An illiberal democracy is a governing system that "hides its nondemocratic practices behind formally democratic institutions and procedures". While there is no universal consensus on its precise definition, the
term broadly describes governments that present themselves as liberal democracies while subtly suppressing opposing views. It is sometimes described as a 21st-century form of fascism,
maintaining electoral democracy while employing state power for largely
nationalistic, anti-minority, and anti-freedom purposes, often under
the leadership of dominant figures and their close associates.
The rulers of an illiberal democracy may ignore, bypass, or undermine constitutional limits on their power. While liberal democracies protect individual rights and freedoms,
illiberal democracies may not, or such rights may be highly limited. Elections in an illiberal democracy are often manipulated, rigged, or
lopsided, whether overtly or subtly, legitimising and consolidating the
incumbent rather than genuinely choosing the country's leaders and
policies. Illiberalism rejects rational discourse, instead promoting intolerance,
fear of difference, the cult of force, discipline, and moral authority. Illiberal constitutions are generally anti-pluralist and anti-institutionalist.
Scholars have criticized the claim that illiberal democracies are
genuine democracies, arguing that liberal principles and democracy
cannot be separated and that elections cannot truly be free and fair
without freedom of the press and speech. Other theorists contend that classifying illiberal democracy as democratic is overly sympathetic to such regimes, and therefore prefer terms such as electoral authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism, or soft authoritarianism. It is also seen as a type of a defective democracy.
Origin and usage of the term
Antiquity to the 20th century
Elements of illiberalism date back to Plato's embrace of an illiberal social order, with democracy viewed as inferior to monarchy and aristocracy. Since antiquity, the terms liberal and illiberal lacked any connection with democracy and political government until the French Revolution,
and were instead used to describe the noble or ignoble personal
qualities of individuals. In the eighteenth century, liberal came to be
viewed as character traits of an enlightened gentleman, associated with
reasonableness, politeness, open-mindedness, and tolerance; whereas
illberal was described as being ungenerous, mean, narrow-minded,
bigoted, and offensive. For example, Lord Chesterfield wrote: "Whenever you write Latin, remember that every word or phrase which you make use of, but cannot find in Caesar, Cicero, Livy, Horace, Virgil; and Ovid, is bad, illiberal Latin." By the 20th century, liberalism was primary viewed in a European context, eventually becoming Americanized and associated with liberal democracy.
While totalitarian regimes during the 1930's and 1940's criticized
liberalism, they did not embrace the label of "illiberal democracy"
partly due to its prior negative connotations, although
anti-totalitarian critics soon came to use the term.
Modern usage
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to Francis Fukuyama's influential book The End of History and the Last Man,
announcing that the last "beacon of illiberal forces" in the world had
been extinguished and that Western-style liberalism was ascendant
through Americanization, liberalization, and globalization. The modern term and concept of illiberal democracy derives from the 1995 book Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia. Challenging Francis Fukuyama's
end-of-history thesis that political history was culminating in the
global rule of capitalist liberal democracy, the book countered that
Pacific Asia was not converging on liberal democracy but had instead
taken an illiberal turn. Political philosopher Daniel A. Bell contributed a chapter on Confucianism as offering an alternative, illiberal approach to democracy.
The term illiberal democracy was then used and popularized by Fareed Zakaria in a regularly cited 1997 article in the journal Foreign Affairs. According to Zakaria, illiberal democracies were "democratically
elected regimes often re-elected or reinforced by referendums that
ignored the constitutional limits of their power and deprived their
citizens of basic rights and liberties." Zakaria stated that in the West,
electoral democracy and civil liberties (of speech, religion, etc.) go
hand in hand but that around the world, the two concepts were coming
apart. According to Zakaria, democracy without constitutional liberalism was producing centralized
regimes, the erosion of liberty, ethnic competition, conflict, and war.
Recent scholarship has addressed why elections, institutions commonly
associated with liberalism and freedom, have led to such negative outcomes in illiberal democracies. Hybrid regimes
are political systems in which the mechanism for determining access to
state office combines both democratic and autocratic practices. In
hybrid regimes, freedoms exist and the opposition is allowed to legally compete in elections, but the system of checks and balances becomes inoperative.
By the decade after the Cold War,
a rise in right-wing nationalist and populist parties began openly
declaring themselves against liberal democracy. Beginning in Russia and
Central and Eastern Europe, political scientists Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes described the emergence of an "illiberal counter-revolution". Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán,
gave an oft-cited speech in 2014 where he proclaimed Hungary an
illiberal democracy, stating that "a democracy does not necessarily have
to be liberal" and that "the new state we are constructing in Hungary
is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state." Modern advocates of
illiberal democracy insist they are more democratic than others, and
generally define themselves as being against liberal democracy, the West, and the United States. Vladimir Putin of Russia
is an outspoken critic of liberalism, with him and Orban described as
re-defining it in ways that suit their agendas by equating it with multiculturalism, immigration and LGBTQ rights. The election of Donald Trump saw a large increase in scholarly research about illiberalism, what it means, and if America is on the road to fascism.
Definition
Scholars
have generally criticized the claim that illiberal democracies are
democracies, arguing that liberal principles and democracy cannot be
separated and that without freedom of the press and speech, elections
cannot truly be free and fair. According to jurist András Sajó, illiberal democracy should be counted as a type of democracy because it is "democratic in a plebiscitarian sense". Other theorists say that classifying illiberal democracy as democratic is overly sympathetic to the illiberal regimes, and therefore prefer terms such as electoral authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism, or soft authoritarianism.
Contemporary usage of illberalism indicates an opposition to liberalism or liberal democracy. Fritz Stern,
a historian of Germany, understood by illiberalism anti-democratic
mentality and anti-democratic practices such as suffrage restrictions. Marlène Laruelle
defines illiberalism as a backlash against today's liberalism.
According to her, illiberalism is "majoritarian, nation-centric or
sovereigntist, favouring traditional hierarchies and cultural
homogeneity", calling for "a shift from politics to culture and is
post-post-modern in its claims of rootedness in an age of
globalization". Zsolt Egyed
defines illiberalism as opposition to the main principles of liberal
democracy: limited government, open society, and state neutrality. He
distinguishes between authoritarian, populist, traditionalist,
religious, paternalist, libertarian, nativist-nationalist, materialist,
and left-wing varieties.
Types of illiberal democracy
There is a spectrum of illiberal democracies: from those that are nearly liberal democracies to those that are almost openly dictatorships.
