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Thursday, March 3, 2022

Afghanistan conflict (1978–present)

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Afghanistan conflict
Part of the Cold War (1978–1991) and the War on Terror (2001–2021)
War in Afghanistan (1992–2001).png
Development of the war in Afghanistan from the Peshawar Accord in April 1992 to the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001
Date27 April 1978 – present
Location
Result
Casualties and losses
1,405,111–2,084,468 (2014)

The Afghanistan conflict (Pashto: دافغانستان جنګونه; Persian: جنگ های افغانستان) is a continuous series of wars fought in Afghanistan from 1978 through to the present day.

Previously, the Kingdom of Afghanistan was overthrown in the relatively bloodless 1973 Afghan coup d'état, which brought the monarch Mohammed Zahir Shah’s 39-year reign to an end, and ended Afghanistan’s relatively peaceful period in modern history. Starting with the Saur Revolution military coup, an almost continuous series of armed conflicts has dominated and afflicted Afghanistan, including a Soviet invasion, a series of civil wars between mujahideen groups (notably the Taliban), a NATO invasion, a Taliban insurgency, and fighting between the Taliban and the local branch of the Islamic State. The conflict includes:

By 2014, it had been estimated that 1,405,111 to 2,084,468 lives were lost over the duration of the conflict.

Prelude

Zahir Shah and the Kingdom of Afghanistan

From 1933 to 1973, the Kingdom of Afghanistan experienced a lengthy period of peace and relative stability. It was ruled as a monarchy by King Zahir Shah, who belonged to the Afghan Musahiban Barakzai dynasty. In the 1960s, Afghanistan as a constitutional monarchy held limited parliamentary elections.

Daoud Khan and the Republic of Afghanistan

Zahir Shah, who would become the last King of Afghanistan, was overthrown by his cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan in July 1973, after discontent with the monarchy grew in the urban areas of Afghanistan. The country had experienced several droughts, and charges of corruption and poor economic policies were leveled against the ruling dynasty. Khan abolished the monarchy and declared the Republic of Afghanistan, and he became the first President of Afghanistan. He was supported by a faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Afghanistan's communist party, which was founded in 1965 and enjoyed a strong relationship with the Soviet Union. In The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region, Neamatollah Nojumi writes: "The establishment of the Republic of Afghanistan increased the Soviet investment in Afghanistan and the PDPA influence in the government's military and civil bodies."

In 1976, alarmed by the growing power of the PDPA and the party's strong affiliation with the Soviet Union, Daoud Khan tried to scale back the PDPA's influence. He dismissed PDPA members from their government posts, appointed conservative elements instead and finally announced the dissolution of the PDPA, arresting senior party members.

Downfall

On 27 April 1978, the PDPA and military units loyal to the PDPA revolted and killed Daoud Khan, his immediate family and bodyguards in a violent coup during the battle to seize control of the capital, Kabul in what became known as the Saur Revolution. As the PDPA had chosen a weekend holiday to conduct the coup, when many government employees were having a day off, Daoud Khan was not able to fully activate the well-trained armed forces which remained loyal to him to counter the coup.

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

Khalqist rule

The PDPA formed a new government through a 'revolutionary council', which attempted to balance the two major competing factions within itself - the more radical and revolutionary Khalq on one hand, and the more moderate and reformist Parcham on the other. Despite this, the Khalqist wing, led by the charismatic Nur Muhammad Taraki, who became the new chairman, gained supremacy in the aftermath of the revolution and adopted a program of land reform, abolition of feudal and tribal structures and equality for women. The council also prefixed the term 'Democratic' to the country's Daoud-era name, making it the 'Democratic Republic of Afghanistan'. Though these reforms were supported by the army and city-dwelling population, they opposed the very traditional, religious and tribal customs of rural Afghanistan, which in turn led to strong rural and clerical opposition to the government and various anti-government uprisings. Around this time, the party came to be influenced by Hafizullah Amin, who undermined Taraki despite being a fellow Khalqist, purged Parchamites from the party and began ruthlessly cracking down on political opposition. Therefore, a hostile doctrine against any political dissent was adopted, whether inside or outside the party. Taraki, who had ruled for only about a year, was then assassinated by Amin, who now took over formal leadership of the country. Amin was known for his independent and nationalist inclinations, and was also seen by many as a ruthless leader. He has been accused of killing tens of thousands of Afghan civilians at Pul-e-Charkhi and other national prisons while cracking down on both the opposition and the Parchamites: 27,000 politically motivated executions reportedly took place at Pul-e-Charkhi prison alone. Afghans generally held Amin personally responsible for most of the repression, while the Soviet Union considered his government illegitimate, discredited and doomed to collapse in a civil war.

Soviet intervention and withdrawal

The Soviet Union secured an alliance with the more moderate Babrak Karmal and his Parchamite faction, invading Afghanistan on 24 December 1979 and originally meeting only limited resistance. Amin was deposed from power almost immediately, as he and 200 of his guards were killed on 27 December by Soviet Army Spetsnaz, replaced by Karmal. After deployment into Afghanistan, Soviet forces, whom the locals dubbed Shuravi, along with government forces would begin to engage in a protracted counter-insurgency war against a wide coalition of various anti-government insurgent forces, who in turn styled themselves as mujahideen - Islamic holy warriors.

Karmal and Parchamite rule

Karmal declared a general amnesty for people imprisoned during Taraki and Amin's rule and restored the Afghan national symbols in place of the Khalqist red flag. He also granted several concessions to religious leaders and at least partially restored property seized during the original Khalqist land reform. However, this did not satisfy the opposition, as they considered his ascension to power during the Soviet intervention to be a mark that he would rule as a "Soviet puppet", thus continuing their insurgency against the government.

Soviet troops returning home from Afghanistan during the Soviet–Afghan War in October 1986

The Soviet government realized that a military solution to the conflict would require far more troops. Because of this they discussed troop withdrawals and searched for a political and peaceful solution as early as 1980, but they never took any serious steps in that direction until 1988. Early Soviet military reports confirm the difficulties the Soviet army had while fighting on the mountainous terrain, for which the Soviet army had no training whatsoever. Parallels with the Vietnam War were frequently referred to by Soviet army officers.

Najibullah, national reconciliation and Soviet withdrawal

Policy failures, and the stalemate that ensued after the Soviet intervention, led the Soviet leadership to become highly critical of Karmal's leadership. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was able to depose Karmal and replace him with Mohammad Najibullah. Karmal's leadership was seen as a failure by the Soviet Union because of the rise of violence and crime during his administration. Najibullah, another Parchamite, attempted to end the insurgency through a policy of accommodation and power sharing known as the National Reconciliation. He reversed several of his predecessor's unpopular reforms, abolished the one-party system, reinstated Islam as the state religion (though still maintaining a fairly secular legal and political setup), replaced the Revolutionary Council with a republican presidency and bicameral parliament, removed communist symbols deemed "provocative" to the opposition from the country's national emblem, dropped the "Democratic" prefix from the country's name, offered amnesty to mujahideen fighters and called for a six-month ceasefire in which fighting would stop in exchange for political negotiations intended to create a coalition government between the PDPA and various rebel groups in an attempt to end the country's crisis. The talks did not succeed in reconciling the government and the mujahideen, though it was noted that they increased the government's popularity among urban areas, stabilized the armed forces and led to a round of defections from disillusioned mujahideen fighters to government militias. Despite this, the only insurgent group to fully reconcile with the government was the Shia-dominated Afghan Hizbullah (not to be confused with the modern, Lebanese-based group of the same name). A mujahideen boycott of the 1988 elections, which were the first-ever Afghan elections to allow competing political parties, foiled Najibullah's attempt to reconstruct the nation's parliament, who in turn ordered 50 seats be left vacant to offer to the mujahideen if they decided to reconcile at a later date. Moreover, though Najibullah presented himself personally as a pious Muslim and restored the legal status of Islam, his government was unable to acquire the same Islamic credentials that the mujahideen forces wielded, which in turn meant that many of his reforms were not nearly as successful at convincing the devout, conservative rural and tribal population as Najibullah had hoped. Most importantly, Najibullah oversaw the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The withdrawal was to be done according to the Geneva Accords, which entailed a full removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in exchange for the end of American and Pakistan support to the Mujahideen.

