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The nuclear program can be traced back to about 1962, when North
Korea committed itself to what it called "all-fortressization", which
was the beginning of the hyper-militarized North Korea of today. In 1963, North Korea asked the
Soviet Union
for help in developing nuclear weapons, but was refused. The Soviet
Union agreed to help North Korea develop a peaceful nuclear energy
program, including the training of nuclear scientists. Later, China,
after its nuclear tests, similarly rejected North Korean requests for
help with developing nuclear weapons.
Soviet engineers took part in the construction of the
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and began construction of an IRT-2000
research reactor in 1963, which became operational in 1965 and was upgraded to 8 MW in 1974. In 1979, North Korea began to build a second research reactor in Yongbyon, as well as an ore processing plant and a
fuel rod fabrication plant.
North Korea's nuclear weapons program dates back to the 1980s. Focusing on practical uses of
nuclear energy
and the completion of a nuclear weapon development system, North Korea
began to operate facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion, and
conducted
high-explosive detonation tests. In 1985 North Korea ratified the NPT but did not include the required safeguards agreement with the
IAEA until 1992.
In early 1993, while verifying North Korea's initial declaration, the
IAEA concluded that there was strong evidence this declaration was
incomplete. When North Korea refused the requested special inspection,
the IAEA reported its noncompliance to the
UN Security Council. In 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the
NPT, but suspended that withdrawal before it took effect.
Under the 1994
Agreed Framework,
the U.S. government agreed to facilitate the supply of two light water
reactors to North Korea in exchange for North Korean disarmament. Such reactors are considered "more proliferation-resistant than North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors", but not "proliferation proof".
Implementation of the Agreed Framework foundered, and in 2002 the
Agreed Framework fell apart, with each side blaming the other for its
failure. By 2002, Pakistan had admitted that North Korea had gained
access to Pakistan's nuclear technology in the late 1990s.
Based on evidence from Pakistan, Libya, and multiple confessions
from North Korea itself, the United States accused North Korea of
noncompliance and halted oil shipments; North Korea later claimed its
public confession of guilt had been deliberately misconstrued. By the
end of 2002, the Agreed Framework was officially abandoned.
In 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. In 2005, it admitted to having nuclear weapons but vowed to close the nuclear program.
On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it had successfully conducted its
first nuclear test. An
underground nuclear explosion was detected, its yield was estimated as less than a
kiloton, and some radioactive output was detected. On January 6, 2007, the North Korean government further confirmed that it had nuclear weapons.
On March 17, 2007, North Korea told delegates at international
nuclear talks that it was preparing to shut down its main nuclear
facility. The agreement was reached following a series of
six-party talks,
involving North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the
United States begun in 2003. According to the agreement, a list of its
nuclear programs would be submitted and the nuclear facility would be
disabled in exchange for fuel aid and normalization talks with the
United States and Japan.
[26] This was delayed from April due to a dispute with the United States over
Banco Delta Asia, but on July 14,
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors confirmed the shutdown of North Korea's
Yongbyon nuclear reactor and consequently North Korea began to receive aid. This agreement fell apart in 2009, following a North Korean satellite launch.
In April 2009, reports surfaced that North Korea has become a "fully fledged nuclear power", an opinion shared by
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General
Mohamed ElBaradei. On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted a
second nuclear test, resulting in an explosion estimated to be between 2 and 7 kilotons. The 2009 test, like the 2006 test, is believed to have occurred at
Mantapsan,
Kilju County, in the north-eastern part of North Korea. This was found by an
earthquake occurring at the test site.
In February 2012, North Korea announced that it would suspend uranium enrichment at the
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center
and not conduct any further tests of nuclear weapons while productive
negotiations involving the United States continue. This agreement
included a moratorium on long-range missile tests. Additionally, North
Korea agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor operations at Yongbyon.
The United States reaffirmed that it had no hostile intent toward the
DPRK and was prepared to improve bilateral relationships, and agreed to
ship humanitarian food aid to North Korea.
The United States called the move "important, if limited", but said it
would proceed cautiously and that talks would resume only after North
Korea made steps toward fulfilling its promise.
However, after North Korea conducted a long-range missile test in April
2012, the United States decided not to proceed with the food aid.
On February 11, 2013, the
U.S. Geological Survey detected a magnitude 5.1
seismic disturbance, reported to be a
third underground nuclear test.
North Korea has officially reported it as a successful nuclear test
with a lighter warhead that delivers more force than before, but has not
revealed the exact yield. Multiple South Korean sources estimate the
yield at 6–9 kilotons, while the German
Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources estimates the yield at 40 kilotons. However, the German estimate has since been revised to a yield
equivalent of 14 kt when they published their estimations in January
2016.
On January 6, 2016 in Korea, the
United States Geological Survey detected a magnitude 5.1 seismic disturbance, reported to be a
fourth underground nuclear test. North Korea claimed that this test involved a
hydrogen bomb. This claim has not been verified.
As described below, a "hydrogen bomb" could mean one of several degrees
of weapon, ranging from enhanced fission devices to true thermonuclear
weapons.
Within hours, many nations and organizations had condemned the test.
Expert U.S. analysts do not believe that a hydrogen bomb was detonated.
Seismic data collected so far suggests a 6–9 kiloton yield and that
magnitude is not consistent with the power that would be generated by a
hydrogen bomb explosion. "What we're speculating is they tried to do a
boosted nuclear device, which is an atomic bomb that has a little bit of
hydrogen, an isotope in it called
tritium," said
Joseph Cirincione, president of the global security firm
Ploughshares Fund.
