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Thursday, March 16, 2023

Islamic extremism in the United States

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Islamic extremism in the United States comprises all forms of Islamic extremism occurring within the United States. Islamic extremism is an adherence to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, potentially including the promotion of violence to achieve political goals. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, Islamic extremism became a prioritized national security concern of the U.S. government and a focus of many subsidiary security and law enforcement entities. Initially, the focus of concern was on foreign Islamic terrorist organizations, particularly al-Qaeda, but in the course of the years since the September 11 terror attacks, the focus has shifted more towards Islamic extremist and jihadist networks within the United States.

For nearly two decades, counter-terrorism was America's foremost defense and national security priority. Since the release of the Trump administration's National Defense Strategy in 2018, counter-terrorism is no longer considered the preeminent U.S. national security concern, despite terrorism remaining an enduring threat. Although the number of U.S. citizens or long-term residents involved in extremist activity is small, their recruitment and participation in criminal activities organized by Islamic terrorist groups on the U.S. territory is still considered a national security concern by U.S. authorities.

Islamic extremism and jihadist violence

Main articles: Islamic extremism and Terrorism in the United States
Further information: International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism and International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism by region

Writing for National Public Radio, Belgian-born American journalist Dina Temple-Raston argues that the "single biggest change in terrorism over the past several years has been the wave of Americans joining the fight – not just as foot soldiers but as key members of Islamist groups and as operatives inside terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda". According to Temple-Raston, U.S. citizens or longtime residents are "masterminds, propagandists, enablers, and media strategists" in foreign terror groups and working to spread extremist ideology in the West. This trend is worrisome to her, which further commented that American extremists "understand the United States better than the United States understands them."

There is a lack of understanding of how American radical jihadists are propagated. According to U.S. statesmen, there is "no typical profile" of an American extremist and the "experiences and motivating factors vary widely." Janet Napolitano, former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, stated that it is unclear if there has been an "increase in violent radicalization" or "a rise in the mobilization of previously radicalized individuals". Islamist organizations seek Americans to radicalize and recruit because of a familiarity with the United States and the West. According to Napolitano, the evolving extremist threat makes it "more difficult for law enforcement or the intelligence community to detect and disrupt plots."

Zeyno Baran, senior fellow and director of the Center for Eurasian Policy at the American conservative think-tank Hudson Institute, argues that a more appropriate term is Islamist extremism to distinguish the Islamic religion from the political ideology that leads to extremism:

Islam, the religion, deals with piety, ethics, and beliefs, and can be compatible with secular liberal democracy and basic civil liberties. Islamists, however, believe Islam is the only basis for the legal and political system that governs the world's economic, social, and judicial mechanisms. Islamic law, or sharia, must shape all aspects of human society, from politics and education to history, science, the arts, and more. It is diametrically opposed to liberal democracy.

With the value placed on freedom of religion in the United States, religious extremism is a difficult and divisive topic. Zuhdi Jasser, president and founder of the American Muslim think-tank American Islamic Forum for Democracy, testified before Congress in March 2010 that the United States is "polarized on its perceptions of Muslims and the radicalization that occurs within our communities... One camp refuses to believe any Muslim could be radicalized living in blind multiculturalism, apologetics, and denial, and the other camp believes all devout Muslims and the faith of Islam are radicalized." In between the two polarities is a respect for the religion of Islam coupled with an awareness of the danger "of a dangerous internal theo-political domestic and global ideology that must be confronted – Islamism."

Some U.S. extremists are actively recruited and trained by foreign Islamic terrorist organizations, while others are known as "lone wolves" that radicalize on their own. The Fort Hood shooter, Major Nidal Hasan, is a U.S. citizen of Palestinian descent. He communicated via email with Anwar al-Awlaki, but had no direct ties to al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda propaganda uses Hasan to promote the idea of "be al-Qaeda by not being al-Qaeda". Carlos Leon Bledsoe, a U.S.-born citizen who converted to Islam as a young adult in 2004 and changed his name to Abdulhakim Muhammad, shot a U.S. military recruiter in Little Rock, Arkansas in June 2009, after spending time in Yemen. Faisal Shahzad is a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan and received bomb training from the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan; his plot to detonate a bomb in New York's Times Square was discovered only after the bomb failed. Zachary Chesser converted to Islam after high school and began to spread extremism over the Internet. He was arrested attempting to board a flight to Somalia to join the Islamic terrorist group al-Shabaab.

U.S. citizens in Islamic terrorist organizations

Since 2007, over 50 U.S. citizens and permanent residents have been arrested or charged in connection with attempts to join Islamic terrorist organizations abroad, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Shabaab. In 2013 alone, 9 Americans are known to have joined or attempted to join foreign terrorist organizations. U.S. citizens inside al-Qaeda provide insider's knowledge of the United States. Adam Gadahn was an American convert who joined al-Qaeda in the late 1990s. He released English-language propaganda videos, but Gadahn lacked charisma and his voice was replaced by Anwar al-Awlaki. Awlaki was a U.S. citizen of Yemeni descent, killed on September 30, 2011 by a U.S. missile strike in Yemen. Awlaki had religious credentials Gadahn lacks and a "gently persuasive" style; "tens of thousands, maybe millions, have watched [Awlaki's] lectures on the Internet."

Another key U.S. citizen in al-Qaeda's power structure was a man named Adnan Shukrijumah. Shukrijumah is believed to be the highest ranking American in al-Qaeda. He was born in Saudi Arabia, grew up in Trinidad, and moved to Florida as a teenager; he was a naturalized American citizen and left the United States in the spring of 2001. Shukrijumah was a mystery to authorities until he was identified by Najibullah Zazi after Zazi was arrested for a failed plot to bomb transportation targets around New York City. Zazi had traveled to Afghanistan to fight U.S. forces, but Shukrijumah convinced Zazi to return to the United States and plan an attack there. In May 2014, Florida-born convert Mohammed Abusalha conducted a deadly suicide bombing while fighting for Islamist extremists in Syria.

In 2014, Troy Kastigar and Douglas McAuthur McCain, two Americans who had previously converted to Islam, traveled to Syria and Iraq in order to join the global jihad in Syria and Iraq on behalf of the Islamic terrorist group ISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh, and were killed in battle. In 2015, Zulfi Hoxha traveled to Syria where he became a significant figure among the ranks of ISIS.

Places for radicalization

Prison

Main article: Conversion to Islam in U.S. prisons
Further information: Prison gangs in the United States

The United States has the world's largest prison population and "prisons have long been places where extremist ideology and calls to violence could find a willing ear, and conditions are often conducive to radicalization." Muslim prisoners have been characterized as a danger or threat for radicalization in the post-September 11, 2001 terror attacks media. There is a "significant lack of social science research" on the issue of Islamic extremism in U.S. prisons and there is disagreement on the danger Islamic extremism in prisons poses to U.S. national security. Some suggest that the gravity of so-called prison radicalization should be questioned due to the fact that data presents only one terrorism-related case among millions of individuals.

Reports have cautioned for the potential for radicalization as a result of vulnerable inmates having little exposure to mainstream Islam and monitoring of religious services activities in the event they may be exposed to extremist versions of the religion from inadequate religious service providers or other inmates via anti-American sermons and extremist media, which may be embraced or influenced by the Salafi brand of Sunni Islam (including revisionist versions commonly known as "prison Islam") and an extremist view of Shia Islam. The terms "prison Islam" or "jailhouse Islam" are unique to prison and incorporates values of gang loyalty and violence into the Islamic religion. In spite of the fact of there being over 350,000 Muslim inmates in the United States, little evidence indicates widespread radicalization or foreign recruitment.

