of fresh basil, reflected by basil amounts in pesto sauce products on the market.

That sound you just heard was the thud of aging hippies and Italian food-loving chemophobes hitting the floor. Patchouli oil and basil are loaded with the stuff.

Or maybe it is the sucking sound created from a vacuum of logic that will condemn one chemistry and let another slide by, when it fits their ideological proclivities or someone sees money in the corner of their eye.

Or maybe it is the hypocrisy of indulging in a Class 2A probable carcinogen as part of their identity at the same time fighting against a different Class 2A probable carcinogen is part of their identity.

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Credit: Clean Cooking with Caitlin

The case of methyl eugenol is a stellar opportunity to underscore the hypocrisy in IARC-induced chemophobia. Methyl eugenol is a central component of essential oils, like tea tree oil and citronella. It is a dominant flavor note in nutmeg, lemon grass, cloves and allspice. Methyl eugenol or its metabolites may be detected in the urine of close to 100 percent of individuals that recently ate bananas or oranges. It is present in orders of magnitude higher levels than the parts per billion of glyphosate reportedly found in grocery products deemed deadly toxic by anti-glyphosate interests.

Yet ‘progressive’ dudes with man-buns will slather on methyl-eugenol-laden tinctures and creams. Naturopaths will sing the praises of aromatherapy, while inhaling a Class 2A carcinogen deep into the lungs. Skin creams will give you a healthy glow, as methyl eugenol’s magic combines with essential oils and carnauba wax — and better yet it’s organic!

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And in the widespread application of a IARC Class 2A probable carcinogen you won’t see social media activists slamming Annie’s Heirloom Seeds for profiting off of seeds of death. You won’t see lawyers line up to sue Big Pesto. Irrelevant pseudo-journalists will not write books that reinterpret internal emails at McCormick spices, cherry-picking to denounce cherries.

The point is simple. The archaic IARC classification system has been mobilized by unscrupulous actors to malign chemistries used by industries targeted by activist groups — what they call Big Ag or Big Soda. An IARC classification and its attention-getting headlines are the first stinky step in lawsuits and manipulation of public opinion.

[Editor’s note: Read GLP’s investigative report on how IARC’s aspartame classification is providing gruel to anti-chemical environmentalists and tort lawyers.]

The differing media and advocacy group reactions to classification of aspartame and glyphosate, while ignoring methyl eugenol, ethanol (drinking wine or beer, Class 1 carcinogen) and lunch meat (Class 1 carcinogen) illustrates how pronouncements by IARC and a similar agency based in Italy, Ramazzini Institute, are selectively twisted to mislead, affect public perception, and recruit for a lawsuit class action.

It is clear that the weight and urgency of the IARC classification only matters on products that online quacks, consumer watchdogs, pseudoscience nutrition hawks — and a host of so-called mainstream environmental groups that raise money off of chemophobia with glyphosate tops on their list (e.g., Environmental Working Group, Natural Resources Defense Council, Organic Consumers Association, Union of Concerned Scientists, don’t like. But to the scientific world where the dose makes the poison, the social outrage driven by these monographs breaks trust in science while it lines the pockets of attorneys that profit from misleading campaigns targeting select industries.

Kevin M. Folta is a professor, keynote speaker and podcast host. Follow Professor Folta on Twitter @kevinfolta

 

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