The German source which estimates for all the North Korea's past
nuclear test has instead made an initial estimation of 14 kt, which is
about the same (revised) yield as its previous nuclear test in 2013.
However, the yield estimation for January 2016 nuclear test was revised
to 10 kt in the subsequent nuclear test from North Korea.
On February 7, 2016, roughly a month after the alleged hydrogen bomb test, North Korea claimed to have put a
satellite into
orbit around the Earth.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe
had warned the North to not launch the rocket, and if it did and the
rocket violated Japanese territory, it would be shot down. Nevertheless,
North Korea launched the rocket anyway, claiming the satellite was
purely intended for peaceful, scientific purposes. Several nations,
including the United States, Japan, and South Korea, have criticized the
launch, and despite North Korean claims that the rocket was for
peaceful purposes, it has been heavily criticized as an attempt to
perform an
ICBM
test under the guise of a peaceful satellite launch. China also
criticized the launch, however urged "the relevant parties" to "refrain
from taking actions that may further escalate tensions on the Korean
peninsula".
A fifth nuclear test occurred on September 9, 2016. This test
yield is considered the highest among all five tests thus far,
surpassing its previous record in 2013. The South Korean government said
that the yield was about 10 kt despite other sources suggesting a
20 to 30 kt yield.
The same German source which has made estimation of all North Korea's
previous nuclear tests suggested an estimation of a 25 kiloton yield.
Other nations and the
United Nations have responded to North Korea's ongoing missile and nuclear development with a variety of sanctions; on March 2, 2016, the
UN Security Council voted to impose additional
sanctions against North Korea.
In 2017, North Korea test-launched two ICBMs, the second of which had sufficient range to reach the continental United States.
In September 2017, the country announced a further "perfect" hydrogen bomb test.
Nuclear weapons
Overview
Military parade in Pyongyang, 2015
The
Korean Central News Agency
claims that the "U.S. has long posed nuclear threats to the DPRK" and
"the U.S. was seized by a foolish ambition to bring down the DPRK", so
it "needed a countermeasure".
North Korea has been suspected of maintaining a clandestine nuclear
weapons development program since the early 1980s, when it constructed a
plutonium-producing
Magnox nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon.
Various diplomatic means have been used by the international community
to attempt to limit North Korea's nuclear program to peaceful power
generation and to encourage North Korea to participate in international
treaties.
In May 1992, the
International Atomic Energy Agency's
(IAEA) first inspection in North Korea uncovered discrepancies
suggesting that the country had reprocessed more plutonium than
declared. IAEA requested access to additional information and access to
two nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon. North Korea rejected the IAEA request and announced on March 12, 1993, an intention to withdraw from the NPT.
In 1994, North Korea pledged, under the
Agreed Framework
with the United States, to freeze its plutonium programs and dismantle
all its nuclear weapons programs in return for the normalization of
diplomatic relations and several kinds of assistance, including
resources for alternative energy supplies.
By 2002, the United States believed North Korea was pursuing both
uranium enrichment
technology and plutonium reprocessing technologies in defiance of the
Agreed Framework. North Korea reportedly told American diplomats in
private that they were in possession of nuclear weapons, citing American
failures to uphold their own end of the Agreed Framework as a
motivating force. North Korea later "clarified" that it did not possess
weapons yet, but that it had "a right" to possess them, despite the
Agreed Framework. In late 2002 and early 2003, North Korea began to take
steps to eject
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors while re-routing spent
fuel rods
to be used for plutonium reprocessing for weapons purposes. As late as
the end of 2003, North Korea claimed that it would freeze its nuclear
program in exchange for additional American concessions, but a final
agreement was not reached. North Korea withdrew from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003.
2006
On October 9, 2006, North Korea demonstrated its nuclear capabilities with its
first underground nuclear test, detonating a plutonium based device with an estimated yield of 0.2–1
kilotons. The test was conducted at
Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in
North Hamgyong Province,
and U.S. intelligence officials later announced that analysis of
radioactive debris in air samples collected a few days after the test
confirmed that the blast had taken place. The UN Security Council condemned the test and announced the imposition of
Resolution 1874.
Aftermath of 2006 nuclear test
On January 6, 2007, the North Korean government further confirmed that it had nuclear weapons.
In February 2007, following the
six-party talks disarmament process, Pyongyang agreed to shut down its main nuclear reactor. On October 8, 2008,
IAEA inspectors were forbidden by the North Korean government to conduct further inspections of the site.
2009
On April 25, 2009, the North Korean government announced the country's nuclear facilities had been reactivated, and that spent fuel reprocessing for arms-grade plutonium has been restored.
On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted its
second underground nuclear test.
The U.S. Geological Survey calculated its origin in proximity of the
site of the first nuclear test. The test was more powerful than the
previous test, estimated at 2 to 7 kilotons. The same day, a successful short range missile test was also conducted.
2010
In May 2010, the North Korean government claimed to have successfully performed
nuclear fusion. Although the claim was largely dismissed at the time, a 2012 analysis of radioisotopes suggested that North Korea may have performed two nuclear tests involving fusion. The paper was met with skepticism, as subsequent analysis of seismic data suggested no tests took place. In 2014, a study using seismic data found evidence for nuclear testing
but a 2016 study once again dismissed claims of nuclear testing,
suggesting that the seismic data was indicative of a minor earthquake.
