In aerospace engineering, concerning aircraft, rocket and spacecraft design, overall propulsion system efficiency is the efficiency with which the energy contained in a vehicle's fuel is converted into kinetic energy of the vehicle, to accelerate it, or to replace losses due to aerodynamic drag or gravity. Mathematically, it is represented as , where is the cycle efficiency and is the propulsive efficiency.
The cycle efficiency is expressed as the percentage of the heat
energy in the fuel that is converted to mechanical energy in the engine,
and the propulsive efficiency is expressed as the proportion of the mechanical energy actually used to propel the aircraft. The propulsive efficiency is always less than one, because conservation of momentum
requires that the exhaust have some of the kinetic energy, and the
propulsive mechanism (whether propeller, jet exhaust, or ducted fan) is
never perfectly efficient. It is greatly dependent on exhaust expulsion
velocity and airspeed.
Most aerospace vehicles are propelled by heat engines of some kind,
usually an internal combustion engine. The efficiency of a heat engine
relates how much useful work is output for a given amount of heat energy
input.
is the work extracted from the engine. (It is negative because work is done by the engine.)
is the heat energy taken from the high-temperature system (heat
source). (It is negative because heat is extracted from the source,
hence is positive.)
is the heat energy delivered to the low-temperature system (heat sink). (It is positive because heat is added to the sink.)
In other words, a heat engine absorbs heat from some heat source,
converting part of it to useful work, and delivering the rest to a heat
sink at lower temperature. In an engine, efficiency is defined as the
ratio of useful work done to energy expended.
The theoretical maximum efficiency of a heat engine, the Carnot efficiency, depends only on its operating temperatures. Mathematically, this is because in reversible processes, the cold reservoir would gain the same amount of entropy as that lost by the hot reservoir (i.e., ), for no change in entropy. Thus:
where is the absolute temperature of the hot source and that of the cold sink, usually measured in kelvins. Note that is positive while
is negative; in any reversible work-extracting process, entropy is
overall not increased, but rather is moved from a hot (high-entropy)
system to a cold (low-entropy one), decreasing the entropy of the heat
source and increasing that of the heat sink.
Propulsive efficiency
Propulsive
efficiency is defined as the ratio of propulsive power (i.e. thrust
times velocity of the vehicle) to work done on the fluid.
In generic terms, the propulsive power can be calculated as follows:
where represents thrust and , the flight speed.
The thrust can be computed from intake and exhaust massflows ( and ) and velocities ( and ):
The work done by the engine to the flow, on the other hand, is the
change in kinetic energy per time. This does not take into account the
efficiency of the engine used to generate the power, nor of the
propeller, fan or other mechanism used to accelerate air. It merely
refers to the work done to the flow, by any means, and can be expressed
as the difference between exhausted kinetic energy flux and incoming
kinetic energy flux:
The propulsive efficiency can therefore be computed as:
Depending on the type of propulsion used, this equation can be
simplified in different ways, demonstrating some of the peculiarities of
different engine types.
The general equation already shows, however, that propulsive efficiency
improves when using large massflows and small velocities compared to
small mass-flows and large velocities, since the squared terms in the
denominator grow faster than the non-squared terms.
The losses modelled by propulsive efficiency are explained by the
fact that any mode of aero propulsion leaves behind a jet moving into
the opposite direction of the vehicle. The kinetic energy flux in this
jet is for the case that .
Jet engines
Dependence of the energy efficiency (η) from the exhaust speed/airplane speed ratio (c/v) for airbreathing jets
The propulsive efficiency formula for air-breathing engines is given below. It can be derived by setting in the general equation, and assuming that . This cancels out the mass-flow and leads to:
where is the exhaust expulsion velocity and is both the airspeed at the inlet and the flight velocity.
For pure jet engines, particularly with afterburner,
a small amount of accuracy can be gained by not assuming the intake and
exhaust massflow to be equal, since the exhaust gas also contains the
added mass of the fuel injected. For turbofan engines, the exhaust
massflow may be marginally smaller than the intake massflow because the
engine supplies "bleed air"
from the compressor to the aircraft. In most circumstances, this is not
taken into account, as it makes no significant difference to the
computed propulsive efficiency.