Some argue that empirical studies have not supported the claims that prisons are fertile grounds for terrorism. Only one black American prison convert was convicted for involvement among the millions of adult males under supervision in the United States. This individual founded an Islamic extremist group in prison, called Jami'iy yat Ul-Isla Is Saheeh (JIS), from New Folsom State Prison in California and hatched a plot to attack numerous local government and Jewish targets. In July 2005, members of JIS "were involved in almost a dozen armed gas station robberies in Los Angeles with the goal of financing terrorist operations."

Statistics are not kept on the religious orientation of inmates in the U.S. prison system, limiting the ability to adequately judge the potential for Islamic extremism. A report published by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General in 2004 on the issue of the Federal Bureau of Prisons's selection of Muslim chaplains, estimated that 6% of the federal inmate population seek Islamic services. Through prisoner self-reporting, the majority of Muslims in federal prison are Sunni or Nation of Islam followers.

Mosques

Some mosques in the United States transmit Islamic extremist ideologies. The North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) "holds titles of approximately 300 properties [mosques and Islamic schools]". The organization's website states that "NAIT does not administer these institutions or interfere in their daily management, but is available to support and advise them regarding their operation in conformity with the Shari'ah." Other research on the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States claims NAIT influences a far larger number of Islamic institutions in the United States.

There is no government policy on the establishment of mosques in the United States and no way to monitor activity. The value placed on religious freedom in the U.S. complicates the situation as mosques are places of worship that may be used to spread extremist ideology.

Internet and social media

Further information: Radicalization of youth on the Internet and Terrorism and social media

The Internet can be used as a "facilitator—even an accelerant—for terrorist and criminal activity." Radicalization of young people by foreign and homegrown terrorist groups frequently occurs on the Internet and social media platforms. According to a report on counter-terrorism from the Security, Conflict, and Cooperation in the Contemporary World (SCCCW) series published by Palgrave Macmillan (2022), "jihadist groups have exploited—and continue to exploit—the Internet to plan, recruit, train and execute terrorist attacks and spread their ideology online." The increase of online English-language extremist material in recent years is readily available with guidance to plan violent activity. "English-language web forums […] foster a sense of community and further indoctrinate new recruits". The Internet has "become a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, and for terrorist recruiting, training, and planning. It is a means of social networking for like-minded extremists... including those who are not yet radicalized, but who may become so through the anonymity of cyberspace."

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) published an English-language online magazine called Inspire. The magazine is designed to appeal to a Western audience. It is "[w]ritten in colloquial English, [with] jazzy headlines and articles that made it seem almost mainstream—except that they were all about terrorism." Inspire "included tips for aspiring extremists on bomb-making, traveling overseas, email encryption, and a list of individuals to assassinate." The editor is believed to be Samir Khan, a Saudi Arabian naturalized U.S. citizen, based on work he did before leaving the United States. The magazine appeared six months after Khan arrived in Yemen. There have been seven issues of Inspire. Khan died in the same missile attack that killed Anwar al-Awlaki and the future of the magazine is unknown.

Yousef al-Khattab and Younes Abdullah Mohammed, both American converts to Islam, started a group called Revolution Muslim. The group was meant "to be both a radical Islamic organization and a movement" with goals that include "establishing Islamic law in the United States, destroying Israel and taking al-Qaeda's messages to the masses." A list of its members "reads like a who’s who of American homegrown terrorism suspects"; Samir Khan and Fatimah LaRose were regulars in the Revolution Muslim chat rooms. Revolution Muslim had a website and a YouTube account before it was shut down after a posting that glorified the stabbing of a British member of the U.K. Parliament. The revolutionmuslim.com domain now redirects to a website called Islam Policy, run by Younes Abdullah Mohammed. The danger of the website, and others that offer similar content, is the websites offer the chance to become further involved in violent extremism and connect to like-minded people in the U.S. and abroad.

U.S.-specific extremist narrative

Key to the trend of increasing Islamic extremism in the United States "has been the development of a U.S.-specific narrative that motivates individuals to violence." "This narrative—a blend of al-Qa‘ida inspiration, perceived victimization, and glorification of past plotting—has become increasingly accessible through the Internet, and English-language websites are tailored to address the unique concerns of U.S.-based extremists." Juan C. Zarate, attorney and security advisor for the American think-tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues that "[t]o disaffected, aggrieved, or troubled individuals, this narrative explains in a simple framework the ills around them and the geopolitical discord they see on their television sets and on the Internet." The narrative is easy to understand and grants "meaning and heroic outlet" for the discontented and alienated, according to Zarate.

Response from the U.S. Government

The President, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) are the most relevant elements of the U.S. government to the threat of Islamic extremism in the United States, and each has taken steps to address and counter the issue. Since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the government has worked to improve information sharing "within the government, and between federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement, as well as with the public." The "If You See Something, Say Something" campaign, instituted by DHS and local law enforcement, was created to raise public awareness of the potential dangers. In August 2011, the Office of the President released a strategy to counter violent extremism called Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. The strategy takes a three-pronged approach of community engagement, better training, and counternarratives. The plan states: "We must actively and aggressively counter the range of ideologies violent extremists employ to radicalize and recruit individuals by challenging justifications for violence and by actively promoting the unifying and inclusive visions of our American ideals," challenging extremist propaganda through words and deeds. The goal is to "prevent violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence."

American Muslim community response

There are Muslim Americans speaking out against Islamic extremist activities. Zuhdi Jasser, president of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, testified before a House hearing on Muslim radicalization in the U.S. in early 2010:

For me it is a very personal mission to leave my American Muslim children a legacy that their faith is based in the unalienable right to liberty and to teach them that the principles that founded America do not contradict their faith but strengthen it. Our founding principle is that I as a Muslim am able to best practice my faith in a society like the United States that guarantees the rights of every individual blind to faith with no governmental intermediary stepping between the individual and the creator to interpret the will of God. Because of this, our mission is to advocate for the principles of the Constitution of the United States of America, liberty and freedom and the separation of mosque and state. We believe that this mission from within the "House of Islam" is the only way to inoculate Muslim youth and young adults against radicalization. The "Liberty narrative" is the only effective counter to the "Islamist narrative."

Another notable voice in the American Muslim community that warned of Islamic extremist activities in the United States before the September 11, 2001 terror attacks is the Sufi Muslim preacher and Imam Hisham Kabbani, which serves as chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America.

Attacks or failed attacks by date in the United States

Further information: List of unsuccessful terrorist plots in the United States post-9/11

Media attention in the United States on Islamic terrorism

Further information: Mass media in the United States

The Universities of Georgia and Alabama in the United States conducted a study comparing media coverage of "terrorist attacks" committed by Islamist militants with those of non-Muslims in the United States. Researchers found that "terrorist attacks" by Islamist militants receive 357% more media attention than attacks committed by non-Muslims or White Americans. Terrorist attacks committed by non-Muslims (or where the religion was unknown) received an average of 15 headlines, while those committed by Muslim extremists received 105 headlines. The study was based on an analysis of news reports covering terrorist attacks in the United States between 2005 and 2015.