One proposed method of determining whether a regime is an illiberal
democracy is to determine whether "it has regular, free, fair, and
competitive elections to fill the principal positions of power in the
country, but it does not qualify as Free in Freedom House's annual ratings of civil liberties and political rights." A 2008 article by Rocha Menocal, Fritz and Rakner describes the
emergence of illiberal democracies and discusses some of their shared
characteristics. Rocha Menocal, Fritz, and Rakner try to draw the similarity between illiberal democracies and hybrid regimes.
The authors make the case that the "democratic optimism" in the
1990s—following the collapse of the Soviet Union—has led to the
emergence of hybrid regimes holding illiberal values. Initially, the
Western powers assumed that democratic consolidation
would occur automatically and disregarded the alternatives. In reality,
the non-consolidation of democracy has led to the rise of hybrid
regimes that possess "illiberal values".
Regime type is important for illiberal democracies. This is
because illiberal democracies can rise from both consolidated liberal
democracies and authoritarian states. Zakaria initially wrote his paper
using the term illiberal democracy interchangeably with
pseudo-autocracies but today they are used to describe countries that
are potentially democratically backsliding as well.
According to Marlène Laruelle, there are "significant differences between illiberalism and conservatism" as it has been "traditionally understood".
The key element that dissociates
illiberalism from conservatism is its relationship to political
liberalism. Classical conservatives – such as the Christian Democrats in
Europe or the Republican Party in the U.S. before Donald Trump –
are/were fervent supporters of political rights and constitutionalism,
while illiberalism challenges them. For classical conservatives, the
political order is a reflection of the natural and family order, and
therefore commands some submission to it. For illiberals, today’s
political order is the enemy of the natural order and should be fought
against.
Author Jennifer Gandhi says that many autocrats allow elections in
their governance to stabilize and reinforce their regimes. She first
says that elections help leaders resolve threats from elites and from
the masses by appeasing those capable of usurping power with money and
securing the cooperation of the general public with political
concessions. Gandhi also claims that illiberal elections serve other useful purposes, such as providing autocrats with information about their citizens and establishing legitimacy both domestically and in the international community, and that these varied functions must be elucidated in future research. One example of the regime durability provided by illiberal democracy is illustrated in Mubarak's
Egyptian regime. Lisa Blaydes shows that under Mubarak's lengthy rule,
elections provided a mechanism through which elites bought votes to
support the government (through distributing needed goods and resources
to the public) to acquire regime-enforced parliamentary immunity. This enabled them to accumulate illicit wealth and draw from state resources without legal consequence. Such research suggests that, given the stability-providing function of
illiberal elections, states governed under illiberal democracies may
have low prospects for a transition to a democratic system protected by
constitutional liberties.
In order to discourage this problem and promote the development of liberal democracies with free and fair elections, Zakaria proposes that the international community and the United States must promote gradual liberalization of societies. Zakaria advances institutions like the World Trade Organization, the Federal Reserve System, and a check on power in the form of the judiciary to promote democracy and limit the power of people which can be destructive. Illiberal democratic governments may believe they have a mandate to act in any way they see fit as long as they hold regular elections. Lack of liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
make opposition extremely difficult. The rulers may centralize powers
between branches of the central government and local government
(exhibiting no separation of powers). Media are often controlled by the state and strongly support the regime. Non-governmental organizations may face onerous regulations or simply be prohibited. The regime may use red tape, economic pressure, imprisonment or violence against its critics. Zakaria believes that constitutional liberalism can bring democracy, but not vice versa.
Relationship with populism
With
the different types and different examples of illustrations discussed, a
key component in the rise of illiberal democracies today is populism.
Current populist leaders—especially within Western states—have the
tendency to promote illiberal values, a notable example being the
exclusion of immigrants and openly xenophobic statements. This wave has
been labeled as "xenophobic populism".
Authors Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser discuss the
role of populism in deteriorating liberal democracies. Within the
article, Mudde and Kaltwasser say that populism—although surrounded by
negative connotations—is democratic in nature, as it gives a voice to
the people and heavily follows the idea of majoritarian rule. The
problem arises within liberal democracies, as the authors say that
liberal values and democracy internally contradict each other. Democracy
promises majoritarian rule while liberal values promise the protection
of minorities. Furthermore, it is said that populism is a product of democracy, but in
general populist leaders try to use the democratic aspect of liberal
democracies to undermine liberalism. This is closely related to
Zakaria's argument. The authors try to establish the idea that the rise
of populism is undermining liberal values as populism at its core
rejects plurality and minority protection—often the evident liberal
values.
Moreover, Sheri Berman
supports that idea that democracy being unchecked by liberalism can
lead to populist—and in some regards dangerous—rule, but further says
that liberal values unchecked by democracy can be just as dangerous, as
she says, through the use of historical examples, this can lead to
oligarchic rule. Berman takes a different perspective on the role of
populism and says that it is rather the weakening of democratic
institutions that has led to the rise of populism and the deterioration
of liberal democracies. When discussing this matter, Berman through the example of Western
states—United States and Europe—has attributed the cause of populist
backlash to national government disregarding the interests of average
citizens for business elites. In sum, Berman is trying to demonstrate
that populism has led to the rise of illiberal democracies, while the
populism has gained traction as a result in democratic institutions
being too elite-led.
While populism is closely associated with leading to illiberal
democracy, religious fundamentalism, radical nationalism, and
communitarianism are also common paths.
Cases of illiberalism
Hungary
In a 2014 speech, after winning re-election for the first time, Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary described his views about the future of Hungary as an "illiberal state". In his interpretation the "illiberal state" does not reject the values of the liberal democracy, rather modern social liberalism, calling it corrupt and unfair and states that the country should work as a community. Orbán listed Singapore, Russia, Turkey, and China as examples of economically "successful" nations, "none of which is liberal and some of which aren’t even democracies."
Slovakia
In 1995 Slovak journalists coined the term "Democracy of the Carpathian type" to describe the illiberal democracy of Vladimír Mečiar's government in the 1990s. Today, the term is often used in connection with the policies of Robert Fico's government, which has been criticised for censorship of criticism of government politicians in media, abolition of the special prosecutor's office, politically motivated abolition of the Radio and Television of Slovakia by Slovak Television and Radio, unjustified exchanges in various expert positions, the cover-up of the accident of government politician Andrej Danko, etc. The previous cabinet of Robert Fico was accused of organised corruption and some politicians were directly or indirectly linked to the kidnapping of Vietnamese businessman Trịnh Xuân Thanh and to the assassination of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée.
