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Thursday, August 31, 2023

Linguistic imperialism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Linguistic imperialism or language imperialism is occasionally defined as "the transfer of a dominant language to other people". This language "transfer" (or rather unilateral imposition) comes about because of imperialism. The transfer is considered to be a sign of power; traditionally military power but also, in the modern world, economic power. Aspects of the dominant culture are usually transferred along with the language. In spatial terms, indigenous languages are employed in the function of official (state) languages in Eurasia, while only non-indigenous imperial (European) languages in the "Rest of the World". In the modern world, linguistic imperialism may also be considered in the context of international development, affecting the standard by which organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank evaluate the trustworthiness and value of structural adjustment loans.

Since the early 1990s, linguistic imperialism has attracted attention among scholars of applied linguistics. In particular, Robert Phillipson's 1992 book, Linguistic Imperialism, has led to considerable debate about its merits and shortcomings. Phillipson found denunciations of linguistic imperialism that dated back to Nazi critiques of the British Council (European aristocracy was, at the time, agreeing on the use of English), and to Soviet analyses of English as the language of world capitalism and world domination. In this vein, criticism of English as a world language is often rooted in anti-globalism.

Definition

Linguistic imperialism is a form of linguicism which benefits and grants power to the dominating/oppressing language and its speakers. As summarized by linguists Heath Rose and John Conama, Dr. Phillipson argues that the defining characteristics of linguistic imperialism are:

As a form of linguicism, which manifests in favoring the dominant language over another along similar lines as racism and sexism.
As a structurally manifested idea, where more resources and infrastructure are given to the dominant language
As being ideological, in that it encourages beliefs that the dominant language form is more prestigious than others. These ideas are hegemonic and internalized and naturalized as being "normal".
As intertwined with the same structure as imperialism in culture, education, media, and politics.
As having an exploitative essence, which causes injustice and inequality between those who use the dominant language and those who do not.
As having a subtractive influence on other languages, in that learning the dominant language is at the expense of others.
As being contested and resisted, because of these factors.

Although it is not easy to determine the intentions of specific policies which have led to linguicism, some scholars believe that intent can be proven by observing whether imperialist practices are continued once their sociolinguistic, sociological, psychological, political, and educational harm of other languages are made aware.

History

The impacts of colonization on linguistic traditions vary based on the form of colonization experienced: trader, settler or exploitation. Congolese-American linguist Salikoko Mufwene describes trader colonization as one of the earliest forms of European colonization. In regions such as the western coast of Africa as well as the Americas, trade relations between European colonizers and indigenous peoples led to the development of pidgin languages. Some of these languages, such as Delaware Pidgin and Mobilian Jargon, were based on Native American languages, while others, such as Nigerian Pidgin and Cameroonian Pidgin, were based on European ones. As trader colonization proceeded mainly via these hybrid languages, rather than the languages of the colonizers, scholars like Mufwene contend that it posed little threat to indigenous languages.

Trader colonization was often followed by settler colonization, where European colonizers settled in these colonies to build new homes. Hamel, a Mexican linguist, argues that "segregation" and "integration" were two primary ways through which settler colonists engaged with aboriginal cultures. In countries such as Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and those in the Caribbean, segregation and genocide decimated indigenous societies. Widespread death due to war and illness caused many indigenous populations to lose their indigenous languages. In contrast, in countries that pursued policies of "integration", such as Mexico, Guatemala and the Andean states, indigenous cultures were lost as aboriginal tribes mixed with colonists. In these countries, the establishment of new European orders led to the adoption of colonial languages in governance and industry. In addition, European colonists also viewed the dissolution of indigenous societies and traditions as necessary for the development of a unified nation state. This led to efforts to destroy tribal languages and cultures: in Canada and the United States, for example, Native children were sent to boarding schools such as Col. Richard Pratt's Carlisle Indian Industrial School. Today, in countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia, which were once settler colonies, indigenous languages are spoken by only a small minority of the populace.

Mufwene also draws a distinction between settler colonies and exploitation colonies. In the latter, the process of colonization was focused on the extraction of raw materials needed in Europe. As a result, Europeans were less invested in their exploitation colonies, and few colonists planned to build homes in these colonies. As a result, indigenous languages were able to survive to a greater extent in these colonies compared to settler colonies. In exploitation colonies, colonial languages were often only taught to a small local elite. During the period of British rule in India, for example, Lord Macaulay highlighted the need for "... a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions who govern... a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in my opinion, in morals and in intellect" in his now-famous "Macaulay minutes", which were written in support of the English Education Act of 1835. The linguistic differences between the local elite and other locals exacerbated class stratification, and also increased inequality in access to education, industry and civic society in postcolonial states.

English

In Linguistic Imperialism, Robert Henry Phillipson defines English linguistic imperialism as "the dominance of English... asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages." English is often called a worldwide "lingua franca", but Phillipson argues that when its dominance leads to a linguicide, it can be more aptly titled a "lingua frankensteinia" by his view.

Phillipson's theory supports the historic spread of English as an international language and that language's continued dominance, particularly in postcolonial settings such as Wales, Scotland, Ireland, India, Pakistan, Uganda, Zimbabwe, etc., but also increasingly in "neo-colonial" settings such as continental Europe. His theory draws mainly on Johan Galtung's imperialism theory, Antonio Gramsci's theory, and in particular on his notion of cultural hegemony.

A central theme of Phillipson's theory is the complex hegemonic processes which, he asserts, continue to sustain the pre-eminence of English in the world today. His book analyzes the British Council's use of rhetoric to promote English, and discusses key tenets of English applied linguistics and English-language-teaching methodology. These tenets hold that:

English is best taught monolingually ("the monolingual fallacy");
the ideal teacher is a native speaker ("the native-speaker fallacy");
the earlier English is taught, the better the results ("the early-start fallacy");
the more English is taught, the better the results ("the maximum-exposure fallacy");
if other languages are used much, standards of English will drop ("the subtractive fallacy").

