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Wednesday, November 20, 2024

Solipsism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Varieties

There are varying degrees of solipsism that parallel the varying degrees of skepticism:

Metaphysical

Metaphysical solipsism is a variety of solipsism based on a philosophy of subjective idealism. Metaphysical solipsists maintain that the self is the only existing reality and that all other realities, including the external world and other persons, are representations of that self, having no independent existence. There are several versions of metaphysical solipsism, such as Caspar Hare's egocentric presentism (or perspectival realism), in which other people are conscious, but their experiences are simply not present.

Epistemological

Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false. Further, one cannot also be certain as to what extent the external world exists independently of one's mind. For instance, it may be that a God-like being controls the sensations received by the mind, making it appear as if there is an external world when most of it (excluding the God-like being and oneself) is false. However, the point remains that epistemological solipsists consider this an "unresolvable" question.

Methodological

Methodological solipsism is an agnostic variant of solipsism. It exists in opposition to the strict epistemological requirements for "knowledge" (e.g. the requirement that knowledge must be certain). It still entertains the points that any induction is fallible. Methodological solipsism sometimes goes even further to say that even what we perceive as the brain is actually part of the external world, for it is only through our senses that we can see or feel the mind. Only the existence of thoughts is known for certain.

Methodological solipsists do not intend to conclude that the stronger forms of solipsism are actually true. They simply emphasize that justifications of an external world must be founded on indisputable facts about their own consciousness. The methodological solipsist believes that subjective impressions (empiricism) or innate knowledge (rationalism) are the sole possible or proper starting point for philosophical construction. Often methodological solipsism is not held as a belief system, but rather used as a thought experiment to assist skepticism (e.g. René Descartes' Cartesian skepticism).

Main points

Mere denial of material existence, in itself, does not necessarily constitute solipsism.

Philosophers generally try to build knowledge on more than an inference or analogy. Well-known frameworks such as Descartes' epistemological enterprise brought to popularity the idea that all certain knowledge may go no further than "I think; therefore I exist." However, Descartes' view does not provide any details about the nature of the "I" that has been proven to exist.

The theory of solipsism also merits close examination because it relates to three widely held philosophical presuppositions, each itself fundamental and wide-ranging in importance:

  • One's most certain knowledge is the content of one's own mind—my thoughts, experiences, affects, etc.
  • There is no conceptual or logically necessary link between mental and physical—between, for example, the occurrence of certain conscious experience or mental states and the "possession" and behavioral dispositions of a "body" of a particular kind.
  • The experience of a given person is necessarily private to that person.

To expand on the second point, the conceptual problem is that the previous point assumes mind or consciousness (which are attributes) can exist independent of some entity having this attribute (a capability in this case), i.e., that an attribute of an existent can exist apart from the existent itself. If one admits to the existence of an independent entity (e.g., the brain) having that attribute, the door is open to an independent reality. (See Brain in a vat)

Some philosophers hold that, while it cannot be proven that anything independent of one's mind exists, the point that solipsism makes is irrelevant. This is because, whether the world as we perceive it exists independently or not, we cannot escape this perception, hence it is best to act assuming that the world is independent of our minds. (See Falsifiability and testability below)

History

Origins of solipsist thought are found in Greece and later Enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Descartes.

Gorgias

Solipsism was first recorded by the Greek presocratic sophist, Gorgias (c. 483–375 BC), who is quoted by the Roman sceptic Sextus Empiricus as having stated:

  • Nothing exists.
  • Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it.
  • Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it cannot be communicated to others.

Much of the point of the sophists was to show that objective knowledge was a literal impossibility.

René Descartes

The foundations of solipsism are in turn the foundations of the view that the individual's understanding of any and all psychological concepts (thinking, willing, perceiving, etc.) is accomplished by making an analogy with their own mental states; i.e., by abstraction from inner experience. And this view, or some variant of it, has been influential in philosophy since René Descartes elevated the search for incontrovertible certainty to the status of the primary goal of epistemology, whilst also elevating epistemology to "first philosophy".

Berkeley

Portrait of George Berkeley by John Smybert, 1727

George Berkeley's arguments against materialism in favour of idealism provide the solipsist with a number of arguments not found in Descartes. While Descartes defends ontological dualism, thus accepting the existence of a material world (res extensa) as well as immaterial minds (res cogitans) and God, Berkeley denies the existence of matter but not minds, of which God is one.

Relation to other ideas

Idealism and materialism

One of the most fundamental debates in philosophy concerns the "true" nature of the world—whether it is some ethereal plane of ideas or a reality of atomic particles and energy. Materialism posits a real "world out there", as well as in and through us, that can be sensed—seen, heard, tasted, touched and felt, sometimes with prosthetic technologies corresponding to human sensing organs. (Materialists do not claim that human senses or even their prosthetics can, even when collected, sense the totality of the universe; simply that they collectively cannot sense what cannot in any way be known to us.) Materialists do not find this a useful way of thinking about the ontology and ontogeny of ideas, but we might say that from a materialist perspective pushed to a logical extreme communicable to an idealist, ideas are ultimately reducible to a physically communicated, organically, socially and environmentally embedded 'brain state'. While reflexive existence is not considered by materialists to be experienced on the atomic level, the individual's physical and mental experiences are ultimately reducible to the unique tripartite combination of environmentally determined, genetically determined, and randomly determined interactions of firing neurons and atomic collisions.