India
Indian-American journalist Fareed Zakaria claimed that India was the largest illiberal democracy in the world, in his book The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.
Turkey
In a 2015 CNN reportage, Zakaria said that Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had become a textbook case of illiberal democracy. Erik Meyersson observed that using Freedom House’s measure of liberty,
Turkey took the last place among electoral democracies in 2015, scoring
worse on the liberty measure than some countries that are not even
considered electoral democracies.
Philippines
Since 2016, the Philippines under presidents Rodrigo Duterte and Bongbong Marcos has been described as being in an illiberal democracy. It has been
described as a worldwide capital and stronghold of illiberalism
culturally and politically.
United States
In
America, some academics have criticized American liberalism for not
being liberal enough and living up to its professed values, with critics
deriding this as "cancel culture" and a form of illiberalism. Other right-wing thinkers such as Patrick Deneen have openly criticized liberalism, instead arguing for replacing it with a new form of illiberal government. The Republican Party has in recent years faced criticism that it is becoming increasingly illiberal under the leadership of Donald Trump, who was elected president in 2016 and 2024. According to a 2020 study by the V-Dem Institute,
the Republican Party has become more illiberal and populist in the last
decade with a large increase under the leadership of Donald Trump. Trump's populist style of governance
has been considered by some to be a dangerous risk to the heart of
liberal democracy, as well as indifference towards traditional
democratic allies and praising other "strongman rulers" in the world
like Putin.
Criticism
Writers such as Steven Levitsky
and Lucan Way reject the concept of an illiberal democracy, saying it
only "muddies the waters" on the basis that if a country does not have
opposition parties and an independent media, it is not democratic. They say that terms like "illiberal democracy" are inappropriate for
some of these states because the term implies that these regimes are at
their heart democracies that have gone wrong. Levitsky and Way say that
states such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milošević, Zimbabwe and post-Soviet Russia
were never truly democratic and not developing toward democracy, but
were rather tending toward authoritarian behavior despite having
elections, which were sometimes sharply contested. Thus, Levitsky and
Way coined a new term to remove the positive connotation of democracy from these states and distinguish them from flawed or developing democracies: competitive authoritarianism.
According to Wojciech Sadurski, "illiberal democracy is largely an oxymoron" in Poland under Prawo i Sprawiedliwość,
because "[b]y dismantling various checks and balances, and the many
democratic institutions related to elections and judicial review, the
ruling party greatly weakens the democratic character of the state".
Sadurski prefers the term "plebiscitarian authoritarianism".
In 1998, author Marc Plattner said that democracy and liberalism
have a turbulent relationship, where throughout history they constantly
repel and attract one another. Plattner believes that the rise of
illiberal democracies is merely part of a democratization cycle, where
states democratizing will often shift from liberal to illiberal
tendencies. From this, Plattner believes that through the careful
assistance of consolidated democracies these 'illiberal democracies' can
slowly push themselves out of this cycle.
According to a study by George Washington University
political scientist Michael K. Miller, multiparty autocratic elections
predict significantly better outcomes on health, education, gender
equality, and basic freedoms relative to non-electoral autocracy.
Effects on health and education are as strong as those of democracy and
are significantly better than in non-electoral autocracy.
Bantu speaking people of South Africa are the majority ethno-linguistic group, native to South Africa.
They are descendents of Southern Bantu-speaking peoples who established
themselves in the now South Africa, between 350 BCE and 300 CE, during
the Bantu expansion (5000 BCE to 500 CE). They are referred to in various census as African, Black or Native South African.
Archaeological evidence suggests that Homo sapiens inhabited the region for over 100,000 years, with agriculture occurring since at least 100 CE. Based on prehistorical archaeological evidence of pastoralism and
farming in southern Africa, the findings in sites located in the
southernmost region of modern Mozambique, that are dated 354–68 BCE,
are some of the oldest and most proximate ancient findings of
archaeological evidence related to the South African Bantu-speaking
peoples in the south African region. Ancient settlements remains found
thus far similarly based on pastoralism and farming within South Africa
were dated 249–370 CE.
When the early Portuguese sailors Vasco Da Gama and Bartholomew Dias reached the Cape of Good Hope in the late 15th century CE,
a number of Khoe language speakers were found living there and the
indigenous population around the Cape primarily consisted of Khoisan
groups. Following the establishment of the Dutch Cape Colony, European settlers began arriving in Southern Africa in substantial numbers. Around the 1770s, Trekboers from the Cape encountered more Bantu language speakers towards the Great Fish River
and frictions eventually arose between the two groups. In the late 18th
and early 19th centuries, there were two major areas of frictional
contact between the white colonialists and the Bantu language speakers
in Southern Africa. Firstly, as the Boers moved north inland from the
Cape they encountered Xhosa, Basotho, and Tswana peoples. Secondly
attempts at coastal settlement was made by the British in two regions
now known as the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.
"Empty Land" myth
The
history of the Bantu-speaking peoples from South Africa has in the past
been misunderstood due to the deliberate spreading of false narratives
such as The Empty Land Myth. First published by W.A. Holden in the 1860s, this doctrine claims that
South Africa had mostly been an unsettled region and that Bantu-speaking
peoples had begun to migrate southwards from present day Zimbabwe
at the same time as the Europeans had begun to move northwards from the
Cape settlement, despite there being no historical or archaeological
evidence to support this theory.
This theory originated in Southern Africa during the period of Colonisation of Africa,
historians have noted that this theory had already gained currency
among Europeans by the mid-1840s. Its later alternative form of note
were conformed around the "1830s concept of Mfecane",
trying to hide and ignore the intrusion of Europeans on Bantu lands, by
implying that the territory they colonized was devoid of human
habitation (as a result of the Mfecane). Modern research has disputed this historiographical narrative. By the 1860s, when Holden was propagating his theory, this turbulent
period had resulted in large swathes of South African land falling under
the control of either the Boer Republics or British colonials, there was denaturalisation accompanied with forced displacement and population transfer
of these indigenous peoples from their land, the myth being used as the
justification for the capture and settlement of Bantu-speaking
peoples's land. The Union of South Africa established rural reserves in 1913 and 1936, by legislating the reduction and voiding of South African Bantu-speaking peoples's land heritage holistically,
thereby land relating to Bantu-speaking peoples of South Africa
legislatively became reduced into being those reserves. In this context,
the Natives Land Act, 1913, limited Black South Africans to 7% of the land in the country. In 1936, through the Native Trust and Land Act, 1936, Union of South Africa's government planned to raise this to 13.6% but subsequently would not.
