Deliberate destruction and theft of cultural heritage has been conducted by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant since 2014 in Iraq, Syria, and to a lesser extent in Libya. The destruction targets various places of worship under ISIL control and ancient historical artifacts. In Iraq, between the fall of Mosul in June 2014 and February 2015, ISIL had plundered and destroyed at least 28 historical religious buildings. Valuable items from some buildings were looted in order to smuggle and sell them to foreigners to finance ISIS activities. By 23 March 2019, ISIL lost most of its territories in the Middle East, having been defeated in Iraq and Syria.
Motivation
ISIL justifies the destruction of cultural heritage sites with its following of Salafism which, according to its followers, places "great importance on establishing tawhid (monotheism)", and "eliminating shirk
(polytheism)." While it is often assumed that the group's actions are
mindless acts of vandalism, there is an ideological underpinning to the
destruction. ISIL views its actions in sites like Palmyra and Nimrud as
being in accordance with Sunni Islamic tradition.
Beyond the ideological aspects of the destruction, there are
other, more practical, reasons behind ISIL's destruction of historic
sites. Grabbing the world's attention is easily done through the
destruction of such sites, given the extensive media coverage and
international condemnation that comes afterwards. Destroying historic
ruins also allows ISIL to wipe the slate clean and to start afresh,
leaving no traces of any previous culture or civilization, while also
providing an ideal platform for the group to establish its own identity
and leave its mark on history. Despite the images showing extreme
destruction, ISIL has also been making use of the looted antiquities to
finance their activities. Despite the UN's ban on the trade of artifacts looted from Syria since 2011, the group has been smuggling these artifacts out of the Middle East and on to the underground antique markets of Europe and North America.
In 2014, media reported destruction of multiple, chiefly Shiite, mosques and shrines throughout Iraq by ISIL. Among them were the Al-Qubba Husseiniya Mosque in Mosul, Sheikh Jawad Al-Sadiq Mosque, Mosque of Arnā’ūt, Mosque of Qado, Mosque of Askar e- Mullah and Saad Bin Aqeel Shrine in Tal Afar, Sufi
Ahmed al-Rifai Shrine and tomb and Sheikh Ibrahim shrine in Mahlabiya
District and the so-called Tomb of the Girl (Qabr al-Bint) in Mosul.
The Tomb of the Girl, reputed to honour a girl who died of a broken
heart, was actually believed to be the tomb of medieval scholar Ali ibn al-Athir.
In June 2014, ISIL bulldozed the two buildings in the complex of the shrine of Fathi al-Ka'en.
On 25 July 2014, the 13th-century shrine of Imam Awn al-Din in Mosul, one of the few structures to have survived the 13th-century Mongol invasion, was destroyed by ISIL. The destruction was mostly carried out with explosive devices, but in some cases bulldozers were used.
In March 2015, ISIL reportedly bulldozed to the ground the Hamu
Al-Qadu Mosque in Mosul, dating back to 1880. The Hamu-Al-Qadu mosque
contained an earlier tomb of Ala-al-din Ibn Abdul Qadir Gilani. In the same year ISIL ordered the removal of all decorative elements and frescoes from mosques in Mosul, even those containing Quranic verses that mention Allah. They were regarded by ISIL as "an erroneous form of creativity, contradicting the basics of sharia." At least one imam in Mosul opposing that order was shot to death.
Leaning minaret of the Great Mosque of Al-nuri. Destroyed by ISIL on 22 June 2017 during the Battle of Mosul.
ISIL also destroyed Sufi shrines near Tripoli, Libya, in March 2015. The shrines were destroyed by sledgehammers and bulldozers.
In 2016, ISIL destroyed the Minaret of Anah located in Al Anbar Province, which dates back to the Abbasid era. The minaret was only rebuilt in 2013 after the destruction by an unknown perpetrator in 2006.
Dair Mar Elia monastery, which was destroyed sometime between late August and September 2014
In June 2014, it was reported that ISIL elements had been instructed to destroy all churches in Mosul. Since then, most churches within the city have been destroyed.
Dair Mar Elia,
the oldest monastery in Iraq, was demolished sometime between late
August and September 2014. The destruction went unreported until January
2016.
The Al-Tahera Church, built in the early 20th century, was possibly blown up in early February 2015. However, there is no evidence that the church was actually destroyed.
St Markourkas Church, a 10th-century Chaldean Catholic
church, was destroyed on 9 March 2015, according to the Iraqi
government official Dureid Hikmat Tobia. A nearby cemetery was also
bulldozed.
Another church, which was reportedly "thousands of years" old, was
blown up in July 2015. According to Kurdish sources, four children were
inadvertently killed when the church was destroyed.
The Sa'a Qadima Church, which was built in 1872, was blown up in April 2016.
The Sa'a Qadima Church in Mosul, blown up in April 2016
ISIL also blew up or demolished a number of other churches elsewhere in Iraq or in Syria. The Armenian Genocide Memorial Church in Deir ez-Zor, Syria was blown up by ISIL militants on 21 September 2014.
As of 5 April 2015, ISIL destroyed the Assyrian Christian Virgin
Mary Church on Easter Sunday in the Syrian town of Tel Nasri. "As the
'joint forces' of Kurdish People's Protection Units and local Assyrian fighters attempted to enter the town", ISIL set off the explosives destroying what remained of the church. ISIL had controlled the church since 7 March 2015.
The Tal Afar Citadel, which was partially destroyed in December 2014
In May 2014, ISIL members smashed a 3,000-year-old neo-Assyrian statue from Tel Ajaja. Later reports indicated that over 40% of the artifacts at Tel Ajaja (Saddikanni) were looted by ISIS.
Parts of the Tal Afar Citadel were blown up by ISIL in December 2014, causing extensive damage.
In January 2015, ISIL reportedly destroyed large parts of the Nineveh Wall in al-Tahrir neighborhood of Mosul. Further parts of the walls, including the Mashka and Adad Gate, were blown up in April 2016.
In the Syrian city of Raqqa, ISIL publicly ordered the bulldozing of a colossal ancient Assyrian gateway lion sculpture from the 8th century BC. Another lion statue was also destroyed. Both statues originated from the Arslan Tash archaeological site. The destruction was published in the ISIL magazine, Dabiq. Among the lost statues are those of Mulla Uthman al-Mawsili, of a woman carrying an urn, and of Abu Tammam.
On 26 February 2015, ISIL released a video showing the destruction of various ancient artifacts in the Mosul Museum. The affected artifacts originate from the Assyrian era and from the ancient city of Hatra. The video in particular shows the defacement of a granite lamassu statue from the right side of the Nergal Gate
by a jackhammer. The statue remained buried until 1941 when heavy rains
eroded the soil around the gate and exposed two statues on both sides. Several other defaced items in the museum were claimed to be copies,
but this was later rebutted by Iraq's Minister of Culture, Adel
Sharshab who said: "Mosul Museum had many ancient artifacts, big and
small. None of them were transported to the National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad. Thus, all artifacts destroyed in Mosul are original except for four pieces that were made of gypsum".
Palace of Ashurnasirpal II in Nimrud, pictured in 2007. ISIL reportedly bulldozed the city in March 2015
On 5 March 2015, ISIL reportedly started the demolition of Nimrud,
an Assyrian city from the 13th century BC. The local palace was
bulldozed, while lamassu statues at the gates of the palace of Ashurnasirpal II were smashed. A video showing the destruction of Nimrud was released in April 2015.
On 7 March 2015, Kurdish sources reported that ISIL had begun the bulldozing of Hatra, which has been under threat of demolition after ISIL had occupied the adjacent area. The next day ISIL sacked Dur-Sharrukin, according to a Kurdish official from Mosul, Saeed Mamuzini.
The Iraqi Tourism and Antiquities Ministry launched the related investigation on the same day. On 8 April 2015, the Iraqi Ministry of Tourism reported that ISIL destroyed the remnants of the 12th-century Bash Tapia Castle in Mosul. As of early July 2015, 20% of Iraq's 10,000 archaeological sites has been under ISIL control.
In 2015 the face of the Winged Bull of Nineveh was damaged.
Following the capture of Palmyra
in Syria, ISIL was reported as not intending to demolish the city's
World Heritage Site (while still intending to destroy any statues deemed
'polytheistic'). On 27 May 2015, ISIL released an 87-second video showing parts of the apparently undamaged ancient colonnades, the Temple of Bel and the Roman theatre. On 27 June 2015, however, ISIL demolished the ancient Lion of Al-lāt statue in Palmyra. Several other statues from Palmyra reportedly confiscated from a smuggler were also destroyed by ISIL. On 23 August 2015, it was reported that ISIL had blown up the 1st-century Temple of Baalshamin. On 30 August 2015, ISIL demolished the Temple of Bel with explosives. Satellite imagery of the site taken shortly after showed almost nothing remained.
According to the report issued on September 3, 2015 by ASOR
Syrian Heritage initiative, ISIL also destroyed seven ancient tower
tombs in Palmyra since the end of June over two phases.
The last phase of destruction occurred between August 27 and September
2, 2015, including the destruction of the 2nd-century AD Tower of Elahbel, called "the most prominent example of Palmyra's distinct funerary monuments". Earlier, the ancient tombs of Iamliku and Atenaten were also destroyed. The Monumental Arch was also blown up in October.
When Palmyra was recaptured by Syrian government forces in March 2016, retreating ISIL fighters blew up parts of the 13th-century Palmyra Castle, causing extensive damage.
ISIL has also looted and demolished the Parthian/Roman city of Dura-Europos in east of Syria. Nicknamed "the Pompeii of the desert", the city was of particular archaeological significance.
It was reported on 1 January 2019 that Syrian authorities
recovered two Roman-era funerary busts smuggled from Palmyra from an
abandoned ISIL site in the al-Suknah countryside.
Hatra
Hatra
(Arabic: الحضر al-Ḥaḍr) was an ancient city in the Ninawa Governorate
and al-Jazira region of Iraq. A large fortified city and capital of the
first Arab Kingdom, Hatra withstood invasions by the Romans in A.D. 116
and 198 thanks to its high, thick walls reinforced by towers.
