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Monday, March 9, 2020

Critical infrastructure protection

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is a concept that relates to the preparedness and response to serious incidents that involve the critical infrastructure of a region or nation.

The American Presidential directive PDD-63 of May 1998 set up a national program of "Critical Infrastructure Protection". In 2014 the NIST Cybersecurity Framework was published after further presidential directives.

In Europe, the equivalent European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) refers to the doctrine or specific programs created as a result of the European Commission's directive EU COM(2006) 786 which designates European critical infrastructure that, in case of fault, incident, or attack, could impact both the country where it is hosted and at least one other European Member State. Member states are obliged to adopt the 2006 directive into their national statutes.

History of the U.S. CIP

The U.S. CIP is a national program to ensure the security of vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures of the United States. In May 1998, President Bill Clinton issued presidential directive PDD-63 on the subject of critical infrastructure protection. This recognized certain parts of the national infrastructure as critical to the national and economic security of the United States and the well-being of its citizenry, and required steps to be taken to protect it.

This was updated on December 17, 2003, by President Bush through Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-7 for Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. The directive describes the United States as having some critical infrastructure that is "so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety."

Overview

The systems and networks that make up the infrastructure of society are often taken for granted, yet a disruption to just one of those systems can have dire consequences across other sectors.

Take, for example, a computer virus that disrupts the distribution of natural gas across a region. This could lead to a consequential reduction in electrical power generation, which in turn leads to the forced shutdown of computerized controls and communications. Road traffic, air traffic, and rail transportation might then become affected. Emergency services might also be hampered.

An entire region can become debilitated because some critical elements in the infrastructure become disabled through natural disaster. While potentially in contravention of the Geneva Conventions, military forces have also recognized that it can cripple an enemy's ability to resist by attacking key elements of its civilian and military infrastructure.

The federal government has developed a standardized description of critical infrastructure, in order to facilitate monitoring and preparation for disabling events. The government requires private industry in each critical economic sector to:
  • Assess its vulnerabilities to both physical or cyber attacks
  • Plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities
  • Develop systems to identify and prevent attempted attacks
  • Alert, contain and rebuff attacks and then, with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to rebuild essential capabilities in the aftermath

Infrastructure sectors

CIP defines sectors and organizational responsibilities in a standard way:
Oklahoma City bombing: Search and rescue teams formed from various emergency services coordinated by FEMA
In 2003 the remit was expanded to include:
With much of the critical infrastructure privately owned, the Department of Defense (DoD) depends on commercial infrastructure to support its normal operations. The Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency are also involved in intelligence analysis with friendly countries.

In May 2007 the DHS completed its sector-specific plans (SSP) for coordinating and dealing with critical events. the Continuity of government (COG) in time of a catastrophic event can be used to preserve the government as seen fit by the president, at which point the welfare of the government can be placed above the welfare of the citizenry of the United States ensuring that the government is preserved to rebuild the economy and country when it is deemed safe to return to the surface of the United States of America.

Significance

On March 9, 1999, Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre warned the United States Congress of a cyber terrorist "electronic Pearl Harbor" saying, "It is not going to be against Navy ships sitting in a Navy shipyard. It is going to be against commercial infrastructure". Later this fear was qualified by President Clinton after reports of actual cyber terrorist attacks in 2000: "I think it was an alarm. I don't think it was Pearl Harbor. We lost our Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor. I don't think the analogous loss was that great." 

There are many examples of computer systems that have been hacked or victims of extortion. One such example occurred in September 1995 where a Russian national allegedly masterminded the break-in of Citicorp's electronic funds transfer system and was ordered to stand trial in the United States. A gang of hackers under his leadership had breached Citicorp's security 40 times during 1994. They were able to transfer $12 million from customer accounts and withdraw an estimated $400,000.
In the past, the systems and networks of the infrastructure elements were physically and logically independent and separate. They had little interaction or connection with each other or other sectors of the infrastructure. With advances in technology, the systems within each sector became automated, and interlinked through computers and communications facilities. As a result, the flow of electricity, oil, gas, and telecommunications throughout the country are linked—albeit sometimes indirectly—but the resulting linkages blur traditional security borders.

While this increased reliance on interlinked capabilities helps make the economy and nation more efficient and perhaps stronger, it also makes the country more vulnerable to disruption and attack. This interdependent and interrelated infrastructure is more vulnerable to physical and cyber disruptions because it has become a complex system with single points of failure. In the past an incident that would have been an isolated failure can now cause widespread disruption because of cascading effects. As an example, capabilities within the information and communication sector have enabled the United States to reshape its government and business processes, while becoming increasingly software driven. One catastrophic failure in this sector now has the potential to bring down multiple systems including air traffic control, emergency services, banking, trains, electrical power, and dam control. 

The elements of the infrastructure themselves are also considered possible targets of terrorism. Traditionally, critical infrastructure elements have been lucrative targets for anyone wanting to attack another country. Now, because the infrastructure has become a national lifeline, terrorists can achieve high economic and political value by attacking elements of it. Disrupting or even disabling the infrastructure may reduce the ability to defend the nation, erode public confidence in critical services, and reduce economic strength. Additionally, well chosen terrorist attacks can become easier and less costly than traditional warfare because of the interdependence of infrastructure elements. These infrastructure elements can become easier targets where there is a low probability of detection.

The elements of the infrastructure are also increasingly vulnerable to a dangerous mix of traditional and nontraditional types of threats. Traditional and non-traditional threats include equipment failures, human error, weather and natural causes, physical attacks, and cyber attacks. For each of these threats, the cascading effect caused by single points of failure has the potential to pose dire and far-reaching consequences.

Challenges

There are fears that the frequency and severity of critical infrastructure incidents will increase in the future.

Although efforts are under way, there is no unified national capability to protect the interrelated aspects of the country's infrastructure. One reason for this is that a good understanding of the inter-relationships does not exist. There is also no consensus on how the elements of the infrastructure mesh together, or how each element functions and affects the others. Securing national infrastructure depends on understanding the relationships among its elements. Thus when one sector scheduled a three-week drill to mimic the effects of a pandemic flu, even though two-thirds of the participants claimed to have business continuity plans in place, barely half reported that their plan was moderately effective.

Critical infrastructure protection requires the development of a national capability to identify and monitor the critical elements and to determine when and if the elements are under attack or are the victim of destructive natural occurrences. CIP is important because it is the link between risk management and infrastructure assurance. It provides the capability needed to eliminate potential vulnerabilities in the critical infrastructure.

CIP practitioners determine vulnerabilities and analyze alternatives in order to prepare for incidents. They focus on improving the capability to detect and warn of impending attacks on, and system failures within, the critical elements of the national infrastructure.

Organization and structure

PDD-63 mandated the formation of a national structure for critical infrastructure protection. To accomplish this one of the primary actions was to produce a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan, or NIAP, later renamed National Infrastructure Protection Plan or NIPP.