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Terrorism and social media

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Terrorism, fear, and media are interconnected. Terrorists uses the media to advertise their attacks and or messages, and the media uses terrorism events to further aid their ratings. Both promote unwarranted propaganda that instills mass amounts of public fear. Osama Bin Laden himself spoke of this weaponization of the media in a letter after 9/11. Within that letter, Bin Laden recalled fear as the deadliest weapon. He reflected upon the way western civilization has become obsessed with mass media in that they are quick to consume what will evidently bring them fear. He also states that, we are bringing this problem on our own people by giving the media such power. In relation to one’s need for media coverage, the Jihad can be classified as an offspring of mass media. The Jihad needs to conceptualize their martyrdom by leaving behind manifestos and live videos of their attacks. In fact, it is crucially important to them that it is being covered. For there is this overall fascination with crime itself, especially terrorism. The components the media looks for to deem the news “worthy” enough to publicize are categorized into ten qualities, terrorists usually exceed half in their attacks. The following are Immediacy, Conflict, Negativity, Human Interest, Photographability, Simple Story Lines, Topicality, Exclusivity, Reliability, and Local Interest. Morality and profitability often are two motivations when delivering news, however recently news has become more motivated in making money than shielding the public from bad news.

A study concerning the disparity in coverage of terrorist events took attacks from the ten-year span of 2005-2015 and found that 136 episodes of terrorism occurred in the United States. LexisNexis Academic and CNN were the platforms used to measure the media coverage. It was found that out of other terrorist attacks showed on the news, one’s with Muslim perpetrators received more than 357% coverage. In addition to this disparity, attacks also received more coverage when they were targeted at the government, had high fatality rates, and showed arrests being made. These findings were aligned with America’s tendency to categorize Muslim people as a threat to national security. Thus, mass media coverage on terrorism is creating fake narratives and an absence of related coverage. For instance, the American public believes that crime rates have been on the rise which in fact they have been on an all-time low. Given that the media often covers crime almost immediately and frequently, suggests that people infer it happening all the time. In reference to the disparity in terror attacks, three attacks were seen to have the least media coverage of all the 136. The Sikh Temple Massacre in Wisconsin which had 2.6% coverage, the Kansas synagogue killings which had 2.2%, and the Charleston Church deaths which only resulted in 5.1% coverage. The three events had commonalities worth mentioning in that they all had white perpetrators and were not directed at government intuitions (in fact all targeted minorities). The media’s obsession with terror is making people fearful of the wrong things and not attentive enough to the issues that are radically unseen.

Not only are minorities usually not the perpetrators of domestic terrorism but they are common victims in mass casualties or proximal witnesses to the attacks. In an early 2000’s study, 72 Israeli adults were measured pre and posttest for increased anxiety after being exposed to news broadcasts of terrorism attacks. The study found that the group exposed to the broadcasts without any treatment (preparation intervention) had heightened levels of anxiety compared to the group that received the treatment along with viewing the broadcast. Since preparatory intervention is not yet normalized, people in proximity to ongoing coverage of terror events are suffering from the lasting impacts of fear and anxiety. Preparatory Intervention, in this case, was conducted by a group facilitator who introduced a topic concerning terrorism in which participants were instructed to write down feelings to share with the group and later learn to cope with.

A discourse of fear created by mass media presence, but false information is leading people to prepare for the wrong situations. In the early 2000’s police units circulated public schools flooding the idea of Stranger Danger into the minds of adolescents. Children and their parents cautiously separated from strangers while perpetrators in those families' social circles continued to offend under the radar. For myths are becoming common precedent and real danger is buried beneath the surface. It is these implementations of fear that are falsifying the true narrative which for terrorism is a huge social problem but one that is not resolved through entertainment and mass media production. Mass media like news outlets and even social media platforms are contributing to the growing discourse of fear surrounding terrorism.

Terrorism and social media refers to the use of social media platforms to radicalize and recruit violent and non-violent extremists.

According to some researchers the convenience, affordability, and broad reach of social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, terrorist groups and individuals have increasingly used social media to further their goals, recruit members, and spread their message. Attempts have been made by various governments and agencies to thwart the use of social media by terrorist organizations.

Terror groups take to social media because it’s cheap, accessible, and facilitates quick access to a lot of people. Social media allow them to engage with their networks. In the past it wasn’t so easy for these groups to engage with the people they wanted to whereas social media allows terrorists to release their messages right to their intended audience and interact with them in real time. "Spend some time following the account, and you realize that you’re dealing with a real human being with real ideas- albeit boastful, hypocritical, violent ideas". Al- Qaeda has been noted as being as being one of the terror groups that uses social media the most extensively. "While almost all terrorist groups have websites, al qaeda is the first to fully exploit the internet. This reflects al Qaeda’s unique characteristics."

Despite the risks of making statements, such as enabling governments to locate terror group leaders, terror leaders communicate regularly with video and audio messages which are posted on the website and disseminated on the internet. ISIS uses social media to their advantage when releasing threatening videos of beheadings. ISIS uses this tactic to scare normal people on social media. Similarly, Western domestic terrorists also use social media and technology to spread their ideas.

Traditional media

Many authors have proposed that media attention increases perceptions of risk of fear of terrorism and crime and relates to how much attention the person pays to the news. The relationship between terrorism and the media has long been noted. Terrorist organizations depend on the open media systems of democratic countries to further their goals and spread their messages. To garner publicity for their cause, terrorist organizations resort to acts of violence and aggression that deliberately target civilians. This method has proven to be effective in gathering attention:

It cannot be denied that although terrorism has proved remarkably ineffective as the major weapon for taking down governments and capturing political power, it has been a remarkably successful means of publicizing a political cause and relaying the terrorist threat to a wider audience, particularly in the open and pluralistic countries of the West. When one says 'terrorism' in a democratic society, one also says 'media'.

While a media organization may not support the goals of terrorist organizations, it is their job to report current events and issues. In the fiercely competitive media environment, when a terrorist attack occurs, media outlets scramble to cover the event. In doing so the media help to further the message of terrorist organizations:

To summarise briefly on the symbiotic nature of the relationship between terrorists and the media, the recent history of terrorism in many democratic countries vividly demonstrates that terrorists do thrive on the oxygen of publicity, and it is foolish to deny this. This does not mean that the established democratic media share the values of the terrorists. It does demonstrate, however, that the free media in an open society are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation by ruthless terrorist organisations.

One notable example of the relationship between terror groups and the media was the release of the Osama bin Laden audio and video recordings. These tapes were sent directly to mainstream Arabic television networks, including Al-Jazeera.

Media can often be the source of discontent for terrorist groups. Irene Kahn says,

New seeds of social discord and insecurity are sprouting between citizens and noncitizens. Racism and xenophobia are latent in all societies, but in some European countries they feature blatantly as some politicians exploit people's fears and prejudices for short-term electoral gains. Some aspects of the media have played into this strategy, dehumanizing and demonizing foreigners, foreign-born citizens, refugees, and asylum seekers. They are pointed out as a source of danger and become an easy target for hate speech and violence. Those who need their rights protected the most have become the ones most at risk of attacks.

Most terrorist groups use social media as a means to bypass the traditional media and spread their propaganda.

Media surveillance

The network described in Michel Foucault's theory of surveillance, panopticism, is a networks of power where all parties are transfixed by the actions of the others in the network. It is especially imperative when major events in the world occur, which is usually the case with terrorism. This model can be transposed on the network of power that media-outlet consumers and producers enter. In a network of power that includes consumers and producers, both parties have fixed gazes' on each other. The consumers transfix their gazes' on the stories that media outlets produce. And, the needs of the consumers, which is in this case their need to be updated regularly, becomes the producers gaze. The producers or media outlets are in competition with other media outlets to supply their constituents with the most up-to-date information. This network of fixed gazes' is both "privileged and imperative" for the system to satisfy the status quo.

