Emotional contagion

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotional_contagion 

Emotional contagion is a form of social contagion that involves the spontaneous spread of emotions and related behaviors.  Such emotional convergence can happen from one person to another, or in a larger group. Emotions can be shared across individuals in many ways, both implicitly or explicitly. For instance, conscious reasoning, analysis, and imagination have all been found to contribute to the phenomenon. The behaviour has been found in humans, other primates, dogs, and chickens.

Emotional contagion contributes to cognitive development initiated in pregnancy. According to a hypothesis of pre-perceptual multimodal integration, the association of affective cues with stimuli responsible for triggering the neuronal pathways of simple reflexes (such as spontaneous blinking, etc.) forms simple neuronal assemblies, shaping the cognitive and emotional neuronal patterns in statistical learning. Empirical evidence showed that cognitive and emotional neuronal patterns are continuously connected with the neuronal pathways of reflexes throughout life.

Emotional contagion is important to personal relationships because it fosters emotional synchrony between individuals. A broader definition of the phenomenon suggested by Schoenewolf is "a process in which a person or group influences the emotions or behavior of another person or group through the conscious or unconscious induction of emotion states and behavioral attitudes." One view developed by Elaine Hatfield, et al., is that this can be done through automatic mimicry and synchronization of one's expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another person.  When people unconsciously mirror their companions' expressions of emotion, they come to feel reflections of those companions' emotions.

In a 1993 paper, psychologists Elaine Hatfield, John Cacioppo, and Richard Rapson define emotional contagion as "the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another person's [sic] and, consequently, to converge emotionally".

Hatfield, et al., theorize emotional contagion as a two-step process: First, we imitate people (e.g., if someone smiles at you, you smile back). Second, our own emotional experiences change based on the non-verbal signals of emotion that we give off. For example, smiling makes one feel happier, and frowning makes one feel worse. Mimicry seems to be one foundation of emotional movement between people.

Emotional contagion and empathy share similar characteristics, with the exception of the ability to differentiate between personal and pre-personal experiences, a process known as individuation. In The Art of Loving (1956), social psychologist Erich Fromm explores these differences, suggesting that autonomy is necessary for empathy, which is not found in emotional contagion.

Abnormally pervasive emotional contagion is a known symptom of some psychiatric disorders, such as borderline personality disorder. In BPD, this is a result of mirroring that arises from an unstable sense of self.

Etymology

Further information: Social contagion § History

James Baldwin addressed "emotional contagion" in his 1897 work Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, though using the term "contagion of feeling". Various 20th century scholars discussed the phenomena under the heading "social contagion". The term "emotional contagion" first appeared in Arthur S. Reber's 1985 The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology.

Influencing factors

Several factors determine the rate and extent of emotional convergence in a group, including membership stability, mood-regulation norms, task interdependence, and social interdependence. Besides these event-structure properties, there are personal properties of the group's members, such as openness to receive and transmit feelings, demographic characteristics, and dispositional affect that influence the intensity of emotional contagion.

Research

Research on emotional contagion has been conducted from a variety of perspectives, including organizational, social, familial, developmental, and neurological. While early research suggested that conscious reasoning, analysis, and imagination accounted for emotional contagion, some forms of more primitive emotional contagion are far more subtle, automatic, and universal.

Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson's 1993 research into emotional contagion reported that people's conscious assessments of others' feelings were heavily influenced by what others said. People's own emotions, however, were more influenced by others' nonverbal clues as to what they were really feeling. Recognizing emotions and acknowledging their origin can be one way to avoid emotional contagion. Transference of emotions has been studied in a variety of situations and settings, with social and physiological causes being two of the largest areas of research.

In addition to the social contexts discussed above, emotional contagion has been studied within organizations. Schrock, Leaf, and Rohr (2008) say organizations, like societies, have emotion cultures that consist of languages, rituals, and meaning systems, including rules about the feelings workers should, and should not, feel and display. They state that emotion culture is quite similar to "emotion climate", otherwise known as morale, organizational morale, and corporate morale. Furthermore, Worline, Wrzesniewski, and Rafaeli (2002)^: 318 mention that organizations have an overall "emotional capability", while McColl-Kennedy, and Smith (2006)^: 255 examine "emotional contagion" in customer interactions. These terms arguably all attempt to describe a similar phenomenon; each term differs in subtle and somewhat indistinguishable ways.

