Water security

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_security 

 

Water security has many different aspects, in clockwise order from top left: a communal tap for water supply in Soweto, South Africa; residents standing in flood water in Kampala, Uganda; the town of Farina in South Australia abandoned due to years of drought and dust storms; water pollution can lead to eutrophication, harmful algal blooms and fish kills

Water security is the focused goal of water policy and water management. A society with a high level of water security makes the most of water's benefits for humans and ecosystems and limits the risk of destructive impacts associated with water. These include too much water (flood), too little water (drought and water scarcity) or poor quality (polluted) water. A widely accepted definition of water security is: "Water security is the reliable availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks". Water security is framed as a situation where water-related risks are managed and water-related opportunities are captured but it is difficult to provide a set of indicators to quantify this.

Policy-makers and water managers seek to achieve a variety of water security outcomes related to economic, environmental and social equity concerns. These outcomes can include increasing economic welfare, enhancing social equity, moving towards long-term sustainability and reducing water related risks. There are interactions and trade-offs between different water security outcomes. Water security is critical for meeting the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) because most SDGs cannot be met without access to adequate and safe water. The absence of water security is termed "water insecurity". Water insecurity is as a growing threat to humanity. Factors contributing to water insecurity include water scarcity, water pollution, reduced water quality due to climate change impacts, poverty, destructive forces of water and others (for example natural disasters, terrorism and armed conflict).

Improving water security, for example by better managing water resources, is a key factor in achieving sustainable development and poverty reduction. Major factors that determine a society's ability to sustain water security include: the hydrologic environment, the socio-economic environment and changes in the future environment (climate change). Water security risks need to be managed at different spatial scales: from within the household to community, town, city, basin and region. Policy-makers and water managers also have to think on different timescales, looking months, years or decades ahead to build resilience to local climate variability and extreme events (e.g. heavy precipitation or drought). Climate change is affecting the type and severity of water risks in ways that will vary from place to place. Research suggests that effects on the water security of different groups in society should be considered when designing strategies for climate adaptation. Many institutions are working to develop climate-resilient WASH services.

Approaches for improving water security require natural resources, science, and engineering knowledge, political and legal tools, economic and financial tools, policy and governance strategies. In practice it means that for example institutions and information flows need to be strengthened, water quality management improved, inequalities reduced, investments in infrastructure made and the climate resilience of water and sanitation services has to be improved.

Some organizations use the phrase "water security" in a different way to talk specifically about water supply and infrastructure issues. Integrated water resources management (IWRM) is a paradigm related to water security. Related concepts include water risk and water conflict.

Definitions

Broad definition

The term "water security" is often used with varying definitions. It emerged as a concept in the 21st century and is a broader concept than just the absence of water scarcity. When compared to the terms "food security" and "energy security" (which refer to reliable access to food or energy), an important difference with "water security" is that not only is the absence of water a problem but also its presence when there is too much.

Water security has been defined in 2007 as "the reliable availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks".

A similar working definition of water security by UN-Water was provided in 2013 as follows:

Water security is defined here as the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being , and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability. [...] The term "water security" offers a common framework and a platform for communication.

— UN-Water,

World Resources Institute also proposed a similar definition in 2020: "For purposes of this report, we define water security as the capacity of a population to

• safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socioeconomic development;
• protect against water pollution and water-related disasters; and
• preserve ecosystems, upon which clean water availability and other ecosystem services depend."

Access to WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) services is one component of water security.

Narrower definition with a focus on water supply

Some organizations use "water security" in a more specific sense to refer to water supply only, not the water-related risks of "too much water". For example, the definition of WaterAid in 2012 is focused on water supply issues: "WaterAid defines water security as:Reliable access to water of sufficient quantity and quality for basic human needs, small-scale livelihoods and local ecosystem services, coupled with a well managed risk of water-related disasters. The World Water Council also uses this more specific approach with a focus on water supply: "Water security refers to the availability of water, in adequate quantity and quality, to sustain all these needs together (social and economic sectors, as well as the larger needs of the planet’s ecosystems) – without exceeding its ability to renew."

Related concepts

Water risk

"Water risk" refers to the "possibility of an entity experiencing a water-related challenge (e.g., water scarcity, water stress, flooding, infrastructure decay, drought)". Water risk is inversely related to water security, meaning that as water risk increases, water security decreases. Water risk is complex and multidimensional. It includes risks from natural disasters such as flooding and drought, which can lead to infrastructure failure and worsen hunger. When these risks are realized, they result in water scarcity or other problems. The potential economic effects of water risk are significant. Entire industries, such as the food and beverage, agriculture, oil and gas, utilities, semiconductor and industries, are threatened by water risk. Agriculture uses 69% of global freshwater, making the industry extremely vulnerable to water stress.

Risk is a combination of hazard (droughts, floods and quality deterioration), exposure and vulnerability. Bad infrastructure and bad governance result in high vulnerability.

The financial sector is becoming more aware of the potential impacts of water risk and the need for its proper management. By 2025, $145 trillion in assets under management will likely be exposed to water risk.

To help mitigate water risk, companies can develop water risk management plans. Stakeholders within financial markets can then use these plans to measure company environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance and identify leaders in water risk management. The World Resources Institute has also developed an online water data platform named Aqueduct for risk assessment and water management. China Water Risk is a nonprofit dedicated to understanding and managing water risk in China. The World Wildlife Fund has a Water Risk Filter that helps companies assess and respond to water risk with scenarios for 2030 and 2050. The World Wildlife Fund has also partnered with DWS, which provides business solutions to water risk including water-centric investment funds.

The concept of risk is increasingly used in water security policy and practice but has been weakly integrated with social equity considerations.

There is no unifying theory or model for determining or managing water risk. Instead, a range of theories, models, and technologies are used to understand the trade-offs that exist in responding to risk.

Water conflict

Ethiopia's move to fill the dam's reservoir could reduce Nile flows by as much as 25% and devastate Egyptian farmlands.

 

Water conflict is a term describing a conflict between countries, states, or groups over the rights to access water resources. The United Nations recognizes that water disputes result from opposing interests of water users, public or private. A wide range of water conflicts appear throughout history, though rarely are traditional wars waged over water alone. Instead, water has historically been a source of tension and a factor in conflicts that start for other reasons. Water conflicts arise for several reasons, including territorial disputes, a fight for resources, and strategic advantage. Water conflicts can occur on the intrastate and interstate levels. Interstate conflicts occur between two or more neighboring countries that share a transboundary water source, such as a river, sea, or groundwater basin. For example, the Middle East has only 1% of the world's freshwater shared among 5% of the world's population. Intrastate conflicts take place between two or more parties in the same country. An example would be the conflicts between farmers and industry (agricultural vs industrial use of water).

Water insecurity

If water security is what good development policy is aiming to achieve, then water insecurity is what policy is trying to avoid or address. Scholarship on water insecurity has grown significantly in recent years and is now a speciality area in its own right with its own scientific literature, its own groupings (e.g. the Household Water Insecurity Experiences Research Coordination Network - HWISE-RCN) and growing influence in the policy arena.

Integrated water management and others

Water security incorporates ideas and concepts related to the sustainability, integration and adaptiveness of water resource management. Terms such as "integrated water resources management (IWRM)" or "sustainable water management" are predecessors. Related terms that are gaining in popularity include water risk, water resilience, water proof, and the water-food-energy nexus.

Some see IWRM as complementary to water security because water security is a goal or destination, whilst IWRM is the process necessary to achieve that goal.

Outcomes

Water security outcomes can be grouped according to the sustainable development framework into economic, environmental and equity (or social) outcomes. Outcomes are things that are happening, or that we want to see happen, as a result of policy and management:

• Economic outcomes of water security: Sustainable growth (e.g. job creation, increased productivity and standards of living) which takes changing water needs and threats into account; may require adaptation of economic activities to cope with seasonal and annual variations in rainfall and surface water levels, including extreme events.

• Environmental outcomes: Sustainability of the water resource, in terms of its quality and availability and the ecosystems services it supports. Loss of freshwater biodiversity and depletion of groundwater are examples of negative environmental outcomes.
• Equity or social outcomes: Inclusive services so that different users (people, industry, agriculture) are able to access safe, reliable, sufficient and affordable water, and to dispose of wastewater safely. Aspects of interest include gender issues, empowerment, participation and accountability.

In the literature, there are four different focusses when researchers define and study water security and its outcomes: it is about using water such that we are increasing economic welfare, enhancing social equity, moving towards long-term sustainability or reducing water-related risks. Policy-makers and water managers must consider interactions and trade-offs between the different types of outcome.

Improving water security is a key factor to achieve growth, sustainable development and poverty reduction. Water security is linked to social justice and fair distribution of environmental benefits and harms. Sustainable development would result in lowered poverty and increased living standards for those most susceptible to the impacts of insecure water resources in the region, especially women and children.

Water security is critical for meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) because most SDGs cannot be met without access to adequate and safe water. It is also important for climate-resilient development. Research suggests that water security outcomes for different groups in society should be considered during the design of climate change adaptation strategies.