However about 240 ce, the city fell to Shāpūr I (reigned c. 240–272),
the ruler of the Persian Sāsānian dynasty, and was destroyed.
The remains of the city, especially the temples where Hellenistic and
Roman architecture blend with Eastern decorative features, attest to the
greatness of its civilization.
The city lies 290 km (180 mi) northwest of Baghdad and 110 km (68 mi)
southwest of Mosul.
On 7 March 2015, various sources including Iraqi officials reported that
the militant group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had
begun demolishing the ruins of Hatra. Video released by ISIL the next month showed destruction of the monuments. The ancient city was recaptured by the Popular Mobilization Forces on 26 April 2017.
Libraries
ISIL has burned or stolen collections of books and papers from various locations, including the Central Library of Mosul (which they rigged with explosives and burned down), the library at the University of Mosul,
a Sunni Muslim library, a 265-year-old Latin Church and Monastery of
the Dominican Fathers, and the Mosul Museum Library. Some destroyed or
stolen works date back to 5000 BC and include "Iraq newspapers dating to
the early 20th century, maps and books from the Ottoman Empire, and
book collections contributed by about 100 of Mosul’s establishment
families." The stated goal is to destroy all non-Islamic books.
Response
On 22 September 2014, the United States Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the Department of State
had partnered with the American Schools of Orient Research Cultural
Heritage Initiatives to "comprehensively document the condition of, and
threats to, cultural heritage sites in Iraq and Syria to assess their
future restoration, preservation, and protection needs". In 2014, the UNESCO's
Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict condemned at the Ninth Meeting "repeated and deliberate
attacks against cultural property... in particular in the Syrian Arab
Republic and the Republic of Iraq". UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova called the destructions in Mosul a violation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199, and the destruction of Nimrud a war crime.
Former Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki
reported that the local parliamentary tourism and antiquities committee
had "filed complaints with the UN to condemn all ISIL crimes and
abuses, including those that affect ancient places of worship". On 28 May 2015, the United Nations General Assembly
unanimously passed a resolution, initiated by Germany and Iraq and
sponsored by 91 UN member states, stating that ISIL's destruction of
cultural heritage may amount to a war crime and urging international
measures to halt such acts, which it described as a "tactic of war".
After the Palmyra temple's destruction in August 2015, the Institute for Digital Archaeology (IDA) announced plans to establish a digital record of historical sites and artifacts threatened by ISIL advance. To accomplish this goal, the IDA, in collaboration with UNESCO, will deploy 5,000 3D cameras to partners in the Middle East. The cameras will be used to capture 3D scans of local ruins and relics.
The general director of the Czech National Museum,
Michal Lukeš, signed an agreement in June 2017 committing the
institution to help Syria save, preserve and conserve much of its
cultural and historical heritage damaged by war, including the ancient
site of Palmyra; he met with Maamoun Abdulkarim and discussed plans for
the works that are said to last until 2019.
In June 2017, The World Monuments Fund (WMF) announced launching a
£500,000 scheme to train Syrian refugees near the Syrian-Jordanian
border in traditional stone masonry. The aim is teaching them to develop
skills necessary to be able to help in restoring cultural heritage
sites that have been damaged or destroyed during the Syrian Civil War
once peace is restored to Syria.
Minor restorations have already begun: Palmyrene funerary busts
of a deceased man and a woman, damaged and defaced by ISIL, were taken
from Palmyra, then to Beirut to be sent off to Rome.
Italian experts restored the portraits using 3D technology to print
resin prosthetics, which were coated with a thick layer of stone dust to
blend in with the original stone; the prosthetics were attached to the
damaged faces of the busts using strong magnets. The restored pieces are now back in Syria.
Abdulkarim said the restoration of the busts "is the first real,
visible positive step that the international community has taken to
protect Syrian heritage".
Islamism is a concept whose meaning has been debated in both public and academic contexts.
The term can refer to diverse forms of social and political activism
advocating that public and political life should be guided by Islamic
principles or more specifically to movements which call for full implementation of sharia. It is commonly used interchangeably with the terms political Islam or Islamic fundamentalism. In academic usage, the term Islamism
does not specify what vision of "Islamic order" or sharia are being
advocated, or how their advocates intend to bring them about.
In Western mass media it tends to refer to groups whose aim is to
establish a sharia-based Islamic state, often with implication of
violent tactics and human rights violations, and has acquired
connotations of political extremism. In the Muslim world, the term has
positive connotations among its proponents.
Different currents of Islamist thought include advocating a
"revolutionary" strategy of Islamizing society through exercise of state
power, and alternately a "reformist" strategy to re-Islamizing society
through grass-roots social and political activism. Islamists may emphasize the implementation of sharia (Islamic law); pan-Islamic political unity, including an Islamic state; or selective removal of non-Muslim, particularly Western military, economic, political, social, or cultural influences in the Muslim world that they believe to be incompatible with Islam.
Graham Fuller has argued for a broader notion of Islamism as a form of identity politics,
involving "support for [Muslim] identity, authenticity, broader
regionalism, revivalism, [and] revitalization of the community." Some authors hold the term "Islamic activism" to be synonymous and preferable to "Islamism", and Rached Ghannouchi writes that Islamists prefer to use the term "Islamic movement" themselves.
Central and prominent figures in twentieth-century Islamism include Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abul Ala Maududi, and Ruhollah Khomeini. Most Islamist thinkers emphasize peaceful political processes, which are supported by the majority of contemporary Islamists. Others, Sayyid Qutb in particular, called for violence, and his followers are generally considered Islamic extremists, although Qutb denounced the killing of innocents.
According to Robin Wright,
Islamist movements have "arguably altered the Middle East more than any
trend since the modern states gained independence", redefining
"politics and even borders". Following the Arab Spring, some Islamist currents became heavily involved in democratic politics, while others spawned "the most aggressive and ambitious Islamist militia" to date, ISIS.
Terminology
The term Islamism, which originally denoted the religion of Islam, first appeared in the English language as Islamismus in 1696, and as Islamism in 1712. The term appears in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in In Re Ross
(1891). By the turn of the twentieth century the shorter and purely
Arabic term "Islam" had begun to displaced it, and by 1938, when
Orientalist scholars completed The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Islamism seems to have virtually disappeared from English usage.
The term "Islamism" acquired its contemporary connotations in
French academia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. From French, it began
to migrate to the English language in the mid-1980s, and in recent
years has largely displaced the term Islamic fundamentalism in academic circles.
The new use of the term "Islamism" at first functioned as "a
marker for scholars more likely to sympathize" with new Islamic
movements; however, as the term gained popularity it became more
specifically associated with political groups such as the Taliban or the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, as well as with highly-publicized acts of violence.
In summation, the term Islamism enjoyed its first run, lasting from Voltaire to the First World War, as a synonym for Islam. Enlightened scholars and writers generally preferred it to Mohammedanism.
Eventually both terms yielded to Islam, the Arabic name of the faith,
and a word free of either pejorative or comparative associations. There
was no need for any other term, until the rise of an ideological and
political interpretation of Islam challenged scholars and commentators
to come up with an alternative, to distinguish Islam as modern ideology
from Islam as a faith... To all intents and purposes, Islamic
fundamentalism and Islamism have become synonyms in contemporary
American usage.
The Council on American–Islamic Relations complained in 2013 that the Associated Press's
definition of "Islamist"—a "supporter of government in accord with the
laws of Islam [and] who view the Quran as a political model"—had become a
pejorative shorthand for "Muslims we don't like". Mansoor Moaddel, a sociologist at Eastern Michigan University,
criticized it as "not a good term" because "the use of the term
Islamist does not capture the phenomena that is quite heterogeneous."
The AP Stylebook entry for Islamist as of 2013 reads as follows:
"An
advocate or supporter of a political movement that favors reordering
government and society in accordance with laws prescribed by Islam. Do
not use as a synonym for Islamic fighters, militants, extremists or
radicals, who may or may not be Islamists. Where possible, be specific
and use the name of militant affiliations: al-Qaida-linked, Hezbollah,
Taliban, etc. Those who view the Quran as a political model encompass a
wide range of Muslims, from mainstream politicians to militants known as
jihadi."
Overview
Definitions
Islamism has been defined as:
"the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life",
"political movement that favors reordering government and society in accordance with laws prescribed by Islam" (from Associated Press's definition of "Islamist")
"[the term 'Islamist' has become shorthand for] 'Muslims we don't like.'" (from Council on American–Islamic Relations's complaint about AP's earlier definition of Islamist)
"a theocratic ideology that seeks to impose any version of Islam over society by law". (Maajid Nawaz, a former Islamist turned critic). Subsequently, clarified to be "the desire to impose any given interpretation of Islam on society".
"the [Islamic] ideology that guides society as a whole and that [teaches] law must be in conformity with the Islamic sharia",
a term "used by outsiders to denote a strand of activity which they
think justifies their misconception of Islam as something rigid and
immobile, a mere tribal affiliation."
a movement so broad and flexible it reaches out to "everything to everyone" in Islam, making it "unsustainable".
an alternative social provider to the poor masses;
an angry platform for the disillusioned young;
a loud trumpet-call announcing "a return to the pure religion" to those seeking an identity;
a "progressive, moderate religious platform" for the affluent and liberal;
... and at the extremes, a violent vehicle for rejectionists and radicals.
an Islamic "movement that seeks cultural differentiation from the
West and reconnection with the pre-colonial symbolic universe"
"the organised political trend [...] that seeks to solve modern
political problems by reference to Muslim texts [...] the whole body of
thought which seeks to invest society with Islam which may be
integrationist, but may also be traditionalist, reform-minded or even
revolutionary"
"the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies that are held to be Islamic in character,"
a movement of "Muslims who draw upon the belief, symbols, and
language of Islam to inspire, shape, and animate political activity;"
which may contain moderate, tolerant, peaceful activists or those who
"preach intolerance and espouse violence."