Controversy

A controversial experiment demonstrating emotional contagion by using the social media platform Facebook was carried out in 2014 on 689,000 users by filtering positive or negative emotional content from their news feeds. The experiment sparked uproar among people who felt the study violated personal privacy. The 2014 publication of a research paper resulting from this experiment, "Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks", a collaboration between Facebook and Cornell University, is described by Tony D. Sampson, Stephen Maddison, and Darren Ellis (2018) as a "disquieting disclosure that corporate social media and Cornell academics were so readily engaged with unethical experiments of this kind." Tony D. Sampson et al. criticize the notion that "academic researchers can be insulated from ethical guidelines on the protection for human research subjects because they are working with a social media business that has 'no obligation to conform' to the principle of 'obtaining informed consent and allowing participants to opt out'." A subsequent study confirmed the presence of emotional contagion on Twitter without manipulating users' timelines.

Beyond the ethical concerns, some scholars criticized the methods and reporting of the Facebook findings. John Grohol, writing for Psych Central, argued that despite its title and claims of "emotional contagion," this study did not look at emotions at all. Instead, its authors used an application (called "Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count" or LIWC 2007) that simply counted positive and negative words in order to infer users' sentiments. A shortcoming of the LIWC tool is that it does not understand negations. Hence, the tweet "I am not happy" would be scored as positive: "Since the LIWC 2007 ignores these subtle realities of informal human communication, so do the researchers." Grohol concluded that given these subtleties, the effect size of the findings are little more than a "statistical blip."

Kramer et al. (2014) found a 0.07%—that's not 7 percent, that's 1/15th of one percent!!—decrease in negative words in people's status updates when the number of negative posts on their Facebook news feed decreased. Do you know how many words you'd have to read or write before you've written one less negative word due to this effect? Probably thousands.

Types

Emotions can be shared and mimicked in many ways. Taken broadly, emotional contagion can be either: implicit, undertaken by the receiver through automatic or self-evaluating processes; or explicit, undertaken by the transmitter through a purposeful manipulation of emotional states, to achieve a desired result.

Implicit

Unlike cognitive contagion, emotional contagion is less conscious and more automatic. It relies mainly on non-verbal communication, although emotional contagion can and does occur via telecommunication. For example, people interacting through e-mails and chats are affected by the other's emotions, without being able to perceive the non-verbal cues.

One view, proposed by Hatfield and colleagues, describes emotional contagion as a primitive, automatic, and unconscious behavior that takes place through a series of steps. When a receiver is interacting with a sender, he perceives the emotional expressions of the sender. The receiver automatically mimics those emotional expressions. Through the process of afferent feedback, these new expressions are translated into feeling the emotions the sender feels, thus leading to emotional convergence.

Another view, emanating from social comparison theories, sees emotional contagion as demanding more cognitive effort and being more conscious. According to this view, people engage in social comparison to see if their emotional reaction is congruent with the persons around them. The recipient uses the emotion as a type of social information to understand how he or she should be feeling. People respond differently to positive and negative stimuli; negative events tend to elicit stronger and quicker emotional, behavioral, and cognitive responses than neutral or positive events. So unpleasant emotions are more likely to lead to mood contagion than are pleasant emotions. Another variable is the energy level at which the emotion is displayed. Higher energy draws more attention to it, so the same emotional valence (pleasant or unpleasant) expressed with high energy is likely to lead to more contagion than if expressed with low energy.

Explicit

Aside from the automatic infection of feelings described above, there are also times when others' emotions are being manipulated by a person or a group in order to achieve something. This can be a result of intentional affective influence by a leader or team member. Suppose this person wants to convince the others of something, he may do so by sweeping them up in his enthusiasm. In such a case, his positive emotions are an act with the purpose of "contaminating" the others' feelings. A different kind of intentional mood contagion would be, for instance, giving the group a reward or treat, in order to alleviate their feelings.

The discipline of organizational psychology researches aspects of emotional labor. This includes the need to manage emotions so that they are consistent with organizational or occupational display rules, regardless of whether they are discrepant with internal feelings. In regard to emotional contagion, in work settings that require a certain display of emotions, one finds oneself obligated to display, and consequently feel, these emotions. If superficial acting develops into deep acting, emotional contagion is the byproduct of intentional affective impression management.

In workplaces and organizations

Intra-group

Many organizations and workplaces encourage teamwork. Studies conducted by organizational psychologists highlight the benefits of work teams. Emotions come into play and a group emotion is formed.

