Biocentrism (from Greek βίος bios, "life" and κέντρον kentron, "center"), in a political and ecological sense, as well as literally, is an ethical point of view that extends inherent value to all living things. It is an understanding of how the earth works, particularly as it relates to its biosphere or biodiversity. It stands in contrast to anthropocentrism, which centers on the value of humans. The related ecocentrism extends inherent value to the whole of nature.
Biocentrism does not imply the idea of equality among the animal
kingdom, for no such notion can be observed in nature. Biocentric
thought is nature-based, not human-based.
The term biocentrism encompasses all environmental ethics that "extend the status of moral object from human beings to all living things in nature". Biocentric ethics calls for a rethinking of the relationship between humans and nature. It states that nature does not exist simply to be used or consumed by humans, but that humans are simply one species amongst many, and that because we are part of an ecosystem, any actions which negatively affect the living systems of which we are a part adversely affect us as well, whether or not we maintain a biocentric worldview. Biocentrists observe that all species have inherent value, and that humans are not "superior" to other species in a moral or ethical sense.
The four main pillars of a biocentric outlook are:
Humans and all other species are members of Earth's community.
All species are part of a system of interdependence.
All living organisms pursue their own "good" in their own ways.
Human beings are not inherently superior to other living things.
Biocentrism views individual species as parts of the living
biosphere. It observes the consequences of reducing biodiversity on both
small and large scales and points to the inherent value all species
have to the environment.
The environment is seen for what it is; the biosphere within
which we live and depend on its diversity for our health. From these
observations the ethical points are raised.
History and development
Biocentric
ethics differs from classical and traditional ethical thinking. Rather
than focusing on strict moral rules, as in Classical ethics, it focuses
on attitudes and character. In contrast with traditional ethics, it is
nonhierarchical and gives priority to the natural world rather than to
humankind exclusively.
Albert Schweitzer's "reverence for life" principle was a precursor of modern biocentric ethics.
In contrast with traditional ethics, the ethics of "reverence for life"
denies any distinction between "high and low" or "valuable and less
valuable" life forms, dismissing such categorization as arbitrary and
subjective.
Conventional ethics concerned itself exclusively with human beings—that
is to say, morality applied only to interpersonal relationships—whereas
Schweitzer's ethical philosophy introduced a "depth, energy, and
function that differ[s] from the ethics that merely involved humans".
"Reverence for life" was a "new ethics, because it is not only an
extension of ethics, but also a transformation of the nature of ethics".
Similarly, Peter Singer argues that non-human animals deserve the same equality of consideration that we extend to human beings. His argument is roughly as follows:
Membership in the species Homo sapiens is the only criterion of moral importance that includes all humans and excludes all non-humans.
Using membership in the species Homo sapiens as a criterion of moral importance is completely arbitrary.
Of the remaining criteria we might consider, only sentience is a plausible criterion of moral importance.
Using sentience as a criterion of moral importance entails that we
extend the same basic moral consideration (i.e. "basic principle of
equality") to other sentient creatures that we do to human beings.
Therefore, we ought to extend to animals the same equality of consideration that we extend to human beings.
Singer's work, while notable in the canon of environmental ethics,
should not be considered as fully biocentric however. Singer's ethics is
extended from humans to nonhuman animals because the criterion for
moral inclusion (sentience) is found in both humans and nonhuman
animals, thus it would be arbitrary to deny it to nonhuman animals
simply because they were not human. However, not all biological entities
are sentient, consider: algae, plants and trees, fungi, lichens,
mollusks, protozoa, for example. For an ethical theory to be biocentric,
it must have a reason for extending ethical inclusion to the entire
biosphere (as in Taylor and Schweitzer). The requirement for
environmental ethics to move beyond sentience as criteria for inclusion
in the moral realm is discussed in Tom Regan's 1981 paper "The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic".
Biocentrism is most commonly associated with the work of Paul W. Taylor, especially his book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (1986).
Taylor maintains that biocentrism is an "attitude of respect for
nature", whereby one attempts to make an effort to live one's life in a
way that respects the welfare and inherent worth of all living creatures. Taylor states that:
Humans are members of a community of life along with all other species, and on equal terms.
This community consists of a system of interdependence between all
members, both physically, and in terms of relationships with other
species.
Every organism is a "teleological centre of life", that is, each organism has a purpose and a reason for being, which is inherently "good" or "valuable".
Humans are not inherently superior to other species.
Historian Donald Worster traces today's biocentric philosophies, which he sees as part of a recovery of a sense of kinship between man and nature, to the reaction by the British intelligencia of the Victorian era against the Christian ethic of dominion over nature. He has pointed to Charles Darwin as an important spokesman for the biocentric view in ecological thought and quotes from Darwin's Notebook on Transmutation of Species (1837):
If
we choose to let conjecture run wild, then animals, our fellow brethren
in pain, diseases, death, suffering and famine—our slaves in the most
laborious works, our companions in our amusement—they may partake of our
origin in one common ancestor—we may be all netted together.
In 1859, Charles Darwin published his book On the Origin of Species.
This publication sparked the beginning of biocentrist views by
introducing evolution and "its removal of humans from their supernatural
origins and
placement into the framework of natural laws".
The work of Aldo Leopold has also been associated with biocentrism. The essay "The Land Ethic" in Leopold's book Sand County Almanac
(1949) points out that although throughout history women and slaves
have been considered property, all people have now been granted rights
and freedoms.
Leopold notes that today land is still considered property as people
once were. He asserts that ethics should be extended to the land as "an
evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity".
He argues that while people's instincts encourage them to compete with
others, their ethics encourage them to co-operate with others.
He suggests that "the land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the
community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or
collectively: the land". In a sense this attitude would encourage humans to co-operate with the land rather than compete with it.