The different entities of the national CIP structure work together as a partnership between the government and the public sectors. Each department and agency of the federal government is responsible for protecting its portion of the government's critical infrastructure. In addition, there are grants made available through the Department of Homeland Security for municipal and private entities to use for CIP and security purposes. These include grants for emergency management, water security training, rail, transit and port security, metropolitan medical response, LEA terrorism prevention programs and the Urban Areas Security Initiative.

PDD-63 identified certain functions related to critical infrastructure protection that must be performed chiefly by the federal government. These are national defense, foreign affairs, intelligence, and law enforcement. Each lead agency for these special functions appoints a senior official to serve as a functional coordinator for the federal government. In 2008 a mobile PDA-based Vulnerability Assessment Security Survey Tool (VASST) was introduced to speed physical security assessment of critical infrastructure by law enforcement to meet compliance requirements of PDD-63.

National Infrastructure Assurance Plan / National Infrastructure Protection Plan

For each of the identified major sectors of the critical infrastructure, the federal government appointed a Sector Liaison Official from a designated Lead Agency. A private sector counterpart, a Sector Coordinator, was also identified. Together, the two sector representatives, one federal government and one corporate, were responsible for developing a sector NIAP.

In addition, each department and agency of the federal government was responsible for developing its own CIP plan for protecting its portion of the federal government's critical infrastructure. The federal department and agency plans were assimilated with the sector NIAPs to create one comprehensive National Infrastructure Assurance Plan. Additionally the national structure must ensure there is a national CIP program. This program includes responsibilities such as education and awareness, threat assessment and investigation, and research.

The process includes assessments of:
  • Protection - Can be defined as the state of being defended, safeguarded, or shielded from injury, loss, or destruction from natural or unnatural forces.
  • Vulnerability – The quality of being susceptible to attack or injury, warranted or unwarranted, by accident or by design.
  • Risk – The possibility or likelihood of being attacked or injured.
  • Mitigation – The ability to alleviate, reduce, or moderate a vulnerability, thus reducing or eliminating risk.

Controversy

There have been public criticisms of the mechanisms and implementation of some security initiatives and grants, with claims they are being led by the same companies who can benefit, and that they are encouraging an unnecessary culture of fear. Commentators note that these initiatives started directly after the collapse of the Cold War, raising the concern that this was simply a diversion of the military-industrial complex away from a funding area which was shrinking and into a richer previously civilian arena.

Grants have been distributed across the different states even though the perceived risk is not evenly spread, leading to accusations of pork barrel politics that directs money and jobs towards marginal voting areas. The Urban Areas Security Initiative grant program has been particularly controversial, with the 2006 infrastructure list covering 77,000 assets, including a popcorn factory and a hot dog stand. The 2007 criteria were reduced to 2,100 and now those facilities must make a much stronger case to become eligible for grants. While well-intentioned, some of the results have also been questioned regarding claims of poorly designed and intrusive security theater that distracts attention and money from more pressing issues or creates damaging side effects.

An absence of comparative risk analysis and benefits tracking it has made it difficult to counter such allegations with authority. In order to better understand this, and ultimately direct effort more productively, a Risk Management and Analysis Office was recently created in the National Protection and Programs directorate at the Department of Homeland Security.

Department of Defense and CIP

The U.S. Department of Defense is responsible for protecting its portion of the government's critical infrastructure. But as part of the CIP program, DoD has responsibilities that traverse both the national and department-wide critical infrastructure.

PDD-63 identified the responsibilities DoD had for critical infrastructure protection. First, DoD had to identify its own critical assets and infrastructures and provide assurance through analysis, assessment, and remediation. DoD was also responsible for identifying and monitoring the national and international infrastructure requirements of industry and other government agencies, all of which needed to be included in the protection planning. DoD also addressed the assurance and protection of commercial assets and infrastructure services in DoD acquisitions. Other DoD responsibilities for CIP included assessing the potential impact on military operations that would result from the loss or compromise of infrastructure service. There were also requirements for monitoring DoD operations, detecting and responding to infrastructure incidents, and providing department indications and warnings as part of the national process. Ultimately, DoD was responsible for supporting national critical infrastructure protection.

In response to the requirements identified in PDD-63, DoD categorized its own critical assets by sector, in a manner similar to the national CIP organization. The DoD identified a slightly different list of infrastructure sectors for those areas that specifically required protection by DoD. DoD's organizational structure for critical infrastructure protection reflects, complements, and effectively interacts with the national structure for CIP.

DoD sectors

There are ten defense critical infrastructure sectors that are protected by the DoD. These include:
  • Financial Services - Defense financial services support activities related to officially appropriated funds. These activities include the disbursement of cash, receipt of funds, and acceptance of deposits for credit to officially designated Treasury general accounts. This sector also provides financial services to individuals and on-base organizations, including deposits, account maintenance, and safekeeping. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service is the lead component for the Financial Services sector.
  • Transportation - The Defense Transportation System, or DTS, includes resources that support global DoD transportation needs. These include surface, sea, and lift assets; supporting infrastructure; personnel; and related systems. Transportation Command, or USTRANSCOM, is the single manager for DoD transportation.
  • Public Works - Public works includes four distinct physical infrastructure sectors: electric power, oil, and natural gas, water and sewer; and emergency services, such as fire, medical, and hazardous material handling. This defense infrastructure sector is composed of networks and systems, principally for the distribution of the associated commodities. The Corps of Engineers is responsible for coordinating the assurance activities of the public works infrastructure sector.
  • Global Information Grid Command Control, or GIG/C2 - The Global Information Grid Command Control, or GIG/C2, are two combined sectors that support overall asset assurance for CIP. The GIG is the globally interconnected set of personnel, information, and communication capabilities necessary to achieve information superiority. C2 includes assets, facilities, networks, and systems that support mission accomplishment. The Defense Information Systems Agency, or DISA, is the lead component responsible for Global Information Grid Command Control.
  • Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, or ISR - The Defense Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance infrastructure sector is composed of facilities, networks, and systems that support ISR activities such as intelligence production and fusion centers. The Defense Intelligence Agency, or DIA, is responsible for coordinating the assurance activities of this infrastructure sector.
  • Health Affairs - The health care infrastructure consists of facilities and sites worldwide. Some are located at DoD installations; however, DoD also manages a larger system of non-DoD care facilities within its health care network. These health care facilities are linked by information systems. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs is the designated lead component for this sector.
  • Personnel - The defense personnel infrastructure sector includes a large number of assets hosted on component sites, a network of facilities, and information systems linking those sites and facilities. In addition to being responsible for its own assets, the personnel infrastructure sector also coordinates commercial services that support the personnel function. These services include recruitment, record keeping, and training. The Defense Human Resources Activity is the designated lead component for the Defense Personnel infrastructure sector.
  • Space - The defense space infrastructure sector is composed of both space- and ground-based assets including launch, specialized logistics, and control systems. Facilities are located worldwide on both DoD-controlled and private sites. The Defense Space sector is led by the United States Strategic Command, or USSTRATCOM.
  • Logistics - The defense logistics sector includes all activities, facilities, networks, and systems that support the provision of supplies and services to U.S. forces worldwide. Logistics includes the acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, and maintenance of material and supplies. This sector also includes the final disposition of material no longer needed by DoD. The Defense Logistics Agency, or DLA, is the lead component for the DoD Logistics infrastructure.
  • Defense Industrial Base - The Defense Industrial Base consists of DoD product and service providers from the private sector. The services and products provided constitute critical assets for DoD. The lead component for the Defense Industrial Base is the Defense Contract Management Agency. For those cases when infrastructure protection requirements affect more than one defense sector, DoD has set up special function components that support the implementation of CIP.