Determining factors for water security

Three main factors determine a society's ability to sustain water security:

1. Hydrologic environment
2. Socio-economic environment
3. Changes in the future environment (climate change)

Hydrologic environment

The hydrologic environment is a determinant of water security. This is because the flow of water in, on and between the ground, surface, and atmosphere controls the spatial distribution and inter-and intra-annual variability of water resources:

• An "easy to manage" hydrologic environment would be one with low rainfall variability, with rain distributed throughout the year and perennial river flows sustained by groundwater base flows. For example, many of the world’s industrialized nations have an “easy to manage” hydrologic environment. This has helped them to achieve water security early in their development path.
• A "difficult to manage" hydrologic environment is one with absolute water scarcity (i.e. deserts) or low-lying lands where there is severe flood risk; regions where rainfall is markedly seasonal, or high inter-annual climate variability are also likely to face water security challenges. An example would be East Africa, where prolonged drought have happened every two to three years since 1999. Most of the world’s developing countries have difficult to manage hydrologies and have not achieved water security - which is not a coincidence.

Aspects of difficult to manage hydrologic environments

The "Poverty and hydrology" hypothesis states that: "Not coincidentally, most of the world’s poor face difficult hydrologies". This is because regions with a difficult hydrology (for example inter-annual and intra-annual variability) remain poor because they have not been able to make the large investments needed to achieve water security. The resulting water insecurity constrains economic growth. Research has shown that greater rainfall variability (within one year and across several years) is "statistically associated with lower per capita incomes".

In regions with marked seasonality and inter-annual variability, water managers would benefit from more accurate seasonal weather forecasts. In some locations the onset of seasonal rainfall is particularly hard to predict because aspects of the climate system are difficult to model successfully. For example, the long rains in East Africa which fall March to May have been difficult to simulate within the climate models that are used to produce seasonal forecasts. This is in part because long rains do not respond in a simple way to large-scale modes of variability such as ENSO and because of interactions with complex topography. Improved understanding of atmospheric processes may allow climate scientists to provide more relevant and localized information to water managers on a seasonal timescale, and to provide more detailed predictions for the effects of climate change on a longer timeframe.

The existence of trans-boundary waters, such as "international rivers" which belong to several countries, are also a complicating factor for achieving water security. Many of these trans-boundary waters are the result of 20th century colonial borders that were drawn without giving thought to natural watersheds.

Socio-economic environment

The socio-economic environment also determines the potential of a society to sustain water security. This refers the structure of the economy, behavior of its actors, natural and cultural legacies as well as policy choices. It also includes water infrastructure and institutions, macroeconomic structure and resilience, risk and the behavior of economic actors.

Climate change

Further information: Effects of climate change on the water cycle and Water security § Reduced water quality due to climate change impacts

Water-related impacts from climate change impact people's water security on a day-to-day basis. They include: increased frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation, accelerated melting of glaciers, changes in frequency, magnitude, and timing of floods; more frequent and severe droughts in some places; decline in groundwater storage, and reduction in groundwater recharge and water quality deterioration due to extreme events. Water resources can be affected by climate change in various ways. The total amount of locally available freshwater available can change, for instance due to dry spells or droughts. There can also be reduced water quality due to the effects of climate change.

Global climate change is "likely to increase the complexity and costs of ensuring water security". It creates new threats and adaptation challenges. This is because climate change leads to increased hydrological variability and extremes. Climate change has many impacts on the water cycle, resulting in higher climatic and hydrological variability, which means that water security will be compromised. Changes in the water cycle threaten existing water infrastructure and make it harder to plan future investments that can cope with uncertain changes in hydrologic variability. This makes societies more vulnerable to extreme water-related events and therefore increases water insecurity.

Climate change is about uncertainty and is an important long-term risk to water security. On the other hand, climate change must be seen in the context of other existing challenges for water security which include: existing high levels of climate variability at low latitudes, population growth, increased demand for water resources, political obstacles, increased disaster exposure due to settlement of hazard-prone areas, and environmental degradation. Water demand for irrigation in agriculture will increase due to climate change. This is because evaporation rates and crop transpiration rates will be higher due to rising temperatures.

Climate factors are a major driver of water security across different scales. Geographic variability in water availability, reliability of rainfall and vulnerability to droughts, floods and cyclones are inherent hazards that affect development opportunities and that play out at international to intra-basin scales. At local scales, the risks to water security associated with weather and climate are strongly mediated by social vulnerability. For example, people affected by poverty may have less ability to cope with climate shocks.

Factors contributing to water insecurity

There are many risk drivers for water insecurity, for example:

• Water scarcity: Water demand exceeds supply in many regions of the world. This can be due to population growth, higher living standards, general economic expansion and/or greater quantities of water used in agriculture (often with inefficient irrigation schemes, instead of more efficient sprinkler or drip irrigation technologies).
• Increasing water pollution and low levels of wastewater treatment, which is making local water unusable.
• Poor planning of water use, poor water management and misuse (causing groundwater levels to drop, rivers and lakes to dry out, and local ecosystems to collapse).
• Climate change (increasing frequency and intensity of water-related natural disasters, such as droughts and floods; rising temperatures and sea levels can lead to contamination of freshwater sources).

Water scarcity

An important threat to water security is water scarcity. There can be several causes to water scarcity including low rainfall, climate change, high population density, and overallocation of a water source. About 27% of the world's population lived in areas affected by water scarcity in the mid-2010s. This number will likely increase to 42% by 2050. Over-urbanization relative to water resources can create conditions of rapidly deteriorating household water security, particularly where pre-existing water and sanitation infrastructure is only poorly developed. Examples of periodic deep water scarcity that is inducing water insecurity include the ongoing California drought that started in early 2000s and the Cape Town Water Crisis (mid-2017 to mid-2018). In both cases pre-existing vulnerabilities were exacerbated by persistent climatic drought.

Water stress per country in 2019. Water stress is the ratio of water use relative to water availability ("demand-driven scarcity").

Water scarcity (closely related to water stress or water crisis) is the lack of fresh water resources to meet the standard water demand. There are two types of water scarcity: physical or economic water scarcity. Physical water scarcity is where there is not enough water to meet all demands, including that needed for ecosystems to function effectively. Arid areas for example Central and West Asia, and North Africa often suffer from physical water scarcity. On the other hand, economic water scarcity is caused by a lack of investment in infrastructure or technology to draw water from rivers, aquifers, or other water sources, or insufficient human capacity to satisfy the demand for water. Much of Sub-Saharan Africa has economic water scarcity.

The essence of global water scarcity is the geographic and temporal mismatch between fresh water demand and availability. At the global level and on an annual basis, enough freshwater is available to meet such demand, but spatial and temporal variations of water demand and availability are large, leading to physical water scarcity in several parts of the world during specific times of the year. The main driving forces for the rising global demand for water are the increasing world population, improving living standards, changing consumption patterns (for example a dietary shift toward more animal products), and expansion of irrigated agriculture. Climate change (including droughts or floods), deforestation, increased water pollution and wasteful use of water can also cause insufficient water supply. Scarcity varies over time as a result of natural hydrological variability, but varies even more so as a function of prevailing economic policy, planning and management approaches. Scarcity can and will likely intensify with most forms of economic development, but many of its causes can be avoided or mitigated.

Water pollution

A broad category of threats to water security is environmental threats (water pollution). These include contaminants such as nutrients, pesticides and herbicides (usually from agriculture), heavy metals (usually from industry), and Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (persistent organic pollutants commonly described as "forever chemicals"), climate change and natural disasters. Contaminants can enter a water source naturally through flooding.

Contaminants can also be a problem if a population switches their water supply from surface water to groundwater or even from one surface source to another. An example of this was the "Flint Water Crisis" in Flint, Michigan during 2014-2019 (Flint had changed its water source from treated water that was sourced from Lake Huron and the Detroit River to the Flint River).

Water pollution (or aquatic pollution) is the contamination of water bodies, usually as a result of human activities, so that it negatively affects its uses. Water bodies include lakes, rivers, oceans, aquifers, reservoirs and groundwater. Water pollution results when contaminants are introduced into these water bodies. Water pollution can be attributed to one of four sources: sewage discharges, industrial activities, agricultural activities, and urban runoff including stormwater. It can be grouped into surface water pollution (either fresh water pollution or marine pollution) or groundwater pollution. For example, releasing inadequately treated wastewater into natural waters can lead to degradation of these aquatic ecosystems. Water pollution can also lead to water-borne diseases for people using polluted water for drinking, bathing, washing or irrigation. Water pollution reduces the ability of the body of water to provide the ecosystem services (such as drinking water) that it would otherwise provide.

Sources of water pollution are either point sources or non-point sources. Point sources have one identifiable cause, such as a storm drain, a wastewater treatment plant or an oil spill. Non-point sources are more diffuse, such as agricultural runoff. Pollution is the result of the cumulative effect over time. Pollution may take the form of toxic substances (e.g., oil, metals, plastics, pesticides, persistent organic pollutants, industrial waste products), stressful conditions (e.g., changes of pH, hypoxia or anoxia, increased temperatures, excessive turbidity, unpleasant taste or odor, and changes of salinity), or pathogenic organisms. Contaminants may include organic and inorganic substances. Heat can also be a pollutant, and this is called thermal pollution. A common cause of thermal pollution is the use of water as a coolant by power plants and industrial manufacturers.

Reduced water quality due to climate change impacts

Drinking water quality framework for analysis: Environment (including weather events), infrastructure and management affect drinking water quality at point of collection (PoC) and point of use (PoU).

Weather and weather-related shocks can affect water quality in different ways depending on the local climate and context. Weather-related shocks include water shortages, heavy rain and temperature extremes. They can cause damage to water infrastructure from erosion under heavy rainfall and floods, loss of water sources in droughts, and deterioration of water quality. For this reason, climate change threatens the Sustainable Development Goal 6.1 of achieving universal access to safe drinking water. Understanding how weather affects water quality can help predict the likely impacts of climate change on water quality and thus health.