A Soviet Spetsnaz group prepares for a mission in 1988

Throughout the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, troop convoys came under attack by Afghan rebel fighters. In all, 523 Soviet soldiers were killed during the withdrawal. The total withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed in February 1989. The last Soviet soldier to leave was Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, leader of the Soviet military operations in Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet invasion. In total, 14,453 Soviet soldiers died during the Afghan war. Though the Soviet forces did withdraw, the mujahideen, having not been a party to the accords, refused to abide by them. Furthermore, the United States reneged on its agreement and continued funding the insurgent groups even after the Soviet withdrawal. Najibullah's government further complained to the UN that Pakistan had also continued supplying, training and arming the rebel forces fighting against his government.

The Soviet war had a damaging impact on Afghanistan. The deaths of up to 2 million Afghans in the war has been described as "genocide" by a number of sources. Five to ten million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran, amounting to 1/3 of the prewar population of the country, and another 2 million were displaced within the country. Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province functioned as an organisational and networking base for the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance, with the province's influential Deobandi ulama playing a major supporting role in promoting the 'jihad'.

Final years

Initial stabilisation

After the Soviet withdrawal, the Republic of Afghanistan under Najibullah continued to face resistance from the various mujahideen forces and instituted a state of emergency as he prepared to fend off the armed opposition on his own. Nevertheless, Najibullah received funding and arms from the Soviet Union until 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. For several years the Afghan Army had actually increased their effectiveness past levels ever achieved during the Soviet military presence. The Afghan Army was able to prove itself in combat during the Battle of Jalalabad in 1989, where it defeated a major assault on the city by Mujahideen forces with US and Pakistani backing, inflicting on them greater than 3,000 losses. Moreover, it was actually able to go on the offensive, forestalling several more attacks and preventing the governmental collapse that both American and Pakistani policymakers expected. This greatly increased army morale and demoralized the rebel groups, who had hoped for a quick post-withdrawal victory.

Watan Party and coup attempt

In 1990, Najibullah reformed the PDPA into the Watan (Homeland) Party, which rejected Marxism–Leninism in favour of leftist Afghan nationalism. This did not necessarily have the desired effect, as it did not lead to significant drop in opposition, but did enrage several of his party members, not only Khalqists but also pro-Karmal Parchamites, who accused him of conceding too much of the Saur Revolution's gains to the mujahideen. Najibullah rejected the accusations, stating that his actions had been done in an attempt to preserve and protect the gains of the revolution, not sacrifice them. Regardless, these reforms caused further rifts within the ruling party. These tensions boiled over in the 1990 Afghan coup d'état attempt, in which a group of disillusioned Khalqists, led by Defence Minister Shahnawaz Tanai, attempted to overthrow Najibullah with the aid of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin and external support from Pakistan. The coup failed, but led to many pro-Khalqist officers either fleeing the country or being sacked by Najibullah, considerably weakening the Afghan Armed Forces. The resulting instability led to a defeat in the Siege of Khost a year later to the hands of Pakistan-backed Mujahideen forces after ten years of heavy fighting.

Downfall

Another blow was dealt to his government in late 1991, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union signalled the end of foreign aid for Najibullah's Afghanistan, as the new Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, had neither the resources, nor the desire to aid the Afghan government. Because of this and with Afghanistan being landlocked and not having a fuel supply of its own, the relatively modern and formidable Afghan Air Force essentially became grounded due to a lack of fuel, which in turn made it all the more difficult to supply the army and various pro-government militias spread across Afghanistan's harsh geography, consequently causing a considerable increase in desertion. A few months later and with the war still continuing, Najibullah offered his entire government's resignation and voiced his support for a United Nations plan for a transitional administration including both Watan and all Mujahideen groups in the country. This announcement led to the desertion of many of his own supporters, who now feared the end of his government. In these circumstances, Abdul Rashid Dostum, a leading army general, created an alliance with the Shura-e Nazar of Ahmad Shah Massoud and turned against Najibullah, taking with him over 40,000 previously pro-government soldiers. Najibullah sent a high-ranking army general to talk to Dostum and attempt to salvage the situation, only to learn that the general had also defected, alongside his own foreign minister. These defections devastated the Afghan Armed Forces' morale and large parts of the Afghan government and armed forces capitulated to the forces of Massoud in early 1992. By April, Najibullah stated that he would be handing power to a seven-member transitional council and resigning immediately. Mujahideen forces loyal to Massoud and Dostum entered and captured Kabul shortly thereafter, leading to the definitive end of PDPA/Watan rule in Afghanistan. Najibullah was granted safety by the UN office in Kabul. He had obtained political asylum in India, but was unable to leave as he was prevented from doing so by forces loyal to Massoud, Dostum and Hekmatyar. Because of this, he was forced to remain in the UN building, until he was captured, dragged from a truck, castrated and executed by the Taliban several years later. After the Soviet defeat, The Wall Street Journal named Massoud "the Afghan who won the Cold War". He had defeated the Soviet forces nine times in his home region of the Panjshir Valley in northeastern Afghanistan.

Pakistan tried to install Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in power in Afghanistan despite the opposition of all other mujahideen commanders and factions. As early as October 1990, the Inter-Services Intelligence had devised a plan for Hekmatyar to conduct a mass bombardment of the Afghan capital Kabul with possible Pakistani troop enforcements. This unilateral ISI-Hekmatyar plan came although the thirty most important mujahideen commanders had agreed on holding a conference inclusive of all Afghan groups to decide on a common future strategy. Peter Tomsen reports that the protest by the other mujahideen commanders was like a "firestorm". Ahmad Zia Massoud, the brother of Ahmad Shah Massoud, said that his faction strongly opposed the plan and like other factions would take measures if any "Pakistani troops reinforced Hekmatyar". Abdul Haq was reportedly so angry about the ISI plan that he was "red in the face". And Nabi Mohammad, another commander, pointed out that "Kabul's 2 million could not escape Hekmatyar's rocket bombardment – there would be a massacre." Massoud's, Abdul Haq's and Amin Wardak's representatives said that "Hekmatyar's rocketing of Kabul ... would produce a civilian bloodbath." The United States finally put pressure on Pakistan to stop the 1990 plan, which was subsequently called off until 1992.

Islamic State and foreign interference

Flag of Hezb-e Islami. All of the Afghan political parties were unified under the Islamic State of Afghanistan in April 1992 except for Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hezb-e Islami, supported by Pakistan, started a massive bombardment campaign against the Islamic State.

After the fall of Najibullah's government in 1992, the Afghan political parties agreed on a power-sharing agreement, the Peshawar Accord. The Peshawar Accord created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional period to be followed by general democratic elections. Human Rights Watch said: "The sovereignty of Afghanistan was vested formally in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, an entity created in April 1992, after the fall of the Soviet-backed Najibullah government. ... With the exception of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, all of the parties ... were ostensibly unified under this government in April 1992. ... Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, for its part, refused to recognize the government for most of the period discussed in this report and launched attacks against government forces and Kabul generally. ... Shells and rockets fell everywhere."

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar received operational, financial and military support from Pakistan. On Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, Afghanistan expert Amin Saikal says that "Pakistan was keen to gear up for a breakthrough in Central Asia. ... Islamabad could not possibly expect the new Islamic government leaders ... to subordinate their own nationalist objectives in order to help Pakistan realize its regional ambitions. ... Had it not been for the ISI's logistic support and supply of a large number of rockets, Hekmatyar's forces would not have been able to target and destroy half of Kabul.