Outside of formal philosophical works biocentric thought is
common among pre-colonial tribal peoples who knew no world other than
the natural world.
In law
The paradigm of biocentrism and the values that it promotes are beginning to be used in law.
In recent years, cities in Maine, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and Virginia have adopted laws that protect the rights of nature. The purpose of these laws is to prevent the degradation of nature, especially by corporations who may want to exploit natural resources and land space, and to also use the environment as a dumping ground for toxic waste.
The first country to include rights of nature in its constitution is Ecuador (see 2008 Constitution of Ecuador).
Article 71 states that nature "has the right to integral respect for
its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life
cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes".
In religion
Islam
In Islam:
In Islam, biocentric ethics stem from the belief that all of creation belongs to Allah
(God), not humans, and to assume that non-human animals and plants
exist merely to benefit humankind leads to environmental destruction and
misuse.
As all living organisms exist to praise God, human destruction of other
living things prevents the earth's natural and subtle means of praising
God. The Qur'an acknowledges that humans are not the only all-important creatures and emphasizes a respect for nature. Muhammad
was once asked whether there would be a reward for those who show
charity to nature and animals, to which he replied, "for charity shown
to each creature with a wet heart [i.e. that is alive], there is a
reward."
Hinduism
In Hinduism:
Hinduism contains many elements of biocentrism. In Hinduism, humans have
no special authority over other creatures, and all living things have
souls ('atman'). Brahman (God) is the "efficient cause" and Prakrti (nature), is the "material cause" of the universe.
However, Brahman and Prakrti are not considered truly divided: "They
are one in [sic] the same, or perhaps better stated, they are the one in
the many and the many in the one."
However, while Hinduism does not give the same direct authority over nature that the Judeo-Christian God grants, they are subject to a "higher and more authoritative responsibility for creation". The most important aspect of this is the doctrine of Ahimsa (non-violence). The Yājñavalkya Smṛti
warns, "the wicked person who kills animals which are protected has to
live in hell fire for the days equal to the number of hairs on the body
of that animal". The essential aspect of this doctrine is the belief that the Supreme Being incarnates into the forms of various species. The Hindu belief in Saṃsāra
(the cycle of life, death and rebirth) encompasses reincarnation into
non-human forms. It is believed that one lives 8,400,000 lifetimes
before one becomes a human. Each species is in this process of samsara
until one attains moksha (liberation).
Another doctrinal source for the equal treatment of all life is found in the Rigveda.
The Rigveda states that trees and plants possess divine healing
properties. It is still popularly believed that every tree has a
Vriksa-devata (a tree deity).Trees are ritually worshiped through
prayer, offerings, and the sacred thread ceremony. The Vriksa-devata
worshiped as manifestations of the Divine. Tree planting is considered a
religious duty.
Jainism
In Jainism:
The Jaina tradition exists in tandem with Hinduism and shares many of its biocentric elements.
Ahimsa (non-violence), the central teaching of Jainism, means more than not hurting other humans. It means intending not to cause physical, mental or spiritual harm to any part of nature. In the words of Mahavira: 'You are that which you wish to harm.' Compassion is a pillar of non-violence. Jainism encourages people to practice an attitude of compassion towards all life.
The principle of interdependence
is also very important in Jainism. This states that all of nature is
bound together, and that "if one does not care for nature one does not
care for oneself.".
Another essential Jain teaching is self-restraint. Jainism discourages wasting the gifts of nature, and encourages its practitioners to reduce their needs as far as possible. Gandhi, a great proponent of Jainism, once stated "There is enough in this world for human needs, but not for human wants."
Buddhism
In Buddhism:
The Buddha's teachings encourage people "to live simply, to cherish tranquility, to appreciate the natural cycle of life".
Buddhism emphasizes that everything in the universe affects everything
else. "Nature is an ecosystem in which trees affect climate, the soil,
and the animals, just as the climate affects the trees, the soil, the
animals and so on. The ocean, the sky, the air are all interrelated, and
interdependent—water is life and air is life."
Although this holistic approach is more ecocentric than
biocentric, it is also biocentric, as it maintains that all living
things are important and that humans are not above other creatures or
nature. Buddhism teaches that "once we treat nature as our friend, to
cherish it, then we can see the need to change from the attitude of
dominating nature to an attitude of working with nature—we are an
intrinsic part of all existence rather than seeing ourselves as in
control of it."
Criticism
Biocentrism
has faced criticism for a number of reasons. Some of this criticism
grows out of the concern that biocentrism is an anti-human paradigm and
that it will not hesitate to sacrifice human well-being for the greater
good. Biocentrism has also been criticized for its individualism;
emphasizing too much on the importance of individual life and
neglecting the importance of collective groups, such as an ecosystem.
A more complex form of criticism focuses on the contradictions of biocentrism. Opposed to anthropocentrism, which sees humans as having a higher status than other species, biocentrism puts humans on a par with the rest of nature, and not above it. In his essay A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism Richard Watson suggests that if this is the case, then "Human ways—human culture—and human actions are
as natural as the ways in which any other species of animals behaves".
He goes on to suggest that if humans must change their behavior to
refrain from disturbing and damaging the natural environment, then that
results in setting humans apart from other species and assigning more
power to them.
This then takes us back to the basic beliefs of anthropocentrism.
Watson also claims that the extinction of species is "Nature's way"
and that if humans were to instigate their own self-destruction by
exploiting the rest of nature, then so be it. Therefore, he suggests
that the real reason humans should reduce their destructive behavior in
relation to other species is not because we are equals but because the
destruction of other species will also result in our own destruction. This view also brings us back to an anthropocentric perspective.