Consumers looks to media outlets to provide news on terrorism. If consumers believe terrorism is a threat to their safety, they want to be informed of the threats against them. Media outlets fulfill their viewers' needs, and portray terrorism as a threat because of the cycle that surveillance engenders. As terrorism flourishes as a prominent discourse of fear, consumers want information faster because they feel their safe being is in peril. The idea of total surveillance, as prescribed by Foucault, becomes a cycle where the disruption of power causes scrutiny by various players in system. If the media-outlets are not constantly looking for stories that fulfill consumer needs, then they are scrutinized. In addition to the surveillance aspect of news dissemination, therein is the notion that "needs" drive the network of power: both the media outlets and consumers have needs that are fulfilled by broadcasting the news. It is this idea expressed in the uses and gratifications theory. It stipulates that the active audience and the terrorist "seek to satisfy their various needs" through media transmission. While media outlets know the stories they show have astounding effects on the political and sociological perspective in society, the impetus on economic gains is of greater importance.

Use of social media

In a study by Gabriel Weimann from the University of Haifa, Weimann found that nearly 90% of organized terrorism activities on the internet takes place via social media. According to Weimann, terror groups use social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and internet forums to spread their messages, recruit members and gather intelligence.

Terror groups take to social media because social media tools are cheap and accessible, facilitate quick, broad dissemination of messages, and allow for unfettered communication with an audience without the filter or "selectivity" of mainstream news outlets. Also, social media platforms allow terror groups to engage with their networks. Whereas previously terror groups would release messages via intermediaries, social media platforms allow terror groups to release messages directly to their intended audience and converse with their audience in real time: Weimann also mentions in "Theater of Terror", that terrorists use the media to promote the theatrical like nature of the premeditated terror.

HSMPress is using Twitter the way social media experts have always advised- not just broadcasting, but engaging in conversation. Spend some time following the account, and you realize that you're dealing with a real human being with real ideas—albeit boastful, hypocritical, violent ideas.

Terror groups using social media

Al-Qaeda has been noted as being one of the terror groups that uses social media the most extensively. Brian Jenkins, senior advisor for the Rand Corporation, commented on Al-Qaeda's dominant presence on the web:

While almost all terrorist organizations have websites, al Qaeda is the first to fully exploit the internet. This reflects al Qaeda's unique characteristics. It regards itself as a global movement and therefore depends on a global communications network to reach its perceived constituents. It sees its mission as not simply creating terror among its foes but awakening the Muslim community. Its leaders view communications as 90 percent of the struggle. Despite the risks imposed by intense manhunts, its leaders communicate regularly with video and audio messages, which are posted on its websites and disseminated on the Internet. The number of websites devoted to the al Qaeda-inspired movement has grown from a handful to reportedly thousands, although many of these are ephemeral.

According to Rob Wainwright, author of "Fighting Crime and Terrorism in the Age of Technology," in order for ISIS to spread its message, they have utilized more than one hundred sites. This shows how vastly social media is used by terrorist groups. Known terrorist group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also translated to ISIS, uses the widespread of news over social media to their advantage when releasing threatening videos of beheadings. As of November 16, 2014, following the beheading of former U.S. Army Ranger Peter Kassig, there have now been five recorded executions of Westerners taken captive in Syria. James Foley, David Cawthorne Haines, Alan Henning, and Steven Sotloff are also among the men kidnapped and executed by ISIS. The videos of the brutal beheadings are both posted online by ISIS, where they can be viewed by anyone using their own discretion, and sent to government officials as threats. Posting the executions online gives the terrorist groups the power to manipulate viewers and cause havoc among the population viewing them, and the videos have the ability to instill fear within the Western world. The videos are typically high production quality and generally show the entirety of the gruesome act, with the hostage speaking a few words before they are killed on camera.

In the case of U.S. aid worker Peter Kassig, his video did not show the actual beheading act and he did not speak any final words before the execution. His silence and the fact that the actual execution was not included in the video raised question about his video was different than the rest. In response to Kassig's beheading, his family expressed their wish that news media avoid doing what the group wants by refraining from publishing or distributing the video. By refusing to circulate the video of the beheading, it therefore loses the ability to manipulate Americans or further the cause of the terrorist group.

In addition to beheading videos, ISIS has released videos of their members doing nonviolent acts. For example, Imran Awan described one such instance in his article "Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media" where one video showed members of the Islamic State were seen helping people and visiting hospitals. These videos gave a humanistic nature to the terrorist group members, therefore, contradicting what civilians think terrorist groups should be.

Edgar Jones has mentioned in his article, "The Reception of Broadcast Terrorism: Recruitment and Radicalisation," that ISIS has utilized documentaries and even their own magazine, Dabiq, in order to recruit new members and to get their message out to the public. This illustrates just a couple of the various mediums that ISIS has used.

According to Wainwright, social media is also used by ISIS and other terror groups to recruit foreign people to join the terrorist cause. In some cases, these new recruits are sent back to their home country to carry out terrorist attacks. Others who can not physically move to the terrorist cause have been known to carry out acts of terrorism in their own countries due to the propaganda that they are exposed to online. This exhibits how ISIS can brainwash or expand on ideas that individuals may have.

The Taliban has been active on Twitter since May 2011, and has more than 7,000 followers. Tweeting under the handle @alemarahweb, the Taliban tweets frequently, on some days nearly hourly. This account is currently suspended.

In December 2011, it was discovered that the Somalia-based terror cell Al-Shabab was using a Twitter account under the name @HSMPress. Since opening on December 7, 2011, the account has amassed tens of thousands of followers and tweets frequently.

Shortly after a series of coordinated Christmas bombings in Kono, Nigeria, in 2011, the Nigerian-based terror group Boko Haram released a video statement defending their actions to YouTube. Boko Haram has also used Twitter to voice their opinions.

AQAP and Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/DAESH)

Islamic State has emerged as one of the most potent users of social media. In many respects, Islamic State learned their propaganda craft from al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). However, IS quickly eclipsed its mentor, deploying a whole range of narratives, images and political proselytizing through various social media platforms. A study by Berger and Morgan estimated that at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters between September and December 2014. However, as ISIS supporters regularly get suspended and then easily create new, duplicate accounts, counting ISIS Twitter accounts over a few months can overestimate the number of unique people represented by 20–30%. In 2019, Storyful discovered that approximately two dozen TikTok accounts were used to post propaganda videos targeting users. Accounts broadcast news from Amaq News Agency, the official news outlet for the Islamic State.

However, as the November 2015 attacks in Paris demonstrate, IS also uses old-fashioned methods of communication and propaganda. Lewis notes that the attacks in Paris represent the sort of 'propaganda in action' which was a method developed by the 19th century anarchists in Europe. The November 2015 IS attacks were perpetrated without prior warning, largely because the operatives met face-to-face and used other non-digital means of communication.

Attempts to thwart the use of social media by terror groups

Some U.S. government officials have urged social media companies to stop hosting content from terror groups. In particular, Joe Lieberman has been especially vocal in demanding that social media companies not permit terror groups to use their tools. In 2008, Lieberman and the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs issued a report titled "Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat". The report stated that the internet is one of the "primary drivers" of the terrorist threat to the United States.

In response to the news that Al-Shabab was using Twitter, U.S. officials have called for the company to shut down the account. Twitter executives have not complied with these demands and have declined to comment on the case.