The impacts of climate change can result in lower water quality through several mechanisms:

• Heavy rainfall can have a rapid impact on water quality in rivers and a delayed but still significant effect on water quality in reservoirs. It can also have a rapid effect on water quality in shallow groundwater, with a more limited effect on groundwater in deeper, unfractured aquifers. For example, increases in fecal contamination of water sources is often linked to rainfall. Rainfall following a dry period can lead to microbial contamination of drinking water in piped water supplies.
• Floods intensify the mixing of floodwater with wastewater and the redistribution of pollutants: Heavy rainfall and flooding can have an impact on water quality. This is because pollutants can be transported into water bodies by the increased surface runoff.
• Droughts reduce river dilution capacities and groundwater levels, increasing the risk of groundwater contamination.
• Saltwater intrusion from rising sea levels: In coastal regions, more salt may find its way into water resources, especially groundwater, due to higher sea levels and more intense storms.
• Increased eutrophication at higher temperatures: Warmer water in lakes, reservoirs and rivers can lead to more frequent harmful algal blooms in those surface water bodies. Higher temperatures also directly degrade water quality because warm water contains less oxygen.
• Permafrost degradation leads to an increased flux of contaminants.
• Increased meltwater from glaciers may release historically deposited contaminants. As glaciers shrink or disappear, the positive effect of seasonal meltwater on downstream water quality through dilution may be lost.

Poverty

Low-income countries are at greater risk of water insecurity. This can result in human suffering, sustained poverty, constrained growth and social unrest.

Destructive forces of water

Standing water in Ponce, Puerto Rico, poses health risks for its residents more than a week after Hurricane Maria devastated the island (2017)

Water can be a force for destruction due to its "extraordinary power, mobility, indispensability and unpredictability": this can be either through catastrophic events (tsunamis, droughts, floods, landslides and epidemics) or through progressive events (erosion, inundation, desertification, contamination and disease).

Other

Other threats to water security include:

• Natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and wildfires can damage man-made structures such as dams and fill waterways with debris.
• Many climate change mitigation measures can impact future water security. For example, "bioenergy with carbon capture and storage and afforestation and reforestation can have a considerable water footprint if done at inappropriate locations".
• Terrorism such as water supply terrorism
• Radiation due to a nuclear accident
• Emergence of extensive new water uses such as hydraulic fracturing for energy resources
• Armed conflict and migration (this can be due to water scarcity or can lead to increased water scarcity)

Approaches to improve water security

Approaches to improve water security include natural resources, science, and engineering approaches, political and legal tools, economic and financial tools, policy and governance strategies. A sequence of investments in institutions, information and infrastructure is needed to achieve a high level of water security.

Investments in institutions

Suitable institutions and infrastructure are needed to improve water security. Institutions comprise law, policies, regulations and organizations as well as informal networks. Sustainable Development Goal 16 is about "peace, justice and strong institutions" and recognizes that strong institutions are a necessary condition to support sustainable development, also with regards to water security. Institutions govern how decisions can promote or constrain water security outcomes for the poor. In some cases, the approaches to strengthen institutions might involve re-allocating risks and responsibilities between the state, market and communities in novel ways. This can include performance-based models, development impact bonds, or blended finance from government, donors and users. These finance mechanisms challenge the traditional separation between the state, private sector and communities.

Governance mechanisms can reduce water insecurity in transboundary groundwater contexts. They need processes that "(1) enhance context-specific and flexible international mechanisms; (2) address the perpetual need for groundwater data and information; (3) focus on the precautionary principle and pollution prevention, in particular; (4) where appropriate, integrate governance of surface and subsurface water and land; and (5) expand institutional capacity, especially of binational or multinational actors."

Improving water quality management

Drinking water quality and water pollution are interlinked but often not addressed in a comprehensive way. For example, industrial pollution is rarely linked to drinking water quality in developing countries. River, groundwater and wastewater monitoring is important to identify sources of contamination and to guide targeted regulatory responses. WHO has described water safety plans as the most effective means of maintaining a safe supply of drinking water to the public.

Reducing inequalities in water security

Inequalities in water security have structural and historical roots. They can affect people at different scales: from the household, to the community, town, river basin or the region. Vulnerable social groups and geographies can be identified or ignored during political debates. For example, water inequality is often related to gender in low-income countries, e.g. at the household level, where women are often the water managers but with constrained choices over water and related expenditures.

Investments in information flows

Information provides the fundamental underpinning for water security institutions and infrastructure. This enables evidence-based planning and decision-making, monitoring policy effectiveness and accountability of all actors involved in water resources policy and management.

To build climate resilience into water systems across scales, from dams to drinking water, requires investment to ensure access to climate information that is appropriate for the local context. Climate information products need to cover a wide range of temporal and spatial scales, and respond to regional water-related climate risks.

For example, in the case of Ethiopia, observed climatic conditions in the preceding months can improve and refine seasonal to sub-seasonal outlooks for the July to September rain season. Such information could be valuably used by decision makers in the Awash river basin to allocate water, plan water use and plan emergency responses to the extremes of water scarcity and flooding that are common experiences of the basin.

Investments in infrastructure

Water infrastructure is used to access, store, regulate, move and conserve water. These functions can be performed by a combination of natural assets (lakes, rivers, wetlands, aquifers, springs) and engineered assets (bulk water management infrastructure, such as multipurpose dams for river regulation and storage and inter-basin transfer schemes). Examples for investments in infrastructure include:

• protection, restoration and rehabilitation of natural water storage facilities, such as aquifers and wetlands
• adaptation of existing landscapes to store water (for instance, soil conservation, managed aquifer recharge)
• built infrastructure (such as distribution networks, latrines, treatment plants, storage tanks and dams).
• augmenting water supplies through non-conventional sources, including water recycling or desalination.
• flood protection embankments to manage water's destructive force.

Water security can be improved at a national scale through investment in an "evolving balance of complementary institutions and infrastructure for water management". This is important to avoid unforeseen and even unacceptable social and environmental costs from infrastructure measures that were designed to improve water security.

Consideration of scales

Annual rainfall pattern in two regions of Ethiopia. The lines represent observations (red dashed line) and model results (green line) in climate model study of the region.

Water security risks need to be managed at different spatial scales: from within the household to community, town, city, basin and region. At the local scale, actors include county governments, schools, water user groups, local water providers and the private sector. At the next larger scale there are basin and national level actors which contribute to informing overarching policy, institutional and investment constraints. Lastly, there are global actors such as the World Bank, UNICEF, FCDO, WHO and USAID. These global actors shape international agendas around water security. They can also support the design and dissemination of service delivery models which result in affordable, safe and sustainable services. Policy-makers and water managers (whether household, industrial, commercial or public sector) also have to think on different timescales: They have to look weeks, months, years or decades ahead when making plans to maintain or improve water security.

The scale at which plans to manage water security risks need to be made may depend on physical geography, including climatology. Even within a country, the hydrologic environment may vary significantly. See, for example, the variety of seasonal rainfall regimes across Ethiopia.

Seasonal climate and hydrological forecasts can be useful to prepare for and reduce water security risks, and they may need to be adapted for users at the local scale. Seasonal forecasts can be improved and made more localized by developing knowledge of teleconnections - i.e. correlations between patterns of rainfall, temperature, and wind speed between distant areas caused by large-scale ocean and atmospheric circulation. For example, seasonal forecasts of rainfall in Ethiopia's Awash river basin may be improved by understanding how sea surface temperatures in different ocean regions relate to rainfall patterns which vary across the basin. At a larger regional scale, understanding how wind speeds and rainfall patterns in the Greater Horn of Africa are influenced by pressure systems in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic may contribute to improved representation of this region in climate models to assist development planning.

Improving climate resilience of water and sanitation services

Climate resilience is the ability to recover from, or to mitigate vulnerability to, climate-related shocks such as floods and droughts. Climate resilient development has become the new paradigm for sustainable development influencing theory and practice across all sectors globally. This is particularly true in the water sector, since water security is intimately connected to climate change. On every continent, governments are adopting policies for climate resilient economies. International frameworks such as the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals are drivers for such initiatives.

Climate-resilient water services (or "climate-resilient WASH") provide access to high quality drinking water during all seasons and even during extreme weather events. The right infrastructure and management choices are important at the community and household levels in order to achieve climate resilience for water supply.

To put climate resilience into practice and to engage better with politicians, the following questions need to be addressed on a case by case basis: "resilience of what, to what, for whom, over what time frame, by whom and at what scale?":

• "Resilience of what?" means thinking beyond infrastructure but to also include resilience of water resources, local institutions and water users.
• "Resilience to what?" means that smaller variations in water quantity and quality are as important as extreme events: smaller changes in seasonal rainfall variability can have devastating impacts on rainfall-dependent communities. Moreover, those without access to safe, reliable domestic water supplies face heightened water insecurity at specific times throughout the year due to cyclical changes in water quantity or quality. For example, where access to water on-premises is not available, drinking water quality at the point of use (PoU) can be much worse compared to the quality at the point of collection (PoC). Correct household practices around hygiene, storage and treatment are therefore important. There are interactions between weather, water source and management, and these in turn impact on drinking water safety.
• "Resilience over what time frame?" refers to short term or longer-term investments.
• "Resilience for whom?" speaks about reducing vulnerability and preventing maladaptation: For instance, top-down, technocratic interventions that attempt to work around power and politics undermine indigenous knowledge and compromise community resilience.
• "Resilience by whom?" refers to the fact that including diverse actors can expose, and allow operation within, power imbalances across scales.
• And finally, "Resilience at what scale?" reminds decision makers to scale-up solutions while maintaining context specificity.

