Geoengineering (also known as climate engineering or climate intervention) is the deliberate large-scale interventions in the Earth’s climate system intended to counteract human-caused climate change. The term commonly encompasses two broad categories: large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation modification (SRM). CDR involves techniques to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and is generally considered a form of climate change mitigation. SRM aims to reduce global warming by reflecting a small portion of sunlight (solar radiation)
away from Earth and back into space. Although historically grouped
together, these approaches differ substantially in mechanisms,
timelines, and risk profiles, and are now typically discussed
separately. Some other large-scale engineering proposals—such as interventions to
slow the melting of polar and alpine ice—are also sometimes classified
as forms of geoengineering.
Some types of geoengineering present political, social and
ethical issues. One common objection is that focusing on these
technologies could undermine efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Effective governance and international oversight are widely regarded as
essential.
Planting trees is a nature-based way to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere; however, the effect may only be temporary in some cases.
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is a process in which carbon dioxide (CO2)
is removed from the atmosphere by deliberate human activities and
durably stored in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in
products.
This process is also known as carbon removal, greenhouse gas removal or
negative emissions. CDR is more and more often integrated into climate policy, as an element of climate change mitigation strategies.Achieving net zero emissions
will require first and foremost deep and sustained cuts in emissions,
and then—in addition—the use of CDR ("CDR is what puts the net into net zero emissions").
In the future, CDR may be able to counterbalance emissions that are
technically difficult to eliminate, such as some agricultural and
industrial emissions.
Solar radiation modification (SRM) (or solar geoengineering) is a group of large-scale approaches to reduce global warming by increasing the amount of sunlight that is reflected away from Earth and back to space. It is not intended to replace efforts to reducegreenhouse gas emissions, but rather to complement them as a potential way to limit global warming. SRM is a form of geoengineering.
The most-researched SRM method is stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), in which small reflective particles would be introduced into the upper atmosphere to reflect sunlight. Other approaches include marine cloud brightening (MCB), which would increase the reflectivity of clouds over the oceans, or constructing a space sunshade or a space mirror, to reduce the amount of sunlight reaching earth.
Glacial geoengineering
Arctic sea ice coverage as of 2007 compared to 2005 and also compared to 1979-2000 average
Glacial geoengineering is a set of proposed geoengineering approaches that focus on slowing the loss of glaciers, ice sheets, and sea ice in polar regions
and, in some cases, alpine areas. Proposals are motivated by concerns
that feedback loops—such as ice-albedo loss, accelerated glacier flow,
and permafrost methane release—could amplify climate change and trigger climate tipping points.
Proposed glacial geoengineering methods include regional or local solar radiation management, thinning cirrus clouds
to allow more heat to escape, and deploying mechanical or engineering
structures to stabilize ice. Specific strategies under investigation are
stratospheric aerosol injection focused on polar regions, marine cloud brightening, surface albedo modification with reflective materials, basal interventions such as draining subglacial water or promoting basal freezing, and ice shelf protection measures including seabed curtains.
Glacial geoengineering is in the early research stage and many
proposals face major technical, environmental, and governance
challenges. Supporters argue that targeted interventions could help stabilize ice
sheets, slow sea-level rise, and reduce the risk of passing irreversible
thresholds in the climate system.
At the same time, experts caution that the effectiveness of these
methods remains highly uncertain and that interventions could produce
unintended side effects. Glacial geoengineering is generally considered a possible complement
to, not a replacement for, efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Governance
Most governance issues relating to geoengineering are specific to the
category or the specific method. Nevertheless, a couple of
international governance instruments have addressed geoengineering
collectively.
The Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
have made several decisions regarding "climate related geoengineering."
That of 2010 established "a comprehensive non-binding normative
framework" for "climate-related geoengineering activities that may affect
biodiversity," requesting that such activities be justified by the need
to gather specific scientific data, undergo prior environmental
assessment, be subject to effective regulatory oversight.
The Parties' 2016 decision called for "more transdisciplinary research
and sharing of knowledge... in order to better understand the impacts of
climate-related geoengineering."
The parties to the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
and its associated London Protocol have addressed "marine
geoengineering." In 2013, the parties to the London Protocol adopted an
amendment to establish a legally binding framework for regulating marine
geoengineering, initially limited to ocean fertilization and requiring
assessment and permitting before any activity proceeds. This amendment
has not yet entered into force due to insufficient ratifications. In
2022, the parties to both agreements acknowledged growing interest in
marine geoengineering, identified four techniques for priority review,
and encouraged careful assessment of proposed projects under existing
guidelines while considering options for further regulation. In 2023,
they cautioned that these techniques could pose serious environmental
risks, highlighted scientific uncertainty about their effects, urged
strict application of assessment frameworks, and called for broader
international cooperation. Their work is supported by the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection of the International Maritime Organization.
A global catastrophic risk or a doomsday scenario is a hypothetical event that could damage human well-being on a global scale, endangering or even destroying modern civilization. Existential risk is a related term limited to events that could cause full-blown human extinction or permanently and drastically curtail humanity's existence or potential.
In the 21st century, a number of academic and non-profit
organizations have been established to research global catastrophic and
existential risks, formulate potential mitigation measures, and either
advocate for or implement these measures.
Definition and classification
Scope–severity grid from Bostrom's paper "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority"
Defining global catastrophic risks
The term global catastrophic risk "lacks a sharp definition", and
generally refers (loosely) to a risk that could inflict "serious damage
to human well-being on a global scale".
Humanity has suffered large catastrophes before. Some of these have caused serious damage but were only local in scope—e.g. the Black Death may have resulted in the deaths of a third of Europe's population, 10% of the global population at the time. Some were global, but were not as severe—e.g. the 1918 influenza pandemic killed an estimated 3–6% of the world's population. Most global catastrophic risks would not be so intense as to kill the
majority of life on earth, but even if one did, the ecosystem and
humanity would eventually recover (in contrast to existential risks).
Similarly, in Catastrophe: Risk and Response, Richard Posner
singles out and groups together events that bring about "utter
overthrow or ruin" on a global, rather than a "local or regional" scale.
Posner highlights such events as worthy of special attention on cost–benefit grounds because they could directly or indirectly jeopardize the survival of the human race as a whole.
Defining existential risks
Existential risks are defined as "risks that threaten the destruction of humanity's long-term potential." The instantiation of an existential risk (an existential catastrophe) would either cause outright human extinction or irreversibly lock in a drastically inferior state of affairs. Existential risks are a sub-class of global catastrophic risks, where the damage is not only global but also terminal and permanent, preventing recovery and thereby affecting both current and all future generations.
Non-extinction risks
While extinction is the most obvious way in which humanity's
long-term potential could be destroyed, there are others, including unrecoverablecollapse and unrecoverabledystopia. A disaster severe enough to cause the permanent, irreversible collapse
of human civilisation would constitute an existential catastrophe, even
if it fell short of extinction. Similarly, if humanity fell under a totalitarian regime, and there were
no chance of recovery, then such a dystopia would also be an
existential catastrophe. Bryan Caplan writes that "perhaps an eternity of totalitarianism would be worse than extinction". (George Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty-Four suggests an example.)
A dystopian scenario shares the key features of extinction and
unrecoverable collapse of civilization: before the catastrophe humanity
faced a vast range of bright futures to choose from; after the
catastrophe, humanity is locked forever in a terrible state.
Arrangement
of global catastrophic risks into three sets according to whether they
are largely human-caused, human influences upon nature, or purely
natural
Research into the nature and mitigation of global catastrophic risks
and existential risks is subject to a unique set of challenges and, as a
result, is not easily subjected to the usual standards of scientific
rigour. For instance, it is neither feasible nor ethical to study these risks experimentally. Carl Sagan
expressed this with regards to nuclear war: "Understanding the
long-term consequences of nuclear war is not a problem amenable to
experimental verification". Moreover, many catastrophic risks change rapidly as technology advances
and background conditions, such as geopolitical conditions, change.
Another challenge is the general difficulty of accurately predicting the
future over long timescales, especially for anthropogenic risks which
depend on complex human political, economic and social systems. In addition to known and tangible risks, unforeseeable black swan extinction events may occur, presenting an additional methodological problem.
Lack of historical precedent
Humanity has never suffered an existential catastrophe and if one were to occur, it would necessarily be unprecedented. Therefore, existential risks pose unique challenges to prediction, even more than other long-term events, because of observation selection effects. Unlike with most events, the failure of a complete extinction event
to occur in the past is not evidence against their likelihood in the
future, because every world that has experienced such an extinction
event has gone unobserved by humanity. Regardless of civilization
collapsing events' frequency, no civilization observes existential risks
in its history. These anthropic
issues may partly be avoided by looking at evidence that does not have
such selection effects, such as asteroid impact craters on the Moon, or
directly evaluating the likely impact of new technology.
To understand the dynamics of an unprecedented, unrecoverable
global civilizational collapse (a type of existential risk), it may be
instructive to study the various local civilizational collapses that have occurred throughout human history. For instance, civilizations such as the Roman Empire
have ended in a loss of centralized governance and a major
civilization-wide loss of infrastructure and advanced technology.
However, these examples demonstrate that societies appear to be fairly
resilient to catastrophe; for example, Medieval Europe survived the Black Death without suffering anything resembling a civilization collapse despite losing 25 to 50 percent of its population.
Incentives and coordination
There are economic reasons that can explain why so little effort is
going into global catastrophic risk reduction. First, it is speculative
and may never happen, so many people focus on other more pressing
issues. It is also a global public good, so we should expect it to be undersupplied by markets. Even if a large nation invested in risk mitigation measures, that
nation would enjoy only a small fraction of the benefit of doing so.
Furthermore, global catastrophic risk reduction can be thought of as an intergenerational
global public good. Since most of the hypothetical benefits of the
reduction would be enjoyed by future generations, and though these
future people would perhaps be willing to pay substantial sums for risk
reduction, no mechanism for such a transaction exists.
Scope insensitivity influences how bad people consider the
extinction of the human race to be. For example, when people are
motivated to donate money to altruistic causes, the quantity they are
willing to give does not increase linearly with the magnitude of the
issue: people are roughly as willing to prevent the deaths of 200,000 or
2,000 birds. Similarly, people are often more concerned about threats to individuals than to larger groups.
Substantially larger numbers, such as 500 million deaths,
and especially qualitatively different scenarios such as the extinction
of the entire human species, seem to trigger a different mode of
thinking... People who would never dream of hurting a child hear of
existential risk, and say, "Well, maybe the human species doesn't really
deserve to survive".
All past predictions of human extinction have proven to be false. To some, this makes future warnings seem less credible. Nick Bostrom
argues that the absence of human extinction in the past is weak
evidence that there will be no human extinction in the future, due to survivor bias and other anthropic effects.
SociobiologistE. O. Wilson
argued that: "The reason for this myopic fog, evolutionary biologists
contend, is that it was actually advantageous during all but the last
few millennia of the two million years of existence of the genus
Homo... A premium was placed on close attention to the near future and
early reproduction, and little else. Disasters of a magnitude that occur
only once every few centuries were forgotten or transmuted into myth."
Proposed mitigation
Multi-layer defense
Defense in depth is a useful framework for categorizing risk mitigation measures into three layers of defense:
Prevention: Reducing the probability of a catastrophe
occurring in the first place. Example: Measures to prevent outbreaks of
new highly infectious diseases.
Response: Preventing the scaling of a catastrophe to the
global level. Example: Measures to prevent escalation of a small-scale
nuclear exchange into an all-out nuclear war.
Resilience: Increasing humanity's resilience (against
extinction) when faced with global catastrophes. Example: Measures to
increase food security during a nuclear winter.
Human extinction is most likely when all three defenses are weak,
that is, "by risks we are unlikely to prevent, unlikely to successfully
respond to, and unlikely to be resilient against".
The unprecedented nature of existential risks poses a special
challenge in designing risk mitigation measures since humanity will not
be able to learn from a track record of previous events.
Funding
Some researchers argue that both research and other initiatives
relating to existential risk are underfunded. Nick Bostrom states that
more research has been done on Star Trek, snowboarding, or dung beetles than on existential risks. Bostrom's comparisons have been criticized as "high-handed". As of 2020, the Biological Weapons Convention organization had an annual budget of US$1.4 million.
Survival planning
Some scholars propose the establishment on Earth of one or more
self-sufficient, remote, permanently occupied settlements specifically
created for the purpose of surviving a global disaster.Economist Robin Hanson
argues that a refuge permanently housing as few as 100 people would
significantly improve the chances of human survival during a range of
global catastrophes.
Food storage
has been proposed globally, but the monetary cost would be high.
Furthermore, it would likely contribute to the current millions of
deaths per year due to malnutrition. In 2022, a team led by David Denkenberger modeled the cost-effectiveness of resilient foods to artificial general intelligence (AGI) safety and found "~98-99% confidence" for a higher marginal impact of work on resilient foods. Some survivalists stock survival retreats with multiple-year food supplies.
The Svalbard Global Seed Vault is buried 400 feet (120 m) inside a mountain on an island in the Arctic.
It is designed to hold 2.5 billion seeds from more than 100 countries
as a precaution to preserve the world's crops. The surrounding rock is
−6 °C (21 °F) (as of 2015) but the vault is kept at −18 °C (0 °F) by
refrigerators powered by locally sourced coal.
More speculatively, if society continues to function and if the biosphere
remains habitable, calorie needs for the present human population might
in theory be met during an extended absence of sunlight, given
sufficient advance planning. Conjectured solutions include growing
mushrooms on the dead plant biomass left in the wake of the catastrophe,
converting cellulose to sugar, or feeding natural gas to
methane-digesting bacteria.
Global catastrophic risks and global governance
Insufficient global governance
creates risks in the social and political domain, but the governance
mechanisms develop more slowly than technological and social change.
There are concerns from governments, the private sector, and the general
public about the lack of governance mechanisms to efficiently deal with
risks, negotiate and adjudicate between diverse and conflicting
interests. This is further underlined by an understanding of the
interconnectedness of global systemic risks. In absence or anticipation of global governance, national governments
can act individually to better understand, mitigate and prepare for
global catastrophes.
Climate emergency plans
In 2018, the Club of Rome
called for greater climate change action and published its Climate
Emergency Plan, which proposes ten action points to limit global average
temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Further, in 2019, the Club published the more comprehensive Planetary Emergency Plan.
There is evidence to suggest that collectively engaging with the
emotional experiences that emerge during contemplating the vulnerability
of the human species within the context of climate change allows for
these experiences to be adaptive. When collective engaging with and
processing emotional experiences is supportive, this can lead to growth
in resilience, psychological flexibility, tolerance of emotional
experiences, and community engagement.
Space colonization is a proposed alternative to improve the odds of surviving an extinction scenario. Solutions of this scope may require megascale engineering.
Astrophysicist Stephen Hawking advocated colonizing other planets within the Solar System once technology progresses sufficiently, in order to improve the chance of human survival from planet-wide events such as global thermonuclear war.
Organizations
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(est. 1945) is one of the oldest global risk organizations, founded
after the public became alarmed by the potential of atomic warfare in
the aftermath of WWII. It studies risks associated with nuclear war and
energy and famously maintains the Doomsday Clock established in 1947. The Foresight Institute
(est. 1986) examines the risks of nanotechnology and its benefits. It
was one of the earliest organizations to study the unintended
consequences of otherwise harmless technology gone haywire at a global
scale. It was founded by K. Eric Drexler who postulated "grey goo".
Beginning after 2000, a growing number of scientists,
philosophers and tech billionaires created organizations devoted to
studying global risks both inside and outside of academia.
Independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) include the Machine Intelligence Research Institute (est. 2000), which aims to reduce the risk of a catastrophe caused by artificial intelligence, with donors including Peter Thiel and Jed McCaleb. The Nuclear Threat Initiative
(est. 2001) seeks to reduce global threats from nuclear, biological and
chemical threats, and containment of damage after an event. It maintains a nuclear material security index. The Lifeboat Foundation (est. 2009) funds research into preventing a technological catastrophe. Most of the research money funds projects at universities. The Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (est. 2011) is a US-based non-profit, non-partisan think tank founded by Seth Baum
and Tony Barrett. GCRI does research and policy work across various
risks, including artificial intelligence, nuclear war, climate change,
and asteroid impacts. The Global Challenges Foundation (est. 2012), based in Stockholm and founded by Laszlo Szombatfalvy, releases a yearly report on the state of global risks. The Future of Life Institute
(est. 2014) works to reduce extreme, large-scale risks from
transformative technologies, as well as steer the development and use of
these technologies to benefit all life, through grantmaking, policy
advocacy in the United States, European Union and United Nations, and
educational outreach. Elon Musk, Vitalik Buterin and Jaan Tallinn are some of its biggest donors.
University-based organizations included the Future of Humanity Institute (est. 2005) which researched the questions of humanity's long-term future, particularly existential risk. It was founded by Nick Bostrom and was based at Oxford University. The Centre for the Study of Existential Risk
(est. 2012) is a Cambridge University-based organization which studies
four major technological risks: artificial intelligence, biotechnology,
global warming and warfare. All are man-made risks, as Huw Price
explained to the AFP news agency, "It seems a reasonable prediction
that some time in this or the next century intelligence will escape from
the constraints of biology". He added that when this happens "we're no
longer the smartest things around," and will risk being at the mercy of
"machines that are not malicious, but machines whose interests don't
include us." Stephen Hawking was an acting adviser. The Millennium Alliance for Humanity and the Biosphere
is a Stanford University-based organization focusing on many issues
related to global catastrophe by bringing together members of academia
in the humanities. It was founded by Paul Ehrlich, among others. Stanford University also has the Center for International Security and Cooperation focusing on political cooperation to reduce global catastrophic risk. The Center for Security and Emerging Technology
was established in January 2019 at Georgetown's Walsh School of Foreign
Service and will focus on policy research of emerging technologies with
an initial emphasis on artificial intelligence. They received a grant of 55M USD from Good Ventures as suggested by Open Philanthropy.
Other risk assessment groups are based in or are part of governmental organizations. The World Health Organization (WHO) includes a division called the Global Alert and Response (GAR) which monitors and responds to global epidemic crisis. GAR helps member states with training and coordination of response to epidemics. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has its Emerging Pandemic Threats Program which aims to prevent and contain naturally generated pandemics at their source. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
has a division called the Global Security Principal Directorate which
researches on behalf of the government issues such as bio-security and
counter-terrorism.
Hyperreality is a concept in post-structuralism that refers to the process of the evolution of notions of reality, leading to a cultural state of confusion between signs and symbols invented to stand in for reality, and direct perceptions of consensus reality. Hyperreality is seen as a condition in which, because of the
compression of perceptions of reality in culture and media, what is
generally regarded as real and what is understood as fiction are
seamlessly blended together in experiences so that there is no longer
any clear distinction between where one ends and the other begins.
The term was proposed by French philosopher Jean Baudrillard, whose postmodern
work contributed to a scholarly tradition in the field of communication
studies that speaks directly to larger social concerns. Postmodernism
was established through the social turmoil of the 1960s, spurred by
social movements that questioned preexisting conventions and social
institutions. Through the postmodern lens, reality is viewed as a
fragmented, complimentary and polysemic system with components that are
produced by social and cultural activity. Social realities
that constitute consensus reality are constantly produced and
reproduced, changing through the extended use of signs and symbols which
hence contribute to the creation of a greater hyperreality.
Origins and usage
The postmodern semiotic concept of hyperreality was contentiously coined by Baudrillard in Simulacra and Simulation (1981). Baudrillard defined "hyperreality" as "the generation by models of a real without origin or reality"; and his earlier book Symbolic Exchange and Death.
Hyperreality is a representation, a sign, without an original referent.
According to Baudrillard, the commodities in this theoretical state do
not have use-value as defined by Karl Marx but can be understood as signs as defined by Ferdinand de Saussure. He believes hyperreality goes further than confusing or blending the
'real' with the symbol which represents it; it involves creating a
symbol or set of signifiers which represent something that does not
actually exist, like Santa Claus. Baudrillard borrows, from Jorge Luis Borges' "On Exactitude in Science" (already borrowed from Lewis Carroll), the example of a society whose cartographers create a map so detailed that it covers the very things it was designed to represent. When the empire declines, the map fades into the landscape. He says that, in such a case, neither the representation nor the real remains, just the hyperreal.
Baudrillard's idea of hyperreality was heavily influenced by phenomenology, semiotics, and the philosophy of Marshall McLuhan. Baudrillard, however, challenges McLuhan's famous statement that "the medium is the message,"
by suggesting that information devours its own content. He also
suggested that there is a difference between the media and reality and
what they represent. Hyperreality is the inability of consciousness to distinguish reality
from a simulation of reality, especially in technologically advanced
societies. However, Baudrillard's hyperreality theory goes a step further than
McLuhan's medium theory: "There is not only an implosion of the message
in the medium, there is, in the same movement, the implosion of the
medium itself in the real, the implosion of the medium and of the real
in a sort of hyperreal nebula, in which even the definition and distinct
action of the medium can no longer be determined".
Italian author Umberto Eco
explores the notion of hyperreality further by suggesting that the
action of hyperreality is to desire reality and in the attempt to
achieve that desire, to fabricate a false reality that is to be consumed
as real. Linked to contemporary western culture, Umberto Eco and post-structuralists would argue that in current cultures, fundamental ideals are built on desire and particular sign-systems. Temenuga Trifonova from University of California, San Diego notes,
[...] it is important to consider Baudrillard's texts as articulating an ontology rather than an epistemology.
Significance
Hyperreality is significant as a paradigm to explain current cultural conditions. Consumerism,
because of its reliance on sign exchange value (e.g. brand X shows that
one is fashionable, car Y indicates one's wealth), could be seen as a
contributing factor in the creation of hyperreality or the hyperreal
condition. Hyperreality tricks consciousness into detaching from any
real emotional engagement, instead opting for artificial simulation, and
endless reproductions of fundamentally empty appearance. Essentially
(although Baudrillard himself may balk at the use of this word),
fulfillment or happiness is found through simulation and imitation of a transient simulacrum of reality, rather than any interaction with any "real" reality.
While hyperreality is not a new concept, its effects are more
relevant in modern society, incorporating technological advancements
like artificial intelligence, virtual reality and neurotechnology (simulated reality).
This is attributed to the way it effectively captured the postmodern
condition, particularly how people in the postmodern world seek
stimulation by creating unreal worlds of spectacle and seduction and
nothing more. There are dangers to the use of hyperreality within our culture;
individuals may observe and accept hyperreal images as role models when
the images don't necessarily represent real physical people. This can
result in a desire to strive for an unobtainable ideal, or it may lead
to a lack of unimpaired role models. Daniel J. Boorstin
cautions against confusing celebrity worship with hero worship, "we
come dangerously close to depriving ourselves of all real models. We
lose sight of the men and women who do not simply seem great because
they are famous but who are famous because they are great". He bemoans the loss of old heroes like Moses, Julius Caesar and Abraham Lincoln, who did not have public relations (PR) agencies to construct hyperreal images of themselves. The dangers of hyperreality are also facilitated by information
technologies, which provide tools to dominant powers that seek to
encourage it to drive consumption and materialism. The danger in the pursuit of stimulation and seduction emerge not in
the lack of meaning but, as Baudrillard maintained, "we are gorged with
meaning and it is killing us."
Hyperreality, some sources point out, may provide insights into
the postmodern movement by analyzing how simulations disrupt the binary opposition between reality and illusion but it does not address or resolve the contradictions inherent in this tension.
Key relational themes
The concepts most fundamental to hyperreality are those of simulation and the simulacrum, first conceptualized by Jean Baudrillard in his book Simulacra and Simulation. The two terms are separate entities with relational origin connections to Baudrillard's theory of hyperreality.
Simulation
Simulation
is characterized by a blending of 'reality' and representation, where
there is no clear indication of where the former stops and the latter
begins. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential
being, or a substance; "It is the generation by models of a real without
origin or reality: a hyperreal." Baudrillard suggests that simulation no longer takes place in a
physical realm; it takes place within a space not categorized by
physical limits i.e., within ourselves, technological simulations, etc.
Simulacrum
The simulacrum is "an image without resemblance"; as Gilles Deleuze summarized, it is the forsaking of "moral existence in order to enter into aesthetic existence". However, Baudrillard argues that a simulacrum is not a copy of the
real, but becomes—through sociocultural compression—truth in its own
right.
There are four steps of hyperreal reproduction:
Basic reflection of reality, i.e. in immediate perception
Perversion of reality, i.e. in representation
Pretense of reality, where there is no model
Simulacrum, which "bears no relation to any reality whatsoever"
The concept of "hyperstition" as expounded upon by the English collective Cybernetic Culture Research Unit
generalizes the notion of hyperreality to encompass the concept of
"fictional entities that make themselves real." In Nick Land's own
words:
Hyperstition is a positive feedback circuit including culture as a component. It can be defined as the experimental (techno-)science of self-fulfilling prophecies.
Superstitions are merely false beliefs, but hyperstitions – by their
very existence as ideas –function causally to bring about their own
reality.
The concept of hyperstition is also related to the concept of "theory-fiction", in which philosophy, critical theory and postmodern literature
speculate on actual reality and engage with concepts for potentialities
and virtualities. An oft-cited example of such a concept is cyberspace—originating in William Gibson's 1984 novel Neuromancer—which is a concept for the convergence between virtualities and actualities. By the mid-1990s, the realization of this concept had begun to emerge on a mass scale in the form of the internet.
Consequence
The truth was already being called into question with the rise of media and technology,
but with the presence of hyperreality being used most and embraced as a
new technology, there are a couple of issues or consequences of
hyperreality. It's difficult enough to hear something on the news and
choose not to believe it, but it's quite another to see an image of an
event or anything and use your empirical sense to determine whether the
news is true or false, which is one of the consequences of hyperrealism. The first is the possibility of various simulations being used to
influence the audience, resulting in an inability to differentiate
fiction from reality, which affects the overall truth value of a subject
at hand. Another implication or disadvantage is the possibility of
being manipulated by what we see.
The audience can interpret different messages depending on the
ideology of the entity behind an image. As a result, power equates to
control over the media and the people. Celebrities, for example, have their photographs taken and altered so
that the public can see the final result. The public then perceives
celebrities based on what they have seen rather than how they truly are.
It can progress to the point where celebrities appear completely
different. As a result of celebrities' body modifications and editing,
there has been an increase in surgeries and a decrease in self-esteem
during adolescence. Because the truth is threatened, a similar outcome for hyperreality is possible.
In culture
There is a strong link between media and the impact that the presence
of hyperreality has on its viewers. This has shown to blur the lines
between artificial realities and reality, influencing the day to day
experiences of those exposed to it. As hyperreality captures the inability to distinguish reality from a
simulation of reality, common media outlets such as news, social media
platforms, radio and television contribute to this misconception of true
reality. Descriptions of the impact of hyperreality can be found in popular
media. They present themselves as becoming blended with reality, which
influences the experience of life and truth for its viewers.
Baudrillard, like Roland Barthes before him, explained that these impacts have a direct effect on younger generations who idolize the heroes, characters or influencers
found on these platforms. As media is a social institution that shapes
and develops its members within society, the exposure to hyperreality
found within these platforms presents an everlasting effect. Baudrillard concludes that exposure to hyperreality over time will
lead, from the conservative perspective of the institutions themselves,
to confusion and chaos, in turn leading to the destruction of identity,
originality and character while ironically still being the mainstay of
the institutions.
Social media and public image
The hyperreality environment on the internet has shifted dramatically over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, so much so that it has an influence on the Italian Stock Exchange in 2021.
The Hollywood sign
The Hollywood sign in Los Angeles, California, itself produces similar notions, but is more a symbol of a facet of hyperreality—the creation of a city with its main target being media production.
Disneyland
Both Umberto Eco and Jean Baudrillard refer to Disneyland as an example of hyperreality. Eco believes that Disneyland with its settings such as Main Street and full sized houses has been created to look "absolutely realistic", taking visitors' imagination to a "fantastic past". This false reality creates an illusion and makes it more desirable for
people to buy this reality. Disneyland works in a system that enables
visitors to feel that technology and the created atmosphere "can give us
more reality than nature can". The "fake nature" of Disneyland satisfies our imagination and daydream
fantasies in real life. The idea is that nothing in this world is real.
Nothing is original, but all are endless copies of reality. Since we do
not imagine the reality of simulations, both imagined and real are
equally hyperreal, for example, the numerous simulated rides, including
the submarine ride and the Mississippi boat tour. When entering Disneyland, consumers form into lines to gain access to
each attraction. Then they are ordered by people with special uniforms
to follow the rules, such as where to stand or where to sit. If the
consumers follow each rule correctly, they can enjoy "the real thing"
and see things that are not available to them outside of Disneyland's
doors.
Examples
A high end sex doll used as a simulacrum of an unattainable partner.
Heidiland, is a region in eastern Switzerland named after the "Heidi" novels by Johanna Spyri,
encompassing alpine landscapes, villages, and recreational areas
inspired by the story's setting. The labels throughout the village
attraction treat Heidi as a historical figure with few hints of
make-believe.
The restaurant Chain, which features nostalgic callbacks to real fast food chains (in particular Pizza Hut) though is a pastiche of fast food restaurants from a previous era.
The Gulf War was an armed conflict between Iraq and a 42-country coalition led by the United States. The coalition's efforts were in two phases: Operation Desert Shield, which marked the military buildup from August 1990 to January 1991; and Operation Desert Storm, from the bombing campaign against Iraq on 17 January until the American-led liberation of Kuwait on 28 February.
The Security Council issued an ultimatum
to Iraq on 29 November 1990, expiring on 15 January 1991, to withdraw
from Kuwait, with member-states thereafter empowered to use "all
necessary means" to force withdrawal. On 17 January, the coalition began
aerial and naval bombardment of Iraq and Kuwait, which continued for
five weeks. Iraq fired missiles at Israel and at Saudi Arabia,
but failed to provoke the Israeli military response it hoped would
split Muslim-majority countries from the coalition. On 24 February 1991,
the coalition launched a decisive ground assault liberating Kuwait and
promptly advancing into Iraqi territory. The coalition halted its ground
advance after one hundred hours, and declared a ceasefire.
The war is also known under other names, such as the Second Gulf War (not to be confused with the 2003 Iraq War, also referred to as such), Persian Gulf War, Kuwait War, or Iraq Warbefore the term "Iraq War" became identified with the 2003 Iraq War (also known in the US as "Operation Iraqi Freedom"). The war was named Umm al-Ma'arik ("mother of all battles") by Iraqi officials. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Gulf War of 1990–1991 is often known as the "First Iraq War".