DoD special functions

The DoD CIP special function components interface with the equivalent national functional coordinators and coordinate all activities related to their function within DoD.

DoD's special function components currently include seven areas of focus. They include the following components:
  • Policy and Strategy - The Policy and Strategy Special Function Component provides the strategic planning required to prepare our Armed Forces for the 21st century. In part, it satisfies this responsibility through the development of the National Military Strategy. Within the area of policy development it is responsible for leading the Chairman's biennial review of the Unified Command Plan and developing Joint Staff positions on such key issues as the organization, roles and missions, and functions of the Armed Forces and the combatant commands.
  • Intelligence Support - The CIP Intelligence Support Special Function Component provides intelligence support to DoD in protection of the Defense portion of the Federal Government Critical Infrastructure. Intelligence Support responsibilities also include supporting the Defense Warning System, Alert and Notification, and interfacing with the national intelligence community. The responsibilities of the Intelligence Support agencies include such activities as provisioning threat assessments; indications and warnings of potential attacks; advice and support to Sector CIAOs in the development of defense infrastructure sector monitoring and reporting; crisis management support; and counter-intelligence. This special function component is also tasked with the support to the DoD contingent of the NIPC related to intelligence and counter-intelligence.
  • Industrial Policy - The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics ensures that an adequate defense industrial base exists and remains viable to meet current, future, and emergent national security requirements."
  • Defense Security - The Defense Security Service provides to the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies an array of security products and services which are designed to deter and detect espionage
  • Information Assurance - The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, or ASD NII, is the principal OSD staff assistant for the development, oversight, and integration of DoD policies and programs relating to the strategy of information superiority for the Department of Defense. Information Assurance, or IA, is the component of Information Operations that assures DoD's operational readiness by providing for the continuous availability and reliability of information systems and networks. IA protects the DII against exploitation, degradation, and denial of service, while providing the means to efficiently reconstitute and reestablish vital capabilities following an attack.
  • Research and Development - The Research and Development Special Function Component is responsible for information assurance and protection. The Office of Director, Defense Research and Engineering coordinates a CIP DoD research and development agenda. As well as reconciling the DoD agenda with the national R&D agenda.
  • Education and Awareness - Although education and awareness may rightly be considered everyone's responsibility, a comprehensive education and awareness strategy was deemed essential for a successful DoD CIP program. The National Defense University, or NDU, provided advice and assistance in assessing DoD education and awareness requirements. The Education and Awareness Component also developed the CIAO Education Program. This component was tasked to assist in the development of any special education or training required for CIP crisis management personnel. Education and Awareness also supports both DoD and national CIP policy and strategy formulation and executive leadership development through periodic "infrastructure games".

DoD CIP lifecycle

As mandated by PDD-63, the DoD must protect its portion of the federal government's critical infrastructure. For DoD, this is the Defense Infrastructure or DI. Protecting the Defense Infrastructure is a complex task involving ten defense sectors.

It was deemed that it was nearly impossible to protect every critical asset at every location, therefore the focus was directed on protecting the critical Defense Infrastructure. The critical Defense Infrastructure is the critical assets essential to providing mission assurance. 

The CIP Cycle (Chart 1)

Six phases

The six phases of the DoD CIP life cycle build on one another to create a framework for a comprehensive solution for infrastructure assurance. The life cycle phases occur before, during, and after an event that may compromise or degrade the infrastructure. A synopsis of the six phases are:
  • Analysis and Assessment (occurs before an event) - The Analysis and Assessment phase is the foundation and most important phase of the CIP life cycle. This phase identifies the assets absolutely critical to mission success and determines the assets’ vulnerabilities, as well as their interdependencies, configurations, and characteristics. An assessment is then made of the operational impact of infrastructure loss or degradation. In addition, Proactive Cyber Defence may anticipate an attack against computers and networks. It applies equally well to all critical infrastructure sectors, as it involves interdicting and disrupting an attack or a threat's preparation to attack, either preemptively or in self-defense.
  • Remediation (occurs before an event) - The Remediation phase involves precautionary measures and actions taken before an event occurs to fix the known cyber and physical vulnerabilities that could cause an outage or compromise a National Defense Infrastructure, or NDI, or critical asset. For example, remediation actions may include education and awareness, operational process or procedural changes or system configuration and component changes.
  • Indications and Warnings (occurs before and/or during an event) - The Indications and Warnings phase involves daily sector monitoring to assess the mission assurance capabilities of critical infrastructure assets and to determine if there are event indications to report. Indications are preparatory actions that indicate whether an infrastructure event is likely to occur or is planned. Indications are based on input at the tactical, operational, theater, and strategic level. At the tactical level, input comes from asset owners. At the operational level, input comes from the NDI sectors. At the theater level, input comes from regional assets such as allied intelligence, NATO, command intelligence, allied governments, and coalition forces. At the strategic level, input comes from intelligence, law-enforcement, and the private sector. Warning is the process of notifying asset owners of a possible threat or hazard.
  • Mitigation (occurs both before and during an event) - The Mitigation phase comprises actions taken before or during an event in response to warnings or incidents. DoD Critical Asset owners, NDI sectors, DoD installations, and military operators take these actions to minimize the operational impact of a critical asset's loss or debilitation.
  • Incident Response (occurs after an event) - Incident Response comprises the plans and activities taken to eliminate the cause or source of an infrastructure event.
  • Reconstitution (occurs after an event) - The last phase of the CIP life cycle, involves actions taken to rebuild or restore a critical asset capability after it has been damaged or destroyed. This phase is the most challenging and least developed process.
Effective management of the CIP life cycle ensures that protection activities can be coordinated and reconciled among all DoD sectors. In many ways, DoD CIP, is risk management at its most imperative. Achieving success means obtaining mission assurance. Missing the mark can mean mission failure as well as human and material losses. For critical infrastructure protection, risk management requires leveraging resources to address the most critical infrastructure assets that are also the most vulnerable and that have the greatest threat exposure.