By computing the exhaust velocity from the equation for thrust (while still assuming ), we can also obtain the propulsive efficiency as a function of specific thrust ():
A corollary of this is that, particularly in air breathing engines,
it is more energy efficient to accelerate a large amount of air by a
small amount, than it is to accelerate a small amount of air by a large
amount, even though the thrust is the same. This is why turbofan engines are more efficient than simple jet engines at subsonic speeds.
Dependence of the propulsive efficiency () upon the vehicle speed/exhaust speed ratio (v_0/v_9) for rocket and jet engines
Rocket engines
A rocket engine's
is usually high due to the high combustion temperatures and pressures,
and the long converging-diverging nozzle used. It varies slightly with
altitude due to changing atmospheric pressure, but can be up to 70%.
Most of the remainder is lost as heat in the exhaust.
Rocket engines have a slightly different propulsive efficiency ()
than air-breathing jet engines, as the lack of intake air changes the
form of the equation. This also allows rockets to exceed their exhaust's
velocity.
Similarly to jet engines, matching the exhaust speed and the vehicle
speed gives optimum efficiency, in theory. However, in practice, this
results in a very low specific impulse, causing much greater losses due to the need for exponentially larger masses of propellant. Unlike ducted engines, rockets give thrust even when the two speeds are equal.
In 1903, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky discussed the average propulsive efficiency of a rocket, which he called the utilization (utilizatsiya), the "portion of the total work of the explosive material transferred to the rocket" as opposed to the exhaust gas.
Propeller engines
Propulsive efficiency comparison for various gas turbine engine configurations
The calculation is somewhat different for reciprocating and turboprop
engines which rely on a propeller for propulsion since their output is
typically expressed in terms of power rather than thrust. The equation
for heat added per unit time, Q, can be adopted as follows:
where H = calorific value of the fuel in BTU/lb, h = fuel consumption
rate in lb/hr and J = mechanical equivalent of heat = 778.24 ft.lb/BTU,
where is engine output in horsepower, converted to foot-pounds/second by multiplication by 550. Given that specific fuel consumption is Cp = h/Pe and H = 20 052 BTU/lb for gasoline, the equation is simplified to:
expressed as a percentage.
Assuming a typical propeller efficiency of 86% (for the optimal airspeed and air density conditions for the given propeller design), maximum overall propulsion efficiency is estimated as:
In astronautics, a powered flyby, or Oberth maneuver, is a maneuver in which a spacecraft falls into a gravitational well and then uses its engines to further accelerate as it is falling, thereby achieving additional speed. The resulting maneuver is a more efficient way to gain kinetic energy than applying the same impulse outside of a gravitational well. The gain in efficiency is explained by the Oberth effect, wherein the use of a reaction engine
at higher speeds (relative to any reference frame) generates a greater
change in mechanical energy than its use at lower speeds. In practical
terms, this means that the most energy-efficient method for a spacecraft
to burn its fuel is at the lowest possible orbital periapsis, when its orbital velocity (and so, its kinetic energy) is greatest. In some cases, it is even worth spending fuel on slowing the spacecraft
into a gravity well to take advantage of the efficiencies of the Oberth
effect. The maneuver and effect are named after the Transylvanian Saxonphysicist and a founder of modern rocketryHermann Oberth, who first described them in 1927.
Because the vehicle remains near periapsis only for a short time,
for the Oberth maneuver to be most effective the vehicle must be able
to generate as much impulse as possible in the shortest possible time.
As a result the Oberth maneuver is much more useful for high-thrust
rocket engines like liquid-propellant rockets, and less useful for low-thrust reaction engines such as ion drives,
which take a long time to gain speed. Low thrust rockets can use the
Oberth effect by splitting a long departure burn into several short
burns near the periapsis. The Oberth effect also can be used to
understand the behavior of multi-stage rockets: the upper stage can generate much more usable kinetic energy than the total chemical energy of the propellants it carries.
In terms of the energies involved, the Oberth effect is more effective at higher speeds because at high speed the propellant has significant kinetic energy in addition to its chemical potential energy.
At higher speed the vehicle is able to employ the greater change
(reduction) in kinetic energy of the propellant (as it is exhausted
backward and hence at reduced speed and hence reduced kinetic energy) to
generate a greater increase in kinetic energy of the vehicle.