"All who seek to Islamize their environment, whether in relation to
their lives in society, their family circumstances, or the workplace,
may be described as Islamists."
Varieties
Islamism
takes different forms and spans a wide range of strategies and tactics
towards the powers in place—"destruction, opposition, collaboration,
indifference" that have varied as "circumstances have changed"—and thus is not a united movement.
Moderate and reformist Islamists who accept and work within the democratic process include parties like the Tunisian Ennahda Movement. Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan is basically a socio-political and democratic Vanguard party but has also gained political influence through military coup d'états in the past. Other Islamist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine participate in the democratic and political process as well as armed attacks. Jihadist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and groups such as the Taliban, entirely reject democracy, often declaring as kuffar those Muslims who support it (see takfirism), as well as calling for violent/offensive jihad or urging and conducting attacks on a religious basis.
Another major division within Islamism is between what Graham E. Fuller has described as the fundamentalist "guardians of the tradition" (Salafis, such as those in the Wahhabi movement) and the "vanguard of change and Islamic reform" centered around the Muslim Brotherhood. Olivier Roy
argues that "Sunni pan-Islamism underwent a remarkable shift in the
second half of the 20th century" when the Muslim Brotherhood movement
and its focus on Islamisation of pan-Arabism was eclipsed by the Salafi movement with its emphasis on "sharia rather than the building of Islamic institutions," and rejection of Shia Islam.
Following the Arab Spring, Roy has described Islamism as "increasingly
interdependent" with democracy in much of the Arab Muslim world, such
that "neither can now survive without the other." While Islamist
political culture itself may not be democratic, Islamists need
democratic elections to maintain their legitimacy. At the same time,
their popularity is such that no government can call itself democratic
that excludes mainstream Islamist groups.
Relation to Islam
The relationship between the notions of Islam and Islamism has been subject to disagreement.
Hayri Abaza argues that the failure to distinguish between Islam
and Islamism leads many in the West to support illiberal Islamic
regimes, to the detriment of progressive moderates who seek to separate
religion from politics.
In contrast, Abid Ullah Jan,
writes "If Islam is a way of life, how can we say that those who want
to live by its principles in legal, social, political, economic, and
political spheres of life are not Muslims, but Islamists and believe in
Islamism, not [just] Islam." A writer for the International Crisis Group maintains that "the conception of 'political Islam'" is a creation of Americans to explain the Iranian Islamic Revolution
and apolitical Islam was a historical fluke of the "short-lived era of
the heyday of secular Arab nationalism between 1945 and 1970", and it is
quietist/non-political Islam, not Islamism, that requires explanation.
Another source distinguishes Islamist from Islamic "by the fact
that the latter refers to a religion and culture in existence over a
millennium, whereas the first is a political/religious phenomenon linked
to the great events of the 20th century". Islamists have, at least at
times, defined themselves as "Islamiyyoun/Islamists" to differentiate
themselves from "Muslimun/Muslims". Daniel Pipes
describes Islamism as a modern ideology that owes more to European
utopian political ideologies and "isms" than to the traditional Islamic
religion.
Influence
Few observers contest the influence of Islamism within the Muslim world. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, political movements based on the liberal ideology of free expression and democratic rule have led the opposition in other parts of the world such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and many parts of Asia;
however "the simple fact is that political Islam currently reigns as
the most powerful ideological force across the Muslim world today".
People see the unchanging socioeconomic condition in the Muslim
world as a major factor. Olivier Roy believes "the socioeconomic
realities that sustained the Islamist wave are still here and are not
going to change: poverty, uprootedness, crises in values and identities,
the decay of the educational systems, the North-South opposition, and
the problem of immigrant integration into the host societies".
The strength of Islamism also draws from the strength of
religiosity in general in the Muslim world. Compared to Western
societies, "[w]hat is striking about the Islamic world is that ... it
seems to have been the least penetrated by irreligion".
Where other peoples may look to the physical or social sciences for
answers in areas which their ancestors regarded as best left to
scripture, in the Muslim world, religion has become more encompassing,
not less, as "in the last few decades, it has been the fundamentalists
who have increasingly represented the cutting edge" of Muslim culture.
Even before the Arab Spring, Islamists in Egypt and other Muslim
countries had been described as "extremely influential. ... They
determine how one dresses, what one eats. In these areas, they are
incredibly successful. ... Even if the Islamists never come to power,
they have transformed their countries." Democratic, peaceful and political Islamists are now dominating the spectrum of Islamist ideology as well as the political system of the Muslim world.
Moderate strains of Islamism have been described as "competing in the
democratic public square in places like Turkey, Tunisia, Malaysia and
Indonesia".
Types
Moderate Islamism
Moderate Islamism is a term denoting the emerging Islamist discourses
and movements which considered deviated from the traditional Islamist
discourses of the mid-20th century.
Moderate Islamism is characterized by pragmatic participation within
the existing constitutional and political framework, in the most cases democratic institution. Moderate Islamists make up the majority of the contemporary Islamist movements.
From the philosophical perspective, their discourses are represented by
reformation or reinterpretation of modern socio-political institutions
and values imported from the West including democracy.
This had led to the conception of Islamic form of such institutions,
and Islamic interpretations are often attempted within this conception.
In the example of democracy, Islamic democracy as an Islamized form of the system has been intellectually developed. In Islamic democracy, the concept of shura, the tradition of consultation which considered as Sunnah of the prophetMuhammad, is invoked to Islamically reinterpret and legitimatize the institution of democracy.
Performance, goal, strategy, and outcome of moderate Islamist
movements vary considerably depending on the country and its
socio-political and historical context. In terms of performance, most of
the Islamist political parties are oppositions. However, there are few
examples they govern or obtain the substantial amount of the popular
votes. This includes National Congress of Sudan, National Iraqi Alliance of Iraq and Justice and Development Party (PJD) of Morocco. Their goal also ranges widely. The Ennahda Movement of Tunisia and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) of Indonesia formally resigned their vision of implementing sharia. In Morocco, PJD supported King Muhammad VI's Mudawana,
a "startlingly progressive family law" which grants women the right to a
divorce, raises the minimum age for marriage to 18, and, in the event
of separation, stipulates equal distribution of property.
To the contrary, National Congress of Sudan has implemented the strict
interpretation of sharia with the foreign support from the conservative
states. Movements of the former category are also termed as Post-Islamism
(see below). Their political outcome is interdependent with their goal
and strategy, in which what analysts call "inclusion-moderation theory"
is in effect. Inclusion-moderation theory assumes that the more lenient
the Islamists become, the less likely their survival will be threatened.
Similarly, the more accommodating the government be, the less extreme
Islamists become.
Moderate Islamism within the democratic institution is a relatively recent phenomenon. Throughout the 80s and 90s, major moderate Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood
and the Ennahda were excluded from democratic political participation.
Islamist movements operated within the state framework were markedly
scrutinized during the Algerian Civil War (1991-2002) and after the increase of terrorism in Egypt
in the 90s. Reflecting on these failures, Islamists turned increasingly
into revisionist and receptive to democratic procedures in the 21st
century.
The possibility of accommodating this new wave of modernist Islamism
has been explored among the Western intellectuals, with the concept such
as Turkish model was proposed. The concept was inspired by the perceived success of Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan in harmonizing the Islamist principles within the secular state framework. Turkish model, however, has been considered came "unstuck" after recent purge and violations of democratic principles by the Erdogan regime.
Critics of the concept hold that Islamist aspirations are fundamentally
incompatible with the democratic principles, thus even moderate
Islamists are totalitarian in nature. As such, it requires strong constitutional checks and the effort of the mainstream Islam to detach political Islam from the public discourses.
Post-Islamism
Post-Islamism is a term proposed by Iranian political sociologist Asef Bayat,
referring to the Islamist movements which marked by the critical
departure from the traditional Islamist discourses of the mid-20th
century.
Bayat explained it as "a condition where, following a phase of
experimentation, the appeal, energy, symbols and sources of legitimacy
of Islamism get exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters. As
such, post-Islamism is not anti-Islamic, but rather reflects a tendency
to resecularize religion." It originally pertained only to Iran, where
"post-Islamism is expressed in the idea of fusion between Islam (as a
personalized faith) and individual freedom and choice; and post-Islamism
is associated with the values of democracy and aspects of modernity". A 2008 Lowy Institute for International Policy paper suggests that PKS of Indonesia and AKP of Turkey are post-Islamist. The characterization can be applied to Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), and used to describe the "ideological evolution" within the Ennahda of Tunisia.
Salafi movement
The contemporary Salafi movement encompasses a broad range of ultraconservative Islamist doctrines which share the reformist mission of Ibn Taymiyyah. From the perspective of political Islam, the Salafi movement can be broadly categorized into three groups; the quietist (or the purist), the activist (or haraki) and the jihadist (Salafi jihadism,
see below). The quietist school advocates for societal reform through
religious education and proselytizing rather than political activism.
The activist school, to the contrary, encourages political participation
within the constitutional and political framework. The jihadist school
is inspired by the ideology of Sayyid Qutb (Qutbism,
see below), and rejects the legitimacy of secular institutions and
promotes the revolution in order to pave the way for the establishment
of a new Caliphate.
The quietist Salafi movement is stemming from the teaching of Nasiruddin Albani, who challenged the notion of taqlid
(imitation, conformity to the legal precedent) as a blind adherence. As
such, they alarm the political participation as potentially leading to
the division of the Muslim community. This school is exemplified by Madkhalism which based on the writings of Rabee al-Madkhali.
Madkhalism was originated in the 90s Saudi Arabia, as a reaction
against the rise of the Salafi activism and the threat of Salafi
Jihadism. It rejects any kind of opposition against the secular
governance, thus endorsed by the authoritarian governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia during the 90s. The influence of the quietist school has waned significantly in the Middle East recently, as the governments began incorporating Islamist factions emanating from the popular demand.
The politically active Salafi movement, Salafi activism or harakis,
is based on the religious belief that endorses non-violent political
activism in order to protect God's Divine governance. This means that
politics is a field which requires Salafi principles to be applied as
well, in the same manner with other aspects of society and life.