The National Party (South Africa) government, the Apartheid
government became the profundity action from the pre-1948 Union of
South Africa's government rule, it introduced a series of measures that
reshaped the South African society such that Europeans would take
themselves as the demographic majority while being a minority group. The
creation of false homelands or Bantustans (based on dividing South African Bantu language speaking peoples by ethnicity) was a central element of this strategy, the Bantustans were eventually made nominally independent, in order to limit South African Bantu language speaking peoples citizenship to those Bantustans. The Bantustans were meant to reflect an analogy of the various ethnic "-stans" of Western and Central Asia such as the Kafiristan, Pakistan,
etc. But in South Africa, the association with Apartheid discredited
the term, and the Apartheid government shifted to the politically
appealing but historically deceptive term "ethnic homelands". Meanwhile,
the Anti-Apartheid Movement
persisted in calling the areas Bantustans, to actively protest the
Apartheid governments' political illegitimacy. The fallacy of The Empty Land Myth also completely omits the existence of the Saan (hunter-gatherers) and the Khoikhoi
(pastoralists) in southern Africans, who roamed much of the
southwestern region of Africa for millenniums before the invasions,
colonialism of Europeans.
The longest running military action from the period of colonialism in Africa, which saw a series of nine wars during 1779 till 1879. Involving the Xhosa Kingdom and the British Empire, mainly in the present day South African region of Eastern Cape.
(1779–1803): After European invasion of the present day Western Cape, South Africa
region, colonialist's frontiersmen in the 18th century started
encroaching the land farther inland present-day South African region,
encountering more of the indigenous population, conflict of land and
cattle grew sparking the first war that set to drive Xhosa people out of Zuurveld by 1781. The second war involved a larger Xhosa territory between the Great Fish River and the Sundays River, the Gqunukhwebe
clans of the Xhosa started to penetrate back into the Zuurveld and
colonists under Barend Lindeque, allied themselves with Ndlambe, a
regent of the Western Xhosas, to repel the Gqunukhwebe. The second war
concluded when farms were abandoned due to panic in 1793. In 1799 the third war began with the Xhosa rebellion – discontented Khoekhoe revolted and joined with the Xhosa in the Zuurveld, and started retaking land through farms occupied by colonialist, reaching Oudtshoorn
by July 1799. The colonial officials made peace with the Xhosa and Khoe
in Zuurveld. In 1801, Graaff-Reinet rebellion started forcing more
Khoekhoe desertions and farm abandonment. The commandos could not
achieve any result, so in February 1803 a peace was arranged with the
Xhosas and Khoekhoes.
(1811–1819): Zuurveld became a buffer zone between the Cape
Colony and Xhosa territory, empty of the Boers, the British to the west
and the Xhosa to the east. In 1811 the fourth war began when the
Xhosa took back the rest of their territory of Zuurveld, conflicts with
the settlers followed. Forces under Colonel John Graham drove the Xhosa back beyond the Fish River. The fifth war,
the war of Nxele, started after the Battle of Amalinde. This happened
after a civil war broke out within the Xhosa Nation when the
British-allied chief Ngqika of the Right Hand House allegedly tried to
overthrow the Government and become the king of the Xhosas but was
defeated. Then Ngqika appealed to the British who seized 23,000 head of
cattle from a Xhosa chief. The Xhosa prophet, Nxele (Makhanda) emerged, under the command of Mdushane, Ndlambe's son, led 6,000 Xhosa force attack on 22 April 1819 to Grahamstown, which was held by 350 troops repulsed Nxele. Nxele was captured and imprisoned on Robben Island. The British pushed the Xhosa further east beyond the Fish River to the Keiskamma River.
The resulting empty territory was designated as a buffer zone for loyal
Africans' settlements. It came to be known as the "Ceded Territories".
(1834–1879): The Xhosa remained expelled from their territory
dubbed "Ceded Territories", that was then settled by Europeans and other
African peoples. They were also subjected to territorial expansions
from other Africans that were themselves under pressure from the
expanding Zulu Kingdom. Nevertheless, the frontier region was seeing
increasing amounts of multi-racial issues because Africans and Europeans
living and trading throughout the frontier region. The indecision by
the Cape Government's policy towards the return of the Xhosa territories
did not dissipate Xhosa frustration toward the inability to provide for
themselves, hence the Xhosa resorted to frontier cattle-raiding. In
response on 11 December 1834, a Cape government commando party killed a
chief of high rank, incensing the Xhosa army of 10,000 led by Maqoma, that swept across the frontier into the Cape Colony. A string of defeats by Sir Benjamin d'Urban combining forces under Colonel Sir Harry Smith
stopped the Xhosa, most Xhosa chiefs surrendered but the primary
leadership Maqoma and Tyali retreated, a treaty was imposed and
hostilities finally died down on 17 September 1836. Aftermath the sixth war, a chief believed to be actually the paramount chief or the King of the Gcaleka Xhosa by the Cape Colony, Chief Hintsa ka Khawuta, was shot and killed by George Southey, brother of Richard Southey. The era also saw the rise and fall of Stockenström's treaty system.
The seventh war became a war between the imperial British troops collaborating with the mixed-race "Burgher forces", which were mainly Khoi, Fengu, British settlers and Boer commandos, against the Ngcika assisted by the Ndlambe and Thembu.
Tension had been simmering between colonialist farmers and Xhosa
raiders, on both sides of the frontier since the dismantlement of
Stockenstrom's treaty system. This began when Governor Maitland imposed a
new system of treaties on the chiefs without consulting them, while a
severe drought forced desperate Xhosa to engage in cattle raids across
the frontier to survive. In addition, politician Robert Godlonton continued to use his newspaper the Graham's Town Journal to agitate for 1820 Settlers
to annex and settle the land that had been returned to the Xhosa after
the previous war. The war concluded after the announcement of the
annexation of the country between the Keiskamma and the Kei rivers to
the British crown by order of Lord Glenelg. It was not, however,
incorporated with the Cape Colony, but made a crown dependency under the
name of British Kaffraria Colony with King William's Town as its capital.
