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Śūnyatā (
Sanskrit:
शून्यता,
romanized: śūnyatā;
Pali:
suññatā) – pronounced in English as
(shoon-ya-ta), translated most often as
emptiness and sometimes
voidness – is a
Buddhist concept which has multiple meanings depending on its doctrinal context. It is either an
ontological feature of reality, a meditative state, or a phenomenological analysis of experience.
In
Theravada Buddhism, suññatā often refers to the
non-self (Pāli:
anattā, Sanskrit:
anātman) nature of the
five aggregates of experience and the
six sense spheres. Suññatā is also often used to refer to a meditative state or experience.
In
Mahayana,
Sunyata refers to the tenet that "all things are empty of intrinsic existence and nature (
svabhava)," but may also refer to the
Buddha-nature teachings and primordial or empty awareness, as in
Dzogchen and
Shentong.
Etymology
"
Śūnyatā" (
Sanskrit) is usually translated as "devoidness," "emptiness," "hollow, hollowness," "voidness." It is the noun form of the adjective
śūnya, plus
-tā:
- śūnya means "zero," "nothing," "empty" or "void" and derives from the root śvi, meaning "hollow"
- -tā means "-ness"
Development of the concept
The concept of Sunyata as "emptiness", states Sue Hamilton, is related to the concept of
anatta in early Buddhism. Over time, many different philosophical schools or tenet-systems (Sanskrit:
siddhānta) have developed within Buddhism in an effort to explain the exact philosophical meaning of emptiness.
After the Buddha, emptiness was further developed by the
Abhidharma schools,
Nāgārjuna and the
Mādhyamaka school, an early Mahāyāna school. Emptiness ("positively" interpreted) is also an important element of the
Buddha nature literature, which played a formative role in the evolution of subsequent Mahāyāna doctrine and practice.
Early Buddhism
Pāli Nikāyas
A simile from the Pali scriptures (SN 22.95) compares form and feelings with foam and bubbles.
The
Pali canon
uses the term emptiness in three ways: "(1) as a meditative dwelling,
(2) as an attribute of objects, and (3) as a type of awareness-release."
According to
Bhikkhu Analayo, in the
Pali canon
"the adjective suñña occurs with a much higher frequency than the
corresponding noun suññatā" and emphasizes seeing phenomena as 'being
empty' instead of an abstract idea of "emptiness."
One example of this usage is in the
Pheṇapiṇḍūpama Sutta (
SN 22:95), which states that on close inspection, each of the five aggregates are seen as being void (
rittaka), hollow (
tucchaka), coreless (
asāraka). In the text a series of contemplations is given for each aggregate: form is like “a lump of foam” (
pheṇapiṇḍa); sensation like “a water bubble” (
bubbuḷa); perception like “a mirage” (
marici); formations like “a plantain tree” (
kadalik-khandha); and cognition is like “a magical illusion” (
māyā).
According to Shi Huifeng, the terms void (
rittaka), hollow (
tucchaka) and coreless (
asāraka) are also used in the early texts to refer to words and things which are deceptive, false, vain and worthless. This sense of worthlessness and vacuousness is also found in other uses of the term
māyā, such as the following:
“Monks, sensual pleasures are impermanent, hollow, false, deceptive; they are illusory (māyākatame), the prattle of fools.”
It
is said that the world is empty, the world is empty, lord. In what
respect is it said that the world is empty?" The Buddha replied,
"Insofar as it is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self:
Thus it is said, Ānanda, that the world is empty.
Emptiness as a quality of dharmas,
in the early canons, means simply that one cannot identify them as
one's own self or having anything pertaining to one's own self ...
Emptiness as a mental state, in the early canons, means a mode of
perception in which one neither adds anything to nor takes anything away
from what is present, noting simply, "There is this." This mode is
achieved through a process of intense concentration, coupled with the
insight that notes more and more subtle levels of the presence and
absence of disturbance (see MN 121).
Meditative state
Emptiness
as a meditative state is said to be reached when "not attending to any
themes, he [the bhikku] enters & remains in internal emptiness" (MN
122). This meditative dwelling is developed through the "four formless
states" of meditation or
Arūpajhānas and then through "themeless concentration of awareness."
The Cūlasuññata-sutta (MN III 104) and the Mahāsuññata-sutta (MN
III 109) outline how a monk can "dwell in emptiness" through a gradual
step by step mental cultivation process, they both stress the importance
of the impermanence of mental states and the absence of a self.
In the Kāmabhu Sutta S IV.293, it is explained that a
bhikkhu can experience a
trancelike contemplation in which perception and feeling cease. When he emerges from this state, he recounts three types of "contact" (
phasso):
- "emptiness" (suññato),
- "signless" (animitto),
- "undirected" (appaṇihito).