In addition, Saudi Arabia and Iran—as competitors for regional hegemony—supported Afghan militias hostile towards each other. According to Human Rights Watch, Iran was assisting the Shia Hazara Hezb-i Wahdat forces of Abdul Ali Mazari, as Iran was attempting to maximize Wahdat's military power and influence. Saudi Arabia supported the Wahhabite Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and his Ittihad-i Islami faction. Conflict between the two militias soon escalated into a full-scale war. A publication by the George Washington University describes the situation: "[O]utside forces saw instability in Afghanistan as an opportunity to press their own security and political agendas."

Owing to the sudden initiation of the war, working government departments, police units or a system of justice and accountability for the newly created Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have time to form. Atrocities were committed by individuals of the different armed factions while Kabul descended into lawlessness and chaos as described in reports by Human Rights Watch and the Afghanistan Justice Project. Because of the chaos, some leaders increasingly had only nominal control over their (sub-)commanders. For civilians there was little security from murder, rape and extortion. An estimated 25,000 people died during the most intense period of bombardment by Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami and the Junbish-i Milli forces of Abdul Rashid Dostum, who had created an alliance with Hekmatyar in 1994. Half a million people fled Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch writes: "Rare ceasefires, usually negotiated by representatives of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi or Burhanuddin Rabbani [the interim government], or officials from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), commonly collapsed within days."

Taliban's rise to power

Southern Afghanistan was not under the control of foreign-backed militias nor was it under the control of the government in Kabul, instead, it was ruled by local leaders such as Gul Agha Sherzai and their militias. In 1994, the Taliban (a movement originating from Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-run religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan) also developed in Afghanistan as a politico-religious force, reportedly in opposition to the tyranny of the local governor. Mullah Omar started his movement with fewer than 50 armed madrassah students in his hometown of Kandahar. When the Taliban took control of the city in 1994, they forced the surrender of dozens of local Pashtun leaders who had presided over a situation of complete lawlessness and atrocities. In 1994, the Taliban took power in several provinces in southern and central Afghanistan.

A totally destroyed section of Kabul in 1993

In late 1994, most of the militia factions (Hezb-i Islami, Junbish-i Milli and Hezb-i Wahdat) which had been fighting in the battle for control of Kabul were defeated militarily by forces of the Islamic State's Secretary of Defense Ahmad Shah Massoud. Bombardment of the capital came to a halt. Massoud tried to initiate a nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation and democratic elections, also inviting the Taliban to join the process. Massoud had united political and cultural personalities, governors, commanders, clergymen and representatives to reach a lasting agreement. Massoud, like most people in Afghanistan, saw this conference as a small hope for democracy and for free elections. His favourite for candidacy to the presidency was Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, the first democratic prime minister under Zahir Shah, the former king. In the first meeting representatives from 15 different Afghan provinces met, in the second meeting there were already 25 provinces participating. Massoud went unarmed to talk to several Taliban leaders in Maidan Shar, but the Taliban declined to join this political process. When Massoud returned safely, the Taliban leader who had received him as his guest paid with his life: he was killed by other senior Taliban for failing to execute Massoud while the possibility was there.

The Taliban started shelling Kabul in early 1995 but were defeated by forces of the Islamic State government under Ahmad Shah Massoud. Amnesty International, referring to the Taliban offensive, wrote in a 1995 report: "This is the first time in several months that Kabul civilians have become the targets of rocket attacks and shelling aimed at residential areas in the city."

The Taliban's early victories in 1994 were followed by a series of defeats that resulted in heavy losses. Pakistan provided strong support to the Taliban. Many analysts like Amin Saikal describe the Taliban as developing into a proxy force for Pakistan's regional interests which the Taliban deny.

On 26 September 1996, as the Taliban, with military support by Pakistan and financial support by Saudi Arabia, prepared for another major offensive, Massoud ordered a full retreat from Kabul. The Taliban seized Kabul on 27 September 1996, and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Taliban emirate against the United Front

Taliban offensives

Map of the situation in Afghanistan in 1996: Ahmad Shah Massoud (red), Abdul Rashid Dostum (green) and Taliban (yellow) territories

The Taliban imposed on the parts of Afghanistan under their control their interpretation of Islam. The Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) stated: "To PHR's knowledge, no other regime in the world has methodically and violently forced half of its population into virtual house arrest, prohibiting them on pain of physical punishment."

Women were required to wear the all-covering burqa, they were banned from public life and denied access to health care and education, windows needed to be covered so that women could not be seen from the outside, and they were not allowed to laugh in a manner that could be heard by others. The Taliban, without any real court or hearing, cut people's hands or arms off when they were accused of stealing. Taliban hit-squads watched the streets, conducting arbitrary brutal public beatings.

The Taliban began preparing offensives against the remaining areas controlled by Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum. Massoud and Dostum, former foes, responded by allying to form the United Front (Northern Alliance) against the Taliban. In addition to the dominantly Tajik forces of Massoud and the Uzbek forces of Dostum, the United Front included Hazara factions and Pashtun forces under the leadership of commanders such as Abdul Haq or Haji Abdul Qadir. Prominent politicians of the United Front were in example diplomat and Afghan prime minister Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai or the UF's foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah. From the Taliban conquest in 1996 until November 2001 the United Front controlled roughly 30% of Afghanistan's population in provinces such as Badakhshan, Kapisa, Takhar and parts of Parwan, Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman, Samangan, Kunduz, Ghōr and Bamyan.

Taliban border guard

According to a 55-page report by the United Nations, the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians. UN officials stated that there had been "15 massacres" between 1996 and 2001. They also said, that "[t]hese have been highly systematic and they all lead back to the [Taliban] Ministry of Defense or to Mullah Omar himself." In a major effort to retake the Shomali plains, the Taliban indiscriminately killed civilians, while uprooting and expelling the population. Kamal Hossein, a special reporter for the UN, reported on these and other war crimes. Upon taking Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, about 4,000 civilians were executed by the Taliban and many more reported tortured. The Taliban especially targeted people of Shia religious or Hazara ethnic background. Among those killed in Mazari Sharif were several Iranian diplomats. Others were kidnapped by the Taliban, touching off a hostage crisis that nearly escalated to a full-scale war, with 150,000 Iranian soldiers massed on the Afghan border at one time. It was later admitted that the diplomats were killed by the Taliban, and their bodies were returned to Iran.

The documents also reveal the role of Arab and Pakistani support troops in these killings. Bin Laden's so-called 055 Brigade was responsible for mass-killings of Afghan civilians. The report by the United Nations quotes eyewitnesses in many villages describing Arab fighters carrying long knives used for slitting throats and skinning people.

Role of the Pakistani Armed Forces

Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), wanted the Mujahideen to establish a government in Afghanistan. The director-general of the ISI, Hamid Gul, was interested in an Islamic revolution which would transcend national borders, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in Central Asia. To set up the proposed Mujahideen government, Hamid Gul ordered an assault on Jalalabad-with the intent on using it as the capital for the new government Pakistan was interested in establishing in Afghanistan.

The Taliban were largely funded by Pakistan's ISI in 1994. The ISI used the Taliban to establish a regime in Afghanistan which would be favorable to Pakistan, as they were trying to gain strategic depth. Since the creation of the Taliban, the ISI and the Pakistani military have given financial, logistical and military support.

According to Pakistani Afghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid, "between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan" on the side of the Taliban. Peter Tomsen stated that up until 9/11 Pakistani military and ISI officers along with thousands of regular Pakistani Armed Forces personnel had been involved in the fighting in Afghanistan.