The following names have been used to describe the conflict itself:
Gulf War and Persian Gulf War are the most common terms for the conflict used within western countries, though it may also be called the First Gulf War (to distinguish it from the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent Iraq War). Some authors have called it the Second Gulf War to distinguish it from the Iran–Iraq War. Liberation of Kuwait (Arabic: تحرير الكويت) (taḥrīr al-kuwayt) is the term used by Kuwait and most of the coalition's Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Terms in other languages include French: la Guerre du Golfe and Guerre du Koweït (War of Kuwait); German: Golfkrieg (Gulf War) and Zweiter Golfkrieg (Second Gulf War).
Operational names
Most of the coalition states used various names for their operations
and the war's operational phases. These are sometimes incorrectly used
as the conflict's overall name, especially the US Desert Storm:
Operation Desert Shield was the US operational name for the US buildup of forces and Saudi Arabia's defense from 2 August 1990 to 16 January 1991
Operation Desert Storm was the US name of the airland conflict from 17 January 1991 through 28 February 1991
Operation Desert Sabre (early name Operation Desert Sword)
was the US name for the air and land offensive against the Iraqi Army
in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (the "100-hour war") from 24 to 28
February 1991, in itself, part of Operation Desert Storm
Operation Desert Farewell
was the name given to the return of US units and equipment to the US in
1991 after Kuwait's liberation, sometimes referred to as Operation Desert Calm
Operativo Alfil was the Argentine name for Argentine military activities
Opération Daguet was the French name for French military activities in the conflict
Throughout the Cold War, Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union, and there was a history of friction between Iraq and the United States. The US was concerned with Iraq's position on Israeli–Palestinian politics. The US also disliked Iraqi support for Palestinian militant groups, which led to Iraq's inclusion on the developing US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in December 1979.
The US remained officially neutral after Iraq's invasion of Iran in
1980, which became the Iran–Iraq War, although it provided resources,
political support, and some "non-military" aircraft to Iraq. In March 1982, Iran began a successful counteroffensive (Operation Undeniable Victory), and the US increased its support for Iraq
to prevent Iran from forcing a surrender. In a US bid to open full
diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the US list
of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Ostensibly, this was because of improvement in the regime's record,
although former US Assistant Defense Secretary Noel Koch later stated:
"No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in terrorism ... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."
With Iraq's newfound success in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales to Iraq reached a record spike in 1982. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein expelled Abu Nidal to Syria at the US's request in November 1983, the Reagan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to meet Saddam as a special envoy and to cultivate ties. By the time the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was heavily debt-ridden and tensions within society were rising. Most of its debt was owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq's debts to Kuwait amounted to $14 billion. Iraq pressured both nations to forgive the debts, but they refused.
The Iraq–Kuwait border dispute involved Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory. Kuwait had been a part of the Ottoman Empire's province of Basra, something that Iraq claimed made Kuwait rightful Iraqi territory. Kuwait's ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate
agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for Kuwait's foreign
affairs to the United Kingdom. The UK drew the border between Kuwait and
Iraq in 1922, making Iraq almost entirely landlocked. Kuwait rejected Iraqi attempts to secure further provisions in the region.
Iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding its OPEC quotas for oil production. In order for the cartel to maintain its desired price of $18 per
barrel, discipline was required. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait
were consistently overproducing; the latter at least in part to repair
losses caused by Iranian attacks in the Iran–Iraq War and to pay for the
losses of an economic scandal. The result was a slump in the oil
price – as low as $10 per barrel ($63/m3) – with a resulting loss of $7 billion a year to Iraq, equal to its 1989 balance of payments deficit. Resulting revenues struggled to support the government's basic costs, let alone repair Iraq's damaged infrastructure. Jordan and Iraq both looked for more discipline, with little success. The Iraqi government described it as a form of economic warfare, which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait slant-drilling across the border into Iraq's Rumaila oil field. According to oil workers in the area, Iraq's slant drilling claim was
fabricated, as "oil flows easily from the Rumaila field without any need
for these techniques." At the same time, Saddam looked for closer ties with those Arab states
that had supported Iraq in the war. This move was supported by the US,
who believed that Iraqi ties with pro-Western Gulf states would help
bring and maintain Iraq inside the US' sphere of influence.
In 1989, it appeared that Saudi–Iraqi relations, strong during the war, would be maintained. A pact of non-interference and non-aggression
was signed between the countries, followed by a Kuwaiti-Iraqi deal for
Iraq to supply Kuwait with water for drinking and irrigation, although a
request for Kuwait to lease Iraq Umm Qasr was rejected. Saudi-backed development projects were hampered by Iraq's large debts, even with the demobilization
of 200,000 soldiers. Iraq also looked to increase arms production so as
to become an exporter, although the success of these projects was also
restrained by Iraq's obligations; in Iraq, resentment to OPEC's controls
mounted.
Iraq's relations with its Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt,
were degraded by mounting violence in Iraq against expatriate groups,
who were well-employed during the war, by unemployed Iraqis, among them
demobilized soldiers. These events drew little notice outside the Arab
world because of fast-moving events directly related to the fall of
Communism in Eastern Europe. However, the US did begin to condemn Iraq's
human rights record, including the well-known use of torture. The UK also condemned the execution of Farzad Bazoft, a journalist working for the British newspaper The Observer. Following Saddam's declaration that "binary chemical weapons" would be
used on Israel if it used military force against Iraq, Washington halted
part of its funding. A UN mission to the Israeli-occupied territories, where riots had resulted in Palestinian deaths, was vetoed
by the US, making Iraq deeply skeptical of US foreign policy aims in
the region, combined with the reliance of the US on Middle Eastern
energy reserves.
Map of Kuwait
In early July 1990, Iraq complained about Kuwait's behavior, such as
not respecting their quota, and openly threatened to take military
action. On the 23rd, the CIA reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border, and the US naval fleet in the Persian Gulf
was placed on alert. Saddam believed an anti-Iraq conspiracy was
developing – Kuwait had begun talks with Iran, and Iraq's rival Syria
had arranged a visit to Egypt. On 15 July 1990, Saddam's government laid out its combined objections to the Arab League,
including that policy moves were costing Iraq $1 billion a year, that
Kuwait was still using the Rumaila oil field, and that loans made by the
UAE and Kuwait could not be considered debts to its "Arab brothers". He threatened force against Kuwait and the UAE, saying: "The policies
of some Arab rulers are American ... They are inspired by America to
undermine Arab interests and security." The US sent aerial refuelling planes and combat ships to the Persian Gulf in response to these threats. Discussions in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, mediated on the Arab League's behalf by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, were held on 31 July and led Mubarak to believe that a peaceful course could be established.
During Saddam Hussein's 2003–2004 interrogation following his
capture he claimed that in addition to economic disputes, an insulting
exchange between the Kuwaiti emirAl Sabah
and the Iraqi foreign minister – during which the emir stated his
intention to turn "every Iraqi woman into a $10 prostitute" by
bankrupting the country – was a decisive factor in triggering the Iraqi
invasion.
On the 25th, Saddam met with April Glaspie, the US Ambassador to Iraq, in Baghdad. The Iraqi leader attacked American policy with regards to Kuwait and the UAE:
So what can it mean when America
says it will now protect its friends? It can only mean prejudice against
Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made
has encouraged the UAE and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights ... If you
use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can
harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you.
Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We
cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual
Arabs may reach you ... We do not place America among the enemies. We
place it where we want our friends to be and we try to be friends. But
repeated American statements last year made it apparent that America did
not regard us as friends.
Glaspie replied:
I know you need funds. We
understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity
to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab
conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait ... Frankly, we can
only see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally
that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the
context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the
details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the
Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the UAE and Kuwait is,
in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq,
then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned.
Saddam stated that he would attempt last-ditch negotiations with the Kuwaitis but Iraq "would not accept death."
According to Glaspie's own account, she stated in reference to
the precise border between Kuwait and Iraq, "... that she had served in
Kuwait 20 years before; 'then, as now, we took no position on these Arab
affairs'." Glaspie similarly believed that war was not imminent.
Saddam's foreign minister Tariq Aziz later told PBSFrontline
in 1996 that the Iraqi leadership was under "no illusion" about
America's likely response to the Iraqi invasion: "She [Glaspie] didn't
tell us anything strange. She didn't tell us in the sense that we
concluded that the Americans will not retaliate. That was nonsense you
see. It was nonsense to think that the Americans would not attack us." Then in a second 2000 interview with the same television program, Aziz said:
There
were no mixed signals. We should not forget that the whole period
before August 2 witnessed a negative American policy towards Iraq. So it
would be quite foolish to think that, if we go to Kuwait, then America
would like that. Because the American tendency ... was to untie Iraq. So
how could we imagine that such a step was going to be appreciated by
the Americans? It looks foolish, you see, this is fiction. About the
meeting with April Glaspie—it was a routine meeting...She didn't say
anything extraordinary beyond what any professional diplomat would say
without previous instructions from his government...what she said were
routine, classical comments on what the president was asking her to
convey to President Bush. He wanted her to carry a message to George
Bush—not to receive a message through her from Washington.
On 26 July 1990, only a few days before the Iraqi invasion, OPEC
officials said that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had agreed to a
proposal to limit their oil output to 1.5 million barrels (240,000 m3)
per day, "down from the nearly 2 million barrels a day they had each
been pumping," thus potentially settling differences over oil policy
between Kuwait and Iraq.
The result of the Jeddah talks was an Iraqi demand for $10 billion to cover the lost revenues from Rumaila; Kuwait offered $500 million. The Iraqi response was to immediately order an invasion, which started on 2 August 1990 with the bombing of Kuwait's capital, Kuwait City.
Before the invasion, the Kuwaiti military
was believed to have numbered 16,000 men, arranged into three armored,
one mechanized infantry and one under-strength artillery brigade. The pre-war strength of the Kuwait Air Force was around 2,200 Kuwaiti personnel, with 80 fixed-wing aircraft and 40 helicopters. In spite of Iraqi sabre-rattling, Kuwait did not mobilize its force; the army had been stood-down on 19 July, and during the Iraqi invasion many Kuwaiti military personnel were on leave.
By 1988, at the end of the Iran–Iraq war, the Iraqi Army was the
world's fourth largest army, consisting of 955,000 standing soldiers and
650,000 paramilitary forces in the Popular Army. According to John
Childs and André Corvisier, a low estimate shows the Iraqi Army capable
of fielding 4,500 tanks, 484 combat aircraft and 232 combat helicopters. According to Michael Knights, a high estimate shows the Iraqi Army
capable of fielding one million troops and 850,000 reservists, 5,500
tanks, 3,000 artillery pieces, 700 combat aircraft and helicopters; it
held 53 divisions, 20 special-forces brigades, and several regional
militias, and had a strong air defense.
Iraqi commandos infiltrated the Kuwaiti border first to prepare for
the major units, which began the attack at midnight. The Iraqi attack
had two prongs, with the primary attack force driving south straight for
Kuwait City down the main highway, and a supporting attack force
entering Kuwait farther west, but then turning and driving east, cutting
off Kuwait City from the country's southern half. The commander of a
Kuwaiti armored battalion, 35th Armoured Brigade, deployed them against the Iraqi attack and conducted a robust defense at the Battle of the Bridges near Al Jahra, west of Kuwait City.
Kuwaiti aircraft scrambled
to meet the invading force, but approximately 20% were lost or
captured. A few combat sorties were flown against Iraqi ground forces.
Within 12 hours, most resistance had ended within Kuwait, and the
royal family had fled, allowing Iraq to control most of Kuwait. After two days of intense combat, most of the Kuwaiti military were either overrun by the Iraqi Republican Guard,
or had escaped to Saudi Arabia. The Emir and key ministers fled south
along the highway for refuge in Saudi Arabia. Iraqi ground forces
consolidated their control of Kuwait City, then headed south and
redeployed along the Saudi border. After the decisive Iraqi victory,
Saddam initially installed a puppet regime known as the "Provisional Government of Free Kuwait" before installing his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid as Kuwait's governor on 8 August.
After the invasion, the Iraqi military looted over $1 billion in banknotes from Kuwait's Central Bank. At the same time, Saddam Hussein made the Kuwaiti dinar equal to the
Iraqi dinar, thereby lowering the Kuwaiti currency to one-twelfth of its
original value. In response, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah ruled the
banknotes as invalid and refused to reimburse stolen notes, which became
worthless because of a UN embargo. After the conflict ended, many of
the stolen banknotes made their way back into circulation. The stolen
banknotes are a collectible for numismatists.
Kuwaiti resistance movement
Kuwaitis founded a local armed resistance movement following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti resistance's [ar] casualty rate far exceeded that of the coalition military forces and Western hostages. The resistance predominantly consisted of ordinary citizens who lacked any form of training and supervision.
Run-up to the war
Diplomatic means
A key element of US political, military and energy economic planning
occurred in 1984. The Iran–Iraq war had been going on for five years and
both had sustained casualties into the hundreds of thousands. Within
President Ronald Reagan's National Security Council
concern was growing war could spread beyond the two belligerents. A
National Security Planning Group meeting was formed, chaired by then
Vice President George H. W. Bush,
to review US options. It was determined that the conflict would likely
spread into Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, but the US had little
capability to defend the region. A prolonged war in the region would
induce much higher oil prices and threaten the recovery of the world
economy, which was just beginning to gain momentum. In May 1984,
President Reagan was briefed on the project conclusions by William Flynn Martin who had served as the head of the NSC staff that organized the study. The declassified presentation can be seen here: The conclusions were: first, oil stocks needed to be increased among members of the International Energy Agency
and, if necessary, released early if the oil market was disrupted;
second, the US needed to strengthen the security of friendly Arab states
in the region; and third, an embargo should be placed on sales of
military equipment to Iran and Iraq. The plan was approved by Reagan and
affirmed by the G7 leaders headed by the UK's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in the 10th G7 summit,
held in London in June. The plan was implemented and became the basis
for US preparedness to respond to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in
1991.
President Bush visiting American troops in Saudi Arabia on Thanksgiving Day, 1990
Within hours of the invasion, Kuwait and US delegations requested a meeting of the UN Security Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On 3 August 1990, the Arab League passed a resolution, which called for
a solution from within the league, and warned against outside
intervention. Iraq and Libya were the only Arab League states that
opposed the resolution for Iraq to withdraw; the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) opposed it as well. Yemen and Jordan – a Western ally which bordered Iraq and relied on the country for economic support – opposed military intervention from non-Arab states. Separately, Sudan, also an Arab League member, aligned itself with Saddam.
On 6 August, Resolution 661 placed economic sanctions on Iraq. Resolution 665 followed soon after, which authorized a naval blockade
to enforce the sanctions. It said the "use of measures commensurate to
the specific circumstances as may be necessary ... to halt all inward
and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their
cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of
resolution 661."
The US administration had at first been indecisive with an
"undertone ... of resignation to the invasion and even adaptation to it
as a fait accompli" until the UK's prime minister Thatcher played a powerful role,
reminding the President that appeasement in the 1930s had led to war,
that Saddam would have the whole Gulf at his mercy along with 65% of the
world's oil supply, and famously urging Bush "not to go wobbly". Once persuaded, US officials insisted on Iraqi pullout, without any
linkage to other Middle Eastern problems, accepting the British view
that any concession would strengthen Iraqi influence.
Weapons training at Abu Hydra Range, 1990
On 12 August 1990, Saddam "propose[d] that all cases of occupation,
and those cases that have been portrayed as occupation, in the region,
be resolved simultaneously". He called for Israel to withdraw from
occupied territories in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, Syria to withdraw
from Lebanon, and "mutual withdrawals by Iraq and Iran and arrangement
for the situation in Kuwait." He called for a replacement of US troops,
that mobilized in Saudi Arabia, with "an Arab force", as long as that
force did not involve Egypt. He requested an "immediate freeze of all
boycott and siege decisions" and a normalization of relations with Iraq. Bush was strongly opposed to any "linkage" between Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the Palestinian issue.