Large numbers of Xhosa were displaced across the Keiskamma by Governor Harry Smith,
and these refugees supplemented the original inhabitants there, causing
overpopulation and hardship. Those Xhosa who remained in the colony
were moved to towns and encouraged to adopt European lifestyles. In June
1850 there followed an unusually cold winter, together with an extreme
drought. It was at this time that Smith ordered the displacement of
large numbers of Xhosa squatters from the Kat River region. The war
became known as "Mlanjeni's War", the eighth war, after the
prophet Mlanjeni who arose among the homeless Xhosa and preached
mobilization, large numbers of Xhosa began leaving the colony's towns
and mobilizing in the tribal areas. In February 1852, the British
Government decided that Sir Harry Smith's inept rule had been
responsible for much of the violence, and ordered him replaced by George Cathcart,
who took charge in March. In February 1853 Xhosa chiefs surrendered,
the 8th frontier war was the most bitter and brutal in the series of
Xhosa wars. It lasted over two years and ended in subjugation of the
Ciskei Xhosa.
The cattle-killing movement that began in 1856 to 1858, led Xhosa
people to destroy their own means of subsistence in the belief that it
would bring about salvation from colonialism through supernatural
spirits. First declared by a prophetess Nongqawuse
no one believed in the prophecy and it was considered absurdity, but
more and more people started believing Nongqawuse. The cult grew and
built up momentum, sweeping across the eastern Cape. The return of the
ancestors was predicted to occur on 18 February 1857, when the day came,
the Xhosa nation waited en masse for the momentous events to occur,
only to be bitterly disappointed. Famine set in and disease was also
spread from the cattle killings, this forced the remainder of the Xhosa
nation to seek relief from colonialists.
In 1877 the ninth of the Cape frontier war happened, known
as the "Fengu-Gcaleka War", and also the "Ngcayechibi's War" — the name
stemming from a headman whose feast was where the initial fight
occurred that traces from the conflicts of this war.
Before the early 19th century the indigenous population composition in
KwaZulu-Natal region was primarily by many different, largely
Nguni-speaking clans and influenced by the two powers of the Mthethwa and the Ndwandwe. In 1816, Shaka
acceded to the Zulu throne (at that stage the Zulu was merely one of
the many clans). Within a relatively short period of time he had
conquered his neighbouring clans and had forged the Zulu into the most
important ally of the large Mthethwa clan, which was in competition with
the Ndwandwe clan for domination of the northern part of modern-day
KwaZulu-Natal.
Depicted muster and dance performance of Zulu regiments, c. 1827
After the death of the Mthethwa king Dingiswayo around 1818, at the hands of Zwide,
the king of the Ndwandwe, Shaka assumed leadership of the entire
Mthethwa alliance. The alliance under his leadership survived Zwide's
first assault at the Battle of Gqokli Hill. Within two years he had defeated Zwide at the Battle of Mhlatuze River
and broken up the Ndwandwe alliance, some of whom in turn began a
murderous campaign against other Nguni communities, resulting in a mass
migration of communities fleeing those who are regarded now as Zulu
people too. Historians have postulated this as the cause of the Mfecane,
a period of mass migration and war in the Southern African interior in
the 19th, however this hypothesis is no longer accepted by most
historians, and the idea itself of Mfecane/Difaqane has been thoroughly disputed by many scholars, notably by Julian Cobbing.
The Pedi polity under King Thulare (c. 1780–1820) was made up of land that stretched from present-day Rustenburg to the lowveld in the west and as far south as the Vaal River. Pedi power was undermined during the Mfecane, by the Ndwandwe. A period of dislocation followed, after which the polity was re-stabilised under Thulare's son Sekwati.
Sekwati was also engaged in struggles over land and labour with
the invading colonialists. These disputes over land started in 1845
after the arrival of Boers and their declaring of Ohrigstad in King Sekwati's domain, in 1857 the town was incorporated into the Transvaal Republic and the Republic of Lydenburg was formed, an agreement was reached that the Steelpoort River was the border between the Pedi and the Republic. The Pedi were well equipped for waging war though, as Sekwati and his heir, Sekhukhune I were able to procure firearms, mostly through migrant labour from the Kimberley diamond fields and as far as Port Elizabeth. On 16 May 1876, Thomas François Burgers,
president of the South African Republic (ZAR), not to be confused with
the modern-day Republic of South Africa, caused the First of the
Sekhukhune Wars when he declared war against the Bapedi Kingdom, the
Burgers' army was defeated on 1 August 1876. The Burgers' government
later hired the Lydenburg Volunteer Corps commanded by a German
mercenary Conrad von Schlickmann, they were repelled and Conrad was
killed in later battles.
On 16 February 1877, the two parties, mediated by Alexander Merensky,
signed a peace treaty at Botshabelo. This led to the British annexation
of the South African Republic (ZAR) on 12 April 1877 by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, a secretary for native affairs of Natal at that time. The Second of Sekhukhune Wars commenced in 1878 and 1879 with three
British attacks that were successfully repelled but Sekhukhune was
defeated in November 1879 by Sir Garnet Wolseley's army of twelve thousand, made up of the 2,000 British, Boers and 10,000 Swazis, Swazis joined the war in support of Mampuru II's claim to the Bopedi (Pedi Kingdom) throne. This brought about the Pretoria Convention
of 3 August 1881, which stipulated Sekhukhune's release on reasons that
his capital was already burned to the ground. Sekhukhune I was murdered
by assassination on alleged orders from his half brother Mampuru II due
to the existing dispute to the throne, as Mampuru II had been ousted by
Sekhukhune before being reinstalled as King of Bopedi by the British
after the British invasion of Bopedi. King Mampuru II was then arrested
and executed by the treaty restored Boer South African Republic
(ZAR) on charges of public violence, revolt and the murder of his half
brother. The arrest was also well claimed by others to be because of
Mampuru's opposition to the hut tax imposed on black people by the South African Republic (ZAR) in the area.
Mampuru II has been described as one of South Africa's first
liberation icons. Potgieter Street in Pretoria and the prison where he
was killed was renamed in his honour, in February 2018 a statue of
Mampuru was proposed to be erected in Church Square, Pretoria where it
will stand opposite one of Paul Kruger who was President of the
British's South African Republic (ZAR) at the time of Mampuru's
execution. The Pedi paramountcy's power was also cemented by the fact
that chiefs of subordinate villages, or kgoro, take their principal
wives from the ruling house. This system of cousin marriage
resulted in the perpetuation of marriage links between the ruling house
and the subordinate groups, and involved the payment of inflated bohadi
or bride wealth, mostly in the form of cattle, to the Maroteng house.