Measurement tools

Aggregated global water security index, calculated using the aggregation of water availability, accessibility, safety and quality, and management indices. The value ‘0–1’ (with the continuous color ‘red to blue’) represents ‘low to high’ security.

Water security cannot be quantified in absolute terms. It is very difficult to measure and there are no standard indicators to measure water security because it is a tool that focuses on outcomes. The outcomes of importance can change depending on the context and stakeholders involved.

Instead, relative levels of water security can be compared by using metrics which represent certain aspects of security. For example, the "Global Water Security Index" includes metrics on availability (water scarcity index, drought index, groundwater depletion); accessibility to water services (access to sanitation, access to drinking water); safety and quality (water quality index, global flood frequency); and metrics on management (World Governance Index, transboundary legal framework, transboundary political tension).

Scholars and practitioners have been working on methodologies to measure water security at a variety of scale and focus. There are two dominant research clusters in this field: experiential scale-based metrics and resource-based metrics. The former mainly focus on measuring the water experiences of households and its impact on human well-being, while the majority of the latter assess freshwater availability or water resources security.

The 12-item Household Water InSecurity Experiences (HWISE) Scale measures the multiple components of water insecurity at the household level: adequacy, reliability, accessibility, safety. The HWISE Scale can be used to identify vulnerable subpopulations, optimize resource allocation to those in need and to measure the effectiveness of water-related policies and interventions. It is a cross-culturally validated scale for assessing and comparing household water insecurity between locations.

Global estimates

The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report in 2022 provided the following estimates about the number of people affected by water scarcity: "Increasing weather and climate extreme events have exposed millions of people to acute food insecurity and reduced water security, with the largest impacts observed in many locations and/or communities in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, Small Islands and the Arctic". The same report predicted that "at approximately 2°C global warming level, between 0.9 and 3.9 billion people are projected to be at increased exposure to water stress, depending on regional patterns of climate change and the socio-economic scenarios considered." With regards to water scarcity (which is one parameter that contributes to water insecurity), the report states that "currently, between 1.5 and 2.5 billion people live within areas exposed to water scarcity globally".

Water scarcity and water security do not have to be directly proportional: There are regions with high water security, despite also grappling with water scarcity issues, for example parts of the United States, Australia and Southern Europe. This is due to a good performance of management, safety and quality, and accessibility to water services.

Country examples

Bangladesh

Further information: Water supply and sanitation in Bangladesh

 

Too much water security can also drive water insecurity. Left: Flooding in Bangladesh as seen from the International Space Station; Right: People on an island in a flooded river in Bangladesh.

Water security risks in Bangladesh include:

• some natural hazards that related to climate (climate hazards)
• the impacts of urbanization
• impacts from climate change such as changes to precipitation patterns and sea level rise.

The country experiences water security risks for the capital Dhaka as well as for coastal region. In Dhaka, monsoonal pulses can lead to urban flooding and subsequent contamination of the water supply. Water risks for people in the coastal region are caused by increasingly saline aquifers, seasonal water scarcity, fecal contamination, and flooding from the monsoon and storm surges from cyclones. About 20 million people are affected by those water risks in coastal areas.

Different types of floods occur in coastal Bangladesh. They are: river floods, tidal floods and storm surge floods due to tropical cyclones. These floods can damage drinking water infrastructure, and lead to reduced water quality as well as losses in agricultural and fishery yields. There is a correlation between water insecurity and poverty in the low-lying areas in the Ganges-Brahmaputra tidal delta plain, which is an example of embanked areas in coastal Bangladesh.

The government has various programs to reduce the vulnerability of coastal communities to water-related hazards. These programs also create opportunities for economic development. Examples include the "Coastal Embankment Improvement Project" by World Bank in 2013), the BlueGold project in 2012, UNICEF's "Managed Aquifer Recharge" program in 2014 and the Bangladesh Delta Plan in 2014. Such investments in water security aim to improve the reliability, maintenance and operation of water infrastructure. They can help coastal communities escape the poverty trap caused by water insecurity.

A program called the "SafePani" framework is investigating how the government allocates risks and responsibilities between the state, the market (service providers) and communities. This program aims to help decision makers to address climate risks through a process called "climate resilient water safety planning". The program is a cooperation between UNICEF and the Government of Bangladesh.

Ethiopia

Further information: Water supply and sanitation in Ethiopia

 

Rainfall regimes vary across Ethiopia. Left figure: Annual average rainfall in mm/day with the interquartile range (25th–75th) of monthly rainfall in mm/day indicated by black contours (map produced with CHIRPS data 1981–2020). Right figure: Three rainfall zones in Ethiopia with different seasonal rainfall patterns, e.g. the green zone has two separate rainy seasons like the bimodal East African climate; the red zone has a single peak in rainfall in Jun to September.

Ethiopia has two main wet seasons per year: in the spring ("Belg") and summer ("Kiremt"). These seasonal patterns of rainfall vary a lot across the country. Western Ethiopia has a seasonal rainfall pattern that is similar to the Sahel: it has rainfall from February to November decreasing to the north, and has peak rainfall from June to September. Southern Ethiopia has a rainfall pattern similar to the one in East Africa: there are two distinct wet seasons every year (February to May, and October to November). Central and eastern Ethiopia has some rainfall between February and November, with a smaller peak in rainfall from March to May and a second higher peak in rainfall from June to September.

Water security was threatened in Ethiopia in 2022 when the country experienced "one of the most severe La Niña-induced droughts in the last forty years following four consecutive failed rainy seasons since late 2020". This drought affected more than 8 million people (pastoralists and agro-pastoralists) in the Somali, Oromia, SNNP and South-West regions. About 7.2 million people needed food aid, and 4.4 million people needed help to access water. Food prices have significantly increased due to the drought conditions. Vulnerable communities in the affected regions have experienced food insecurity as a result of water insecurity.

In the Awash basin in central Ethiopia floods and drought events are common. Agriculture in the basin is mainly rainfed, meaning without irrigation systems (this applies to around 98% of total cropland as of 2012). Therefore, changes in rainfall patterns due to climate change will reduce economic activities in the basin. Rainfall shocks have a direct impact on agriculture: A rainfall decrease in the Awash basin could lead to a 5% decline in the basin's overall GDP. The agricultural GDP could drop by as much as 10%.

Partnerships with Awash Basin Development Office (AwBDO) and the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity (MoWIE) have led to the development and uptake of a refined model of water allocation in the Awash basin. This can improve water security for the 18.3 million residents, as well as for irrigation and industry in the basin.

Disaster risk reduction

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disaster_risk_reduction 

 

Villages have adapted the design of houses to protect people from rising flood waters and small boats are used to transport people and food to sustain livelihoods. This kind of disaster risk reduction is an important Climate change adaptation

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) sometimes called disaster risk management (DRM) is a systematic approach to identifying, assessing and reducing the risks of disaster. It aims to reduce socio-economic vulnerabilities to disaster as well as dealing with the environmental and other hazards that trigger them. The most commonly cited definition of Disaster risk reduction is one used by UN agencies such as United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDDR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): "The conceptual framework of elements considered with the possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development."

Disaster risk reduction has been strongly influenced by the research on vulnerability since the mid-1970s as well as the mapping of natural disaster risks. Disaster risk reduction is the responsibility of development and relief agencies alike. It should be an integral part of the way such organizations do their work, not an add-on or one-off action. Disaster risk reduction is very wide-ranging: Its scope is much broader and deeper than conventional emergency management. There is potential for disaster risk reduction initiatives in most sectors of development and humanitarian work.

Development of the concept and approach

Disaster risk reduction progress score for some countries

Moving from disaster management to DRR

Landmines are also a hazard that cause much loss of life and injury. Female de-miners in Lebanon set off to clear landmines.

The evolution of disaster thinking and practice since the 1970s has seen a progressively wider and deeper understanding of why disasters happen, accompanied by more integrated, holistic approaches to reduce their impact on society through reducing risk before it occurs (disaster risk reduction, or disaster risk management) as well as managing impacts when disasters occur (disaster management). It is being widely embraced by international agencies, governments, disaster planners and civil society organisations.

DRR is such an all-embracing concept that it has proved difficult to define or explain in detail, although the broad idea is clear enough. Inevitably, there are different definitions in the technical literature, but it is generally understood to mean the broad development and application of policies, strategies and practices to minimise vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout society. The term 'disaster risk management' (DRM) is often used in the same context and to mean much the same thing: a systematic approach to identifying, assessing and reducing risks of all kinds associated with hazards and human activities. It is more properly applied to the operational aspects of DRR: the practical implementation of DRR initiatives.

DRR and climate change adaptation

Climate change, through rising temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, and changing sea levels, will affect the nature of hydro meteorological disasters, such as droughts, floods, and cyclones. The IPCC issued a special report in 2012 "Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation" stating that a changing climate leads to changes in the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of extreme weather and climate events, and can result in unprecedented extreme weather and climate events. Similarly there has been an increase in the economic losses from weather- and climate-related disasters, which contributed to $165 billion of economic losses worldwide in 2018 according to estimates from insurance giant Swiss Re. There are growing efforts to closely link DRR and climate change adaptation, both in policy and practice.

This linkage has clearly revealed the significance of disaster risk reduction for sustainable development planning. An underlying process refers to the ability of disaster risk management to alter existing development trajectories as transformation, which “involve[s] fundamental changes in the attributes of a system, including value systems; regulatory, legislative, or bureaucratic regimes; financial institutions; and technological or biophysical systems”. Transformation occurs as society learns. This learning includes building partnerships, which helps to increase local capacity and contribute to institutional change. This in turn allows society to continually move from vulnerability, adaptation and development to resilience.