Gaia philosophy (named after Gaia, Greekgoddess of the Earth) is a broadly inclusive term for related concepts that living organisms on a planet will affect the nature of their environment in order to make the environment more suitable for life. This set of hypotheses holds that all organisms on a life-giving planet regulate the biosphere
in such a way as to promote its habitability. Gaia concept draws a
connection between the survivability of a species (hence its evolutionary course) and its usefulness to the survival of other species.
While there were a number of precursors to Gaia hypothesis, the first scientific form of this idea was proposed as the Gaia hypothesis by James Lovelock, a UK chemist, in 1970. The Gaia hypothesis deals with the concept of biological homeostasis,
and claims the resident life forms of a host planet coupled with their
environment have acted and act like a single, self-regulating system.
This system includes the near-surface rocks, the soil, and the
atmosphere. Today many scientists consider such ideas to be unsupported
by, or at odds with, the available evidence (see Gaia hypothesis criticism). These theories are however significant in green politics.
Predecessors to the Gaia theory
There
are some mystical, scientific and religious predecessors to the Gaia
philosophy, which had a Gaia-like conceptual basis. Many religious
mythologies had a view of Earth as being a whole that is greater than
the sum of its parts (e.g. some Native American religions and various
forms of shamanism).
Lewis Thomas believed that Earth should be viewed as a single cell; he derived this view from Johannes Kepler's view of Earth as a single round organism.
Isaac Newton wrote of the earth, "Thus this Earth resembles a great animal or rather inanimate vegetable, draws in æthereall
breath for its dayly refreshment & vitall ferment & transpires
again with gross exhalations, And according to the condition of all
other things living ought to have its times of beginning youth old age
& perishing."
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a paleontologist and geologist,
believed that evolution fractally unfolded from cell to organism to
planet to solar system and ultimately the whole universe, as we humans
see it from our limited perspective. Teilhard later influenced Thomas Berry and many Catholic humanist thinkers of the 20th century.
Buckminster Fuller
is generally credited with making the idea respectable in Western
scientific circles in the 20th century. Building to some degree on his
observations and artifacts, e.g. the Dymaxion map of the Earth he created, others began to ask if there was a way to make the Gaia theory scientifically sound.
In 1931, L.G.M. Baas Becking delivered an inaugural lecture about Gaia in the sense of life and earth.
Many believe that these ideas cannot be considered scientific
hypotheses; by definition a scientific hypothesis must make testable
predictions. As the above claims are not currently testable, they are
outside the bounds of current science. This does not mean that these
ideas are not theoretically testable. As one can postulate tests that
could be applied, given enough time and space, then these ideas should
be seen as scientific hypotheses.
These are conjectures and perhaps can only be considered as
social and maybe political philosophy; they may have implications for theology, or thealogy as Zell-Ravenheart and Isaac Bonewits put it.
Range of views
According to James Kirchner
there is a spectrum of Gaia hypotheses, ranging from the undeniable to
radical. At one end is the undeniable statement that the organisms on
the Earth have radically altered its composition. A stronger position is
that the Earth's biosphere effectively acts as if it is a
self-organizing system which works in such a way as to keep its systems
in some kind of equilibrium that is conducive to life. Today many
scientists consider that such a view (and any stronger views) are
unlikely to be correct.
An even stronger claim is that all lifeforms are part of a single
planetary being, called Gaia. In this view, the atmosphere, the seas,
the terrestrial crust would be the result of interventions carried out
by Gaia, through the coevolving diversity of living organisms.
The most extreme form of Gaia theory is that the entire Earth is a
single unified organism with a highly intelligent mind that arose as an
emergent property of the whole biosphere. In this view, the Earth's biosphere is consciously
manipulating the climate in order to make conditions more conducive to
life. Scientists contend that there is no evidence at all to support
this last point of view, and it has come about because many people do
not understand the concept of homeostasis. Many non-scientists instinctively and incorrectly see homeostasis as a process that requires conscious control.
The more speculative versions of Gaia, including versions in
which it is believed that the Earth is actually conscious, sentient, and
highly intelligent, are usually considered outside the bounds of what
is usually considered science.
A variant of this hypothesis was developed by Lynn Margulis,
a microbiologist, in 1979.
Her version is sometimes called the "Gaia Theory" (note uppercase-T).
Her model is more limited in scope than the one that Lovelock proposed.
Whether this sort of system is present on Earth is still open to
debate. Some relatively simple homeostatic mechanisms are generally
accepted. For example, when atmosphericcarbon dioxide
levels rise, plants are able to grow better and thus remove more carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere. Other biological effects and feedbacks
exist, but the extent to which these mechanisms have stabilized and modified the Earth's overall climate is largely not known.
The Gaia hypothesis is sometimes viewed from significantly
different philosophical perspectives. Some environmentalists view it as
an almost conscious process, in which the Earth's ecosystem is literally viewed as a single unified organism. Some evolutionary biologists, on the other hand, view it as an undirected emergent property
of the ecosystem: as each individual species pursues its own
self-interest, their combined actions tend to have counterbalancing
effects on environmental change. Proponents of this view sometimes point
to examples of life's actions in the past that have resulted in
dramatic change rather than stable equilibrium, such as the conversion
of the Earth's atmosphere from a reducing environment to an oxygen-rich
one.
Depending on how strongly the case is stated, the hypothesis conflicts with mainstream neo-Darwinism.
Most biologists would accept Daisyworld-style homeostasis as possible,
but would certainly not accept the idea that this equates to the whole
biosphere acting as one organism.
A very small number of scientists, and a much larger number of environmental activists, claim that Earth's biosphere is consciously
manipulating the climate in order to make conditions more conducive to
life. Scientists contend that there is no evidence to support this
belief.
Gaia in the social sciences
A social science view of Gaia theory is the role of humans as a keystone species who may be able to accomplish global homeostasis.