In January 2012, Twitter announced changes to their censorship policy, stating that they would now be censoring tweets in certain countries when the tweets risked breaking the local laws of that country. The reason behind the move was stated on their website as follows:

As we continue to grow internationally, we will enter countries that have different ideas about the contours of freedom of expression. Some differ so much from our ideas that we will not be able to exist there. Others are similar but, for historical or cultural reasons, restrict certain types of content, such as France or Germany, which ban pro-Nazi content.Until now, the only way we could take account of those countries' limits was to remove content globally. Starting today, we give ourselves the ability to reactively withhold content from users in a specific country — while keeping it available in the rest of the world. We have also built in a way to communicate transparently to users when content is withheld, and why.

The move drew criticism from many Twitter users who said the move was an affront to free speech. Many of the users threatened to quit tweeting if the policy was not rescinded, including Chinese artist and activist Ai Weiwei.

In December 2010, in response to growing demands that YouTube pull video content from terrorist groups from its servers, the company added a "promotes terrorism" option under the "violent or repulsive content" category that viewers can select to "flag" offensive content. By limiting the terrorists access to conventional mass media and censoring news coverage of terrorist acts and their perpetrators and also minimising the terrorists allowance to manipulate mass media, the mass fear impact that is usually created will decrease.

Effectiveness of suspension

Western governments have been actively trying to surveil and censor IS social media sites. As Jeff Lewis explains, as quickly as platform managers close down accounts, IS and its supporters continually create new IDs which they then use to resurge back with new accounts and sites for propaganda. A case study of an al Shabaab account and a George Washington University white paper found that accounts that resurged did not regain the high number of followers they had had originally. However this picture is complicated as a May 2016 article in the Journal of Terrorism Research found that resurgent accounts acquire an average (median) of 43.8 followers per day, while regular jihadist accounts accrue only 8.37 followers on average per day.

Free speech and terrorism

U.S. Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, has said that the U.S. Constitution does not apply to terrorists and that they have given up their rights to free speech. He cited a Supreme Court ruling that anyone providing "material support" to a terrorist organization is guilty of a crime, even if that support only involves speaking and association. He also cited terrorist speech as being like child pornography in that it does harm.

Homeland security subcommittee

On December 6, 2011 the US Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence held a hearing entitled "Jihadist Use of Social Media - How to Prevent Terrorism and Preserve Innovation."

At the hearing, members heard testimony from William McCants, an analyst for the Center for Naval Analyses, Aaron Weisburd, director of the Society for Internet Research, Brian Jenkins, senior advisor for the Rand Corporation and Evan Kohlmann, senior partner from Flashpoint Global Partners.

McCants stated that while terror groups were actively using social media platforms to further their goals, research did not support the notion that the social media strategies they adopted were proving effective:

We are talking about a relatively small number of people. Because the number of people is so small, it is difficult to say why some become active supporters of al-Qaeda and others do not. What we can say is that the vast majority of people who watch and read al-Qaeda propaganda will never act violently because of it. Put metaphorically, the material may be incendiary but nearly everyone is fireproof. Since that is the case, it is better to spend our resources putting out the fires and issuing warnings about the dangers of fire rather than trying to fireproof everyone or remove incendiary material.

McCants added that he did not believe that closing online user accounts would be effective in stopping radicalization and stated that closing online accounts could even disadvantage US security and intelligence forces:

I do not put much stock in closing online user accounts that do not violate our laws. I also do not put much stock in intervening with well-meaning outreach programs or removing propaganda. There are too many downsides to these approaches. They are also unnecessary. The FBI and local law enforcement in the United States have done an excellent job in finding al-Qaeda supporters online and arresting them before they hurt anyone. They have gotten very good at following the smoke trails and putting out fires.

McCants stressed that not enough research has been conducted on this topic and he would be willing to change his opinion on the matter if there was empirical evidence that proved that social media has a major role in radicalizing youth.

Weisburd stated that any organization that played a part in producing and distributing media for terrorist organizations were in fact supporting terrorism:

I would argue that a service provider who knowingly assists in the distribution of terrorist media is also culpable. While it is in no one's interest to prosecute internet service providers, they must be made to realize that they can neither turn a blind eye to the use of their services by terrorist organizations, nor can they continue to put the onus of identifying and removing terrorist media on private citizens.

Weisburd argued that social media lends an air of legitimacy to content produced by terror organizations and provides terrorist organizations an opportunity to brand their content: "Branding in terrorist media is a sign of authenticity, and terrorist media is readily identifiable as such due to the presence of trademarks known to be associated with particular organizations." He concluded that the goal of intelligence and security forces should not be to drive all terrorist media offline, but rather to deprive terror groups from the branding power gleaned from social media.

Jenkins stated that the risks associated with al Qaeda's online campaign do not justify an attempt to impose controls on content distributors. Any attempted controls would be costly and would deprive the intelligence officials of a valuable source of information. Jenkins also stated that there was no evidence that attempts to control online content would be possible:

Even China, which has devoted immense resources to controlling social media networks with far fewer concerns about freedom of speech, has been unable to block the micro blogs that flourish on the web. Faced with the shutdown of one site, jihadist communicators merely change names and move to another, dragging authorities into a frustrating game of Whac-a-mole and depriving them of intelligence while they look for the new site. Is this, then the best way to address the problem?"

Kohlmann stated US government officials must do more to pressure social media groups like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to remove content produced by terror groups:

Unfortunately, current U.S. law gives few incentives for companies like YouTube for volunteering information on illicit activity, or even cooperating when requested by U.S. law enforcement. If such companies are to be trusted to self-police their own professed commitments to fighting hate speech, then they must be held to a public standard which reflects the importance of that not unsubstantial responsibility.

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Radicalization

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radicalization

Radicalization (or radicalisation) is the process by which an individual or a group comes to adopt increasingly radical views in opposition to a political, social, or religious status quo. The ideas of society at large shape the outcomes of radicalization; for example, radical movements can originate from a broad social consensus against progressive changes in society or from a broad desire for change in society. Radicalization can result in both violent and nonviolent action – academic literature focuses on radicalization into violent extremism (RVE) or radicalisation leading to acts of terrorism. Multiple separate pathways can promote the process of radicalization, which can be independent but are usually mutually reinforcing.

Radicalization that occurs across multiple reinforcing pathways greatly increases a group's resilience and lethality. Furthermore, by compromising a group's ability to blend in with non-radical society and to participate in a modern, national or international economy, radicalization serves as a kind of sociological trap that gives individuals no other place to go to satisfy their material and spiritual needs.

Definitions

There is no universally accepted definition of radicalization. One of the difficulties with defining radicalization appears to be the importance of the context to determine what is perceived as radicalization. Therefore, radicalization can mean different things to different people. Presented below is a list of definitions used by different governments.

European Union

The European Commission defined and coined the term "radicalization" in the year 2005 as follows: "Violent radicalisation" is the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism as defined in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. The term "violent radicalisation" originated in EU policy circles and was coined after the Madrid bombing of 11 March 2004. It was not widely used in social science as a concept but it obviously refers to a process of socialisation leading to the use of violence. In an initiating report of the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation – based on four deepening studies – the research paradigm has been opened for further scientific research, also flanked by research grants and funding via different security research programs.

United Kingdom

The UK Home Office, MI5's parent agency, defines radicalisation as "The process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then join terrorist groups." The MI5 report closes by saying that no single measure will reduce radicalisation in the UK and that the only way to combat it is by targeting the at-risk vulnerable groups and trying to assimilate them into society. This may include helping young people find jobs, better integrating immigrant populations into the local culture, and effectively reintegrating ex-prisoners into society.