Explanation in terms of work and kinetic energy
Because kinetic energy equals mv2/2,
this change in velocity imparts a greater increase in kinetic energy at
a high velocity than it would at a low velocity. For example,
considering a 2 kg rocket:
at 1 m/s, the rocket starts with 12 = 1 J of kinetic energy. Adding 1 m/s increases the kinetic energy to 22 = 4 J, for a gain of 3 J;
at 10 m/s, the rocket starts with 102 = 100 J of kinetic energy. Adding 1 m/s increases the kinetic energy to 112 = 121 J, for a gain of 21 J.
This greater change in kinetic energy can then carry the rocket
higher in the gravity well than if the propellant were burned at a lower
speed.
Description in terms of work
The
thrust produced by a rocket engine is independent of the rocket’s
velocity relative to the surrounding atmosphere. A rocket acting on a
fixed object, as in a static firing, does no useful work on the rocket;
the rocket's chemical energy is progressively converted to kinetic
energy of the exhaust, plus heat. But when the rocket moves, its thrust
acts through the distance it moves. Force multiplied by displacement is
the definition of mechanical work.
The greater the velocity of the rocket and payload during the burn the
greater is the displacement and the work done, and the greater the
increase in kinetic energy of the rocket and its payload. As the
velocity of the rocket increases, progressively more of the available
kinetic energy goes to the rocket and its payload, and less to the
exhaust.
This is shown as follows. The mechanical work done on the rocket () is defined as the dot product of the force of the engine's thrust () and the displacement it travels during the burn ():
If the burn is made in the prograde direction, . The work results in a change in kinetic energy
Differentiating with respect to time, we obtain
or
where is the velocity. Dividing by the instantaneous mass to express this in terms of specific energy(), we get
Thus it can be readily seen that the rate of gain of specific
energy of every part of the rocket is proportional to speed and, given
this, the equation can be integrated (numerically or otherwise) to calculate the overall increase in specific energy of the rocket.
Impulsive burn
Integrating
the above energy equation is often unnecessary if the burn duration is
short. Short burns of chemical rocket engines close to periapsis or
elsewhere are usually mathematically modeled as impulsive burns, where
the force of the engine dominates any other forces that might change the
vehicle's energy over the burn.
For example, as a vehicle falls toward periapsis
in any orbit (closed or escape orbits) the velocity relative to the
central body increases. Briefly burning the engine (an "impulsive burn")
prograde at periapsis increases the velocity by the same increment as at any other time (). However, since the vehicle's kinetic energy is related to the square
of its velocity, this increase in velocity has a non-linear effect on
the vehicle's kinetic energy, leaving it with higher energy than if the
burn were achieved at any other time.
Oberth calculation for a parabolic orbit
If an impulsive burn of Δv is performed at periapsis in a parabolic orbit, then the velocity at periapsis before the burn is equal to the escape velocity (Vesc), and the specific kinetic energy after the burn is
where .
When the vehicle leaves the gravity field, the loss of specific kinetic energy is
so it retains the energy
which is larger than the energy from a burn outside the gravitational field () by
When the vehicle has left the gravity well, it is traveling at a speed
For the case where the added impulse Δv is small compared to escape velocity, the 1 can be ignored, and the effective Δv of the impulsive burn can be seen to be multiplied by a factor of simply
If the vehicle travels at velocity v at the start of a burn that changes the velocity by Δv, then the change in specific orbital energy (SOE) due to the new orbit is
Once the spacecraft is far from the planet again, the SOE is entirely kinetic, since gravitational potential energy approaches zero. Therefore, the larger the v at the time of the burn, the greater the final kinetic energy, and the higher the final velocity.
The effect becomes more pronounced the closer to the central
body, or more generally, the deeper in the gravitational field potential
in which the burn occurs, since the velocity is higher there.
So if a spacecraft is on a parabolic flyby of Jupiter with a periapsis
velocity of 50 km/s and performs a 5 km/s burn, it turns out that the
final velocity change at great distance is 22.9 km/s, giving a
multiplication of the burn by 4.58 times.
Paradox
It may seem that the rocket is getting energy for free, which would violate conservation of energy.
However, any gain to the rocket's kinetic energy is balanced by a
relative decrease in the kinetic energy the exhaust is left with (the
kinetic energy of the exhaust may still increase, but it does not
increase as much). Contrast this to the situation of static firing, where the speed of the
engine is fixed at zero. This means that its kinetic energy does not
increase at all, and all the chemical energy released by the fuel is
converted to the exhaust's kinetic energy (and heat).