On 23 August,
Saddam appeared on state television with Western hostages to whom he had
refused exit visas. In the video, he asks a British boy, Stuart
Lockwood, whether he is getting his milk, and goes on to say, through
his interpreter, "We hope your presence as guests here will not be for
too long. Your presence here, and in other places, is meant to prevent
the scourge of war."
Another Iraqi proposal communicated was delivered to US National Security AdvisorBrent Scowcroft
by an unidentified Iraqi official. The official communicated that Iraq
would "withdraw from Kuwait and allow foreigners to leave" provided the
UN lifted sanctions, allowed "guaranteed access to the Persian Gulf
through the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah", and allowed Iraq to
"gain full control of the Rumaila oil field that extends slightly into
Kuwaiti territory". The proposal also "include[d] offers to negotiate an
oil agreement with the United States 'satisfactory to both nations'
national security interests,' develop a joint plan 'to alleviate Iraq's
economical and financial problems' and 'jointly work on the stability of
the gulf.'"
On 29 November 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678,
which gave Iraq until 15 January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait, and
empowered states to use "all necessary means" to force Iraq out of
Kuwait after the deadline.
In December 1990, Iraq made a proposal to withdraw from Kuwait
provided foreign troops left the region and that an agreement was
reached regarding the Palestinian problem and the dismantlement of
Israel's and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The White House rejected the proposal. The PLO's Yasser Arafat
expressed that neither he nor Saddam insisted that solving the
Israel–Palestine issues should be a precondition to solving the issues
in Kuwait, though he did acknowledge a "strong link" between these
problems.
The US and UK stuck to their position there would be no
negotiations until Iraq withdrew, and should not grant Iraq concessions,
lest they give the impression Iraq benefited from its military
campaign. When US Secretary of State James Baker met with Tariq Aziz
in Geneva, for last minute peace talks in early 1991, Aziz reportedly
made no concrete proposals and did not outline any hypothetical Iraqi
moves.
On 14 January 1991, France proposed that the UN Security Council
call for "a rapid and massive withdrawal" from Kuwait along with a
statement to Iraq that Council members would bring their "active
contribution" to a settlement of the region's other problems, "in
particular, of the Arab–Israeli conflict and in particular to the
Palestinian problem by convening, at an appropriate moment, an
international conference" to assure "the security, stability and
development of this region of the world." The proposal was supported by
Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and several
non-aligned states. The US, UK, and Soviet Union rejected it; US
Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering stated that the French proposal was unacceptable, because it went beyond Council resolutions on the Iraqi invasion. France dropped this proposal when it found "no tangible sign of interest" from Baghdad.
Military means
"Operation Desert Shield" redirects here. For the 2006 operation by the Iraqi insurgency, see Operation Desert Shield (2006).
American F-15Es parked in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield
A concern in the Western world was the significant threat Iraq posed
to Saudi Arabia. Following Kuwait's conquest, the Iraqi Army was within
striking distance of Saudi oil fields.
Control of these, along with Kuwaiti and Iraqi reserves, would have
given Saddam control over most of the world's oil reserves. Iraq had
grievances with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had lent Iraq 26 billion
dollars during its war with Iran, as the Saudis feared the influence of Shia Iran's Islamic revolution
on its own Shia minority. After the war, Saddam felt he should not have
to repay the loans due to the help he had given the Saudis by fighting
Iran. After his conquest of Kuwait, Saddam verbally attacked the Saudis. He
argued the US-supported Saudi state was an illegitimate and unworthy
guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. He combined the language of the Islamist groups that had fought in Afghanistan with the rhetoric Iran had used to attack the Saudis.
Acting on the Carter Doctrine
policy, and out of fear the Iraqi Army could invade Saudi Arabia, Bush
announced that the US would launch a "wholly defensive" mission to
prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia, under the codename Operation
Desert Shield. The operation began on 7 August 1990, when US troops were
sent to Saudi Arabia, due also to the request of its monarch, King Fahd, who had called for US military assistance. This "wholly defensive" doctrine was quickly abandoned when, on 8
August, Iraq declared Kuwait to be Iraq's 19th province and Saddam named
his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, as its governor.
M3 Bradleys of L Troop, 3rd ACR, stand in line at a holding area during the build-up to Operation Desert Shield.
The US Navy dispatched two naval battle groups built around the aircraft carriersUSS Dwight D. Eisenhower and USS Independence to the Gulf, where they were ready by 8 August. The US sent the battleships USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin. 48 US Air Force F-15s from the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia, landed in Saudi Arabia and commenced round-the-clock air
patrols of the Saudi–Kuwait–Iraq border to discourage Iraqi military
advances. They were joined by 36 F-15 A-Ds from the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing at Bitburg, Germany. The Bitburg contingent was based at Al Kharj Air Base.
The 36th TFW would be responsible for 11 confirmed Iraqi Air Force
aircraft shot down during the war. Two Air National Guard units were
stationed at Al Kharj Air Base, the South Carolina Air National Guard's
169th Fighter Wing flew bombing missions with 24 F-16s flying 2,000
combat missions and dropping four million pounds (1,800,000 kilograms;
1,800 metric tons) of munitions, and the New York Air National Guard's 174th Fighter Wing from Syracuse
flew 24 F-16s on bombing missions. Military buildup continued, reaching
543,000 troops, twice that used in the 2003 invasion. Much of the
material was airlifted or carried to the staging areas via fast sealift ships,
allowing a quick buildup. Amphibious exercises were carried out in the
Gulf, including Operation Imminent Thunder, which involved the USS Midway and 15 other ships, 1,100 aircraft, and a thousand Marines. In a press conference, General Schwarzkopf stated that these exercises
were intended to deceive the Iraqi forces, forcing them to continue
their defense of the Kuwaiti coastline.
Creating a coalition
Countries that deployed coalition forces or provided support (On behalf of Afghanistan, 300 Mujaheddin joined the coalition on 11
February 1991. Niger contributed 480 troops to guard shrines in Mecca
and Medina on 15 January 1991.)
A series of UN Security Council resolutions
and Arab League resolutions were passed regarding Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. Resolution 678, passed on 29 November 1990, gave Iraq a
withdrawal deadline until 15 January 1991 and authorized "all necessary
means to uphold and implement Resolution 660", and a diplomatic
formulation authorizing the use of force if Iraq failed to comply.
To ensure the US received economic backing, James Baker went on
an 11-day journey to nine countries in September 1990, which the press
dubbed "The Tin Cup Trip". The first stop was Saudi Arabia, which had
already granted permission to the US to use its facilities. However,
Baker believed that Saudi Arabia should assume some of the cost of to
defend it. When Baker asked King Fahd for $15 billion, the King agreed,
with the promise that Baker ask Kuwait for the same amount. The next day, 7 September, Baker did just that, and the Emir of Kuwait,
displaced in a Sheraton hotel outside Kuwait, agreed. Baker moved to
enter talks with Egypt, whose leadership he considered "the moderate
voice of the Middle East". President Mubarak was furious with Saddam for
his invasion, and that Saddam had assured Mubarak that an invasion was
not his intention. Egypt received approximately $7 billion in debt
forgiveness for providing support and troops for the US-led
intervention.
After stops in Helsinki and Moscow to smooth out Iraqi demands
for a Middle-Eastern peace conference with the Soviet Union, Baker
traveled to Syria to discuss its role with President Hafez Assad. Assad had a personal enmity towards Saddam, as "Saddam had been trying to kill him [Assad] for years." Harboring this animosity and impressed with Baker's initiative to visit Damascus (relations had been severed since the 1983 bombing of US barracks),
Assad agreed to pledge up to 100,000 Syrian troops to the coalition.
This was a vital step in ensuring Arab states were represented in the
coalition. In exchange, Washington gave al-Assad the green light to wipe
out forces opposing Syria's rule in Lebanon and arranged for weapons valued at a billion dollars to be provided to Syria, mostly through Gulf states. In exchange for Iran's support for the US-led intervention, the US promised Iran to end US opposition to World Bank loans to Iran. On the day before the coalition ground invasion, the World Bank gave Iran the first loan of $250m.
Baker flew to Rome for a meeting with the Italians in which he
was promised the use of military equipment, before journeying to Germany
to meet with American ally Chancellor Kohl. Although Germany's constitution
(brokered by the US) prohibited military involvement outside Germany's
borders, Kohl committed a two billion dollar contribution to the war
effort, and further economic and military support of coalition ally
Turkey, and the transportation of Egyptian soldiers and ships to the
Gulf.
A coalition of forces opposing Iraq's aggression was formed,
consisting of forces from 42 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France,
Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg,
Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Syria,
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the UK and US. It was the largest coalition since World War II. A group of Afghan mujahideen soldiers also reportedly joined towards the end of the war. Although they did not contribute forces, Japan and Germany made
financial contributions totaling $10 billion and $6.6 billion
respectively. Luxembourg provided financial support. US troops represented 73% of the coalition's 956,600 troops in Iraq.
US Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr.
was designated to be the commander of the coalition forces. The Soviet
Union condemned Baghdad's aggression against Kuwait, but did not support
the US and allied intervention in Iraq and tried to avert it. Many of the coalition countries were reluctant to commit military
forces. Some felt that the war was an internal Arab affair or did not
want to increase US influence in the Middle East. In the end, however,
many governments were persuaded by Iraq's belligerence towards other
Arab states, offers of economic aid or debt forgiveness, and threats to
withhold aid.
Justification for intervention
The US and UN gave public justifications for involvement in the
conflict, the most prominent being the Iraqi violation of Kuwaiti
territorial integrity. In addition, the US moved to support its ally
Saudi Arabia, whose importance in the region, and as a key supplier of
oil, made it of considerable geopolitical importance. Shortly after the Iraqi invasion, US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney
made the first of several visits to Saudi Arabia where King Fahd
requested US military assistance. During a speech in a special joint
session of the US Congress given on 11 September 1990, Bush summed up
the reasons with the following remarks: "Within three days, 120,000
Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to
threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to act to check that
aggression."
The Pentagon stated that satellite photos showing a buildup of
Iraqi forces along the border were the source of this information, but
this was later alleged to be false. A reporter for the St. Petersburg Times acquired commercial Soviet satellite images which showed nothing but empty desert.
Other justifications for foreign involvement included Iraq's history of human rights abuses under Saddam. Iraq was known to possess biological weapons and chemical weapons, which Saddam had used against Iranian troops during the Iran–Iraq War and his own country's Kurdish population in the Al-Anfal campaign. Iraq was known to have a nuclear weapons program; the report about it from January 1991 was partially declassified by the CIA in May 2001.
Although the Iraqi military committed human rights abuses during the
invasion, the alleged incidents that received the most publicity in the
US were fabrications of the public relations firm hired by the government of Kuwait to persuade Americans to support military intervention. Shortly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the organization Citizens for a Free Kuwait was formed in the US. It hired the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton for about $11 million, paid by Kuwait's government.
Among many other means of influencing US opinion, such as
distributing books on Iraqi atrocities to US soldiers deployed, "Free
Kuwait" T-shirts and speakers to college campuses, and video news
releases to television stations, the firm arranged for an appearance
before members of the US Congress in which a young woman identifying herself as a nurse working in the Kuwait City hospital described Iraqi soldiers pulling babies out of incubators and letting them die on the floor. The story helped tip the public and Congress towards a war with Iraq:
six Congressmen said the testimony was enough for them to support
military action against Iraq and seven Senators referenced the testimony
in debate. The Senate supported the military actions in a 52–47 vote.
However, a year after the war, this allegation was revealed to be a
fabrication. The young woman was found to be a member of Kuwait's royal
family and the daughter of Kuwait's ambassador to the US. She had not lived in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion.
The details of the Hill & Knowlton public relations campaign, including the incubator testimony, were published in John R. MacArthur's Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War, and came to public attention when an Op-ed by MacArthur was published in The New York Times. This prompted a reexamination by Amnesty International,
which had promoted an account alleging even greater numbers of babies
torn from incubators than the fake testimony. After finding no evidence
to support it, the organization issued a retraction. Bush repeated the incubator allegations on television.
The Iraqi Army did commit well-documented crimes during its occupation, such as the summary execution without trial of three brothers, after which their bodies were stacked and left to decay in a street. Iraqi troops ransacked and looted private homes; one residence was repeatedly defecated in. A resident later commented: "The whole thing was violence for the sake
of violence, destruction for the sake of destruction ... Imagine a surrealistic painting by Salvador Dalí". Bush repeatedly compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler.
The USAFF-117 Nighthawk, one of the key aircraft used in Operation Desert Storm
The Gulf War began with an extensive aerial bombing
campaign on 16 January 1991. For 42 consecutive days and nights, the
coalition forces subjected Iraq to one of the most intensive air
bombardments in military history. The coalition flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tonnes of bombs, which widely destroyed military and civilian infrastructure.
Iraqi anti-aircraft defenses, including man-portable air-defense systems,
were surprisingly ineffective against enemy aircraft, and the coalition
suffered only 75 aircraft losses in over 100,000 sorties, 44 due to
Iraqi action. Two of these losses are the result of aircraft colliding
with the ground while evading Iraqi ground-fired weapons. One of these losses is a confirmed air-air victory.
Iraqi Scud missile strikes on Israel and Saudi Arabia
Scud Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with missile in upright position
Iraq's government made no secret that it would attack Israel if
invaded. Prior to the war's start, in the aftermath of the failed
US–Iraq peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland, a reporter asked Iraq's
English-speaking Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz:
"Mr. Foreign Minister, if war starts ... will you attack Israel?" His
response was: "Yes, absolutely, yes."
Five hours after the first attacks, Iraq's state radio broadcast
declared that "The dawn of victory nears as this great showdown begins."
Iraq fired eight missiles the next day. These missile attacks were to
continue throughout the war. Iraq fired 88 Scud missiles during the
war's seven weeks.
Iraq hoped to provoke a military response from Israel. The Iraqi
government hoped that many Arab states would withdraw from the
Coalition, as they would be reluctant to fight alongside Israel. Following the first attacks, Israeli Air Force
jets were deployed to patrol the northern airspace with Iraq. Israel
prepared to militarily retaliate, as its policy for the previous 40
years had always been retaliation. However, President Bush pressured
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
not to retaliate and withdraw Israeli jets, fearing that if Israel
attacked Iraq, the other Arab states would either desert the coalition
or join Iraq. It was also feared that if Israel used Syrian or Jordanian
airspace to attack Iraq, they would intervene in the war on Iraq's side
or attack Israel. The coalition promised to deploy Patriot missiles to defend Israel if it refrained from responding to the Scud attacks.
The Scud missiles targeting Israel were relatively ineffective,
as firing at extreme range resulted in a dramatic reduction in accuracy
and payload. Two Israeli civilians died as a direct result of the
missile attacks. Between 11 and 74 died from incorrect use of gas masks, heart attacks, and incorrect use of the anti-chemical weapons drug atropine. Approximately 230 Israelis were injured. Extensive property damage was also caused, and, according to the Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Damage to general property consisted of
1,302 houses, 6,142 apartments, 23 public buildings, 200 shops and 50
cars." It was feared that Iraq would fire missiles filled with nerve agents such as sarin. As a result, Israel's government issued gas masks
to its citizens. When the first Iraqi missiles hit Israel, some people
injected themselves with an antidote for nerve gas. It has been
suggested that the sturdy construction techniques used in Israeli
cities, coupled with the fact that Scuds were only launched at night,
played an important role in limiting the number of casualties from Scud
attacks.