Salafi activism was originated in the 50s to 60s Saudi Arabia, where
many Muslim Brothers had taken refuge from the prosecution by the Nasser regime.
There, Muslim Brothers' Islamism had synthesized with Salafism, and led
to the creation of the Salafi activist trend exemplified by the Sahwa movement in the 80s, promulgated by Safar Al-Hawali and Salman al-Ouda. Today, the school makes up the majority of Salafism. There are many active Salafist political parties throughout the Muslim world, including Al Nour Party of Egypt, Al Islah of Yemen and Al Asalah of Bahrain.
Wahhabism
The antecedent of the contemporary Salafi movement is Wahhabism, which traces back to the 18th-century reform movement in Najd by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Although having different roots, Wahhabism and Salafism are considered more or less merged in the 60s Saudi Arabia. In the process, Salafism had been greatly influenced by Wahhabism, and today they share the similar religious outlook. Wahhabism is also described as a Saudi brand of Salafism. From the political perspective, Wahhabism is marked in its teaching of bay'ah (oath to allegiance), which requires Muslims to present an allegiance to the ruler of the society. Wahhabis have traditionally given their allegiance to the House of Saud, and this has made them apolitical in Saudi Arabia.
However, there are small numbers of other strains including Salafi
Jihadist offshoot which decline to present an allegiance to the House of
Saud. Wahhabism is also characterized by its disinterest in social justice, anticolonialism, or economic equality, expounded upon by the mainstream Islamists. Historically, Wahhabism was state-sponsored and internationally propagated by Saudi Arabia with the help of funding from mainly Saudi petroleum exports,
leading to the "explosive growth" of its influence (and subsequently,
the influence of Salafism) from the 70s (a phenomenon often dubbed as Petro-Islam).
Today, both Wahhabism and Salafism exert their influence worldwide, and
they have been indirectly contributing to the upsurge of Salafi
Jihadism as well.
Militant Islamism/Jihadism
Qutbism
Qutbism is an ideology formulated by Sayyid Qutb,
an influential figure of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 50s and 60s,
which justifies the use of violence in order to push the Islamist
goals. Qutbism is marked by the two distinct methodological concepts; one is takfirism, which in the context of Qutbism, indicates the excommunication of fellow Muslims who are deemed equivalent to apostate, and another is "offensive Jihad", a concept which promotes violence in the name of Islam against the perceived kuffar (infidels).
Based on the two concepts, Qutbism promotes engagement against the
state apparatus in order to topple down its regime. Fusion of Qutbism
and Salafi Movement had resulted in the development of Salafi jihadism (see below).
Qutbism is considered a product of the extreme repression experienced by Qutb and his fellow Muslim Brothers under the Nasser
regime, which was resulted from the 1954 Muslim Brothers plot to
assassinate Nasser. During the repression, thousands of Muslim Brothers
were imprisoned, many of them, including Qutb, tortured and held in concentration camps. Under this condition, Qutb had cultivated his Islamist ideology in his seminal work Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), in which he equated the Muslims within the Nasser regime with secularism and the West, and described them as regression back to jahiliyyah (period of time before the advent of Islam). In this context, he allowed the tafkir (which was an unusual practice before the rejuvenation by Qutb) of said Muslims. Although Qutb was executed before the completion of his ideology, his idea was disseminated and continuously expanded by the later generations, among them Abdullah Yusuf Azzam and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who was a student of Qutb's brother Muhammad Qutb and later became a mentor of Osama bin Laden.
Al-Zawahiri was considered "the purity of Qutb's character and the
torment he had endured in prison," and had played an extensive role in
the normalization of offensive Jihad within the Qutbist discourse.
Both al-Zawahiri and bin Laden had become the core of Jihadist
movements which exponentially developed in the backdrop of the late
20th-century geopolitical crisis throughout the Muslim world.
Salafi Jihadism
Salafi jihadism is a term coined by Gilles Kepel in 2002, referring to the ideology which actively promotes and conducts violence and terrorism in order to pursue the establishment of an Islamic state or a new Caliphate. Today, the term is often simplified to Jihadism or Jihadist movement in popular usage according to Martin Kramer. It is a hybrid ideology between Qutbism, Salafism, Wahhabism and other minor Islamist strains.
Qutbism taught by scholars like Abdullah Azzam provided the political
intellectual underpinnings with the concepts like takfirism, and
Salafism and Wahhabism provided the religious intellectual input. Salafi Jihadism makes up a tiny minority of the contemporary Islamist movements.
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Raqqa, Syria, 2014
Distinct characteristics of Salafi Jihadism noted by Robin Wright include the formal process of taking bay'ah (oath of allegiance) to the leader, which is inspired by the Wahhabi teaching.
Another characteristic is its flexibility to cut ties with the
less-popular movements when its strategically or financially convenient,
exemplified by the relations between al-Qaeda and al-Nusra Front.
Other marked developments of Salafi Jihadism include the concepts of
"near enemy" and "far enemy". "Near enemy" connotes the despotic regime
occupying the Muslim society, and the term was coined by Mohammed Abdul-Salam Farag in order to justify the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat by the Salafi Jihadi organization Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in 1981. Later, the concept of "far enemy" which connotes the West was introduced and formally declared by al-Qaeda in 1996.
Salafi Jihadism emerged out during the 80s when the Soviet invaded Afghanistan. Local mujahideen had extracted financial, logistical and military support from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United States. Later, Osama bin Laden
established al-Qaeda as a transnational Salafi Jihadi organization in
1988 to capitalize this financial, logistical and military network and
to expand their operation. The ideology had seen its rise during the 90s when the Muslim world experienced numerous geopolitical crisis, notably the Algerian Civil War (1991–2002), Bosnian War (1992–1995), and the First Chechen War
(1994–1996). Within these conflicts, political Islam often acted as a
mobilizing factor for the local belligerents, who demanded financial,
logistical and military support from al-Qaeda, in the exchange for
active proliferation of the ideology. After the 1998 bombings of US embassies, September 11 attacks (2001), the US-led invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), Salafi Jihadism had seen its momentum. However, it got devastated by the US counterterrorism operations, culminated in bin Laden's death in 2011. After the Arab Spring (2011) and subsequent Syrian Civil War (2011–present), the remnants of al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq had restored their capacity, which rapidly developed into the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, spreading its influence throughout the conflict zones of MENA region and the globe.
History
Predecessor movements
Some Islamic revivalist movements and leaders pre-dating Islamism include:
Ahmad Sirhindi (~1564–1624) was part of a reassertion of orthodoxy within Islamic Mysticism
(Taṣawwuf) and was known to his followers as the 'renovator of the
second millennium'. It has been said of Sirhindi that he 'gave to Indian
Islam the rigid and conservative stamp it bears today.'
Ibn Taymiyyah,
a Syrian Islamic jurist during the 13th and 14th centuries who is often
quoted by contemporary Islamists. Ibn Taymiyya argued against the
shirking of Sharia law, was against practices such as the celebration of
Muhammad's birthday, and "he believed that those who ask assistance
from the grave of the Prophet or saints, are mushrikin (polytheists),
someone who is engaged in shirk."
Shah Waliullah of India and Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab of Arabia were contemporaries who met each other while studying in Mecca. Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab
advocated doing away with the later accretions like grave worship and
getting back to the letter and the spirit of Islam as preached and
practiced by Muhammad. He went on to found Wahhabism. Shah Waliullah was a forerunner of reformist Islamists like Muhammad Abduh, Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Asad in his belief that there was "a constant need for new ijtihad
as the Muslim community progressed and expanded and new generations had
to cope with new problems" and his interest in the social and economic
problems of the poor.
Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi
was a disciple and successor of Shah Waliullah's son who emphasized the
'purification' of Islam from un-Islamic beliefs and practices. He
anticipated modern militant Islamists by leading an extremist, jihadist movement and attempted to create an Islamic state based on the enforcement of Islamic law. While he battled Sikh fundamentalist rule in Muslim-majority North-Western India, his followers fought against British colonialism after his death and allied themselves with the Indian Mutiny.
After the failure of the Indian Mutiny, some of Shah Waliullah's
followers turned to more peaceful methods for preserving India's Islamic
heritage and founded the Dar al-Ulum seminary in 1867 in the town of Deoband. From the school developed the Deobandi movement which became the largest philosophical movement of traditional Islamic thought on the subcontinent and led to the establishment of thousands of madrasahs throughout modern-day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
The end of the 19th century saw the dismemberment of most of the Muslim Ottoman Empire by non-Muslim European colonial powers.
The empire spent massive sums on Western civilian and military
technology to try to modernize and compete with the encroaching European
powers, and in the process went deep into debt to these powers.
In this context, the publications of Jamal ad-din al-Afghani (1837–97), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935) preached Islamic alternatives to the political, economic, and cultural decline of the empire. Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida formed the beginning of the Islamist movement, as well as the reformist Islamist movement.
Their ideas included the creation of a truly Islamic society under sharia law, and the rejection of taqlid, the blind imitation of earlier authorities, which they believed deviated from the true messages of Islam. Unlike some later Islamists, Early Salafiyya strongly emphasized the restoration of the Caliphate.
Muhammad Iqbal
Muhammad Iqbal was a philosopher, poet and politician in British India who is widely regarded as having inspired the Islamic Nationalism and Pakistan Movement in British India. Iqbal is admired as a prominent classical poet by Pakistani, Iranian, Indian and other international scholars of literature. Though Iqbal is best known as an eminent poet, he is also a highly acclaimed "Islamic philosophical thinker of modern times".
While studying law and philosophy in England and Germany, Iqbal became a member of the London branch of the All India Muslim League. He came back to Lahore
in 1908. While dividing his time between law practice and philosophical
poetry, Iqbal had remained active in the Muslim League. He did not
support Indian involvement in World War I and remained in close touch with Muslim political leaders such as Muhammad Ali Johar and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He was a critic of the mainstream Indian nationalist and secularistIndian National Congress. Iqbal's seven English lectures were published by Oxford University press in 1934 in a book titled The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. These lectures dwell on the role of Islam as a religion as well as a political and legal philosophy in the modern age.