Whilst a few social scientists who draw inspiration from 'organic'
views of society have embraced Gaia philosophy as a way to explain the
human-nature interconnections, most professional social scientists are
more involved in reflecting upon the way Gaia philosophy is used and
engaged with within sub-sections of society. Alan Marshall, in the Department of Social Sciences at Mahidol University,
for example, reflects upon the way Gaia philosophy has been used and
advocated in various societal settings by environmentalists,
spiritualists, managers, economists, and scientists and engineers (see
The Unity of Nature, 2002, Imperial College Press: London and
Singapore). As Marshall explains, most social scientists had already
given up on systems ideas of society in the 1960s before Gaia philosophy
was born under James Lovelock's ideas since such ideas were interpreted
as supporting conservatism and traditionalism.
Gaia in politics
Some radical political environmentalists who accept some form of the Gaia theory call themselves Gaians. They actively seek to restore the Earth's homeostasis — whenever they see it out of balance, e.g. to prevent manmade climate change, primate extinction, or rainforest loss.
In effect, they seek to cooperate to become the "system consciously
manipulating to make conditions more conducive to life". Such activity
defines the homeostasis, but for leverage it relies on deep
investigation of the homeorhetic balances, if only to find places to intervene in a system which is changing in undesirable ways.
Tony Bondhus brings up the point in his book, Society of Conceivia,
that if Gaia is alive, then societies are living things as well. This
suggests that our understanding of Gaia can be used to create a better
society and to design a better political system.
Other intellectuals in the environmental movement, like Edward Goldsmith,
have used Gaia in the completely opposite way; to stake a claim about
how Gaia's focus on natural balance and resistance and resilience,
should be emulated to design a conservative political system (as
explored in Alan Marshall's 2002 book The Unity of Nature, (Imperial College Press: London).
Gaians do not passively ask "what is going on", but rather, "what to do next", e.g. in terraforming or climate engineering or even on a small scale, such as gardening. Changes can be planned, agreed upon by many people, being very deliberate, as in urban ecology and especially industrial ecology.
Gaians argue that it is a human duty to act as such - committing themselves in particular to the Precautionary Principle. Such views began to influence the Green Parties, Greenpeace, and a few more radical wings of the environmental movement such as the Gaia Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front. These views dominate some such groups, e.g. the Bioneers. Some refer to this political activity as a separate and radical branch of the ecology movement,
one that takes the axioms of the science of ecology in general, and
Gaia theory in particular, and raises them to a kind of theory of personal conduct or moral code.
Gaia in religion
Hinduism
has many tenets of Nature worship and preservation. The ecologist and
theologian Anne Primavesi is the author of two books dealing with the
Gaia hypothesis and theology.
Rosemary Radford Ruether, the American feminist scholar and theologian, wrote a book called "Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing".
Many new age authors have written books which mix New Age teachings with Gaia philosophy. This is known as New Age Gaian.
Often referred to as Gaianism, or the Gaian Religion, this spiritual
aspect of the philosophy is very broad and inclusive, making it
adaptable to other religions: Taoism, Neo-Paganism, Pantheism,
Judeo-Christian Religions, and many others.
Semantic debate
The question of "what is an organism",
and at what scale is it rational to speak about organisms vs.
biospheres, gives rise to a semantic debate. We are all ecologies in the
sense that our (human) bodies contain gut bacteria, parasite species, etc., and to them our body is not organism but rather more of a microclimate or biome. Applying that thinking to whole planets:
The argument is that these symbiotic organisms, being unable to
survive apart from each other and their climate and local conditions,
form an organism in their own right, under a wider conception of the
term organism than is conventionally used. It is a matter for often
heated debate whether this is a valid usage of the term, but ultimately
it appears to be a semantic dispute.
In this sense of the word organism, it is argued under the theory that
the entire biomass of the Earth is a single organism (as Johannes Kepler thought).
Unfortunately, many supporters of the various Gaia theories do
not state exactly where they sit on this spectrum; this makes discussion
and criticism difficult.
Much effort on behalf of those analyzing the theory currently is
an attempt to clarify what these different hypotheses are, and whether
they are proposals to 'test' or 'manipulate' outcomes. Both Lovelock's
and Margulis's understanding of Gaia are considered scientific
hypotheses, and like all scientific theories are constantly put to the
test.
More speculative versions of Gaia, including all versions in
which it is held that the Earth is actually conscious, are currently
held to be outside the bounds of science, and are not supported by
either Lovelock or Margulis.
Gaian reproduction
One of the most problematic issues with referring to Gaia as an organism is its apparent failure to meet the biological criterion of being able to reproduce.
Obviously this limited view misunderstands cosmic cycles of death of
planets and stars into star stuff that creates more planets and stars
over billions of years. Richard Dawkins has asserted that the planet is not the offspring of any parents and is unable to reproduce.
Dialectic or dialectics (Greek: διαλεκτική, dialektikḗ; related to dialogue; German: Dialektik), also known as the dialectical method, is a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth through reasonedargumentation. Dialectic resembles debate, but the concept excludes subjective elements such as emotional appeal and the modern pejorative sense of rhetoric. Dialectic may thus be contrasted with both the eristic, which refers to argument that aims to successfully dispute another's argument (rather than searching for truth), and the didactic method, wherein one side of the conversation teaches the other. Dialectic is alternatively known as minor logic, as opposed to major logic or critique.
Within Hegelianism, the word dialectic has the specialised meaning of a contradiction between ideas that serves as the determining factor in their relationship. Dialectical materialism, a theory or set of theories produced mainly by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, adapted the Hegelian dialectic into arguments regarding traditional materialism. The dialectics of Hegel and Marx were criticized in the twentieth century by the philosophers Karl Popper and Mario Bunge.
Dialectic tends to imply a process of evolution and so does not naturally fit within classical logics, but was given some formalism in the twentieth century. The emphasis on process is particularly marked in Hegelian dialectic, and even more so in Marxist dialectical logic, which tried to account for the evolution of ideas over longer time periods in the real world.