Canada

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police defines radicalization as "the process by which individuals—usually young people—are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views." While radical thinking is by no means problematic in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when Canadian citizens or residents espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism. Sometimes referred to as “homegrown terrorism,” this process of radicalization is more correctly referred to as domestic radicalization leading to terrorist violence.

Denmark

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) defines radicalization as “A process by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective.”

UNESCO

In a UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) research report on the impact of the Internet and social media on youth and violent extremism , the difficulty of defining radicalization is discussed. A distinction is drawn "between a process of radicalization, a process of violent radicalization (legitimizing the adoption of violence), and acts of violence." For the purposes of the UNESCO report, radicalization is defined by these three points:

  • "The individual person's search for fundamental meaning, origin and return to a root ideology;
  • "The individual as part of a group's adoption of a violent form of expansion of root ideologies and related oppositionist objectives;
  • "The polarization of the social space and the collective construction of a threatened ideal 'us' against 'them,' where the others are dehumanized by a process of scapegoating."

Varieties and commonalities

See also: Online youth radicalization

Despite being composed of multifarious pathways that lead to different outcomes and sometimes diametrically opposed ideological purposes, radicalization can be traced to a common set of pathways that translate real or perceived grievances into increasingly extreme ideas and readiness to participate in political action beyond the status quo. Shira Fishman, a researcher at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, wrote "Radicalization is a dynamic process that varies for each individual, but shares some underlying commonalities that can be explored." Though there are many end products of the process of radicalization, to include all manner of extremist groups both violent and nonviolent, a common series of dynamics have been consistently demonstrated in the course of academic inquiry.

Islamic

Jihadis have a "tried and tested model" of contact with different vulnerable, and extremist individuals through online messaging services or social media platforms, and then rapidly manipulating them towards participating in violent action in their name.

It was reported that Raffia Hayat of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association warned that jailed extremists attempt to recruit violent criminals into radical groups so they carry out attacks on the public once released. There have been several notable criticisms of radicalization theories for focusing disproportionately on Islam.

There have been concerns that converts to Islam are more susceptible to violent radicalization than individuals born into the faith. Dr. Abdul Haqq Baker developed the Convert's Cognitive Development Framework that describes how new converts conceptualize Islam and the stages where they are most vulnerable to radicalization.

Right-wing

Radical right-wing terrorism is motivated by a variety of different right-wing/far-right ideologies, most prominently neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, white nationalism and to a lesser extent "Patriot"/Sovereign citizen beliefs and anti-abortion sentiment. Modern radical right-wing terrorism appeared in Western Europe, Central Europe and the United States in the 1970s, and Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Groups associated with right-wing radicals include white power skinhead gangs, right-wing/far-right hooligans, and sympathizers. Examples of right-wing/far-right radical organizations and individuals include Aryan Nations, Aryan Republican Army (ARA), Atomwaffen Division (AWD), Army of God (AOG), Anders Behring Breivik, Alexandre Bissonnette, Brenton Harrison Tarrant, Cesar Sayoc, Cliven Bundy, Dylann Roof, David Koresh, David Lane, Eric Robert Rudolph, Frazier Glenn Miller, James Mason, James Alex Fields, John T. Earnest, Jim David Adkisson, Ku Klux Klan (KKK), National Action (NA), National Socialist Underground (NSU), Timothy McVeigh, Robert Bowers, Thomas Mair, The Order and Wade Michael Page. From 2008 to 2016, there were more right-wing terror attacks both attempted and accomplished in the US than Islamist and left-wing attacks combined.

Right-wing populism by those who support ethnocentrism (usually white nationalism) and oppose immigration creates a climate of "us versus them" leading to radicalization. The growth of white nationalism in a political climate of polarization has provided an opportunity for both on- and offline radicalization and recruitment as an alternative to increasingly distrusted traditional mainstream choices. In 2009, the United States Department of Homeland Security identified economic and political conditions as leading to a rise in right-wing radicalization and recruitment.

The Anti-Defamation League reports that white supremacist propaganda and recruitment efforts on and around college campuses have been increasing sharply, with 1,187 incidents in 2018 compared to 421 in 2017, far exceeding any previous year. Far-right terrorists rely on a variety of strategies such as leafleting, violent rituals, and house parties to recruit, targeting angry and marginalized youth looking for solutions to their problems. But their most effective recruitment tool is extremist music, which avoids monitoring by moderating parties such as parents and school authorities. Risk factors for recruitment include exposure to racism during childhood, dysfunctional families such as divorced parents, physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, neglect, and disillusionment.

In 2018, researchers from the Data & Society think tank identified the YouTube recommendation system as promoting a range of political positions from mainstream libertarianism and conservatism to overt white nationalism. Many other online discussion groups and forums are used for online right-wing radicalization. Facebook was found to be offering advertisements targeted to 168,000 users in a white genocide conspiracy theory category, which they removed shortly after being contacted by journalists in the wake of the 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue shooting. After the March 15, 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings, Facebook announced that they have banned white nationalist and white separatist content along with white supremacy.

Left-wing

Left-wing terrorism is terrorism committed with the aim of overthrowing current capitalist systems and replacing them with Marxist–Leninist or socialist societies. Left-wing terrorism can also occur within already socialist states as criminal action against the current ruling government.

Most left-wing terrorist groups that had operated in the 1970s and 1980s disappeared by the mid-1990s. One exception was the Greek Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N), which lasted until 2002. Since then, left-wing terrorism has been relatively minor in the Western world in comparison with other forms, and is now mostly carried out by insurgent groups in the developing world.

According to Sarah Brockhoff, Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks, while left-wing terrorism is ideologically motivated, nationalist-separatist terrorism is ethnically motivated. They argue that the revolutionary goal of left-wing terrorism is non-negotiable whereas nationalist terrorists are willing to make concessions. They suggest that rigidity of the demands of left-wing terrorists may explain their lack of support relative to nationalist groups. Nevertheless, many on the revolutionary left have shown solidarity for national liberation groups employing terrorism, such as Irish nationalists, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South American Tupamaros, seeing them as engaged in a global struggle against capitalism. Since the nationalist sentiment is fueled by socio-economic conditions, some separatist movements, including the Basque ETA, the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army, incorporated communist and socialist ideology into their policies.

Role of the Internet and social media

UNESCO explored the role of the Internet and social media on the development of radicalization among youth in a 2017 research report, Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research. The report explores violent extremism in the countries within Europe, North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean; violent radicalization in the Arab world and Africa; and, violent radicalization in Asia. At this time, more research is available on this issue within Europe, North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean than is available in the Arab world, Africa, and Asia. The report expresses a need for continued research on this topic overall as there are multiple types of radicalization (political, religious, psychosocial) that can be explored in relation to youth and the role the Internet and social media play. One key conclusion of the report is that "social media constitutes a facilitating environment rather than a driving force for violent radicalization or the actual commission of violence."

As stated before the authors of the 2017 UNESCO report repeatedly call for the support of more research into the study of online violent radicalization. Especially as it relates to young people and women as available research has been gendered. Gaps in research also apply to specific areas of the world. There is a notable absence of research on this topic when it comes to the Arab world, Africa, and Asia. So much so, that the authors of this report had difficulty developing specific conclusions about the connections between the Internet and social media, radicalization, and youth in these three areas of the world. The authors see these multiple gaps in research as opportunities for future studies, but also admit that there are specific challenges in carrying out research in this area successfully. They discuss empirical, methodological, and ethical challenges. For example, if youth and the influence of the Internet and social media on radicalizing them are to be studied, there are ethical concerns when it comes to the age of the youth being studied as well as the privacy and safety of these youth. The authors conclude their report with general recommendations as well as recommendations for government entities, the private sector, and civil society.