For materialists, ideas have no primary reality as essences separate from our physical existence. From a materialist perspective, ideas are social (rather than purely biological), and formed and transmitted and modified through the interactions between social organisms and their social and physical environments. This materialist perspective informs scientific methodology, insofar as that methodology assumes that humans have no access to omniscience and that therefore human knowledge is an ongoing, collective enterprise that is best produced via scientific and logical conventions adjusted specifically for material human capacities and limitations.

Modern idealists believe that the mind and its thoughts are the only true things that exist. This is the reverse of what is sometimes called "classical idealism" or, somewhat confusingly, "Platonic idealism" due to the influence of Plato's theory of forms (εἶδος eidos or ἰδέα idea) which were not products of our thinking. The material world is ephemeral, but a perfect triangle or "beauty" is eternal. Religious thinking tends to be some form of idealism, as God usually becomes the highest ideal (such as neoplatonism). On this scale, solipsism can be classed as idealism. Thoughts and concepts are all that exist, and furthermore, only the solipsist's own thoughts and consciousness exist. The so-called "reality" is nothing more than an idea that the solipsist has (perhaps unconsciously) created.

Cartesian dualism

There is another option: the belief that both ideals and "reality" exist. Dualists commonly argue that the distinction between the mind (or 'ideas') and matter can be proven by employing Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which states that if two things share exactly the same qualities, then they must be identical, as in indistinguishable from each other and therefore one and the same thing. Dualists then attempt to identify attributes of mind that are lacked by matter (such as privacy or intentionality) or vice versa (such as having a certain temperature or electrical charge). One notable application of the identity of indiscernibles was by René Descartes in his Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes concluded that he could not doubt the existence of himself (the famous cogito ergo sum argument), but that he could doubt the (separate) existence of his body. From this, he inferred that the person Descartes must not be identical to the Descartes body since one possessed a characteristic that the other did not: namely, it could be known to exist. Solipsism agrees with Descartes in this aspect, and goes further: only things that can be known to exist for sure should be considered to exist. The Descartes body could only exist as an idea in the mind of the person Descartes. Descartes and dualism aim to prove the actual existence of reality as opposed to a phantom existence (as well as the existence of God in Descartes' case), using the realm of ideas merely as a starting point, but solipsism usually finds those further arguments unconvincing. The solipsist instead proposes that their own unconscious is the author of all seemingly "external" events from "reality".

Philosophy of Schopenhauer

The World as Will and Representation is the central work of Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer saw the human will as our one window to the world behind the representation, the Kantian thing-in-itself. He believed, therefore, that we could gain knowledge about the thing-in-itself, something Kant said was impossible, since the rest of the relationship between representation and thing-in-itself could be understood by analogy as the relationship between human will and human body.

Idealism

The idealist philosopher George Berkeley argued that physical objects do not exist independently of the mind that perceives them. An item truly exists only as long as it is observed; otherwise, it is not only meaningless but simply nonexistent. Berkeley does attempt to show things can and do exist apart from the human mind and our perception, but only because there is an all-encompassing Mind in which all "ideas" are perceived – in other words, God, who observes all. Solipsism agrees that nothing exists outside of perception, but would argue that Berkeley falls prey to the egocentric predicament – he can only make his own observations, and thus cannot be truly sure that this God or other people exist to observe "reality". The solipsist would say it is better to disregard the unreliable observations of alleged other people and rely upon the immediate certainty of one's own perceptions.

Rationalism

Rationalism is the philosophical position that truth is best discovered by the use of reasoning and logic rather than by the use of the senses (see Plato's theory of forms). Solipsism is also skeptical of sense-data.

Philosophical zombie

The theory of solipsism crosses over with the theory of the philosophical zombie in that other seemingly conscious beings may actually lack true consciousness, instead they only display traits of consciousness to the observer, who may be the only conscious being there is.

Falsifiability and testability

Solipsism is not a falsifiable hypothesis as described by Karl Popper: there does not seem to be an imaginable disproof. According to Popper: a hypothesis that cannot be falsified is not scientific, and a solipsist can observe "the success of sciences" (see also no miracles argument). One critical test is nevertheless to consider the induction from experience that the externally observable world does not seem, at first approach, to be directly manipulable purely by mental energies alone. One can indirectly manipulate the world through the medium of the physical body, but it seems impossible to do so through pure thought (psychokinesis). It might be argued that if the external world were merely a construct of a single consciousness, i.e. the self, it could then follow that the external world should be somehow directly manipulable by that consciousness, and if it is not, then solipsism is false. An argument against this states that this argument is circular and incoherent. It assumes at the beginning a "construct of a single consciousness" meaning something false, and then tries to manipulate the external world that it just assumed was false. Of course this is an impossible task, but it does not disprove solipsism. It is simply poor reasoning when considering pure idealized logic and that is why David Deutsch states that when also other scientific methods are used (not only logic) solipsism is "indefensible", also when using the simplest explanations: "If, according to the simplest explanation, an entity is complex and autonomous, then that entity is real."