The most important part of the CIP lifecycle is Phase 1. Because it is crucial to target the right assets for infrastructure protection, determining these assets is the first phase in the CIP life cycle. This phase, Analysis and Assessment, is the key and foundation of the seven lifecycle activities. Without a solid foundation, the remaining CIP life cycle phases may be flawed, resulting in a CIP plan that fails to protect the critical infrastructure and, therefore, mission assurance.

Phase 1: Analysis and Assessment

Phase 1 determines what assets are important, and identifies their vulnerabilities, and dependencies so that decision makers have the information they need to make effective risk management choices.

The Defense Infrastructure, or DI, is organized into ten sectors. Each sector is composed of assets, such as systems, programs, people, equipment, or facilities. Assets may be simple, such as one facility within one geographic location, or complex, involving geographically dispersed links and nodes.

The Analysis and Assessment is made up of five steps that include activities that span and encompass the ten DI sectors and their assets.
  • I. The first step in the Analysis and Assessment phase is to identify critical assets. An asset's criticality is a function of both time and situation based on the asset's operational or business value. For the DI, value depends on several factors: First, what military operations or services rely on an asset and how those dependencies change across time Next, how sensitive the operation is to the loss or compromise of the asset, in other words what is the maximum allowable down time if the asset is compromised. Finally, what the asset's assurance profile is, in particular whether asset restoration or a switch to a backup can occur within the allowable down time. Through domain expertise and inspection, critical assets are identified and then reported to the CIP Program.
  • II. The second step of the Analysis and Assessment phase is Defense Infrastructure characterization. This step maps and associates critical asset functions and relationships within a DI sector.
  • III. The third step in the Analysis and Assessment phase is the Operational Impact Analysis. This step is accomplished through the development of operational dependency matrices and the application of operations research methods. Potential operational impacts and service-level requirements are then reflected in the asset's criticality attributes and criticality index in the CIP program.
  • IV. The fourth step is the Vulnerability Assessment. This step is accomplished through multiple channels. Through the CIP program, all critical assets have a baseline vulnerability index, which is calculated from inputs associated with the class of asset and geographic region such as the probability of natural disasters, criminal or national security events, and technological failures. Asset owners, host installations, the sector CIAO, or other DoD entities may provide asset operational readiness and emergency preparedness information.
  • V. The fifth and final step in the Analysis and Assessment phase is Interdependency Analysis. Interdependency analysis seeks to map functions and relationships among DI sectors. As a result of the Interdependency Analysis, the criticality attributes for previously identified assets may be updated and additional critical assets may be identified to the CIP program. Multiple groups within the DoD CIP structure perform analysis and assessment activities. Translating the analysis and assessment process into concrete data requires specific activities, tasks, and tools.

Phase 1 Example in the “Real World”

On August 24, 2001, the Director of the Joint Staff requested USPACOM to serve as the lead support Combatant Command for creating a CIP first-ever theater CIP Plan – known as the “CIP Appendix 16 Plan”. The following is how USPACOM approached the task. USPACOM focused the Analysis and Assessment phase by organizing its activities to answer three major questions:
  • What is critical?
  • Is it vulnerable?
  • What can be done?
To answer the question, “What is critical?”, USPACOM outlined a three-step procedure:
  • First, identify the project focus.
  • Second, complete an operational analysis.
  • Third, complete a Defense Infrastructure analysis.
To accomplish these steps, USPACOM adopted a methodology that focuses its CIP efforts on Tier 1 assets. Tier 1 assets are assets that could cause mission failure if they are compromised or damaged. The methodology UAPACOM adopted and modified is Mission Area Analysis, or MAA. The MAA links combatant command missions to infrastructure assets that are critical to a given Operations Plan, or OPLAN, Contingency Plan, or CONPLAN, or Crisis Action Plan. Typically, the MAA process determines the assessment site priorities. USPACOM modified the process and selected the CIP assessment sites and installations prior to conducting the MAA. The following is an illustration of the USPACOM MAA process:
  • First, it identified the Mission Essential Requirements, or MERs, which are specific combatant commands or joint task force capabilities essential for execution of a warfighting plan. Then, they created an MER matrix for the specific command. For example, one MER may be to provide command, control, communications, and computers, or C4.
  • Second, it identified forces required for each MER. For example, the C4 MER is linked to a specific signal battalion. Third, it linked the forces to the necessary functions and tasks supporting the force. For example, the signal battalion is linked to the Communications and Civil Engineers functions and the task of managing the theater's C4 information systems requirements.
  • Third, it links assets to the functions supporting the tasks. The result is a mission area analysis of mission-critical assets.
USPACOM uses the MAA data it gathers to scope and focus its efforts on truly mission-critical assets to answer the next question in its process, Is it vulnerable?
The first step in answering this question is to complete an installation analysis. The next step is to complete a commercial infrastructure analysis. USPACOM relied upon two different DoD organizations for CIP assessments: Balanced Survivability Assessments, or BSAs, and Mission Assurance Assessments. The BSA is a two-week mission-focused assessment at a military installation or designated site. A Mission Assurance Assessment is unique because it uses an area assessment approach to focus on both commercial and military asset vulnerabilities and dependencies. The final step to determine vulnerabilities is to integrate the two analyses and assessments. With its critical assets and their vulnerabilities identified, USPACOM is ready to perform risk management activities to decide what can be done to protect the mission-critical assets.
Booz Allen Hamilton developed this process at PACOM.

Phase 2: Remediation

The first phase of the CIP life cycle, Analysis and Assessment, identified the critical assets of DoD sector infrastructures and the vulnerabilities or weaknesses of those critical assets.
The second phase is the Remediation phase. In the Remediation phase, the known weaknesses and vulnerabilities are addressed. Remediation actions are deliberate, precautionary measures designed to fix known virtual and physical vulnerabilities before an event occurs. The purpose of remediation is to improve the reliability, availability, and survivability of critical assets and infrastructures. Remediation actions apply to any type of vulnerability, regardless of its cause. They apply to acts of nature, technology failures, or deliberate malicious actions.
The cost of each remediation action depends on the nature of the vulnerability it addresses. The Defense Infrastructure Sector Assurance Plan that each infrastructure sector must develop, establishes the priorities and resources for remediation. Remediation requirements are determined by multiple factors. These are analysis and assessment, input from military planners and other DoD sectors, the National Infrastructure Assurance Plan and other plans, reports, and information on national infrastructure vulnerabilities and remediation, as well as intelligence estimates and assessments of threats.
Remediation requirements are also gathered through lessons learned from Defense Infrastructure sector monitoring and reporting and infrastructure protection operations and exercises. The CIP program tracks the status of remediation activities for critical assets. Remediation activities to protect the critical Defense Infrastructure cross multiple Department components.