Mutual aid

Eli Berman's 2009 book Radical, Religious, and Violent: the New Economics of Terrorism applies a rational choice model to the process of radicalization, demonstrating that the presence of mutual aid networks increase the resilience of radical groups. When those groups decide to use violence, they also enjoy a heightened level of lethality and are protected from defection and other forms of intervention by states and outside groups.

All organizations insofar as they include the possibility of free riders by extension experience defection constraints. Within the context of a violent extremist organization, defection means either defection to a counterintelligence or security apparatus, or defection to a non-radical criminal apparatus. Both of these outcomes spoil specific plans to exercise violence in the name of the group at large. The “defection constraint” is similar to a threshold price-point in that it denotes what rewards would justify the defection of any one individual within the context of an organization. Berman uses the example of a Taliban protection racket for convoys of consumer goods moving through Afghanistan: checkpoints are set up at several points along a trade route, and each checkpoint's team is given a small percentage of the convoy's total value if it arrives safely at its destination. The incentive for any one checkpoint's team deciding to simply hijack a convoy as it passes through, sell the goods off, and escape, increases as the value of the convoy increases. The same dynamic applies to attacks; while an individual in a terrorist group may not feel drawn by the reward of alerting the police to an impending low level crime, the reward for alerting the police to an impending high-profile attack, such as a mass bombing, becomes more attractive. While non-radicalized and criminal organizations can only rely on organizational cohesion through a calculus of greed, fear, and perhaps familial loyalty, Berman argues that religious radicalization greatly increases the defection constraints of radical terrorist organizations by requiring outsized demonstrations of commitment to the cause prior to recruiting operatives.

Mutual aid is the voluntary and reciprocal exchange of goods within an organization. Examples in various religious antecedents include Judaic Tzedakah, Islamic Zakat, and various Christian institutions of charity, as described in the Acts of the Apostles. Berman argues that religious organizations experience economic risks by extending mutual aid to all alleged believers—theological assent is cheap, action can be costly. By imposing a series of outwardly visible social rules, such as restrictions (or prescriptions) on dress, diet, language, and social interactions, groups impose a cost on entering into a mutual aid partnership, diminishing the occurrence of free riding.

These restrictions have a dual effect in radical groups. Not only do they ensure that an individual is committed to the cause, but they also diminish individual's access to consumption opportunities and social interaction that might persuade them to distance themselves from the cause. As individuals become more involved with radical activities, their social circles become more constrained, which diminishes contact with non-radicalized persons and further entrenches radicalized thinking. For example, when a young man spends several years in a Yeshiva in order to establish himself within a Haredi community, he foregoes future earnings that would be accessible should he choose a secular education. To quote Berman “As consumption opportunities are limited, work for pay becomes less appealing, freeing up even more time for community activities.” This sunk cost figures into future calculations, and raises the defection constraint in a way that non-radicalized group dynamics cannot. Going back to the Taliban convoy example, not only have the two footsoldiers in question have been vetted by demonstrating commitment to the cause, they also have had their exterior options limited such that it would be difficult to blend into a new environment for lack of skills and cultural understanding. As such, the threshold price point to defect, as represented by the value of the convoy, increases to include both the price of losing their existing support network and non-quantifiable factors such as friends, family, safety, and other goods over the course of their lives.

Leading theories

While the overall arch of radicalization usually involves multiple reinforcing processes, scholars have identified a series of individual pathways to radicalization.

McCauley and Mosalenko

Clark McCauley and Sofia Mosalenko's 2009 book Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us identifies 12 following sociological and psychodynamic pathways:

Individual-level factors

Personal grievance

This pathway emphasizes revenge for real or perceived harm inflicted upon oneself by an outside party. This initial offense triggers other psychodynamic mechanisms, such as thinking in more stark in-group and out-group terms, lowered inhibitions to violence, and lessened incentives to avoid violence. Chechen “Shahidka” also known as Black Widows, women who have lost husbands, children, or other close family members in conflict with Russian forces are a good example.

Group grievance

"Group grievance" radicalization dynamics are similar to those that are primed by personal grievances; the difference is that the subject perceives harm inflicted on a group that she belongs to or has sympathy for. This pathway accounts for the larger portion of political and ethnic radical violence, in which action is taken on behalf of the group at large rather than as an act of personal revenge. Radicalization out of sympathy for an outgroup is rarer, but can be observed in the Weather Underground's attempted alignment with the Black Panthers and Viet Cong. The tie between radicalization into violent extremism through group grievance and suicide bombing has also been quantifiably demonstrated: perceived threats to proximal identity such as the presence of foreign troops or invasion accounts for the majority of suicide bombings.

Some commentators believe that the anger and suspicion directed toward innocent Muslims living in Western countries after the September 11 attacks and the indignities inflicted upon them by security forces and the general public contributes to radicalization of new recruits. Such "us vs. them" hostility cited by commentators includes political positions such as the Trump travel ban which Donald Trump initially campaigned for as "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States", or ironically Senator Ted Cruz's call to "patrol and secure Muslim neighborhoods before they become radicalized".

Slippery slope

The "Slippery slope" represents gradual radicalization through activities that incrementally narrow the individual's social circle, narrow their mindset, and in some cases desensitize them to violence. This has also been called the “True Believer” syndrome, as a product of which one becomes increasingly serious about their political, social, and religious beliefs as a product of “taking the next step”. One can begin by participating in nonviolent activities such as mutual aid, wherein the best way to raise one's in-group social status is to demonstrate seriousness about the cause and increase the level of commitment in terms of beliefs and activities. As an individual commits act after act, sunk costs are developed. Even if activity is initially only ideological or only criminal, the process of radicalization equates the two such that criminal acts are justified for intellectually radical purposes, and radical purposes are invoked to justify what are ultimately criminal acts.

Love

Romantic and familial entanglement is often an overlooked factor in radicalization. Several violent extremist organizations, especially at their origin, owe their structure to a tight-knit group of friends who share religious, economic, social, and sexual bonds. While this example is evident in more extreme cases, such as those of Charles Manson's "Family" and other radical cults, it also applies to radicalization in secular and orthodox religious environments. Love can serve as a connection between influential figures, connecting their networks of followers through a combination of attraction and loyalty. This particular force was especially notable in New Left radical groups, such as the American Weather Underground and the German Red Army Faction. The connections between Bill Ayers and Bernardine Dohrn, or between Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader served as the organizational and intellectual nucleus of these groups.

Risk and status

Within a radical group, high-risk behavior, if successful, offers a pathway to status insofar as it becomes re-construed as bravery and commitment to the cause. As such, violence or other radical activity provides a pathway to success, social acceptance, and physical rewards that might otherwise be out of reach.

Disproportionate involvement in risk taking and status seeking is particularly true of those young men who come from disadvantaged family backgrounds, have lower IQ levels, are of lower socioeconomic status, and who therefore have less opportunity to succeed in society along a traditional career path. These young men are more likely to be involved in gang activity, violent crime, and other high-risk behavior.

James Pugel conducted a study in which Liberian ex-combatants indicated that their radicalization was motivated by the opportunity to increase their economic and social status within their community. There was a belief that radicalized individuals lived better than non-radicalized individuals. Specifically, extremists groups offered compensatory employment, which provided the means for basic needs to be met such as food and housing. In addition, radicalization provided protection and safety from local violence (i.e. abductions) for their entire family.