The method of the typical scientist is naturalist: they first assume that the external world exists and can be known. But the scientific method, in the sense of a predict-observe-modify loop, does not require the assumption of an external world. A solipsist may perform a psychological test on themselves, to discern the nature of the reality in their mind – however Deutsch uses this fact to counter-argue: "outer parts" of solipsist, behave independently so they are independent for "narrowly" defined (conscious) self. A solipsist's investigations may not be proper science, however, since it would not include the co-operative and communitarian aspects of scientific inquiry that normally serve to diminish bias.

Minimalism

Solipsism is a form of logical minimalism. Many people are intuitively unconvinced of the nonexistence of the external world from the basic arguments of solipsism, but a solid proof of its existence is not available at present. The central assertion of solipsism rests on the nonexistence of such a proof, and strong solipsism (as opposed to weak solipsism) asserts that no such proof can be made. In this sense, solipsism is logically related to agnosticism in religion: the distinction between believing you do not know, and believing you could not have known.

However, minimality (or parsimony) is not the only logical virtue. A common misapprehension of Occam's razor has it that the simpler theory is always the best. In fact, the principle is that the simpler of two theories of equal explanatory power is to be preferred. In other words: additional "entities" can pay their way with enhanced explanatory power. So the naturalist can claim that, while their world view is more complex, it is more satisfying as an explanation.

In infants

Some developmental psychologists believe that infants are solipsistic, and that eventually children infer that others have experiences much like theirs and reject solipsism.

Hinduism

The earliest reference to solipsism is found in the ideas in Hindu philosophy in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, dated to early 1st millennium BC. The Upanishad holds the mind to be the only god and all actions in the universe are thought to be a result of the mind assuming infinite forms. After the development of distinct schools of Indian philosophy, Advaita Vedanta and Samkhya schools are thought to have originated concepts similar to solipsism.

Advaita Vedanta

Advaita is one of the six most known Hindu philosophical systems and literally means "non-duality". Its first great consolidator was Adi Shankaracharya, who continued the work of some of the Upanishadic teachers, and that of his teacher's teacher Gaudapada. By using various arguments, such as the analysis of the three states of experience—wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, he established the singular reality of Brahman, in which Brahman, the universe and the Atman or the Self, were one and the same.

One who sees everything as nothing but the Self, and the Self in everything one sees, such a seer withdraws from nothing. For the enlightened, all that exists is nothing but the Self, so how could any suffering or delusion continue for those who know this oneness?

— Ishopanishad: sloka 6, 7

The concept of the Self in the philosophy of Advaita could be interpreted as solipsism. However, the theological definition of the Self in Advaita protect it from true solipsism as found in the west. Similarly, the Vedantic text Yogavasistha, escapes charge of solipsism because the real "I" is thought to be nothing but the absolute whole looked at through a particular unique point of interest.

It is mentioned in Yoga Vasistha that “…..according to them (we can safely assume that them are present Solipsists) this world is mental in nature. There is no reality other than the ideas of one’s own mind. This view is incorrect, because the world cannot be the content of an individual’s mind. If it were so, an individual would have created and destroyed the world according to his whims. This theory is called atma khyati – the pervasion of the little self (intellect). Yoga Vasistha - Nirvana Prakarana - Uttarardha (Volume - 6) Page 107 by Swami Jyotirmayananda

Samkhya and Yoga

Samkhya philosophy, which is sometimes seen as the basis of Yogic thought, adopts a view that matter exists independently of individual minds. Representation of an object in an individual mind is held to be a mental approximation of the object in the external world. Therefore, Samkhya chooses representational realism over epistemological solipsism. Having established this distinction between the external world and the mind, Samkhya posits the existence of two metaphysical realities Prakriti (matter) and Purusha (consciousness).

Buddhism

Some interpretations of Buddhism assert that external reality is an illusion, and sometimes this position is [mis]understood as metaphysical solipsism. Buddhist philosophy, though, generally holds that the mind and external phenomena are both equally transient, and that they arise from each other. The mind cannot exist without external phenomena, nor can external phenomena exist without the mind. This relation is known as "dependent arising" (pratityasamutpada).

The Buddha stated, "Within this fathom long body is the world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the world and the path leading to the cessation of the world". Whilst not rejecting the occurrence of external phenomena, the Buddha focused on the illusion created within the mind of the perceiver by the process of ascribing permanence to impermanent phenomena, satisfaction to unsatisfying experiences, and a sense of reality to things that were effectively insubstantial.

Mahayana Buddhism also challenges the illusion of the idea that one can experience an 'objective' reality independent of individual perceiving minds.