At very high speeds the mechanical power imparted to the rocket
can exceed the total power liberated in the combustion of the
propellant; this may also seem to violate conservation of energy. But
the propellants in a fast-moving rocket carry energy not only
chemically, but also in their own kinetic energy, which at speeds above a
few kilometres per second exceed the chemical component. When these
propellants are burned, some of this kinetic energy is transferred to
the rocket along with the chemical energy released by burning.
The Oberth effect can therefore partly make up for what is
extremely low efficiency early in the rocket's flight when it is moving
only slowly. Most of the work done by a rocket early in flight is
"invested" in the kinetic energy of the propellant not yet burned, part
of which they will release later when they are burned.
Essentialism is the view that objects have a set of attributes that are necessary to their identity. In early Western thought, Platonic idealism held that all things have such an "essence"—an "idea" or "form". In Categories, Aristotle similarly proposed that all objects have a substance that, as George Lakoff put it, "make the thing what it is, and without which it would be not that kind of thing". The contrary view—non-essentialism—denies the need to posit such an "essence". Essentialism has been controversial from its beginning. In the Parmenides dialogue, Plato depicts Socrates
questioning the notion, suggesting that if we accept the idea that
every beautiful thing or just action partakes of an essence to be
beautiful or just, we must also accept the "existence of separate
essences for hair, mud, and dirt".
Older social theories were often conceptually essentialist. In biology and other natural sciences, essentialism provided the rationale for taxonomy at least until the time of Charles Darwin. The role and importance of essentialism in modern biology is still a matter of debate. Beliefs which posit that social identities such as race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender are essential characteristics have been central to many discriminatory or extremist ideologies. For instance, psychological essentialism is correlated with racial prejudice. Essentialist views about race have also been shown to diminish empathy when dealing with members of another racial group. In medical sciences, essentialism can lead to a reified view of identities, leading to fallacious conclusions and potentially unequal treatment.
In philosophy
An essence characterizes a substance or a form, in the sense of the forms and ideas in Platonic idealism. It is permanent, unalterable, and eternal, and is present in every possible world. Classical humanism has an essentialist conception of the human, in its endorsement of the notion of an eternal and unchangeable human nature. This has been criticized by Kierkegaard, Marx, Heidegger, Sartre, Badiou and many other existential, materialist and anti-humanist thinkers. Essentialism, in its broadest sense, is any philosophy that acknowledges the primacy of essence. Unlike existentialism, which posits "being" as the fundamental reality, the essentialist ontology
must be approached from a metaphysical perspective. Empirical knowledge
is developed from experience of a relational universe whose components
and attributes are defined and measured in terms of intellectually
constructed laws. Thus, for the scientist, reality is explored as an
evolutionary system of diverse entities, the order of which is
determined by the principle of causality.
In Plato's philosophy, in particular the Timaeus and the Philebus, things were said to come into being by the action of a demiurge who works to form chaos into ordered entities. Similarly, many definitions of essence hark back to the ancient Greek hylomorphic understanding of the formation of the things as articulated, for example, by Aristotle.
According to that account, the structure and real existence of any
thing can be understood by analogy to an artefact produced by a
craftsperson. The craftsperson requires hyle (timber or wood) and
a model, plan or idea in their own mind, according to which the wood is
worked to give it the indicated contour or form (morphe). Aristotle was the first to use the terms hyle and morphe, developing an account indebted to Plato's. According to Aristotle's explanation, all entities have two aspects: "matter" and "form". It is the particular form imposed that gives some matter its identity—its quiddity or "whatness" (i.e., "what it is"). Plato was one of the first essentialists, postulating the concept of ideal forms—an abstract entity
of which individual objects are mere facsimiles. To give an example:
the ideal form of a circle is a perfect circle, something that is
physically impossible to make manifest; yet the circles we draw and
observe clearly have some idea in common—the ideal form. Plato
proposed that these ideas are eternal and vastly superior to their
manifestations, and that we understand these manifestations in the
material world by comparing and relating them to their respective ideal
form. Plato's forms are regarded as patriarchs to essentialist dogma
simply because they are a case of what is intrinsic and a-contextual of
objects—the abstract properties that make them what they are. One
example is Plato's parable of the cave.
Plato believed that the universe was perfect and that its observed
imperfections came from man's limited perception of it. For Plato, there
were two realities: the "essential" or ideal and the "perceived".