According to Phillipson, those who promote English—organizations such as the British Council, the IMF and the World Bank, and individuals such as operators of English-language schools—use three types of argument:

Intrinsic arguments describe the English language as "providential", "rich", "noble" and "interesting". Such arguments tend to assert what English is and what other languages are not.
Extrinsic arguments point out that English is well-established: that it has many speakers, and that there are trained teachers and a wealth of teaching material.
Functional arguments emphasize the usefulness of English as a gateway to the world.

Other arguments for English are:

its economic utility: it enables people to get access to some technologies
its ideological function: it is said as standing for modernity;
its status might be seen as symbol for material advance and efficiency.

Another theme in Phillipson's work is "linguicism"—the kind of prejudice which can lead to endangered languages becoming extinct or losing their local eminence due to the rise and competing prominence of English.

Other languages

At various times, especially in colonial settings or where a dominant culture has sought to unify a region under its control, a similar phenomenon has arisen. In the Roman Empire, Latin—originally the language of a limited region in central Italy—was imposed first on the rest of Italy and later on parts of Europe, largely displacing local languages, while in Roman Africa Latin was dominant only until it and the native languages were displaced by Arabization.

Anatolia had similar linguistic diversity when it was ruled by small native states. Under the Persian and Hellenistic empires, the tongue of the conqueror served as the lingua franca. The indigenous Anatolian languages disappeared.

In the Far East, Africa and the Americas, regional languages have been or are being coercively replaced or slighted—Tibetan and regional Chinese varieties by Mandarin Chinese, Ainu and Ryukyuan by Japanese, Quechua and Mesoamerican languages by Spanish, Malayo-Polynesian languages by Malay (incl. Indonesian), Philippine languages by Filipino and so on. Arabization has eliminated many indigenous Berber languages in North Africa and restricted Coptic to use as a liturgical language by Coptic Christian Orthodox and Coptic Catholic Churches.

The English language during the Middle Ages was an object of linguistic imperialism by the French language, particularly following the Norman conquest. For hundreds of years, French or Anglo-Norman was the language of administration (See Law French) and therefore a language of higher status in England. Latin remained the tongue of church and learning. Although many words introduced by the Normans are today indistinguishable by most English-speakers from native Germanic words, later-learned loanwords, copied from Latin or French may "sound more cultured" to a native English-speaker.

Following the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire over much of present-day Germany and Central Europe, the German language and its dialects became the preferred language of many Central-European nobility. With varying success, German spread across much of Central and Eastern Europe as a language of trade and status. This ended with World War II (See also Germanization.).

French has also expanded. Languages such as Occitan, Breton, Basque, Catalan and Corsican have been slighted in France. This process, known as Francization, often causes resistance amongst minority peoples, leading to demands for independence. Examples of this can still be found in Breton nationalism and in the Flanders' Flemish Movement in Belgium).

In Italy there is a situation similar to the French one, with Italian that has expanded at the expense of languages such as Sardinian, Sicilian, Ladin, Venetian and Friulan, while languages such as German (in South Tyrol) or French (in Aosta Valley), historically persecuted, are now co-official in those regions (See also Italianization).

Portuguese and Spanish colonization made these languages prevalent in South America and in parts of Africa and Asia (the Philippines, Macau, and for a short time Formosa). In Spain, Spanish spread and was imposed over other languages, becoming the only official language of the state from the 18th to the 20th century. It was labelled "the companion of the Empire" by Antonio de Nebrija (1492) in the introduction to his Gramática de la lengua castellana.

Russian linguistic imperialism can be seen in Belarus both in the former dispute over the name of the country (Belarus vs Belorussia) and in the common spelling of the name of their president. The English transcription of his name is the Russian form, Alexander Lukashenko, instead of the Belarusian form, Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

In post-independence India, there were attempts to make Hindi as the sole official language which was vehemently opposed by various provinces, particularly by the state of Tamil Nadu. In Karnataka, linguistic imperialism manifests as pushes to impose Kannada almost everywhere.

Criticism

Many scholars have participated in lively discussions of Phillipson's claims. Alan Davies, for instance, envisions the ghost of Phillipson haunting the Department of Applied Linguistics in Edinburgh:

'Round up the usual suspects', he cries, outing those who have pretended all these years merely to teach applied linguistics, but who have really been plotting with the British Council to take over the world.

For Davies, two cultures inhabit linguistic imperialism: one, a culture of guilt ("colonies should never have happened"); the other, that of romantic despair ("we shouldn't be doing what we are doing"). Rajagopalan goes a step farther and maintains that Phillipson's book has led to a guilt complex among English language learning and teaching (ELT) professionals.

Davies also argues that Phillipson's claims are not falsifiable: what "if the dominated... wanted to adopt English and continue to want to keep it? Phillipson's unfalsifiable answer must be that they don't, they can't, they've been persuaded against their better interests." It has thus been argued that Phillipson's theory is patronizing in its implication that developing countries lack independent decision-making capacity (to adopt or not to adopt ELT). In the context of Nigeria, Bisong holds that people in the "periphery" use English pragmatically—they send their children to English-language schools precisely because they want them to grow up multilingual. Regarding Phillipson, Bisong maintains that "to interpret such actions as emanating from people who are victims of Centre linguistic imperialism is to bend sociolinguistic evidence to suit a preconceived thesis". If English should be abolished because it is foreign, Bisong argues, then Nigeria itself would also have to be dissolved, because it was conceived as a colonial structure.

Furthermore, the assumption that the English language itself is imperialistic has come under attack. Henry Widdowson has argued that "there is a fundamental contradiction in the idea that the language of itself exerts hegemonic control: namely that if this were the case, you would never be able to challenge such control". Additionally, the idea that the promotion of English necessarily implies a demotion of local languages has been challenged. Holborrow points out that "not all Englishes in the centre dominate, nor are all speakers in the periphery equally discriminated against". Hiberno-English or New Zealand English or even England's regional dialects such as Cornish English, for instance, could be regarded as a non-dominant centre variety of English.