Bantu publication by the apartheid government, February 1959
The Apartheid government retained and continued on from 1948 with even more officiation and policing on racial oppression of Bantu-speaking peoples of South Africa for 48 years. Decades before the inception of Apartheid there was a Rand Rebellion
uprising in 1922 which eventually became an open rebellion against the
state, it was against mining companies whose efforts at the time, due to
economic situations, were nullifying irrational oppression of natives
in the work place. The pogroms and slogans used in the uprising against blacks by whites articulated that irrationally oppressing Bantu-speaking peoples of South Africa
was much more a social movement in European communities in the 20th
century South Africa, before ever becoming government in 1948 which
happened through a discriminatory vote by only white, minority people in
South Africa, that formed a racist, well resourced and a police state
of an illegitimate government for nearly 50 years. In the 1930s, this
irrational oppression/discrimination was already well supported by
propaganda, e.g. the Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the Poor White Question in South Africa, it served as the blueprint of Apartheid.
A non-racial system franchise known as Cape Qualified Franchise was adhered to from year 1853 in the Cape Colony and the early years of the Cape Province which was later gradually restricted, and eventually abolished, under various National Party and United Party governments. It qualified practice of a local system of multi-racial suffrage. The early Cape constitution which later became known as the Cape Liberal tradition.
When the Cape's political system was severely weakened, the
movement survived as an increasingly liberal, local opposition against
the Apartheid government of the National Party. In the fight against
Apartheid, African majority took the lead in the struggle, as effective
allies the remaining Cape liberals against the growing National Party,
engaged to a degree in collaboration and exchange of ideas with the
growing African liberation movements, especially in the early years of
the struggle. This is seen through the non-racial values that were
successfully propagated by the political ancestors of the African National Congress, and that came to reside at the centre of South Africa's post-Apartheid Constitution.
Nelson Mandela (1918–2013), the first democratically elected president of South Africa, a Thembu (Xhosa ethnicity), one of the Bantu-speaking peoples of South Africa
The year 1994 saw the first democratic election in South Africa, the majority of the population, Black South Africans, participating in political national elections
for the first time in what ceremonially ended the Apartheid era and
also being the first time a political party in South Africa getting
legitimately elected as government. The day was ideally hailed as Freedom day and the beginning of progress to the conclusion of Black South Africans existential struggle that began with European colonisation in the South African region.
As a consequence of Apartheid policies, black Africans are regarded as a race group in South Africa. These groups (blacks, whites, Coloureds
and Indians) still tend to have a strong racial identities, and to
classify themselves, and others, as members of these race groups and the classification continues to persist in government policy, to an extent, as a result of attempts at redress such as Black Economic Empowerment and Employment Equity.
Ethnic groups
African – ethnic or racial reference in South Africa is a synonym to Black South Africans. It is also used to refer to expatriateBlack people from other African countries who are in South Africa.
South Africa's Bantu language speaking communities are roughly classified into four main groups: Nguni, Sotho–Tswana, Vhavenda and Shangana–Tsonga, with the Nguni and Basotho-Tswana being the largest groups, as follows:
Black people in South Africa were group-related and their conception
of borders based on sufficient land and natural features such as rivers
or mountains, which were not by any means fixed.
Common among the two powerful divisions, the Nguni and the
Sotho–Tswana, are patrilineal societies, in which the leaders formed the
socio-political units. Similarly, food acquisition was by pastoralism,
agriculture, and hunting. The most important differences are the
strongly deviating languages, although both are Southern Bantu languages,
and the different settlement types and relationships. In the Nguni
settlements villages were usually widely scattered, whereas the
Sotho–Tswana often settled in towns.
The majority of Bantu languages spoken in South Africa are classified as belonging to one of two groups. The Nguni languages (such as Xhosa, Zulu, Ndebele, and Swazi), whose speakers historically occupied mainly the eastern coastal plains, and the Sotho–Tswana languages (such as the Southern Sotho, Tswana, Northern Sotho)
and whose speakers historically lived on the interior plateau. The two
language groups differ in certain key aspects (especially in the sound
systems), with the rest of South African Bantu languages (Venda and Tsonga) showing even more unique aspects. Significant number of Black South Africans are native multilingual, speaking two or more languages as their first language, mainly from languages of South Africa.
Ditema syllabary
The
composition of the syllables of the words "Xilo" [ʃiːlɔ] "thing" in
Xitsonga, "Vhathu" [βaːtʰu] "people" in Tshivenḓa and "Ho tlêtse"
[hʊt͜ɬ’ɛːt͜s’ɪ] "It is full" in Sesotho, using Ditema syllabary
A constructed script of featural writing system and syllabary,
whose developments in 2010 was inspired by ancient ideographic
traditions of the Southern African region, and its parent systems being Amabheqe ideographs and Litema. It was developed for siNtu. The origins of Litemaornamental and mural
art of Southern Africa stretches centuries back in time, while
excavations at Sotho-Tswana archaeological sites have revealed hut
floors that have survived the elements for 1500 years, the earliest
intact evidence of this art stretches back from the c. 1400s.
A Southern Ndebele artist signs her work on a finished wall.
Southern Ndebele prior and during the 18th century primarily used
their expressive symbols for communication, it is believed that these
paintings are a synthesis of historical Nguni design traditions and
Northern Sotho ditema or litema tradition(s). They also
began to stand for their continuity and cultural resistance to their
circumstances during the colonisation in the 19th century. These wall
paintings done by the women was their secret code to their people,
disguised to anyone but the Southern Ndebele. The vibrant symbols and
expressions portray communications of personal prayers,
self-identification, values, emotions, and marriage, sometimes the male
initiation but the ritual was not expressed. Religions have never been a
part of the Southern Ndebele's house paintings. The women of the
Southern Ndebele are often the tradition carriers and the main developer
of the wall art of their home. The tradition and style of house
painting is passed down in the families from generation to generation by
the mothers. A well-painted home shows the female of the household is a
good wife and mother. She is responsible for the painting of the
outside gates, front walls, side walls, and usually the interior of her
home. One thing that has changed since the beginning of the paintings
and the present-day wall art is their styles. In the late 1960s, the new
style was evident, what was once a finger-painted creation was now
created using bundled twigs with feathers as brushes. The walls are
still originally whitewashed, but the outlines and colours have
significantly changed.
The patterns and symbols can be seen today with a rich black
outline and a vivid colour inside. There are five main colours
represented: red and dark red, yellow to gold, a sky blue, green, and
sometimes pink, white is always used as the background because it makes
the bright patterns stand out more. The geometric patterns and shape are
first drawn with the black outline and later filled in with colour. The
patterns are grouped together throughout the walls in terms of their
basic design structure. Creating the right tools to allow accuracy and
freedom becomes a difficult task. The tools can't restrict the painter
from creating her art. They have to have tools for the large geometric
shapes of flat colour and small brushes for the very small areas,
outlines, and sacks. The advancement of tools has allowed faster and
more complex designs throughout the Southern Ndebele's homes. Every
generation passes it down and little changes become apparent.