In 2001 alone, according to several international sources, 28,000–30,000 Pakistani nationals, 14,000–15,000 Afghan Taliban and 2,000–3,000 Al Qaeda militants were fighting against anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan as a roughly 45,000-strong military force. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf – then as Chief of Army Staff – was responsible for sending thousands of Pakistanis to fight alongside the Taliban and Bin Laden against the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Of the estimated 28,000 Pakistani nationals fighting in Afghanistan, 8,000 were militants recruited in madrassas filling regular Taliban ranks. A 1998 document by the U.S. State Department confirms that "20–40 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers are Pakistani." The document further states that the parents of those Pakistani nationals "know nothing regarding their child's military involvement with the Taliban until their bodies are brought back to Pakistan." According to the U.S. State Department report and reports by Human Rights Watch, the other Pakistani nationals fighting in Afghanistan were regular Pakistani soldiers especially from the Frontier Corps but also from the Pakistani Army providing direct combat support.

Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf sent more troops against the United Front of Ahmad Shah Massoud than the Afghan Taliban

In 2000, Human Rights Watch wrote: "Of all the foreign powers involved in efforts to sustain and manipulate the ongoing fighting [in Afghanistan], Pakistan is distinguished both by the sweep of its objectives and the scale of its efforts, which include soliciting funding for the Taliban, bankrolling Taliban operations, providing diplomatic support as the Taliban's virtual emissaries abroad, arranging training for Taliban fighters, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planning and directing offensives, providing and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel, and ... directly providing combat support.

On 1 August 1997, the Taliban launched an attack on Sheberghan, the main military base of Abdul Rashid Dostum. Dostum has said the reason the attack was successful was that 1500 Pakistani commandos took part and that the Pakistani Air Force also gave support.

In 1998, Iran accused Pakistani troops of war crimes at Bamiyan in Afghanistan and claimed that Pakistani warplanes had, in support of the Taliban, bombarded Afghanistan's last Shia stronghold. The same year Russia said, Pakistan was responsible for the "military expansion" of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan by sending large numbers of Pakistani troops some of whom had subsequently been taken as prisoners by the anti-Taliban United Front.

In 2000, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo against military support to the Taliban, with UN officials explicitly singling out Pakistan. The UN secretary-general implicitly criticized Pakistan for its military support and the Security Council stated it was "deeply distress[ed] over reports of involvement in the fighting, on the Taliban side, of thousands of non-Afghan nationals." In July 2001, several countries including the United States, accused Pakistan of being "in violation of U.N. sanctions because of its military aid to the Taliban." The Taliban also obtained financial resources from Pakistan. In 1997 alone, after the capture of Kabul by the Taliban, Pakistan gave $30 million in aid and a further $10 million for government wages.

In 2000, British Intelligence reported that the ISI was taking an active role in several Al Qaeda training camps. The ISI helped with the construction of training camps for both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. From 1996 to 2001 the Al Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri became a state within the Taliban state. Bin Laden sent Arab and Central Asian Al-Qaeda militants to join the fight against the United Front, among them his Brigade 055.

Anti-Taliban resistance

Ahmad Zia Massoud (left), the brother of anti-Taliban leader Ahmad Shah Massoud

Abdul Rashid Dostum and his forces were defeated by the Taliban in 1998. Dostum subsequently went into exile. The only leader to remain in Afghanistan, and who was able to defend vast parts of his area against the Taliban, was Ahmad Shah Massoud. In the areas under his control Ahmad Shah Massoud set up democratic institutions and signed the Women's Rights Declaration. In the area of Massoud, women and girls did not have to wear the Afghan burqa. They were allowed to work and to go to school. In at least two known instances, Massoud personally intervened against cases of forced marriage. To Massoud there was reportedly nothing worse than treating a person like an object. He stated: "It is our conviction and we believe that both men and women are created by the Almighty. Both have equal rights. Women can pursue an education, women can pursue a career, and women can play a role in society — just like men."

In Massoud: From Warrior to Statesman, author Pepe Escobar wrote that "Massoud is adamant that in Afghanistan women have suffered oppression for generations. He says that 'the cultural environment of the country suffocates women. But the Taliban exacerbate this with oppression.' His most ambitious project is to shatter this cultural prejudice and so give more space, freedom and equality to women — they would have the same rights as men." While it was Massoud's stated conviction that men and women are equal and should enjoy the same rights, he also had to deal with Afghan traditions which he said would need a generation or more to overcome. In his opinion that could only be achieved through education. Humayun Tandar, who took part as an Afghan diplomat in the 2001 International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, said that "strictures of language, ethnicity, region were [also] stifling for Massoud. That is why ... he wanted to create a unity which could surpass the situation in which we found ourselves and still find ourselves to this day." This applied also to strictures of religion. Jean-José Puig describes how Massoud often led prayers before a meal or at times asked his fellow Muslims to lead the prayer but also did not hesitate to ask a Christian friend Jean-José Puig or the Jewish Princeton University Professor Michael Barry: "Jean-José, we believe in the same God. Please, tell us the prayer before lunch or dinner in your own language."

Human Rights Watch cites no human rights crimes for the forces under direct control of Massoud for the period from October 1996 until the assassination of Massoud in September 2001. One million people fled the Taliban, many to the area of Massoud. In its Inside the Taliban documentary, National Geographic stated: "The only thing standing in the way of future Taliban massacres is Ahmad Shah Massoud." The Taliban repeatedly offered Massoud a position of power to make him stop his resistance but Massoud declined. He explained in one interview: "The Taliban say: 'Come and accept the post of prime minister and be with us', and they would keep the highest office in the country, the presidentship. But for what price?! The difference between us concerns mainly our way of thinking about the very principles of the society and the state. We can not accept their conditions of compromise, or else we would have to give up the principles of modern democracy. We are fundamentally against the system called "the Emirate of Afghanistan." In another interview, he was quoted as saying: "There should be an Afghanistan where every Afghan finds himself or herself happy. And I think that can only be assured by democracy based on consensus." With his proposals for peace, Massoud wanted to convince the Taliban to join a political process leading towards nationwide democratic elections in a foreseeable future. Massoud stated: "The Taliban are not a force to be considered invincible. They are distanced from the people now. They are weaker than in the past. There is only the assistance given by Pakistan, Osama bin Laden and other extremist groups that keep the Taliban on their feet. With a halt to that assistance, it is extremely difficult to survive."

In early 2001, Massoud employed a new strategy of local military pressure and global political appeals. Resentment was increasingly gathering against Taliban rule from the bottom of Afghan society including the Pashtun areas. Massoud publicized their cause of "popular consensus, general elections and democracy" worldwide. At the same time he was very wary not to revive the failed Kabul government of the early 1990s. In 1999, he began training police forces specifically to keep order and protect the civilian population, in case the United Front was successful. Massoud also addressed the European Parliament in Brussels asking the international community to provide humanitarian help to the people of Afghanistan. He stated that the Taliban and Al Qaeda had introduced "a very wrong perception of Islam" and that without the support of Pakistan and Bin Laden the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for up to a year. On this visit to Europe, he also warned that his intelligence had gathered information about a large-scale attack on U.S. soil being imminent. The president of the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, called him the "pole of liberty in Afghanistan".

On 9 September 2001, Massoud, then aged 48, was the target of a suicide attack by two Arabs posing as journalists at Khwaja Bahauddin, in the Takhar Province of Afghanistan. Massoud died in a helicopter taking him to a hospital. The funeral, though in a rather rural area, was attended by hundreds of thousands of mourning people. The assassination was not the first time Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Pakistani ISI, and before them the Soviet KGB, the Afghan Communist KHAD and Hekmatyar had tried to assassinate Massoud. He survived countless assassination attempts over a period of 26 years. The first attempt on Massoud's life was carried out by Hekmatyar and two Pakistani ISI agents in 1975, when Massoud was only 22 years old. In early 2001, Al-Qaeda would-be assassins were captured by Massoud's forces while trying to enter his territory.

9/11 connection

The assassination of Massoud is considered to have a strong connection to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, which killed nearly 3000 people, and which appeared to be the terrorist attack that Massoud had warned against in his speech to the European Parliament several months earlier.