Some scholars believe that English's dominance is not due to specific language policies, but rather as a side-effect of the spread of English-speaking colonists through colonization and globalization.

Thus it could be argued that, while those who follow Phillipson see choices about language as externally imposed, the other camp sees them as personal choices.

Response

Those who support the arguments favoring the existence of linguistic imperialism claim that arguments against it are often advanced by monolingual native-speakers of English who may see the current status of English as a fact worthy of celebration.

Those who see the increasing spread of English in the world as a worrying development (which lowers the status of local and regional languages as well as potentially undermining or eroding cultural values) are likely to be more receptive to Phillipson's views. Alastair Pennycook, Suresh Canagarajah, Adrian Holliday and Julian Edge fall into this group and are described as critical applied linguists.

However, Henry Widdowson’s remarks on critical discourse analysis may also be applied to the critical applied linguists:

It ought surely to be possible to say that an argument is confused, or an analysis flawed, without denying the justice of the cause they support. My view would be that if a case is just then we should look for ways of supporting it by coherent argument... And I would indeed argue that to do otherwise is to do a disservice to the cause. For the procedures of ideological exposure by expedient analysis... can, of course be taken up to further any cause, right wing as well as left.... If you have the conviction and commitment, you will always find your witch.

In Ireland, the issue of de-anglicising the influence of English has been a topic of debate in the country even before independence. An argument for de-anglicisation was delivered before the Irish National Literary Society in Dublin, 25 November 1892; "When we speak of 'The Necessity for De-Anglicising the Irish Nation', we mean it, not as a protest against imitating what is best in the English people, for that would be absurd, but rather to show the folly of neglecting what is Irish, and hastening to adopt, pell-mell, and indiscriminately, everything that is English, simply because it is English."

According to Ghil'ad Zuckermann, "Native tongue title and language rights should be promoted. The government ought to define Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander vernaculars as official languages of Australia. We must change the linguistic landscape of Whyalla and elsewhere. Signs should be in both English and the local indigenous language. We ought to acknowledge intellectual property of indigenous knowledge including language, music and dance."

Appropriation

Some who reject the idea of linguistic imperialism argue that the global spread of English is better understood in the framework of appropriation—that English is used around the world for local purposes. In addition to the example of Nigeria, other examples have been given:

Demonstrators in non-English-speaking countries often use signs in English to convey their demands to TV audiences around the world. In some cases, demonstrators may not understand what their signs say.
Bobda shows how Cameroon has moved away from a mono-cultural, Anglo-centered way of teaching English and has gradually accommodated teaching materials to a Cameroonian context. Non-Western topics are treated, such as rule by emirs, traditional medicine, and polygamy. Bobda argues for bi-cultural, Cameroonian and Anglo-American education.
Kramsch and Sullivan describe how Western methodology and textbooks have been appropriated to suit local Vietnamese culture.
The Pakistani textbook Primary Stage English includes lessons such as "Pakistan, My Country", "Our Flag," and "Our Great Leader", which might sound jingoistic to western ears. Within the native culture, however, establishing a connection between ELT, patriotism and the Muslim faith is seen as an aim of ELT, as the chairman of the Punjab Textbook Board openly states: "The board... takes care, through these books to inoculate in the students a love of the Islamic values and awareness to guard the ideological frontiers of your [the student's] home lands."

Such an "internationalization" of English may also offer new possibilities to English native-speakers. McCabe elaborates:

...whereas for two centuries we exported our language and our customs in hot pursuit of... fresh markets, we now find that our language and our customs are returned to us but altered so that they can be used by others... so that our own language and culture discover new possibilities, fresh contradictions.

Anti-submarine warfare

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-submarine_warfare

Anti-submarine warfare (ASW, or in the older form A/S) is a branch of underwater warfare that uses surface warships, aircraft, submarines, or other platforms, to find, track, and deter, damage, or destroy enemy submarines. Such operations are typically carried out to protect friendly shipping and coastal facilities from submarine attacks and to overcome blockades.

Successful ASW operations typically involved a combination of sensor and weapon technologies, along with effective deployment strategies and sufficiently trained personnel. Typically, sophisticated sonar equipment is used for first detecting, then classifying, locating, and tracking a target submarine. Sensors are therefore a key element of ASW. Common weapons for attacking submarines include torpedoes and naval mines, which can both be launched from an array of air, surface, and underwater platforms. ASW capabilities are often considered of significant strategic importance, particularly following provocative instances of unrestricted submarine warfare and the introduction of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which greatly increased the lethality of submarines.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, ASW techniques and submarines themselves were primitive. During the First World War, submarines deployed by Imperial Germany proved themselves to be a capable threat to shipping, being capable of striking targets even out in the North Atlantic ocean. Accordingly, multiple nations embarked on research into devising more capable ASW methods, resulting in the introduction of practical depth charges and advances in sonar technology; the adoption of the convoy system also proved to be a decisive tactic. After a lull in progress during the interwar period, the Second World War would see submarine warfare and ASW alike advance rapidly, particularly during the critical Battle of the Atlantic, during which Axis submarines sought to prevent Britain from effectively importing supplies. Techniques such as the Wolfpack achieved initial success, but became increasingly costly as more capable ASW aircraft were introduced. Technologies such as the Naxos radar detector gained only a temporary reprieve until detection apparatus advanced yet again. Intelligence efforts, such as Ultra, had also played a major role in curtailing the submarine threat and guiding ASW efforts towards greater success.

During the postwar era, ASW continued to advance, as the arrival of nuclear submarines had rendered some traditional techniques less effective. The superpowers of the era constructed sizable submarine fleets, many of which were armed with nuclear weapons; in response to the heightened threat posed by such vessels, various nations chose to expand their ASW capabilities. Helicopters, capable of operating from almost any warship and equipped with ASW apparatus, became commonplace during the 1960s. Increasingly capable fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft were also widely used, capable of covering vast areas of ocean. The Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD), diesel exhaust sniffers, sonobuoys and other electronic warfare technologies also became a staple of ASW efforts. Dedicated attack submarines, purpose-built to track down and destroy other submarines, became a key component as well. Torpedo carrying missiles, such as ASROC and Ikara, were another area of advancement.