Traditional sports and martial arts
A Bafana Bafana fan with the famous South African Association football supporter's accessories, the Makarapa and the Vuvuzela
The most popular sporting code in South Africa and among Black South
Africans is Association football with the most notable event having been
hosted being the 2010 FIFA World Cup, but before such advent there are historical sports that were popular to the indigenous.
It is a martial art
historically practiced by teenage Nguni herdboys in South Africa. Each
combatant is armed with two long, hard sticks, one of which is used for
defense and the other for offense with little or no armor used. Although
Xhosa styles of fighting may use only two sticks, variations of Nguni
stick-fighting throughout Southern Africa incorporate shields as part of the stick-fighting weaponry. Zulu stick-fighting uses an isikhwili, an attacking stick, and ubhoko, a defending stick or an ihawu,
a defending shield. The objective is for two opposing warriors to fight
each other to establish which of them is the strongest or the "Bull"
(Inkunzi). An "induna" or War Captain becomes a referee for each group
of warriors, keeps his crew in check and keeps order between fighters.
Warriors of similar affiliation did this when engaging in combat with
one another. In modern times this usually occurs as a friendly symbolic
practice part of the wedding ceremony, where warriors (participants)
from the bridegroom's household welcome warriors from the bride's
household. Other groups of participants may also be welcomed to join in.
It is well documented in the Apartheid legislation, that the white minority, government regime – recreated and used the "traditional" Chiefdom-ships system to be the National Party's power reach, and even increased the Chiefdom-ships' powers over the Bantu-speaking peoples of South Africa
for the Apartheid government's interests. This was after colonial
regimes and subsequent South African governments before formal Apartheid,
had initiated the taking of most of South African land from the
indigenous peoples. Most of South African land began being made an
exclusive possession of only white minority Europeans in South Africa
legislatively by 1913.
Until very recently, South African Bantu-speaking communities were often divided into different clans,
not around national federations, but independent groups from some
hundreds to thousands of individuals. The smallest unit of the political
organisational structure was the household, or kraal,
consisting of a man, woman or women, and their children, as well as
other relatives living in the same household. The man was the head of
the household and often had many wives, and was the family's primary
representative. The household and close relations generally played an
important role. Households which lived in the same valley or on the same
hill in a village were also an organisational unit, managed by a
sub-chief.
Chiefdom-ship was largely hereditary,
although chiefs were often replaced when not effective. In most clans
the eldest son inherited the office of his father. In some clans the
office was left to the oldest brother of the deceased chief, and after
his death again the next oldest brother. This repeated until the last
brother died. Next was the eldest son of the original chieftain; then
the oldest one of the brothers as the leader.
The chief was surrounded with a number of trusted friends or
advisors, usually relatives like uncles and brothers, rather than
influential headmen or personal friends. The degree of the democracy
depended on the strength of the chieftain.
The more powerful and more influential a chieftain was, the less the
influence of his people. Although the leader had much power, he was not
above the law. He could be criticised both by advisors as well as by his
people, and compensation could be demanded. The people were divided
into different clans or tribes which had their own functions, laws, and
language.
Time-reliant traditions
Traditionally Pleiades star cluster, in the Xhosa calendar symbolizes the beginning of the year called in Xhosa.
Xhosa people historically and traditionally based their agricultural
time on reliable star systems. When these traditions are aligned with
the Gregorian calendar system the Xhosa year begins in June and ends in May when the Canopus star (in Xhosa: UCanzibe) becomes visible in the Southern hemisphere, this signaled their time for harvesting.
Sesotho months (in Sotho: Likhoeli)
indicate special natural and agricultural events of Southern Africa.
Traditionally and historically, being cattle breeders who lived in the
semi-arid regions of Southern Africa, a deep understanding of
agriculture and the natural world was essential for their survival.
Sesotho speaking people generally recognise only two seasons called Dihla.
However, names do exist aligned to all four of the traditional Western
seasons. The Sotho year begins approximately in August or September, a
time when their crops were planted.
A ceremony of giving the first fruits in a harvest to God, or the
gods who are believed to be responsible for the abundance of food in
Southern Africa. Traditionally it marked a time of prosperity, in the
good harvests experienced after the seasonal agricultural period. It
also brought people together, unifying them at a time of merry making
and quashing fears of famine. In South Africa the tradition is practiced
by Zulu people of KwaZulu-Natal as Umkhosi Wokweshwama.
Umhlanga is an annual event that originates from Eswatini in the 1940s from the rule of King Sobhuza II, it is an adaptation of a much older ceremony of Umchwasho. In South Africa it was introduced by the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu in 1991 to be later known as Umkhosi womHlanga, as a means to encourage young Zulu girls to delay sexual activity until marriage. All girls are required to undergo a virginity test
before they are allowed to participate in a royal dance, they wear a
traditional attire, including beadwork, and izigege, izinculuba and
imintsha, with anklets, bracelets, necklaces, and colourful sashes. Each
sash has appendages of a different colour, which denote whether or not
the girl is betrothed.
These young women then participate in a traditional dance
bare-breasted, while each maiden carries a long reed – the girls take
care to choose only the longest and strongest reeds – and then carry
them towering above their heads in a slow procession up the hill to the
royal Enyokeni Palace. The procession is led by the chief Zulu princess.
Historical food acquisition
Food acquisition was primarily limited to types of agriculture (slash and burn and Intensive subsistence farming), pastoral farming and engaging in hunting. Generally women were responsible for Crop agriculture and men went to herd
and hunt except for the Tsonga (and partially the Mpondo). Fishing was
relatively of little importance. All Bantu-speaking communities commonly
had clear separation between women's and men's tasks.
Nguni cattle roaming and resting on a beach, South Africa.
Essentially they consumed meat (primarily from Nguni cattle, Nguni sheep (Zulu sheep, Pedi sheep,
Swazi sheep), pigs/boars and wild game hunts), vegetables, fruits,
cattle and sheep milk, water, and grain beer on occasion. They began to
eat the staple product of maize mid-18th century (introduced from the Americas
by Portuguese in the late 17th century via the East African coast), it
became favoured for its productiveness which was more than the grains of
South African native grasses. There were a number of taboos
regarding the consumption of meat. The well known, no meat of dogs,
apes, crocodiles or snakes could be eaten. Likewise taboo was the meat
of some birds, like owls, crows and vultures, as well as the flesh of certain totem animals. The mopane worms
are traditionally popular amongst the Tswana, Venda, Southern Ndebele,
Northern Sotho and Tsonga people, though they have been successfully
commercialised.