Israeli civilians taking shelter from missiles (top) and aftermath of attack in Ramat Gan, Israel (bottom)
In response to the threat of Scuds on Israel, the US rapidly sent a
Patriot missile air defense artillery battalion to Israel along with two
batteries of MIM-104 Patriot missiles for the protection of civilians. The Royal Netherlands Air Force
also deployed a Patriot missile squadron to Israel and Turkey. The
Dutch Defense Ministry later stated that the military use of the Patriot
missile system was largely ineffective, but its psychological value for
the affected populations was high.
Coalition air forces were also extensively exercised in "Scud
hunts" in the Iraqi desert, trying to locate the camouflaged trucks
before they fired their missiles at Israel or Saudi Arabia. On the
ground, special operations forces also infiltrated Iraq, tasked with
locating and destroying Scuds – including the ill-fated Bravo Two Zero patrol of the SAS.
Once special operations were combined with air patrols, the number of
attacks fell sharply, then increased slightly as Iraqi forces adjusted
to coalition tactics.
As the Scud attacks continued, the Israelis grew increasingly
impatient, and considered taking unilateral military action against
Iraq. On 22 January 1991, a Scud missile hit the Israeli city of Ramat Gan,
after two coalition Patriots failed to intercept it. Three elderly
people suffered fatal heart attacks, another 96 people were injured, and
20 apartment buildings were damaged. After this attack, the Israelis warned that if the US failed to stop
the attacks, they would. At one point, Israeli commandos boarded
helicopters prepared to fly into Iraq, but the mission was called off
after a phone call from US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, reporting on
the extent of coalition efforts to destroy Scuds and emphasizing that
Israeli intervention could endanger US forces.
In addition to the attacks on Israel, 47 Scud missiles were fired into Saudi Arabia,
and one missile was fired at Bahrain and another at Qatar. The missiles
were fired at both military and civilian targets. One Saudi civilian
was killed, and 78 others were injured. No casualties were reported in
Bahrain or Qatar. The Saudi government issued all its citizens and
expatriates with gas masks in the event of Iraq using missiles with
warheads containing chemical weapons. The government broadcast alerts and 'all clear' messages over television to warn citizens during Scud attacks.
On 25 February 1991, a Scud missile hit a US Army barracks of the
14th Quartermaster Detachment, out of Greensburg, Pennsylvania,
stationed in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 soldiers and injuring over 100. A subsequent investigation found that the assigned Patriot missile battery had failed to engage due to the loss of significance effect in the onboard computer's floating point calculations
compounding over 100 hours of consecutive use, shifting the range gate
position far enough to lose contact with the Scud during tracking
action.
On 29 January, Iraqi forces attacked and occupied the lightly defended Saudi city of Khafji with tanks and infantry. The Battle of Khafji ended two days later when the Iraqis were driven back by the Saudi Arabian National Guard, supported by Qatari forces and US Marines. The allied forces used extensive artillery fire.
Both sides suffered casualties, although Iraqi forces sustained
substantially more dead and captured than the allied forces. Eleven
Americans were killed in two separate friendly fire incidents, an additional 14 US airmen were killed when their AC-130 gunship was shot down by an Iraqi surface-to-air missile, and two US soldiers were captured during the battle. Saudi and Qatari
forces had a total of 18 dead. Iraqi forces in Khafji had 60–300 dead
and 400 captured.
The Battle of Khafji was an example of how air power could
single-handedly hinder the advance of enemy ground forces. Upon learning
of Iraqi troop movements, 140 coalition aircraft were diverted to
attack an advancing column consisting of two armored divisions in
battalion-sized units. Precision stand-off attacks were conducted during
the night and through to the next day. Iraqi vehicle losses included
357 tanks, 147 armored personnel carriers, and 89 mobile artillery
pieces. Some crews simply abandoned their vehicles upon realizing that
they could be destroyed by guided bombs, stopping the divisions from
massing for an organized attack on the town. One Iraqi soldier, who had
fought in the Iran–Iraq War, remarked that his brigade "had sustained
more punishment from allied airpower in 30 minutes at Khafji than in
eight years of fighting against Iran."
Task Force 1-41 Infantry was a US Army heavy battalion task force from the 2nd Armored Division (Forward). 2nd Armored Division (Forward) included the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 66th Armor Regiment, and the 4th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment.
Task Force 1–41 was the first coalition force to breach the Saudi
Arabian border on 15 February 1991, and to conduct ground combat
operations in Iraq against the enemy on 17 February 1991. Shortly after arrival in theatre "..the battalion received, for
planning, a brigade cross-boundary counter-reconnaissance mission." 1–41 Infantry was assisted by the 1st Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry
Regiment. This joint effort would become known as Task Force Iron. Counter-reconnaissance generally includes destroying or repelling the
enemy's reconnaissance elements and denying their commander any
observation of friendly forces. On 15 February 1991 4th Battalion of the
3rd Field Artillery Regiment fired on a trailer and a few trucks in the
Iraqi sector observing American forces.
On 16 February 1991 several groups of Iraqi vehicles appeared to
be performing reconnaissance on the Task Force and were driven away by
fire from 4–3 FA. Another enemy platoon, including six vehicles, was reported as being to
the northeast of the Task Force. They were engaged with artillery fire
from 4–3 FA. Later that evening another group of Iraqi vehicles was spotted moving
towards the center of the Task Force. They appeared to be Iraqi
Soviet-made BTRs and tanks. For the next hour the Task Force fought several small battles with Iraqi reconnaissance units. TF 1–41 IN fired TOW missiles
at the Iraqi formation destroying one tank. The rest of the formation
was destroyed or driven away by artillery fire from 4–3 FA. On 17 February 1991 the Task Force took enemy mortar fire, but the enemy forces managed to escape. Later that evening the Task Force received enemy artillery fire but suffered no casualties. That same evening the Task Force identified an Iraqi mortar position and engaged it with both direct and indirect fires. The Iraqis continued probing operations against the Task Force for approximately two hours. For the next two days the Task Force observed Iraqi wheeled vehicles
and small units move in front of them. Several times Iraqi mortars fired
on Task Force 1–41 Infantry positions. On 18 February Iraqi mortar positions continued to conduct fire
missions against the Task Force. The Task Force returned fire on the
Iraqi positions with artillery fire from 4–3 FA and 1st Infantry
Division Artillery. During the Iraqi mortar attacks two American soldiers were wounded. Iraqi reconnaissance elements continued to patrol the area between the Task Force and the 1st Cavalry Division. VII Corps air units and artillery conducted combat operations against Iraqi defensive positions.
Task Force 1–41 Infantry was the first coalition force to breach the
Saudi Arabian border on 15 February 1991 and conduct ground combat
operations in Iraq engaging in direct and indirect fire fights with the
enemy on 17 February 1991. Prior to this action the Task Force's primary fire support battalion,
4th Battalion of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, participated in a
massive artillery preparation. Around 300 guns from multiple countries
participated in the artillery barrage. Over 14,000 rounds were fired during these missions. M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems contributed an additional 4,900 rockets fired at Iraqi targets. Iraq lost close to 22 artillery battalions during the initial stages of this barrage, including the destruction of approximately 396 Iraqi artillery pieces.
By the end of these raids Iraqi artillery assets had all but
ceased to exist. One Iraqi unit that was totally destroyed during the
preparation was the Iraqi 48th Infantry Division Artillery Group. The group's commander stated his unit lost 83 of its 100 guns to the artillery preparation. The artillery bombardment was supplemented by Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombing raids and Lockheed AC-130 attacks. AH-64 Apache attack helicopters from the 1st Infantry Division and B-52 bombers attacked the Iraqi 110th Infantry Brigade. Under enemy fire, the 1st and 9th Engineer Battalions marked and proofed assault lanes to secure a foothold in enemy territory and pass the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Armoured Division forward.
An Iraqi Republican Guard T-55 tank destroyed by Task Force 1–41 Infantry, February 1991
On 24 February 1991 the 1st Cavalry Division fired its artillery against Iraqi artillery units. One artillery mission struck a series of Iraqi bunkers, reinforced by
Iraqi T-55 tanks, in the sector of the Iraqi 25th Infantry Division. The same day the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division with the 1st
Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Battalion, 32nd Armor, and the 1st
Battalion, 8th Cavalry destroyed Iraqi bunkers and combat vehicles in
the sector of the Iraqi 25th Infantry Division. On 24 February 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division rolled through the breach in the Iraqi defense west of Wadi al-Batin and also cleared the northeastern sector of the breach site of enemy resistance. Task Force 3–37th Armor breached the Iraqi defense clearing four passage lanes and expanding the gap under direct enemy fire. Also on 24 February the 1st Infantry Division along with the 1st
Cavalry Division destroyed Iraqi outposts and patrols belonging to the
Iraqi 26th Infantry Division. The two divisions also began capturing prisoners. The 1st Infantry Division cleared a zone between Phase Line Vermont and Phase Line Kansas. Once the 1st Infantry Division's 3rd Battalion, 37th Armor reached the Iraqi rear defensive positions it destroyed an Iraqi D-30 artillery battery and many trucks and bunkers.
Task Force 1–41 Infantry was given the task of breaching Iraq's initial defensive positions along the Iraq–Saudi Arabia border. The 1st Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment handled similar responsibilities in its sector of operations. The 1st Infantry Division's 5th Battalion, 16th Infantry also played a
significant role clearing the trenches and captured 160 Iraqi soldiers
in the process. Once into Iraqi territory Task Force 1–41 Infantry encountered multiple
Iraqi defensive positions and bunkers. These defensive positions were
occupied by a brigade-sized element. Task Force 1–41 Infantry elements dismounted and prepared to engage the
enemy soldiers who occupied these well-prepared and heavily fortified
bunkers. The Task Force found itself engaged in six hours of combat in order to clear the extensive bunker complex. The Iraqis engaged the Task Force with small arms fire, RPGs, mortar fire, and what was left of Iraqi artillery
assets. A series of battles unfolded resulting in heavy Iraqi
casualties and the Iraqis being removed from their defensive positions
with many becoming prisoners of war. Some escaped to be killed or
captured by other coalition forces. In the process of clearing the bunkers, Task Force 1–41 captured two
brigade command posts and the command post of the Iraqi 26th Infantry
Division. The Task Force also captured a brigade commander, several battalion commanders, company commanders, and staff officers. As combat operations progressed Task Force 1–41 Infantry engaged at
short range multiple dug in enemy tanks in ambush positions. For a few hours, bypassed Iraqi RPG-equipped anti-tank teams, T-55
tanks, and dismounted Iraqi infantry fired at passing American
vehicles, only to be destroyed by other US tanks and fighting vehicles
following the initial forces.
The 1st Infantry Division's Task Force 2–16 Infantry cleared four
lanes simultaneously through an enemy fortified trench system while
inflicting heavy casualties on Iraqi forces. Task Force 2–16 continued the attack clearing over 21 km (13 mi) of
entrenched enemy positions resulting in the capture and destruction of
numerous enemy vehicles, equipment, personnel and command bunkers.
M109 howitzers belonging to 4th Battalion of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment,
2nd Armored Division (FWD) conducts artillery strikes on Iraqi
positions during the Gulf War. 4-3 FA was the primary fire support
battalion for Task Force 1–41 during the Gulf War, February 1991.
A 90,000 round artillery preparation fire on Iraqi defensive positions preceded the major ground assault, lasting 2.5 hours. 1st Infantry Division Artillery, which included 4-3 FA battalion, was
decisive during artillery combat operations performing multiple raids
and fire missions. These combat operations resulted in the destruction
of 50 enemy tanks, 139 APCs, 30 air defense systems, 152 artillery
pieces, 27 missile launchers, 108 mortars, and 548 wheeled vehicles, 61
trench lines and bunker positions, 92 dug in and open infantry targets,
and 34 logistical sites. The ground campaign consisted of three or possibly four of the largest tank battles in American military history. The battles at 73 Easting, Norfolk, and Medina Ridge are well noted for their historical significance. Some consider the Battle of Medina Ridge the largest tank battle of the war.Other sources consider the Battle of Norfolk the largest tank battle of the war and the second largest tank battle in American military history, behind the Battle of the Bulge. The U.S. Marine Corps also fought the biggest tank battle in its history at Kuwait International Airport. The U.S. 3rd Armored Division also fought a significant battle at
Objective Dorset not far from where the Battle of Norfolk was taking
place. The U.S. 3rd Armored Division destroyed approximately 300 enemy
combat vehicles during this particular encounter with Iraqi forces.
The U.S. VII Corps was the primary combat formation of the coalition forces. It was a formidable fighting force consisting of 1,487 tanks, 1,384
infantry fighting vehicles, 568 artillery pieces, 132 MLRS, 8 missile
launchers, and 242 attack helicopters. It had a total troop strength of 146,321 troops. Its primary full strength fighting formations were the 1st Armored Division (United States), the 3rd Armored Division (United States) and the 1st Infantry Division (United States). The 2nd Armored Division (Forward) was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division as its third maneuver brigade. Its Task Force 1-41 Infantry would be the spearhead of VII Corps. In addition, the corps had the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (United States) to act as a scouting and screening force, and two further heavy divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division (United States) and the United Kingdom's 1st Armoured Division, as well as the U.S. 11th Aviation Group.VII Corps fought a number of large battles against Iraqi forces, with
some of historic scope and size. Three of the battles at Norfolk, Medina
Ridge, and 73 Easting are considered among the largest tank battles in
history. By the end of combat operations on 28 February 1991, U.S. VII Corps had
driven 260 kilometres (160 mi), captured 22,000 Iraqi soldiers, and
destroyed 1,350 Iraqi tanks, 1,224 armored personnel carriers, 285
artillery pieces, 105 air defense systems, and 1,229 trucks.
An OH-58D Kiowa helicopter departs from a communications site in the desert during Operation Desert Shield
The primary combat vehicles of the American divisions were the M1A1 Abrams tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The primary American artillery system was the self propelled M109 howitzer. The primary American attack helicopter was the Boeing AH-64 Apache (Army) with the Bell AH-1 Cobra (Army and Marines) also being in theatre. The U.S. Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II ground attack aircraft would distinguish itself during the Gulf War aided by the OH-58DJAATT eyes in the sky. Together they inflicted significant damage on Iraqi ground forces. U.S. A-10 "Warthog" crews would destroy 900 Iraqi tanks, 2,000 other
military vehicles and 1,200 artillery pieces during combat operations.
The U.S. Marine Corps was represented by the 1st Marine Division and the 2nd Marine Division. They were supported by the U.S. Army's 2nd Armored Division's Tiger
Brigade to provide the Marines with additional armor support. Marine armor units mostly consisted of the older M-60 tank. The 1st Marine Division destroyed around 60 Iraqi tanks near the Burgan oil field without suffering any losses. The 1st Marine Division
Task Force Ripper led the drive to the Kuwait International Airport on
27 February 1991. Marine Task Force Ripper destroyed about 100 Iraqi
tanks and armored personnel carriers, including T-72 tanks. The division commander Maj. Gen. J.M. Myatt said, "During the first day of combat operations 1st Platoon, D Company, 3rd Tank Battalion destroyed 15 Iraqi tanks". The Marines also destroyed 25 APCs and took 300 prisoners of war. The U.S.M.C. would often encounter the Iraqi 3rd Armored Division in
their theater of operations. Once the 1st Marine Division reached Kuwait
International Airport they found what remained of the Iraqi 12th
Armored Brigade, 3rd Armored Division defending it. The Marines
destroyed 30 to 40 Iraqi T-72 tanks which had taken up defensive
positions around the airport. The Iraqi 3rd Armored Division losses included more than 250 T-55/62s and 70 T-72 tanks by the end of combat operations. The Iraqi 3rd Armored Division would be totally destroyed. The 2nd
Marine Division played a major role repelling the attempted Iraqi
invasion of Saudi Arabia which is known as the Battle of Khafji. The 2nd Marine Division also faced heavy resistance during the Battle of Kuwait International Airport.