History

Origins

The first attacks on a ship by an underwater vehicle are generally believed to have been during the American Revolutionary War, using what would now be called a naval mine but what was then referred to a torpedo. Even so, various attempts to produce submarines had been made prior to this. In 1866, British engineer Robert Whitehead invented the first effective self-propelled torpedo, the eponymous Whitehead torpedo; French and German inventions followed soon thereafter. The first submarine with a torpedo was Nordenfelt I built in 1884–1885, though it had been proposed earlier. By the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, all the large navies except the Germans had acquired submarines. Nevertheless, by 1904, all powers still defined the submarine as an experimental vessel and did not put it into operational use.

There were no means to detect submerged U-boats, and attacks on them were limited at first to efforts to damage their periscopes with hammers. The Royal Navy torpedo establishment, HMS Vernon, studied explosive grapnel sweeps; these sank four or five U-boats in the First World War. A similar approach featured a string of 70 lb (32 kg) charges on a floating cable, fired electrically; an unimpressed Admiral Edward Evans considered any U-boat sunk by it deserved to be.

Another primitive technique of attacking submarines was the dropping of 18.5 lb (8.4 kg) hand-thrown guncotton bombs. The Lance Bomb was developed, also; this featured a 35–40 lb (16–18 kg) cone-shaped steel drum on a 5 ft (1.5 m) shaft, intended to be thrown at a submarine. Firing Lyddite shells, or using trench mortars, was tried. Use of nets to ensnare U-boats was also examined, as was a destroyer, HMS Starfish, fitted with a spar torpedo. To attack at set depths, aircraft bombs were attached to lanyards which would trigger their charges; a similar idea was a 16 lb (7.3 kg) guncotton charge in a lanyarded can; two of these lashed together became known as the Depth Charge Type A. Problems with the lanyards tangling and failing to function led to the development of a chemical pellet trigger as the Type B. These were effective at a distance of around 20 ft (6.1 m).

Perhaps the best early concept arose in a 1913 RN Torpedo School report, describing a device intended for countermining, a "dropping mine". At Admiral John Jellicoe's request, the standard Mark II mine was fitted with a hydrostatic pistol (developed in 1914 by Thomas Firth & Sons of Sheffield) preset for 45 ft (14 m) firing, to be launched from a stern platform. Weighing 1,150 lb (520 kg), and effective at 100 ft (30 m), the "cruiser mine" was also a potential hazard to the dropping ship.

First World War

During the First World War, submarines were a major threat. They operated in the Baltic, North Sea, Black Sea and Mediterranean as well as the North Atlantic. Previously, they had been limited to relatively calm and protected waters. The vessels used to combat them were a range of small, fast surface ships using guns and good luck. They mainly relied on the fact a submarine of the day was often on the surface for a range of reasons, such as charging batteries or crossing long distances. The first approach to protect warships was chainlink nets strung from the sides of battleships, as defense against torpedoes. Nets were also deployed across the mouth of a harbour or naval base to stop submarines entering or to stop torpedoes of the Whitehead type fired against ships. British warships were fitted with a ram with which to sink submarines, and U-15 was thus sunk in August 1914.

During June 1915, the Royal Navy began operational trials of the Type D depth charge, with a 300 lb (140 kg) charge of TNT (amatol, as TNT supplies became critical) and a hydrostatic pistol, firing at either 40 or 80 ft (12 or 24 m), and believed to be effective at a distance of 140 ft (43 m); the Type D*, with a 120 lb (54 kg) charge, was offered for smaller ships.

In July 1915, the British Admiralty set up the Board of Invention and Research (BIR) to evaluate suggestions from the public as well as carrying out their own investigations. Some 14,000 suggestions were received about combating submarines. In December 1916, the RN set up its own Anti-Submarine Division (ASD), from which came the term "Asdic", but relations with the BIR were poor. After 1917, most ASW work was carried out by the ASD. In the U.S., a Naval Consulting Board was set up in 1915 to evaluate ideas. After American entry into the war in 1917, they encouraged work on submarine detection. The U.S. National Research Council, a civilian organization, brought in British and French experts on underwater sound to a meeting with their American counterparts in June 1917. In October 1918, there was a meeting in Paris on "supersonics", a term used for echo-ranging, but the technique was still in research by the end of the war.

The first recorded sinking of a submarine by depth charge was U-68, sunk by Q-ship HMS Farnborough off Kerry, Ireland 22 March 1916. By early 1917, the Royal Navy had also developed indicator loops which consisted of long lengths of cables lain on the seabed to detect the magnetic field of submarines as they passed overhead. At this stage, they were used in conjunction with controlled mines which could be detonated from a shore station once a 'swing' had been detected on the indicator loop galvanometer. Indicator loops used with controlled mining were known as 'guard loops'. By July 1917, depth charges had developed to the extent that settings of between 50–200 ft (15–61 m) were possible. This design would remain mainly unchanged through the end of World War II. While dipping hydrophones appeared before war's end, the trials were abandoned.

Seaplanes and airships were also used to patrol for submarines. A number of successful attacks were made, but the main value of air patrols was in driving the U-boat to submerge, rendering it virtually blind and immobile.

However, the most effective anti-submarine measure was the introduction of escorted convoys, which reduced the loss of ships entering the German war zone around the British Isles from 25% to less than 1%. The historian Paul E. Fontenoy summarised the situation as: "[t]he convoy system defeated the German submarine campaign." A major contributing factor was the interception of German submarine radio signals and breaking of their code by Room 40 of the Admiralty.

To attack submerged boats, a number of anti-submarine weapons were derived, including the sweep with a contact-fused explosive. Bombs were dropped by aircraft and depth charge attacks were made by ships. Prior to the introduction of dedicated depth charge throwers, charges were manually rolled off the stern of a ship. The Q-ship, a warship disguised as a merchantman, was used to attack surfaced U-boats, while the R1 was the first ASW submarine.