Phase 3: Indications and Warnings

The need to monitor activities and warn of potential threats to the United States is not new. From conventional assaults to potential nuclear attacks, the military has been at the forefront of monitoring and warning of potential dangers since the founding of the country. Protecting the security and well being of the United States, including the critical Defense Infrastructure, has now entered a new era. It has been deemed essential to have a coordinated ability to identify and warn of potential or actual incidents among critical infrastructure domains. The ability to detect and warn of infrastructure events is the third phase of the critical infrastructure protection life cycle, the Indications and Warnings phase. 

Indications and warnings are actions or infrastructure conditions that signal an event is either:
  • Likely,
  • Planned or
  • Underway.
Historically, DoD event indications have focused and relied on intelligence information about foreign developments. These event indications have been expanded to include all potential infrastructure disruption or degradation, regardless of its cause. DoD CIP indications are based on four levels of input:
  • Tactical level input from DoD asset owners or installations
  • Operational-level input from sector Chief Information Assurance Officers (CIAOs)
  • Theater-level input from command and service intelligence and counter-intelligence activities.
  • Strategic-level intelligence from the intelligence community, law enforcement, and the private sector
This fusion of traditional intelligence information with sector-specific information has been determined to be essential for meaningful CIP indications.

If an indication is detected, a warning notifying the appropriate asset owners of a possible or occurring event or hazard can be issued. The sector's assurance plan determines what conditions and actions are monitored and reported for each Defense Infrastructure Sector. Each sector must develop a written Defense Sector Assurance Plan that includes a compendium of sector incidents for monitoring and reporting. The sector incident compendium is made up of three types of incidents:
  • Nationally defined reportable incidents
  • DoD defined reportable incidents, and
  • Sector-defined reportable incidents.
DoD critical asset owners, installations, and sector CIAOs determine the DoD and sector-defined incidents. Each of the reportable incidents or classes of incidents must include the following components:
  • Who should monitor the incident
  • How soon the incident must be reported
  • Which information elements the incident should contain
  • How the incident reporting should be routed
  • What follow-up actions are required
The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) is the primary national warning center for significant infrastructure attacks. Critical asset owners, DoD installations, and Sector CIAOs monitor the infrastructure daily. Indications of an infrastructure incident are reported to the National Military Command Center, or NMCC. If indications are on a computer network, they are also reported to the Joint Task Force Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO). The NMCC and JTF-CNO assess the indications and pass them to the NIPC and appropriate DoD organizations. When the NIPC determines that an infrastructure event is likely to occur, is planned, or is under way, it issues a national warning. For DoD, the NIPC passes its warnings and alerts to the NMCC and JTF-CNO. These warnings and alerts are then passed to the DoD components. The warning may include guidance regarding additional protection measures DoD should take.

Phase 4: Mitigation

Phase 1 of the CIP life cycle provided a layer of protection by identifying and assessing critical assets and their vulnerabilities. Phase 2 provided another layer of protection by remediating or improving the identified deficiencies and weaknesses of an asset. Even with these protections and precautions, an infrastructure incident was still possible. When it does the Indications and Warnings phase goes into effect.

The Mitigation phase (Phase 4), is made up of preplanned coordinated actions in response to infrastructure warnings or incidents. Mitigation actions are taken before or during an infrastructure event. These actions are designed to minimize the operational impact of the loss of a critical asset, facilitate incident response, and quickly restore the infrastructure service.

A primary purpose of the Mitigation phase is to minimize the operational impact on other critical Defense Infrastructures and assets when a critical asset is lost or damaged. As an example, if there is a U.S. installation, Site A, located in a host nation. Site A is a tier 1 asset, meaning that if it fails, the Combatant Commands mission fails. Site A has mutual Global Information Grid Command Control (GIG/C2), information interdependencies with Sites B and C. In addition, other Defense Infrastructure sectors rely on Site A for mission capabilities. In this scenario, what could be the impact if the supply line to the commercial power plant that provides the installation's primary power is accidentally severed. Because of all the interdependencies, losing this asset is more than the loss of just one site. It means the loss of other sector capabilities.

A possible mitigation action might be for Site A to go on backup power. An alternate action could be to pass complete control of Site A's functionality to another site, where redundancy has been previously arranged. These actions would limit the impact of this incident on the other sites and related sectors. In addition to lessening the operational impact of a critical infrastructure event, the Mitigation phase of the CIP life cycle supports and complements two other life cycle phases. Mitigation actions aid in the emergency, investigation, and management activities of Phase 5, Incident Response. They also facilitate the reconstitution activities of Phase 6.

During the Mitigation phase, DoD critical asset owners, DoD installations, and Sector Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officers, or CIAOs, work with the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) to develop, train for, and exercise mitigation responses for various scenarios. When there is a warning, emergency, or infrastructure incident, the critical asset owners, installations, and Sector CIAOs initiate mitigation actions to sustain service to the DoD. They also provide mitigation status information to the NMCC and JTF-CNO. The NMCC monitors for consequences from an event within one Defense Infrastructure sector that are significant enough to affect other sectors. For events that cross two or more sectors, the NMCC advises on the prioritization and coordination of mitigation actions. When event threats or consequences continue to escalate, the NMCC directs mitigation actions by sector to ensure a coordinated response across the DoD. The NMCC and the JTF-CNO keep the National Infrastructure Protection Center, or NIPC, apprised of any significant mitigation activities.

Phase 5: Incident response

When an event affects the Defense Infrastructure, the Incident Response phase begins. Incident Response is the fifth phase of the CIP life cycle. The purpose of the Incident Response phase is to eliminate the cause or source of an infrastructure event. For example, during the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, all non-military airplanes were grounded over the United States to prevent further incidents. Response activities included emergency measures, not from the asset owners or operators, but from dedicated third parties such as law enforcement, medical rescue, fire rescue, hazardous material or explosives handling, and investigative agencies. Response to Defense Infrastructure incidents can take one of two paths depending on whether or not the event affects a DoD computer network. 

When incidents compromise a DoD computer network, the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) directs the response activities. These activities are designed to stop the computer network attack, contain and mitigate damage to a DoD information network and then restore minimum required functionality. JTF-CNO also requests and coordinates any support or assistance from other Federal agencies and civilian organizations during incidents affecting a DoD network. When incidents impact any other DoD owned assets, installation commanders and critical asset owners follow traditional channels and procedures to coordinate responses. This includes notifying affected Sector Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officers, or CIAOs, in the initial notice and status reporting. Although third parties play a major role in the response to Defense Infrastructure events, DoD CIP personnel also have responsibilities to fulfill.

Phase 6: Reconstitution

After the source or cause of an infrastructure event is eliminated or contained, the infrastructure and its capabilities must be restored. Reconstitution is the last phase of the critical infrastructure protection. Reconstitution is probably the most challenging and least developed process of the life cycle. DoD critical asset owners have the major responsibility for reconstitution.