The battle featured the "Reveille Engagement" which went on to become
the largest tank battle in United States Marine Corps' entire history. Marine Reserve unit Bravo Company, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine division was assigned to the 2nd Marine Division. Bravo Company destroyed a total of 119 enemy vehicles and took over 800 POWs by the end of combat operations. The 1st Tank Battalion claimed 50 Iraqi T-55 and T-62 tanks and 25
APCs. The 3rd Battalion claimed 57 T-55s and T-62s along with 5 T-72s, 7
APCs, and 10 trucks. The 8th Battalion destroyed more than three dozen
tanks and a number of other vehicles. U.S. Marine Corps armor units would destroy hundreds of Iraqi tanks by the end of combat operations. U.S. Marine Corps tank losses would be light as they suffered the loss of ten M-60 tanks during combat operations.
British
Challenger 1 tanks during the Gulf War. The British Challenger tank was
the most efficient tank of the Gulf War, suffering no losses while
destroying approximately 300 Iraqi tanks during combat operations.
The United Kingdom was represented by its 1st Armoured Division known
as the Desert Rats. The British 1st Armoured Division fielded
approximately 176 Challenger 1 tanks. British infantry rode into battle on the Warrior tracked armoured vehicle. It had reasonable armour protection and a 30mm gun. Modified versions of the vehicle included mortar carriers, MILAN
antitank systems, and command and control vehicles; and the British
possessed a variety of excellent light armoured vehicles built on their FV101 Scorpion chassis. British artillery was primarily American made M109 howitzers (155mm), M110 howitzers (203mm), and M270 MLRS which were compatible with American systems. Their air support consisted of Gazelle helicopters, used for reconnaissance, and the Lynx helicopter which was comparable to the American AH-1 Cobra. The British had their full contingent of engineer, logistics, and medical units.
The British 1st Armoured Division was responsible for protecting
the right flank of VII Corps. It was assumed by the Corps' planners the
Iraqi 52nd Armored Division would counterattack VII Corps once their
penetration into Iraqi defenses was discovered. The British 1st Armoured
Division had two brigades (the 4th and 7th) which participated in Operation Granby,
the name given to the British military operations during the 1991 Gulf
War. The British 1st Armoured Division had traveled 217 miles in 97
hours. The British 1st Armoured Division had captured or destroyed about
300 Iraqi tanks and a very large number of armored personnel carriers, trucks, reconnaissance vehicles, etc. The Desert Rats also destroyed multiple Iraqi artillery positions. The division also took over 7,000 Iraqi prisoners of war including two division commanders and two other general officers. The British 1st Armoured Division destroyed or isolated four Iraqi
infantry divisions (the 26th, 48th, 31st, and 25th) and overran the
Iraqi 52nd Armored Division in several sharp engagements. The Iraqi 80th
Armored Brigade would also fall victim to the British 1st Armoured
Division.
Iraq was represented mostly by its own VII Corps and its Jihad Corps. Its most notable participants were its elite Republican Guard Divisions Tawakalna, Medina, Hammurabi, and Adnan. The first three of these had a strength of over 660 tanks, 660 infantry
fighting vehicles, and thousands of antitank weapons, self propelled
artillery, and other combat systems. The Tawakalna Republican Guard Division was Iraq's most powerful division which included approximately 14,000 soldiers, 220 T-72 tanks, 284 infantry fighting vehicles, 126 artillery pieces, and 18 MLRS. The Iraqi 52nd Armored Division was also a primary participant. It was a powerful division consisting of 245 tanks and 195 armored fighting vehicles. The Iraqi 10th and 12th Armored Divisions were also present. The two divisions formed the foundation of the Jihad Corps. The Iraqi 10th Armored Division was considered the best regular division in the Iraqi Army. It had more modern equipment than the other regular Iraqi units. It was equipped with T-72 and T-62 tanks. The T-62 tank being its primary system. Overall the primary tank of the Iraqi forces was the T-55 tank. The Iraqis fielded them in great numbers. The Iraqis also had elements of two other independent armored brigades
in theatre, those being the 50th and 29th Armored Brigades. Iraq would also field multiple Infantry Divisions.
The Iraqis suffered the loss of over 3,000 tanks and over 2,000
other combat vehicles during these battles against the American-led
coalition. It is estimated that Iraqi forces suffered 20,000–50,000 troops killed during combat operations. It is also estimated that over 75,000 Iraqi soldiers were wounded. Between 80,000 and 175,000 Iraqi troops were taken prisoner.Iraqi forces inflicted very minimal damage on Coalition forces.
US decoy attacks by air attacks and naval gunfire the night before
Kuwait's liberation were designed to make the Iraqis believe the main
coalition ground attack would focus on central Kuwait. For months, American units in Saudi Arabia had been under almost
constant Iraqi artillery fire, as well as threats from Scud missiles and
chemical attacks. On 24 February 1991, the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions
and the 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion crossed into Kuwait and
headed toward Kuwait City. They encountered trenches, barbed wire, and
minefields. However, these positions were poorly defended, and were
overrun in the first few hours. Several tank battles took place, but
otherwise coalition troops encountered minimal resistance, as most Iraqi
troops surrendered. The general pattern was that the Iraqis would put
up a short fight before surrendering. However, Iraqi air defenses shot
down nine US aircraft. Meanwhile, forces from Arab states advanced into
Kuwait from the east, encountering little resistance and suffering few
casualties.
Despite the successes of coalition forces, it was feared that the
Iraqi Republican Guard would escape into Iraq before it could be
destroyed. It was decided to send British armored forces into Kuwait 15
hours ahead of schedule, and to send US forces after the Republican
Guard. The coalition advance was preceded by a heavy artillery and
rocket barrage, after which 150,000 troops and 1,500 tanks began their
advance. Iraqi forces in Kuwait counterattacked against US troops,
acting on a direct order from Saddam Hussein himself. Despite the
intense combat, the Americans repulsed the Iraqis and continued to
advance towards Kuwait City.
Kuwaiti forces were tasked with liberating the city. Iraqi troops
offered only light resistance. The Kuwaitis quickly liberated the city
despite losing one soldier and having one plane shot down. On 27 February, Saddam ordered a retreat from Kuwait, and President Bush declared it liberated. However, an Iraqi unit at Kuwait International Airport appeared not to
have received the message and fiercely resisted. US Marines fought for
hours before securing the airport, after which Kuwait was declared
secure. After four days of fighting, Iraqi forces were expelled from
Kuwait. As part of a scorched earth policy, they set fire to nearly 700 oil wells and placed land mines around the wells to make extinguishing the fires more difficult.
Initial moves into Iraq
Ground troop movements 24–28 February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm
The war's ground phase was officially designated Operation Desert Saber. The first units to move into Iraq were three patrols of the British
Special Air Service's B squadron, call signs Bravo One Zero, Bravo Two
Zero, and Bravo Three Zero, in late January. These eight-man patrols
landed behind Iraqi lines to gather intelligence on the movements of
Scud mobile missile launchers, which could not be detected from the air,
as they were hidden under bridges and camouflage netting during the
day. Other objectives included the destruction of the launchers and their
fiber-optic communications arrays that lay in pipelines and relayed
coordinates to the TEL
operators launching attacks against Israel. The operations were
designed to prevent any possible Israeli intervention. Due to lack of
sufficient ground cover to carry out their assignment, One Zero and
Three Zero abandoned their operations, while Two Zero remained, and was
later compromised, with only Sergeant Chris Ryan escaping to Syria.
Elements of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Battalion 5th Cavalry
of the 1st Cavalry Division of the US Army performed a direct attack
into Iraq on 15 February 1991, followed by one in force on 20 February
that led directly through seven Iraqi divisions which were caught off
guard. On 17 January 1991 the 101st Airborne Division Aviation Regiment fired the first shots of the war when eight AH-64 helicopters successfully destroyed two Iraqi early warning radar sites. From 15 to 20 February, the Battle of Wadi al-Batin
took place inside Iraq; this was the first of two attacks by 1
Battalion 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division. It was a feint
attack, designed to make the Iraqis think that a coalition invasion
would take place from the south. The Iraqis fiercely resisted, and the
Americans eventually withdrew as planned back into the Wadi al-Batin.
Three US soldiers were killed and nine wounded, with one M2 Bradley IFV
turret destroyed, but they had taken 40 prisoners and destroyed five
tanks, and successfully deceived the Iraqis. This attack led the way for
the XVIII Airborne Corps to sweep around behind the 1st Cav and attack
Iraqi forces to the west. On 22 February 1991, Iraq agreed to a
Soviet-proposed ceasefire agreement. The agreement called for Iraq to
withdraw troops to pre-invasion positions within six weeks following a
total ceasefire, and called for monitoring of the ceasefire and
withdrawal to be overseen by the UN Security Council.
The coalition rejected the proposal, but said that retreating Iraqi forces would not be attacked, and gave 24 hours for Iraq to withdraw its forces. On 23 February,
fighting resulted in the capture of 500 Iraqi soldiers. On 24 February,
British and American armored forces crossed the Iraq–Kuwait border and
entered Iraq in large numbers, taking hundreds of prisoners. Iraqi
resistance was light, and four Americans were killed.
Coalition forces enter Iraq
Aerial view of destroyed Iraqi T-72 tank, BMP-1 and Type 63 armored personnel carriers and trucks on Highway 8 in March 1991
Shortly afterwards, the US VII Corps, in full strength and
spearheaded by the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, launched an armored
attack into Iraq early on 24 February, just to the west of Kuwait,
surprising Iraqi forces. Simultaneously, the US XVIII Airborne Corps launched a sweeping "left-hook" attack across southern Iraq's largely undefended desert, led by the US 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). This movement's left flank was protected by the French Division Daguet. The 101st Airborne Division conducted a combat air assault into enemy territory. The 101st Airborne Division had struck 249 km (155 mi) behind enemy lines. It was the deepest air assault operation in history. Approximately 400 helicopters transported 2,000 soldiers into Iraq
where they destroyed Iraqi columns trying to flee westward and prevented
the escape of Iraqi forces. The 101st Airborne Division travelled a further 80 to 100 km (50 to 60 mi) into Iraq. By nightfall, the 101st cut off Highway 8 which was a vital supply line running between Basra and the Iraqi forces. The 101st had lost 16 soldiers in action during the 100-hour war and captured thousands of enemy prisoners of war.
The French force quickly overcame Iraq's 45th Infantry Division,
suffering light casualties and taking a large number of prisoners, and
took up blocking positions to prevent an Iraqi counterattack on the
coalition's flank. The movement's right flank was protected by the
United Kingdom's 1st Armoured Division. Once the allies had penetrated
deep into Iraqi territory, they turned eastward, launching a flank
attack against the elite Republican Guard before it could escape. The
Iraqis resisted fiercely from dug-in positions and stationary vehicles,
and even mounted armored charges.
Unlike many previous engagements, the destruction of the first
Iraqi tanks did not result in a mass surrender. The Iraqis suffered
massive losses and lost dozens of tanks and vehicles, while US
casualties were comparatively low, with a single Bradley knocked out.
Coalition forces pressed another 10 km (6.2 mi) into Iraqi territory,
and captured their objective within three hours. They took 500 prisoners
and inflicted heavy losses, defeating Iraq's 26th Infantry Division. A
US soldier was killed by an Iraqi land mine, another five by friendly
fire, and 30 wounded during the battle. Meanwhile, British forces
attacked Iraq's Medina Division and a major Republican Guard logistics
base. In nearly two days of some of the war's most intense fighting, the
British destroyed 40 enemy tanks and captured a division commander.
Meanwhile, US forces attacked the village of Al Busayyah, meeting fierce resistance. The US force destroyed military hardware and took prisoners, while suffering no casualties.
On 25 February 1991, Iraqi forces fired a Scud missile at an
American barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The missile attack killed 28
US military personnel.
The coalition's advance was much swifter than US generals had
expected. On 26 February, after setting 737 of Kuwait's oil wells on
fire, Iraqi troops began retreating. A long convoy of retreating Iraqi
troops formed along the main Iraq–Kuwait highway. This convoy was bombed
so extensively by coalition air forces that it came to be known as the Highway of Death.
Thousands of Iraqi troops were killed. American, British, and French
forces continued to pursue retreating Iraqi forces over the border and
back into Iraq, eventually moving to within 240 km (150 mi) of Baghdad,
before withdrawing back to Iraq's border with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Civilians
and coalition military forces wave Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian flags as
they celebrate the retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
In coalition-occupied Iraqi territory, a peace conference was held
where a ceasefire agreement was negotiated and signed by both sides. At
the conference, Iraq was authorized to fly armed helicopters on their
side of the temporary border, ostensibly for government transit due to
the damage done to civilian infrastructure. Soon after, these
helicopters and much of Iraq's military were used to fight an uprising in the south. On March 1, 1991, one day after the Gulf War ceasefire, a revolt broke out in Basra against the Iraqi government. The uprising spread within days to all of the largest Shia cities in southern Iraq: Najaf, Amarah, Diwaniya, Hilla, Karbala, Kut, Nasiriyah and Samawah.
The rebellions were encouraged by an airing of "The Voice of Free Iraq"
on 24 February 1991, which was broadcast from a CIA-run radio station
out of Saudi Arabia. The Arabic service of the Voice of America
supported the uprising by stating that the rebellion was well supported,
and that they would soon be liberated from Saddam.
In the North, Kurdish leaders took American statements that they
would support an uprising to heart, and began fighting, hoping to
trigger a coup d'état.
However, when no US support came, Iraqi generals remained loyal to
Saddam and brutally crushed the Kurdish uprising and the uprising in the
south. Millions of Kurds fled across the mountains to Turkey and Kurdish areas
of Iran. On April 5, the Iraqi government announced "the complete
crushing of acts of sedition, sabotage and rioting in all towns of
Iraq." An estimated 25,000 to 100,000 Iraqis were killed in the
uprisings.
In Kuwait, the Emir was restored, and suspected Iraqi
collaborators were repressed. Eventually, over 400,000 people were
expelled from the country, including a large number of Palestinians, because of PLO support of Saddam. Yasser Arafat did not apologize for his support of Iraq, but after his death Mahmoud Abbas formally apologized in 2004 on behalf of the PLO. This came after the Kuwaiti government formally forgave the group.
There was some criticism of the Bush administration, as they
chose to allow Saddam to remain in power instead of pushing on to
capture Baghdad and overthrowing his government. In their co-written
1998 book, A World Transformed, Bush and Brent Scowcroft
argued that such a course would have fractured the alliance, and would
have had many unnecessary political and human costs associated with it.
In 1992, the US Defense Secretary during the war, Dick Cheney, made the same point:
I would guess if we had gone in
there, we would still have forces in Baghdad today. We'd be running the
country. We would not have been able to get everybody out and bring
everybody home.
And the final point that I think needs to be made is this
question of casualties. I don't think you could have done all of that
without significant additional US casualties, and while everybody was
tremendously impressed with the low cost of the conflict, for the 146
Americans who were killed in action and for their families, it wasn't a
cheap war.