Other researchers such as Alpaslan Ozerdem and Sukanya Podder contend that radicalization “can become the only route to survival, offering protection from torture, abuse, and politically instigated killing." Furthermore, individuals that do not join radical groups may be subjected to an indefinite “insufferable social burden that included demeaning names and labels".

Unfreezing

Loss of social connection can open an individual to new ideas and a new identity that may include political radicalization. Isolated from friends, family, or other basic needs, individuals may begin to associate with unlike parties, to include political, religious, or cultural radicals. This is especially noted in prison radicalization, where individuals bind together over racial, religious, and gang identity to a greater degree than in the outside world and often bring their newfound radical identity beyond prison to connect with radical organizations in the populace at large.

Group-level factors

Insofar as a group is a dynamic system with a common goal or set of values it is possible that the group's mindset as a whole can affect individuals such that those individuals become more radical.

Polarization

Discussion, interaction, and experience within a radical group can result in an aggregate increase in commitment to the cause, and in some cases can contribute to the formation of divergent conceptions of the group's purpose and preferred tactics. Within a radical group, internal dynamics can contribute to the formation of different factions as a result of internal disillusionment (or, conversely, ambitions) with the group's activities as a whole, especially when it comes to a choice between violent terrorism and nonviolent activism. The Weather Underground’s split with Students for a Democratic Society is one of many examples. The dynamics of group polarization imply that members of this larger group must either commit to one faction and demonstrate their loyalty through further radicalization, or leave the group entirely.

Isolation

Isolation reinforces the influence of radical thinking by allowing serious and or persuasive members of the group to disproportionately define the body's agenda. When an individual only has access to one in-group social environment, that group gains a totalizing influence over the individual—disapproval would be tantamount to social death, personal isolation, and often a lack of access to the basic services that mutual aid communities fulfill. As an isolated minority, Islamic groups in the West are especially vulnerable to this form of radicalization. Being cut off from society at large through language barriers, cultural difference, and occasionally discriminatory treatment, Muslim communities become more vulnerable to additional pathways of radicalization.

One such additional pathway of radicalization of individuals that feel isolated is the Internet. Utilizing data compiled by the Internet World Stats, Robin Thompson contends that the rate of Middle East and North African Internet usage is “above average” in comparison to other countries, yet in countries where Internet availability is more widespread, individuals are “more likely to be recruited and radicalized via the Internet.” Hence, the Internet, specifically social media sites such as extremists’ chat rooms and blogs, “lures its users with a promise of friendship, acceptance, or a sense of purpose.”

Competition

Groups can become radicalized vis-a-vis other groups as they compete for legitimacy and prestige with the general populace. This pathway emphasizes increased radicalization in an effort to outdo other groups, whether that increase is in violence, time spent in religious ritual, economic and physical hardship endured, or all four. Religious movements and the terrorist elements that form in their name display this characteristic. While in some cases there may be doctrinal or ethnic differences that motivate this kind of competition, its greatest outward sign is an increased demand by the group for commitment to radical actions.

Mass radicalization

Chairman Mao Zedong writing On Protracted War in 1938.
Jiujitsu politics

Also called "the logic of political violence", Jiujitsu politics is a form of asymmetrical political warfare in which radical groups act to provoke governments to crack down on the populace at large and produce domestic blowback that legitimates further violent action. The primary purpose of a radical group using this tactic is not to destroy the enemy outright, but to make the enemy strike at political and ideological moderates, such that the existing political order loses its claim on legitimacy while the radical group gains legitimacy. By destroying moderates, radical groups encourage a bifurcated society and use state's reactions to violence as a justification for further violence. Al-Qaeda's strategy of luring the West, specifically the United States, into ground wars in Islamic states that polarize the Ummah against the West while avoiding engagements that would allow the American military to draw on its technical superiority is an example of jiujitsu politics. David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency advisor to David Petraeus during the Iraq Surge, has called this the "accidental guerrilla syndrome".

This tactic is also pillar of Maoist insurgency and serves both the purposes of tactical and ideological advantage.

Hatred

In protracted conflicts the enemy is increasingly seen as less human, such that their common humanity does not readily trigger natural inhibitions against violence. This involves "essentializing" both the self and enemies as respectively good and evil entities. The Islamist use of Takfirism, or (apostasy), to justify the murder of non-radical Muslims and nonbelievers (kafir: "pagans") is an example of this. Hannah Arendt, in The Origins of Totalitarianism outlines a similar dynamic that contributed to the ideologies of pan-slavism, Nazism, and antisemitism, where an in-group constructs an exalted self identity for political purposes and mobilizes against out-groups in order to solidify that identity. This dynamic of hatred is not unique to rightist groups. The Weathermen and Red Army Faction often characterized police officers and government officials as “pigs” worthy of death and subhuman treatment.

Martyrdom

Martyrdom implies that the person in question died for a cause or is willing to die for a cause. The symbolic impact of martyrdom varies across cultures, but within the field of radicalization the act or pursuit of martyrdom denotes the absolute value of a radical's way of life.

Barrett

Robert Barrett is one of the leading researchers in field research with Nigerian terrorist groups. Barrett contributes a unique perspective to this type of research because his studies are conducted with current, not former, members of insurgent groups. Barrett's 2008 field research study revealed unique typologies and motivations for radicalization as reported by insurgent groups. For instance, individuals that were radicalized expressed sentiments of volunteerism, yet extremist recruiters conveyed that their objective was to make “coercion feel like volunteerism.” Barrett asserted that the motivations to become radicalized can be characterized as: ideologue, combatant, criminals, pragmatist, soldier, and follower.

Ideologues

Ideologues uphold a belief that ethnic supremacy is necessary and violence was the means to achieve this truth. Ideologues maintain a “readiness to die for the ethnic group if necessary; survival and preservation of the group or community is more important than survival or preservation of oneself”.

Combatants

Combatants’ express concerns that their basic survival depends on joining extremist groups. Hence, combatants are not motivated by ideologies and their primary objective is self-preservation.

Criminals

Criminals are predominantly motivated by their “freedom to carry out activities that would otherwise be deemed illegal”. As such, criminals thrive on instant self-gratification of engaging in violent acts against their enemies. Criminals thrive on conflict and in a sense believe their actions are heroic.

Pragmatists

Pragmatists are interested in the benefits of economic and social status mobility. Their goals are in “preserving the structures and environment conducive to either continued success or to newfound success” in wealth, land ownership, and/or mining rights.

Soldiers

Soldiers believe “injustice and insecurity” are mitigating factors for radicalization. Prominent feelings that they have a duty to fight against injustices. Soldiers are motivated by a sense that they can instrumentally affect positive change.

Followers desire a sense of group dependence and attachment to overcome feelings of being an outsider. They are overwhelmingly concerned with social perception. “Ensuring one’s acceptance and preserving or enhancing one’s social status within the community was the most important factor promoting membership”.

Misconceptions

Poverty

The association between radicalization and poverty is a myth. Many terrorists come from middle-class backgrounds and have university-level educations, particularly in the technical sciences and engineering. There is no statistical association between poverty and militant radicalization. As outlined above, poverty and disadvantage may incentivize joining a mutual aid organization with radical tendencies, but this does not mean that poverty proper is responsible for radicalization.

Mental illness

Though personal psychology does play a significant part in radicalization, mental illness is not a root cause of terrorism specifically or ideological radicalization broadly. Even in the case of suicide terrorism, psychological pathologies, such as depression and schizophrenia are largely absent.

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Entropy (information theory)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory) In info...

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