2013
North Korea's ballistic missile
On February 12, monitors in Asia picked up unusual seismic activity
at a North Korean facility at 11:57 (02:57 GMT), later determined to be
an artificial quake with an initial
magnitude 4.9 (later revised to 5.1).
The Korean Central News Agency subsequently said that the country had
detonated a miniaturized nuclear device with "greater explosive force"
in an underground test. According to the Korea Institute of Geosciences and Mineral Resources, the estimated yield was 7.7–7.8 kilotons. Other researchers estimate the yield to have been 12.2 ± 3.8 kilotons.
December 2015 hydrogen bomb claim
In December 2015,
Kim Jong-un suggested that the country had the capacity to launch a
hydrogen bomb, a device of considerably more power than conventional
atomic bombs used in previous tests. The remark was met with skepticism from the
White House and from South Korean officials.
2016
First claimed North Korean hydrogen bomb test
On January 6, after reports of a magnitude 5.1 earthquake originating in northeast North Korea at 10:00:01
UTC+08:30,
the country's regime released statements that it had successfully
tested a hydrogen bomb. Whether this was in fact a hydrogen bomb has yet
to be proven. Experts have cast doubt on this claim. A South Korean spy expert suggested that it may have been an atomic bomb and not a hydrogen bomb.
Experts in several countries, including South Korea have expressed
doubts about the claimed technology because of the relatively small size
of the explosion. Senior Defense Analyst Bruce W. Bennett of research
organization RAND told the BBC that "... Kim Jong-un is either lying,
saying they did a hydrogen test when they didn't, they just used a
little bit more efficient fission weapon – or the hydrogen part of the
test really didn't work very well or the fission part didn't work very
well."
Aftermath of claimed North Korean hydrogen bomb test
Kim Jong-un, with what North Korea claims is a miniaturized silver spherical nuclear bomb, at a missile factory in early 2016.
On March 9, 2016, North Korea released a video of Kim Jong Un visiting a missile factory. The international community was skeptical,
IHS Jane's
Karl Dewey said that "It is possible that the silver sphere is a simple
atomic bomb. But it is not a hydrogen bomb." Furthermore, he said "a
hydrogen bomb would not only be in two parts but also be a different
shape".
Nations across the world, as well as
NATO
and the UN, spoke out against the tests as destabilizing, as a danger
to international security and as a breach of UN Security Council
resolutions. China, one of North Korea's allies, also denounced the test.
First nuclear warhead test explosion
On September 9, 2016, a 5.3 seismic tremor was detected by
seismograms in surrounding countries, after which North Korea confirmed
it conducted another nuclear test.
North Korea stated that this test has enabled them to confirm that its
warhead can be mounted to a missile and to verify the warhead's power.
It was previously doubted that North Korea could pair the nuclear
warhead and missile together, but South Korean experts started to
believe that North Korea can accomplish this goal within a few years after the September 9 nuclear test.
2017
On February 18, 2017, China announced that it was suspending all
imports of coal from North Korea as part of its effort to enact United
Nations Security Council sanctions aimed at stopping the country’s
nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile program.
On March 6, 2017, North Korea launched four ballistic missiles from the
Tongchang-ri region towards the Sea of Japan. The launch was condemned by the United Nations as well as South Korea. The move prompted US Secretary of State
Rex Tillerson
to embark on a diplomatic mission ten days later to Japan, South Korea
and China, in an effort to address the heightened international tension
in the region.
On April 13, 2017, White House representative Nick Rivero was quoted
saying the United States was "very close" to engaging in some sort of
retaliation towards North Korea. President Trump commented on North Korea by saying they will fight the war on terrorism no matter the cost.
On April 15, 2017, at the yearly major public holiday also known in the country as the
Day of the Sun,
North Korea staged a massive military parade to commemorate the 105th
birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung, the country’s founder and grandfather
of current leader, Kim Jong-un. The parade took place amid hot
speculation in the United States, Japan, and South Korea that the
country would also potentially test a sixth nuclear device, but failed to do so.
The parade did publicly display, for the first time, two new
intercontinental ballistic missile-sized canisters as well as
submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a land-based version of the
same.
On April 16, 2017, hours after the military parade in Pyongyang,
North Korea attempted to launch a ballistic missile from a site near the
port of
Sinpo, on the country's east coast. The missile exploded seconds after launch.
Later that month, after a visit to Washington by the top Chinese
leader, the US State Department announced that North Korea was likely to
face economic sanctions from China if it conducted any further tests.
On April 28, 2017, North Korea launched an unidentified ballistic missile over
Pukchang airfield, in North Korean territory. It blew up shortly after take-off at an altitude of approximately 70 kilometers (44 miles).
On July 4, 2017, North Korea launched Hwasong-14 from
Banghyon
airfield, near Kusong, in a lofted trajectory it claims lasted 39
minutes for 578 miles (930 km), landing in the waters of the Japanese
exclusive economic zone.
US Pacific Command
said the missile was aloft for 37 minutes, meaning that in a standard
trajectory it could have reached all of Alaska, a distance of 4,160
miles (6,690 km).
By targeting the deep waters in the Sea of Japan, North Korea was
ensuring that American or Japanese divers would encounter difficulties
when attempting to recover Hwasong-14's engine.
Equally, North Korea was not attempting to recover any re-entry debris
either, which South Korea pointed out is an indication that this first
launch was of an ICBM which was far from ready for combat.