Iqbal expressed fears that not only would secularism and secular nationalism weaken the spiritual foundations of Islam and Muslim society, but that India's Hindu-majority population would crowd out Muslim heritage, culture and political influence. In his travels to Egypt, Afghanistan, Palestine and Syria, he promoted ideas of greater Islamic political co-operation and unity,
calling for the shedding of nationalist differences. Sir Mummad Iqbal
was elected president of the Muslim League in 1930 at its session in Allahabad as well as for the session in Lahore in 1932. In his Allahabad Address
on 29 December 1930, Iqbal outlined a vision of an independent state
for Muslim-majority provinces in northwestern India. This address later
inspired the Pakistan movement.
Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi
was an important early twentieth-century figure in the Islamic revival
in India, and then after independence from Britain, in Pakistan. Trained
as a lawyer he chose the profession of journalism, and wrote about
contemporary issues and most importantly about Islam and Islamic law.
Maududi founded the Jamaat-e-Islami
party in 1941 and remained its leader until 1972. However, Maududi had
much more impact through his writing than through his political
organising. His extremely influential books (translated into many
languages) placed Islam in a modern context, and influenced not only
conservative ulema but liberal modernizer Islamists such as al-Faruqi, whose "Islamization of Knowledge" carried forward some of Maududi's key principles.
Maududi believed that Islam was all-encompassing: "Everything in
the universe is 'Muslim' for it obeys God by submission to His laws...
The man who denies God is called Kafir (concealer) because he conceals by his disbelief what is inherent in his nature and embalmed in his own soul."
Maududi also believed that Muslim society could not be Islamic
without Sharia, and Islam required the establishment of an Islamic
state. This state should be a "theo-democracy," based on the principles of: tawhid (unity of God), risala (prophethood) and khilafa (caliphate).
Although Maududi talked about Islamic revolution, by "revolution" he meant not the violence or populist policies of the Iranian Revolution,
but the gradual changing the hearts and minds of individuals from the
top of society downward through an educational process or da'wah.
Muslim Brotherhood
Roughly contemporaneous with Maududi was the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailiyah, Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al Banna.
His was arguably the first, largest and most influential modern Islamic
political/religious organization. Under the motto "the Qur'an is our
constitution,"
it sought Islamic revival through preaching and also by providing basic
community services including schools, mosques, and workshops. Like
Maududi, Al Banna believed in the necessity of government rule based on
Shariah law implemented gradually and by persuasion, and of eliminating
all imperialist influence in the Muslim world.
Some elements of the Brotherhood, though perhaps against orders, did engage in violence against the government, and its founder Al-Banna was assassinated in 1949 in retaliation for the assassination of Egypt's premier Mahmud Fami Naqrashi three months earlier.
The Brotherhood has suffered periodic repression in Egypt and has been
banned several times, in 1948 and several years later following
confrontations with Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser, who jailed thousands of members for several years.
Maududi's political ideas influenced Sayyid Qutb a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and one of the key philosophers of Islamism and highly influential thinkers of Islamic universalism.
Qutb believed things had reached such a state that the Muslim community
had literally ceased to exist. It "has been extinct for a few
centuries," having reverted to Godless ignorance (Jahiliyya).
To eliminate jahiliyya, Qutb argued Sharia, or Islamic law, must
be established. Sharia law was not only accessible to humans and
essential to the existence of Islam, but also all-encompassing,
precluding "evil and corrupt" non-Islamic ideologies like communism,
nationalism, or secular democracy.
Qutb preached that Muslims must engage in a two-pronged attack of converting individuals through preaching Islam peacefully and also waging what he called militant jihad
so as to forcibly eliminate the "power structures" of Jahiliyya—not
only from the Islamic homeland but from the face of the earth.
Qutb was both a member of the brotherhood and enormously
influential in the Muslim world at large. Qutb is considered by some
(Fawaz A. Gerges) to be "the founding father and leading theoretician"
of modern jihadists, such as Osama bin Laden. However, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and in Europe has not embraced his vision of undemocratic Islamic state and armed jihad, something for which they have been denounced by radical Islamists.
Ascendance on international politics
Six-Day War (1967)
The quick and decisive defeat of the Arab troops during the Six-Day
War by Israeli troops constituted a pivotal event in the Arab Muslim
world. The defeat along with economic stagnation in the defeated
countries, was blamed on the secular Arab nationalism
of the ruling regimes. A steep and steady decline in the popularity and
credibility of secular, socialist and nationalist politics ensued. Ba'athism, Arab socialism, and Arab nationalism suffered, and different democratic and anti-democratic Islamist movements inspired by Maududi and Sayyid Qutb gained ground.
The first modern "Islamist state" (with the possible exception of Zia's Pakistan) was established among the Shia of Iran. In a major shock to the rest of the world, AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini
led the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in order to overthrow the oil-rich,
well-armed, Westernized and pro-American secular monarchy ruled by Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi.
The views of Ali Shariati, the ideologue of the Iranian Revolution, resembled those of Mohammad Iqbal, the ideological father of the State of Pakistan,
but Khomeini's beliefs are perceived to be placed somewhere between the
beliefs of Shia Islam and the beliefs of Sunni Islamic thinkers like
Mawdudi and Qutb. He believed that complete imitation of the Prophet Mohammad and his successors such as Ali
for the restoration of Sharia law was essential to Islam, that many
secular, Westernizing Muslims were actually agents of the West and
therefore serving Western interests, and that acts such as the
"plundering" of Muslim lands was part of a long-term conspiracy against
Islam by Western governments.
His views differed from those of Sunni scholars in:
Khomeini talked not about restoring the Caliphate or SunniIslamic democracy,
but about establishing a state where the guardianship of the democratic
or the dictatorial political system was performed by Shia jurists (ulama) as the successors of Shia Imams until the Mahdi returns from occultation. His concept of velayat-e-faqih
("guardianship of the [Islamic] jurist"), held that the leading Shia
Muslim cleric in society—which Khomeini's mass of followers believed and
chose to be himself—should serve as the supervisor of the state in
order to protect or "guard" Islam and Sharia law from "innovation" and "anti-Islamic laws" passed by dictators or democratic parliaments.
The revolution was influenced by Marxism through Islamist thought and also by writings that sought either to counter Marxism (Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's work) or to integrate socialism and Islamism (Ali Shariati's work). A strong wing of the revolutionary leadership was made up of leftists or "radical populists", such as Ali Akbar Mohtashami-Pur.
While initial enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution in the Muslim
world was intense, it has waned as critics hold and campaign that
"purges, executions, and atrocities tarnished its image".
The Islamic Republic has also maintained its hold on power in Iran in spite of US economic sanctions, and has created or assisted like-minded Shia terrorist groups in Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Jordan (SCIRI) and Lebanon (Hezbollah) (two Muslim countries that also have large Shiite populations).
During the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, the Iranian government enjoyed something of a resurgence in popularity amongst the predominantly Sunni "Arab street," due to its support for Hezbollah and to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's vehement opposition to the United States and his call that Israel shall vanish.
Grand Mosque seizure (1979)
The strength of the Islamist movement was manifest in an event which
might have seemed sure to turn Muslim public opinion against fundamentalism, but did just the opposite. In 1979 the Grand Mosque in MeccaSaudi Arabia was seized by an armed fundamentalist group and held for over a week. Scores were killed, including many pilgrim bystanders in a gross violation of one of the most holy sites in Islam (and one where arms and violence are strictly forbidden).
Instead of prompting a backlash against the movement from which
the attackers originated, however, Saudi Arabia, already very
conservative, responded by shoring up its fundamentalist credentials
with even more Islamic restrictions. Crackdowns followed on everything
from shopkeepers who did not close for prayer and newspapers that
published pictures of women, to the selling of dolls, teddy bears
(images of animate objects are considered haraam), and dog food (dogs are considered unclean).
In other Muslim countries, blame for and wrath against the
seizure was directed not against fundamentalists, but against Islamic
fundamentalism's foremost geopolitical enemy—the United States.
Ayatollah Khomeini sparked attacks on American embassies when he announced:
It is not beyond guessing that this is the work of criminal American imperialism and international Zionism
despite the fact that the object of the fundamentalists' revolt was the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, America's major ally in the region.
Anti-American demonstrations followed in the Philippines, Turkey, Bangladesh, India, the UAE, Pakistan, and Kuwait. The US Embassy in Libya was burned by protesters chanting pro-Khomeini slogans and the embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan was burned to the ground.
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989)
In 1979, the Soviet Union deployed its 40th Army into Afghanistan, attempting to suppress an Islamic rebellion against an allied Marxist regime in the Afghan Civil War. The conflict, pitting indigenous impoverished Muslims (mujahideen)
against an anti-religious superpower, galvanized thousands of Muslims
around the world to send aid and sometimes to go themselves to fight for
their faith. Leading this pan-Islamic effort was Palestinian sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. While the military effectiveness of these "Afghan Arabs" was marginal, an estimated 16,000 to 35,000 Muslim volunteers came from around the world to fight in Afghanistan.
When the Soviet Union abandoned the Marxist Najibullah regime and
withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 (the regime finally fell in 1992),
the victory was seen by many Muslims as the triumph of Islamic faith
over superior military power and technology that could be duplicated
elsewhere.
The jihadists gained legitimacy and prestige from their
triumph both within the militant community and among ordinary Muslims,
as well as the confidence to carry their jihad to other countries where
they believed Muslims required assistance.
The "veterans of the guerrilla campaign" returning home to Algeria, Egypt, and other countries "with their experience, ideology, and weapons," were often eager to continue armed jihad.
The collapse of the Soviet Union itself, in 1991, was seen by
many Islamists, including Bin Laden, as the defeat of a superpower at
the hands of Islam. Concerning the $6 billion in aid given by the US and
Pakistan's military training and intelligence support to the
mujahideen,
bin Laden wrote: "[T]he US has no mentionable role" in "the collapse of
the Soviet Union ... rather the credit goes to God and the mujahidin"
of Afghanistan.