Hybrid warfare

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Hybrid warfare is a military strategy which employs political warfare and blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy, lawfare and foreign electoral intervention. By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution. Hybrid warfare can be used to describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battlespace requiring a highly adaptable and resilient response. There are a variety of terms used to refer to the hybrid war concept: hybrid war, hybrid threats, hybrid influencing or hybrid adversary (as well as non-linear war, non-traditional war or special war). US military bodies tend to speak in terms of a hybrid threat, while academic literature speaks of a hybrid warfare. For the purposes of this article, these terms will be used interchangeably.

Definition

Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.
Carl von Clausewitz
 
There is no universally accepted definition of hybrid warfare which leads to some debate whether the term is useful at all. Some argue that the term is too abstract and only the latest term to refer to irregular methods to counter a conventionally superior force. The abstractness of the term means that it is often used as a catch all term for all non-linear threats.

Hybrid warfare is warfare with the following aspects:
  • A non-standard, complex, and fluid adversary. A hybrid adversary can be state or non-state. For example, in the Israel–Hezbollah War and the Syrian Civil War the main adversaries are non-state entities within the state system. These non-state actors can act as proxies for countries but have independent agendas as well. For example, Iran is a sponsor of Hezbollah but it was Hezbollah's, not Iran's, agenda that resulted in the kidnapping of Israeli troops that led to the Israel–Hezbollah war. On the other hand, Russian involvement in Ukraine can be described as a traditional state actor waging a hybrid war (in addition to using a local hybrid proxy). Note that Russia denies involvement in the Ukraine conflict.
  • A hybrid adversary uses a combination of conventional and irregular methods. Methods and tactics include conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, irregular formations, diplomacy, politics, terrorist acts, indiscriminate violence, and criminal activity. A hybrid adversary also uses clandestine actions to avoid attribution or retribution. These methods are used simultaneously across the spectrum of conflict with a unified strategy. A current example is the Islamic State's transnational aspirations, blended tactics, structured formations, and cruel use of terror as part of their arsenal.
  • A hybrid adversary is flexible and adapts quickly. For example, the Islamic State's response to the U.S. aerial bombing campaign was to quickly reduce the use of checkpoints, large convoys, and cell phones. IS militants also dispersed among the civilian population. Civilian collateral damage from airstrikes can be used as an effective recruiting tool.
  • A hybrid adversary uses advanced weapons systems and other disruptive technologies. These weapons can be now bought at bargain prices. Moreover, other novel technologies are being adapted to the battlefield such as cellular networks. In 2006, Hezbollah was armed with high-tech weaponry, such as precision guided missiles, that nation-states typically use. Hezbollah forces shot down Israeli helicopters, severely damaged a patrol boat with a cruise missile and destroyed heavily armored tanks by firing guided missiles from hidden bunkers. The organization also used aerial drones to gather intelligence, communicated with encrypted cell phones and watched Israeli troop movements with thermal night-vision equipment.
  • Use of mass communication for propaganda. The growth of mass communication networks offers powerful propaganda and recruiting tools. The use of fake news websites to spread false stories is an element of hybrid warfare.
  • A hybrid war takes place on three distinct battlefields. the conventional battlefield, the indigenous population of the conflict zone, and the international community.

Other definitions

The U.S. Army Chief of Staff defined a hybrid threat in 2008 as an adversary that incorporates "diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities". The United States Joint Forces Command defines a hybrid threat as, “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battle space. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be a combination of state and nonstate actors". The U.S. Army defined a hybrid threat in 2011 as "the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects". NATO uses the term to describe "adversaries with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives". Former U.S. Army Chief Gen. George W. Casey talked of a new type of war that would become increasingly common in the future: "A hybrid of irregular warfare and conventional warfare." According to the 2017-inaugurated European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, "[h]ybrid threats are methods and activities that are targeted towards vulnerabilities of the opponent" where the "range of methods and activities is wide."

Effectiveness

Traditional militaries find it hard to respond to hybrid warfare. Collective defense organizations such as NATO might find it hard to agree on the source of the conflict making response difficult. An article published in Global Security Review entitled "What is Hybrid Warfare?," compares the notion of hybrid warfare to the Russian concept of "non-linear" warfare. It defines non-linear warfare as the deployment of "conventional and irregular military forces in conjunction with psychological, economic, political, and cyber assaults." The article partially attributes this difficulty to the "rigid" or static military taxonomy used by NATO to define the very concept of warfare. Also, to counter a hybrid threat, hard power is often insufficient. Often the conflict evolves under the radar and even a "rapid" response turns out to be too late. Overwhelming force is an insufficient deterrent. Many traditional militaries lack the flexibility to shift tactics, priorities, and objectives on a constant basis.

History

The combination of conventional and irregular methods is not new and has been used throughout history. Some historians find the origins of the concept in the campaigns waged in ancient Hispania by the Lusitanian leader Viriathus or the renegade general Sertorius against the forces of the Roman Republic in the 2nd and 3rd centuries B.C. respectively. Elements of hybrid warfare are also seen in the concept of la petite guerre, a sort of reconnaissance in force practiced by light troops in European armies during the 17th and 18th centuries. A few examples of this type of combat are found in the American Revolution (a combination of Washington's Continental Army with militia forces) and Napoleonic Wars (British regulars cooperated with Spanish guerrillas). One can also find examples of hybrid warfare in smaller conflicts during the nineteenth century. For instance, between 1837 and 1840 Rafael Carrera, a Conservative peasant rebel leader in Guatemala, waged a successful military campaign against the Liberals and the Federal government of Central America utilizing a strategy that combined classical guerrilla tactics with conventional operations. Carrera's hybrid approach to warfare gave him the edge over his numerically superior and better armed enemies.

After 1945

The Vietnam war saw hybrid warfare tactics on both side, with the US using the CIA to support civil war parties in Laos and the Cambodian Civil War as well as ethnic groups inside Vietnam for their cause, while the USSR supported the Vietcong militia.

The Nicaraguan Revolution and the influence of the USA.

 

After 1989

The end of the Cold War created a unipolar system with a preponderant American military power, and though this has tempered traditional conflicts, regional conflicts and threats that leverage the weaknesses of conventional military structure are becoming more frequent.

At the same time sophistication and lethality of non-state actors increased. These actors are well armed with technologically advanced weapons that are now available at low prices. Similarly, commercial technologies such as cell phones and digital networks are adapted to the battlefield. Another new element is the ability of non-state actors to persist within the modern system.

2006 Israel–Hezbollah War

One of the most often quoted examples of a hybrid war is the 2006 conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah. The Hezbollah is a sophisticated non-state actor sponsored by Iran. While the group often acts as a proxy for Iran, it has its own agenda. It was Hezbollah policy, rather than Iran's, that led to the kidnapping of Israeli troops that was the impetus for the war. The war featured about 3,000 Hezbollah fighters embedded in the local population attacked by about 30,000 Israeli regular troops.