As of July 2017, the U.S. estimated that North Korea would have a
reliable nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by
early 2018. On July 28, North Korea launched a second, apparently more
advanced, ICBM, with altitude around 3,700 km (2,300 mi), that traveled
1,000 km (620 mi) down range; analysts estimated that it was capable of
reaching the continental United States.
Aerospace engineer and weapons analyst Dr. John Schilling
estimates the current accuracy of the North's Hwasong-14 as poor, at the
mooted ranges which threaten US cities. Michael Elleman points out that July 28, 2017 missile re-entry vehicle broke up on re-entry; further testing would be required.
On August 8, 2017
The Washington Post reported that the
Defense Intelligence Agency,
in a confidential assessment, stated that North Korea has sufficiently
miniaturized a nuclear warhead to fit inside one of its long-range
missiles. On August 12
The Diplomat reported that the
Central Intelligence Agency, in a confidential assessment from early August, has concluded that the reentry vehicle in the July 28 test of
Hwasong-14
did not survive atmospheric reentry due to apogee of 3,700 kilometers
which caused structural stresses in excess of what an ICBM would have
had in minimum energy trajectory. The CIA also concluded that North
Korean reentry vehicle is likely advanced enough that it would likely
survive reentry under normal minimum energy trajectory.
On September 3, 2017, North Korea claimed to have successfully
tested a thermonuclear bomb, also known as a hydrogen bomb.
Corresponding seismic activity similar to an earthquake of magnitude 6.3
was reported by the
USGS, making the blast around 10 times more powerful than previous detonations by the country. Later the bomb yield was estimated to be 250 kilotons, based on further study of the seismic data. The test was reported to be "a perfect success" by North Korean authorities.
Jane's Information Group estimates the explosive payload of the North Korean
thermonuclear/hydrogen Teller-Ulam type bomb to weigh between 255 and 360 kilograms (562 and 794 lb).
On November 20, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that North Korea was re-listed by the
State Department as a
state sponsor of terrorism. Japan and South Korea welcomed the move as a method of increasing pressure on North Korea to negotiate about denuclearization.
On November 28, 2017, North Korea fired an intercontinental
ballistic missile in the first such launch from the country in more than
two months. The missile, believed by the U.S. Military to be an ICBM,
was launched from
Sain Ni and flew roughly 620 miles (1,000 km) before landing in the
Sea of Japan.
After North Korea claimed that the missile was capable of
"carrying [a] super-heavy [nuclear] warhead and hitting the whole
mainland of the U.S.", Kim-Jong-Un announced that they had "finally
realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear
force", putting them in a position of strength to push the United States into talks.
Fissile material production
Plutonium facilities
North Korea's plutonium-based
nuclear reactors are located at the
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, about 90 km north of
Pyongyang.
- One Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor, completed in 1967. Uranium irradiated in this reactor was used in North Korea's first plutonium separation experiments in 1975. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of the reactor is not to produce
plutonium and North Korea has had trouble acquiring enough fuel for
constant operation. The U.S. Department of Energy
estimated that this reactor could have been used to produce up to
1–2 kg of plutonium, though the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee said that the amount was no more than a few hundred grams.
- A newer nuclear reactor with a capacity of 5 MWe. This gas-graphite moderated Magnox
type reactor is North Korea's main reactor, where practically all of
its plutonium has been produced. A full core consists of 8,000 fuel rods
and can yield a maximum of 27–29 kg of plutonium if left in the reactor
for optimal burnup.
The North Korean Plutonium Stock, Mid-2006, is estimated to be able to
produce 0.9 grams of plutonium per thermal megawatt every day of its
operation. The material required to make a single bomb is approximately
four to eight kilograms.
Often, North Korea has unloaded the reactor before reaching the maximum
burnup level. There are three known cores which were unloaded in 1994
(under IAEA supervision in accordance with the Agreed Framework), 2005, and 2007.
- In 1989, the 5 MWe reactor was shut down for a period of seventy
to a hundred days. In this time it is estimated that up to fifteen
kilograms of plutonium could have been extracted. In 1994, North Korea
unloaded its reactors again. The IAEA had these under full surveillance
until later being denied the ability to observe North Korean power
plants.
Under normal operation, the reactor can produce about 6 kg of plutonium
per year although the reactor would need to be shut down and the fuel
rods extracted to begin the plutonium separation process. Hence,
plutonium separation stages alternate with plutonium production stages.
Reprocessing (also known as separation) is known to have taken place in
2003 for the first core and 2005 for the second core.
- Two Magnox reactors (50 MWe and 200 MWe), under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon.
If completed, 50 MWe reactor would be capable of producing 60 kg of
plutonium per year, enough for approximately 10 weapons and 200 MWe
reactor 220 kg of plutonium annually, enough for approximately 40
weapons. Construction was halted in 1994 about a year from completion in
accord with the Agreed Framework, and by 2004 the structures and pipework had deteriorated badly.
- Fuel reprocessing facility that recovers uranium and plutonium from spent fuel using the PUREX process. Based on extended Eurochemic reprocessing plant design at the Mol-Dessel site in Belgium. In 1994 its activity was frozen in accord with the Agreed Framework. On April 25, 2009, North Korean news agency KCNA, reported the resumption of reprocessing of spent fuel to recover plutonium.
On March 12, 1993, North Korea said that it planned to withdraw from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and refused to allow IAEA inspectors access to its nuclear sites.