And the question in my mind is, how many additional American casualties
is Saddam [Hussein] worth? And the answer is, not that damned many. So, I
think we got it right, both when we decided to expel him from Kuwait,
but also when the President made the decision that we'd achieved our
objectives and we were not going to go get bogged down in the problems
of trying to take over and govern Iraq.
On 15 March 1991, SheikhJaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah
returned to Kuwait, staying at the private home of a wealthy Kuwaiti as
his own palace had been destroyed. He was met with a symbolic arrival
with several dozen cars filled with people honking their horns and
waving Kuwaiti flags who tried to follow the Emir's convoy. According to
The New York Times, he faced a population divided between those
who stayed and those who fled, a government straining to reassert
control and a rejuvenated opposition pressing for greater democracy and
other postwar changes, including voting rights for women. Democracy
advocates had been calling for restoration of Parliament that the Emir
had suspended in 1986.
Coalition troops from Egypt, Syria, Oman, France, and Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm
Coalition members included Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
Kuwait, Luxembourg, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Korea, Spain,
Sweden, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and
the United States. The United States had 700,000 troops.
Germany and Japan provided financial assistance and donated military hardware, although they did not send direct military assistance. This later became known as checkbook diplomacy.
Australia contributed a Naval Task Group, which formed part of the multi-national fleet in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, under Operation Damask. In addition, medical teams were deployed aboard a US hospital ship, and a naval clearance diving team
took part in de-mining Kuwait's port facilities following the end of
combat operations. Australian forces experienced a number of incidents
in the first number of weeks of the Desert Storm Campaign including the
detection of significant air threats from Iraq as a part of the outer
perimeter of Battle Force Zulu; the detection of free sea floating mines
and assistance to the aircraft carrier USS Midway. The Australian Task Force was also placed at great risk with regard to the sea mine threat, with HMAS Brisbane
narrowly avoiding a mine. The Australians played a significant role in
enforcing the sanctions put in place against Iraq following Kuwait's
invasion. Following the war's end, Australia deployed a medical unit on Operation Habitat to northern Iraq as part of Operation Provide Comfort.
Argentina was the only South American country to participate in the 1991 Gulf War. It sent a destroyer, ARA Almirante Brown (D-10), a corvette, ARA Spiro (P-43) (later replaced by another corvette, ARA Rosales (P-42)) and a supply ship, ARA Bahía San Blas (B-4) to participate on the United Nations
blockade and sea control effort of the Persian Gulf. The success of
"Operación Alfil" (English: "Operation Bishop") with more than 700
interceptions and 25,000 nautical miles (46,000 km) sailed in the
theatre of operations helped to overcome the so-called "Malvinas syndrome".
Argentina was later classified by the US as a major non-NATO ally due to its contributions during the war.
Canada was one of the first countries to condemn Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, and it quickly agreed to join the US-led coalition. In August
1990, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney committed the Canadian Forces to deploy a Naval Task Group. The destroyers HMCS Terra Nova and HMCS Athabaskan joined the maritime interdiction force supported by the supply ship HMCS Protecteur in Operation Friction. The Canadian Task Group led the coalition's maritime logistics forces in the Persian Gulf. A fourth ship, HMCS Huron, arrived in-theater after hostilities had ceased and was the first allied ship to visit Kuwait.
Following the UN-authorized use of force against Iraq, the Canadian Forces deployed a CF-18 Hornet and CH-124 Sea King squadron with support personnel, as well as a field hospital
to deal with casualties from the ground war. When the air war began,
the CF-18s were integrated into the coalition force and provided air
cover and attacked ground targets. This was the first time since the Korean War that the Canadian Armed Forces
had participated in an offensive. The only CF-18 Hornet to record an
official victory during the conflict was an aircraft involved in the
beginning of the Battle of Bubiyan against the Iraqi Navy.
French and American soldiers inspecting an Iraqi Type 69 tank destroyed by the French Division Daguet during Operation Desert Storm
The second largest European contingent was from France, which committed 18,000 troops. Operating on the left flank of the US XVIII Airborne Corps, the French
Army force was the Division Daguet, including troops from the French Foreign Legion.
Initially, the French operated independently under national command and
control, but coordinated closely with the Americans (via CENTCOM) and
Saudis. In January, the Division was placed under the tactical control
of the XVIII Airborne Corps. France also deployed several combat
aircraft and naval units. The French called their contribution Opération Daguet.
Following the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, on September 25, 1990, the Italian Government sent eight multirole fighter bombers Tornado IDS (plus two spare) in the Persian Gulf, belonging to the 6º, 36º and 50º Stormo, which were deployed at the Al Dhafra Air Base, near Abu Dhabi, in the United Arab Emirates. During the 42 days of war, Italian fighters made 226 sorties for a
total of 589 flight hours. The Italian Air Force recorded the loss of a
single aircraft in the Gulf War. The use of Italian aircraft as part of
the Desert Storm operation represented the first operational employment
in combat missions of Italian Air Force aircraft since the end of World
War II.
The United Kingdom committed the largest contingent of any European
state that participated in the war's combat operations. Operation Granby
was the code name for the operations in the Persian Gulf. British Army regiments (mainly with the 1st Armoured Division), Royal Air Force, Naval Air Squadrons and Royal Navy
vessels were mobilized in the Persian Gulf. Both Royal Air Force and
Naval Air Squadrons, using various aircraft, operated from airbases
in Saudi Arabia and Naval Air Squadrons from various vessels in the
Persian Gulf. The United Kingdom played a major role in the Battle of
Norfolk, where its forces destroyed over 200 Iraqi tanks and a large
quantity of other vehicles. After 48 hours of combat the British 1st Armoured Division destroyed or
isolated four Iraqi infantry divisions (the 26th, 48th, 31st, and 25th)
and overran the Iraqi 52nd Armored Division in several sharp
engagements.
A British Challenger 1 achieved the longest range confirmed tank kill of the war, destroying an Iraqi tank with an armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding-sabot (APFSDS) round fired over 4,700 metres (2.9 mi)—the longest tank-on-tank kill shot ever recorded.
Casualties
Civilian
Iraqi Kurds fleeing to Turkey shortly after the war
Over 1,000 Kuwaiti civilians were killed by Iraqis. More than 600 Kuwaitis went missing during Iraq's occupation, and approximately 375 remains were found in mass graves in Iraq. The increased importance of air attacks from both coalition warplanes and cruise missiles
led to controversy over the number of civilian deaths caused during
Desert Storm's initial stages. Within Desert Storm's first 24 hours,
more than 1,000 sorties were flown, many against targets in Baghdad.
In one noted incident, two USAF stealth planes bombed a bunker in Amiriyah, killing 408 Iraqi civilians. Scenes of burned and mutilated bodies were subsequently broadcast, and
controversy arose over the bunker's status, with some stating that it
was a civilian shelter, while others contended that it was a center of
Iraqi military operations, and that the civilians had been deliberately
moved there to act as human shields.
The Iraqi government claimed that 2,300 civilians died during the air campaign. A Project on Defense Alternatives study found that 3,664 Iraqi civilians were killed in the conflict.
During the nationwide uprisings
against the Ba'athist Iraqi government that directly followed the end
of the Gulf War in March and April, an estimated 25,000 to 100,000
Iraqis were killed, overwhelmingly civilians.
A Harvard University
study released in June 1991 predicted that there would be tens of
thousands of additional Iraqi civilian deaths by the end of 1991 due to
the "public health catastrophe" caused by the destruction of the
country's electrical generating capacity. "Without electricity,
hospitals cannot function, perishable medicines spoil, water cannot be
purified and raw sewage cannot be processed,". The US government refused
to release its own study of the effects of the Iraqi public health
crisis.
An investigation in 1992 by Beth Osborne Daponte estimated about
13,000 civilians were directly killed in the war, while another 70,000
died indirectly from the war's other effects. According to a 1992 study published in The New England Journal of Medicine
by researchers known as the International Study Team (IST), child
mortality increased threefold as a result of the war, with 46,900
children under the age of 5 dying between January and August 1991. However, these figures have been challenged by a 2017 study published in The BMJ,
which stated that the "IST survey probably understated the level of
child mortality that prevailed during 1985–1990 and overstated the level
during 1991." According to this study, "there was no major rise in
child mortality in Iraq after 1990". A report published in 2002 by Medact
estimated the total number of Iraqi deaths caused directly and
indirectly by the Gulf War to be between 142,500 and 206,000, including
100,000–120,000 military deaths, and 20,000–35,000 civilian deaths in
the civil war and 15,000–30,000 refugee deaths after the end of the Gulf war.
Iraq also launched numerous attacks on civilian targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. A 1991 report by Middle East Watch said that at least one Saudi civilian was killed after they were hit by Iraqi shelling in Riyadh. A disputed number of people were also killed during the Iraqi rocket attacks on Israel.
Iraqi
A United Nations report in March 1991 described the effect on Iraq of
the US-led bombing campaign as "near apocalyptic", bringing back Iraq
to the "pre-industrial age". The exact number of Iraqi combat casualties is unknown, but is believed
to have been heavy. Some estimate that Iraq sustained between 20,000
and 35,000 fatalities. A report commissioned by the US Air Force estimated 10,000–12,000 Iraqi
combat deaths in the air campaign, and as many as 10,000 casualties in
the ground war. This analysis is based on Iraqi prisoner of war reports.
According to the Project on Defense Alternatives study, between
20,000 and 26,000 Iraqi military personnel were killed in the conflict
while 75,000 others were wounded.
According to Kanan Makiya, "For the Iraqi people, the cost of enforcing the will of the United Nations has been grotesque." General Schwarzkopf talked about "a very, very large number of dead in these units, a very, very large number indeed." The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin, estimated that "at least 65,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed". A figure was supported by Israeli sources who speak of "one to two
hundred thousand Iraqi casualties." Most of the killing "took place
during the ground war. Fleeing soldiers were bombed with a device known
as a 'fuel-air explosive.'"
Coalition
Sailors from a US Navy honor guard carry Navy pilot Scott Speicher's remains.
The US Department of Defense reports that US forces suffered 148 battle-related deaths (35 to friendly fire), with one pilot listed as MIA (his remains were found and identified in August 2009). A further 145 Americans died in non-combat accidents. The UK suffered 47 deaths (nine to friendly fire, all by US forces), France nine, and the other countries, not including Kuwait, suffered 37 deaths (18 Saudis, one Egyptian, six UAE and three Qataris). At least 605 Kuwaiti soldiers were still missing 10 years after their capture.
The largest single loss of life among coalition forces happened on 25 February 1991, when an Iraqi Al Hussein missile hit a US military barrack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 US Army Reservists from Pennsylvania.
In all, 190 coalition troops were killed by Iraqi fire during the war,
113 of whom were American, out of 358 coalition deaths. Another 44
soldiers were killed and 57 wounded by friendly fire. 145 soldiers died
of exploding munitions or non-combat accidents.
The largest accident among coalition forces happened on 21 March
1991, when a Royal Saudi Air Force C-130H crashed in heavy smoke on
approach to Ras Al-Mishab Airport, Saudi Arabia. 92 Senegalese soldiers
and six Saudi crew members were killed.
The number of coalition wounded in combat was 776, including 458 Americans.
190 coalition troops were killed by Iraqi combatants, the rest of
the 379 coalition deaths were from friendly fire or accidents. This
number was much lower than expected. Among the American combat dead were
four female soldiers.
Friendly fire
While the death toll among coalition forces engaging Iraqi combatants
was very low, a substantial number of deaths were caused by accidental
attacks from other Allied units. Of the 148 US troops who died in
battle, 24% were killed by friendly fire, a total of 35 service
personnel. A further 11 died in detonations of coalition munitions. Nine British
military personnel were killed in a friendly fire incident when a USAF A-10 Thunderbolt II destroyed a group of two Warrior IFVs.
Many returning coalition soldiers reported illnesses following their action in the war, a phenomenon known as Gulf War syndrome (GWS) or Gulf War illness (GWI). Common symptoms reported are chronic fatigue, fibromyalgia, and gastrointestinal disorder. There has been widespread speculation and disagreement about the causes
of the illness and the possibly related birth defects. Researchers
found that infants born to male veterans of the 1991 war had higher
rates of two types of heart valve defects. Some children born after the
war to Gulf War veterans had a certain kidney defect that was not found
in Gulf War veterans' children born before the war. Researchers have
said that they did not have enough information to link birth defects
with exposure to toxic substances.
In 1994, the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs with Respect to Export Administration published a report
entitled, "U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports
to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the
Gulf War". This publication, called the Riegle Report,
summarized testimony this committee had received establishing that the
U.S. had in the 1980s supplied Saddam Hussein with chemical and
biological warfare technology, that Saddam had used such chemical
weapons against Iran and his own native Kurds, and possibly against U.S.
soldiers as well, plausibly contributing to the GWS.
A 2022 study by Dr. Robert W. Haley of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, et al., of 1,016 U.S. Gulf War veterans found evidence of a causal
link between GWS and exposure to low levels of the nerve agent sarin,
which was released into the air by coalition bombing of Iraqi chemical
weapons facilities. Significantly, the study found an increased
incidence of GWS not only among veterans who recounted hearing nerve
agent alarms, but also among veterans with the RR or QR (as opposed to
the QQ) forms of the PON1 gene, which produces an enzyme that deactivates organophosphates (including sarin) through hydrolysis. By contrast, GWS was inversely associated with higher levels of the type Q isozyme, which is more efficient at breaking down sarin than its type R counterpart. The authors "found that the PON1 genotype and hearing nerve agent alarms were independent and the findings robust to both measured and unmeasured confounding,
supporting a mechanistic [gene–environment] interaction. ... Moreover,
the change in the combined effect from one category to the next was
significantly greater than the sum of the independent effects of the
environmental exposure and the genotype".
Approximate area and major clashes in which DU rounds were used
The US military used depleted uranium in tank kinetic energy penetrators and 20–30 mm (0.79–1.18 in) cannon ordnance. Significant controversy regarding the long term safety of depleted uranium exists, including claims of pyrophoric, genotoxic, and teratogenicheavy metal
effects. Many have cited its use during the war as a contributing
factor to a number of major health issues in veterans and in surrounding
civilian populations, including in birth defects and child cancer
rates. Scientific opinion on the risk is mixed. In 2004, Iraq had the highest mortality rate due to leukemia of any country.
Depleted uranium has 40% less radioactivity than natural uranium. Depleted uranium is not a significant health hazard unless it is taken
into the body. External exposure to radiation from depleted uranium is
generally not a major concern because the alpha particles emitted by its
isotopes travel only a few centimeters in air or can be stopped by a
sheet of paper. Also, the uranium-235 that remains in depleted uranium
emits only a small amount of low-energy gamma radiation. However, if
allowed to enter the body, depleted uranium, like natural uranium, has
the potential for both chemical and radiological toxicity with the two
important target organs being the kidneys and the lungs.
Destroyed Iraqi civilian and military vehicles on the Highway of Death
In the night of 26–27 February 1991, some Iraqi forces began leaving
Kuwait on the main highway north of Al Jahra in a column of some 1,400
vehicles. A patrolling E-8 Joint STARS aircraft observed the retreating forces and relayed the information to the DDM-8 air operations center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. These vehicles and the retreating soldiers were subsequently attacked
by two A-10 aircraft, resulting in a 60 kilometres (37 mi) stretch of
highway strewn with debris—the Highway of Death. New York Times
reporter Maureen Dowd wrote, "With the Iraqi leader facing military
defeat, Mr. Bush decided that he would rather gamble on a violent and
potentially unpopular ground war than risk the alternative: an imperfect
settlement hammered out by the Soviets and Iraqis that world opinion
might accept as tolerable."