John P. O'Neill was a counter-terrorism expert and the assistant director of the FBI until late 2001. He retired from the FBI and was offered the position of director of security at the World Trade Center (WTC). He took the job at the WTC two weeks before 9/11. On 10 September 2001, O'Neill allegedly told two of his friends, "We're due. And we're due for something big.... Some things have happened in Afghanistan. [referring to the assassination of Massoud] I don't like the way things are lining up in Afghanistan...I sense a shift, and I think things are going to happen...soon." O'Neill died on 11 September 2001, when the South Tower collapsed.

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Massoud's United Front troops, with American air support, ousted the Taliban from power in Kabul in Operation Enduring Freedom. In November and December 2001, the United Front gained control of much of the country and played a crucial role in establishing the post-Taliban interim government of Hamid Karzai in late 2001.

Islamic Republic and NATO

American intervention

U.S. Special Forces ODA 574 with Hamid Karzai during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.
 
U.S. Marines of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines and an allied fighter near Siah Chub Kalay during Operation Asbury Park in 2004.

The US-led war in Afghanistan began on 7 October 2001, as Operation Enduring Freedom. It was designed to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda militants, as well as replace the Taliban with a US-friendly government. The Bush Doctrine stated that, as policy, it would not distinguish between al-Qaeda and nations that harbor them.

Several Afghan leaders were invited to Germany in December 2001 for the UN sponsored Bonn Agreement, which was to restore stability and governance in their country. In the first step, the Afghan Transitional Administration was formed and was installed on 22 December 2001. Chaired by Hamid Karzai, it numbered 30 leaders and included a Supreme Court, an Interim Administration, and a Special Independent Commission.

Formation of the Islamic Republic

U.S. President George W. Bush and Hamid Karzai at the Presidential Palace in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 
Soldiers of the Afghan National Army, including the ANA Commando Brigade standing in the front.

A loya jirga (grand assembly) was convened in June 2002 by former King Zahir Shah, who returned from exile after 29 years. Hamid Karzai was elected president for the two years in the jirga, in which the Afghan Interim Authority was also replaced with the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA). A constitutional loya jirga was held in December 2003, adopting the new 2004 constitution, with a presidential form of government and a bicameral legislature. Karzai was elected in the 2004 presidential election followed by winning a second term in the 2009 presidential election. Both the 2005 and the 2010 parliamentary elections were also successful.

In the meantime, the reconstruction process of Afghanistan began in 2002. There are more than 14,000 reconstruction projects under way in Afghanistan, such as the Kajaki and the Salma Dam. Many of these projects are being supervised by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The World Bank contribution is the multilateral Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which was set up in 2002. It is financed by 24 international donor countries and has spent more than $1.37 billion as of 2007. Approximately 30 billion dollars have been provided by the international community for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, most of it from the United States. In 2002, the world community allocated $4 billion at the Tokyo conference followed by another $4 billion in 2004. In February 2006, $10.5 billion were committed for Afghanistan at the London Conference and $11 billion from the United States in early 2007. Despite these vast investments by the international community, the reconstruction effort's results have been mixed. Implementation of development projects at the district and sub-district level has been frequently marred by lack of coordination, knowledge of local conditions, and sound planning on the side of international donors as well as by corruption and inefficiency on the side of Afghan government officials. On the provincial and national level, projects such as the National Solidarity Programme, inter-provincial road construction, and the US-led revamping of rural health services have met with more success.

The UN Security Council established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in December 2001 to provide basic security for the people of Afghanistan and assist the Karzai administration. Since 2002, the total number of ISAF and U.S. forces have climbed from 15,000 to 150,000. The majority of them belong to various branches of the United States Armed Forces, who are not only fighting the Taliban insurgency but also training the Afghan Armed Forces and Afghan National Police. They are scheduled to withdraw slowly until the end of 2014 but Vice President Joe Biden has proposed to retain an unknown number of U.S. military personnel after the 2014 deadline if the security situation required and the Afghan government and people desired. Germany has announced that they will continue training Afghan police recruits after the 2014 withdrawal date for military troops.

Stalemate

U.S. and Afghan troops in 2010.

NATO and Afghan troops led many offensives against the Taliban in this period. By 2009, a Taliban-led shadow government began to form, complete with their own version of mediation court. In 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama deployed an additional 30,000 soldiers over a period of six months and proposed that he would begin troop withdrawals by 2012. At the 2010 International Conference on Afghanistan in London, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said he intended to reach out to the Taliban leadership (including Mullah Omar, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar). Supported by senior U.S. officials Karzai called on the group's leadership to take part in a loya jirga meeting to initiate peace talks. According to The Wall Street Journal, these steps were initially reciprocated with an intensification of bombings, assassinations and ambushes.

Many Afghan groups (including the former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh and opposition leader Dr. Abdullah Abdullah) believe that Karzai's plan aims to appease the insurgents' senior leadership at the cost of the democratic constitution, the democratic process and progress in the field of human rights, especially women's rights. Abdullah stated: "I should say that Taliban are not fighting in order to be accommodated. They are fighting in order to bring the state down. So it's a futile exercise, and it's just misleading. ... There are groups that will fight to the death. Whether we like to talk to them or we don't like to talk to them, they will continue to fight. So, for them, I don't think that we have a way forward with talks or negotiations or contacts or anything as such. Then we have to be prepared to tackle and deal with them militarily. In terms of the Taliban on the ground, there are lots of possibilities and opportunities that with the help of the people in different parts of the country, we can attract them to the peace process; provided, we create a favorable environment on this side of the line. At the moment, the people are leaving support for the government because of corruption. So that expectation is also not realistic at this stage."

According to a report by the United Nations, the Taliban were responsible for 76% of civilian casualties in 2009. Afghanistan was struggling to rebuild itself while dealing with the results of 30 years of war, corruption among high-level politicians and the ongoing Taliban insurgency which according to different scientific institutes such as the London School of Economics, senior international officials, such as former United States Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admrial Mike Mullen, believed the Taliban was backed by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence.

At the end of July 2010, the Netherlands became the first NATO ally to end its combat mission in Afghanistan after 4 years military deployment including the most intense period of hostilities. They withdrew 1,900 troops. The Atlantic Council described the decision as "politically significant because it comes at a time of rising casualties and growing doubts about the war." Canada withdrew troops in 2011, but about 900 were left to train Afghani soldiers.

In February 2012, a small number of American service members burned several copies of the Quran. Some Afghans responded by staging massive demonstrations and riots in Kabul and other areas. Assailants killed several American military personnel, including two officers in the Interior Ministry building following this event.

On 11 March 2012, an American soldier, Robert Bales, killed 16 civilians in the Kandahar massacre.

According to ISAF there were about 120,000 NATO-led troops in Afghanistan per December 2012, of which 66,000 were US troops and 9,000 British. The rest were from 48 different countries. A process of handing over power to local forces has started and according to plans a majority of international troops will leave in 2014.

On 24 November 2013, President Karzai held a Loya jirga and imposed a ban on NATO house raids. This ban was put in place, and NATO soldiers were instructed to adhere to it. In December 2013, a house raid in Zabul Province was exceptionally carried out by two NATO soldiers. Karzai condemned this in a highly publicised speech. On 3 January 2014 a bomb blast was heard by NATO soldiers in a base in Kabul; there were no reported casualties or injuries. The day after, a bomb hit a US military base in Kabul and killed one US citizen. The bomb was planted by the Taliban and the American service member was the first combat casualty in Afghanistan in that year. The Taliban immediately claimed responsibility for the attack.

Peace negotiations

On 1 May 2015 the media reported a scheduled meeting in Qatar between Taliban insurgents and peacemakers, including the Afghan President, about ending the war.

In 2016, the government signed a peace deal with Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, which was at the time the second largest anti-government insurgent, after the Taliban. The deal proved controversial and several sectors of Afghan society protested against it due to the Hekmatyar's alleged war crimes.