By 1994, the United States believed that North Korea had enough
reprocessed plutonium to produce about 10 bombs with the amount of
plutonium increasing. Faced with diplomatic pressure after
UN Security Council Resolution 825 and the threat of American military
air strikes against the reactor, North Korea agreed to dismantle its plutonium program as part of the
Agreed Framework in which South Korea and the United States would provide North Korea with
light water reactors and
fuel oil until those reactors could be completed.
Because the light water reactors would require
enriched uranium
to be imported from outside North Korea, the amount of reactor fuel and
waste could be more easily tracked, making it more difficult to divert
nuclear waste to be reprocessed into plutonium. However, the Agreed
Framework was mired in difficulties, with each side blaming the other
for the delays in implementation; as a result, the light water reactors
were never finished. In late 2002, after fuel aid was suspended, North
Korea returned to using its old reactors.
In 2006, there were eight sites identified as potential test
explosion sites for current (and future) tests according to a statement
by the South Korean Parliament. These sites are distinguished from a
number of other nuclear materials production facilities in that they are
thought to be most closely identified with a military, or potentially
military purpose:
1. Hamgyong Bukdo (North Hamgyong) Province – two sites:
- Chungjinsi – Nuclear fuel storage site, military base and unidentified underground facility
- Kiljugun – Extensive military buildup with motorized troop
formations and construction of new advanced underground facility – Site
of May 25, 2009, Nuclear Test.
- Phunggyere – Site of October 9, 2006, Nuclear Test
2. Chagangdo Province – one site: Kanggyesi – Production center of
North Korea's advanced equipment and munitions since 1956. Also,
extensive intelligence of highly advanced underground facility.
3. Pyongan Bukdo (North Pyongan) Province – four sites:
- Yongbyonsi – 2 Sites – Location of Yongbyon Nuclear Research
Center, and the facility's Experimental Test Explosion facility and two
unidentified underground facilities. In addition, there is a
gas-graphite reactor, HE test site, nuclear fuel fabrication site,
nuclear waste storage site
- Kusungsi – Between 1997 and September 2002, approximately 70 test
explosions of North Korean munitions took place. Also, existence of
underground facility
- Taechongun – 200MWe Nuclear Energy Plant construction site. Location
of unidentified underground facility and nuclear arms/energy related
facilities known to exist
4. Pyongan Namdo (South Pyongan) Province – one site: Pyongsungsi – Location of
National Science Academy and extensive underground facility whose purpose is not known.
Highly enriched uranium program
North Korea possesses uranium mines containing an estimated 4 million tons of high-grade uranium ore.
Prime minister
Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan allegedly, through Pakistan's former top scientist,
Abdul Qadeer Khan, supplied key data, stored on CDs, on uranium enrichment and information to North Korea in exchange for
missile technology around 1990–1996, according to U.S.
intelligence officials. President
Pervez Musharraf and Prime minister
Shaukat Aziz acknowledged in 2005 that Khan had provided
centrifuges and their designs to North Korea.
In May 2008, Khan, who had previously confessed to supplying the data
on his own initiative, retracted his confession, claiming that the
Pakistan Government forced him to be a "scapegoat". He also claimed that
North Korea's nuclear program was well advanced before his visits to
North Korea.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) program was publicized in October
2002 when the United States asked North Korean officials about the
program.
Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea explicitly agreed to freeze
plutonium programs (specifically, its "graphite moderated reactors and
related facilities"). The agreement also committed North Korea to
implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, in which both Koreas committed not to have enrichment or
reprocessing facilities. The United States argued North Korea violated
its commitment not to have enrichment facilities.
In December 2002, claiming North Korean non-compliance, the
United States persuaded the KEDO Board to suspend fuel oil shipments,
which led to the end of the Agreed Framework. North Korea responded by
announcing plans to reactivate a dormant nuclear fuel processing program
and power plant north of Pyongyang. North Korea soon thereafter
expelled
United Nations inspectors and announced a unilateral "withdrawal" from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In 2007, a Bush administration official assessed that, while
there was still a "high confidence" that North Korea acquired materials
that could be used in a "production-scale" uranium program, there is
only a "mid-confidence" level such a production-scale uranium (rather
than merely plutonium) program exists.
Construction of the probable first uranium enrichment facility started in 2002 at a site known as
Kangson/Chollima by
US intelligence,
and could have been completed and developing or operating initial gas
centrifuge cascades in 2003. The facility was suspected by US
intelligence for many years.
Stockpile estimates and projections
Defense Intelligence Agency
On August 8, 2017, the
Washington Post reported recent analysis completed the previous month by the U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency
which concluded that North Korea had successfully produced a
miniaturized nuclear warhead that can fit in missiles and could have up
to 60 nuclear warheads in its inventory.
Siegfried S. Hecker
On August 7, 2017,
Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of the
Los Alamos National Laboratory
who has visited North Korea nuclear facilities many times on behalf of
the U.S., estimated that North Korea's stockpile of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium was probably sufficient for 20 to 25 nuclear weapons.
He assessed that North Korea had developed a miniaturized warhead
suitable for medium-range missiles, but would need further tests and
development to produce a smaller and more robust warhead suitable for an
intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) and re-entry into the atmosphere. He considered the warhead as
the least developed part of North Korea's plans for an ICBM.
Institute for Science and International Security
For 2013, the
Institute for Science and International Security
gave a mid-range estimate of 12 to 27 "nuclear weapon equivalents",
including plutonium and uranium stockpiles. By 2016, North Korea was
projected to have 14 to 48 nuclear weapon equivalents.