From the standpoint of Prasangika (a branch of Madhyamaka thought), external objects do exist, but are devoid of any type of inherent identity: "Just as objects of mind do not exist [inherently], mind also does not exist [inherently]". In other words, even though a chair may physically exist, individuals can only experience it through the medium of their own mind, each with their own literal point of view. Therefore, an independent, purely 'objective' reality could never be experienced.

The Yogacara (sometimes translated as "Mind only") school of Buddhist philosophy contends that all human experience is constructed by mind. Some later representatives of one Yogacara subschool (Prajñakaragupta, Ratnakīrti) propounded a form of idealism that has been interpreted as solipsism. A view of this sort is contained in the 11th-century treatise of Ratnakirti, "Refutation of the existence of other minds" (Santanantara dusana), which provides a philosophical refutation of external mind-streams from the Buddhist standpoint of ultimate truth (as distinct from the perspective of everyday reality).

In addition to this, the Bardo Thodol, Tibet's famous book of the dead, repeatedly states that all of reality is a figment of one's perception, although this occurs within the "Bardo" realm (post-mortem). For instance, within the sixth part of the section titled "The Root Verses of the Six Bardos", there appears the following line: "May I recognize whatever appeareth as being mine own thought-forms"; there are many lines in similar ideal.

Criticism

Solipsism as radical subjective idealism has often been criticized by well-known philosophers ("solipsism can only succeed in a madhouse" — A. Schopenhauer, "solipsism is madness" — M. Gardner.)

Bertrand Russell wrote that it was "psychologically impossible" to believe, "I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me". He also argues that the logic of solipsism compels you to believe in 'solipsism of the moment' where only the presently existing moment can be said to exist.

John Stuart Mill wrote that one can know of others' minds because "First, they have bodies like me, which I know in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings".

Dream argument

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dream_argument
The Dream of Human Life, by unknown artist, based on Michelangelo’s drawing The Dream, c. 1533

The dream argument is the postulation that the act of dreaming provides preliminary evidence that the senses we trust to distinguish reality from illusion should not be fully trusted, and therefore, any state that is dependent on our senses should at the very least be carefully examined and rigorously tested to determine whether it is in fact reality.

Synopsis

While dreaming, one does not normally realize one is dreaming. On more rare occasions, the dream may be contained inside another dream with the very act of realizing that one is dreaming, itself, being only a dream that one is not aware of having. This has led philosophers to wonder whether it is possible for one ever to be certain, at any given point in time, that one is not in fact dreaming, or whether indeed it could be possible for one to remain in a perpetual dream state and never experience the reality of wakefulness at all.

In Western philosophy this philosophical puzzle was referred to by Plato (Theaetetus 158b-d), Aristotle (Metaphysics 1011a6), and the Academic Skeptics. It is now best known from René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy. The dream argument has become one of the most prominent skeptical hypotheses.

In Eastern philosophy this type of argument is sometimes referred to as the "Zhuangzi paradox":

He who dreams of drinking wine may weep when morning comes; he who dreams of weeping may in the morning go off to hunt. While he is dreaming he does not know it is a dream, and in his dream he may even try to interpret a dream. Only after he wakes does he know it was a dream. And someday there will be a great awakening when we know that this is all a great dream. Yet the stupid believe they are awake, busily and brightly assuming they understand things, calling this man ruler, that one herdsman—how dense! Confucius and you are both dreaming! And when I say you are dreaming, I am dreaming, too. Words like these will be labeled the Supreme Swindle. Yet, after ten thousand generations, a great sage may appear who will know their meaning, and it will still be as though he appeared with astonishing speed.

The Yogachara philosopher Vasubandhu (4th to 5th century C.E.) referenced the argument in his "Twenty verses on appearance only."

The dream argument came to feature prominently in Mahayana and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. Some schools of thought (e.g., Dzogchen) consider perceived reality to be literally unreal. As Chögyal Namkhai Norbu puts it: "In a real sense, all the visions that we see in our lifetime are like a big dream ..." In this context, the term 'visions' denotes not only visual perceptions, but also appearances perceived through all senses, including sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations, and operations on perceived mental objects.

Simulated reality

Dreaming provides a springboard for those who question whether our own reality may be an illusion. The ability of the mind to be tricked into believing a mentally generated world is the "real world" means at least one variety of simulated reality is a common, even nightly event.

Those who argue that the world is not simulated must concede that the mind—at least the sleeping mind—is not itself an entirely reliable mechanism for attempting to differentiate reality from illusion.

Whatever I have accepted until now as most true has come to me through my senses. But occasionally I have found that they have deceived me, and it is unwise to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.

— René Descartes

Critical discussion

In the past, philosophers John Locke and Thomas Hobbes have separately attempted to refute Descartes's account of the dream argument. Locke claimed that you cannot experience pain in dreams. Various scientific studies conducted within the last few decades provided evidence against Locke's claim by concluding that pain in dreams can occur, but on very rare occasions. Philosopher Ben Springett has said that Locke might respond to this by stating that the agonizing pain of stepping into a fire is non-comparable to stepping into a fire in a dream. Hobbes claimed that dreams are susceptible to absurdity while the waking life is not.