Western dialectical forms
There is a variety of meanings of dialectic or dialectics within Western philosophy.
Classical philosophy
In classicalphilosophy, dialectic (διαλεκτική) is a form of reasoning based upon dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments, advocating propositions (theses) and counter-propositions (antitheses).
The outcome of such a dialectic might be the refutation of a relevant
proposition, or of a synthesis, or a combination of the opposing
assertions, or a qualitative improvement of the dialogue.
Moreover, the term "dialectic" owes much of its prestige to its role in the philosophies of Socrates and Plato, in the Greek Classical period (5th to 4th centuries BC). Aristotle said that it was the pre-Socratic philosopher Zeno of Elea who invented dialectic, of which the dialogues of Plato are the examples of the Socratic dialectical method.
According to Kant,
however, the ancient Greeks used the word "dialectic" to signify the
logic of false appearance or semblance. To the Ancients, "it was nothing
but the logic of illusion. It was a sophistic art of giving to one's
ignorance, indeed even to one's intentional tricks, the outward
appearance of truth, by imitating the thorough, accurate method which
logic always requires, and by using its topic as a cloak for every empty
assertion."
The Socratic dialogues are a particular form of dialectic known as the method of elenchus (literally, "refutation, scrutiny")
whereby a series of questions clarifies a more precise statement of a
vague belief, logical consequences of that statement are explored, and a
contradiction is discovered. The method is largely destructive, in that
false belief is exposed
and only constructive in that this exposure may lead to further search
for truth. The detection of error does not amount to a proof of the
antithesis; for example, a contradiction in the consequences of a
definition of piety does not provide a correct definition. The
principal aim of Socratic activity may be to improve the soul of the
interlocutors, by freeing them from unrecognized errors; or indeed, by
teaching them the spirit of inquiry.
In common cases, Socrates used enthymemes as the foundation of his argument.
For example, in the Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro
to provide a definition of piety. Euthyphro replies that the pious is
that which is loved by the gods. But, Socrates also has Euthyphro
agreeing that the gods are quarrelsome and their quarrels, like human
quarrels, concern objects of love or hatred. Therefore, Socrates
reasons, at least one thing exists that certain gods love but other gods
hate. Again, Euthyphro agrees. Socrates concludes that if Euthyphro's
definition of piety is acceptable, then there must exist at least one
thing that is both pious and impious (as it is both loved and hated by
the gods)—which Euthyphro admits is absurd. Thus, Euthyphro is brought
to a realization by this dialectical method that his definition of piety
is not sufficiently meaningful.
For example, in Plato's Gorgias, dialectic occurs between
Socrates, the Sophist Gorgias, and two men, Polus and Callicles. Because
Socrates' ultimate goal was to reach true knowledge, he was even
willing to change his own views in order to arrive at the truth. The
fundamental goal of dialectic, in this instance, was to establish a
precise definition of the subject (in this case, rhetoric) and with the
use of argumentation and questioning, make the subject even more
precise. In the Gorgias, Socrates reaches the truth by asking a series
of questions and in return, receiving short, clear answers.
Plato
There is another interpretation of dialectic, suggested in The Republic, as a procedure that is both discursive and intuitive.
In Platonism and Neoplatonism, dialectic assumes an ontological and
metaphysical role in that it becomes the process whereby the intellect
passes from sensibles to intelligibles, rising from Idea to Idea until
it finally grasps the supreme Idea, the First Principle which is the
origin of all. The philosopher is consequently a "dialectician". In this sense, dialectic is a process of enquiry that does away with hypotheses up to the First Principle (Republic,
VII, 533 c-d). It slowly embraces the multiplicity in unity. Simon
Blackburn writes that the dialectic in this sense is used to understand
"the total process of enlightenment, whereby the philosopher is educated
so as to achieve knowledge of the supreme good, the Form of the Good".
Aristotle
Aristotle
stresses that rhetoric is closely related to dialectic. He offers
several formulas to describe this affinity between the two disciplines:
first of all, rhetoric is said to be a "counterpart" (antistrophos) to
dialectic (Rhet. I.1, 1354a1); (ii) it is also called an "outgrowth"
(paraphues ti) of dialectic and the study of character (Rhet. I.2,
1356a25f.); finally, Aristotle says that rhetoric is part of dialectic
and resembles it (Rhet. I.2, 1356a30f.). In saying that rhetoric is a
counterpart to dialectic, Aristotle obviously alludes to Plato's Gorgias
(464bff.), where rhetoric is ironically defined as a counterpart to
cookery in the soul. Since, in this passage, Plato uses the word
'antistrophos' to designate an analogy, it is likely that Aristotle
wants to express a kind of analogy too: what dialectic is for the
(private or academic) practice of attacking and maintaining an argument,
rhetoric is for the (public) practice of defending oneself or accusing
an opponent. The analogy to dialectic has important implications for the
status of rhetoric. Plato argued in his Gorgias that rhetoric cannot be
an art (technê), since it is not related to a definite subject, while
real arts are defined by their specific subjects, as e.g. medicine or
shoemaking are defined by their products, i.e., health and shoes.
Medieval philosophy
Logic, which could be considered to include dialectic, was one of the three liberal arts taught in medieval universities as part of the trivium; the other elements were rhetoric and grammar.
This dialectic (a quaestio disputata) was formed as follows:
The question to be determined ("It is asked whether...");
A provisory answer to the question ("And it seems that...");
The principal arguments in favor of the provisory answer;
An argument against the provisory answer, traditionally a single argument from authority ("On the contrary...");
The determination of the question after weighing the evidence ("I answer that...");
The replies to each of the initial objections. ("To the first, to the second etc., I answer that...")