The estimate was dropped to 13 to 30 nuclear weapon equivalents in
2017, but was increased to as much as 60 equivalents later in August of
the same year. (For uranium weapons, each weapon is assumed to contain 20 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium.)
FAS
As of 2012, the
Federation of American Scientists estimated North Korea had fewer than 10 plutonium warheads.
SIPRI
As of January 2013, the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated North Korea had 6 to 8 warheads.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
As of 8 January 2018,
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris of the
Federation of American Scientists published in the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
that they "cautiously estimate that North Korea may have produced
enough fissile material to build between 30 and 60 nuclear weapons, and
that it might possibly have assembled 10 to 20.".
Chemical and biological weapons
North Korea began to develop its own
chemical industry and
chemical weapon (CW) program in 1954, immediately following the end of the
Korean War. However, substantial progress was not made until the 1960s, when
Kim Il-sung
"issued a 'Declaration for Chemicalization' whose aim was to further
develop an independent chemical industry capable of supporting various
sectors of its economy, as well as support chemical weapons production"
and established North Korea's
Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, North Korea received Soviet
and Chinese aid in developing its chemical industry. In 1979, the U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency believed that North Korea "had only a defensive CW capability."
It is unclear when North Korea "acquired the capability for independent
CW production"; estimates range from the 1970s to early 1980s. However, by the late 1980s, North Korea's CW capabilities had expanded; the
South Korean Ministry of National Defense reported in 1987 that the North "possessed up to 250 metric tons of chemical weapons" including
mustard (a
blister agent) and some
nerve agents. In 2009 the
International Crisis Group reported that the consensus expert view was that North Korea had a stockpile of about 2,500 to 5,000
metric tons of chemical weapons, including
mustard gas,
sarin (GB) and other
nerve agents. The South Korean Ministry of National Defense had the same estimate in 2010.
In 2014, the South Korean Defense Ministry estimated that "the North
had stockpiled 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons and had a
capacity to produce a variety of biological weapons." In 2015, the
U.S. Department of Defense
reported to Congress that North Korea's CW program "likely possesses a
CW stockpile" and likely had "the capability to produce nerve, blister,
blood, and choking agents."
The report also found that "North Korea probably could employ CW agents
by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery
and ballistic missiles. In addition, North Korean forces are prepared to
operate in a contaminated environment; they train regularly in chemical
defense operations."
The report indicated that North Korea "continues to develop its
biological research and development capabilities" and "may consider the
use of biological weapons as an option, contrary to its obligations
under the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention."
North Korea is a signatory to the
Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical weapons in warfare. North Korea is also a signatory to the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Although the nation has signed the BWC, it "has failed to provide a BWC Confidence-Building Measure declaration since 1990." North Korea is not a
party to the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is one of four countries that have not ratified the CWC (the others are Israel, Egypt, and
South Sudan).
North Korea has refused to acknowledge possessing chemical weapons, as called for by
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, passed in 2006.
After the 2010
bombardment of Yeonpyeong (in which North Korea attacked
Yeonpyeong Island with conventional weapons, killing a number of civilians), the
National Emergency Management Agency
of South Korea distributed 1,300 gas masks to South Koreans living in
the western border (a flashpoint for conflict); the agency also
distributed another 610,000 gas masks to members of the South Korean
civil defense corps, which numbers 3.93 million.
The agency also announced the renovation of underground emergency shelters. Gas masks are effective against some chemical agents, but not against blister agents such as mustard gas,
Lewisite, and
Phosgene oxime, which North Korea is thought to have in its stockpiles.
In October 2013, South Korea and the United States "agreed to build a
joint surveillance system to detect biochemical agents along the
demilitarized zone" and to share information.
Also in 2015, Melissa Hanham of the
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies released an analysis of a photograph of North Korean supreme leader
Kim Jong-un visiting the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute, a factory supposedly for the production of
bacillus thuringiensis of use in pesticides. Hanham's analysis concluded that the factory actually produces weaponized
anthrax. Hanham noted that pesticide production factories are "an old and
well-used cover for a biological weapons program" and an example of
dual-use technology. A number of other experts agreed that "the photos most likely show an operational biological weapons facility." The North Korean government denied the allegations; an official spokesperson for the
National Defence Commission, through the official
Korean Central News Agency, challenged the
U.S. Congress to inspect the Institute and "behold the awe-inspiring sight of the Pyongyang Bio-technical Institute."
North Korea possesses various types of chemical weapons,
including nerve, blister, blood, and vomiting agents, as well as some
biological weapons, including anthrax, smallpox, and cholera.
In 2017,
Kim Jong-nam, the estranged elder half-brother of Kim Jong-un, was assassinated with
VX nerve agent at
Kuala Lumpur International Airport in
Malaysia by suspected North Korean agents.
The identified stockpile is between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons
of chemical weapons. It is one of the world's largest possessors of
chemical weapons, ranking third after the United States and Russia.
Delivery systems
History
In
the 1960s, DPRK first received shipments of short-range ballistic
missiles from its main ally, the Soviet Union. The first weapons of this
kind to be delivered were the tactical
FROG-series. In the late 1970s or early 1980s, the DPRK received several longer range
Scud-B missiles from Egypt (which in turn received those missiles from the
USSR,
Bulgaria and Poland). The USSR had refused to supply Scuds to North
Korea, but North Korea has produced missiles based on its design. A local production basis was established, and the first modified copy was named
Hwasong-5. With time, more advanced types of missiles were developed. Eventually North Korea equipped itself with
ballistic missiles,
capable of reaching Japan. In the 1990s, North Korea sold medium-sized
nuclear capable missiles to Pakistan in a deal facilitated by China.