211 of the 360 U-boats were sunk during the war, from a variety of ASW methods:

Mines 58

Depth charges 30

Submarine torpedoes 20

Gunfire 20

Ramming 19

Unknown 19

Accidents 10

Sweeps 33

Other (including bombs) 2

Inter-war period

This period saw the development of active sonar (ASDIC) and its integration into a complete weapons system by the British, as well as the introduction of radar. During the period, there was a great advance due to the introduction of electronics for amplifying, processing, and displaying signals. In particular, the "range recorder" was a major step that provided a memory of target position. Because the propellers of many submarines were extremely loud in the water (though it doesn't seem so from the surface), range recorders were able to gauge the distance from the U-boat by sound. This would allow mines or bombs around that area to be detonated. New materials for sound projectors were developed. Both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy fitted their destroyers with active sonars. In 1928, a small escort ship was designed and plans made to arm trawlers and to mass-produce ASDIC sets.

Several other technologies were developed; depth sounders that allowed measurement by moving ships were a new innovation, along with a greater appreciation of the properties of the ocean that affected sound propagation. The bathythermograph was invented in 1937, which became a common fixture amongst ASW ships within only a few years. There were relatively few major advances in weapons during the period; however, the performance of torpedoes continued to improve.

Second World War

Battle of the Atlantic

During the Second World War, the submarine menace revived, threatening the survival of island nations like Britain and Japan which were particularly vulnerable because of their dependence on imports of food, oil, and other vital war materials. Despite this vulnerability, little had been done to prepare sufficient anti-submarine forces or develop suitable new weapons. Other navies were similarly unprepared, even though every major navy had a large, modern submarine fleet, because all had fallen in the grip of Mahanian doctrine which held guerre de course could not win a war.

At the beginning of the conflict, most navies had few ideas how to combat submarines beyond locating them with sonar and then dropping depth charges on them. Sonar proved much less effective than expected, and was no use at all against submarines operating on the surface, as U-boats routinely did at night. The Royal Navy had continued to develop indicator loops between the wars but this was a passive form of harbour defense that depended on detecting the magnetic field of submarines by the use of long lengths of cable lain on the floor of the harbour. Indicator loop technology was quickly developed further and deployed by the US Navy in 1942. By then, there were dozens of loop stations around the world. Sonar was far more effective and loop technology for ASW purposes was discontinued shortly after the conflict's end.

The use and improvement of radar technology was one of the most important elements in the fight against submarines. Locating submarines was the first step in being able to defend against and destroy them. Throughout the war, Allied radar technology was much better than their German counterparts. German U-boats struggled to have proper radar detection capabilities and keep up with the successive generations of Allied airborne radar. The first generation of Allied airborne radar used a 1.7 meter wavelength and had a limited range. By the second half of 1942 the "Metox" radar detector was used by U-boats to give some warning from airborne attack. During 1943, the Allies began to deploy aircraft equipped with new cavity magnetron-based 10-centimeter wavelength radar (ASV III), which was undetectable by "Metox", in sufficient numbers to yield good results. Eventually the "Naxos" radar detector was fielded that could detect 10-cm wavelength radar, but it had a very short range and only gave a U-boat limited time to dive. Between 1943 and 1945, radar equipped aircraft would account for the bulk of Allied kills against U-boats. Allied anti-submarine tactics developed to defend convoys (the Royal Navy's preferred method), aggressively hunt down U-boats (the U.S. Navy approach), and to divert vulnerable or valuable ships away from known U-boat concentrations.

During the Second World War, the Allies developed a huge range of new technologies, weapons and tactics to counter the submarine danger. These included:

Vessels

Allocating ships to convoys according to speed, so faster ships were less exposed.
Adjusting the convoy cycle. Using operations research techniques, analysis of convoy losses over the first three years of the war showed that the overall size of a convoy was less important than the size of its escorting force. Therefore, escorts could better protect a few large convoys than many small ones.
Huge construction programmes to mass-produce the small warships needed for convoy defense, such as corvettes, frigates, and destroyer escorts. These were more economical than using destroyers, which were needed for fleet duties. Corvettes were small enough to be built in merchant shipyards and used triple expansion engines. They could be built without using up scarce turbine engines and reduction gears, thus not interfering with larger warship production.
Ships that could carry aircraft, such as the CAM ships, the merchant aircraft carrier, and eventually the purpose-built escort carriers.
Support groups of escort ships that could be sent to reinforce the defense of convoys under attack. Free from the obligation to remain with the convoys, support groups could continue hunting a submerged submarine until its batteries and air supplies were exhausted and it was forced to surface.
Hunter-killer groups, whose job was to actively seek out enemy submarines, as opposed to waiting for the convoy to come under attack. Later hunter-killer groups were centered around escort carriers.
Huge construction programmes to mass-produce the transports and replace their losses, such as the American Liberty Ships. Once shipbuilding had ramped up to full efficiency, transports could be built faster than U-boats could sink them, playing a crucial role in the Allies winning the "Tonnage war".

Aircraft

Air raids on the German U-boat pens at Brest and La Rochelle.
Long-range aircraft patrols to close the Mid-Atlantic gap.
Escort carriers to provide the convoy with air cover, as well as close the mid-Atlantic gap.
High frequency direction finding (HF/DF), including shipborne sets, to pinpoint the location of an enemy submarine from its radio transmissions.
The introduction of seaborne radar which could enable the detection of surfaced U-boats.
Airborne radar.
The Leigh light airborne searchlight, in conjunction with airborne radar to surprise and attack enemy submarines on the surface at night.
Magnetic anomaly detection
Diesel exhaust sniffers
Sonobuoys

Weaponry

Depth charges, the most used weapon, were improved during the course of the war. Starting with WW1 vintage 300-pound (140 kg) depth charges, a 600-pound (270 kg) version was developed. Torpex explosive, which is a 50% more powerful explosive than TNT, was introduced in 1943. Y-guns and K-guns were used to throw depth charges to the side of the escort vessel, augmenting the charges rolled off the stern and letting the escort vessel lay a pattern of depth charges
The development of forward-throwing anti-submarine weapons such as Hedgehog and the Squid. This allowed the escort vessel to stay in contact with the submarine during an attack.
The FIDO (Mk 24 'mine') air-dropped homing torpedo.
When the German Navy developed an acoustic homing torpedo, torpedo countermeasures such as the Foxer acoustic decoy were deployed.