South African Bantu language speaking peoples' modern diet is
largely still similar to that of their ancestors, but significant
difference being in the systems of production and consumption of their
food. They do take interest to innovations in foods that come their way
while still practicing their very own unique food cuisine popular
amongst themselves and those curious alike.
Historically, communities lived in two different types of houses before this tradition was dominated by one, the Rondavel. The Nguni people usually used the beehive house, a circular structure made of long poles covered with grass. The huts of the Sotho–Tswana people, Venda people and Shangana–Tsonga
people, used the cone and cylinder house type. A cylindrical wall is
formed out of vertical posts, which is sealed with mud and cow dung. The
roof built from poles tied-together, covered with grass. The floor of
both types is compressed earth.
The Rondavel itself developed from the general, grass domed African-style hut nearly 3 000 years ago, its first variety, the veranda Rondavel,
emerged about 1 000 years ago in southern Africa. Colonial housing
styles inspired the rectangular shaping of the Rondavel from the 1870s,
this is regarded as the beginning of the Rondavel's westernisation that sees this African indigenous invention even today being popularly known as the Rondavel, (a derivative of Afrikaans: Rondawel), instead of its indigenous name(s). Constraints caused by urbanisation produced a highveld type of style housing, shack-like, structures coalesced with corrugated metal sheeting
(introduced during the British colonisation), this marked a significant
visible change in the southern African region, it attested to the
contemporary pressures of South African Bantu-speaking peoples's realities, especially that of resources.
Venda people's village of Mbilwe, Rondavels as its structures on a rising slope as photographed in 1923, a decade after the Natives Land Act, 1913
A reconstruction in a heritage site of KwaZulu-Natal of the Zulu people's variation of a hut called iQhugwane, which dominated as an indigenous abode during Dingane kaSenzangakhona's reign.
Bahurutshe people's homestead of veranda Rondavels pre-1822 from the ancient city of Kaditshwene (c.1400s–c.1820s).
Early 19th century, South Africa.
Bantu-speaking peoples of South Africa's variation of a hut, built on
stilts, to protect themselves from lions and other predatory animals.
Modern usage of the Rondavel, residency near the coastline of Eastern Cape, South Africa.
Ideologies
Umvelinqangi
Umvelinqangi according to mainly Xhosa and Zulu people's culture is the Most High or Divine Consciousness, is the source of all that has been, that is and all that ever will be. It's the inner light of creation. Ukukhothama
(similar to meditation) prior to Colonization/Westernization was a
widespread practice in South Africa noticeably by those considered Zulu
people now, it was seen as a way of attaining oneness (in Zulu: Ubunye), with the divine conscious.
King Shaka's philosophy
Statue portraying King Shaka kaSenzangakhona, London, UK.
King Shaka
is well known for the many military, social, cultural and political
reforms he used to create his highly organised and centralised Zulu state. The most important of these were the transformation of the army,
thanks to innovative tactics and weapons he conceived, and a showdown
with the spiritual leadership, limiting the power of traditional
healers, and effectively ensuring the subservience of the Zulu church to
the state. King Shaka integrated defeated Zulu-speaking tribes into the newly formed Zulu ethnic group,
on a basis of full equality, with promotions in the army and civil
service being a matter of merit rather than circumstance of birth.
An anti-Apartheid movement
that emerged in South Africa in the mid-1960s. BCM attacked what they
saw as traditional white values, especially the "condescending" values
of white people of liberal
opinion and emphasised the rejection of white monopoly on truth as a
central tenet of their movement. The BCM's policy of perpetually
challenging the dialectic of Apartheid South Africa as a means of
transforming Black thought into rejecting prevailing opinion or
mythology to attain a larger comprehension brought it into direct
conflict with the full force of the security apparatus of the Apartheid
regime.
A concept that began to be popularised in the 1950s and became
propagated by political thinkers specifically in Southern Africa during
the 1960s. Ubuntu asserts that society, not a transcendent being, gives
human beings their humanity. An "extroverted communities" aspect is the
most visible part of this ideology. There is sincere warmth with which
people treat both strangers and members of the community. This overt
display of warmth is not merely aesthetic but enables formation of
spontaneous communities. The resultant collaborative work within these
spontaneous communities transcends the aesthetic and gives functional
significance to the value of warmth. It is also implied that Ubuntu is
in the ideal of that everyone has different skills and strengths; people
are not isolated, and through mutual support they can help each other
to complete themselves.
Notable Black people of South Africa include contributors, scholars
and professionals from a range of diverse and broad fields, also those
who are laureates of national and international recognition and certain
individuals from South African monarchs.
The list of notable Black South Africans includes a diverse range
of individuals who have made significant contributions in various
fields, including academia, politics, sports, and the arts. Here are
some examples of notable Black South Africans who have achieved
recognition nationally and internationally:
Academics and Scholars:Mojuta Steven Mothlamme:
A prominent scholar who has made significant contributions to the field
of epistemology and the study of black academics under apartheid.William Anderson SogaZ. K. Matthews: A renowned academic and anti-apartheid activist who was the first black vice-chancellor of the University of Fort Hare.
Nomalanga Mkhize:
A prominent academic and humanitarian who has made significant
contributions to the field of African studies and humanitarianism.
Njabulo Ndebele: The Principal of the University of Cape Town and a prominent figure in South African academia.
Politicians and Activists:Nelson Mandela:
The first democratically elected president of South Africa and a Nobel
Peace Prize laureate for his role in the fight against apartheid.
F.W. de Klerk: The last State President of South Africa under apartheid
and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate for his role in the country's
transition to democracy.
Anwar Sadat: The President of Egypt who was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1978 for his efforts to reach a peace agreement between Egypt
and Israel.
Sports:
Black and mixed race people who have black south African dna who have
made significant contributions to sports in South Africa, particularly
during the apartheid era, despite facing numerous challenges and
obstacles.
Arts and Culture:Benedict Wallet Vilakazi: A prominent author, educator, and the first black South African to receive a PhD.
Monarchs:
The list of notable Black South Africans includes individuals from
various monarchies, such as the Zulu Kingdom, the Xhosa Kingdom, and the
Sotho Kingdom, who have played significant roles in shaping the
country's history and culture.
These individuals, among many others, have made significant
contributions to various fields, breaking barriers and paving the way
for future generations.
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