Tensions between the US and Pakistan worsened, as US President Donald Trump accused Pakistan of harboring the Taliban. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani offered unconditional peace talks to the Taliban, offering them legal status as a regular political party, alongside the release of Taliban prisoners. Over 20 nations and organizations backed the deal, but it was rejected by the Taliban, who refused to negotiate with the Afghan government. The Taliban insisted on only negotiating directly with the United States and only upon a full US withdrawal from the country - a demand the US rejected.

An unprecedented three-day ceasefire was negotiated in 2018 around the Eid al-Fitr celebrations, with Taliban members openly approaching and talking to civilians and government forces. The ceasefire was widely celebrated and Ghani announced it would be extended by ten days, with some societal leaders calling for it to be made permanent. The Taliban, however, rejected the extension and relaunched their military campaign against the government at the end of the original three-day period.

As the Afghan government had fallen into a major dispute over the 2019 Afghan presidential election, in which both Ghani and his rival Abdullah Abdullah claimed victory, a power-sharing deal between the two men was signed, which assigned responsibility for the peace negotiations to the latter.

Doha Agreement

US representative Zalmay Khalilzad (left) and Taliban representative Abdul Ghani Baradar (right) sign the Doha Agreement in Qatar in 2020.

Eventually and after several years of back-and-forth negotiations, the US Trump Administration struck a major deal with the Taliban in 2020, known as the Doha Agreement. The deal provided for a full, but staggered US withdrawal from Afghanistan in exchange for a Taliban pledge not to allow Al-Queda to reestablish itself in the country and commit itself to talks with the Afghan government (which was not a party to the agreement). The deal also required the Afghan president to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for a Taliban release of 1,000 captive Afghan soldiers. Ghani, having never agreed to the deal, rejected the prisoner release, stating that it was not a US prerogative and adding that he would reject any other releases as a prerequisite to Taliban-Afghan government talks. The Taliban replied by reiterating that they would not start any talks with the Afghan government until the 5,000 prisoners were released. The situation led to an increase in Taliban attacks, with the group having launched more than 4,500 attacks on government forces during the 45-day period following the signing of the Doha Agreement - a 70% increase vis-à-vis the same period during the previous year. As the US had stopped conducting airstrikes on Taliban targets as part of the agreement (in exchange for a halting of Taliban attacks on US forces), Taliban casualties dropped by about two thirds during this period. Following what was described as some of the bloodiest fighting in 19 years, the US conducted several airstrikes against the group in early March 2020. Ghani agreed on releasing 1,500 Taliban prisoners, so long as those prisoners signed a pledge not to return to combat once released. The Taliban rejected this move, insisting on the full and unconditional release of the full 5,000 prisoner list. By August, the government agreed to free the 5,000 Taliban captives, but stated that it could not release 400 of them, as they had been accused of serious crimes against civilians, calling a loya jirga to decide their fate. It ruled in favor of release and all of the prisoners were freed. Following these developments, the first intra-Afghan talks between the Taliban and Afghan government were held in Qatar.

US withdrawal and collapse of the Islamic Republic

Taliban control of Afghanistan during the 2021 Taliban offensive and capture of Kabul.

In April 2021, the newly inaugurated US President Joe Biden announced that all US troops would withdraw from the country by 11 September 2021, the 20-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. He later brought this date forward to 31 August. As US forces started to withdraw in May, the Taliban stepped up attacks on the Afghan government. The group began by first capturing the countryside to surround regional capitals, then taking those capitals without facing any major resistance. The United States Intelligence Community warned in July that the Afghan government was likely to collapse 6–12 months after the US withdrawal. US President Biden stated that he would not cease or delay the withdrawal, regardless of the situation.

By 15 August, almost the entire country was under the control of the Taliban, who had already encircled and were preparing to enter the nation's capital. The Afghan President fled the country to Tajikistan and Kabul was captured that same day, with the entire political and military apparatus of the Islamic Republic having collapsed. What remained of the NATO forces in the country occupied the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, evacuating hundreds of thousands of servicemen and civilians. In their last act while in Afghanistan, coalition forces destroyed or damaged most of what was left behind in the airport to prevent it from being used by the Taliban, totalling 75 aircraft and over 100 vehicles and other equipment, alongside the airport's anti-air defences, before definitively leaving the country on 30 August - thus meeting Biden's withdrawal deadline. Biden defended his decision, stating that he did not wish to prolong the "forever war" and blamed the Afghan authorities for not having found a political settlement and fleeing the country for the collapse of the country's government, adding that the collapse had nevertheless "unfolded more quickly than anticipated". According to the US president, the American mission in the country had never been nation-building, but instead a pre-emption of attacks on the US homeland, which he considered to have been a success. Following the coalition's withdrawal, Taliban forces captured the airport and announced they would form a new government shortly thereafter.

Despite the call to have some refugees admitted to the US after the withdrawal of NATO troops, only a tiny percentage of vulnerable Afghans seeking to move to the United States under a refugee resettlement program were admitted to the US. Refugees admitted through the P-2 criteria by the State Department's pre-existing Priority 1 program, had the only option to be referred to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or a designated NGO.

Taliban emirate returns

Government formation

As the Taliban took over Kabul, a Coordination Council was formed to transfer power to the Taliban, consisting of former mujahideen and Hezb-e Islami commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, former President Hamid Karzai and political leader Abdullah Abdullah. The latter two then met with Taliban representatives with the stated goal of ensuring safety and returning normalcy to the capital. However, it was reported that the two would likely not be a part of the future Taliban government. The New York Times reported that Karzai had been forced out of his home after the Taliban disarmed his guards and took over security at his residence, instead moving in to live in Abdullah's house. According to a source cited by the CNN, both had "effectively" been placed under house arrest, with their security details removed and at the mercy of the Taliban.

Anti-Taliban uprisings

Following the Taliban's victory across Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic's vice president and long-time opponent of the Taliban, Amrullah Saleh, cited provisions in the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan which would make him Acting President of the country. In doing so, he appealed to a sense of continuity of the Islamic Republic, which would lend him political legitimacy. As Kabul, alongside the vast majority of Afghanistan, was under Taliban control, he joined forces with Ahmad Massoud, son of former mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, in declaring the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (also known as the Panjshir Resistance), an anti-Taliban coalition based in the Panjshir Valley. In turn, he was recognized as president by Massoud, as well as Defence Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi. A small-scale uprising led by the group in August 2021 succeeded in ousting the Taliban from three districts, establishing its own control in the valley. The front, often compared to the Northern Alliance, reached a ceasefire with the Taliban shortly thereafter. The ceasefire did not last long and by the start of September the Taliban had launched an assault against the Panjshir resistance. By 3 September, the Taliban claimed to have defeated the resistance, establishing Taliban control over the entirety of Afghanistan for the first time in the country's history. These claims were dismissed as lies by resistance forces, which in turn claimed they were still in control of much of their positions and were actively fighting the Taliban. Fighting continued into the following day, and Mark Milley, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that the situation could develop into a full-scale civil war.

At the same time, notable regional leaders Tajik Atta Muhammad Nur and Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostum, the PDPA-era commander who turned on Najibullah in 1991 and formed his own Uzbek-dominated and relatively left-secular political movement Junbish, fled the country to avoid what they dubbed 'conspiracy' as Mazar-i-Sharif fell to the Taliban. The two had been bitter political rivals, but joined forces in the face of the Taliban advance. According to Nur, the local equipment of the armed forces had been handed over to the Taliban in a 'cowardly plot' intended to entrap himself and Dostum, which led to the fall of the city. The two joined with other regional strongmen and politicians in creating a 'front' for negotiations with the Taliban, in which they would hope to achieve concessions from the predominantly Pashtun group for their respective local movements and ethnicities. The two stated that they would never accept a surrender and were preparing for armed anti-Taliban resistance should the talks fail, prior to the ultimate fall of the Panjshir Valley to the Taliban the following day. Both Saleh and Massoud fled the Panjshiri capital but remained in the province.