The group's emotional state influences factors such as cohesiveness, morale, rapport, and the team's performance. For this reason, organizations need to take into account the factors that shape the emotional state of the work-teams, in order to harness the beneficial sides and avoid the detrimental sides of the group's emotion. Managers and team leaders should be cautious with their behavior, since their emotional influence is greater than that of a "regular" team member: leaders are more emotionally "contagious" than others.

Employee/customer

The interaction between service employees and customers affects both customers' assessments of service quality and their relationship with the service provider. Positive affective displays in service interactions are positively associated with important customer outcomes, such as intention to return and to recommend the store to a friend. It is the interest of organizations that their customers be happy, since a happy customer is a satisfied one. Research has shown that the emotional state of the customer is directly influenced by the emotions displayed by the employee/service provider via emotional contagion. But this influence depends on authenticity of the employee's emotional display, such that if the employee is only surface-acting, the contagion is poor, in which case the beneficial effects will not occur.

Neurological basis

At the neurophysiological level, emotional contagion can result by mechanisms that involve synchronization of brain structures due to laws of physics: electromagnetic interference and quantum effects. These are the same mechanisms that shape cognition. One of the essential issues in cognition and emotions development is the Morphology problem of proper nervous system shaping. Numerous research attempts to explain the precise coordination of all cells in space and time (not even anatomically connected) during embryological processes of cells and tissue differentiation for the shaping of the particular nervous system structure. In cognitive development, shaping the proper nervous system is necessary for emerging multiple brain-based functions that enable humans to perform mental processes such as perception, learning, memory, understanding, awareness, reasoning, judgment, intuition, and language. Our nervous system operates over everything that makes us human. It means that only the formation of neural tissues in a certain way contributes to shaping cognitive functions. Gene activity from interaction with events and experiences in the environment cannot alone shape tissues in morphogenesis since these processes may not be coordinated in time at the gene level. The formation of the nervous system's specific structure should be closely related to the precise coordination in time of all general classes of tissue deformation at the cell level. A complete developmental program with a template to create the final biological structure of the nervous system is required for such a complex dynamic process.

According to professor Igor Val Danilov, electromagnetic properties of the mother's heart and its interaction with the mother's own and fetal nervous system (physical laws of electromagnetic interference) form neuronal coherence in the mother-fetus bio-system, providing the template beginning from pregnancy. This natural neurostimulation ensures the balanced development of the embryo's nervous system and guarantees the development of the correct architecture of the nervous system with the necessary cognitive functions corresponding to the ecological context and the qualities that make human beings unique. Empirical evidence from studies of simple reflexes in newborns has shown that this pre-perceptual multimodal integration form primary neuronal assemblies, further shaping the cognitive and emotional neuronal patterns in statistical learning that succeeds owing to neuronal coherence in mother-child dyads beginning from pregnancy.

A discovery of mirror neurons is likely an appearance of the mechanisms of natural neurostimulation and pre-perceptual multimodal integration.

"Contagious" yawning has been observed in humans, chimpanzees, dogs, cats, birds, and reptiles, and can occur across species.

Vittorio Gallese posits that mirror neurons are responsible for intentional attunement in relation to others. Gallese and colleagues at the University of Parma found a class of neurons in the premotor cortex that discharge either when macaque monkeys execute goal-related hand movements or when they watch others doing the same action. One class of these neurons fires with action execution and observation, and with sound production of the same action. Research in humans shows an activation of the premotor cortex and parietal area of the brain for action perception and execution.

Gallese says humans understand emotions through a simulated shared body state. The observers' neural activation enables a direct experiential understanding. "Unmediated resonance" is a similar theory by Goldman and Sripada (2004). Empathy can be a product of the functional mechanism in our brain that creates embodied simulation. The other we see or hear becomes the "other self" in our minds. Other researchers have shown that observing someone else's emotions recruits brain regions involved in (a) experiencing similar emotions and (b) producing similar facial expressions. This combination indicates that the observer activates (a) a representation of the emotional feeling of the other individual which leads to emotional contagion and (b) a motor representation of the observed facial expression that could lead to facial mimicry. In the brain, understanding and sharing other individuals' emotions would thus be a combination of emotional contagion and facial mimicry. Importantly, more empathic individuals experience more brain activation in emotional regions while witnessing the emotions of other individuals.

Amygdala

The amygdala is one part of the brain that underlies empathy and allows for emotional attunement and creates the pathway for emotional contagion. The basal areas including the brain stem form a tight loop of biological connectedness, re-creating in one person the physiological state of the other. Psychologist Howard Friedman thinks this is why some people can move and inspire others. The use of facial expressions, voices, gestures and body movements transmit emotions to an audience from a speaker.