Many contemporary philosophers have attempted to refute dream skepticism in detail (see, e.g., Stone (1984)). Ernest Sosa (2007) devoted a chapter of a monograph to the topic, in which he presented a new theory of dreaming and argued that his theory raises a new argument for skepticism, which he attempted to refute. In A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, he states: "in dreaming we do not really believe; we only make-believe." Jonathan Ichikawa (2008) and Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans (2010) have offered critiques of Sosa's proposed solution. Ichikawa argued that as we cannot tell whether our beliefs in waking life are truly beliefs and not imaginings, like in a dream, we are still not able to tell whether we are awake or dreaming.

The dream hypothesis is also used to develop other philosophical concepts, such as Valberg's personal horizon: what this world would be internal to if this were all a dream.

Dream Skepticism

Norman Malcolm in his monograph "Dreaming" (published in 1959) elaborated on Wittgenstein's question as to whether it really mattered if people who tell dreams "really had these images while they slept, or whether it merely seems so to them on waking". He argues that the sentence "I am asleep" is a senseless form of words; that dreams cannot exist independently of the waking impression; and that skepticism based on dreaming "comes from confusing the historical and dream telling senses...[of]...the past tense" (page 120). In the chapter: "Do I Know I Am Awake ?" he argues that we do not have to say: "I know that I am awake" simply because it would be absurd to deny that one is awake.

Philosopher Daniel Dennett expanded on this idea with his cassette type hypothesis of dreaming. He conjectured that dreams are not real conscious experiences, and are instead pseudo-memories that emerge upon awakening from sleep. This pseudo-memories do not correspond to any real dream experiences, and are instead strictly fabrications of experiences that never occurred.

Philosopher Jennifer Windt has counter-argued against dream skepticism, drawing on the psychology of lucid dreaming, and has advanced a conceptual framework of dreaming as real imaginative experiences.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Sagan is pictured besides a Viking lander mockup
Carl Sagan, seen here with a model of Viking lander, popularized the aphorism.

"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" (sometimes shortened to ECREE), also known as the Sagan standard, is an aphorism popularized by science communicator Carl Sagan. He used the phrase in his 1979 book Broca's Brain and the 1980 television program Cosmos. It has been described as fundamental to the scientific method and is regarded as encapsulating the basic principles of scientific skepticism.

The concept is similar to Occam's razor in that both heuristics prefer simpler explanations of a phenomenon to more complicated ones. In application, there is some ambiguity regarding when evidence is deemed sufficiently "extraordinary". It is often invoked to challenge data and scientific findings, or to criticize pseudoscientific claims. Some critics have argued that the standard can suppress innovation and affirm confirmation biases.

Philosopher David Hume characterized the principle in his 1748 essay "Of Miracles". Similar statements were made by figures such as Thomas Jefferson in 1808, Pierre-Simon Laplace in 1814, and Théodore Flournoy in 1899. The formulation "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof" was used a year prior to Sagan, by scientific skeptic Marcello Truzzi.

Critics state that it is impossible to objectively define the term "extraordinary" and that measures of "extraordinary evidence" are completely reliant on subjective evaluation. Ambiguity in what constitutes "extraordinary" has led to misuse of the aphorism, and it is frequently invoked to discredit research dealing with scientific anomalies or any claim that falls outside the mainstream.

Application

An interesting debate has gone on within the [Federal Communications Commission] between those who think that all doctrines that smell of pseudoscience should be combated and those who believe that each issue should be judged on its own merits, but that the burden of proof should fall squarely on those who make the proposals. I find myself very much in the latter camp. I believe that the extraordinary should certainly be pursued. But extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

Carl Sagan in his 1979 book Broca's Brain

The aphorism "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence", according to psychologist Patrizio Tressoldi, "is at the heart of the scientific method, and a model for critical thinking, rational thought and skepticism everywhere". It has also been described as a "fundamental principle of scientific skepticism". The phrase is often used in the context of paranormal and other pseudoscientific claims. It is also frequently invoked in scientific literature to challenge research proposals, like a new species of Amazonian tapir, biparental inheritance of mitochondrial DNA, or a Holocene "mega-tsunami".

The concept is related to Occam's razor as, according to such a heuristic, simpler explanations are preferred to more complicated ones. Only in situations where extraordinary evidence exists would an extraordinary claim be the simplest explanation. It appears in hypothesis testing where the hypothesis that there is no evidence for the proposed phenomenon, what is known as the "null hypothesis", is preferred. The formal argument involves assigning a stronger Bayesian prior to the acceptance of the null hypothesis as opposed to its rejection.

Origin and precursors

portrait of philosopher David Hume
Philosopher David Hume may have been the first to fully describe the principles of the Sagan standard.

Sagan popularized the aphorism in his 1979 book Broca's Brain, and in his 1980 television show Cosmos in reference to claims about extraterrestrials visiting Earth. Sagan had first stated the eponymous standard in a 1977 interview with The Washington Post. However, scientific skeptic Marcello Truzzi used the formulation "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof" in an article published by Parapsychology Review in 1975, as well as in a Zetetic Scholar article in 1978. Two 1978 articles quoted physicist Philip Abelson—then the editor of the journal Science—using the same phrasing as Truzzi.