Aristotle (384–322 BC) applied the term essence to that which things in a category have in common and without which they cannot be members of that category (for example, rationality is the essence of man; without rationality a creature cannot be a man). In his critique of Aristotle's philosophy, Bertrand Russell
said that his concept of essence transferred to metaphysics what was
only a verbal convenience and that it confused the properties of
language with the properties of the world. In fact, a thing's "essence"
consisted in those defining properties without which we could not use
the name for it, rather than those properties without which a thing would not be what kind of thing it actually is. Although the concept of essence was, according to Bertrand Russell,
"hopelessly muddled" it became part of every philosophy until modern
times. The Egyptian-born philosopher Plotinus (204–270 AD) brought idealism to the Roman Empire as Neoplatonism,
and with it the concept that not only do all existents emanate from a
"primary essence" but that the mind plays an active role in shaping or
ordering the objects of perception, rather than passively receiving
empirical data.
Examples
Naturalism
Dating back to the 18th century, naturalism is a form of essentialism in which social matters are explained through the logic of natural dispositions. The invoked nature can be biological, ontological or theological. It is opposed by antinaturalism and culturalism.
In the case of Homo sapiens, the divergent conceptions of human nature may be partitioned into essentialist versus non-essentialist (or even anti-essentialist) positions. Another established dichotomy is that of monism versus pluralism about the matter.
Monism will demand that
enhancement technologies be used to create humans as close as possible
to the ideal state. [...] The Nazis would have proposed the list of
characteristics for admission to the SS as the universal template for
enhancement technologies. Hedonistic utilitarianism
is a less objectionable version of monism, according to which the best
human life is one that contains as much pleasure and as little suffering
as possible – but like Nazism, it leaves no room for meaningful choice
about enhancement.
Before evolution was developed as a scientific theory, the essentialist view of biology posited that all species are unchanging throughout time. The historian Mary P. Winsor has argued that biologists such as Louis Agassiz in the 19th century believed that taxa such as species and genus were fixed, reflecting the mind of the creator. Some religious opponents of evolution continue to maintain this view of biology.
Work by historians of systematic biology
in the 21st century has cast doubt upon this view of pre-Darwinian
thinkers. Winsor, Ron Amundson and Staffan Müller-Wille have each argued
that in fact the usual suspects (such as Linnaeus
and the Ideal Morphologists) were very far from being essentialists,
and that the so-called "essentialism story" (or "myth") in biology is a
result of conflating the views expressed and biological examples used by
philosophers going back to Aristotle and continuing through to John Stuart Mill and William Whewell in the immediately pre-Darwinian period, with the way that biologists used such terms as species.
Anti-essentialists contend that an essentialist typological
categorization has been rendered obsolete and untenable by evolutionary
theory for several reasons. First, they argue that biological species are dynamic entities,
emerging and disappearing as distinct populations are molded by natural
selection. This view contrasts with the static essences that
essentialists say characterize natural categories. Second, the opponents of essentialism argue that our current understanding of biological species emphasizes genealogical relationships rather than intrinsic traits. Lastly, non-essentialists assert that every organism has a mutational load, and the variability and diversity within species contradict the notion of fixed biological natures.
In feminist theory and gender studies,
gender essentialism is the attribution of fixed essences to men and
women—this idea that men and women are fundamentally different
continues to be a matter of contention. Gay/lesbian rights advocate Diana Fuss
wrote: "Essentialism is most commonly understood as a belief in the
real, true essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which
define the 'whatness' of a given entity." Women's essence is assumed to be universal and is generally identified
with those characteristics viewed as being specifically feminine. These ideas of femininity are usually biologized and are often
preoccupied with psychological characteristics, such as nurturance,
empathy, support, and non-competitiveness, etc. Feminist theorist Elizabeth Grosz states in her 1995 publication Space, time and perversion: essays on the politics of bodies
that essentialism "entails the belief that those characteristics
defined as women's essence are shared in common by all women at all
times. It implies a limit of the variations and possibilities of
change—it is not possible for a subject to act in a manner contrary to
her essence. Her essence underlies all the apparent variations
differentiating women from each other. Essentialism thus refers to the
existence of fixed characteristic, given attributes, and ahistorical
functions that limit the possibilities of change and thus of social
reorganization."
Gender essentialism is pervasive in popular culture, as illustrated by the #1 New York Times best seller Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus, but this essentialism is routinely critiqued in introductory women's studies textbooks such as Women: Images & Realities. Starting in the 1980s, some feminist writers have put forward essentialist theories about gender and science. Evelyn Fox Keller, Sandra Harding,
and Nancy Tuana
argued that the modern scientific enterprise is inherently patriarchal
and incompatible with women's nature. Other feminist scholars, such as Ann Hibner Koblitz, Lenore Blum, Mary Gray, Mary Beth Ruskai, and Pnina Abir-Am and Dorinda Outram have criticized those theories for ignoring the diverse nature of
scientific research and the tremendous variation in women's experiences
in different cultures and historical periods.
Cultural and racial essentialism is the view that fundamental
biological or physical characteristics of human "races" produce
personality, heritage, cognitive abilities, or 'natural talents' that
are shared by all members of a racial group. In the early 20th century, many anthropologists
taught this theory – that race was an entirely biological phenomenon
and that this was core to a person's behavior and identity. This, coupled with a belief that linguistic, cultural, and social groups fundamentally existed along racial lines, formed the basis of what is now called scientific racism. After the Nazi eugenics program, along with the rise of anti-colonial movements, racial essentialism lost widespread popularity. New studies of culture and the fledgling field of population genetics
undermined the scientific standing of racial essentialism, leading race
anthropologists to revise their conclusions about the sources of
phenotypic variation. A significant number of modern anthropologists and biologists in the West came to view race as an invalid genetic or biological designation.
Historically, beliefs which posit that social identities such as
ethnicity, nationality or gender determine a person's essential
characteristics have in many cases been shown to have destructive or
harmful results. It has been argued by some that essentialist thinking
lies at the core of many simplistic, discriminatory or extremist ideologies. Psychological essentialism is also correlated with racial prejudice. In medical sciences, essentialism can lead to an over-emphasis on the
role of identities—for example assuming that differences in hypertension
in African-American populations are due to racial differences rather than social causes—leading to fallacious conclusions and potentially unequal treatment. Older social theories were often conceptually essentialist.
Strategic essentialism, a major concept in postcolonial theory, was introduced in the 1980s by the Indianliterary critic and theoristGayatri Chakravorty Spivak. It refers to a political tactic in which minority groups,
nationalities, or ethnic groups mobilize on the basis of shared
gendered, cultural, or political identity. While strong differences may
exist between members of these groups, and among themselves they engage
in continuous debates, it is sometimes advantageous for them to
temporarily "essentialize" themselves, despite it being based on
erroneous logic, and to bring forward their group identity in a simplified way to achieve certain goals, such as equal rights or antiglobalization.
Machine learning
Pelillo argues that traditional machine learning techniques often align with an essentialist paradigm by relying on features - properties assumed to be essential for classification tasks. For instance, pattern recognition,
which attempts to extract essential attributes from data, is described
as inherently essentialist since it presupposes that objects have
stable, identifiable essences that define their categories. This
perspective extends to similarity-based approaches, which use prototype theory
to establish relationships within data by grouping instances around
central prototypes that exhibit the "essence" of a category.
Expanding on this, Pelillo and Scantamburlo highlight that
certain machine-learning scenarios, such as when data is highly
dimensional or features are poorly defined, challenge the essentialist
framework. They advocate for alternative paradigms that consider
relational and contextualinformation
instead of isolated feature analysis. This relational focus aligns with
anti-essentialist stances, which view categories as dynamic and
context-dependent rather than fixed.
Šekrst and Skansi build on these ideas, noting that supervised learning, by utilizing labeled datasets,
reflects essentialist tendencies since it relies on predefined
human-defined categories. However, they argue that this does not commit
machine learning to an ontological stance on essentialism. Instead, they
propose that the categories used in supervised learning are
human-constructed in feature selection processes and reflect epistemological practices rather than metaphysical truths. Similarly, unsupervised learning's clustering
and similarity-based approaches often resemble prototypical reasoning
but do not inherently affirm or deny essentialism, focusing instead on pragmatic task performance.
In historiography
Essentialism
in history as a field of study entails discerning and listing essential
cultural characteristics of a particular nation or culture, in the
belief that a people or culture can be understood in this way. Sometimes
such essentialism leads to claims of a praiseworthy national or
cultural identity, or to its opposite, the condemnation of a culture
based on presumed essential characteristics. Herodotus,
for example, claims that Egyptian culture is essentially feminized and
possesses a "softness" which has made Egypt easy to conquer. To what extent Herodotus was an essentialist is a matter of debate; he
is also credited with not essentializing the concept of the Athenian
identity, or differences between the Greeks and the Persians that are the subject of his Histories.
Essentialism had been operative in colonialism, as well as in critiques of colonialism. Post-colonial theorists, such as Edward Said,
insisted that essentialism was the "defining mode" of "Western"
historiography and ethnography until the nineteenth century and even
after, according to Touraj Atabaki, manifesting itself in the historiography of the Middle East and Central Asia as Eurocentrism, over-generalization, and reductionism. Into the 21st century, most historians, social scientists, and humanists reject methodologies associated with essentialism, although some have argued that certain varieties of essentialism may be useful or even necessary. Karl Popper splits the ambiguous term realism into essentialism and realism. He uses essentialism whenever he means the opposite of nominalism, and realism only as opposed to idealism.
Popper himself is a realist as opposed to an idealist, but a
methodological nominalist as opposed to an essentialist. For example,
statements like "a puppy is a young dog" should be read from right to
left as an answer to "What shall we call a young dog", never from left
to right as an answer to "What is a puppy?"
In psychology
Paul Bloom
attempts to explain why people will pay more in an auction for the
clothing of celebrities if the clothing is unwashed. He believes the
answer to this and many other questions is that people cannot help but
think of objects as containing a sort of "essence" that can be
influenced.
There is a difference between metaphysical essentialism and
psychological essentialism, the latter referring not to an actual claim
about the world but a claim about a way of representing entities in
cognition. Influential in this area is Susan Gelman,
who has outlined many domains in which children and adults construe
classes of entities, particularly biological entities, in essentialist
terms—i.e., as if they had an immutable underlying essence which can be
used to predict unobserved similarities between members of that class. This causal relationship is unidirectional; an observable feature of an entity does not define the underlying essence.
In developmental psychology
Essentialism has emerged as an important concept in psychology, particularly developmental psychology. In 1991, Kathryn Kremer and Susan Gelman studied the extent to which
children from four–seven years old demonstrate essentialism. Children
believed that underlying essences predicted observable behaviours.
Children were able to describe living objects' behaviour as
self-perpetuated and non-living objects' behavior as a result of an
adult influencing the object. Understanding the underlying causal
mechanism for behaviour suggests essentialist thinking. Younger children were unable to identify causal mechanisms of behaviour
whereas older children were able to. This suggests that essentialism is
rooted in cognitive development.
It can be argued that there is a shift in the way that children
represent entities, from not understanding the causal mechanism of the
underlying essence to showing sufficient understanding.
There are four key criteria that constitute essentialist
thinking. The first facet is the aforementioned individual causal
mechanisms. The second is innate potential: the assumption that an object will fulfill its predetermined course of development. According to this criterion, essences predict developments in entities
that will occur throughout its lifespan. The third is immutability. Despite altering the superficial appearance of an object it does not
remove its essence. Observable changes in features of an entity are not
salient enough to alter its essential characteristics. The fourth is
inductive potential. This suggests that entities may share common features but are
essentially different; however similar two beings may be, their
characteristics will be at most analogous, differing most importantly in
essences. The implications of psychological essentialism are numerous.
Prejudiced individuals have been found to endorse exceptionally
essential ways of thinking, suggesting that essentialism may perpetuate
exclusion among social groups. For example, essentialism of nationality has been linked to anti-immigration attitudes. In multiple studies in India and the United States, it was shown that
in lay view a person's nationality is considerably fixed at birth, even
if that person is adopted and raised by a family of another nationality
at day one and never told about their origin. This may be due to an over-extension of an essential-biological mode of thinking stemming from cognitive development. Paul Bloom
of Yale University has stated that "one of the most exciting ideas in
cognitive science is the theory that people have a default assumption
that things, people and events have invisible essences that make them
what they are. Experimental psychologists have argued that essentialism
underlies our understanding of the physical and social worlds, and
developmental and cross-cultural psychologists have proposed that it is
instinctive and universal. We are natural-born essentialists." Scholars suggest that the categorical nature of essentialist thinking
predicts the use of stereotypes and can be targeted in the application
of stereotype prevention.