Chuck Horner, Commander of US and allied air operations, has written:
[By February 26], the Iraqis
totally lost heart and started to evacuate occupied Kuwait, but airpower
halted the caravan of Iraqi Army and plunderers fleeing toward Basra.
This event was later called by the media "The Highway of Death". There
were certainly a lot of dead vehicles, but not so many dead Iraqis.
They'd already learned to scamper off into the desert when our aircraft
started to attack. Nevertheless, some people back home wrongly chose to
believe we were cruelly and unusually punishing our already whipped
foes.
...
By February 27, talk had turned toward terminating the hostilities.
Kuwait was free. We were not interested in governing Iraq. So the
question became "How do we stop the killing."
Another incident during the war highlighted the question of large-scale Iraqi combat deaths. This was the "bulldozer
assault", wherein two brigades from the US 1st Infantry Division
(Mechanized) were faced with a large and complex trench network, as part
of the heavily fortified "Saddam Hussein Line". After some
deliberation, they opted to use anti-mine plows
mounted on tanks and combat earthmovers to simply plow over and bury
alive the defending Iraqi soldiers. Not a single American was killed
during the attack. Reporters were banned from witnessing the attack,
near the neutral zone that touches the border between Saudi Arabia and
Iraq. Every American in the assault was inside an armored vehicle.
Patrick Day Sloyan of Newsday
reported, "Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Vulcan armored carriers
straddled the trench lines and fired into the Iraqi soldiers as the
tanks covered them with mounds of sand. 'I came through right after the
lead company,' [Col. Anthony] Moreno said. 'What you saw was a bunch of
buried trenches with peoples' arms and things sticking out of them.'" However, after the war, the Iraqi government said that only 44 bodies were found. In his book The Wars Against Saddam, John Simpson alleges that US forces attempted to cover up the incident. After the incident, the commander of the 1st Brigade said: "I know
burying people like that sounds pretty nasty, but it would be even
nastier if we had to put our troops in the trenches and clean them out
with bayonets." Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney did not mention the First Division's
tactics in an interim report to Congress on Operation Desert Storm. In the report, Cheney acknowledged that 457 enemy soldiers were buried during the ground war.
A Palestinian exodus from Kuwait took place during and after the Gulf War. During the Gulf War, more than 200,000 Palestinians fled Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait due to harassment and intimidation by Iraqi security forces, in addition to getting fired from work by Iraqi authority figures in Kuwait. After the Gulf War, the Kuwaiti authorities forcibly pressured nearly 200,000 Palestinians to leave Kuwait in 1991. Kuwait's policy, which led to this exodus, was a response to alignment
of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and the PLO with Saddam Hussein.
The Palestinians who fled Kuwait were Jordanian citizens. In 2013, 280,000 Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin lived in Kuwait. In 2012, 80,000 Palestinians (without Jordanian citizenship) lived in Kuwait.
Saudi Arabia expelled Yemeni workers after Yemen supported Saddam during the Gulf War.
Coalition bombing of Iraq's civilian infrastructure
In the 23 June 1991 edition of The Washington Post, reporter Bart Gellman wrote:
Many of the targets were chosen
only secondarily to contribute to the military defeat of Iraq ...
Military planners hoped the bombing would amplify the economic and
psychological impact of international sanctions on Iraqi society ...
They deliberately did great harm to Iraq's ability to support itself as
an industrial society ...
In the Jan/Feb 1995 edition of Foreign Affairs, French diplomat Eric Rouleau wrote:
[T]he Iraqi people, who were not
consulted about the invasion, have paid the price for their government's
madness ... Iraqis understood the legitimacy of a military action to
drive their army from Kuwait, but they have had difficulty comprehending
the Allied rationale for using air power to systematically destroy or
cripple Iraqi infrastructure and industry: electric power stations (92
percent of installed capacity destroyed), refineries (80 percent of
production capacity), petrochemical complexes, telecommunications
centers (including 135 telephone networks), bridges (more than 100),
roads, highways, railroads, hundreds of locomotives and boxcars full of
goods, radio and television broadcasting stations, cement plants, and
factories producing aluminum, textiles, electric cables, and medical
supplies.
However, the UN subsequently spent billions rebuilding hospitals, schools, and water purification facilities throughout the country.
Abuse of Coalition POWs
During the conflict, coalition aircrew shot down over Iraq were
displayed as prisoners of war on TV, most with visible signs of abuse.
Amongst several testimonies to poor treatment, USAF Captain Richard Storr was allegedly tortured by Iraqis during the
Persian Gulf War. Iraqi secret police broke his nose, dislocated his
shoulder and punctured his eardrum. Royal Air Force Tornado crew John Nichol and John Peters have both alleged that they were tortured during this time. Nichol and Peters were forced to make statements against the war on
television. Members of British Special Air Service Bravo Two Zero were
captured while providing information about an Iraqi supply line of Scud
missiles to coalition forces. Only one, Chris Ryan, evaded capture while
the group's other surviving members were violently tortured. Flight surgeon (later General) Rhonda Cornum was sexually assaulted by one of her captors after the Black Hawk helicopter in which she was riding was shot down while searching for a downed F-16 pilot.
Since the war, the US has had a continued presence of 5,000 troops
stationed in Saudi Arabia – a figure that rose to 10,000 during the 2003
conflict in Iraq. Operation Southern Watch enforced the no-fly zones
over southern Iraq set up after 1991; oil exports through the Persian
Gulf's shipping lanes were protected by the Bahrain-based US Fifth Fleet.
Since Saudi Arabia houses Mecca and Medina, Islam's holiest
sites, many Muslims were upset at the permanent military presence. The
continued presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia after the war was one
of the stated motivations behind the 11 September terrorist attacks, the Khobar Towers bombing, and the date chosen for the 1998 US embassy bombings (7 August), which was eight years to the day that US troops were sent to Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden interpreted the Islamic prophet Muhammad as banning the "permanent presence of infidels in Arabia". In 1996, bin Laden issued a fatwa, calling for US troops to leave Saudi Arabia. In a December 1999 interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai, bin Laden said he felt that Americans were "too near to Mecca" and considered this a provocation to the entire Islamic world.
On 6 August 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 661 which imposed economic sanctions on Iraq,
providing for a full trade embargo,
excluding medical supplies, food and other items of humanitarian
necessity, these to be determined by the council's sanctions committee.
From 1991 until 2003, the effects of government policy and sanctions
regime led to hyperinflation, widespread poverty and malnutrition.
During the late 1990s, the UN considered relaxing the sanctions
imposed because of the hardships suffered by ordinary Iraqis. Studies
dispute the number of people who died in south and central Iraq during
the years of the sanctions.
The draining of the Qurna Marshes was an irrigation project in Iraq during and immediately after the war, to drain a large area of marshes in the Tigris–Euphrates river system. Formerly covering an area of around 3,000 km2 (1,200 sq mi), the large complex of wetlands were nearly emptied of water, and the local Shi'ite population relocated, following the war and 1991 uprisings. By 2000, the United Nations Environment Programme estimated that 90% of the marshlands had disappeared, causing desertification of over 7,500 square miles (19,000 km2).
The draining occurred in Iraq and to a smaller degree in Iran
between the 1950s and 1990s to clear large areas of the marshes.
Formerly covering an area of around 20,000 km2 (7,700 sq mi), the large complex of wetlands was 90% drained before the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. The marshes are typically divided into three main sub-marshes, the Hawizeh, Central, and Hammar Marshes
and all three were drained at different times for different reasons.
Initial draining of the Central Marshes was intended to reclaim land for
agriculture but later all three marshes would become a tool of war and
revenge.
On 23 January, Iraq dumped 400 million US gallons (1,500,000 m3) of crude oil into the Persian Gulf, causing the largest offshore oil spill in history at that time. It was reported as a deliberate natural resources attack to keep US Marines from coming ashore (Missouri and Wisconsin had shelled Failaka Island during the war to reinforce the idea that there would be an amphibious assault attempt). About 30–40% of this came from allied raids on Iraqi coastal targets.
The Kuwaiti oil fires were caused by the Iraqi military
setting fire to 700 oil wells as part of a scorched earth policy while
retreating from Kuwait in 1991 after conquering the country but being
driven out by coalition forces. The fires started in January and
February 1991, and the last one was extinguished by November.
The resulting fires burned uncontrollably because of the dangers of sending in firefighting crews. Land mines
had been placed in areas around the oil wells, and a military cleaning
of the areas was necessary before the fires could be put out. Somewhere
around 6 million barrels (950,000 m3) of oil were lost each
day. Eventually, privately contracted crews extinguished the fires, at a
total cost of US$1.5 billion to Kuwait. By that time, however, the fires had burned for approximately 10 months, causing widespread pollution.
Iraqi uprisings
An Iraqi army tank disabled by rebels
The 1991 Iraqi uprisings were ethnic and religious uprisings against Saddam Hussein'sBa'athist regime in Iraq that were mainly led by Shia rebels and Kurds.
The uprisings lasted from March to April 1991 after a ceasefire
following the end of the Gulf War. The mostly uncoordinated insurgency
was fueled by the perception that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had
become vulnerable to regime change. This perception of weakness was
largely the result of the outcome of the Iran–Iraq War and the Gulf War, both of which occurred within a single decade and devastated the population and economy of Iraq.
Within the first two weeks, most of Iraq's cities and provinces
fell to rebel forces. Participants in the uprising were of diverse
ethnic, religious and political affiliations, including military
mutineers, Shia Islamists, Kurdish nationalists, Kurdish Islamists, and far-left
groups. Following initial victories, the revolution was held back from
continued success by internal divisions as well as a lack of anticipated
American and Iranian support. Saddam's Sunni Arab-dominated Ba'ath Party regime managed to maintain control over the capital of Baghdad and soon largely suppressed the rebels in a brutal campaign conducted by loyalist forces spearheaded by the Iraqi Republican Guard.
A sentry patrols along a line-up of OH-58 Kiowa helicopters
The cost of the war to the United States was calculated by the US Congress in April 1992 to be $61.1 billion (equivalent to $122 billion in 2024). About $52 billion of that amount was paid by other countries:
$36 billion by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states of the Persian
Gulf; $16 billion by Germany and Japan (which sent no combat forces due
to their constitutions). About 25% of Saudi Arabia's contribution was
paid with in-kind services to the troops, such as food and
transportation. US troops represented about 74% of the combined force, and the global cost was therefore higher.
Effect on developing countries
Apart from the impact on Arab States of the Persian Gulf,
the resulting economic disruptions after the crisis affected many
states. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) undertook a study in
1991 to assess the effects on developing states and the international
community's response. A briefing paper finalized on the day that the
conflict ended draws on their findings which had two main conclusions:
Many developing states were severely affected and while there has been a
considerable response to the crisis, the distribution of assistance was
highly selective.
The ODI factored in elements of "cost" which included oil
imports, remittance flows, re-settlement costs, loss of export earnings
and tourism. For Egypt, the cost totaled $1 billion, 3% of GDP. Yemen
had a cost of $830 million, 10% of GDP, while it cost Jordan
$1.8 billion, 32% of GDP.
International response to the crisis on developing states came
with the channeling of aid through The Gulf Crisis Financial
Co-ordination Group. They were 24 states, comprising most of the OECD
countries plus some Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,
Qatar and Kuwait. The members of this group agreed to disperse
$14 billion in development assistance.
The World Bank responded by speeding up the disbursement of existing project and adjustment loans. The International Monetary Fund
adopted two lending facilities – the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF) and the Compensatory & Contingency Financing
Facility (CCFF). The European Community offered $2 billion in assistance.
US policy regarding media freedom was much more restrictive than in the Vietnam War. The policy had been spelled out in a Pentagon document entitled Annex Foxtrot.
Most of the press information came from briefings organized by the
military. Only selected journalists were allowed to visit the front
lines or conduct interviews with soldiers. Those visits were always
conducted in the presence of officers, and were subject to both prior
approval by the military and censorship afterward. This was ostensibly
to protect sensitive information from being revealed to Iraq. This
policy was heavily influenced by the military's experience with the
Vietnam War, in which public opposition within the US grew throughout
the war's course. It was not only the limitation of information in the
Middle East; media were also restricting what was shown about the war
with more graphic depictions like Ken Jarecke's image of a burnt Iraqi soldier being pulled from the American AP wire whereas in Europe it was given extensive coverage.
Two BBC journalists, John Simpson and Bob Simpson
(no relation), defied their editors and remained in Baghdad to report
on the war's progress. They were responsible for a report which included
an "infamous cruise missile that travelled down a street and turned
left at a traffic light."
Alternative media outlets provided views opposing the war. Deep Dish Television compiled segments from independent producers in
the US and abroad, and produced a 10-hour series that was distributed
internationally, called The Gulf Crisis TV Project. The series' first program War, Oil and Power was compiled and released in 1990, before the war broke out. News World Order
was the title of another program in the series; it focused on the
media's complicity in promoting the war, as well as Americans' reactions
to the media coverage.
Media watchdog group Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) critically analyzed media coverage during the war in various articles and books, such as the 1991 Gulf War Coverage: The Worst Censorship was at Home.
Precision-guided munitions,
informally "smart bombs", were heralded as key in allowing military
strikes to be made with a minimum of civilian casualties compared to
previous wars, although they were not used as often as more traditional,
less accurate bombs. Specific buildings in downtown Baghdad could be
bombed while journalists in their hotels watched cruise missiles fly by.
Precision-guided munitions amounted to approximately 7.4% of all bombs dropped by the coalition. Other bombs included cluster bombs, which disperse numerous submunitions, and daisy cutters, 15,000-pound bombs which can disintegrate everything within hundreds of yards.
Global Positioning System
(GPS) units were relatively new at the time and were important in
enabling coalition units to easily navigate across the desert. Since
military GPS receivers were not available for most troops, many used
commercially available units. To permit these to be used to best effect,
the "selective availability" feature of the GPS system was turned off
for the duration of Desert Storm, allowing these commercial receivers to
provide the same precision as the military equipment.
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and satellite communication systems were also important. Two examples of this are the US Navy's Grumman E-2 Hawkeye and the US Air Force's Boeing E-3 Sentry.
Both were used in command and control area of operations. These systems
provided essential communications links between air, ground, and naval
forces. It is one of several reasons coalition forces dominated the air
war.
American-made color photocopiers were used to produce some of
Iraq's battle plans. Some of the copiers contained concealed high-tech
transmitters that revealed their positions to American electronic warfare aircraft, leading to more precise bombings.
Scud and Patriot missiles
Military personnel examine the remains of a Scud.
The role of Iraq's Scud missiles featured prominently in the war. Scud is a tactical ballistic missile that the Soviet Union developed and deployed among the forward deployed Soviet Armydivisions in East Germany.
Scud missiles utilize inertial guidance which operates for the
duration that the engines operate. Iraq used Scud missiles, launching
them into both Saudi Arabia and Israel. Some missiles caused extensive
casualties, while others caused little damage.
The US Patriot missile was used in combat for the first time. The
US military claimed a high effectiveness against Scuds at the time, but
later analysis gives figures as low as 9%, with 45% of the 158 Patriot
launches being against debris or false targets. The Dutch Ministry of Defense, which also sent Patriot missiles to protect civilians in Israel and Turkey, later disputed the higher claim. Further, there is at least one incident of a software error causing a
Patriot missile's failure to engage an incoming Scud, resulting in
deaths. Both the US Army and the missile manufacturers maintained the Patriot delivered a "miracle performance" in the Gulf War.
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