Persian Gulf War (1990–1991)
Another factor in the early 1990s that worked to radicalize the Islamist movement was the Gulf War, which brought several hundred thousand US and allied non-Muslim military personnel to Saudi Arabian soil to put an end to Saddam Hussein's
occupation of Kuwait. Prior to 1990 Saudi Arabia played an important
role in restraining the many Islamist groups that received its aid. But
when Saddam, secularist and Ba'athist dictator of neighboring Iraq,
attacked Kuwait (his enemy in the war), western troops came to protect
the Saudi monarchy. Islamists accused the Saudi regime of being a puppet
of the west.
These attacks resonated with conservative Muslims and the problem
did not go away with Saddam's defeat either, since American troops
remained stationed in the kingdom, and a de facto cooperation with the
Palestinian-Israeli peace process developed. Saudi Arabia attempted to
compensate for its loss of prestige among these groups by repressing
those domestic Islamists who attacked it (bin Laden being a prime
example), and increasing aid to Islamic groups (Islamist madrassas
around the world and even aiding some violent Islamist groups) that did
not, but its pre-war influence on behalf of moderation was greatly
reduced. One result of this was a campaign of attacks on government officials and tourists in Egypt, a bloody civil war in Algeria and Osama bin Laden's terror attacks climaxing in the 9/11 attack.
In Afghanistan, the mujahideen's victory against the Soviet Union in the 1980s did not lead to justice and prosperity, due to a vicious and destructive civil war between political and tribal warlords, making Afghanistan one of the poorest countries on earth. In 1992, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan ruled by communist forces collapsed, and democratic Islamist elements of mujahdeen founded the Islamic State of Afghanistan. In 1996, a more conservative and anti-democratic Islamist movement known as the Taliban rose to power, defeated most of the warlords and took over roughly 80% of Afghanistan.
The Taliban were spawned by the thousands of madrasahs the Deobandi movement established for impoverished Afghan refugees and supported by governmental and religious groups in neighboring Pakistan. The Taliban differed from other Islamist movements to the point where they might be more properly described as Islamic fundamentalist
or neofundamentalist, interested in spreading "an idealized and
systematized version of conservative tribal village customs" under the
label of Sharia to an entire country. Their ideology was also described as being influenced by Wahhabism, and the extremistjihadism of their guest Osama bin Laden.
The Taliban considered "politics" to be against Sharia and thus did not hold elections. They were led by Mullah Mohammed Omar who was given the title "Amir al-Mu'minin" or Commander of the Faithful, and a pledge of loyalty by several hundred Taliban-selected Pashtun
clergy in April 1996. Taliban were overwhelmingly Pashtun and were
accused of not sharing power with the approximately 60% of Afghans who
belonged to other ethnic groups.
The Taliban's hosting of Osama bin Laden led to an American-organized attack which drove them from power following the 9/11 attacks.
Taliban are still very much alive and fighting a vigorous insurgency with suicide bombings and armed attacks being launched against NATO and Afghan government targets.
An Islamist movement influenced by Salafism and the jihad in Afghanistan, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, was the FIS or Front Islamique de Salut (the Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria. Founded as a broad Islamist coalition in 1989 it was led by Abbassi Madani, and a charismatic Islamist young preacher, Ali Belhadj.
Taking advantage of economic failure and unpopular social
liberalization and secularization by the ruling leftist-nationalist FLN
government, it used its preaching to advocate the establishment of a
legal system following Sharia law, economic liberalization and
development program, education in Arabic rather than French, and gender
segregation, with women staying home to alleviate the high rate of
unemployment among young Algerian men. The FIS won sweeping victories in
local elections and it was going to win national elections in 1991 when
voting was canceled by a military coup d'état.
As Islamists took up arms to overthrow the government, the FIS's
leaders were arrested and it became overshadowed by Islamist guerrilla
groups, particularly the Islamic Salvation Army, MIA and Armed Islamic Group (or GIA). A bloody and devastating civil war ensued in which between 150,000 and 200,000 people were killed over the next decade.
The civil war was not a victory for Islamists. By 2002 the main
guerrilla groups had either been destroyed or had surrendered. The
popularity of Islamist parties has declined to the point that "the
Islamist candidate, Abdallah Jaballah, came a distant third with 5% of
the vote" in the 2004 presidential election.
Bangladesh
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh is the largest Islamist party in the country and supports the implementation of Sharia law and promotes the country's main right-wing politics. Since 2000, the main political opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has been allied with it and another Islamic party, Islami Oikya Jote.
Some of their leaders and supporters, including former ministers and
MPs, have been hanged for alleged war crimes during Bangladesh's struggle for independence and speaking against the ruling Bangladesh Awami League.
Belgium
In the 2012, the party named Islam had four candidates and they were elected in Molenbeek and Anderlecht.
In 2018, they candidated in 28 municipalities. Its policies include
schools must offer halal food and women must be able to wear a headscarf
anywhere.
Egypt (Jihadism)
While Qutb's ideas became increasingly radical during his
imprisonment prior to his execution in 1966, the leadership of the
Brotherhood, led by Hasan al-Hudaybi,
remained moderate and interested in political negotiation and activism.
Fringe or splinter movements inspired by the final writings of Qutb in
the mid-1960s (particularly the manifesto Milestones, a.k.a. Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq) did, however, develop and they pursued a more radical direction. By the 1970s, the Brotherhood had renounced violence as a means of achieving its goals.
The path of violence and military struggle was then taken up by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. Unlike earlier anti-colonial movements the extremist
group directed its attacks against what it believed were "apostate"
leaders of Muslim states, leaders who held secular leanings or who had
introduced or promoted Western/foreign ideas and practices into Islamic
societies. Its views were outlined in a pamphlet written by Muhammad Abd
al-Salaam Farag, in which he states:
...there is no doubt that the first battlefield for jihad
is the extermination of these infidel leaders and to replace them by a
complete Islamic Order...
Another of the Egyptian groups which employed violence in their struggle for Islamic order was al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya
(Islamic Group). Victims of their campaign against the Egyptian state
in the 1990s included the head of the counter-terrorism police (Major
General Raouf Khayrat), a parliamentary speaker (Rifaat al-Mahgoub), dozens of European tourists and Egyptian bystanders, and over 100 Egyptian police. Ultimately the campaign to overthrow the government was unsuccessful, and the major jihadi group, Jamaa Islamiya (or al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya), renounced violence in 2003. Other lesser known groups include the Islamic Liberation Party, Salvation from Hell and Takfir wal-Hijra,
and these groups have variously been involved in activities such as
attempted assassinations of political figures, arson of video shops and
attempted takeovers of government buildings.
Hamas is a Palestinian Sunni Islamist organization that governs the Gaza Strip
where it has moved to establish sharia law in matters such as
separation of the genders, using the lash for punishment, and Islamic
dress code.
Hamas also has a military resistance wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.
For some decades prior to the First Palestine Intifada in 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine took a "quiescent" stance towards Israel,
focusing on preaching, education and social services, and benefiting
from Israel's "indulgence" to build up a network of mosques and
charitable organizations.
As the First Intifada gathered momentum and Palestinian shopkeepers
closed their shops in support of the uprising, the Brotherhood announced
the formation of HAMAS ("zeal"), devoted to Jihad against Israel. Rather than being more moderate than the PLO, the 1988 Hamas charter
took a more uncompromising stand, calling for the destruction of
Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine.
It was soon competing with and then overtaking the PLO for control of
the intifada. The Brotherhood's base of devout middle class found common
cause with the impoverished youth of the intifada in their cultural
conservatism and antipathy for activities of the secular middle class
such as drinking alcohol and going about without hijab.
Hamas has continued to be a major player in Palestine. From 2000
to 2007 it killed 542 people in 140 suicide bombing or "martyrdom
operations". In the January 2006 legislative election—its first foray into the political process—it won the majority of the seats, and in 2007 it drove the PLO out of Gaza. Hamas has been praised by Muslims for driving Israel out of the Gaza Strip, but criticized for failure to achieve its demands in the 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza Wars despite heavy destruction and significant loss of life.
Sovereignty belongs to Allah
alone but He has delegated it to the State of Pakistan through its
people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a
sacred trust.
The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the elected representatives of the people.
The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed.
Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and
collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out
in the Quran and Sunnah.
Provision shall be made for the religious minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures.
This resolution later became a key source of inspiration for writers of the Constitution of Pakistan, and is included in the constitution as preamble.
In July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's
regime in Pakistan. Ali Bhutto, a leftist in democratic competition
with Islamists, had announced banning alcohol and nightclubs within six
months, shortly before he was overthrown. Zia-ul-Haq was much more committed to Islamism, and "Islamization"
or implementation of Islamic law, became a cornerstone of his
eleven-year military dictatorship and Islamism became his "official
state ideology". Zia ul Haq was an admirer of Mawdudi and Mawdudi's party Jamaat-e-Islami became the "regime's ideological and political arm".
In Pakistan this Islamization from above was "probably" more complete
"than under any other regime except those in Iran and Sudan," but
Zia-ul-Haq was also criticized by many Islamists for imposing "symbols"
rather than substance, and using Islamization to legitimize his means of
seizing power.
Unlike neighboring Iran, Zia-ul-Haq's policies were intended to "avoid
revolutionary excess", and not to strain relations with his American and
Persian Gulf state allies. Zia-ul-Haq was killed in 1988 but Islamization remains an important element in Pakistani society.
Sudan
For many years, Sudan had an Islamist regime under the leadership of Hassan al-Turabi. His National Islamic Front first gained influence when strongman General Gaafar al-Nimeiry
invited members to serve in his government in 1979. Turabi built a
powerful economic base with money from foreign Islamist banking systems,
especially those linked with Saudi Arabia. He also recruited and built a
cadre of influential loyalists by placing sympathetic students in the
university and military academy while serving as minister of education.