In his 1748 essay "Of Miracles", philosopher David Hume wrote that if "the fact ... partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous ... the evidence ... received a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual". Deming concluded that this was the first complete elucidation of the standard. Unlike Sagan, Hume defined the nature of "extraordinary": he wrote that it was a large magnitude of evidence.

Others had also put forward very similar ideas. Quote Investigator cites similar statements from Benjamin Bayly (in 1708), Arthur Ashley Sykes (1740), Beilby Porteus (1800), Elihu Palmer (1804), and William Craig Brownlee (1824). The French scholar Pierre-Simon Laplace, in essays (1810 and 1814) on the stability of the Solar System, wrote that "the weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned to its strangeness". Thomas Jefferson in an 1808 letter expressed contemporary skepticism of meteorites thus: "A thousand phenomena present themselves daily which we cannot explain, but where facts are suggested, bearing no analogy with the laws of nature as yet known to us, their verity needs proofs proportioned to their difficulty."

Analysis and criticism

Science communicator Carl Sagan did not describe any concrete or quantitative parameters as to what constitutes "extraordinary evidence", which raises the issue of whether the standard can be applied objectively. Academic David Deming notes that it would be "impossible to base all rational thought and scientific methodology on an aphorism whose meaning is entirely subjective". He instead argues that "extraordinary evidence" should be regarded as a sufficient amount of evidence rather than evidence deemed of extraordinary quality. Tressoldi noted that the threshold of evidence is typically decided through consensus. This problem is less apparent in clinical medicine and psychology where statistical results can establish the strength of evidence.

Deming also noted that the standard can "suppress innovation and maintain orthodoxy". Others, like Etzel Cardeña, have noted that many scientific discoveries that spurred paradigm shifts were initially deemed "extraordinary" and likely would not have been so widely accepted if extraordinary evidence were required. Uniform rejection of extraordinary claims could affirm confirmation biases in subfields. Additionally, there are concerns that, when inconsistently applied, the standard exacerbates racial and gender biases. Psychologist Richard Shiffrin has argued that the standard should not be used to bar research from publication but to ascertain what is the best explanation for a phenomenon. Conversely, mathematical psychologist Eric-Jan Wagenmakers stated that extraordinary claims are often false and their publication "pollutes the literature". To qualify the publication of such claims, psychologist Suyog Chandramouli has suggested the inclusion of peer reviewers' opinions on their plausibility or an attached curation of post-publication peer evaluations.

Cognitive scientist and AI researcher Ben Goertzel believes that the phrase is utilized as a "rhetorical meme" without critical thought. Philosopher Theodore Schick argued that "extraordinary claims do not require extraordinary evidence" if they provide the most adequate explanation. Moreover, theists and Christian apologists like William Lane Craig have argued that it is unfair to apply the standard to religious miracles as other improbable claims are often accepted based on limited testimonial evidence, such as an individual claiming that they won the lottery.

Tuesday, November 19, 2024

Model

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model
Model of a molecule, with coloured balls representing different atoms

A model is an informative representation of an object, person, or system. The term originally denoted the plans of a building in late 16th-century English, and derived via French and Italian ultimately from Latin modulus, a measure.

Models can be divided into physical models (e.g. a ship model or a fashion model) and abstract models (e.g. a set of mathematical equations describing the workings of the atmosphere for the purpose of weather forecasting). Abstract or conceptual models are central to philosophy of science.

In scholarly research and applied science, a model should not be confused with a theory: while a model seeks only to represent reality with the purpose of better understanding or predicting the world, a theory is more ambitious in that it claims to be an explanation of reality.

Model in specific contexts

As a noun, model has specific meanings in certain fields, derived from its original meaning of "structural design or layout":

  • Model (art), a person posing for an artist, e.g. a 15th-century criminal representing the biblical Judas in Leonardo da Vinci's painting The Last Supper
  • Model (person), a person who serves as a template for others to copy, as in a role model, often in the context of advertising commercial products; e.g. the first fashion model, Marie Vernet Worth in 1853, wife of designer Charles Frederick Worth.
  • Model (product), a particular design of a product as displayed in a catalogue or show room (e.g. Ford Model T, an early car model)
  • Model (organism) a non-human species that is studied to understand biological phenomena in other organisms, e.g. a guinea pig starved of vitamin C to study scurvy, an experiment that would be immoral to conduct on a person
  • Model (mimicry), a species that is mimicked by another species
  • Model (logic), a structure (a set of items, such as natural numbers 1, 2, 3,..., along with mathematical operations such as addition and multiplication, and relations, such as ) that satisfies a given system of axioms (basic truisms), i.e. that satisfies the statements of a given theory
  • Model (CGI), a mathematical representation of any surface of an object in three dimensions via specialized software
  • Model (MVC), the information-representing internal component of a software, as distinct from its user interface

Physical model

Part of the one-ninth scale model of Bourton-on-the-Water at Bourton-on-the-Water, Gloucestershire, England

A physical model (most commonly referred to simply as a model but in this context distinguished from a conceptual model) is a smaller or larger physical representation of an object, person or system. The object being modelled may be small (e.g., an atom) or large (e.g., the Solar System) or life-size (e.g., a fashion model displaying clothes for similarly-built potential customers).