DRR and resilience

See also: Ecosystem-based disaster risk reduction

In disaster risk reduction, the concept of resilience expresses one goal of disaster prevention and response. Resilience refers to the ability of a community or society to preserve its essential structure and function in the face of stress and shocks. Resilience is closely connected to the concept of vulnerability, though resilience tends to be a higher, strategic goal of building social systems, while vulnerability is a tool for analyzing the properties of those systems.

The term resilience issues from the ecological sciences as a description of a system’s response to change, originally coming from the Latin resilire, “to bounce [back]”. It was first used in the present sense by C.S. Holling in 1973, as a measure of the ability of relationships within a natural system to persist, i.e., for the organisms within the system to not go extinct. Resilience in the ecological sense is not equilibrium: it differs from stability, the ability of a system to resist fluctuation. A system that is resilient, therefore, can undergo changes without losing its core structure and function. In the case of human systems, that function is survival and the necessities of life.

Within the field of disaster risk reduction, one widely-accepted definition of resilience comes from UNISDR: “The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.”

The importance of resilience in disaster risk management can be seen from the centrality of the term in the 2005-2015 Hyogo Framework for Action, which was subtitled “Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters.” Building resilience, therefore, is currently understood as the goal of disaster risk reduction.

The disaster resilience of infrastructure systems is a critical challenge for developing Asia. Exposure to climate and geophysical hazards is already widespread. Infrastructure has a central role to play in supporting economic resilience. To sustain economic development and reduce poverty, the region must have disaster-resilient infrastructure systems, with provisions for reducing, transferring, and managing the climate and disaster risks to the systems.

Policy arena

Chennai damage after 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake

There have been growing calls for greater clarity about the components of DRR and about indicators of progress toward resilience — a challenge that the international community took up at the UN's World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) in Kobe, Japan, in 2005, only days after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake. The WCDR began the process of pushing international agencies and national governments beyond the vague rhetoric of most policy statements and toward setting clear targets and commitments for DRR.

Hyogo Framework for Action

The first step in this process was the formal approval at the WCDR of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015) (HFA). This was the first internationally accepted framework for DRR. It set out an ordered sequence of objectives (outcome – strategic goals – priorities), with five priorities for action attempting to 'capture' the main areas of DRR intervention. The UN's biennial Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction provided an opportunity for the UN and its member states to review progress against the Hyogo Framework. It held its first session 5–7 June 2007 in Geneva, Switzerland, where UNISDR is based. The subsequent Global Platforms were held in June 2009, May 2011 and May 2013, all in Geneva.

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030) is an international document that was adopted by the United Nations (UN) member states between 14 and 18 March 2015 at the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Sendai, Japan, and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in June 2015. It is the successor agreement to the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015), which had been the most encompassing international accord to date on disaster risk reduction.

Other international initiatives

UN initiatives have helped to refine and promote the concept at international level, stimulated initially by the UN's designation of the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. In 1999, UN member states approved the International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, which reflected a shift from the traditional emphasis on disaster response to disaster reduction, by seeking to promote a "culture of prevention".

Disaster risk is an indicator of poor development, so reducing disaster risk requires integrating DRR practice into the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Decision makers need to manage risks, not just disasters.

Regional initiatives

Africa

Several African Regional Economic Communities have drafted gender-responsive DRR strategies. This includes the Southern African Development Community's Gender-Responsive Disaster Risk Reduction Strategic Plan and Plan of Action 2020-30; the Economic Commission of Central Africa States' Gender-Responsive Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy and Action Plan 2020-30; the Economic Commission of West African States' Disaster Risk Reduction Gender Strategy and Action Plan 2020-2030 and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Regional Strategy and Action Plan for Mainstreaming Gender in Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation.  

Bangladesh

Based on the Climate Risk Index, Bangladesh is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to different types of disasters because of climatic variability, extreme events, high population density, high incidence of poverty and social inequity, poor institutional capacity, inadequate financial resources, and poor infrastructure. Bangladesh commenced its disaster preparedness following the cyclone of 1991 and has now a comprehensive National Plan for Disaster Management which provides mechanisms at both national and sub-national levels.

Cost and financing

Economic costs of disasters are on the rise, but most humanitarian investment is currently spent on responding to disasters, rather than managing their future risks. Only 4% of the estimated $10 billion in annual humanitarian assistance is devoted to prevention (source), and yet every dollar spent on risk reduction saves between $5 and $10 in economic losses from disasters. A case study of Niger showed positive cost and benefit results for preparedness spending across 3 different scenarios (from the absolute level of disaster loss, to the potential reduction in disaster loss and the discount rate), estimating that every $1 spent results in $3.25 to $5.31 of benefit.

Countries are starting to develop national disaster risk financing strategies, using risk layering. Lesotho estimated that, through adopting such an approach, the government could save on average $4 million per year, and as much as $42 million for an extreme shock.

Disaster research

Disaster research deals with conducting field and survey research on group, organizational and community preparation for, response to, and recovery from natural and technological disasters and other community-wide crises.

Related field such as anthropology study human populations, environments, and events that create utter chaos. They research long-lasting effects on multiple areas of society including: social organization, political organization and empowerment, economic consequences, environmental degradation, human and environmental adaptation and interactions, oral history, traditional knowledge, psychological consequences, public health and the broader historical record of the affected region.

Public health preparedness requires cultural awareness, respect and preparation; different parties acting during a relief period are driven by cultural and religious beliefs, including taboos. If these are not acknowledged or known by emergency and medical personnel, treatment can become compromised by both a patient refusing to be treated and by personnel refusing to treat victims because of a violation of values.

Research history

United States

The Disaster Research Center (DRC), was the first social science research center in the world devoted to the study of disasters. It was established at Ohio State University in 1963 and moved to the University of Delaware in 1985.

The Center conducts field and survey research on group, organizational and community preparation for, response to, and recovery from natural and technological disasters and other community-wide crises. Disaster Research Center researchers have carried out systematic studies on a broad range of disaster types, including hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, hazardous chemical incidents, and plane crashes. Disaster Research Center has also done research on civil disturbances and riots, including the 1992 Los Angeles unrest. Staff have conducted nearly 600 field studies since the Center's inception, traveling to communities throughout the United States and to a number of foreign countries, including Mexico, Canada, Japan, Italy, and Turkey. Faculty members from the University's Sociology and Criminal Justice Department and Engineering Department direct the Disaster Research Center's projects. The staff also includes postdoctoral fellows, graduate students, undergraduates and research support personnel.

The Disaster Research Center not only maintains its own databases but also serves as a repository for materials collected by other agencies and researchers, and it contains over 50,000 items, making it the most complete collection on the social and behavioral aspects of disasters in the world.

Studies in the field of Disaster Research are supported by many diverse sources, such as:

• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
• Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research
• National Institute of Mental Health
• National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Sea Grant Program
• Public Entity Risk Institute
• Social Science Research Council
• U.S. Geological Survey

Additionally, there are numerous academic and national policy boards in the realm of disaster research:

• National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council's Commission on International Disaster Assistance and Board on Natural Disasters
• National Science Foundation's Social Hazard Review Panel
• U.S. Committee on the UN Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction

Major international conferences and workshops

With the growth of interest in disasters and disaster management, there are many conferences and workshops held on the topic, from local to global levels. Regular international conferences include:

• The annual conference of TIEMS: The International Emergency Management Society.
• The International Disaster and Risk Conferences (IDRC) and workshops, held each year since 2006, in Davos, Switzerland (even-numbered years), and other locations (odd numbered years).
• The meetings of the International Research Committee on Disasters (IRCD), held as part of the International Sociological Association's World Congress of Sociology.
• The biennial Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction is multi-stakeholder forum organized by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), which was established by the United Nations General Assembly to review progress, share knowledge, and discuss the latest developments and trends in reducing disaster risk.
• The World Reconstruction Conference (WRC) is a global forum that provides a platform for policy makers, experts, and practitioners from governments, international organizations, community-based organizations, the academia, and private sector from both developing and developed countries to come together to collect, assess, and share experiences in disaster recovery and reconstruction and take the policy dialogue forward.

Issues and challenges

Priorities

According to Mluver 1996 it is unrealistic to expect progress in every aspect of DRR : capacities and resources are insufficient. Governments and other organisations have to make what are in effect 'investment decisions', choosing which aspects of DRR to invest in, when, and in what sequence. This is made more complicated by the fact that many of the interventions advocated are developmental rather than directly related to disaster management. Most existing DRR guidance sidesteps this issue. One way of focusing is to consider only actions that are intended specifically to reduce disaster risk. This would at least distinguish from more general efforts toward sustainable development. The concept of 'invulnerable development' attempts this: In this formulation, invulnerable development is development directed toward reducing vulnerability to disaster, comprising 'decisions and activities that are intentionally designed and implemented to reduce risk and susceptibility, and also raise resistance and resilience to disaster'.

Partnerships and inter-organisational co-ordination

No single group or organisation can address every aspect of DRR. DRR thinking sees disasters as complex problems demanding a collective response. Co-ordination even in conventional emergency management is difficult, for many, organisations may converge on a disaster area to assist. Across the broader spectrum of DRR, the relationships between types of organisation and between sectors (public, private and non-profit, as well as communities) become much more extensive and complex. DRR requires strong vertical and horizontal linkages (central-local relations become important). In terms of involving civil society organisations, it should mean thinking broadly about which types of organisation to involve (i.e., conventional NGOs and such organisations as trades unions, religious institutions, amateur radio operators (as in the US and India), universities and research institutions).