After al-Nimeiry was overthrown in 1985 the party did poorly in
national elections, but in 1989 it was able to overthrow the elected
post-al-Nimeiry government with the help of the military. Turabi was
noted for proclaiming his support for the democratic process and a
liberal government before coming to power, but strict application of
sharia law, torture and mass imprisonment of the opposition, and an intensification of the long-running war in southern Sudan, once in power. The NIF regime also harbored Osama bin Laden for a time (before 9/11), and worked to unify Islamist opposition to the American attack on Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War.
After Sudanese intelligence services were implicated in an assassination attempt on the President of Egypt, UN economic sanctions were imposed on Sudan, a poor country, and Turabi fell from favor.
He was imprisoned for a time in 2004–05. Some of the NIF policies, such
as the war with the non-Muslim south, have been reversed, though the
National Islamic Front still holds considerable power in the government
of Omar al-Bashir and National Congress Party, another Islamist party in country.
Turkey
had a number of Islamist parties, often changing names as they were
banned by the constitutional court for anti-secular activities. Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011) was the leader of several of the parties, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, 1970–1971), the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, 1972–1981), and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, 1983-1998); he also became a member of the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, 2003–2011).
The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has dominated Turkish politics since 2002, is sometimes described as Islamist, but rejects such classification.
Contemporary era
By country
Various Islamist political groups are dominant forces in the political systems of Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq.
Islamic Action Front is Jordan's
Islamist political party and largest democratic political force in the
country. The IAF's survival in Jordan is primarily due to its
flexibility and less radical approach to politics.
Hadas or "Islamic Constitutional Movement" is Kuwait's Sunni Islamist party.
The Justice and Construction Party is the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm in Libya and the second largest political force in the country. The National Forces Alliance,
the largest political group in country, doesn't believe the country
should be run entirely by Sharia law or secular]] law, but does hold
that Sharia should be "the main inspiration for legislation." Party
leader Jibril has said the NFA is a moderate Islamic moveme that
recognises the importance of Islam in political life and favours Sharia
as the basis of the law.
The Muslim Brotherhood of Syria is a Sunni Islamist force in Syria and very loosely affiliated to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It has also been called the "dominant group" or "dominant force" in the Arab Spring uprising in Syria.
The group's stated political positions are moderate and in its most
recent April 2012 manifesto it "pledges to respect individual rights",
to promote pluralism and democracy.
The Ennahda Movement, also known as Renaissance Party or simply Ennahda, is a moderate Islamist political party in Tunisia. On 1 March 2011, after the government of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali collapsed in the wake of the 2011 Tunisian revolution,
Tunisia's interim government granted the group permission to form a
political party. Since then it has become the biggest and most
well-organized party in Tunisia, so far outdistancing its more secular
competitors. In the Tunisian Constituent Assembly election of 2011,
the first honest election in the country's history with a turnout of
51% of all eligible voters, the party won 37% of the popular vote and 89
(41%) of the 217 assembly seats, far more than any other party.
Hizb ut-Tahrir is an influential international Islamist movement, founded in 1953 by an Islamic Qadi(judge)Taqiuddin al-Nabhani.
HT is unique from most other Islamist movements in that the party
focuses not on implementation of Sharia on local level or on providing
social services, but on unifying the Muslim world under its vision of a
new Islamic caliphate spanning from North Africa and the Middle East to much of central and South Asia.
To this end it has drawn up and published a 186-article
constitution for its proposed caliphate-state specifying specific
policies such as sharia law, a "unitary ruling system" headed by a
caliph elected by Muslims, an economy based on the gold standard, public ownership of utilities, public transport, and energy resources, death for apostates and Arabic as the "sole language of the State."
In its focus on the Caliphate, the party takes a different view of Muslim history than some other Islamists such as Muhammad Qutb. HT sees Islam's pivotal turning point as occurring not with the death of Ali, or one of the other four rightly guided Caliphs in the 7th century, but with the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate
in 1924. This is believed to have ended the true Islamic system,
something for which it blames "the disbelieving (Kafir) colonial powers"
working through Turkish modernist Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
HT does not engage in armed jihad
or work for a democratic system, but works to take power through
"ideological struggle" to change Muslim public opinion, and in
particular through elites who will "facilitate" a "change of the
government," i.e., launch a "bloodless" coup.
It allegedly attempted and failed such coups in 1968 and 1969 in
Jordan, and in 1974 in Egypt, and is now banned in both countries.
The party is sometimes described as "Leninist" and "rigidly controlled by its central leadership,"
with its estimated one million members required to spend "at least two
years studying party literature under the guidance of mentors (Murshid)" before taking "the party oath." HT is particularly active in the ex-soviet republics of Central Asia and in Europe.
In the UK its rallies have drawn thousands of Muslims,
and the party has been described by two observers (Robert S. Leiken and
Steven Brooke) to have outpaced the Muslim Brotherhood in both
membership and radicalism.
Post-Arab Spring (2011-present)
One observer (Quinn Mecham) notes four trends in Islamism rising from the Arab Spring of 2010-11:
The repression of the Muslim Brotherhood. Primarily by the Egyptian military and courts following the forcible removal of Morsi from office in 2013; but also by Saudi Arabia and a number of Gulf countries (not Qatar).
Rise of Islamist "state-building"
where "state failure" has taken place—most prominently in Syria, Iraq,
Libya and Yemen. Islamists have found it easier than competing
non-Islamists trying to fill the void of state failure, by securing
external funding, weaponry and fighters—"many of which have come from
abroad and have rallied around a pan-Islamic identity". The norms of
governance in these Islamist areas are militia-based, and the population
submit to their authority out of fear, loyalty, other reasons, or some
combination. The "most expansive" of these new "models" is the Islamic State.
Increasing sectarianism at least in part from Proxy Wars.
Fighters are proxies primarily for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and
for Iran. Islamists are fighting Islamists across sectarian lines in
Lebanon (Sunni militants targeting Hezbollah positions), Yemen (between mainstream Sunni Islamists of Islah and the Shiite ZaydiHouthi movement), in Iraq (Islamic State and Iraqi Shiite militias)
Increased caution and political learning in countries such as
Algeria and Jordan where Islamist have chosen not to lead a major
challenge against their governments. In Yemen Islah "has sought to frame
its ideology in a way that will avoid charges of militancy".
Another observer (Tarek Osman) notes with concern that
the failure to take power during the Arab Spring has led not to
"soul-searching" in major Islamist groups about what went wrong, but
instead to "antagonism and fiery anger" and a thirst for revenge.
Partisans of political Islam (although this does not include some
prominent leaders such as Rached Ghannouchi
but is particularly true in Egypt) see themselves as victims of an
injustice whose perpetrators are not just "individual conspirators but
entire social groups".
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIL's territory, in grey, at the time of its greatest territorial extent in May 2015
"The Islamic State", formerly known as the "Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant" and before that as the "Islamic State of Iraq", (also
called by the Arabic acronym Daesh), is a Wahhabi/Salafi jihadistextremist militant group which is led by and mainly composed of Sunni Arabs from Syria and Iraq. In 2014, the group proclaimed itself a caliphate, with religious, political and military authority over all Muslims worldwide.
As of March 2015, it had control over territory occupied by ten million people in Syria and Iraq, and has nominal control over small areas of Libya, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. (While a self-described state, it lacks international recognition.) ISIL also operates or has affiliates in other parts of the world, including North Africa and South Asia.
Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood,
"are well known for providing shelters, educational assistance, free or
low cost medical clinics, housing assistance to students from out of
town, student advisory groups, facilitation of inexpensive mass marriage
ceremonies to avoid prohibitively costly dowry demands, legal
assistance, sports facilities, and women's groups." All this compares
very favourably against incompetent, inefficient, or neglectful
governments whose commitment to social justice is limited to rhetoric.
Dissatisfaction with the status quo
The Arab world—the original heart of the Muslim world—has been afflicted with economic stagnation.
For example, it has been estimated that in the mid 1990s the exports of
Finland, a country of five million, exceeded those of the entire Arab
world of 260 million, excluding oil revenue.
This economic stagnation is argued to have commenced with the demise of
the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, with trade networks being disrupted and
societies torn apart with the creation of new nation states; prior to
this, the Middle East had a diverse and growing economy and more general
prosperity.
Strong population growth combined with economic stagnation has created urban agglomerations in Cairo, Istanbul, Tehran, Karachi, Dhaka, and Jakarta each with well over 12 million citizens, millions of them young and unemployed or underemployed. Such a demographic, alienated from the westernized
ways of the urban elite, but uprooted from the comforts and more
passive traditions of the villages they came from, is understandably
favourably disposed to an Islamic system promising a better world—an
ideology providing an "emotionally familiar basis for group identity,
solidarity, and exclusion; an acceptable basis for legitimacy and
authority; an immediately intelligible formulation of principles for
both a critique of the present and a program for the future."
The modern revival of Islamic devotion and the attraction to things Islamic can be traced to several events.
By the end of World War I, most Muslim states were seen to be
dominated by the Christian-leaning Western states. It is argued that
either the claims of Islam were false and the Christian or
post-Christian West had finally come up with another system that was
superior, or Islam had failed through not being true to itself. Thus, a
redoubling of faith and devotion by Muslims was called for to reverse
this tide.
The connection between the lack of an Islamic spirit and the lack
of victory was underscored by the disastrous defeat of Arab
nationalist-led armies fighting under the slogan "Land, Sea and Air" in
the 1967 Six-Day War, compared to the (perceived) near-victory of the Yom Kippur War six years later. In that war the military's slogan was "God is Great".
Along with the Yom Kippur War came the Arab oil embargo
where the (Muslim) Persian Gulf oil-producing states' dramatic decision
to cut back on production and quadruple the price of oil, made the
terms oil, Arabs and Islam synonymous—with power—in the world, and
especially in the Muslim world's public imagination.
Many Muslims believe as Saudi Prince Saud al Faisal did that the
hundreds of billions of dollars in wealth obtained from the Persian
Gulf's huge oil deposits were nothing less than a gift from God to the
Islamic faithful.