Intelligence: One of the best kept Allied secrets was the breaking of enemy codes including some of the German Naval Enigma codes (information gathered this way was dubbed Ultra) at Bletchley Park in England. This enabled the tracking of U-boat packs to allow convoy re-routings; whenever the Germans changed their codes (and when they added a fourth rotor to the Enigma machines in 1943), convoy losses rose significantly. By the end of the war, the Allies were regularly breaking and reading German naval codes.; To prevent the Germans from guessing that Enigma had been cracked, the British planted a false story about a special infrared camera being used to locate U-boats. The British were subsequently delighted to learn that the Germans responded by developing a special paint for submarines that exactly duplicated the optical properties of seawater.

Tactics: Many different aircraft from airships to four-engined sea- and land-planes were used. Some of the more successful were the Lockheed Ventura, PBY (Catalina or Canso, in British service), Consolidated B-24 Liberator (VLR Liberator, in British service), Short Sunderland, and Vickers Wellington. As more patrol planes became equipped with radar, U-Boats began to be surprised at night by aircraft attacks. U-Boats were not defenseless, as most U-Boats carried some form of anti-aircraft weapon. They claimed 212 Allied aircraft shot down for the loss of 168 U-boats to air attack. The German naval command struggled to find a solution to the aircraft attacks. 'U-Flak' submarines, equipped with extra anti-aircraft weapons, were tried unsuccessfully. At one point in the war, there was even a 'shoot back order' requiring U-boats to stay on the surface and fight back, in the absence of any other option. Some commanders started charging batteries during the day to gain more warning from air attack, and perhaps gain time to submerge. One solution was the snorkel, which allowed a U-boat to stay submerged and still charge its batteries. A snorkel made a U-boat more survivable and losses to aircraft went down. However, the low snorkeling speeds of 5 to 6 knots (9.3–11.1 km/h; 5.8–6.9 mph) greatly limited the mobility of the U-Boats.; The provision of air cover was essential. The Germans at the time had been using their Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor long range aircraft to attack shipping and provide reconnaissance for U-boats, and most of their sorties occurred outside the reach of existing land-based aircraft that the Allies had; this was dubbed the Mid-Atlantic gap. At first, the British developed temporary solutions such as CAM ships and merchant aircraft carriers. These were superseded by mass-produced, relatively cheap escort carriers built by the United States and operated by the US Navy and Royal Navy. There was also the introduction of long-ranged patrol aircraft. Many U-boats feared aircraft, as the mere presence would often force them to dive, disrupting their patrols and attack runs.; The Americans favored aggressive hunter-killer tactics using escort carriers on search and destroy patrols, whereas the British preferred to use their escort carriers to defend the convoys directly. The American view was that defending convoys did little to reduce or contain U-boat numbers, while the British were constrained by having to fight the battle of the Atlantic alone for the early part of the war with very limited resources. There were no spare escorts for extensive hunts, and it was only important to neutralize the U-boats which were found in the vicinity of convoys. The survival of convoys was critical, and if a hunt missed its target a convoy of strategic importance could be lost. The British also reasoned that since submarines sought convoys, convoys would be a good place to find submarines.; Once America joined the war, the different tactics were complementary, both suppressing the effectiveness of and destroying U-boats. The increase in Allied naval strength allowed both convoy defense and hunter-killer groups to be deployed, and this was reflected in the massive increase in U-boat kills in the latter part of the war. The British developments of centimetric radar and the Leigh Light, as well as increased numbers of escorts, reached the point of being able to support U-boat hunting towards the end of the war, while earlier on, the advantage was definitely on the side of the submarine. Commanders such as F. J. "Johnnie" Walker of the Royal Navy were able to develop integrated tactics which made the deployment of hunter-killer groups a practical proposition. Walker developed a creeping attack technique, where one destroyer would track the U-boat while another attacked. Often U-boats would turn and increase speed to spoil the depth charge attack, as the escort would lose sonar contact as it steamed over the submarine. With the new tactic, one escort vessel would attack while another would track the target. Any course or depth change could be relayed to the attacking destroyer. Once a U-boat was caught, it was very difficult to escape. Since Hunter-Killer groups were not limited to convoy escort, they could continue an attack until a U-Boat was destroyed or had to surface from damage or lack of air.; The only recorded sinking of one submarine by another while both were submerged occurred in 1945 when HMS Venturer torpedoed U-864 off the coast of Norway. The captain of Venturer tracked U-864 on hydrophones for several hours and manually calculated a three-dimensional firing solution before launching four torpedoes.

Mediterranean

Italian and German submarines operated in the Mediterranean on the Axis side while French and British submarines operated on the side of the Allies. The German Navy sent 62 U-boats to the Mediterranean; all were lost in combat or scuttled. German subs first had to pass through the highly defended Straits of Gibraltar, where nine were sunk, and a similar number damaged so severely they had to limp back to base. The Mediterranean is calmer than the Atlantic, which made escape for U-boats more difficult and was ringed with Allied air bases. Similar ASW methods were used as in the Atlantic but an additional menace was the use by Italians of midget submarines.

Operating under the same clear-water conditions in the Mediterranean – such that British submarines were painted dark blue on their upper surfaces to make them less visible from the air when submerged at periscope depth – the Royal Navy, mostly operating from Malta, lost 41 submarines to the opposing German and Italian forces, including HMS Upholder and HMS Perseus.