The group used decentralized cells composed of guerrillas and regular troops armed with weaponry that nation states use such as anti-tank missiles, rockets, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and advanced improvised explosive devices. Hezbollah cells downed Israeli helicopters, damaged Merkava IV tanks, communicated with encrypted cell phones, and monitored Israeli troops movements with night vision and thermal imaging devices. Iranian Quds Force operatives acted as mentors and suppliers of advanced systems.

Hezbollah leveraged mass communication immediately distributing battlefield photos and videos dominating the perception battle throughout the conflict. Israel did not lose the war on the battlefield but lost the information battle as the overwhelming perception at the time was of Israeli defeat.

2014 ISIL advance into Iraq

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a non-state actor utilizing hybrid tactics against the conventional Iraqi military. ISIL has transitional aspirations, and uses irregular and regular tactics and terrorism. In response, the state of Iraq itself turned to hybrid tactics utilizing non-state and international actors to counter the ISIL advance. The United States likewise is a hybrid participant through a combination of traditional air power, advisers to Iraqi government troops, Kurdish peshmerga, and sectarian militias, and training opposition forces within Syria. The Iraq–Syria hybrid war is a conflict with an interconnected group of state and non-state actors pursuing overlapping goals and a weak local state.

Russian activities in the 2010s

The Russian government's wide use in conflicts such as in Syria and in Ukraine, of private military contractors such as those of the Wagner Group was in 2018 singled out by experts as a key part of Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare to advance her interests, while obfuscating her involvement and role.

In respect of Russia, Jānis Bērziņš, director of the Center for Security and Strategic Research, has widely published arguing that using the term Hybrid to characterize the Russian strategy is misleading, since the Russian have their own definitions and concepts. Accordingly, to him, "the word “hybrid” is catchy since it can represent a mix of anything. However, its basic framework differs from the one developed by the Russians due to the former being a military concept and the result of American military thought. Moreover, the concept of New Generation Warfare includes conventional operations. In other words, Hybrid Warfare might be part of New Generation Warfare but cannot define it." Michael Kofman, a senior research scientist at CNA and a fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, noted in March 2018 that the West′s frequent references to hybrid warfare was in effect "an unintelligible Western reaction, after decades of wars of choice against paltry adversaries, to confrontation with another power that is capable across the full spectrum of conflict".

Russia on US activities

Moscow has accused Washington of conducting hybrid warfare against Russia during the colour revolutions. Its perception of being at war or in a 'permanent state of conflict' with the US and its allies were furthered by the 2014 Maidan uprising in Ukraine. Russia's activities in former Soviet states have been described as Hobbesian and redolent of Cold War thinking.

Speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club in November 2014, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said:
It is an interesting term, but I would apply it above all to the United States and its war strategy – it is truly a hybrid war aimed not so much at defeating the enemy militarily as at changing the regimes in the states that pursue a policy Washington does not like. It is using financial and economic pressure, information attacks, using others on the perimeter of a corresponding state as proxies and of course information and ideological pressure through externally financed non-governmental organisations. Is it not a hybrid process and not what we call war?

United States on Russian activities

General Philip Breedlove, in a US Senate hearing February 2016, claimed that Russia is using refugees to weaken Europe, directing the influx of refugees in the continent to destabilize areas and regions in terms of economy and to create social unrest. On 10 February 2016, Finnish Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö told a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers that Finland expects Russia to open a second front, where as many as 1 million migrants may arrive over the Finnish/Russian border. A similar statement was made by Ilkka Kanerva, Finland's former foreign minister and now chairman of the country's parliamentary Defense Committee.

Iranian activities in the 2010s

Iran has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare. According to BBC, "Iran, along with its Houthi allies [in Yemen]], is conducting a classic war of the weak against the strong; a "hybrid conflict" as it is known in the strategic textbooks. It is borrowing many of the tactics from the Russian play-book - the use of deniability; proxies; cyber-operations and information warfare."

Iran on United States activities

The United States has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Iran and other countries.

Saudi and Emirati activities in the 2010s

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Qatar.

Chinese activities in the 2010s

China has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Taiwan and in the South China Sea.

Indian activities in the 2010s

India has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Pakistan.

Online social movement

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Online communities build off social movements, enabling the connection of persons worldwide to develop a base and gain awareness of issues. Online social movements gained momentum in the late 20th century and early 21st century as new generations sought social change. With access to the internet and the fast-growing World Wide Web, online social movements brought awareness to issues both political and social. Online social movements have been praised and criticized; the former for its ability to raise awareness to important causes, and the latter for its ability to perpetuate problems like slacktivism. Although online activism has received criticism, it has had real impacts on social movements.

The impact of online movements

The impact of online movements has been substantial since the introduction of the internet. With the ever-growing medium of social media, internet activism has reached the forefront of the internet. Through the use of social networking sites such as Facebook and content-sharing sites as YouTube, the opportunity for wide-scale, online social participation has increased.

Beneficial impacts

Several social media movements have raised money for causes, such as the ALS Ice Bucket Challenge raising $100million in 30 days. Even if they do not directly involve monetary funding, many online social movements raise awareness for causes such as institutionalized racism against African Americans with the Black Lives Matter movement and the inappropriate use of force by police authorities against black females, such as with the Say Her Name social movement. In the political sphere, active online groups increase political participation by providing a framework for discussion, leading petitions, and collecting donations in order to further a political agenda.

Social media can break pluralistic ignorance, which is the belief that your opinions are not shared by others, when in reality, they tend to be. By revealing commonalities, online platforms enable the synchronisation of opinions across disparate geographies by creating a sense of physical presence and connection among those with similar perspectives.

Detrimental impacts

Some experts believe there are potential weaknesses and long-term repercussions that can be identified with online movements. Some examples are clicktivism and slacktivism, where the use of social media to promote a cause include activities such as:
  • Organizing protests
  • Facilitating boycotts
  • Online parody and satire

Examples of online movements

Social movements advance their work through the media. It is easier, less costly as well as time-consuming to link collective behavior as real-time communication can occur vastly and simultaneously via social media. Some examples of online movements include: 


The future

The future of online movements is hard to predict. However, there are some clear directions where they could certainly lead towards. Vanessa DiMauro believes the biggest trend concerning online communities in the near future is private online communities. While these large networks that we encounter and use on a day-to-day basis have provided us with a productive and collaborative experience they have also increased to unmanageable sizes. To become a learning environment these groups need to be much smaller and manageable. This is where the idea and trend of private online communities could potentially be the future of online communities.