Modern philosophy
The concept of dialectics was given new life at the start of the 19th century by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (following Johann Gottlieb Fichte),
whose dialectical model of nature and of history made dialectic a
fundamental aspect of the nature of reality (instead of regarding the
contradictions into which dialectics leads as a sign of the sterility of
the dialectical method, as the 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant tended to do in his Critique of Pure Reason).
In the mid-19th century, the concept of dialectics was appropriated by Karl Marx (see, for example, Das Kapital, published in 1867) and Friedrich Engels
and retooled in what they considered to be a nonidealistic manner. It
would also become a crucial part of later representations of Marxism as a
philosophy of dialectical materialism. These representations often contrasted dramatically
and led to vigorous debate among different Marxist groupings, leading
some prominent Marxists to give up on the idea of dialectics completely.
Hegelian dialectic, usually presented in a threefold manner, was stated by Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus
as comprising three dialectical stages of development: a thesis, giving
rise to its reaction; an antithesis, which contradicts or negates the
thesis; and the tension between the two being resolved by means of a
synthesis. Although this model is often named after Hegel, he never used
that specific formulation. Hegel ascribed that terminology to Kant. Carrying on Kant's work, Fichte greatly elaborated on the synthesis model and popularized it.
On the other hand, Hegel did use a three-valued logical model
that is very similar to the antithesis model, but Hegel's most usual
terms were: Abstract-Negative-Concrete. Hegel used this writing model as
a backbone to accompany his points in many of his works.
The formula, thesis-antithesis-synthesis, does not explain why
the thesis requires an antithesis. However, the formula,
abstract-negative-concrete, suggests a flaw, or perhaps an
incompleteness, in any initial thesis—it is too abstract and lacks the
negative of trial, error, and experience. For Hegel, the concrete, the
synthesis, the absolute, must always pass through the phase of the
negative, in the journey to completion, that is, mediation. This is the
essence of what is popularly called Hegelian dialectics.
Fichte
introduced into German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis,
and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took up this
terminology. Hegel did not. He never once used these three terms
together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of
his books. And they do not help us understand his Phenomenology, his Logic,
or his philosophy of history; they impede any open-minded comprehension
of what he does by forcing it into a scheme which was available to him
and which he deliberately spurned [...] The mechanical formalism [...]
Hegel derides expressly and at some length in the preface to the Phenomenology.
Kaufmann also cites Hegel's criticism of the triad model commonly
misattributed to him, adding that "the only place where Hegel uses the
three terms together occurs in his lectures on the history of
philosophy, on the last page but one of the sections on Kant—where Hegel
roundly reproaches Kant for having 'everywhere posited thesis,
antithesis, synthesis'".
To describe the activity of overcoming the negative, Hegel also often used the term Aufhebung,
variously translated into English as "sublation" or "overcoming", to
conceive of the working of the dialectic. Roughly, the term indicates
preserving the useful portion of an idea, thing, society, etc., while
moving beyond its limitations. (Jacques Derrida's preferred French translation of the term was relever.)
In the Logic, for instance, Hegel describes a dialectic of existence: first, existence must be posited as pure Being (Sein); but pure Being, upon examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Nothing (Nichts).
When it is realized that what is coming into being is, at the same
time, also returning to nothing (in life, for example, one's living is
also a dying), both Being and Nothing are united as Becoming.
As in the Socratic dialectic, Hegel claimed to proceed by making
implicit contradictions explicit: each stage of the process is the
product of contradictions inherent or implicit in the preceding stage.
For Hegel, the whole of history is one tremendous dialectic, major
stages of which chart a progression from self-alienation as slavery to self-unification and realization as the rationalconstitutional state
of free and equal citizens. The Hegelian dialectic cannot be
mechanically applied for any chosen thesis. Critics argue that the
selection of any antithesis, other than the logical negation of the
thesis, is subjective. Then, if the logical negation is used as the
antithesis, there is no rigorous way to derive a synthesis. In practice,
when an antithesis is selected to suit the user's subjective purpose,
the resulting "contradictions" are rhetorical,
not logical, and the resulting synthesis is not rigorously defensible
against a multitude of other possible syntheses. The problem with the
Fichtean "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" model is that it implies that
contradictions or negations come from outside of things. Hegel's point
is that they are inherent in and internal to things. This conception of
dialectics derives ultimately from Heraclitus.
Hegel stated that the purpose of dialectics is "to study things
in their own being and movement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of
the partial categories of understanding."
One important dialectical principle for Hegel is the transition from
quantity to quality, which he terms the Measure. The measure is the
qualitative quantum, the quantum is the existence of quantity.
The
identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at
first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other words,
these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent
authority. On the one hand, the quantitative features of existence may
be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other hand, this
increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has its limit, by
exceeding which the quality suffers change. [...] But if the quantity
present in measure exceeds a certain limit, the quality corresponding to
it is also put in abeyance. This however is not a negation of quality
altogether, but only of this definite quality, the place of which is at
once occupied by another. This process of measure, which appears
alternately as a mere change in quantity, and then as a sudden revulsion
of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the figure of a nodal
(knotted) line.
As an example, Hegel mentions the states of aggregation of water:
"Thus the temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no
consequence in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase or
diminution of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point
where this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water
is converted into steam or ice".
As other examples Hegel mentions the reaching of a point where a single
additional grain makes a heap of wheat; or where the bald tail is
produced, if we continue plucking out single hairs.