Status
North
Korea's ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction to a hypothetical
target is somewhat limited by its missile technology. In 2005, North
Korea's total range with its
Nodong missiles was estimated as 900 km with a 1,000 kg payload. That is enough to reach South Korea, and parts of Japan, Russia, and China. The
Hwasong-10 is a North Korean designed
intermediate-range ballistic missile with range capabilities of up to 1,550 miles (2,490 km), and could carry a nuclear warhead.
In an online interview published in 2006, the Japanese Ministry
of Defense's analyst Hideshi Takesada argued that North Korea's desire
of unification is similar to
North Vietnam,
and warned of the possibility of North Korea's compulsory merger with
South Korea by threats of nuclear weapons, taking advantage of any
possible decrease in the U.S. military presence in South Korea, after
North Korea deploys several hundred mobile ICBMs aimed at the United
States. In 2016, Israeli analyst
Uzi Rubin said that the missile program had demonstrated "remarkable achievements".
Operational delivery systems
There is evidence that North Korea has been able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead for use on a ballistic missile.
Whether North Korea has technology to protect their missiles upon
re-entry is unknown. Some analysts suggest North Korea's new missiles
are fakes. Various North Korean rocket tests continued into the 2010s, for example in
2013, in
2014,
and in 2016. North Korea performed no tests of medium-range missiles
sufficiently powerful to reach Japan in 2015, but South Korea's
Yonhap news agency believes that at least one missile fired during North Korea's March 2016 missile tests is likely a medium-range
Rodong missile.
North Korea appeared to launch a missile test from a submarine on April
23, 2016; while the missile only traveled 30 km, one U.S. analyst noted
that "North Korea's sub launch capability has gone from a joke to
something very serious".
An August 2016 North Korean missile test of a Rodong missile that flew
1,000 kilometres (620 mi) landed about 250 kilometres (160 mi) west of
Japan's
Oga Peninsula, in international waters but inside Japan's
exclusive economic zone, prompting Japan to condemn the "unforgivable act of violence toward Japan's security".
As of 2016, North Korea is known to have approximately 300 Rodong missiles whose maximum range is 800 miles (1,300 km).
Operational or successfully tested
- Hwasong-5 –
initial Scud modification. Road-mobile, liquid-fueled missile, with an
estimated range of 330 km. It has been tested successfully. It is
believed that North Korea has deployed some 150–200 such missiles on
mobile launchers.
- Hwasong-6 –
later Scud modification. Similar to the Hwasong-5, yet with an
increased range (550–700 km) and a smaller warhead (600–750 kg).
Apparently this is the most widely deployed North Korean missile, with
at least 400 missiles in use.
- Hwasong-7[180] –
larger and more advanced Scud modification. Liquid-fueled, road-mobile
missile with a 650 kg warhead. First production variants had inertial
guidance, later variants featured GPS guidance, which improves CEP accuracy to 190–250 m. Range is estimated to be between 1,300 and 1,600 km.
- Hwasong-9 is also known as Scud-ER in rest of the world is further development of Hwasong-6 with range of (1000–1000+ km) and is capable of hitting Japan.
- Hwasong-10 – believed to be a modified copy of the Soviet R-27 Zyb SLBM. Originally believed to have been tested as the first or second stage of Unha, but debris analysis showed that the Unha used older technology than it is believed the Hwasong-10 uses. Also known under the names Nodong-B, Taepodong-X, Musudan and BM25, predicted to have a range of 2,500–4,000 km. A DoD report puts BM25 strength at fewer than 50 launchers.
- Hwasong-11 –
a short-range, solid-fueled, highly accurate mobile missile, modified
copy of the Soviet OTR-21. Unknown number in service, apparently
deployed either in the late 1990s or early 2000s (decade).
- Pukkuksong-1 – a long-range, solid-fueled, SLBM. Also called the KN-11 by the Defense Department. Possibly derived from the Chinese JL-1 SLBM.
- Pukkuksong-2 – a long-range, land based development of the solid fueled Pukkuksong-1. Also known as the KN-15.
- Hwasong-12 – a medium-range, liquid-fueled, mobile missile. First tested in May 2017.
also known as KN-17 outside of Korea, South Korean experts estimate
range of 5000 to 6000 km based on successful test conducted in May.
- Hwasong-14 – Also known as the KN-20, a long-range, road transportable ICBM, tested on July 4 and 29, 2017, estimated range is 6,700–10,000 km (4,200–6,200 mi) John Schilling estimates the current accuracy of the North's Hwasong-14 as poor at the mooted ranges which threaten US cities (which would require more testing to prove its accuracy). Michael Elleman has pointed out that the NHK video
which captured the descent of the reentry vehicle (RV) shows its
failure to survive reentry. If the RV had survived reentry, the video
would have shown a bright image all the way to impact in the sea.
However a recent CIA assessment notes that North Korea’s ICBM reentry
vehicles would likely perform adequately if flown on a normal trajectory
to continental U.S. targets.
- Hwasong-15 - 13,000 km range, successfully tested on 28 November 2017.
Untested
- KN-08 – Road-mobile ICBM.