Cross border incidents

The 2021 Afghanistan–Iran clashes occurred in December of 2021, overlapping with the Panjshir conflict, between the restored Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Iran in Nimruz over border checkpoints. It resulted in a de facto Afghan victory, with the Islamic Emirate capturing various border checkpoints. However, the Afghan military later withdrew from the checkpoints and things returned to status quo ante bellum.

World energy supply and consumption

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

World energy supply and consumption is global production and preparation of fuel, generation of electricity, energy transport and energy consumption. It is a basic part of economic activity. It does not include energy from food.

Coal, oil, and natural gas remain the primary global energy sources even as renewables have begun rapidly increasing.

World energy mix, 1965 to 2020

Many countries publish statistics on the energy supply and consumption of either their own country, of other countries of interest, or of all countries combined in one chart. One of the largest organizations in this field, the International Energy Agency (IEA), publishes yearly comprehensive energy data. This collection of energy balances is very large. This article provides a brief description of energy supply and consumption, using statistics summarized in tables, of the countries and regions that produce and consume most.

Energy production is 80% fossil. Half of that is produced by China, the United States and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The Gulf States and Russia export most of their production, largely to the European Union and China where not enough energy is produced to satisfy demand. Energy production increases slowly, except for solar and wind energy which grows more than 20% per year.

Primary energy sources are transformed by the energy sector to generate energy carriers.

Produced energy, for instance crude oil, is processed to make it suitable for consumption by end users. The supply chain between production and final consumption involves many conversion activities and much trade and transport among countries, causing a loss of one quarter of energy before it is consumed.

Energy consumption per person in North America is very high while in developing countries it is low and more renewable. There was a significant decline in energy usage worldwide caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, notably in the iron and steel industry as demand for new construction shrank. To reach levels similar to that in 2019, there would need to be an increase in the global demand for manufactured goods by the iron and steel industry.

Worldwide carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels was 38 gigatons in 2019. In view of contemporary energy policy of countries the IEA expects that worldwide energy consumption in 2040 will have increased more than a quarter and that the goal, set in the Paris Agreement to limit climate change, will not nearly be reached. Several scenarios to achieve the goal are developed.

Primary energy production

World total primary energy consumption by fuel in 2020:

  Oil (31.2%)
  Coal (27.2%)
  Natural Gas (24.7%)
  Hydro (renewables) (6.9%)
  Nuclear (4.3%)
  Others (renewables) (5.7%)

This is the worldwide production of energy, extracted or captured directly from natural sources. In energy statistics primary energy (PE) refers to the first stage where energy enters the supply chain before any further conversion or transformation process.

Energy production is usually classified as:

Primary energy assessment follows certain rules to ease measurement of different kinds of energy. These rules are controversial. Water and air flow energy that drives hydro and wind turbines, and sunlight that powers solar panels, are not taken as PE, which is set at the electric energy produced. But fossil and nuclear energy are set at the reaction heat which is about 3 times the electric energy. This measurement difference can lead to underestimating the economic contribution of renewable energy.

The table lists the worldwide PE and the countries/regions producing most (90%) of that. The amounts are rounded and given in million tonnes of oil equivalent per year (1 Mtoe = 11.63 TWh, 1 TWh = 109 kWh). The data are of 2018.

Largest PE producers (90%) (Russia excluded in Europe)

Total Coal Oil & Gas Nuclear Renewable
China 2560 1860 325 77 300
United States 2170 369 1400 219 180
Middle East 2040 1 2030 2 4
Russia 1484 240 1165 54 25
Africa 1169 157 611 3 397
Europe 1111 171 398 244 296
India 574 289 67 10 208
Canada 529 31 422 26 50
Indonesia 451 288 102 0 61
Australia 412 287 115 0 9
Brazil 296 2 160 4 129
Kazakhstan 178 49 128 0 1
Mexico 159 7 132 4 16
World 14420 3890 7850 707 1972

In the Middle East, the Persian Gulf states of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates produced the most. A small part came from Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The top producers in Africa were Nigeria (256), South Africa (158), Algeria (156), and Angola (85).

In Europe, Norway (207, oil and gas), France (135, mainly nuclear), the United Kingdom (123), Germany (112), Poland (62, mainly coal), and the Netherlands (36, mainly natural gas) produced the most.

Of the world's renewable energy supply, 68% is generated with biofuel and waste, mostly in developing countries, 18% is generated with hydropower and 14% with other renewables.

For more detailed energy production, see:

Energy conversion and trade


Export minus Import
Mid-East 1245
Russia 701
Africa 319
Australia 280
Canada 228
Indonesia 220
Norway 177
United States -80
Korea -252
India -347
Japan -387
China -733
Europe -985

Primary energy is converted in many ways to energy carriers, also known as secondary energy.

  • Coal mainly goes to thermal power stations. Coke is derived by destructive distillation of bituminous coal.
  • Crude oil goes mainly to oil refineries
  • Natural-gas goes to natural-gas processing plants to remove contaminants such as water, carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide, and to adjust the heating value. It is used as fuel gas, also in thermal power stations.
  • Nuclear reaction heat is used in thermal power stations.
  • Biomass is used directly or converted to biofuel.

2018 World electricity generation (26,700 TWh) by source (IEA, 2019):

  Coal (38%)
  Gas (23%)
  Hydro and other (19%)
  Nuclear (10%)
  Solar PV and wind (7%)
  Oil (3%)

Electricity generators are driven by

The invention of the solar cell in 1954 started electricity generation by solar panels, connected to a power inverter. Around 2000 mass production of panels made this economic.

Much primary and converted energy is traded among countries, about 5800 Mtoe worldwide, mostly oil and gas. The table lists countries/regions with large difference of export and import. A negative value indicates that much energy import is needed for the economy. The quantities are expressed in Mtoe/a and the data are of 2018. Big transport goes by tanker ship, tank truck, LNG carrier, rail freight transport, pipeline and by electric power transmission.

Total Energy Supply

Total Energy Supply and Primary Energy
Location TES PE
China 3210 2560
Europe 1984 1111
India 919 574
Mid-East 760 2040
Russia 760 1484
Japan 426 50
S-Korea 282 45
Canada 298 529
World 14280 14420

Total Energy Supply (TES) indicates the sum of production and imports subtracting exports and storage changes. For the whole world TES nearly equals primary energy PE because imports and exports cancel out, but for countries/regions TES and PE differ in quantity, and also in quality as secondary energy is involved, e.g., import of an oil refinery product. TES is all energy required to supply energy for end users. The table lists TES and PE for some countries/regions where these differ much, and worldwide. The amounts are rounded and given in Mtoe. The data are of 2018.

History (TWh)
Year Total energy
supply (TES)1
Final energy
consumption1
Electricity
generation
1973
71,013
(Mtoe 6,106)
54,335
(Mtoe 4,672)
6,129
1990 102,569 11,821
2000 117,687 15,395
2010
147,899
(Mtoe 12,717)
100,914
(Mtoe 8,677)
21,431
2011
152,504
(Mtoe 13,113)
103,716
(Mtoe 8,918)
22,126
2012
155,505
(Mtoe 13,371)
104,426
(Mtoe 8,979)
22,668
2013
157,482
(Mtoe 13,541)
108,171
(Mtoe 9,301)
23,322
2014
155,481
(Mtoe 13,369)
109,613
(Mtoe 9,425)
23,816
2015
158,715
(Mtoe 13,647)
109,136
(Mtoe 9,384)

2017
162,494
(Mtoe 13,972)
113,009
(Mtoe 9,717)
25,606
1 converted from Mtoe into TWh (1 Mtoe = 11.63 TWh)
and from Quad BTU into TWh (1 Quad BTU = 293.07 TWh)


25% of worldwide primary production is used for conversion and transport, and 6% for non-energy products like lubricants, asphalt and petrochemicals. 69% remains for end-users. Most of the energy lost by conversion occurs in thermal electricity plants and the energy industry own use.