The geometry of the model and the object it represents are often similar in the sense that one is a rescaling of the other. However, in many cases the similarity is only approximate or even intentionally distorted. Sometimes the distortion is systematic, e.g., a fixed scale horizontally and a larger fixed scale vertically when modelling topography to enhance a region's mountains.

An architectural model permits visualization of internal relationships within the structure or external relationships of the structure to the environment. Another use is as a toy.

Instrumented physical models are an effective way of investigating fluid flows for engineering design. Physical models are often coupled with computational fluid dynamics models to optimize the design of equipment and processes. This includes external flow such as around buildings, vehicles, people, or hydraulic structures. Wind tunnel and water tunnel testing is often used for these design efforts. Instrumented physical models can also examine internal flows, for the design of ductwork systems, pollution control equipment, food processing machines, and mixing vessels. Transparent flow models are used in this case to observe the detailed flow phenomenon. These models are scaled in terms of both geometry and important forces, for example, using Froude number or Reynolds number scaling (see Similitude). In the pre-computer era, the UK economy was modelled with the hydraulic model MONIAC, to predict for example the effect of tax rises on employment.

Conceptual model

Weather models use differential equations based on the laws of physics, and a coordinate system which divides the planet into a 3D grid.

A conceptual model is a theoretical representation of a system, e.g. a set of mathematical equations attempting to describe the workings of the atmosphere for the purpose of weather forecasting. It consists of concepts used to help understand or simulate a subject the model represents.

Abstract or conceptual models are central to philosophy of science, as almost every scientific theory effectively embeds some kind of model of the physical or human sphere. In some sense, a physical model "is always the reification of some conceptual model; the conceptual model is conceived ahead as the blueprint of the physical one", which is then constructed as conceived. Thus, the term refers to models that are formed after a conceptualization or generalization process.

Examples

  • Conceptual model (computer science), an agreed representation of entities and their relationships, to assist in developing software
  • Economic model, a theoretical construct representing economic processes
  • Language model a probabilistic model of a natural language, used for speech recognition, language generation, and information retrieval
    • Large language models are artificial neural networks used for generative artificial intelligence (AI), e.g. ChatGPT
  • Mathematical model, a description of a system using mathematical concepts and language
    • Statistical model, a mathematical model that usually specifies the relationship between one or more random variables and other non-random variables
    • Model (CGI), a mathematical representation of any surface of an object in three dimensions via specialized software
  • Medical model, a proposed "set of procedures in which all doctors are trained"
  • Mental model, in psychology, an internal representation of external reality
  • Model (logic), a set along with a collection of finitary operations, and relations that are defined on it, satisfying a given collection of axioms
  • Model (MVC), information-representing component of a software, distinct from the user interface (the "view"), both linked by the "controller" component, in the context of the model–view–controller software design
  • Model act, a law drafted centrally to be disseminated and proposed for enactment in multiple independent legislatures
  • Standard model (disambiguation)

Properties of models, according to general model theory

According to Herbert Stachowiak, a model is characterized by at least three properties:

1. Mapping
A model always is a model of something—it is an image or representation of some natural or artificial, existing or imagined original, where this original itself could be a model.
2. Reduction
In general, a model will not include all attributes that describe the original but only those that appear relevant to the model's creator or user.
3. Pragmatism
A model does not relate unambiguously to its original. It is intended to work as a replacement for the original
a) for certain subjects (for whom?)
b) within a certain time range (when?)
c) restricted to certain conceptual or physical actions (what for?).

For example, a street map is a model of the actual streets in a city (mapping), showing the course of the streets while leaving out, say, traffic signs and road markings (reduction), made for pedestrians and vehicle drivers for the purpose of finding one's way in the city (pragmatism).

Additional properties have been proposed, like extension and distortion as well as validity. The American philosopher Michael Weisberg differentiates between concrete and mathematical models and proposes computer simulations (computational models) as their own class of models.

Integrative neuroscience

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrative_neuroscience

Integrative neuroscience is the study of neuroscience that works to unify functional organization data to better understand complex structures and behaviors. The relationship between structure and function, and how the regions and functions connect to each other. Different parts of the brain carrying out different tasks, interconnecting to come together allowing complex behavior. Integrative neuroscience works to fill gaps in knowledge that can largely be accomplished with data sharing, to create understanding of systems, currently being applied to simulation neuroscience: Computer Modeling of the brain that integrates functional groups together.

Overview

The roots of integrative neuroscience originated from the Rashevsky-Rosen school of relational biology that characterizes functional organization mathematically by abstracting away the structure (i.e., physics and chemistry). It was further expanded by Chauvet who introduced hierarchical and functional integration.

Hierarchical integration is structural involving spatiotemporal dynamic continuity in Euclidean space to bring about functional organization, viz.