As the Islamic revival
gained momentum, governments such as Egypt's, which had previously
repressed (and was still continuing to repress) Islamists, joined the
bandwagon. They banned alcohol and flooded the airwaves with religious
programming, giving the movement even more exposure.
State-sponsorship
Saudi Arabia
Starting in the mid-1970s the Islamic resurgence was funded by an abundance of money from Saudi Arabian oil exports. The tens of billions of dollars in "petro-Islam" largesse obtained from the recently heightened price of oil funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith."
Throughout the Muslim world, religious institutions for people both young and old, from children's maddrassas to high-level scholarships received Saudi funding,
"books, scholarships, fellowships, and mosques" (for example, "more than 1500 mosques were built and paid for with money obtained from public Saudi funds over the last 50 years"),
along with training in the Kingdom for the preachers and teachers who
went on to teach and work at these universities, schools, mosques, etc.
The funding was also used to reward journalists and academics who
followed the Saudis' strict interpretation of Islam; and satellite
campuses were built around Egypt for Al-Azhar University, the world's oldest and most influential Islamic university.
The interpretation of Islam promoted by this funding was the strict, conservative Saudi-based Wahhabism or Salafism.
In its harshest form it preached that Muslims should not only "always
oppose" infidels "in every way," but "hate them for their religion ...
for Allah's sake," that democracy "is responsible for all the horrible
wars of the 20th century," that Shia and other non-Wahhabi Muslims were infidels, etc.
While this effort has by no means converted all, or even most Muslims
to the Wahhabist interpretation of Islam, it has done much to overwhelm
more moderate local interpretations, and has set the
Saudi-interpretation of Islam as the "gold standard" of religion in
minds of some or many Muslims.
Qatar
Qatar
stands out among state sponsors of Islamism as well. Over the past two
decades, the country has exerted a semi-formal patronage for the
international movement of the Muslim Brotherhood. Former Qatari Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani
in particular has distinguished himself as one of the most dedicated
supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and of Islamist movements in general
both in the Middle Eastern region and across the globe.
In 1999 the Muslim Brotherhood was disbanded in Qatar. The
country's longstanding support for the group has been often explained as
determined by a strategic calculus that limited the role played by
religion in Qatar.
As the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at
the Doha-based branch of Georgetown University, Mehran Kamrava,
posited, Qatar presenting itself as the state patron of the Muslim
Brotherhood has caused religion in Qatar to not "play any role in
articulating or forming oppositional sentiments."
Qatar's patronage has been primarily expressed through the ruling
family's endorsement of Muslim Brotherhood's most representative
figures, especially Yusuf al-Qaradawi.
Qaradawi is a prominent, yet controversial Sunni preacher and
theologian who continues to serve as the spiritual leader of the Muslim
Brotherhood. An Egyptian citizen, Qaradawi fled Egypt for Qatar in 1961
after being imprisoned under President Gamal Abdul Nasser.
In 1962 he chaired the Qatari Secondary Institute of Religious Studies,
and in 1977 he founded and directed the Shariah and Islamic Studies
department at the University of Qatar. He left Qatar to return to Egypt shortly before the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.
For twenty years, Qaradawi has hosted a popular show titled Shariah and Life on the Qatari-based media channel Al-Jazeera,
a government sponsored channel notoriously supportive of the Muslim
Brotherhood and Islamism and often designated as a propaganda outlet for
the Qatari government. From that platform, he has promoted his Islamist—and often radical views—on life, politics, and culture.
His positions, as well as his controversial ties to extremist and terrorist individuals and organizations, made him persona non grata to the U.S., UK and French governments respectively in 1999, 2008, and 2012.
Beyond the visibility and political protection granted to Yussuf
al-Qaradawi, Qatar has historically hosted several Muslim Brothers
especially after Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood representative, was overthrown in July 2013.
Before 2013, however, Qatar had made a substantial investment on
Morsi's leadership and had devolved about $10 million to Egypt since
Morsi was elected, allegedly also to "buy political advantage" in the
country.
Qatar's political and financial support for Islamist movements
and factions was not limited to the Egyptian case. Qatar is known to
have backed Islamist factions in Libya, Syria and Yemen.
In Libya in particular, Qatar has supported the Islamist government established in Tripoli.
During the 2011 revolution that ousted President Muammar Gaddafi, Qatar
provided "tens of millions of dollars in aid, military training and
more than 20,000 tons of weapons" to anti-Gaddafi rebels and Islamist
militias in particular. The flow of weapons was not suspended after
Gaddafi's government was removed.
Qatar maintained its influence through key facilitators on the field,
including cleric Ali al-Sallabi, the leader of the Islamist militia
"February 17 Katiba" Ismail al-Sallabi, and the Tripoli Military Council
leader Abdel Hakim Belhaj.
Hamas, as well, has been among the primary beneficiaries of Qatar's financial support.
Not only does the Gulf emirate host Hamas' politburo continuously since
2012; Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has often met with international
delegations on Qatari territory.
More recently, Qatar has channeled material support to Hamas'
terrorist operations by exploiting its official commitment to finance Gaza
reconstruction. Mostly through "truckloads of construction material
being shipped into Gaza", Qatar has funneled dual-use substances that
could be employed to produce explosives into Gaza.
In a 2003 interview with Al-Hayat Hamas politburo declared that
most of Qatar's support was collected through charities and popular
committees. Qatar's largest NGO, Qatar Charity, in particular has played a great role in Qatar's mission to support Islamist worldwide.
Officially through its "Ghaith" initiative but also through
conspicuous donations that preceded the "Ghaith" program, Qatar Charity
has financed the building or reconstruction of mosques and cultural
institutes across the globe. Just like Saudi Arabia, Qatar has devolved considerable energies to spreading Salafism and to "win areas of influence" in the countries that beneficiated from its support.
In France in particular Qatar has heavily invested in the Union des
Organisations Islamiques des France (UOIF), an umbrella organization
informally acting as the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in the
country through which Qatar Charity has channeled funds for the Assalam
mosque in Nantes (€4.4 million) and the mosque in Mulhouse (€2
million).
During the 1970s and sometimes later, Western and pro-Western
governments often supported sometimes fledgling Islamists and Islamist
groups that later came to be seen as dangerous enemies. Islamists were considered by Western governments bulwarks against—what were thought to be at the time—more dangerous leftist/communist/nationalist insurgents/opposition, which Islamists were correctly seen as opposing. The US spent billions of dollars to aid the mujahideen Muslim Afghanistan enemies of the Soviet Union, and non-Afghan veterans of the war returned home with their prestige, "experience, ideology, and weapons", and had considerable impact.
Although it is a strong opponent of Israel's existence, Hamas,
officially created in 1987, traces back its origins to institutions and
clerics supported by Israel in the 1970s and 1980s. Israel tolerated
and supported Islamist movements in Gaza, with figures like Ahmed Yassin, as Israel perceived them preferable to the secular and then more powerful al-Fatah with the PLO.
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat – whose policies included opening Egypt to Western investment (infitah); transferring Egypt's allegiance from the Soviet Union to the United States; and making peace with Israel—released
Islamists from prison and welcomed home exiles in tacit exchange for
political support in his struggle against leftists. His "encouraging of
the emergence of the Islamist movement" was said to have been "imitated
by many other Muslim leaders in the years that followed."
This "gentlemen's agreement" between Sadat and Islamists broke down in
1975 but not before Islamists came to completely dominate university
student unions. Sadat was later assassinated and a formidable insurgency
was formed in Egypt in the 1990s. The French government has also been
reported to have promoted Islamist preachers "in the hope of channeling
Muslim energies into zones of piety and charity."
Muslim alienation from Western ways, including its political ways.
The memory in Muslim societies of the many centuries of
"cultural and institutional success" of Islamic civilization that have
created an "intense resistance to an alternative 'civilizational
order'", such as Western civilization,
The proximity of the core of the Muslim world to Europe and Christendom where it first conquered and then was conquered. Iberia in the seventh century, the Crusades which began in the eleventh century, then for centuries the Ottoman Empire, were all fields of war between Europe and Islam.
For almost a thousand years, from the first
Moorish landing in Spain to the second Turkish siege of Vienna, Europe
was under constant threat from Islam. In the early centuries it was a
double threat—not only of invasion and conquest, but also of conversion
and assimilation. All but the easternmost provinces of the Islamic realm
had been taken from Christian rulers, and the vast majority of the
first Muslims west of Iran and Arabia were converts from Christianity
... Their loss was sorely felt and it heightened the fear that a similar
fate was in store for Europe.
The Islamic world was aware of this European fear and hatred and also felt its own anger and resentment at the much more recent technological superiority of westerners who,
are the perpetual teachers; we, the perpetual students. Generation after generation, this asymmetry has generated an inferiority complex,
forever exacerbated by the fact that their innovations progress at a
faster pace than we can absorb them. ... The best tool to reverse the
inferiority complex to a superiority complex ... Islam would give the whole culture a sense of dignity.
For Islamists, the primary threat of the West is cultural rather
than political or economic. Cultural dependency robs one of faith and
identity and thus destroys Islam and the Islamic community (ummah) far more effectively than political rule.
The end of the Cold War and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has eliminated the common atheist Communist enemy uniting some religious Muslims and the capitalist west.
Response
Criticism
Islamism, or elements of Islamism, have been criticized for:
repression of free expression and individual rights, rigidity,
hypocrisy, lack of true understanding of Islam, misinterpreting the Quran and Sunnah, antisemitism, and for innovations to Islam (bid'ah), notwithstanding proclaimed opposition to any such innovation by Islamists.
Counter-response
The U.S. government has engaged in efforts to counter militant Islamism (Jihadism), since 2001. These efforts were centred in the U.S. around public diplomacy
programmes conducted by the State Department. There have been calls to
create an independent agency in the U.S. with a specific mission of
undermining Jihadism. Christian Whiton, an official in the George W. Bush administration, called for a new agency focused on the nonviolent practice of "political warfare" aimed at undermining the ideology. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates called for establishing something similar to the defunct U.S. Information Agency, which was charged with undermining the communist ideology during the Cold War.
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