Also called the Hwasong-13 (HS-13). Maximum range >3,400 miles. The
US Defense Department estimates at least 6 KN-08 launchers are in
deployment. A modified version, the KN-14, was unveiled at a parade marking the 70th anniversary of the Workers Party of Korea. The missile development was halted due to engine problems.
Exports related to ballistic missile technology
In April 2009, the United Nations named the
Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation
(KOMID) as North Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of
equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The UN
lists KOMID as being based in the Central District, Pyongyang.
However, it also has offices in Beijing and sales offices worldwide
which facilitate weapons sales and seek new customers for North Korean
weapons.
KOMID has sold missile technology to Iran and has done deals for missile related technology with the Taiwanese.
KOMID has also been responsible for the sale of equipment, including
missile technologies, gunboats, and multiple rocket artilleries, worth a
total of over $100 million, to Africa, South America, and the Middle
East.
North Korea's military has also used a company called Hap Heng to
sell weapons overseas. Hap Heng was based in Macau in the 1990s to
handle sales of weapons and missile and nuclear technology to nations
such as Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan's medium-range ballistic missile,
the Ghauri, is considered to be a copy of North Korea's Rodong 1. In
1999, intelligence sources claim that North Korea had sold missile
components to Iran. Listed directors of Hap Heng include Kim Song in and Ko Myong Hun. Ko Myong Hun is now a listed diplomat in Beijing and may be involved in the work of KOMID.
A UN Security Council sanctions committee report stated that
North Korea operates an international smuggling network for nuclear and
ballistic missile technology, including to Myanmar (Burma), Syria, and
Iran.
Export partners
Several
countries have bought North Korean ballistic missiles or have received
assistance from North Korea to establish local missile production.
Egypt- Egypt has received technologies and assistance for manufacture of both the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6, and may have provided guidance systems or information on longer-range missiles to North Korea from the Condor/Badr program.
Iran- Iran was one of the first countries to buy North Korean missiles. Iran has established local production for the Hwasong-5 (Shahab-1), Hwasong-6 (Shahab-2) and the Rodong-1 (Shahab-3). Iran also possesses 19 land-based BM25 Musudan missiles, according to a leaked, classified U.S. State Department cable, Iran designated the Musudan as Khorramshahr (missile). This nuclear-capable missile is currently under development and failed its two known flight tests.
Pakistan- North Korean entities continued to provide assistance to Pakistan's
ballistic missile program during the first half of 1999 in return for
nuclear weapons technology. Such assistance was critical to Islamabad's
efforts to produce ballistic missiles. In April 1998, Pakistan
flight-tested the Ghauri MRBM, which is based on North Korea's Nodong
missile. Also in April 1998, the United States imposed sanctions against
Pakistani and North Korean entities for their role in transferring
Missile Technology Control Regime Category I ballistic missile-related
technology.
Syria- Syria originally obtained the SCUD-B from North Korea. North Korea may have assisted Syria in development of the SCUD-C and/or the SCUD-D.
As of 2013, Syria relies on foreign assistance from multiple countries,
including North Korea, for advanced missile components and
technologies.
In 2018, a United Nations report alleged that North Korea had been
sending technicians and material to Syria to assist in its chemical
weapons program, including acid-resistant tiles, valves, and
thermometers.
United Arab Emirates- 25 Hwasong-5s were purchased from North Korea in 1989. The UAE Union Defence Force were not satisfied with the quality of the missiles, and they were kept in storage.
Vietnam- Vietnam reportedly ordered Hwasong-5/6 missiles in 1998-99, but it is unclear if this deal was fulfilled.
Yemen- Yemen is known to have bought Scud missiles from the DPRK in the 1990s—a total of 15 missiles, conventional warheads and fuel oxidizer.
Former export partners
Libya- Libya during the rule of Muammar Gaddafi had been known to receive technological assistance, blueprints and missile parts from North Korea.
Rejection by a potential export partner
Nigeria- In January 2004, the Nigerian government announced that North Korea
had agreed to sell it missile technology, but a month later Nigeria
rejected the agreement under U.S. pressure.
International responses
In the 1990s, the United States negotiated the
Agreed Framework
to freeze North Korea's nuclear weapons program while pursuing the
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This broke down when North
Korea's clandestine uranium enrichment program came to light in 2002,
after which China convened the
Six-party talks
to negotiate a step-by-step approach to denuclearization. The Six-party
talks stalled after multiple North Korean nuclear and missile tests,
leading to increasing international
Sanctions against North Korea, including a series of
sanctions resolutions imposed by the
United Nations Security Council. In 2018
Moon Jae-in of South Korea and
Donald Trump
of the United States held a series of summits with Kim Jong-un which
led to declarations in favor of the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula.
186.5 billion rubles (2015) 
Sergey Korolev was the mastermind behind the first satellite, the first craft to deliver a human into orbit and the craft from which Aleksei Leonov performed the first spacewalk.
The first human in space and to orbit the Earth, Yuri Gagarin.
Cosmonaut Aleksei Leonov, the first person to perform an EVA (spacewalk), in 1965.
Cosmonaut Valentina Vladimirovna Tereshkova was the first woman to fly in space, aboard Vostok 6 on 16 June 1963.
Vostok was the first spacecraft to carry a human being in space
Soyuz is the longest-serving manned spacecraft design in history (1967– ), upgraded regularly
Progress is the longest-serving unmanned cargo spacecraft (1978– )
First permanently manned space station, the Soviet/Russian Mir, which orbited the Earth from 1986 until 2001
The Soviet space program produced the canceled Space Shuttle Buran based on the discontinued Buran program.
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