Communities and their organizations

Traditional emergency management/civil defense thinking makes two misleading assumptions about communities. First, it sees other forms of social organisation (voluntary and community-based organisations, informal social groupings and families) as irrelevant to emergency action. Spontaneous actions by affected communities or groups (e.g., search and rescue) are viewed as irrelevant or disruptive, because they are not controlled by the authorities. The second assumption is that disasters produce passive 'victims' who are overwhelmed by crisis or dysfunctional behavior (panic, looting, self-seeking activities). They therefore, need to be told what to do and their behavior must be controlled — in extreme cases, through the imposition of martial law. There is plenty of sociological research to refute such 'myths'.

An alternative viewpoint, informed by a considerable volume of research, emphasises the importance of communities and local organisations in disaster risk management. The rationale for community-based disaster risk management that it responds to local problems and needs, capitalises on local knowledge and expertise, is cost-effective, improves the likelihood of sustainability through genuine 'ownership' of projects, strengthens community technical and organisational capacities, and empowers people by enabling them to tackle these and other challenges. Local people and organisations are the main actors in risk reduction and disaster response in any case. Consequently, it has been seen that understanding the social capital already existent in the community can greatly help reducing the risk at the community level.

Learning from a Colombian community

Widespread flooding affected most of Colombia's 32 regions between 2010 and 2012. Some 3.6 million people were affected. On 24 April 2012, President Juan Manuel Santos enacted a law which aimed at improving natural disaster response and prevention at both national and local level. The Universidad Del Norte, based in Barranquilla, has investigated how one community reacted to the destruction caused by the floods, in an effort to try to make Colombian communities more resilient to similar events occurring in the future. With funding from the Climate & Development Knowledge Network, the project team spent 18 months working with women from the municipality of Manatí, in the Department of Atlántico.

Here, 5,733 women were affected by the floods. They had to reconstruct their entire lives in a Manatí they could no longer recognise. The project team worked with the women to find out how they coped with the effects of the floods and to articulate the networks of reciprocity and solidarity that developed in the community. Their findings highlighted resilience strategies that the community used to respond to the extreme event. The researchers suggested that similar strategies could be used to inform government actions to reduce or manage risk from disasters. They also concluded that it is important to consider gender when planning for disasters as women and men often play very different roles and because, on average, disasters kill more women than men.

Governance

The DRR approach requires redefining the role of government disaster reduction. It is generally agreed that national governments should be main actors in DRR: They have a duty to ensure the safety of citizens, the resources and capacity to implement large-scale DRR, a mandate to direct or co-ordinate the work of others, and they create the necessary policy and legislative frameworks. These policies and programmes have to be coherent. More research is needed on the relationship between central government and other actors is another area requiring research. In most countries, risk management is decentralized to local governments. In urban areas, the most widely used tool is the local development plan (municipal, comprehensive or general plan), followed by emergency and risk reduction plans that local governments are required to adopt by law and are updated every 4–5 years. Larger cities prefer stand-alone plans, called, depending on the context, sustainable, mitigation, or green plans. In rural areas, the mainstreaming of risk reduction policies into municipal (county or district) development plans prevails. In many contexts, especially South of the Sahara, this process clashes with the lack of funds or mechanisms for transferring resources from the central to the local budget. Too often plans do not integrate local, scientific and technical knowledge. Finally, they entrust the implementation of policies to individual inhabitants without having fully involved them in the decision-making process. The authentic representativeness of the communities and gender participation in the decision-making process still remain an objective of the local development plans instead of being the way to build them.

Accountability and rights

The principle of accountability lies at the heart of genuine partnership and participation in DRR. It applies to state institutions that are expected to be accountable through the democratic process and to private sector and non-profit organizations that are not subject to democratic control. Accountability is an emerging issue in disaster reduction work. Accountability should be primarily toward those who are vulnerable to hazards and affected by them.

Many organisations working in international aid and development are now committing themselves to a 'rights-based' approach. This tends to encompass human rights (i.e., those that are generally accepted through international agreements) and other rights that an agency believes should be accepted as human rights. In such contexts, the language of rights may be used vaguely, with a risk of causing confusion. Security against disasters is not generally regarded as a right although it is addressed in some international codes, usually indirectly. The idea of a 'right to safety' is being discussed in some circles.

Different kinds of disasters

Gender

Further information: Gender and climate change

Disaster risk is not gender-neutral. Studies have shown that women and girls are disproportionately impacted by disasters. Following the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, 77% and 72% of the deaths in the districts of North Aceh and Aceh Besar, Indonesia, were female. And in India 62% of people who died were female. This is due to socially-constructed gender roles that determine what norms and behaviors are acceptable for women and men, and girls and boys. In particular, women tend to take responsibility for home-based tasks and can be reluctant to leave their assets in the case of hazard warning; and often do not learn survival skills that can help in disasters, such as learning to swim or climb.

A gender-sensitive approach would identify how disasters affect men, women, boys and girls differently and shape policy that addresses people's specific vulnerabilities, concerns and needs.

Climate security

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_security 

Map of the Earth with a six-meter sea level rise represented in red (uniform distribution, actual sea level rise will vary regionally). Hotspots of SLR can divert 3-4 times in the rate of rise, compared to the global average, such as projected for parts of the U.S. East Coast.

Climate security refers to the national and international security risks induced, directly or indirectly, by changes in climate patterns. It is a concept that summons the idea that climate-related change amplifies existing risks in society that endangers the security of humans, ecosystems, economy, infrastructure and societies. Climate-related security risks have far-reaching implications for the way the world manages peace and security. Climate actions to adapt and mitigate impacts can also have a negative effect on human security if mishandled.

Climate change has the potential to exacerbate existing tensions or create new ones – serving as a threat multiplier. It can be a catalyst for violent conflict and a threat to international security. A meta-analysis of over 50 quantitative studies that examine the link between climate and conflict found that "for each 1 standard deviation (1σ) change in climate toward warmer temperatures or more extreme rainfall, median estimates indicate that the frequency of interpersonal violence rises 4% and the frequency of intergroup conflict rises 14%." The IPCC has suggested that the disruption of environmental migration may serve to exacerbate conflicts, though they are less confident of the role of increased resource scarcity. Of course, climate change does not always lead to violence, and conflicts are often caused by multiple interconnected factors.

A variety of experts have warned that climate change may lead to increased conflict. The Military Advisory Board, a panel of retired U.S. generals and admirals, predicted that global warming will serve as a "threat multiplier" in already volatile regions. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security, two Washington think tanks, have reported that flooding "has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities," leading to "armed conflict over resources." They indicate that the greatest threat would come from "large-scale migrations of people – both inside nations and across existing national borders." However, other researchers have been more skeptical: One study found no statistically meaningful relationship between climate and conflict using data from Europe between the years 1000 and 2000.

The link between climate change and security is a concern for authorities across the world, including United Nations Security Council and the G77 group of developing nations. Climate change's impact as a security threat is expected to hit developing nations particularly hard. In Britain, Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett has argued that "An unstable climate will exacerbate some of the core drivers of conflict, such as migratory pressures and competition for resources." The links between the human impact of climate change and the threat of violence and armed conflict are particularly important because multiple destabilizing conditions are affected simultaneously.

Background

See also: Effects of climate change on humans and Environmental security

Climate security refers to the security risks induced, directly or indirectly, by changes in climate patterns. Climate change has been identified as a severe-to-catastrophic threat to international security in the 21st century by multiple risk and security reports. The 2020 Global Catastrophic Risks report, issued by the Global Challenges Foundation, concluded that climate change has a high likelihood to end civilization. 70% of international governments consider climate change to be a national security issue. Policy interest in climate security risks has grown rapidly and affects the policy agenda in relation to, among other questions, food and energy security, migration policy, and diplomatic efforts. Climate change is a global challenge which will affect all countries in the long-term as the impact of climate change is spread unevenly across different regions. However, there may a disproportionally harsher effect in fragile contexts and/or socially vulnerable and marginalized groups.

USDA, projected changes in food prices, depending on emissions scenarios, also factoring trade

The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment report states:

The past 115 years have been the warmest period in the history of modern civilization, and the past few years have been the warmest years on record. Extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential for greater impacts and can compound with other drivers to raise the risk of humanitarian disasters, conflict, water and food shortages, population migration, labor shortfalls, price shocks, and power outages. Research has not identified indicators of tipping points in climate-linked Earth systems, suggesting a possibility of abrupt climate change.

According to studies on climate security, it is often difficult to determine whether security and conflict issues in many countries and regions may occur, or can be attributed to climate change or climate related issues due to the presence of many factors such as ethnic tension, regional resolution tactics to issues, and outside powers placing pressures on countries being the possible reason for the conflict.

Academia

Within academia, climate security is part of environmental security and was first mentioned in the Brundtland Report in 1987. Thirty years later, experts and scientists in fields such as politics, diplomacy, environment and security have used this concept in an increasing frequency. There is high agreement that climate change intimidates security where the term ‘security’ can refer to a broad range of securities involving national, international and Human Security. Human Security is the most fragile as it can be compromised in order to protect national or international security.

Scholars analyzing conflicts with a climate security rendering have long argued that climate change can adversely affect security and international stability. Research has examined ‘indirect pathways between climate stress and conflict’ — through factors like economic growth, food price shock and forced displacement apart from other types of shock such as: income and livelihood shock (with the accompanying caveats in the table). Climate change can threaten human security by impacting economic growth, food price stock, undermining livelihoods, and prompting displacement. Moreover, there has been reports of collapse of pastoral societies, terrorist groups seeking recruits in dehydrated lands, and flooding ultimately feeding anti-government sentiments. Unstable regions appear to be incapable of surviving climate change-related stresses; instead creating conditions for radicalization, poverty and violent conflict. Scholars of climate security can analyze the chronological order of an escalation, where a changing environment or climate change can be an underlying variable. It is a complex interplay of many political and socio-economical factors where climate change is considered a risk-or threat-multiplier.

During the 70's and 80's the Jason advisory group, concerned with security, conducted research on climate change. Climate change has been identified as a threat multiplier, which can exacerbate existing threats. A 2013 meta-analysis of 60 previous peer-reviewed studies, and 45 data sets concluded that, "climate change intensifies natural resource stresses in a way that can increase the likelihood of livelihood devastation, state fragility, human displacement, and mass death."

In the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), The Pentagon stated: "The QDR will set a long-term course for DOD as it assesses the threats and challenges that the nation faces and re-balances DOD's strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats." and " "As greenhouse gas emissions increase, sea levels are rising, average global temperatures are increasing, and severe weather patterns are accelerating [...] Climate change may exacerbate water scarcity and lead to sharp increases in food costs. The pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the world. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence."  Climate scientist Michael E. Mann stated in his commentary to the 2018 global heat wave that climate change is a national security nightmare.

Impact

A report in 2003 by Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall looked at potential implications from climate-related scenarios for the national security of the United States, and concluded, "We have created a climate change scenario that although not the most likely, is plausible, and would challenge United States national security in ways that should be considered immediately." Among the findings were:

"There is a possibility that this gradual global warming could lead to a relatively abrupt slowing of the ocean's thermohaline conveyor, which could lead to harsher winter weather conditions, sharply reduced soil moisture, and more intense winds in certain regions that currently provide a significant fraction of the world's food production. With inadequate preparation, the result could be a significant drop in the human carrying capacity of the Earth's environment."

Researchers studying ancient climate patterns (paleoclimatology) noted in a 2007 study:

We show that long-term fluctuations of war frequency and population changes followed the cycles of temperature change. Further analyses show that cooling impeded agricultural production, which brought about a series of serious social problems, including price inflation, then successively war outbreak, famine, and population decline.

A 2013 review by the U.S. National Research Council assessed the implications of abrupt climate change, including implications for the physical climate system, natural systems, or human systems. The authors noted, "A key characteristic of these changes is that they can come faster than expected, planned, or budgeted for, forcing more reactive, rather than proactive, modes of behavior." A 2018 meta study cited cascading tipping elements, which could trigger self-reinforcing feedbacks that progress even when man-made emissions are reduced, and which could eventually establish a new hothouse climate state. The authors noted, "If the threshold is crossed, the resulting trajectory would likely cause serious disruptions to ecosystems, society, and economies." 

Health

See also: Wet-bulb globe temperature and Effects of global warming on human health

Studies identified uptake in mortality due to extreme heat waves. Extreme heat conditions can overcome the human capacity to thermo regulate; future scenarios with rising emissions could expose about 74% of the world population for at least twenty days per year to lethal heat events.

Psychological impacts

Further information: Effects of climate change on human health § Impacts_on_mental_health

A 2011 article in the American Psychologist identified three classes of psychological impacts from global climate change:

• Direct - "Acute or traumatic effects of extreme weather events and a changed environment"
• Indirect - "Threats to emotional well-being based on observation of impacts and concern or uncertainty about future risks"
• Psychosocial - "Chronic social and community effects of heat, drought, migrations, and climate-related conflicts, and postdisaster adjustment"

Consequences of psychosocial impacts caused by climate change include: increase in violence, intergroup conflict, displacement and relocation and socioeconomic disparities. Based on research, there is a causal relationship between heat and violence and that any increase in average global temperature is likely to be accompanied by an increase in violent aggression.

Conflicts

Further information: Water conflict

 

Climate threats and risks

     The secondary impacts of climate hazards could be even more dangerous. Chief among them is an increased risk of armed conflict in places where established social orders and populations are disrupted. The risk will rise even more where climate effects compound social instability, reduce access to basic necessities, undermine fragile governments and economies, damage vital infrastructure, and lower agricultural production.

U.S. Army Climate Strategy
February 2022

Since climate change has serious and broad implications for societies and human livelihoods, the potential security consequences are far-reaching and complex. The topic started to receive major attention in 2007 when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for their efforts to mitigate climate change. In the same year, the UN Security Council held its first debate on climate change and security, with follow-up debates on the topic in 2012, 2018, 2019 and 2020. In an early study on the topic, the German Advisory Council on Global Change identified four pathways potentially connecting climate change to conflict: degradation of freshwater resources, food insecurity, an increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters, and increasing or changing migration patterns. These factors can reportedly increase the risk of violent conflict by, for instance, changing opportunity structures for violence (e.g., when states are weakened or deprived individuals can be recruited by armed groups more easily) or exacerbating the grievances of affected populations.

In a 2016 article, published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the author suggested that conflict over climate-related water issues could lead to nuclear conflict, involving Kashmir, India and Pakistan. But while some scholars agree that climate change are unlikely to have major impacts on the nature of interstate wars, concerns have been raised about its impacts on civil wars and communal conflicts. Based on a meta-analysis of 60 studies, Hsiang, Burke and Miguel conclude that warmer temperatures and more extreme rainfall could increase interpersonal violence by 4%, and intergroup conflict by 14% (median estimates). However, their results have been disputed by other researchers as being not sufficiently robust to alternative model specifications. Recent studies have been more careful and agree that climate-related disasters (including heatwaves, droughts, storms and floods) modestly increase armed conflict risks, but only in the presence of contextual factors like agricultural dependence, insufficient infrastructure or the political exclusion of ethnic groups. Climate change is therefore rather a "risk multiplier" that amplifies existing risks of conflict. In line with this and other reviews of the topic, an expert assessment published 2019 in Nature concludes that between 3% and 20% of intrastate, armed conflict risks in the previous century were affected by climate-related factors, but that other drivers of conflict are far more important.

The expert assessment itself notes that major knowledge gaps and uncertainties continue to exist in the research field, especially regarding the pathways connecting climate change to conflict risk. Selby argues that the assessment ignores critical or constructivist approaches. Indeed, there are a number of studies that criticize how climate-conflict research is based on a deterministic and conflict-oriented worldview and that findings of statistical studies on the topic are based on problematic models and biased datasets. Existing research also predominantly focuses on a few, well-known and already conflict-ridden regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. This raises questions about sampling biases as well as implications for less-considered regions like Latin America and the Pacific, with topics such as peaceful adaptation and environmental peacebuilding also understudied. The IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report also notes that several factors that increase general conflict risk are sensitive to climate change, but that there is no direct and simple causal association between nature and society.

Even so, several case studies have linked climate change to increased violent conflicts between farmers and herders in Nigeria, Kenya and Sudan, but have found mixed results for Mali and Tanzania. Evidence is also ambiguous and highly contested for high-intensity conflicts such as civil wars. Claims have been put forward that climate change-related droughts, in combination with other factors, had facilitated the civil war in Darfur, the Arab Spring in Egypt, the Syrian civil war, the Islamist insurgency in Nigeria, and the Somali civil war. Yet some studies have suggested that there is very little evidence for several of these causal claims, including for the cases of Darfur, Egypt, Syria, and Ghana.

Recently, researchers have paid increased attention to the impacts of climate change on low-intensity and even non-violent conflicts, such as riots, demonstrations or sit-ins. Even if people do not have the means or motivation to use violence, they can engage in such forms of conflict, for instance in the face of high food prices or water scarcity. Studies indeed show that in vulnerable societies, the anticipated consequences of climate change such as reduced food and water security increase the risk of protests. These conflicts often add to and trigger the escalation of deeper social and political struggles.

According to a report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, intensifying physical effects of climate change "will exacerbate geopolitical flashpoints, particularly after 2030, and key countries and regions will face increasing risks of instability and need for humanitarian assistance.” It names Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, Nicaragua, North Korea and Pakistan as likely to face extreme weather episodes that pose threats to energy, food, water and health security: “Diminished energy, food and water security in the 11 countries probably will exacerbate poverty, tribal or ethnic intercommunal tensions and dissatisfaction with governments, increasing the risk of social, economic, and political instability."

Adaptation

Setup of a solar shade canopy for humanitarian aid and disaster relief. The solar shade has the potential to provide enough energy for continuous 24-hour use.

Energy

See also: Energy usage of the United States military

At least since 2010, the U.S. military begun to push aggressively to develop, evaluate and deploy renewable energy to decrease its need to transport fossil fuels. Based on the 2015 annual report from NATO, the alliance plans investments in renewables and energy efficiency to reduce risks to soldiers, and cites the impacts from climate change on security as a reason.

Climate security practices

Due to the growing importance of climate security on the agendas of many governments, international organisations, and other bodies some now run programmes which are designed to mitigate the effects of climate change on conflict. These practices are known as climate security practices  which are defined by von Lossow et al. as “tangible actions implemented by a (local or central) government, organisation, community, private actor or individual to help prevent, reduce, mitigate or adapt (to) security risks and threats related to impacts of climate change and related environmental degradation”. The Planetary Security Initiative at the Clingendael Institute maintain an updated list of climate security practices.

These practices stem from a variety of actors with different motivations in the sphere of development, diplomacy and defence. An example is the Arms to Farms project in Kauswagan municipality, the Philippines. An insurgency in the area was aggravated by food insecurity because irregular rainfall that caused poor harvests led to an uptick in insurgent recruitment sparking further violence. The project successfully integrated former insurgents into the community by training them in agricultural methods and fostering trust between communities, increasing food security, peace and human security overall. Another example is a division of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) that seeks to solve community conflicts, which can stem from climate change caused resource shortages. One project in Kidal built a new and more effective water pump in order to solve the issue of conflict between different stakeholders in the area over water which risked a violent confrontation.

The field of climate security practices is still young and even though the issue is growing in importance, some actors are still reluctant to get involved due to the uncertainty inherent in the new field. Because climatic change will only increase in the near future von Lossow et al. conclude that expanding the number of climate security practices in vulnerable areas of the world has “huge potential to catalyse more sustainable and long-term peace and stability”.

Political discourse

The transnational character of climate-related security risks often goes beyond the capacity of national governments to respond adequately. Many parts of governments or state leaders acknowledge climate change as an issue for human security, national or regional security:

United Nations

Although climate change is first and foremost dealt within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and now also under the Paris agreement, the security implications of climate change do not have an institutional home within the United Nations system, and hence remain largely unaddressed, in spite of the urgency of the threat it poses to peace and security in several regions. The UN, through its COP - The Conference of the Parties - is the supreme body to negotiate climate frameworks under the UNFCCC Convention. It consists of the representatives of the Parties to the Convention and holds its sessions every year, and takes decisions which are necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the Convention and regularly reviews the implementation of these provisions.Preventing “dangerous” human interference with the climate system is the ultimate aim of the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC is a “Rio Convention”, one of three adopted at the “Rio Earth Summit” in 1992. The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994. Today, it has near-universal membership. The COP has discussed Climate Security during panels, workshops as session, but not as a programmatic track. The greater focus on this topic by the UN has led to the launch in October 2018 of the inter-agency DPPA-UNDP-UN Environment cooperation called the ‘Climate Security Mechanism’.

United Nations Security Council

The UN Security Council first debated climate security and energy in 2007 and in 2011 issued a presidential statement expressing concern at the possible adverse security effects of climate change. There has been a series of informal Arria-Formula meetings on issues related to climate change. In July 2018, Sweden initiated a debate on Climate and Security in the United Nations Security Council. Climate change grew beyond its categorisation as a hypothetical, existential risk and became an operational concern of relevance to other peace and security practitioners beyond the diplomats in the Security Council.

European Union (EU)

The European Council's conclusions on climate diplomacy state that "Climate change is a decisive global challenge which, if not urgently managed, will put at risk ... peace, stability and security."  The Intelligence on European Pensions and Institutional Investment think-tank published a 2018 report with the key point, "Climate change is an existential risk whose elimination must become a corporate objective". In June 2018 European External Action Service (EEAS) High-Level Event hosted an event themed "Climate, Peace and Security: The Time for Action". The EU's comprehensive approach to security would suggest that the EU is well placed to respond to climate-related security risks. However, recent scientific research shows that the European Union has not yet developed a fully coherent policy.

NATO

NATO stated in 2015 that climate change is a significant security threat and that ‘Its bite is already being felt’. In 2021, NATO agreed a Climate Change and Security Action Plan that committed the alliance to 1) analyse the impact of climate change on NATO's strategic environment and NATO's assets, installations, missions and operations 2) incorporate climate change considerations into its work3) contribute to the mitigation of climate change and 4) exchange with partner countries, as well as with international and regional organizations that are active on climate change and security.

United States

In the United States, analysis of climate security and the development of policy ideas for addressing it has been led by the Center for Climate and Security, founded by Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell in 2011, which is now an institute of the Council on Strategic Risks.

US intelligence analysts have expressed concern about the "serious security risks" of climate change since the 1980s. In 2007, the Council on Foreign Relations released a report titled, Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action, stating that "Climate change presents a serious threat to the security and prosperity of the United States and other countries." A 2012 report published by the Joint Global Change Research Institute indicated that second and third order impacts of climate change, such as migration and state stability, are of concern for the US defense and intelligence communities. A 2015 report published by the White House found that climate change puts coastal areas at risk, that a changing Arctic poses risks to other parts of the country, risk for infrastructure, and increases demands on military resources. In 2016, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper noted: "Unpredictable instability has become the “new normal,” and this trend will continue for the foreseeable future...Extreme weather, climate change, environmental degradation, rising demand for food and water, poor policy decisions and inadequate infrastructure will magnify this instability."

A 2015 Pentagon report pointed out how climate denial threatens national security. In 2017, the Trump administration removed climate change from its national security strategy. But in January 2019 the Pentagon released a report stating that climate change is a national security threat to USA. In June 2019, in the course of House Select Committee on Intelligence hearings on the national security implications of climate change, the White House blocked the submission of a statement by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Office, and the analyst who wrote the statement resigned. The idea of creating a presidential committee on climate security has been proposed. As part of the United States National Defense Authorization Act the U.S. Congress asked the Department of Defense for a report on climate matters. The report was published in 2019, and notes, "The effects of a changing climate are a national security issue with potential impacts to Department of Defense (DoD or the Department) missions, operational plans, and installations."

Australia

A 2018 published report by the Australian Senate noted how "climate change as a current and existential national security risk... defined as one that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development."

United Kingdom

In 2014, David Cameron noted that "Climate change is one of the most serious threats facing our world". A 2018 article in UK's The Independent also argued that the U.S.' Trump administration is ‘putting British national security at risk’, according to over 100 climate scientists.

On September 23, 2021, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, UK Minister for the United Nations stated that climate change threatened the safety of the country and all people. He also mentioned that the United Kingdom will host the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow on 31 October – 12 November 2021.

Climate security in Africa

Climate change has had devastating effects on the African continent, affecting the poorest communities. It has escalated food insecurity, led to the displacement of populations and exerted extreme pressure on the available water resources. Africa's exposure to climate change is high due to its low adaptive capacity and limited government capabilities, making it the most vulnerable continent. Although the exact connection between climate change and insecurity is quite blurred, evidence suggests that environmental degradation and resource scarcity contribute to violent conflict in some way. This especially happens when ethnic divisions erupt in countries with weak political systems, and low levels of economic development. A 2007 report by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon points out that, climate change and environmental degradation were partly responsible for the Darfur, Sudan conflict. Between 1967 and 2007, the total rainfall in the area had reduced by 30 percent and the expansion of the Sahara was beyond a mile every year.The ensuing friction between farmers and pastoralists over the reducing grazing land and the few water sources available was at the heart of the Darfur civil war.Of recent, there has been a connection between climate change and the terrorist uprising around the Lake Chad Basin. Climate change has caused rainfall variations and desertification threatening the well-being of people whose lives depend on Lake Chad. Reports suggest that Lake Chad is shrinking at a fast speed, which is creating sharp competition for water. Conflicts arise when communities relocate to places with better water sources, without respecting national borders. Such conditions have also created an ideal environment for the Nigerian Islamist Insurgent group Boko Haram to extend its territory, hence increasing insecurity in the region. In Senegal, the rise in temperatures has led to the migration of the much-sought-after Sardinella fish. Sardinella is known for its high "economic value and food security". Oftentimes conflicts arise when Senegalese fishermen cross to Mauritania searching for fish. Schmidt and Muggah point out that the continued rise in sea level will likely exacerbate conflicts similar to those already seen in the fishing communities of Senegal.  A close look at the Sahel region and the Lake Chad Basin gives an insight into the possible conflicts connected to food security and climate change. As Brown, Hammill and McLeman suggest, strengthening the capacity to adapt to climate change can contribute to the resolution of climate-related conflicts.

Examples

Experts have suggested links to climate change in several major conflicts:

• War in Darfur, where sustained drought encouraged conflict between herders and farmers
• Syrian civil war, preceded by the displacement of 1.5 million people due to drought-induced crop and livestock failure But this is disputed by some academics who say that although the severe drought of 2007 – 2008 in north-east Syria was made more likely by climate change, it is very unlikely that this helped to start the Syrian civil war.
• Islamist insurgency in Nigeria, which exploited natural resource shortages to fuel anti-government sentiment
• Somali Civil War, in which droughts and extreme high temperatures have been linked to violence
• Herder–farmer conflicts in Nigeria, Mali, South Sudan and other countries in the Sahel region are exacerbated by climate change.
• Northern Mali conflict, in which droughts and extreme high temperatures have been linked to violence

Additionally, paleoclimatologists have determined the connections between war frequencies and population changes which have led to the various cycles in temperatures since the preindustrial era. Securitization is a slow process that builds on an issue resulting from a variety of political actions and choices. A 2016 study finds that "drought can contribute to sustaining conflict, especially for agriculturally dependent groups and politically excluded groups in very poor countries. These results suggest a reciprocal nature–society interaction in which violent conflict and environmental shock constitute a vicious circle, each phenomenon increasing the group’s vulnerability to the other." Different researchers have done several analyses regarding whether or not climate change has been securitized. It's essential to understand securitization because it could lead to the placing of certain policies. The disasters leading to this process include the vast disturbances in certain communities that have become unsafe and have made them more vulnerable to economic, human, and environmental losses. Different cases have been able to prove this problem in many communities.

According to a report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, intensifying physical effects of climate change "will exacerbate geopolitical flashpoints, particularly after 2030, and key countries and regions will face increasing risks of instability and need for humanitarian assistance.” It names Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, Nicaragua, North Korea and Pakistan as likely to face extreme weather episodes that pose threats to energy, food, water and health security: “Diminished energy, food and water security in the 11 countries probably will exacerbate poverty, tribal or ethnic intercommunal tensions and dissatisfaction with governments, increasing the risk of social, economic, and political instability."