The meaning of emptiness as contemplated here is explained at M I.297
and S IV.296-97 as the "emancipation of the mind by emptiness" (suññatā cetovimutti) being consequent upon the realization that "this world is empty of self or anything pertaining to self" (suññam idaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā).
The term "emptiness" (suññatā) is also used in two suttas in the Majjhima Nikāya, in the context of a progression of mental states. The texts refer to each state's emptiness of the one below.
Chinese Āgamas
The Chinese
Agamas contain various parallels to the
Pheṇapiṇḍūpama Sutta. One partial parallel from the
Ekottara Agama describes the body with different metaphors: “a ball of snow”, “a heap of dirt”, “a mirage”, “an illusion” (
māyā), or “an empty fist used to fool a child”. In a similar vein, the Mūla-Sarvāstivādin
Māyājāla Sūtra, gives two sets of metaphors for each of the sensory consciousnesses to illustrate their vain illusory character.
Other Sarvāstivādin Agama sutras (extant in Chinese) which have emptiness as a theme include Samyukta Agama 335 -
Paramārtha-śunyatā-sūtra (Sutra on ultimate emptiness) and Samyukta Agama 297 -
Mahā-śunyatā-dharma-paryāya (Greater discourse on emptiness). These sutras have no parallel Pali suttas. These sutras associate emptiness with
dependent origination, which shows that this relation of the two terms was already established in pre-
Nagarjuna sources. The sutra on great emptiness states:
"What is the Dharma Discourse on Great Emptiness? It is this— ‘When this exists, that exists; when this arises, that arises.’"
The phrase "when this exists..." is a common gloss on
dependent origination. Sarvāstivādin Agamas also speak of a certain emptiness
samadhi (
śūnyatāsamādhi) as well as stating that all dharmas are "classified as conventional".
Mun-Keat Choong and
Yin Shun have both published studies on the various uses of emptiness in the
Early Buddhist Texts (Pali Canon and Chinese
Agamas). Choong has also published a collection of translations of Agama sutras from the Chinese on the topic of emptiness.
Early Buddhist schools and Abhidharma
The
Sarvastivadin school's Abhidharma texts like the
Dharmaskandhapāda Śāstra, and the later
Mahāvibhāṣa also take up the theme of emptiness vis a vis dependent origination as found in the Agamas.
Schools such as the
Mahāsāṃghika Prajñaptivādins as well as many of the Sthavira schools (except the
Pudgalavada) held that all dharmas were empty (
dharma śūnyatā). This can be seen in the early
Theravada Abhidhamma texts such as the
Patisambhidamagga which also speak of the emptiness of the five aggregates and of
svabhava as being "empty of essential nature". The Theravada
Kathavatthu also argues against the idea that emptiness is unconditioned. The
Mahāvastu, an influential
Mahāsāṃghika work, states that the Buddha
"has shown that the aggregates are like a lightning flash, as a bubble, or as the white foam on a wave."
One of the main themes of Harivarman's
Tattvasiddhi-Śāstra (3rd-4th century) is
dharma-śūnyatā, the emptiness of phenomena.
Theravāda
"When
one who has great wisdom brings [volitional formations] to mind as
not-self, he acquires the emptiness liberation" -Patis. II 58.
The
Visuddhimagga (c. 5th century CE)
,
the most influential classical Theravāda treatise, states that not-self
does not become apparent because it is concealed by "compactness" when
one does not give attention to the various elements which make up the
person. The
Paramatthamañjusa Visuddhimaggatika of
Acariya Dhammapala, a 5th century Theravāda commentary on the
Visuddhimagga,
comments on this passage by referring to the fact that we often assume
unity and compactness regarding phenomena or functions which are instead
made up of various elements, but when one sees that these are merely
empty dhammas, one can understand the not-self characteristic as
"when
they are seen after resolving them by means of knowledge into these
elements, they disintegrate like froth subjected to compression by the
hand. They are mere states (dhamma) occurring due to conditions and void. In this way the characteristic of not-self becomes more evident."
The modern Thai teacher
Buddhadasa
referred to emptiness as the "innermost heart" of the Buddhist
teachings and the cure for the disease of suffering. He stated that
emptiness, as it relates to the practice of Dhamma, can be seen both "as
the absence of
Dukkha
and the defilements that are the cause of Dukkha and as the absence of
the feeling that there is a self or that there are things which are the
possessions of a self." He also equated
nibbana with emptiness, writing that "Nibbana, the remainderless extinction of Dukkha, means the same as supreme emptiness."
Emptiness is also seen as mode of perception which lacks all the usual
conceptual elaborations we usually add on top of our experiences, such
as the sense of "I" and "Mine". According to
Thanissaro Bhikku,
emptiness is not so much a metaphysical view, as it is a strategic mode
of acting and of seeing the world which leads to liberation:
Emptiness
is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds
nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and
mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no
thought of whether there's anything lying behind them.
This mode is called emptiness because it's empty of the presuppositions
we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and
world-views we fashion to explain who we are and the world we live in.
Although these stories and views have their uses, the Buddha found that
some of the more abstract questions they raise — of our true identity
and the reality of the world outside — pull attention away from a direct
experience of how events influence one another in the immediate
present. Thus they get in the way when we try to understand and solve
the problem of suffering.
Some Theravādins such as
David Kalupahana, see
Nagarjuna's view of emptiness as compatible with the
Pali Canon. In his analysis of the
Mulamadhyamikakarika, Kalupahana sees Nagarjuna's argument as rooted in the
Kaccānagotta Sutta (which Nagarjuna cites by name). Kalupahana states that Nagarjuna's major goal was to discredit heterodox views of
Svabhava (own-nature) held by the
Sarvastivadins and establish the non-substantiality of all dharmas.
According to Peter Harvey, the Theravāda view of dhammas and sabhava is
not one of essences, but merely descriptive characteristics and hence
is not the subject of
Madhyamaka critique developed by Nagarjuna (see below).
In Theravāda, emptiness as an approach to meditation is also seen
as a state in which one is "empty of disturbance." This form of
meditation is one in which meditators become concentrated and focus on
the absence or presence of disturbances in their minds; if they find a
disturbance they notice it and allow it to drop away; this leads to
deeper states of calmness.
Emptiness is also seen as a way to look at sense experience that does
not identify with the "I-making" and "my-making" process of the mind. As
a form of meditation, this is developed by perceiving the
six sense spheres and their objects as empty of any self, this leads to a
formless jhana of nothingness and a state of equanimity.
Mathew Kosuta sees the Abhidhamma teachings of the modern Thai
teacher Ajaan Sujin Boriharnwanaket as being very similar to the
Mahayana emptiness view.
Mahayana Buddhism
There are two main sources of Indian Buddhist discussions of emptiness, the
Mahayana sutra literature,
which is traditionally believed to be the word of the Buddha in
Mahayana Buddhism and the shastra literature, which was composed by
Buddhist scholars and philosophers.
Prajñāpāramitā sūtras
In the Prajñaparamita sutras, the emptiness of phenomena is often illustrated by metaphors like drops of dew.
The
Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom) Sutras taught that all entities, including
dharmas, are empty of self, essential core, or intrinsic nature (
svabhava), being only conceptual existents or constructs. The notion of
prajña (wisdom, knowledge) presented in these sutras is a deep non-conceptual understanding of emptiness.
The Prajñāpāramitā sutras also use various metaphors to explain the
nature of things as emptiness, stating that things are like “illusions” (
māyā) and “dreams” (
svapna). The
Astasahasrika Prajñaparamita, possibly the earliest of these sutras
, states:
If
he knows the five aggregates as like an illusion, But makes not
illusion one thing, and the aggregates another; If, freed from the
notion of multiple things, he courses in peace— Then that is his
practice of wisdom, the highest perfection.
Perceiving dharmas and beings like an illusion (
māyādharmatām) is termed the "great armor" (
mahāsaṃnaha) of the
Bodhisattva, who is also termed the 'illusory man' (
māyāpuruṣa). The
Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra
adds the following similes to describe how all conditioned things are
to be contemplated: like a bubble, a shadow, like dew or a flash of
lightning.
In the worldview of these sutras, though we perceive a world of
concrete and discrete objects, these objects are "empty" of the identity
imputed by their designated labels.
In that sense, they are deceptive and like an illusion. The Perfection
of Wisdom texts constantly repeat that nothing can be found to
ultimately exist in some fundamental way. This applies even to the
highest Buddhist concepts (
bodhisattvas,
bodhicitta, and even
prajña itself). Even
nirvana itself is said to be empty and like a dream or magical illusion.
In a famous passage, the
Heart sutra, a later but influential
Prajñāpāramitā text, directly states that the
five skandhas (along with the five senses, the mind, and the four noble truths) are said to be "empty" (
sunya):
Form is emptiness, emptiness is form
Emptiness is not separate from form, form is not separate from emptiness
Whatever is form is emptiness, whatever is emptiness is form.
In the Prajñāpāramitā sutras the knowledge of emptiness, i.e.
prajñāpāramitā
is said to be the fundamental virtue of the bodhisattva, who is said to
stand on emptiness by not standing (-stha) on any other dharma
(phenomena). Bodhisattvas who practice this perfection of wisdom are
said to have several qualities such as the "not taking up" (
aparigṛhīta) and non-apprehension (
anupalabdhi) of anything, non-attainment (
aprapti), not-settling down (
anabhinivesa) and not relying on any signs (
nimitta, mental impressions).
Bodhisattvas are also said to be free of fear in the face of the
ontological groundlessness of the emptiness doctrine which can easily
shock others.
Mādhyamaka school
We
state that conditioned origination is emptiness. It is mere designation
depending on something, and it is the middle path. (24.18)
Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty. (24.19)
Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamaka states that since things have the nature of lacking true existence or own being (
niḥsvabhāva), all things are mere conceptual constructs (
prajñaptimatra) because they are just impermanent collections of causes and conditions. Because of this, Mādhyamaka is also known as
Niḥsvabhāvavāda. This also applies to the principle of causality itself, since
everything is dependently originated.
If one is unaware of this, things may seem to arise as existents,
remain for a time and then subsequently perish. In reality, dependently
originated phenomena do not arise or remain as inherently existent
phenomena and yet they still appear as a flow of conceptual constructs. Thus both existence and nihilism are ruled out. Any enduring
essential nature
would prevent the process of dependent origination, or any kind of
origination at all. For things would simply always have been, and will
always continue to be, without any change.
For Nāgārjuna, the realization of emptiness is a key understanding
which allows one to reach liberation because it is nothing but the
elimination of ignorance.
There has been significant debate, both in ancient India and in
modern scholarship, as to how to interpret Mādhyamaka and whether it is
nihilistic (a claim that Mādhyamaka thinkers vehemently denied). Some scholars like F.
Shcherbatskoy have also interpret emptiness as described by Nāgārjuna as a Buddhist transcendental
absolute, while other scholars such as
David Kalupahana consider this interpretation to be a mistake. According to Paul Williams, Nāgārjuna associates emptiness with the
ultimate truth but his conception of emptiness is not some kind of
Absolute,
but rather it is the very absence of true existence with regards to the
conventional reality of things and events in the world.
For Nāgārjuna the phenomenal world is the limited truth (
samvrtisatya) and does not really exist in the highest reality (
paramarthasatya)
and yet it has a kind of conventional reality which has its uses for
reaching liberation. This limited truth includes everything, including
the Buddha himself, the teachings (Dharma), liberation and even
Nāgārjuna's own arguments. This
two truth schema which did not deny the importance of convention allowed him to defend himself against charges of
nihilism. Because of his philosophical work, Nāgārjuna is seen by some modern interpreters as restoring the
Middle way of the Buddha, which had become influenced by absolutist metaphysical tendencies of schools like the
Vaibhasika.
Nāgārjuna is also famous for arguing that his philosophy of
emptiness was not a view, and that he in fact did not take any position
or thesis whatsoever since this would just be another form of clinging.
In his
Vigrahavyavartani Nāgārjuna outright states that he has no thesis (
pratijña) to prove. This idea would become a central point of debate for later Mādhyamaka philosophers. After Nāgārjuna, his pupil
Āryadeva (3rd century CE) commented and expanded Nāgārjuna's system. An influential commentator on Nāgārjuna was
Buddhapālita (470–550) who has been interpreted as developing the '
prāsaṅgika' approach to Nāgārjuna's works, which argues that Madhyamaka critiques of essentialism are done only through
reductio ad absurdum arguments. Like Nāgārjuna, instead of putting forth any positive position of his own,
Buddhapālita
merely seeks to show how all philosophical positions are untenable and
self contradictory without putting forth a positive thesis.
Buddhapālita is often contrasted with the works of
Bhāvaviveka (c. 500 – c. 578), who argued for the use of logical arguments using the
pramana based epistemology of Indian logicians like
Dignāga.
Bhāvaviveka
argued that Madhyamika's could put forth positive arguments of one's
own, instead of just criticizing other's arguments, a tactic called
vitaṇḍā
(attacking) which was seen in bad form in Indian philosophical circles.
He argued that the position of a Mādhyamaka was simply that phenomena
are devoid of inherent nature. This approach has been labeled the
svātantrika style of Madhyamaka by Tibetan philosophers and commentators. Another influential commentator,
Candrakīrti (
c. 600–650), critiqued Bhāvaviveka's adoption of the
pramana
tradition on the grounds that it contained a subtle essentialism and
argued that Mādhyamikas must make no positive assertions and need not
construct formal arguments.
Yogācāra school
The central text of the
Yogācāra school, the
Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, explains emptiness in terms of the three natures theory, stating that its purpose is to "establish the doctrine of the
three-own-beings (
trisvabhāva) in terms of their lack of own-nature (
niḥsvabhāvatā)." According to Andrew Skilton, in
Yogācāra, emptiness is the "absence of duality between perceiving
subject (lit. "grasper",
Skt:
grāhaka, Tib:
'dzin-pa) and the perceived
object ("grasped", Skt:
grāhya, Tib:
bzhung-ba)." This is seen in the following quote from the
Madhyāntavibhāga:
There exists the imagination of the unreal, there is no duality, but there is emptiness, even in this there is that.
In his commentary, the Indian
Yogācāra philosopher
Vasubandhu explains that imagination of the unreal (
abhūta-parikalpa)
is the "discrimination between the duality of grasped and grasper."
Emptiness is said to be "the imagination of the unreal that is lacking
in the form of being graspable or grasper." Thus in Yogacara, it can be
said that emptiness is mainly that subject and object and all
experiences which are seen in the subject-object modality are empty.
According to
Yogācāra thought, everything we conceive of is the result of the working of the
Eight Consciousnesses. The "things" we are conscious of are "mere concepts" (
vijñapti), not 'the thing in itself'.
In this sense, our experiences are empty and false, they do not reveal
the true nature of things as an enlightened person would see them, which
would be
non-dual, without the imputed subject object distinction.
The
Yogācāra school philosophers
Asaṅga and
Vasubandhu criticized those in the Madhymamika school who "adhere to non-existence" (
nāstikas, vaināśkas)
and sought to move away from their negative interpretation of emptiness
because they feared any philosophy of 'universal denial' (
sarva-vaināśika) would stray into '
nihilism' (
ucchedavāda), an extreme which was not the
middle way.
Yogacarins differed from Madhyamikas in positing that there really was
something which could be said to 'exist' in experience, namely some kind
of nonobjective and empty perception. This Yogacara conception of
emptiness, which states that there is
something that exists (mainly,
vijñapti, mental construction), and that it is empty, can be seen in the following statement of Vasubandhu:
Thus,
when something is absent [in a receptacle], then one, seeing that
[receptacle] as devoid of that thing, perceives that [receptacle] as it
is, and recognises that [receptacle], which is left over, as it is,
namely as something truly existing there.
This tendency can also be seen in
Asaṅga, who argues in his
Bodhisattvabhūmi that there must be something that exists which is described as empty:
Emptiness
is logical when one thing is devoid of another because of that
[other's] absence and because of the presence of the empty thing itself.
The
nonexistence of duality is indeed the existence of nonexistence; this
is the definition of emptiness. It is neither existence, nor
nonexistence, neither different nor identical.
This "existence of nonexistence" definition of emptiness can also be seen in
Asaṅga's
Abhidharmasamuccaya where he states that emptiness is "the non-existence of the self, and the existence of the no-self."
In the sixth century, scholarly debates between Yogacarins and Madhyamikas centered on the status and reality of the
paratantra-svabhāva (the "dependent nature"), with Madhyamika's like Bhāvaviveka criticizing the views of Yogacarins like
Dharmapāla of Nalanda as reifying
dependent origination.
Buddha-nature
An influential division of 1st-millennium CE Buddhist texts develop the notion of Tathāgatagarbha or Buddha-nature. The Tathāgatagarbha
doctrine, at its earliest probably appeared about the later part of the
3rd century CE, and is verifiable in Chinese translations of 1st
millennium CE.
The
Tathāgatagarbha is the topic of the
Tathāgatagarbha sūtras, where the title itself means a
garbha (womb, matrix, seed) containing
Tathāgata (Buddha). In the
Tathāgatagarbha
sūtras' the perfection of the wisdom of not-self is stated to be the
true self. The ultimate goal of the path is characterized using a range
of positive language that had been used in Indian philosophy previously
by essentialist
philosophers, but which was now transmuted into a new Buddhist
vocabulary to describe a being who has successfully completed the
Buddhist path.
These
Sutras suggest, states Paul Williams, that 'all sentient beings contain a
Tathāgata as their 'essence, core or essential inner nature'.
They also present a further developed understanding of emptiness,
wherein the Buddha Nature, the Buddha and Liberation are seen as
transcending the realm of emptiness, i.e. of the conditioned and
dependently originated phenomena.
One of these texts, the
Angulimaliya Sutra, contrasts between empty phenomena such as the moral and emotional afflictions (
kleshas), which are like ephemeral hailstones, and the enduring, eternal Buddha, which is like a precious gem:
The tens of millions of afflictive
emotions like hail-stones are empty. The phenomena in the class of
non-virtues, like hail-stones, quickly disintegrate. Buddha, like a
vaidurya jewel, is permanent ... The liberation of a buddha also is form
... do not make a discrimination of non-division, saying, "The
character of liberation is empty".'