Pacific Theatre

Japanese submarines pioneered many innovations, being some of the largest and longest range vessels of their type and were armed with the Type 95 torpedo. However, they ended up having little impact, especially in the latter half of the war. Instead of commerce raiding like their U-boat counterparts, they followed the Mahanian doctrine, serving in offensive roles against warships, which were fast, maneuverable and well-defended compared to merchant ships. In the early part of the Pacific War, Japanese subs scored several tactical victories, including three successful torpedo strikes on the US fleet carriers USS Saratoga and USS Wasp, the latter of which was abandoned and scuttled as a result of the attack.

Once the US was able to ramp up construction of destroyers and destroyer escorts, as well as bringing over highly effective anti-submarine techniques learned from the British from experiences in the Battle of the Atlantic, they would take a significant toll on Japanese submarines, which tended to be slower and could not dive as deep as their German counterparts. Japanese submarines, in particular, never menaced the Allied merchant convoys and strategic shipping lanes to any degree that German U-boats did. One major advantage the Allies had was the breaking of the Japanese "Purple" code by the US, so allowing friendly ships to be diverted from Japanese submarines and allowing Allied submarines to intercept Japanese forces.

In 1942 and early 1943, US submarines posed little threat to Japanese ships, whether warships or merchant ships. They were initially hampered by poor torpedoes, which often failed to detonate on impact, ran too deep, or even ran wild. As the US submarine menace was slight in the beginning, Japanese commanders became complacent and as a result did not invest heavily into ASW measures or upgrade their convoy protection to any degree to what the Allies in the Atlantic did. Often encouraged by the Japanese not placing a high priority on the Allied submarine threat, US skippers were relatively complacent and docile compared to their German counterparts, who understood the "life and death" urgency in the Atlantic.

However, US Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood pressured the ordnance department to replace the faulty torpedoes; famously when they initially ignored his complaints, he ran his own tests to prove the torpedoes' unreliability. He also cleaned out the "deadwood", replacing many cautious or unproductive submarine skippers with younger (somewhat) and more aggressive commanders. As a result, in the latter half of 1943, US subs were suddenly sinking Japanese ships at a dramatically higher rate, scoring their share of key warship kills and accounting for almost half of the Japanese merchant fleet. Japan's naval command was caught off guard; Japan had neither the anti-submarine technology or doctrine, nor the production capability to withstand a tonnage war of attrition, nor did she develop the organizations needed (unlike the Allies in the Atlantic).

Japanese antisubmarine forces consisted mainly of their destroyers, with sonar and depth charges. However, Japanese destroyer design, tactics, training, and doctrine emphasized surface nightfighting and torpedo delivery (necessary for fleet operations) over anti-submarine duties. By the time Japan finally developed a destroyer escort, which was more economical and better suited to convoy protection, it was too late; coupled to incompetent doctrine and organization, it could have had little effect in any case. Late in the war, the Japanese Army and Navy used Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) gear in aircraft to locate shallow submerged submarines. The Japanese Army also developed two small aircraft carriers and Ka-1 autogyro aircraft for use in an antisubmarine warfare role, while the Navy developed and introduced the Kyushu Q1W anti-submarine bomber into service in 1945.

The Japanese depth charge attacks by its surface forces initially proved fairly unsuccessful against U.S. fleet submarines. Unless caught in shallow water, a U.S. submarine commander could normally escape destruction, sometimes using temperature gradients (thermoclines). Additionally, IJN doctrine emphasized fleet action, not convoy protection, so the best ships and crews went elsewhere. Moreover, during the first part of the war, the Japanese tended to set their depth charges too shallow, unaware U.S. submarines could dive below 150 feet (45m). Unfortunately, this deficiency was revealed in a June 1943 press conference held by U.S. Congressman Andrew J. May, and soon enemy depth charges were set to explode as deep as 250 feet (76m). Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, COMSUBPAC, later estimated May's revelation cost the navy as many as ten submarines and 800 crewmen.

Much later in the war, active and passive sonobuoys were developed for aircraft use, together with MAD devices. Toward the end of the war, the Allies developed better forward-throwing weapons, such as Mousetrap and Squid, in the face of new, much better German submarines, such as the Type XVII and Type XXI.

British and Dutch submarines also operated in the Pacific, mainly against coastal shipping.

Post-World War II

In the immediate postwar period, the innovations of the late war U-boats were quickly adopted by the major navies. Both the United Kingdom and The United States studied the German Type XXI and used the information to modify WW2 fleet boats, the US with the GUPPY program and the UK with the Overseas Patrol Submarines Project. The Soviets launched new submarines patterned on Type XXIs, the Whiskey and Zulu classes. Britain also tested hydrogen peroxide fuels in Meteorite, Excalibur, and Explorer, with less success.

To deal with these more capable submarines new ASW weapons were essential. This new generation of diesel electric submarine, like the Type XXI before it, had no deck gun and a streamlined hull tower for greater underwater speed, as well as more storage battery capacity than a comparable WW2 submarine; in addition, they recharged their batteries using a snorkel and could complete a patrol without surfacing. This led to the introduction of longer-ranged forward-throwing weapons, such as Weapon Alpha, Limbo, RBU-6000, and of improved homing torpedoes. Nuclear submarines, even faster still, and without the need to snorkel to recharge batteries, posed an even greater threat; in particular, shipborne helicopters (recalling the blimps of World War I) have emerged as essential anti-submarine platforms. A number of torpedo carrying missiles such as ASROC and Ikara were developed, combining ahead-throwing capability (or longer-range delivery) with torpedo homing.

Since the introduction of submarines capable of carrying ballistic missiles, great efforts have been made to counter the threat they pose; here, maritime patrol aircraft (as in World War II) and helicopters have had a large role. The use of nuclear propulsion and streamlined hulls has resulted in submarines with high speed capability and increased maneuverability, as well as low "indiscretion rates" when a submarine is exposed on the surface. This has required changes both to the sensors and weapons used for ASW. Because nuclear submarines were noisy, there was an emphasis on passive sonar detection. The torpedo became the main weapon (though nuclear depth charges were developed). The mine continued to be an important ASW weapon.