Another important principle for Hegel is the negation of the negation, which he also terms Aufhebung
(sublation): Something is only what it is in its relation to another,
but by the negation of the negation this something incorporates the
other into itself. The dialectical movement involves two moments that
negate each other, something and its other. As a result of the negation
of the negation, "something becomes its other; this other is itself
something; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad
infinitum". Something in its passage into other only joins with itself, it is self-related. In becoming there are two moments:
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be: by sublation, i.e., negation of the
negation, being passes over into nothing, it ceases to be, but something
new shows up, is coming to be. What is sublated (aufgehoben) on the one hand ceases to be and is put to an end, but on the other hand it is preserved and maintained. In dialectics, a totality transforms itself; it is self-related, then self-forgetful, relieving the original tension.
Marxist dialectic
Marxist dialectic is a form of Hegelian dialectic which applies to the study of historical materialism.
It purports to be a reflection of the real world created by man.
Dialectic would thus be a robust method under which one could examine
personal, social, and economic behaviors. Marxist dialectic is the core
foundation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which forms the basis of the ideas behind historical materialism.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, writing several decades after Hegel's death, proposed that Hegel's dialectic is too abstract:
The
mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means
prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working
in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its
head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the
rational kernel within the mystical shell.
In contradiction to Hegelian idealism, Marx presented his own dialectic
method, which he claims to be "direct opposite" of Hegel's method:
My
dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its
direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the
process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he even
transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos
of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal
form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else
than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into
forms of thought.
In Marxism, the dialectical method of historical study became intertwined with historical materialism, the school of thought exemplified by the works of Marx, Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. In the USSR, under Joseph Stalin,
Marxist dialectics became "diamat" (short for dialectical materialism),
a theory emphasizing the primacy of the material way of life; social
"praxis" over all forms of social consciousness; and the secondary,
dependent character of the "ideal".
The term "dialectical materialism" was coined by the 19th-century social theorist Joseph Dietzgen who used the theory to explain the nature of socialism and social development. The original populariser of Marxism in Russia, Georgi Plekhanov
used the terms "dialectical materialism" and "historical materialism"
interchangeably. For Lenin, the primary feature of Marx's "dialectical
materialism" (Lenin's term) was its application of materialist
philosophy to history and social sciences. Lenin's main input in the
philosophy of dialectical materialism was his theory of reflection,
which presented human consciousness as a dynamic reflection of the
objective material world that fully shapes its contents and structure.
Later, Stalin's works on the subject established a rigid and
formalistic division of Marxist–Leninist theory in the dialectical
materialism and historical materialism parts. While the first was
supposed to be the key method and theory of the philosophy of nature,
the second was the Soviet version of the philosophy of history.
Friedrich Engels proposed that Nature is dialectical, thus, in Anti-Dühring he said that the negation of negation is:
A
very simple process, which is taking place everywhere and every day,
which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of
mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy.
Probably the same gentlemen who up to now have decried the transformation of quantity into quality as mysticism and incomprehensible transcendentalism
will now declare that it is indeed something quite self-evident,
trivial, and commonplace, which they have long employed, and so they
have been taught nothing new. But to have formulated for the first time
in its universally valid form a general law of development of Nature,
society, and thought, will always remain an act of historic importance.
Marxist dialectics is exemplified in Das Kapital
(Capital), which outlines two central theories: (i) surplus value and
(ii) the materialist conception of history; Marx explains dialectical
materialism:
In its rational form, it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom
and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its
comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of
things, at the same time, also, the recognition of the negation of that
state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every
historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore
takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary
existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence
critical and revolutionary.
Class struggle
is the primary contradiction to be resolved by Marxist dialectics,
because of its central role in the social and political lives of a
society. Nonetheless, Marx and Marxists developed the concept of class
struggle to comprehend the dialectical contradictions between mental and
manual labor, and between town and country. Hence, philosophic
contradiction is central to the development of dialectics – the
progress from quantity to quality, the acceleration of gradual social
change; the negation of the initial development of the status quo; the negation of that negation; and the high-level recurrence of features of the original status quo.
In the USSR, Progress Publishers issued anthologies of dialectical
materialism by Lenin, wherein he also quotes Marx and Engels:
As
the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and the
richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and
Engels the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy.... "The
great basic thought", Engels writes, "that the world is not to be
comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of
processes, in which the things, apparently stable no less than their
mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted
change of coming into being and passing away... this great fundamental
thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated
ordinary consciousness that, in its generality, it is now scarcely ever
contradicted.
But, to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words, and to apply it
in reality in detail to each domain of investigation, are two different
things.... For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute,
sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in
everything; nothing can endure before it, except the uninterrupted
process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the
lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy, itself, is nothing more
than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain." Thus,
according to Marx, dialectics is "the science of the general laws of
motion both of the external world and of human thought".
Lenin describes his dialectical understanding of the concept of development:
A
development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been
passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis ("the
negation of the negation"), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in
spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catastrophes,
and revolutions; "breaks in continuity"; the transformation of quantity
into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the
contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting
on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given
society; the interdependence and the closest and indissoluble connection
between all aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly revealing
ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal
process of motion, one that follows definite laws – these are some of
the features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that is richer
than the conventional one.
Existentialism, like Marxism,
addresses itself to experience in order to discover there concrete
syntheses. It can conceive of these syntheses only within a moving,
dialectical totalisation, which is nothing else but history or—from the
strictly cultural point of view adopted here—'philosophy-becoming-the
world'.
Dialectical naturalism
Dialectical naturalism is a term coined by American philosopher Murray Bookchin to describe the philosophical underpinnings of the political program of social ecology.
Dialectical naturalism explores the complex interrelationship between
social problems, and the direct consequences they have on the ecological
impact of human society. Bookchin offered dialectical naturalism as a
contrast to what he saw as the "empyrean, basically antinaturalistic
dialectical idealism" of Hegel, and "the wooden, often scientistic
dialectical materialism of orthodox Marxists".
Theological dialectical forms
Baháʼí dialectics — dialectical science and religion
Baháʼí Faith
doctrine advocates a form of dialectical science and religion. A
dialectical relationship of harmony between religion and science is
presented, wherein science and religion are described as complementary,
mutually dependent, and indispensable knowledge systems. Baháʼí scripture asserts that true science and true religion can never be in conflict. 'Abdu'l-Bahá,
the son of the founder of the religion, stated that religion without
science is superstition and that science without religion is
materialism. He also admonished that true religion must conform to the
conclusions of science.
As a modern, globalist religion, the Baháʼí Faith defies simple
categorisation into any of Western, Eastern, Northern, Southern, or
other philosophical forms. Nevertheless, the principled dialectical
approach to harmony between science and religion is not unlike social ecology's implementation of dialectical naturalism to moderate the extremes of scientifically unverified idealisms with scientific insight.
Dialectical theology
Neo-orthodoxy, in Europe also known as theology of crisis and dialectical theology, is an approach to theology in Protestantism that was developed in the aftermath of the First World War (1914–1918). It is characterized as a reaction against doctrines of 19th-centuryliberal theology and a more positive reevaluation of the teachings of the Reformation, much of which had been in decline (especially in western Europe) since the late 18th century. It is primarily associated with two Swiss professors and pastors, Karl Barth (1886–1968) and Emil Brunner (1899–1966), even though Barth himself expressed his unease in the use of the term.
In dialectical theology the difference and opposition between God
and human beings is stressed in such a way that all human attempts at
overcoming this opposition through moral, religious or philosophical
idealism must be characterized as 'sin'. In the death of Christ humanity
is negated and overcome, but this judgment also points forwards to the
resurrection in which humanity is reestablished in Christ. For Barth
this meant that only through God's 'no' to everything human can his
'yes' be perceived. Applied to traditional themes of Protestant
theology, such as double predestination,
this means that election and reprobation cannot be viewed as a
quantitative limitation of God's action. Rather it must be seen as its
"qualitative definition".
As Christ bore the rejection as well as the election of God for all
humanity, every person is subject to both aspects of God's double
predestination.
Dialectic prominently figured in Bernard Lonergan's philosophy, in his books Insight and Method in Theology. Michael Shute wrote about Longergan's use of dialectic in The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History.
For Lonergan, dialectic is both individual and operative in community.
Simply described, it is a dynamic process that results in something new:
For the sake of greater precision,
let us say that a dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but
opposed principles of change. Thus there will be a dialectic if (1)
there is an aggregate of events of a determinate character, (2) the
events may be traced to either or both of two principles, (3) the
principles are opposed yet bound together, and (4) they are modified by
the changes that successively result from them.
Dialectic is one of the eight functional specialties Lonergan
envisaged for theology to bring this discipline into the modern world.
Lonergan believed that the lack of an agreed method among scholars had
inhibited substantive agreement from being reached and progress from
being made compared to the natural sciences. Karl Rahner,
S.J., however, criticized Lonergan's theological method in a short
article entitled "Some Critical Thoughts on 'Functional Specialties in
Theology'" where he stated: "Lonergan's theological methodology seems to
me to be so generic that it really fits every science, and hence is not the methodology of theology as such, but only a very general methodology of science."
Karl Popper
has attacked the dialectic repeatedly. In 1937, he wrote and delivered a
paper entitled "What Is Dialectic?" in which he attacked the
dialectical method for its willingness "to put up with contradictions".
Popper concluded the essay with these words: "The whole development of
dialectic should be a warning against the dangers inherent in
philosophical system-building. It should remind us that philosophy
should not be made a basis for any sort of scientific system and that
philosophers should be much more modest in their claims. One task which
they can fulfill quite usefully is the study of the critical methods of science" (Ibid., p. 335).
In chapter 12 of volume 2 of The Open Society and Its Enemies
(1944; 5th rev. ed., 1966), Popper unleashed a famous attack on
Hegelian dialectics in which he held that Hegel's thought (unjustly in
the view of some philosophers, such as Walter Kaufmann) was to some degree responsible for facilitating the rise of fascism in Europe by encouraging and justifying irrationalism. In section 17 of his 1961 "addenda" to The Open Society,
entitled "Facts, Standards and Truth: A Further Criticism of
Relativism", Popper refused to moderate his criticism of the Hegelian
dialectic, arguing that it "played a major role in the downfall of the liberal movement in Germany [...] by contributing to historicism and to an identification of might and right, encouraged totalitarian
modes of thought. [...] [And] undermined and eventually lowered the
traditional standards of intellectual responsibility and honesty".
The philosopher of science and physicist Mario Bunge repeatedly criticized Hegelian and Marxian dialectics, calling them "fuzzy and remote from science" and a "disastrous legacy".
He concluded: "The so-called laws of dialectics, such as formulated by
Engels (1940, 1954) and Lenin (1947, 1981), are false insofar as they
are intelligible."
Formalism
Since the late 20th century, European and American logicians have attempted to provide mathematical foundations for dialectic through formalisation, although logic has been related to dialectic since ancient times. There have been pre-formal and partially-formal treatises on argument and dialectic, from authors such as Stephen Toulmin (The Uses of Argument, 1958),Nicholas Rescher (Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, 1977), and Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (pragma-dialectics, 1980s). One can include works of the communities of informal logic and paraconsistent logic.
Defeasibility
Building on theories of defeasible reasoning (see John L. Pollock),
systems have been built that define well-formedness of arguments, rules
governing the process of introducing arguments based on fixed
assumptions, and rules for shifting burden. Many of these logics appear in the special area of artificial intelligence and law, though the computer scientists' interest in formalizing dialectic originates in a desire to build decision support and computer-supported collaborative work systems.
Dialectic itself can be formalised as moves in a game, where an advocate for the truth of a proposition and an opponent argue. Such games can provide a semantics of logic, one that is very general in applicability.