The
Śrīmālā Sūtra is one of the earliest texts on
Tathāgatagarbha
thought, composed in 3rd century in south India, according to Brian
Brown. It asserted that everyone can potentially attain Buddhahood, and
warns against the doctrine of Sunyata. The
Śrīmālā Sūtra posits that the Buddha-nature is ultimately identifiable as the
supramundane nature of the Buddha, the
garbha
is the ground for Buddha-nature, this nature is unborn and undying, has
ultimate existence, has no beginning nor end, is nondual, and
permanent. The text also adds that the
garbha
has "no self, soul or personality" and "incomprehensible to anyone
distracted by sunyata (voidness)"; rather it is the support for
phenomenal existence.
The notion of Buddha-nature and its interpretation was and continues to be widely debated in all schools of
Mahayana Buddhism. Some traditions interpret the doctrine to be equivalent to emptiness (like the Tibetan
Gelug school), the positive language of the texts
Tathāgatagarbha sutras are then interpreted as being of provisional meaning, and not ultimately true. Other schools however (mainly the
Jonang school), see
Tathāgatagarbha as being an ultimate teaching and see it as an eternal, true self, while Sunyata is seen as a provisional, lower teaching.
Likewise, western scholars have been divided in their interpretation of the Tathāgatagarbha,
since the doctrine of an 'essential nature' in every living being
appears to be confusing, since it seems to be equivalent to a 'Self',
which seems to contradict the doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist
texts. Some scholars, however, view such teachings as metaphorical, not
to be taken literally.
According to some scholars, the Buddha nature which these sutras discuss, does not represent a substantial self (
ātman).
Rather, it is a positive expression of emptiness, and represents the
potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. In this
view, the intention of the teaching of Buddha nature is soteriological
rather than theoretical.
According to others, the potential of salvation depends on the
ontological reality of a salvific, abiding core reality — the
Buddha-nature, empty of all mutability and error, fully present within
all beings. Japanese scholars of the "
Critical Buddhism" movement meanwhile see Buddha-nature as an
essentialist and thus an un-Buddhist idea.
Tibetan Buddhism
In Tibetan Buddhism, emptiness is often symbolized by and compared to the open sky which is associated with openness and freedom.
In Tibet, a distinction also began to be made between the Autonomist (
Svātantrika, rang rgyud pa) and Consequentialist (
Prāsaṅgika, thal ’gyur pa) approaches to
Mādhyamaka
reasoning about emptiness. The distinction was invented by Tibetan
scholarship, and not one made by classical Indian Madhyamikas.
Further Tibetan philosophical developments began in response to the works of the influential scholar
Dolpopa (1292–1361) and led to two distinctly opposed Tibetan
Mādhyamaka views on the nature of emptiness and ultimate reality.
One of these is the view termed
shentong (
Wylie:
gzhan stong, other empty), which is a further development of Indian
Yogacara-Madhyamaka and the Buddha-nature teachings by
Dolpopa, and is primarily promoted in the
Jonang school but also by some
Kagyu figures like
Jamgon Kongtrul. This view states that ultimate reality is empty of the conventional, but it is itself
not empty of being ultimate
Buddhahood and the
luminous nature of mind. Dolpopa considered his view a form of
Mādhyamaka, and called his system "Great
Mādhyamaka". In
Jonang,
this ultimate reality is a "ground or substratum" which is "uncreated
and indestructible, noncomposite and beyond the chain of dependent
origination."
Rangtong (
Wylie:
rang stong; self-empty) refers to views which oppose
shentong
and state that ultimate reality is that which is empty of self nature
in a relative and absolute sense; that is to say ultimate reality is
empty of everything, including itself. It is thus not a transcendental
ground or metaphysical
absolute, but just the absence of true existence (
svabhava). This view has sometimes been applied to the
Gelug school because they tend to hold that emptiness is "an absolute negation" (
med dgag).
However many Tibetan philosophers reject these terms as descriptions of their views on emptiness. The
Sakya thinker
Gorampa Sonam Senge (1429-1489) for example, called his version of
Mādhyamaka, "freedom from extremes" or "freedom from proliferations" (
spros bral) and claimed that the ultimate truth was ineffable, beyond predication or concept.
For Gorampa, emptiness is not just the absence of inherent existence,
but it is the absence of the four extremes in all phenomena i.e.
existence, nonexistence, both and neither (see:
catuskoti).
According
to the theory of emptiness, any belief in an objective reality grounded
in the assumption of intrinsic, independent existence is simply
untenable.
All things and events, whether 'material', mental or even
abstract concepts like time, are devoid of objective, independent
existence ... [T]hings and events are 'empty' in that they can never
possess any immutable essence, intrinsic reality or absolute 'being'
that affords independence.
Chinese Buddhism
Sānlùn school
When Buddhism was introduced in China it was initially understood in
terms of indigenous Chinese philosophical culture. Because of this,
emptiness (
Ch.,
kong, 空;) was at first understood as pointing to a kind of transcendental reality similar to the
Tao. It took several centuries to realize that
śūnyatā does not refer to an essential transcendental reality underneath or behind the world of appearances.
Chinese Mādhyamaka (known as
Sānlùn, or the "three treatise school") began with the work of
Kumārajīva (344–413 CE) who translated the works of Nāgārjuna into Chinese.
Sānlùn figures like Kumārajīva's pupil
Sengzhao (384–414), and the later
Jizang
(549–623) were influential in introducing a more orthodox and
non-essentialist interpretation of emptiness to Chinese Buddhism.
Sengzhao argues for example, that the nature of phenomena could not be
said to be either existent or non-existent and that it was necessary to
go beyond conceptual proliferation to realize emptiness.
Jizang (549–623) was another central figure in Chinese Madhyamaka who wrote numerous commentaries on Nāgārjuna and
Aryadeva and is considered to be the leading representative of the school.
Jizang
called his method "deconstructing what is misleading and revealing what
is corrective". He insisted that one must never settle on any
particular viewpoint or perspective but constantly reexamine one's
formulations to avoid
reifications of thought and behavior.
In the modern era, one major Chinese figure who has written on
Mādhyamaka is the scholar monk
Yin Shun (1906–2005)
.
Tiantai and Huayan
Later Chinese philosophers developed their own unique interpretations of emptiness. One of these was
Zhiyi, the intellectual founder of the
Tiantai school who was strongly influenced by the
Lotus sutra. The Tiantai view of emptiness and
dependent origination
is inseparable from their view of the "interfusion of phenomena" and
the idea that the ultimate reality is an absolute totality of all
particular things which are "Neither-Same-Nor-Different" from each
other.
In Tiantai metaphysics, every event, function, or characteristic
is the product of the interfusion of all others, the whole is in the
particular and every particular event/function is also in every other
particular. This also leads to the conclusion that all phenomena are
"findable" in each and every other phenomena, even seemingly conflicting
phenomena such as good and evil, or delusion and enlightenment are
interfused with each other.
The
Huayan school understood emptiness and ultimate reality through the similar idea of
interpenetration or "coalescence" (Wylie:
zung-'jug; Sanskrit:
yuganaddha), using the concept of
Indra's net to illustrate this.
Chán
Chan Buddhism was influenced by all the previous Chinese Buddhist currents. The
Mādhyamaka of Sengzhao for example, influenced the views of the Chan patriarch
Shen Hui (670-762), a critical figure in the development of Chan, as can be seen by his "Illuminating the Essential Doctrine" (
Hsie Tsung Chi). This text emphasizes that true emptiness or
Suchness cannot be known through
thought since it is free from thought (
wu-nien). Shen Hui also states that true emptiness is not nothing, but it is a "Subtle Existence" (
miao-yu), which is just "Great
Prajña."
The Chinese Chan presentation of emptiness, influenced by
Yogacara and the
Tathāgatagarbha sutras, also used more positive language and poetic metaphors to describe the nature of emptiness. For example,
Hongzhi Zhengjue (1091–1157), the founder of the
Caodong lineage, wrote:
"The
field of boundless emptiness is what exists from the very beginning.
You must purify, cure, grind down, or brush away all the tendencies you
have fabricated into apparent habits. [Those tendencies are the clouds
in our eyes.] Then you can reside in a clear circle of brightness. Utter
emptiness has no image. Upright independence does not rely on anything.
Just expand and illuminate the original truth unconcerned by external
conditions. Accordingly, we are told to realize that not a single thing
exists. In this field birth and death do not appear. The deep source,
transparent down to the bottom, can radiantly shine and can respond
unencumbered to each speck of dust [each object] without becoming its
partner. The subtlety of seeing and hearing transcends mere colors and
sounds. The whole affair functions without leaving traces and mirrors
without obscurations. Very naturally, mind and Dharmas emerge and
harmonize."
The Tiantai and Huayan views of emptiness as interpenetration and interconnection also influenced the views of the
Chan school, and is still discernible in modern
Zen. One modern figure who has adopted an interpretation of emptiness influenced by these two schools is
Thich Nhat Hanh, who explains emptiness through the similar idea of "Interbeing".
Western Buddhism
Various western Buddhists note that
sunyata
refers to the emptiness of inherent existence, as in Madhyamaka; but
also to the emptiness of mind or awareness, as open space and the
"ground of being," as in meditation-orientated traditions and approaches
such as Dzogchen and
Shentong.
Hinduism
Influence on Advaita Vedanta
Gaudapada is considered by some scholars to have been strongly influenced by Buddhism, as he developed his concept of
"ajāta" from Nagajurna's Madhyamaka philosophy, which uses the term "anutpāda":
- "An" means "not", or "non"
- "Utpāda" means "genesis", "coming forth", "birth"
Taken together "anutpāda" means "having no origin", "not coming into existence", "not taking effect", "non-production".
But Gaudapada's perspective is quite different from Nagarjuna. Gaudapada's perspective found in
Mandukya Karika is based on the
Mandukya Upanishad. According to Gaudapada, the metaphysical absolute called
Brahman
never changes, while the phenomenal world changes continuously, so the
phenomenal world cannot arise independently from Brahman. If the world
cannot arise, yet is an empirical fact, than the perceived world has to
be a transitory (unreal) appearance of Brahman. And if the phenomenal
world is a transitory appearance, then there is no real origination or
destruction, only apparent origination or destruction. From the level of
ultimate truth (
paramārthatā) the phenomenal world is
māyā, "illusion", apparently existing but ultimately not metaphysically real.
In
Gaudapada-Karika, chapter III, verses 46-48, he states that
Brahman never arises, is never born, is never unborn, it rests in itself:
When the mind does not lie low, and
is not again tossed about, then that being without movement, and not
presenting any appearance, culminates into Brahman.
Resting in itself, calm, with Nirvana, indescribable, highest
happiness, unborn and one with the unborn knowable, omniscient they say.
No creature whatever is born, no origination of it exists or takes
place. This is that highest truth where nothing whatever is born.
— Gaudapada Karika, 3.46-48, Translated by RD Karmarkar
In contrast to Renard's view, Karmarkar states the Ajativada of Gaudapada has nothing in common with the
Śūnyatā concept in Buddhism.
While the language of Gaudapada is undeniably similar to those found in
Mahayana Buddhism, states Comans, their perspective is different
because unlike Buddhism, Gaudapada is relying on the premise of
"Brahman,
Atman or Turiya" exist and are the nature of absolute reality.
In Shaivism
Sunya and
Sunyatisunya are concepts which appear in some
Shaiva texts, such as the
Vijñāna Bhairava Tantra, which contains several verses mentioning voidness as a feature of ultimate reality -
Shiva:
"The Absolute void is Bhairava who is beyond the senses
and the mind, beyond all the categories of these instruments. From the
point of view of the human mins, He is most void. from the point of view
of Reality, He is most full, for He is the source of all
manifestation."
"The yogi should concentrate intensely on the idea (and
also feel) that this universe is totally void. In that void, his mind
would become absorbed. Then he becomes highly qualified for absorption
i.e. his mind is absorbed in the absolute void (sunyatisunya)."
In a series of Kannada language texts of
Lingayatism, a Shaivism tradition,
shunya is equated to the concept of the Supreme. In particular, the
Shunya Sampadane texts present the ideas of
Allama Prabhu in a form of dialogue, where
shunya
is that void and distinctions which a spiritual journey seeks to fill
and eliminate. It is the described as a state of union of one's soul
with the infinite Shiva, the state of blissful moksha.
In Vaishnavism
Shunya Brahma is a concept found in certain texts of
Vaishnavism, particularly in
Odiya, such as the poetic
Panchasakhas. It explains the
Nirguna Brahman
idea of Vedanta, that is the eternal unchanging metaphysical reality as
"personified void". Alternate names for this concept of Hinduism,
include
shunya purusha and
Jagannatha (Vishnu) in certain text. However, both in Lingayatism and various flavors of Vaishnavism such as
Mahima Dharma, the idea of
Shunya is closer to the Hindu concept of metaphysical
Brahman, rather than to the
Śūnyatā concept of Buddhism. However, there is some overlap, such as in the works of Bhima Bhoi.
nāhi tāhāra rūpa varṇa, adṛsha avarṇa tā cinha.
tāhāku brahmā boli kahi, śūnya brahmhati se bolāi.
It has no shape, no colour,
It is invisible and without a name
This Brahman is called Shunya Brahman.
The
Panchasakhas practiced a form of
Bhakti called Jnana-mishrita Bhakti-marga, which saw the necessity of knowledge (
Jnana) and devotion -
Bhakti.
Alternate translations
- Emptiness
- Interdependence (Ringu Tulku)
- Openness
- Transparency (Cohen)
- Spaciousness
- Thusness
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