In some areas of the ocean, where land forms natural barriers, long strings of sonobuoys, deployed from surface ships or dropped from aircraft, can monitor maritime passages for extended periods. Bottom mounted hydrophones can also be used, with land based processing. A system like this SOSUS was deployed by the US in the GIUK gap and other strategically important places.

Airborne ASW forces developed better bombs and depth charges, while for ships and submarines a range of towed sonar devices were developed to overcome the problem of ship-mounting. Helicopters can fly courses offset from the ships and transmit sonar information to their combat information centres. They can also drop sonobuoys and launch homing torpedoes to positions many miles away from the ships actually monitoring the enemy submarine. Submerged submarines are generally blind to the actions of a patrolling aircraft until it uses active sonar or fires a weapon, and the aircraft's speed allows it to maintain a fast search pattern around the suspected contact.

Increasingly anti-submarine submarines, called attack submarines or hunter-killers, became capable of destroying, particularly, ballistic missile submarines. Initially these were very quiet diesel-electric propelled vessels but they are more likely to be nuclear-powered these days. The development of these was strongly influenced by the duel between HMS Venturer and U-864.

A significant detection aid that has continued in service is the Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD), a passive device. First used during the Second World War, MAD uses the Earth's magnetosphere as a standard, detecting anomalies caused by large metallic vessels, such as submarines. Modern MAD arrays are usually contained in a long tail boom (fixed-wing aircraft) or an aerodynamic housing carried on a deployable tow line (helicopters). Keeping the sensor away from the plane's engines and avionics helps eliminate interference from the carrying platform.

At one time, reliance was placed on electronic warfare detection devices exploiting the submarine's need to perform radar sweeps and transmit responses to radio messages from home port. As frequency surveillance and direction finding became more sophisticated, these devices enjoyed some success. However, submariners soon learned not to rely on such transmitters in dangerous waters. Home bases can then use extremely low frequency radio signals, able to penetrate the ocean's surface, to reach submarines wherever they might be.

Modern warfare

The military submarine is still a threat, so ASW remains a key to obtaining sea control. Neutralizing the SSBN has been a key driver and this still remains. However, non-nuclear-powered submarines have become increasingly important. Though the diesel-electric submarine continues to dominate in numbers, several alternative technologies now exist to enhance the endurance of small submarines. Previously the emphasis had been largely on deep water operation but this has now switched to littoral operation where ASW is generally more difficult.

Anti-submarine warfare technologies

There are a large number of technologies used in modern anti-submarine warfare:

Sensors

Acoustics particularly in active and passive sonar, sonobuoys, and fixed hydrophones aid in the detection of radiated noise. Sonar can be mounted on the hull or in a towed array.
Pyrotechnics in the use of markers, flares and explosive devices
Searchlights
Radar, for surfaced parts
High frequency radio direction finding (HF/DF or huff duff) to determine the bearings of U-boats.
Hydrodynamic pressure wave (wake) detection
- Submerged submarines may produce a Kelvin wake pattern depending on their speed and depth. Kelvins wakes are difficult to detect for submarines below the depth of 100m, however, submarines below 100m may still generate "internal wakes" that may be detectable from the surface.
Laser detection and ranging of surfaced vessels; airborne and satellite
Electronic countermeasures and acoustic countermeasures such as noise and bubble makers
Passive acoustic countermeasures such as concealment and design of sound-absorbing materials to coat reflecting underwater surfaces
Magnetic anomaly detection (MAD)
Active and (more commonly) passive infra-red detection of surfaced parts and water anomalies.

An MH-60R conducts an airborne low frequency sonar (ALFS) operation during testing and evaluation.

In modern times forward looking infrared (FLIR) detectors have been used to track the large plumes of heat that fast nuclear-powered submarines leave while rising to the surface. FLIR devices are also used to see periscopes or snorkels at night whenever a submariner might be incautious enough to probe the surface.

Weapons

Platforms

Satellites have been used to image the sea surface using optical and radar techniques. Fixed-wing aircraft, such as the P-3 Orion & Tu-142 provide both a sensor and weapons platform similar to some helicopters like the Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk, with sonobuoys and/or dipping sonars as well as aerial torpedoes. In other cases the helicopter has been used solely for sensing and rocket delivered torpedoes used as the weapon. Surface ships continue to be an important ASW platform because of their endurance, now having towed array sonars. Submarines are the main ASW platform because of their ability to change depth and their quietness, which aids detection.

In early 2010 DARPA began funding the ACTUV programme to develop a semi-autonomous oceangoing unmanned naval vessel.

Today some nations have seabed listening devices capable of tracking submarines. It is possible to detect man-made marine noises across the southern Indian Ocean from South Africa to New Zealand. Some of the SOSUS arrays have been turned over to civilian use and are now used for marine research.

India introduced supersonic missiles to deliver torpedo at long ranges called SMART or Supersonic missile assisted torpedo system. This new technology helps to deliver the torpedo 1000 kms away and gives flexibility in terms of the launch platform.

Identifying friendly vs hostile submarines

In World War I, 8 submarines were sunk by friendly fire and in World War II nearly 20 were sunk this way. Still, Identification of friend or foe (IFF) has not been regarded a high concern before the 1990s by the US military as not many other countries possess submarines.

IFF methods that are analogous to aircraft IFF have been deemed unfeasible for submarines because they would make submarines easier to detect. Thus, having friendly submarines broadcast a signal, or somehow increase the submarine's signature (based on acoustics, magnetic fluctuations etc.), are not considered viable. Instead, submarine IFF is done based on carefully defining areas of operation. Each friendly submarine is assigned a patrol area, where the presence of any other submarine is deemed hostile and open to attack. Further, within these assigned areas, surface ships and aircraft refrain from any anti-submarine warfare (ASW); only the resident submarine may target other submarines in its own area. Ships and aircraft may still engage in ASW in areas that have not been assigned to any friendly submarines. Navies also use database of acoustic signatures to attempt to identify the submarine, but acoustic data can be ambiguous and several countries deploy similar classes of submarines.

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Thursday, August 31, 2023

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