Hierarchical organization + Hierarchical integration = Functional organization

However, functional integration is relational and as such this requires a topology not restricted to Euclidean space, but rather occupying vector spaces This means that for any given functional organization the methods of functional analysis enable a relational organization to be mapped by the functional integration, viz.

Functional organization + Functional integration = Relational Organization

Thus hierarchical and functional integration entails a "neurobiology of cognitive semantics" where hierarchical organization is associated with the neurobiology and relational organization is associated with the cognitive semantics. Relational organization throws away the matter; "function dictates structure", hence material aspects are entailed, while in reductionism the causal nexus between structure and dynamics entails function that obviates functional integration because the causal entailment in the brain of hierarchical integration is absent from the structure.

If integrative neuroscience is studied from the viewpoint of functional organization of hierarchical levels then it is defined as causal entailment in the brain of hierarchical integration. If it is studied from the viewpoint of relational organization then it is defined as semantic entailment in the brain of functional integration.

It aims to present studies of functional organization of particular brain systems across scale through hierarchical integration leading to species-typical behaviors under normal and pathological states. As such, integrative neuroscience aims for a unified understanding of brain function across scale.

Spivey's continuity of mind thesis extends integrative neuroscience to the domain of continuity psychology.

Motivation

With data building up, it ends up in its respective specializations with very little overlap. With the creation of a standardized integrated database of neuroscience data, lead to statical models that would otherwise not be possible, for example, understanding and treating psychiatric disorders.

It provides a framework for linking the great diversity of specializations within contemporary neuroscience, including

This diversity is inevitable, yet has arguably created a void: neglect of the primary role of the nervous system in enabling the animal to survive and prosper. Integrative neuroscience aims to fill this perceived void.

Experimental methods

Identifying different brain regions through correlation and causal methods, combine to contribute an overall brain function and location map. Using different data collected from different methods combine to create a better interconnected and integrative understanding of the brain.

Correlation

The relationship between brain states and behavioral states. Observed through spatial and temporal differences. That pin point places in the brain affected by an action or stimuli, and the timing of the response. Tools used for this include fMRI and EEG, more information below.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measures blood oxygen dependent response (BOLD), using magnetic resonance to observe blood oxygenated areas. Active areas are associated with increased blood flow, presenting a correlation relationship. The spatial localization of fMRI allows accurate information down to the nuclei and Brodmann areas. Certain activities such as the visual system are so rapid lasting only fractions of seconds, while other brain functions can take days or months such as memory. fMRI measures in the frame of seconds, making it difficult to measure extremely fast processes.

Electroencephalography

Electroencephalography (EEG) allows you to see the electrical activity of the brain over time, can only measure presented stimuli responses, stimuli the experimenter presents. it uses electrode sensors places on the surface on the skull to measure synchronous neuron firing. It can not be certain activity is caused by stimuli only a correlation between a given function and brain area. EEG measures overall changes in wide regions, lacking specificity.

Causal

Brain activity is directly caused by stimulation of a specific region, as proven through experimentation.

TMS

TMS (Transcranial magnetic stimulation) uses a magnetic coil releasing a burst of magnetic field that activated activity in a specific brain area. It is useful in exciting a specific area in the cortex and recording the MEPs (Motor Evoked Potentials) that occurs as a result. It gives certain causal relationships, but is limited to the cortex making it impossible to reach any deeper than the surface of the brain.

Lesions studies

When patients have natural lesions, it is an opportunity to watch how a lesion in a given region affects functionality. Or in non-human experimentation, lesions can be created by removing sections of the brain. These methods are not reversible, unlike brain studying techniques, and does not accurately show what that section of the brain are disabled due to the disruption of homeostasis in the brain. With a permeate lesion, the brain chemically adjusted and restores homeostasis.  Relying on natural occurrences has little control over variables such as location and size. And in cases with damage in multiple areas, differentiation is not certain with lack of mass data.

Electrode stimulation

Cortical Stimulation Mapping, invasive brain surgery that probes at area of the cortex to relate different regions to function. Typically occurs during open brain surgery where electrodes are inserted in areas and observations are made. This method is limited by number of patients having open brain surgery that consent to such experimentation, and to what area of the brain is being operated on. Also performed in mice with full range over the brain.

Applications

Human Brain Project

Since the 'decade of the brain' there has been an explosion of insights into the brain and their application in most areas of medicine. With this explosion, the need for integration of data across studies, modalities and levels of understanding is increasingly recognized. A concrete exemplar of the value of large-scale data sharing has been provided by the Human Brain Project.

Medical

The importance of large-scale integration of brain information for new approaches to medicine has been recognized. Rather than relying mainly on symptom information, a combination of brain and gene information may ultimately be required for understanding what treatment is best suited to which individual person.

Behavioral

There is also work studying empathy and social behavior trends to better understand how empathy plays a role in behavioral science, and how the brain responds to empathy, produces empathy, and develops empathy over time. Combining these functional units and the social behavior and impact work to create a better understanding of the complex behaviors that create the human experience.

Solipsism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsis...