The dark web is the World Wide Web content that exists on darknets: overlay networks that use the Internet but require specific software, configurations, or authorization to access.
Through the dark web, private computer networks can communicate and
conduct business anonymously without divulging identifying information,
such as a user's location. The dark web forms a small part of the deep web, the part of the web not indexed by web search engines, although sometimes the term deep web is mistakenly used to refer specifically to the dark web.
The darknets which constitute the dark web include small, friend-to-friend networks, as well as large, popular networks such as Tor, Freenet, I2P, and Riffle operated by public organizations and individuals. Users of the dark web refer to the regular web as Clearnet due to its unencrypted nature. The Tor dark web or onionland uses the traffic anonymization technique of onion routing under the network's top-level domain suffix .onion.
The dark web has often been confused with the deep web, the parts of the web not indexed (searchable) by search engines. The term dark web first emerged in 2009; however, it is unknown when the actual dark web first emerged. Many internet users only use the surface web, data that can be accessed by a typical web browser.
The dark web forms a small part of the deep web, but requires custom
software in order to access its content. This confusion dates back to at
least 2009. Since then, especially in reporting on Silk Road, the two terms have often been conflated, despite recommendations that they should be distinguished.
The dark web, also known as darknet websites, are accessible only through networks such as Tor ("The Onion Routing" project) that are created specifically for the dark web. Tor browser and Tor-accessible sites are widely used among the darknet users and can be identified by the domain ".onion".
Tor browsers create encrypted entry points and pathways for the user,
allowing their dark web searches and actions to be anonymous.
Identities and locations of darknet users stay anonymous and cannot be tracked due to the layered encryption
system. The darknet encryption technology routes users' data through a
large number of intermediate servers, which protects the users' identity
and guarantees anonymity. The transmitted information can be decrypted
only by a subsequent node
in the scheme, which leads to the exit node. The complicated system
makes it almost impossible to reproduce the node path and decrypt the
information layer by layer. Due to the high level of encryption, websites are not able to track geolocation
and IP of their users, and users are not able to get this information
about the host. Thus, communication between darknet users is highly
encrypted allowing users to talk, blog, and share files confidentially.
A December 2014 study by Gareth Owen from the University of Portsmouth found that the most commonly hosted type of content on Tor was child pornography, followed by black markets, while the individual sites with the highest traffic were dedicated to botnet operations (see attached metric). Many whistleblowing sites maintain a presence as well as political discussion forums. Sites associated with Bitcoin, fraud-related services, and mail order services are some of the most prolific.
As of December 2020, the number of active Tor sites in .onion was
estimated at 76,300 (containing a lot of copies). Of these, 18 000
would have original content.
In July 2017, Roger Dingledine, one of the three founders of the Tor Project, said that Facebook is the biggest hidden service. The dark web comprises only 3% of the traffic in the Tor network.
A February 2016 study from researchers at King's College London gives the following breakdown of content by an alternative category set, highlighting the illicit use of .onion services.
Ransomware
The dark web is also used in certain extortion-related processes.
Indeed, it is common to observe data from ransomware attacks on several
dark web sites (data sales sites, public data repository sites)
Botnets
Botnets are often structured with their command-and-control servers based on a censorship-resistant hidden service, creating a large amount of bot-related traffic.
Commercial darknet markets mediate transactions for illegal goods and typically use Bitcoin as payment. These markets have attracted significant media coverage, starting with the popularity of Silk Road and Diabolus Market and its subsequent seizure by legal authorities.
Silk Road was one of the first dark web marketplaces that emerged in
2011 and has allowed for the trading of weapons and identity fraud
resources. These markets have no protection for its users and can be closed down at any time by authorities. Despite the closures of these marketplaces, others pop up in their place. As of 2020, there have been at least 38 active dark web market places. These marketplaces are similar to that of eBay or Craigslist where users can interact with sellers and leave reviews about marketplace products.
Examination of price differences in dark web markets versus
prices in real life or over the World Wide Web have been attempted as
well as studies in the quality of goods received over the dark web. One
such study was performed on Evolution, one of the most popular crypto-markets active from January 2013 to March 2015.
Although it found the digital information, such as concealment methods
and shipping country, "seems accurate", the study uncovered issues with
the quality of illegal drugs sold in Evolution, stating that, "the
illicit drugs purity is found to be different from the information
indicated on their respective listings." Less is known about consumer motivations for accessing these marketplaces and factors associated with their use. Darknets markets also sell leaked credit cards that can be downloaded for free or purchased for to be used in illegal activities.
Bitcoin services
Bitcoin is one of the main cryptocurrencies used in dark web
marketplaces due to the flexibility and relative anonymity of the
currency. With Bitcoin, people can hide their intentions as well as their identity. A common approach was to use a digital currency exchanger service which converted Bitcoin into an online game currency (such as gold coins in World of Warcraft) that will later be converted back into fiat currency. Bitcoin services such as tumblers are often available on Tor, and some – such as Grams – offer darknet market integration. A research study undertaken by Jean-Loup Richet, a research fellow at ESSEC, and carried out with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, highlighted new trends in the use of Bitcoin tumblers for money laundering purposes.
Due to its relevance in the digital world, Bitcoin has become a popular product for users to scam companies with. Cybercriminal groups such as DDOS"4" have led to over 140 cyberattacks on companies since the emergence of Bitcoins in 2014. These attacks have led to the formation of other cybercriminal groups as well as Cyber Extortion.
Hacking groups and services
Many hackers sell their services either individually or as a part of groups. Such groups include xDedic, hackforum, Trojanforge, Mazafaka, dark0de and the TheRealDeal darknet market. Some have been known to track and extort apparent pedophiles. Cyber crimes and hacking services for financial institutions and banks have also been offered over the dark web.
Attempts to monitor this activity have been made through various
government and private organizations, and an examination of the tools
used can be found in the Procedia Computer Science journal. Use of Internet-scale DNS distributed reflection denial of service (DRDoS) attacks have also been made through leveraging the dark web. There are many scam .onion sites also present which end up giving tools for download that are infected with trojan horses or backdoors.
Financing and fraud
Scott Dueweke the president and founder of Zebryx Consulting states
that Russian electronic currency such as WebMoney and Perfect Money are
behind the majority of the illegal actions.
In April 2015, Flashpoint received a 5 million dollar investment to
help their clients gather intelligence from the deep and dark web. There are numerous cardingforums, PayPal and Bitcoin trading websites as well as fraud and counterfeiting services. Many such sites are scams themselves. Phishing via cloned websites and other scam sites are numerous, with darknet markets often advertised with fraudulent URLs.
Illegal pornography
The type of content that has the most popularity on the dark web is illegal pornography—more specifically, child pornography. About 80% of its web traffic is related to accessing child pornography despite it being difficult to find even on the dark web. A website called Lolita City, which has since been taken down, contained over 100 GB of child pornographic media and had about 15,000 members.
There is regular law enforcement action against sites distributing child pornography – often via compromising the site and tracking users' IP addresses. In 2015, the FBI investigated and took down a website called Playpen. At the time, Playpen was the largest child pornography website on the dark web with over 200,000 members. Sites use complex systems of guides, forums and community regulation. Other content includes sexualised torture and killing of animals and revenge porn. In May 2021, German police said that they had dismantled one of the world's biggest child pornography networks on the dark web known as Boystown, the website had over 400,000 registered users. Four people had been detained in raids, including a man from Paraguay, on suspicion of running the network. Europol said several pedophile chat sites were also taken down in the German-led intelligence operation.
Terrorism
Terrorist organizations took to the internet as early as the 1990s;
however, the birth of the dark web attracted these organizations due to
the anonymity, lack of regulation, social interaction, and easy
accessibility. These groups have been taking advantage of the chat platforms within the dark web to inspire terrorist attacks. Groups have even posted "How To" guides, teaching people how to become and hide their identities as terrorists.
The dark web became a forum for terrorist propaganda, guiding information, and most importantly, funding. With the introduction of Bitcoin, an anonymous transactions were created which allowed for anonymous donations and funding. By accepting Bitcoin, terrorists were now able to fund money to purchase weaponry.
In 2018, an individual named Ahmed Sarsur was charged for attempting to
purchase explosives and hire snipers to aid Syrian terrorists, as well
as attempting to provide them financial support, all through the dark
web.
There are at least some real and fraudulent websites claiming to be used by ISIL (ISIS), including a fake one seized in Operation Onymous. With the increase of technology, it has allowed cyber terrorists to flourish by attacking the weaknesses of the technology. In the wake of the November 2015 Paris attacks, an actual such site was hacked by an Anonymous-affiliated hacker group, GhostSec, and replaced with an advert for Prozac. The Rawti Shax Islamist group was found to be operating on the dark web at one time.
Social media
Within the dark web, there exists emerging social media platforms
similar to those on the World Wide Web, this is known as the Dark Web
Social Network (DWSN).
The DWSN works a like a regular social networking site where members
can have customizable pages, have friends, like posts, and blog in
forums. Facebook
and other traditional social media platforms have begun to make
dark-web versions of their websites to address problems associated with
the traditional platforms and to continue their service in all areas of
the World Wide Web.
Unlike Facebook, the privacy policy of the DWSN requires that members
are to reveal absolutely no personal information and remain anonymous.
There are reports of crowdfunded assassinations and hitmen for hire; however, these are believed to be exclusively scams. The creator of Silk Road, Ross Ulbricht,
was arrested by Homeland Security investigations (HSI) for his site and
allegedly hiring a hitman to kill six people, although the charges were
later dropped. There is an urban legend that one can find live murder on the dark web. The term "Red Room"
has been coined based on the Japanese animation and urban legend of the
same name; however, the evidence points toward all reported instances
being hoaxes.
On June 25, 2015, the indie gameSad Satan was reviewed by YouTubers Obscure Horror Corner
which they claimed to have found via the dark web. Various
inconsistencies in the channel's reporting cast doubt on the reported
version of events. There are several websites which analyze and monitor the deep web and dark web for threat intelligence.
Policing the dark web
There have been arguments that the dark web promotes civil liberties, like "free speech, privacy, anonymity". Some prosecutors and government agencies are concerned that it is a haven for criminal activity.
The deep and dark web are applications of integral internet features to
provide privacy and anonymity. Policing involves targeting specific
activities of the private web deemed illegal or subject to internet censorship.
When investigating online suspects, police typically use the IP
(Internet Protocol) address of the individual; however, due to Tor
browsers creating anonymity, this becomes an impossible tactic.
As a result, law enforcement has employed many other tactics in order
to identify and arrest those engaging in illegal activity on the dark
web. OSINT, or Open Source Intelligence, are data collection tools that legally collect information from public sources.
OSINT tools can be dark web specific to help officers find bits of
information that would lead them to gaining more knowledge about
interactions going on in the dark web.
In 2015 it was announced that Interpol now offers a dedicated dark web training program featuring technical information on Tor, cybersecurity and simulated darknet market takedowns. In October 2013 the UK's National Crime Agency and GCHQ announced the formation of a "Joint Operations Cell"
to focus on cybercrime. In November 2015 this team would be tasked with
tackling child exploitation on the dark web as well as other
cybercrime. In March 2017 the Congressional Research Service
released an extensive report on the dark web, noting the changing
dynamic of how information is accessed and presented on it;
characterized by the unknown, it is of increasing interest to
researchers, law enforcement, and policymakers.
In August 2017, according to reportage, cybersecurity firms which
specialize in monitoring and researching the dark web on behalf of banks
and retailers routinely share their findings with the FBI
and with other law enforcement agencies "when possible and necessary"
regarding illegal content. The Russian-speaking underground offering a
crime-as-a-service model is regarded as being particularly robust.
Journalism
Many journalists, alternative news organizations,
educators, and researchers are influential in their writing and
speaking of the darknet, and making its use clear to the general public.
Media coverage typically reports on the dark web in two ways; detailing
the power and freedom of speech the dark web allows people to express,
or more commonly reaffirms the illegality and fear of its contents, such
as computer hackers.
Many headlines tie the dark web to child pornography with headlines
such as, "N.J. man charged with surfing 'Dark Web' to collect nearly 3K
images of child porn", along with other illegal activities where news outlets describe it as "a hub for black markets that sell or distribute drugs".
Specialist Clearweb news sites such as DeepDotWeb and All Things Vice
provide news coverage and practical information about dark web sites
and services; however, DeepDotWeb was shut down by authorities in 2019. The Hidden Wiki and its mirrors and forks hold some of the largest directories of content at any given time. Traditional media and news channels such as ABC News have also featured articles examining the darknet.
Spying, as well as other intelligence assessment, has existed since ancient history. In the 1980s scholars characterized foreign intelligence as "the missing dimension" of historical scholarship." Since then a largely popular and scholarly literature has emerged. Special attention has been paid to World War II, as well as the Cold War era (1947–1989) that was a favorite for novelists and filmmakers.
Early history
Efforts to use espionage for military advantage are well documented throughout history. Sun Tzu,
4th century BC, a theorist in ancient China who influenced Asian
military thinking, still has an audience in the 21st century for the Art of War. He advised, "One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements." He stressed the need to understand yourself and your enemy for military intelligence.
He identified different spy roles. In modern terms, they included the
secret informant or agent in place, (who provides copies of enemy
secrets), the penetration agent (who has access to the enemy's
commanders), and the disinformation agent (who feeds a mix of true and
false details to point the enemy in the wrong direction to confuse the
enemy). He considered the need for systematic organization and noted the
roles of counterintelligence, double agents (recruited from the ranks
of enemy spies), and psychological warfare. Sun Tzu continued to
influence Chinese espionage theory in the 21st century with its emphasis
on using the information to design active subversion.
Chanakya (also called Kautilya) wrote his Arthashastra
in India in the 4th century BC. It was a 'Textbook of Statecraft and
Political Economy' that provides a detailed account of intelligence
collection, processing, consumption, and covert operations, as
indispensable means for maintaining and expanding the security and power
of the state.
Ancient Egypt had a thoroughly developed system for the acquisition of intelligence. The Hebrews used spies as well, as in the story of Rahab. Thanks to the Bible (Joshua 2:1–24) we have in this story of the spies sent by Ancient Hebrews to Jericho before attacking the city one of the earliest detailed reports of a very sophisticated intelligence operation
Spies were also prevalent in the Greek and Roman empires. During the 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongols relied heavily on espionage in their conquests in Asia and Europe. Feudal Japan often used shinobi to gather intelligence.
A significant milestone was the establishment of an effective intelligence service under King David IV of Georgia at the beginning of the 12th century or possibly even earlier. Called mstovaris,
these organized spies performed crucial tasks, like uncovering feudal
conspiracies, conducting counter-intelligence against enemy spies, and
infiltrating key locations, e.g. castles, fortresses and palaces.
Aztecs used Pochtecas, people in charge of commerce, as spies and diplomats, and had diplomatic immunity. Along with the pochteca, before a battle or war, secret agents, quimitchin,
were sent to spy amongst enemies usually wearing the local costume and
speaking the local language, techniques similar to modern secret agents.
Early modern Europe
Many modern espionage methods were established by Francis Walsingham in Elizabethan England. His staff included the cryptographerThomas Phelippes, who was an expert in deciphering letters and forgery, and Arthur Gregory, who was skilled at breaking and repairing seals without detection. The Catholic exiles fought back when the Welsh exile Hugh Owen created
an intelligence service that tried to neutralize that of Walsingham.
In 1585, Mary, Queen of Scots was placed in the custody of Sir Amias Paulet,
who was instructed to open and read all of Mary's clandestine
correspondence. In a successful attempt to expose her, Walsingham
arranged a single exception: a covert means for Mary's letters to be
smuggled in and out of Chartley in a beer keg. Mary was misled into
thinking these secret letters were secure, while in reality they were
deciphered and read by Walsingham's agents. He succeeded in intercepting
letters that indicated a conspiracy to displace Elizabeth I with Mary.
In foreign intelligence, Walsingham's extensive network of
"intelligencers", who passed on general news as well as secrets, spanned
Europe and the Mediterranean. While foreign intelligence was a normal
part of the principal secretary's activities, Walsingham brought to it
flair and ambition, and large sums of his own money. He cast his net
more widely than anyone had attempted before, exploiting links across
the continent as well as in Constantinople and Algiers, and building and inserting contacts among Catholic exiles.
18th century
The 18th century saw a dramatic expansion of espionage activities.
It was a time of war: in nine years out of 10, two or more major
powers were at war. Armies grew much larger, with corresponding budgets.
Likewise the foreign ministries all grew in size and complexity.
National budgets expanded to pay for these expansions, and room was
found for intelligence departments with full-time staffs, and well-paid
spies and agents. The militaries themselves became more bureaucratised,
and sent out military attaches. They were very bright, personable
middle-ranking officers stationed in embassies abroad. In each capital,
the attached diplomats evaluated the strength, capabilities, and war
plans of the armies and navies.
France
The Kingdom of France under King Louis XIV
(1643–1715) was the largest, richest, and most powerful nation. It had
many enemies and a few friends, and tried to keep track of them all
through a well organized intelligence system based in major cities all
over Europe. France and England pioneered the cabinet noir
whereby foreign correspondence was opened and deciphered, then
forwarded to the recipient. France's chief ministers, especially Cardinal Mazarin
(1642–1661) did not invent the new methods; they combined the best
practices from other states, and supported it at the highest political
and financial levels.
To critics of authoritarian governments,
it appeared that spies were everywhere. Parisian dissidents of the 18th
century thought that they were surrounded by as many as perhaps 30,000
police spies. However, the police records indicate a maximum of 300 paid
informers. The myth was deliberately designed to inspire fear and
hypercaution; the police wanted opponents people to think that they were
under close watch. The critics also seemed to like the myth, for it
gave them a sense of importance and an aura of mystery. Ordinary
Parisians felt more secure believing that the police were actively
dealing with troublemakers.
British
To deal
with the almost continuous wars with France, London set up an
elaborate system to gather intelligence on France and other powers.
Since the British had deciphered the code system of most states, it
relied heavily on intercepted mail and dispatches. A few agents in the
postal system could intercept likely correspondence and have it copied
and forwarded to the intended receiver, as well as to London. Active
spies were also used, especially to estimate military and naval strength
and activities. Once the information was in hand, analysts tried to
interpret diplomatic policies and intentions of states. Of special
concern in the first half of the century were the activities of Jacobites, English supporters of the House of Stuart who had French support in plotting to overthrow the Hanoverian dynasty in England. It was a high priority to find men in England and Scotland who had secret Jacobite sympathies.
One highly successful operation took place in the Russian Empire under the supervision of minister Charles Whitworth
(1704 to 1712). He closely observed public events and noted the
changing power status of key leaders. He cultivated influential and
knowledgeable persons at the royal court, and befriended foreigners in
Russia's service, and in turn they provided insights into high-level
Russian planning and personalities, which he summarized and sent in code
to London.
Industrial espionage
In
1719 Britain made it illegal to entice skilled workers to emigrate.
Nevertheless, small-scale efforts continued in secret. At mid century,
(1740s to 1770s) the French Bureau of Commerce had a budget and a plan,
and systematically hired British and French spies to obtain industrial
and military technology. They had some success deciphering English
technology regarding plate-glass, the hardware and steel industry. They
had mixed success, enticing some workers and getting foiled in other
attempts.
The Spanish were technological laggards, and tried to jump start industry through systematized industrial espionage. The Marquis of Ensenada,
a minister of the king, sent trusted military officers on a series of
missions between 1748 and 1760. They focused on current technology
regarding shipbuilding, steam engines, copper refining, canals,
metallurgy, and cannon-making.
French Revolution and Napoleonic wars, (1793–1815)
The Kingdom of Great Britain,
almost continuously at war with France (1793–1815), built a wide
network of agents and funded local elements trying to overthrow
governments hostile to Britain. It paid special attention to threats of an invasion of the British Isles, and to a possible uprising in Ireland. Britain in 1794 appointed William Wickham as Superintendent of Aliens
in charge of espionage and the new secret service. He strengthened the
British intelligence system by emphasizing the centrality of the
intelligence cycle – query, collection, collation, analysis and
dissemination – and the need for an all-source centre of intelligence.
Napoleon made heavy use of agents, especially regarding Russia.
Besides espionage, they recruited soldiers, collected money, enforced
the Continental System
against imports from Britain, propagandized, policed border entry into
France through passports, and protected the estates of the Napoleonic nobility. His senior men coordinated the policies of satellite countries.
19th century
Modern tactics of espionage and dedicated government intelligence
agencies were developed over the course of the late 19th century. A key
background to this development was the Great Game,
a period denoting the strategic rivalry and conflict that existed
between the British Empire and the Russian Empire throughout Central Asia. To counter Russian ambitions in the region and the potential threat it posed to the British position in India, a system of surveillance, intelligence and counterintelligence was built up in the Indian Civil Service. The existence of this shadowy conflict was popularised in Rudyard Kipling's famous spy book, Kim,
where he portrayed the Great Game (a phrase he popularised) as an
espionage and intelligence conflict that "never ceases, day or night."
Although the techniques originally used were distinctly amateurish – British agents would often pose unconvincingly as botanists or archaeologists
– more professional tactics and systems were slowly put in place. In
many respects, it was here that a modern intelligence apparatus with
permanent bureaucracies for internal and foreign infiltration and
espionage was first developed. A pioneering cryptographic unit
was established as early as 1844 in India, which achieved some
important successes in decrypting Russian communications in the area.
The establishment of dedicated intelligence organizations was
directly linked to the colonial rivalries between the major European
powers and the accelerating development of military technology.
An early source of military intelligence was the diplomatic system of military attachés (an officer attached to the diplomatic service operating through the embassy in a foreign country), that became widespread in Europe after the Crimean War.
Although officially restricted to a role of transmitting openly
received information, they were soon being used to clandestinely gather
confidential information and in some cases even to recruit spies and to
operate de facto spy rings.
Tactical or battlefield intelligence became very vital to both armies in the field during the American Civil War. Allan Pinkerton,
who operated a pioneer detective agency, served as head of the Union
Intelligence Service during the first two years. He thwarted the assassination plot in Baltimore while guarding President-elect Abraham Lincoln. Pinkerton agents often worked undercover as Confederate States Army
soldiers and sympathizers to gather military intelligence. Pinkerton
himself served on several undercover missions. He worked across the Deep South
in the summer of 1861, collecting information on fortifications and
Confederate plans. He was found out in Memphis and barely escaped with
his life. Pinkerton's agency specialized in counter-espionage,
identifying Confederate spies in the Washington area. Pinkerton played up to the demands of General George McClellan with exaggerated overestimates of the strength of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan mistakenly thought he was outnumbered, and played a very cautious role.
Spies and scouts typically reported directly to the commanders of
armies in the field. They provided details on troop movements and
strengths. The distinction between spies and scouts was one that had
life or death consequences. If a suspect was seized while in disguise
and not in his army's uniform, the sentence was often to be hanged.
Intelligence gathering for the Confederates focused on Alexandria, Virginia, and the surrounding area. Thomas Jordan created a network of agents that included Rose O'Neal Greenhow.
Greenhow delivered reports to Jordan via the "Secret Line," the system
used to smuggle letters, intelligence reports, and other documents to
Confederate officials. The Confederacy's Signal Corps was devoted
primarily to communications and intercepts, but it also included a
covert agency called the Confederate Secret Service Bureau, which ran espionage and counter-espionage operations in the North including two networks in Washington.
In both armies, the cavalry service was the main instrument in
military intelligence, using direct observation, Drafting map, and
obtaining copies of local maps and local newspapers. When General Robert E. Lee invaded Pennsylvania in the Gettysburg campaign of June 1863, his cavalry commander J. E. B. Stuart
went on a long unauthorized raid, so Lee was operating blind, unaware
that he was being trapped by Union forces. Lee later said that his
Gettysburg campaign, "was commenced in the absence of correct
intelligence. It was continued in the effort to overcome the
difficulties by which we were surrounded."
Military Intelligence
Austria
Shaken by the revolutionary years 1848–1849, the Austrian Empire founded the Evidenzbureau in 1850 as the first permanent military intelligence service. It was first used in the 1859 Austro-Sardinian war and the 1866 campaign against Prussia,
albeit with little success. The bureau collected intelligence of
military relevance from various sources into daily reports to the Chief
of Staff (Generalstabschef) and weekly reports to Emperor Franz Joseph. Sections of the Evidenzbureau were assigned different regions; the most important one was aimed against Russia.
Great Britain
During the Crimean War of 1854, the Topographical & Statistic Department T&SD was established within the British War Office
as an embryonic military intelligence organization. The department
initially focused on the accurate mapmaking of strategically sensitive
locations and the collation of militarily relevant statistics. After the
deficiencies in the British Army's performance during the war became known, a large-scale reform of army institutions was overseen by Edward Cardwell. As part of this, the T&SD was reorganized as the Intelligence Branch
of the War Office in 1873 with the mission to "collect and classify all
possible information relating to the strength, organization etc. of
foreign armies... to keep themselves acquainted with the progress made
by foreign countries in military art and science..."
France
The French Ministry of War authorized the creation of the Deuxième Bureau on June 8, 1871, a service charged with performing "research on enemy plans and operations." This was followed a year later by the creation of a military counter-espionage service. It was this latter service that was discredited through its actions over the notorious Dreyfus Affair, where a French Jewish
officer was falsely accused of handing over military secrets to the
Germans. As a result of the political division that ensued,
responsibility for counter-espionage was moved to the civilian control
of the Ministry of the Interior.
The ItalianUfficio Informazioni del Comando Supremo was put on a permanent footing in 1900.
Russia
After Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War
of 1904–05, Russian military intelligence was reorganized under the 7th
Section of the 2nd executive board of the great imperial headquarters.
Naval Intelligence
It
was not just the army that felt a need for military intelligence. Soon,
naval establishments were demanding similar capabilities from their
national governments to allow them to keep abreast of technological and
strategic developments in rival countries.
The Naval Intelligence Division was set up as the independent intelligence arm of the British Admiralty in 1882 (initially as the Foreign Intelligence Committee) and was headed by Captain William Henry Hall.
The division was initially responsible for fleet mobilization and war
plans as well as foreign intelligence collection; in the 1900s two
further responsibilities – issues of strategy and defence and the
protection of merchant shipping – were added.
In the United States the Naval intelligence
originated in 1882 "for the purpose of collecting and recording such
naval information as may be useful to the Department in time of war, as
well as in peace." This was followed in October 1885 by the Military Information Division,
the first standing military intelligence agency of the United States
with the duty of collecting military data on foreign nations.
In 1900, the Imperial German Navy established the Nachrichten-Abteilung,
which was devoted to gathering intelligence on Britain. The navies of
Italy, Russia and Austria-Hungary set up similar services as well.
As espionage became more widely used, it became imperative to expand
the role of existing police and internal security forces into a role of
detecting and countering foreign spies. The Austro-Hungarian
Evidenzbureau was entrusted with the role from the late 19th century to
counter the actions of the Pan-Slavist movement operating out of Serbia.
Russia's Okhrana was formed in 1880 to combat political terrorism and left-wing revolutionary activity throughout the Russian Empire, but was also tasked with countering enemy espionage.
Its main concern was the activities of revolutionaries, who often
worked and plotted subversive actions from abroad. It created an antenna
in Paris run by Pyotr Rachkovsky to monitor their activities. The agency used many methods to achieve its goals, including covert operations, undercover agents, and "perlustration" — the interception and reading of private correspondence. The Okhrana became notorious for its use of agents provocateurs who often succeeded in penetrating the activities of revolutionary groups including the Bolsheviks.
In the 1890s Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish artillery captain in the French Army,
was twice falsely convicted of passing military secrets to the Germans.
The case convulsed France regarding antisemitism and xenophobia for a
decade until he was fully exonerated. It raised public awareness of the
rapidly developing world of espionage. Responsibility for military counter-espionage
was passed in 1899 to the Sûreté générale – an agency originally
responsible for order enforcement and public safety – and overseen by
the Ministry of the Interior.
In Britain the Second Boer War (1899–1902) saw a difficult and highly controversial victory over hard-fighting Boer Commandos
in South Africa. One response was to build up counterinsurgency
policies. After that came the "Edwardian Spy-Fever," with rumors of
German spies under every bed.
20th century
Civil intelligence agencies
In Britain, the Secret Service Bureau was split into a foreign and counter-intelligence domestic service in 1910. The latter, headed by Sir Vernon Kell, originally aimed at calming public fears of large-scale German espionage. As the Service was not authorized with police powers, Kell liaised extensively with the Special Branch of Scotland Yard (headed by Basil Thomson), and succeeded in disrupting the work of Indian revolutionaries collaborating with the Germans during the war.
Integrated intelligence agencies run directly by governments were also established. The British Secret Service Bureau (SIS from c. 1920)
was founded in 1909 as the first independent and interdepartmental
agency fully in control over all British government espionage
activities.
At a time of widespread and growing anti-German feeling and fear,
plans were drawn up for an extensive offensive intelligence system to be
used as an instrument in the event of a European war. Due to intense
lobbying by William Melville after he obtained German mobilization plans and proof of German financial support to the Boers, the government authorized the creation of a new intelligence section in the War Office,
MO3 (subsequently re-designated "M05"), headed by Melville, in 1903.
Working under cover from a flat in London, Melville ran both counterintelligence
and foreign-intelligence operations, capitalizing on the knowledge and
foreign contacts he had accumulated during his years running Special Branch.
Due to its success, the Government Committee on Intelligence, with support from Richard Haldane (the Secretary of State for War) and from Winston Churchill
(the President of the Board of Trade), established the Secret Service
Bureau in 1909. It consisted of nineteen military-intelligence
departments – MI1 to MI19, but MI5 and MI6 came to be the most recognized as they are the only ones to have remained active to this day.
The Bureau was a joint initiative of the Admiralty, the War Office and the Foreign Office to control secret-intelligence operations in the UK and overseas, particularly concentrating on the activities of the Imperial German Government. Its first director was Captain Sir George Mansfield Smith-Cumming.
In 1910, the bureau was split into naval and army sections which, over
time, specialised in foreign espionage and internal counter-espionage
activities respectively. The Secret Service
initially focused its resources on gathering intelligence on German
shipbuilding plans and operations. The SIS onsciously refrained from
conducting espionage activity in France so as not to jeopardize the burgeoning alliance between the two countries.
For the first time, the government had access to a peacetime,
centralized independent intelligence bureaucracy with indexed registries
and defined procedures, as opposed to the more ad hoc methods
used previously. Instead of a system whereby rival departments and
military services would work on their own priorities with little to no
consultation or co-operation with each other, the newly established Secret Intelligence Service was interdepartmental, and submitted its intelligence reports to all relevant government departments.
First World War
By the outbreak of the First World War
in 1914 all the major powers had highly sophisticated structures in
place for the training and handling of spies and for the processing of
the intelligence information obtained through espionage. The Dreyfus Affair of 1894-1906, which involved accusations of international espionage and treason, contributed much to public interest in espionage from 1894 onwards.
The spy novel emerged as a distinct genre of fiction in the late-19th century; it dealt with themes such as colonial rivalry, the growing threat of conflict in Europe and the revolutionary and anarchist domestic threats. The Riddle of the Sands (1903) by Erskine Childers
defined the genre: the novel played on public fears of a German plan to
invade Britain (an amateur spy uncovers the nefarious plot). In the
wake of Childers's success there followed a flood of imitators,
including William Le Queux and E. Phillips Oppenheim.
The First World War (1914–1918) saw the honing and refinement of
modern espionage techniques as all the belligerent powers utilized their
intelligence services to obtain military intelligence, to commit acts
of sabotage and to carry out propaganda. As the battle fronts became static and armies dug down in trenches, cavalry reconnaissance became of very limited effectiveness.
Information gathered at the battlefront from the interrogation of prisoners-of-war
typically could give insight only into local enemy actions of limited
duration. To obtain high-level information on an enemy's strategic
intentions, its military capabilities and deployment, required
undercover spy-rings operating deep in enemy territory. On the Western Front the advantage lay with the Western Allies, as for most of the war the Imperial German Armyoccupied Belgium and parts of northern France
amidst a large and disaffected native population that agents could
organize into collecting and transmitting vital intelligence.
British and French intelligence services recruited Belgian or
French refugees and infiltrated these agents behind enemy lines via the Netherlands
– a neutral country. Many collaborators were then recruited from the
local population, who were mainly driven by patriotism and hatred of the
harsh German occupation. By the end of the war the Allies
had set up over 250 networks, comprising more than 6,400 Belgian and
French citizens. These rings concentrated on infiltrating the German railway network so that the Allied powers could receive advance warning of strategic movements of troops and ammunition.
In 1916 Walthère Dewé founded the Dame Blanche ("White Lady") network as an underground intelligence group which became the most effective Allied spy-ring in German-occupied Belgium. It supplied as much as 75% of the intelligence collected from occupied Belgium and northern France
to the Allies. By the end of the war, its 1,300 agents covered all of
occupied Belgium, northern France and, through a collaboration with the Alice Network led by Louise de Bettignies, occupied Luxembourg. The network was able to provide a crucial few days warning before the launch of the German 1918 Spring Offensive.
German intelligence was only ever able to recruit a very small
number of spies. These were trained at an academy run by the
Kriegsnachrichtenstelle (War Intelligence Office) in Antwerp and headed by Elsbeth Schragmüller,
known as "Fräulein Doktor". These agents were generally isolated and
unable to rely on a large support network for the relaying of
information. The most famous German spy was Margaretha Geertruida Zelle, a Dutch exotic dancer with the stage name Mata Hari. As a Dutch subject,
she was able to cross national borders freely. In 1916 she was arrested
and brought to London where she was interrogated at length by Sir Basil Thomson, Assistant Commissioner at New Scotland Yard.
She eventually claimed to be working for French intelligence. In fact,
she had entered German service from 1915, and sent her reports to the
mission in the German embassy in Madrid. In January 1917, the German military attaché in Madrid
transmitted radio messages to Berlin describing the helpful activities
of a German spy code-named H-21. French intelligence-agents intercepted
the messages and, from the information contained, identified H-21 as
Mata Hari. She was executed by firing squad on 15 October 1917.
German spies in Britain did not meet with much success – the German spy-ring operating in Britain was successfully disrupted by MI5 under Vernon Kell on the day after the declaration of the war. Home Secretary, Reginald McKenna,
announced that "within the last twenty-four hours no fewer than
twenty-one spies, or suspected spies, have been arrested in various
places all over the country, chiefly in important military or naval
centres, some of them long known to the authorities to be spies",
One exception was Jules C. Silber, who evaded MI5
investigations and obtained a position at the British censor's office
in 1914. Using mailed window-envelopes that had already been stamped and
cleared he was able to forward microfilm
to Germany that contained increasingly important information. Silber
was regularly promoted and ended up in the position of chief censor,
which enabled him to analyze all suspect documents.
The British economic blockade of Germany was made effective through the support of spy networks operating out of the neutral Netherlands. Agents on the ground determined points of weakness in the naval blockade and relayed this information to the Royal Navy. The blockade led to severe food deprivation in Germany contributed greatly to the collapse of the Central Powers' war effort in 1918.
In 1911, a subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on cable
communications concluded that in the event of war with Germany,
German-owned submarine cables should be destroyed. On the night of 3
August 1914, the cable ship Alert located and cut Germany's five trans-Atlantic cables, which ran under the English Channel. Soon after, the six cables running between Britain and Germany were cut.
As an immediate consequence, there was a significant increase in
messages sent via cables belonging to other countries, and by radio.
These could now be intercepted, but codes and ciphers were naturally
used to hide the meaning of the messages, and neither Britain nor
Germany had any established organisations to decode and interpret such
messages. At the start of the war, the navy had only one wireless
station for intercepting messages, at Stockton-on-Tees. However, installations belonging to the Post Office and the Marconi Company, as well as private individuals who had access to radio equipment, began recording messages from Germany.
Room 40, formed in October 1914 under Director of Naval Education Alfred Ewing, was the section in the British Admiralty most identified with the British crypto analysis effort during the war. The basis of Room 40 operations evolved around an Imperial German Navy codebook, the Signalbuch der Kaiserlichen Marine
(SKM), and around maps (containing coded squares), which were obtained
from three different sources in the early months of the war. Alfred
Ewing directed Room 40 until May 1917, when direct control passed to Captain (later Admiral) Reginald "Blinker" Hall, assisted by William Milbourne James.
A similar organization began in the Military Intelligence department of the War Office, which become known as MI1b,
and Colonel Macdonagh proposed that the two organizations should work
together, decoding messages concerning the Western Front in France. A
sophisticated interception system (known as 'Y' service),
together with the post office and Marconi receiving stations, grew
rapidly to the point it could intercept almost all official German
messages.
As the number of intercepted messages increased it became
necessary to decide which were unimportant and should just be logged,
and which should be passed on to Room 40.
The German fleet was in the habit each day of wirelessing the exact
position of each ship and giving regular position-reports when at sea.
It was possible to build up a precise picture of the normal operation of
the High Seas Fleet,
indeed to infer from the routes they chose where defensive minefields
had been placed and where it was safe for ships to operate. Whenever the
British detected a change to the normal pattern, it immediately
signalled that some operation was about to take place and a warning
could be given. Detailed information about submarine movements was also
available.
Both the British and German interception services began to experiment with direction-finding radio equipment at the start of 1915. Captain H. J. Round, working for Marconi,
had been carrying out experiments for the army in France, and Hall
instructed him to build a direction-finding system for the navy.
Stations were built along the coast, and by May 1915 the Admiralty was
able to track German submarines crossing the North Sea.
Some of these stations also acted as 'Y' stations to collect German
messages, but a new section was created within Room 40 to plot the
positions of ships from the directional reports. The German fleet made
no attempts to restrict its use of wireless until 1917, and then only in
response to perceived British use of direction finding, not because it
believed messages were being decoded.
Room 40 played an important role in several naval engagements
during the war, notably in detecting major German sorties into the North Sea that led to the battles of Dogger Bank (1915) and Jutland (1916) when the British fleet was sent out to intercept them. However its most important contribution was probably in decrypting the Zimmermann Telegram, a telegram from the German Foreign Office sent via Washington to its ambassadorHeinrich von Eckardt in Mexico in January 1917.
In the telegram's plain text, Nigel de Grey and William Montgomery learned of the German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann's
offer to Mexico to join the war as a German ally. The telegram was
made public by the United States, which declared war on Germany on 6
April 1917. This event demonstrated how the course of a war could be
changed by effective intelligence operations.
The British were reading the Americans' secret messages by late 1915.
Another pivotal figure was Sir Paul Dukes (1889-1967), arguably the first professional spy of the modern age. Recruited personally by Mansfield Smith-Cumming to act as a secret agent in Imperial Russia, he set up elaborate plans to help prominent White Russians escape from Soviet prisons after the October Revolution and smuggled hundreds of them into Finland.
Known as the "Man of a Hundred Faces", Dukes continued his use of
disguises, which aided him in assuming a number of identities and gained
him access to numerous Bolshevik organizations. He successfully infiltrated the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Comintern, and the political police, or CHEKA. Dukes also learned of the inner workings of the Politburo, and passed the information to British intelligence.
In the course of a few months in 1918-1919, Dukes, Hall, and
Reilly succeeded in infiltrating Lenin's inner circle, and gaining
access to the activities of the Cheka and the Communist International
at the highest level. This helped to convince the British government of
the importance of a well-funded secret-intelligence service in
peacetime as a key component in formulating foreign policy. Churchill,
once again a member of the UK cabinet in this period, argued that
intercepted communications were more useful "as a means of forming a
true judgment of public policy than any other source of knowledge at the
disposal of the State."
Interwar
Nazi Germany
The intelligence gathering efforts of Nazi Germany
(1933-1945) were largely ineffective. Berlin operated two espionage
networks against the United States. Both suffered from careless
recruiting, inadequate planning, and faulty execution. The FBI captured bungling spies, while poorly-designed sabotage efforts all failed. Adolf Hitler's anti-Semitic
prejudices about Jewish control of the U.S. interfered with objective
evaluation of American capabilities. Hitler's propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels deceived top officials who repeated his propagandistic exaggerations.
Soviet Union
The Soviet GRU
(military intelligence), originating in 1918, started operating
throughout the world. Communist sympathisers and fellow-travellers in
groups aligned with the Comintern (founded in 1919 and operating until 1943) were also widespread.
Churchill's order to "set Europe ablaze," was undertaken by the British Secret Service or Secret Intelligence Service, who developed a plan to train spies and saboteurs. Eventually, this would become the SOE or Special Operations Executive, and to ultimately involve the United States in their training facilities. Sir William Stephenson, the senior British intelligence officer in the western hemisphere, suggested to President Roosevelt that William J. Donovan devise a plan for an intelligence network modeled after the British Secret Intelligence Service or MI6 and Special Operations Executive's (SOE) framework. Accordingly, the first American Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) agents in Canada were sent for training in a facility set up by
Stephenson, with guidance from English intelligence instructors, who
provided the OSS trainees with the knowledge needed to come back and
train other OSS agents. Setting German-occupied Europe ablaze with sabotage and partisan resistance groups was the mission. Through covert special operations teams, operating under the new Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the OSS' Special Operations
teams, these men would be infiltrated into occupied countries to help
organize local resistance groups and supply them with logistical
support: weapons, clothing, food, money, and direct them in attacks
against the Axis powers. Through subversion, sabotage, and the direction
of local guerrilla forces, SOE British agents and OSS teams had the
mission of infiltrating behind enemy lines and wreaked havoc on the
German infrastructure, so much, that an untold number of men were
required to keep this in check, and kept the Germans off balance
continuously like the French maquis. They actively resisted the German occupation of France, as did the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS) partisans who were armed and fed by both the OSS and SOE during the German occupation of Greece.
Magic was an American cryptanalysis project focused on Japanese codes in the 1930s and 1940s. It involved the U.S. Army's Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) and the U.S. Navy's Communication Special Unit.
Magic combined cryptologic capabilities into the Research Bureau with
Army, Navy and civilian experts all under one roof. Their most important
successes involved RED, BLUE, and PURPLE.
In 1923, a United States Navy officer acquired a stolen copy of the Secret Operating Code codebook used by the Imperial Japanese Navy
during World War I. Photographs of the codebook were given to the
cryptanalysts at the Research Desk and the processed code was kept in
red-colored folders (to indicate its Top Secret classification). This
code was called "RED". In 1930, Japan created a more complex code that
was codenamed BLUE, although RED was still being used for low-level
communications. It was quickly broken by the Research Desk no later than
1932. US Military Intelligence COMINT
listening stations began monitoring command-to-fleet, ship-to-ship, and
land-based communications for BLUE messages. After Germany declared war
in 1939, it sent technical assistance to upgrade Japanese
communications and cryptography capabilities. One part was to send them
modified Enigma machines
to secure Japan's high-level communications with Germany. The new code,
codenamed PURPLE (from the color obtained by mixing red and blue),
baffled the codebreakers until they realized that it was not a manual
additive or substitution code like RED and BLUE, but a machine-generated
code similar to Germany's Enigma cipher. Decoding was slow and much of
the traffic was still hard to break. By the time the traffic was decoded
and translated, the contents were often out of date. A
reverse-engineered machine could figure out some of the PURPLE code by
replicating some of the settings of the Japanese Enigma machines. This
sped up decoding and the addition of more translators on staff in 1942
made it easier and quicker to decipher the traffic intercepted. The
Japanese Foreign Office used a cipher machine to encrypt its diplomatic
messages. The machine was called "PURPLE"
by U.S. cryptographers. A message was typed into the machine, which
enciphered and sent it to an identical machine. The receiving machine
could decipher the message only if set to the correct settings, or keys.
American cryptographers built a machine that could decrypt these
messages. The PURPLE machine itself was first used by Japan in 1940.
U.S. and British cryptographers had broken some PURPLE traffic well
before the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, but the Japanese
diplomats did not know or transmit any details.. The Japanese Navy used a
completely different system, known as JN-25.
U.S. cryptographers had decrypted and translated the 14-part
Japanese PURPLE message breaking off ongoing negotiations with the U.S.
at 1 p.m. Washington time on 7 December 1941, even before the Japanese
Embassy in Washington could do so. As a result of the deciphering and
typing difficulties at the embassy, the note was formally delivered
after the attack began.
Throughout the war, the Allies routinely read both German and
Japanese cryptography. The Japanese Ambassador to Germany, General Hiroshi Ōshima,
routinely sent priceless information about German plans to Tokyo. This
information was routinely intercepted and read by Roosevelt, Churchill
and Eisenhower. Japanese diplomats assumed their PURPLE system was
unbreakable and did not revise or replace it.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt
was obsessed with intelligence and deeply worried about German
sabotage. However, there was no overarching American intelligence
agency, and Roosevelt let the Army, the Navy, the State Department, and
various other sources compete against each other, so that all the
information poured into the White House, but was not systematically
shared with other agencies. The British Secret Service fascinated
Roosevelt early on, and to him, an intelligence service modeled on the
British was necessary to prevent false reports (e.g. the Germans having
designs to take over Latin America).
Roosevelt followed MAGIC intercept to Japan religiously, but set it up
so that the Army and Navy briefed him on alternating days. Finally he
turned to William (Wild Bill) Donovan to run a new agency the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) which in 1942 became the Office of Strategic Services or OSS. It became Roosevelt's most trusted source of secrets, and after the war OSS eventually became the CIA.
The COI had a staff of 2,300 in June 1942; OSS reached 5,000 personnel
by September 1943. In all 35,000 men and women served in the OSS by the
time it closed in 1947.
The Army and Navy were proud of their long-established
intelligence services and avoided the OSS as much as possible, banning
it from the Pacific theaters. The Army tried and failed to prevent OSS operations in China.
An agreement with Britain in 1942 divided responsibilities, with
SOE taking the lead for most of Europe, including the Balkans and OSS
took primary responsibility for China and North Africa. OSS experts and
spies were trained at facilities in the United States and around the
world.
The military arm of the OSS, was the Operational Group Command (OGC),
which operated sabotage missions in the European and Mediterranean
theaters, with a special focus on Italy and the Balkans. OSS was a
rival force with SOE in the Italian Civil War in aiding and directing Italian resistance movement groups.
The "Research and Analysis" branch of OSS brought together
numerous academics and experts who proved especially useful in providing
a highly detailed overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the
German war effort. In direct operations it was successful in supporting Operation Torch in French North Africa
in 1942, where it identified pro-Allied potential supporters and
located landing sites. OSS operations in neutral countries, especially
Stockholm, Sweden, provided in-depth information on German advanced
technology. The Madrid station set up agent networks in France that
supported the Allied invasion of southern France in 1944.
Most famous were the operations in Switzerland run by Allen Dulles that provided extensive information on German strength, air defenses, submarine production, the V-1, V-2 rockets, Tiger tanks and aircraft (Messerschmitt Bf 109, Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet,
etc.). It revealed some of the secret German efforts in chemical and
biological warfare. They also received information about mass executions
and concentration camps. The resistance group around the later executed
priest Heinrich Maier, which provided much of this information, was then uncovered by a double spy who worked for the OSS, the German Abwehr and even the Sicherheitsdienst of the SS. Despite the Gestapo's
use of torture, the Germans were unable to uncover the true extent of
the group's success, particularly in providing information for Operation Crossbow and Operation Hydra, both preliminary missions for Operation Overlord.
Switzerland's station also supported resistance fighters in France and
Italy, and helped with the surrender of German forces in Italy in 1945.
Counterespionage
Informants were common in World War II. In November 1939, the German Hans Ferdinand Mayer sent what is called the Oslo Report to inform the British of German technology and projects in an effort to undermine the Nazi regime. The Réseau AGIR was a French network developed after the fall of France that reported the start of construction of V-weapon installations in Occupied France to the British.
The MI5 in Britain and the FBI in the U.S. identified all the German
spies, and "turned" all but one into double agents so that their reports
to Berlin were actually rewritten by counterespionage teams. The FBI
had the chief role in American counterespionage and rounded up all the
German spies in June 1941. Counterespionage included the use of turned Double Cross agents to misinform Nazi Germany of impact points during the Blitz and internment of Japanese in the US against "Japan's wartime spy program". Additional WWII espionage examples include Soviet spying on the US Manhattan project, the German Duquesne Spy Ring convicted in the US, and the Soviet Red Orchestra spying on Nazi Germany.
After 1990s new memoirs and archival materials have opened up the
study of espionage and intelligence during the Cold War. Scholars are
reviewing how its origins, its course, and its outcome were shaped by
the intelligence activities of the United States, the Soviet Union, and
other key countries.
Special attention is paid to how complex images of one's adversaries
were shaped by secret intelligence that is now publicly known.
All major powers engaged in espionage, using a great variety of
spies, double agents, and new technologies such as the tapping of
telephone cables. The most famous and active organizations were the American CIA, the Soviet KGB, and the British MI6. The East German Stasi, unlike the others, was primarily concerned with internal security, but its Main Directorate for Reconnaissance operated espionage activities around the world. The CIA secretly subsidized and promoted anti-communist cultural activities and organizations. The CIA was also involved in European politics, especially in Italy. Espionage took place all over the world, but Berlin was the most important battleground for spying activity.
Enough top secret archival information has been released so that historian Raymond L. Garthoff
concludes there probably was parity in the quantity and quality of
secret information obtained by each side. However, the Soviets probably
had an advantage in terms of HUMINT (espionage) and "sometimes in its reach into high policy circles." In terms of decisive impact, however, he concludes:
We also can now have high confidence in the judgment that there
were no successful “moles” at the political decision-making level on
either side. Similarly, there is no evidence, on either side, of any
major political or military decision that was prematurely discovered
through espionage and thwarted by the other side. There also is no
evidence of any major political or military decision that was crucially
influenced (much less generated) by an agent of the other side.
The USSR and East Germany proved especially successful in placing
spies in Britain and West Germany. Moscow was largely unable to repeat
its successes from 1933 to 1945 in the United States. NATO, on the
other hand, also had a few successes of importance, of whom Oleg Gordievsky
was perhaps the most influential. He was a senior KGB officer who was a
double agent on behalf of Britain's MI6, providing a stream of
high-grade intelligence that had an important influence on the thinking
of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. He was spotted by Aldrich Ames
a Soviet agent who worked for the CIA, but he was successfully
exfiltrated from Moscow in 1985. Biographer Ben McIntyre argues he was
the West's most valuable human asset, especially for his deep
psychological insights into the inner circles of the Kremlin.
He convinced Washington and London that the fierceness and bellicosity
of the Kremlin was a product of fear, and military weakness, rather
than an urge for world conquest. Thatcher and Reagan concluded they
could moderate their own anti-Soviet rhetoric, as successfully happened
when Mikhail Gorbachev took power, thus ending the Cold War.
In addition to usual espionage, the Western agencies paid special attention to debriefing Eastern Bloc defectors.
Middle East
The
United Kingdom's MI6 was involved in the region to protect its
interests, notably collaborating with the CIA in Iran, to bring back ShahMohammad Reza Pahlavi to power in a coup in 1953, after the Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh attempted to nationalise the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The CIA operated with the intent to curtail the influence of the USSR known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, by funding anti-communist organisations such as the Grey Wolves in Turkey. Middle Eastern states developed sophisticated intelligence and security agencies referred to as Mukhabarat (Arabic: المخابرات El Mukhabarat), primarily used domestically for population control and surveillance, notably in Iran, Egypt, Iraq and Syria under Ba'athist rule and Libya. According to Owen L. Sirrs, the 1967 War
between Israel and the Arab coalition of Egypt, Syria and Jordan,
signalled a failure by Egyptian intelligence to adequately evaluate the
military capabilities of their foes. The Yom Kippur War can be attributed to intelligence failure on the side of Israel, caused by a over confidence that Egypt and Syria were not reading for an invasion, despite intelligence proving the contrary provided by high ranking Egyptian Official Ashraf Marwan.
Country
Middle Eastern Intelligence & Security Agencies during the Cold War Era
Internal and external intelligence gathering, monitoring of
political parties, support of opposition groups in rival countries,
sabotage and assassination of high targets
Traditional human intelligence is obsolete when it concerns
Islamic terrorist organisations for several reasons: infiltrating such
organisations is more difficult than dealing with states, recruiting
from within is significantly riskier for loyalty reasons, and working
with informants that are engaged in attacks poses ethical concerns.
Counter-terrorism information gathering strategies rely on
collaboration with foreign intelligence services and prisoner
interrogation.
In December 2009, Jordanian doctor Humam al-Balawi performed a suicide bomb attack at the Camp Chapman
American military base near Khost which led to the death of 7 CIA
operatives, including the chief of the base, one Jordanian intelligence
officer and an afghan driver.
The most dramatic failure of intelligence in this era was the false discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Ba'athist Iraq
in 2003. American and British intelligence agencies agreed on balance
that the WMD were being built and would threaten the peace. They
launched a full-scale invasion that overthrew the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein.
The result was decades of turmoil and large-scale violence. There were
in fact no weapons of mass destruction, but the Iraqi government had
pretended they existed so that it could deter the sort of attack that in
fact resulted.
Israel
In Israel, the Shin Bet unit is the agency for homeland security and counter intelligence. The department for secret and confidential counter terrorist operations is called Kidon. It is part of the national intelligence agency Mossad and can also operate in other capacities. Kidon was described as "an elite group of expert assassins who operate under the Caesarea branch of the espionage organization." The unit only recruits from "former soldiers from the elite IDF special force units." There is almost no reliable information available on this ultra-secret organisation.
On May 6, 2016, documents entitled the "Panama Papers" provided by a John Doe were leaked online revealing the operations of over 214,000 shell companies from all over the world. The leak was announced on April 3, 2016, before being published on the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ (ICIJ) website. The Panama Papers targeted law firm and offshore service provider Mossack Fonseca & Co., as well as their clients. In total, 11.5 million confidential documents were published online.
The leaked documents exposed how companies used offshore vehicles to
evade taxation and to fund bribes that would be used to coerce
corruptible countries into contracts. The documents also exposed all parties involved, from shareholders to directors, and their relationships to each other. Individuals using company funds for personal use was also revealed, such as Russian president Vladimir Putin using funds to pay for his daughter’s wedding. The documents revealed that Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif
was found to be untruthful regarding how he financed his family homes,
which led to his disqualification and removal from power. Other notable people involved include former vice-president of Iraq Ayad Allawi, and former president of Egypt Alaa Mubarak.
Since the release of the Panama Papers, expropriation has become
harder to disguise and resulted in many companies reducing their tax
avoidance. Company values have reduced an average of 0.9%. The documents have sparked new debates on the ethics of offshore vehicles and tax havens.
In March 2018, Mossack Fonesca & Co. officially ceased operation.
On the 23rd of January 2011 more than 1600 pages of confidential
documents from the peace negotiations between the Israeli government and
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were leaked to news channel al-Jazeera.
These documents contained "memos, emails, maps, minutes of private
meetings, accounts of high-level exchanges, strategy papers, and Power
Point presentations" that occurred as early as 1991. Topics include the Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem, refugees and their right to return, the Goldstone Report, security cooperation, the Gaza Strip, and Hamas. These documents were shocking to the public as they exposed the failure of the negotiations between Israel and Palestine.
Palestinians were angered due to the amendable nature of the
Palestinian negotiators, as well as the condescending attitude the
Israelis and Americans had towards said Palestinian negotiators.
Another revelation from the leak was the rebuttal of the belief that
Palestinians were uncooperative during negotiations with the papers
revealing Israel and the Americans were being disruptive.
The papers revealed the Palestinian negotiators working against Palestinian popular opinion, such as exchanging land in the Arab Quarter for land elsewhere or willingness to define Israel as a Jewish state in exchange for refugees.
Many interpreted these decisions as evidence of weakness in the
negotiators; though some sympathised with the negotiators, believing
they did what was required for peace. Palestinian negotiator, Saed Erekat
called the documents lies, but also went on to say that the papers were
non-binding and that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.
People from both parties condemned the release of these
documents, some denouncing their authenticity and questioning the
motives of whoever released them.
Some believe the documents to be fabricated, anti-Israeli propaganda as
the leak coincides with al-Jazeera's airing of programs on the
Jerusalem settlements.
Allegedly, the documents were leaked by multiple members of staff who
worked within the negotiations, though some believe French-Palestinian
lawyer Ziyad Clot was the source of the leak.
Following the leak, protests occurred in Israel and Palestine, as well as in other countries over the world. People began to question whether peace is a possible outcome in Israel and Palestine, and if the United States are capable of being a neutral party during peace talks.
Spying has sometimes been considered a gentlemanly pursuit, with recruiting focused on military officers,
or at least on persons of the class from whom officers are recruited.
However, the demand for male soldiers, an increase in women's rights,
and the tactical advantages of female spies led the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) to set aside any lingering Victorian Era prejudices and begin employing women in April 1942. Their task was to transmit information from Nazi occupied France
back to Allied Forces. The main strategic reason was that men in France
faced a high risk of being interrogated by Nazi troops but women were
less likely to arouse suspicion. In this way they made good couriers and
proved equal to, if not more effective than, their male counterparts.
Their participation in Organization and Radio Operation was also vital
to the success of many operations, including the main network between
Paris and London.