One needs to bear in mind that there are different qualities of energy. Heat, especially at a relatively low temperature, is low-quality energy, whereas electricity is high-quality energy. It takes around 3 kWh of heat to produce 1 kWh of electricity. But by the same token, a kilowatt-hour of this high-quality electricity can be used to pump several kilowatt-hours of heat into a building using a heat pump. And electricity can be used in many ways in which heat cannot. So the "loss" of energy incurred when generating electricity is not the same as a loss due to, say, resistance in power lines.

Final consumption

World total final consumption of 9,717 Mtoe by region in 2017 (IEA, 2019):

  OECD (38.2%)
  Middle East (5.1%)
  Non-OECD Eurasia (7.5%)
  China (20.6%)
  Rest of Asia (13.5%)
  Non-OECD Americas (4.8%)
  Africa (6.1%)
  International aviation and marine bunkers (4.2%)

Total final consumption (TFC) is the worldwide consumption of energy by end-users (whereas primary energy consumption (Eurostat) or total energy supply (IEA) is total energy demand and thus also includes what the energy sector uses itself and transformation and distribution losses). This energy consists of fuel (78%) and electricity (22%). The tables list amounts, expressed in million tonnes of oil equivalent per year (1 Mtoe = 11.63 TWh) and how much of these is renewable energy. Non-energy products are not considered here. The data are of 2018.

Fuel:

  • fossil: natural gas, fuel derived from petroleum (LPG, gasoline, kerosene, gas/diesel, fuel oil), from coal (anthracite, bituminous coal, coke, blast furnace gas).
  • renewable: biofuel and fuel derived from waste.
  • for District heating.

The amounts are based on lower heating value.

The first table lists final consumption in the countries/regions which use most (85%), and per person. In developing countries fuel consumption per person is low and more renewable. Canada, Venezuela and Brazil generate most electricity with hydropower.

Final consumption in most using countries and per person 

Fuel
Mtoe
of which
renewable
Electricity
Mtoe
of which
renewable
TFC pp
toe
China 1436 6% 555 30% 1.4
United States 1106 8% 339 19% 4.4
Europe 982 11% 309 39% 2.5
Africa 531 58% 57 23% 0.5
India 487 32% 104 25% 0.4
Russia 369 1% 65 26% 3.0
Japan 201 3% 81 19% 2.2
Brazil 166 38% 45 78% 1.0
Indonesia 126 21% 22 14% 0.6
Canada 139 8% 45 83% 5.0
Iran 147 0% 22 6% 2.1
Mexico 95 7% 25 18% 1.0
S-Korea 85 5% 46 5% 2.6
Australia 60 7% 18 21% 3.2
Argentina 42 7% 11 27% 1.2
Venezuela 20 3% 6 88% 0.9
World 7050 14% 1970 30% 1.2

In Africa 32 of the 48 nations are declared to be in an energy crisis by the World Bank. See Energy in Africa.

The next table shows countries consuming most (85%) in Europe.

Countries consuming most (85%) in Europe.
Country Fuel
Mtoe
of which
renewable
Electricity
Mtoe
of which
renewable
Germany 156 10% 45 46%
France 100 12% 38 21%
United Kingdom 95 5% 26 40%
Italy 87 9% 25 39%
Spain 60 10% 21 43%
Poland 58 12% 12 16%
Ukraine 38 5% 10 12%
Netherlands 36 4% 9 16%
Belgium 26 8% 7 23%
Sweden 20 35% 11 72%
Austria 20 19% 5 86%
Romania 19 20% 4 57%
Finland 18 34% 7 39%
Portugal 11 20% 4 67%
Denmark 11 15% 3 71%
Norway 8 16% 10 100%

Trend

In the period 2005–2017 worldwide final consumption of

  • coal increased 23%,
  • oil and gas increased 18%,
  • electricity increased 41%.

Energy for energy

Some fuel and electricity is used to construct, maintain and demolish/recycle installations that produce fuel and electricity, such as oil platforms, uranium isotope separators and wind turbines. For these producers to be economic the ratio of energy returned on energy invested (EROEI) or energy return on investment (EROI) should be large enough.

If the final energy delivered for consumption is E and the EROI equals R, then the net energy available is E-E/R. The percentage available energy is 100-100/R. For R>10 more than 90% is available but for R=2 only 50% and for R=1 none. This steep decline is known as the net energy cliff.

Outlook

IEA scenarios

In World Energy Outlook 2021 (WEO) the IEA presents four scenarios based on the computer Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC). Net Zero by 2050 (NZE) is an integral part of the WEO.

In Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) IEA assesses the likely effects of 2021 policy settings. This would lead to global average temperatures still rising when they hit 2.6 °C above pre-industrial levels in 2100.

The Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) assumes that all climate commitments will be met in full and on time. Average temperature will rise to around 2.1 °C by 2100 and continues to increase.

The Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) assumes in addition to APS a surge in clean energy policies and investment. Advanced economies reach net zero emissions by 2050, China around 2060, and all other countries by 2070 at the latest. Then temperature will peak at 1.7 °C by 2050 and could decline to 1.5 °C by 2100. In 2050 energy supply will be 55% renewable. Electricity generation will be 58% renewable and 8% nuclear.

The Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE) reaches global net zero CO2 emissions by 2050. Temperature will peak at 1.7 °C by 2050 and decline to 1.4 °C by 2100. In 2050 half of energy consumption will be electricity, generated for nearly 70% by wind and solar PV, about 20% with other renewable sources and most of the remainder from nuclear power. The other half is biomass, gas and oil with CCS (carbon capture and storage) or non-energetic (asphalt, petrochemicals). Use of coal falls 90%, oil 75% and gas 55%. Emission by the transport sector drops 90%, the remainder mainly caused by heavy trucks, shipping and aviation.

Investing in new fossil fuels is no longer necessary now (2021). Annual energy investment is expected to increase from just over $ 2 trillion worldwide on average over the past five years to nearly $ 5 trillion by 2030 and to $ 4.5 trillion by 2050. The bulk will be spent on generating, storing, and distributing electricity, and electrical end-user equipment (heat pumps, vehicles).

Alternative scenarios

Alternative Achieving the Paris Climate Agreement Goals scenarios are developed by a team of 20 scientists at the University of Technology of Sydney, the German Aerospace Center, and the University of Melbourne, using IEA data but proposing transition to nearly 100% renewables by mid-century, along with steps such as reforestation. Nuclear power and carbon capture are excluded in these scenarios. The researchers say the costs will be far less than the $5 trillion per year governments currently spend subsidizing the fossil fuel industries responsible for climate change (page ix).

In the +2.0 C (global warming) Scenario total primary energy demand in 2040 can be 450 EJ = 10755 Mtoe, or 400 EJ = 9560 Mtoe in the +1.5 Scenario, well below the current production. Renewable sources can increase their share to 300 EJ in the +2.0 C Scenario or 330 PJ in the +1.5 Scenario in 2040. In 2050 renewables can cover nearly all energy demand. Non-energy consumption will still include fossil fuels. See Fig.5 on p.xxvii.

Global electricity generation from renewable energy sources will reach 88% by 2040 and 100% by 2050 in the alternative scenarios. "New" renewables — mainly wind, solar and geothermal energy — will contribute 83% of the total electricity generated (p.xxiv). The average annual investment required between 2015 and 2050, including costs for additional power plants to produce hydrogen and synthetic fuels and for plant replacement, will be around $1.4 trillion (p.182).

Shifts from domestic aviation to rail and from road to rail are needed. Passenger car use must decrease in the OECD countries (but increase in developing world regions) after 2020. The passenger car use decline will be partly compensated by strong increase in public transport rail and bus systems. See Fig.4 on p.xxii.

CO2 emission can reduce from 32 Gt in 2015 to 7 Gt (+2.0 Scenario) or 2.7 Gt (+1.5 Scenario) in 2040, and to zero in 2050 (p.xxviii).

Extraterrestrial liquid water

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterrestrial_liquid_water ...