Online Social Movements and Commercial Social Media Platforms

Since the late 2000s, increased use of commercial social media platforms by social movements has been reported. According to Lopes, "Social Media websites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and the various online blogs have arguably given a voice to individuals that otherwise would not be heard." However, the adoption of these commercial platforms has concerned analysts as they highlighted asymmetrical relationships between the for-profit aims of social media and the copy-left values that drive many online movements. According to Fenton, "Claims for the extension and re-invention of activism need to be considered in the context of the material social and political world of inequality, injustice and corporate dominance." For example, "in his analysis of the Purple Movement (Popolo Viola) in Italy and its extensive use of Facebook, Coretti (2014) demonstrates that, while the myth of the network as open and inclusive persists, it acts as a disguise for the communication protocols of commercial social networking platforms that may well enable large-scale mobilization but ultimately, through their very functionality, encourage organizational centralization and fragmentation in social movements" (Fenton, 2016, p.184). The proprietary nature of the design of platforms such as Facebook pages fails to provide movements with the necessary instruments in terms of a shared democratic management of their resources. Moreover, the inability to manage Facebook pages and groups according to commonly agreed values promotes vertical power structures within movements, contributing to controversial management of Facebook pages and to internal divisions that significantly hinder the potential of protest.

Important figures

  • Shaun King; a Twitter-based civil rights activist.
  • DeRay McKesson; Twitter- and Instagram-based civil rights activist, known for his involvement in the Black Lives Matter movement.
  • Colin Kaepernick; American football quarterback known for his involvement in the Black Lives Matter movement and causing controversy for kneeling rather than standing for the national anthem, a symbolic act in protest of the unjust and oppressive treatment of people of color in the United States.
  • Rachel Dolezal; civil rights activist that caused controversy after her Caucasian parents disclosed that she was a Caucasian woman passing as black. Received backlash on various social media platforms for claiming she was a victim of hate crimes as an African American woman.
  • Van Jones; civil rights activist and creator of various initiatives such as #YesWeCode, which is meant to give aid to minorities in technology fields.

2600: The Hacker Quarterly

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


2600: The Hacker Quarterly
2600 Spring 2012.gif
Spring 2012 issue of 2600
EditorEmmanuel Goldstein (Eric Gordon Corley)
CategoriesComputers, technology
FrequencyQuarterly
Publisher2600 Enterprises Inc.
Total circulation
(2009)
52,250
Year founded1984
CountryUnited States
Based inMiddle Island, New York
LanguageEnglish
Websitewww.2600.com
ISSN0749-3851

2600: The Hacker Quarterly is an American seasonal publication of technical information and articles, many of which are written and submitted by the readership, on a variety of subjects including hacking, telephone switching systems, Internet protocols and services, as well as general news concerning the computer "underground."

With origins in the phone freaking community and late 20th-century counterculture, 2600 and its associated conference transitioned to coverage of modern hacker culture, and the magazine has become a platform for speaking out against increased digital surveillance and advocacy of personal and digital freedoms.

Publication history

The magazine's name comes from the phreaker discovery in the 1960s that the transmission of a 2600 hertz tone – which could be produced perfectly with a plastic toy whistle given away free with Cap'n Crunch cereal, discovered by friends of John Draper – over a long-distance trunk connection gained access to "operator mode," and allowed the user to explore aspects of the telephone system that were not otherwise accessible. The magazine was given its name by David Ruderman, who co-founded the magazine with his college friend, Eric Corley. Ruderman ended his direct involvement with the magazine three years later.

The magazine traces its origins to early Bulletin Board Systems as a place for hackers to share information and stories with each other. It was launched in 1984, coinciding with the book of the same name and the break-up of AT&T. It is published and edited by its co-founder Emmanuel Goldstein (a pen name of Corley which is an allusion to George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four) and his company 2600 Enterprises, Inc. 2600 is released on the first Friday of the month following a season change, usually January, April, July, and October.

Goldstein has published a compilation of articles from the magazine entitled The Best of 2600: A Hacker Odyssey. The book, an 888-page hardcover, has been available from July 28, 2008 in the US and August 8, 2008 in the UK and is published by Wiley.

"Hacker" term

In the usage of 2600 and affiliates, the often loaded term "hacking" refers to grey hat hacking, which is generally understood to be any sort of technological utilization or manipulation of technology which goes above and beyond the capabilities inherent to the design of a given application. This usage attempts to maintain neutrality, as opposed to the politically charged and often contentious terms white hat hacking (which some consider hacking motivated exclusively by good, benevolent intentions--such as hardware modding or penetration testing), and black hat hacking – which some consider to be hacking motivated exclusively by malicious or selfish intentions, such as electronic theft, vandalism, hijacking of websites, and other types of cybercrime.) Other hackers believe that hat-color labels are an oversimplification and unnecessary designation, best suited for use by the media, and suggest that people who use hacking to commit crimes already have a label, that of criminal.

Conferences and meetings

The 2600 van, a modified New York Telephone vehicle.

2600 established the H.O.P.E. (Hackers on Planet Earth) conference in 1994, marking the publication's tenth anniversary. The conference is held at the Hotel Pennsylvania, in Manhattan, New York City, and has occurred every two years with the exception of the second HOPE in 1997, held at the Puck Building in Manhattan. The convention features events such as presentations, talks, concerts, and workshops. Speakers have included computer security figures and hackers such as Kevin Mitnick, Steven Levy, Richard Stallman, and Steve Wozniak, as well as whistleblowers William Binney, Daniel Ellsberg, and Edward Snowden, and countercultural figures like Jello Biafra and The Yes Men.

There are monthly meetings in over 24 countries. The meetings are listed in the back of the magazine, and are advertised as being open to anyone regardless of age or level of expertise.

In other media

2600 Films has made a feature-length documentary about famed hacker Kevin Mitnick, the Free Kevin movement and the hacker world, entitled Freedom Downtime, and is currently working on one titled Speakers' World.

Corley is also host of Off The Wall and Off the Hook, two New York talk radio shows. Both shows can be downloaded or streamed via the 2600 site, and are also broadcast on various radio stations:
In the 1995 movie Hackers, the character of Emmanuel Goldstein, also known as "Cereal Killer" was portrayed by Matthew Lillard.

Court cases

2600 has been involved in many court cases related to technology and freedom of speech alongside the Electronic Frontier Foundation, perhaps most significantly Universal v. Reimerdes involving the distribution of DVD copy protection tool DeCSS, where courts upheld the constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act anti-circumvention provisions.

The magazine itself received a copyright claim for the ink spatter stock image featured on the Spring 2012 issue from Trunk Archive, an image licensing agency, using an automated image tracking toolkit. While Trunk Archive identified its own image that featured the ink spatter as the source, it was discovered that the original ink spatter was created by the Finnish artist Jukka Korhonen, on DeviantArt, who had released it into the public domain. Trunk Archive later retracted the claim and sent a letter to 2600 apologizing for the mistake.

Inequality (mathematics)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inequality...