Groupthink

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groupthink 

Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome. Cohesiveness, or the desire for cohesiveness, in a group may produce a tendency among its members to agree at all costs. This causes the group to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation.

Groupthink is a construct of social psychology but has an extensive reach and influences literature in the fields of communication studies, political science, management, and organizational theory, as well as important aspects of deviant religious cult behaviour.

Overview

Mechanics of Groupthink

Groupthink is sometimes stated to occur (more broadly) within natural groups within the community, for example to explain the lifelong different mindsets of those with differing political views (such as "conservatism" and "liberalism" in the U.S. political context or the purported benefits of team work vs. work conducted in solitude). However, this conformity of viewpoints within a group does not mainly involve deliberate group decision-making, and might be better explained by the collective confirmation bias of the individual members of the group.

The term was coined in 1952 by William H. Whyte Jr. Most of the initial research on groupthink was conducted by Irving Janis, a research psychologist from Yale University. Janis published an influential book in 1972, which was revised in 1982. Janis used the Bay of Pigs Invasion (the failed American invasion of Cuba in 1961) and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 as his two prime case studies. Later studies have evaluated and reformulated his groupthink model.

Groupthink requires individuals to avoid raising controversial issues or alternative solutions, and there is loss of individual creativity, uniqueness and independent thinking. The dysfunctional group dynamics of the "ingroup" produces an "illusion of invulnerability" (an inflated certainty that the right decision has been made). Thus the "ingroup" significantly overrates its own abilities in decision-making and significantly underrates the abilities of its opponents (the "outgroup"). Furthermore, groupthink can produce dehumanizing actions against the "outgroup". Members of a group can often feel under peer pressure to "go along with the crowd" for fear of "rocking the boat" or of how their speaking out will be perceived by the rest of the group. Group interactions tend to favor clear and harmonious agreements and it can be a cause for concern when little to no new innovations or arguments for better policies, outcomes and structures are called to question. (McLeod). Groupthink can often lead to the creation of "yes men", because group activities and group projects in general make it extremely easy to pass on not offering constructive opinions.

Some methods that have been used to counteract group think in the past are selecting teams from more diverse backgrounds, and even mixing men and women for groups (Kamalnath). Groupthink can be considered to be a detriment to companies, organizations and in any work situations. Most positions that are senior level need individuals to be independent in their thinking. There is a positive correlation found between outstanding executives and decisiveness (Kelman). Groupthink also prohibits an organization from moving forward and innovating if no one ever speaks up and says something could be done differently.

Antecedent factors such as group cohesiveness, faulty group structure, and situational context (e.g., community panic) play into the likelihood of whether or not groupthink will impact the decision-making process.

History

From "Groupthink" by William H. Whyte Jr. in Fortune magazine, March 1952

William H. Whyte Jr. derived the term from George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, and popularized it in 1952 in Fortune magazine:

Groupthink being a coinage – and, admittedly, a loaded one – a working definition is in order. We are not talking about mere instinctive conformity – it is, after all, a perennial failing of mankind. What we are talking about is a rationalized conformity – an open, articulate philosophy which holds that group values are not only expedient but right and good as well.

Groupthink was Whyte's diagnosis of the malaise affecting both the study and practice of management (and, by association, America) in the 1950s. Whyte was dismayed that employees had subjugated themselves to the tyranny of groups, which crushed individuality and were instinctively hostile to anything or anyone that challenged the collective view.

American psychologist Irving Janis (Yale University) pioneered the initial research on the groupthink theory. He does not cite Whyte, but coined the term again by analogy with "doublethink" and similar terms that were part of the newspeak vocabulary in the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell. He initially defined groupthink as follows:

I use the term groupthink as a quick and easy way to refer to the mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive ingroup that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. Groupthink is a term of the same order as the words in the newspeak vocabulary George Orwell used in his dismaying world of 1984. In that context, groupthink takes on an invidious connotation. Exactly such a connotation is intended, since the term refers to a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments as a result of group pressures.

He went on to write:

The main principle of groupthink, which I offer in the spirit of Parkinson's Law, is this: "The more amiability and esprit de corps there is among the members of a policy-making ingroup, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against outgroups".

Janis set the foundation for the study of groupthink starting with his research in the American Soldier Project where he studied the effect of extreme stress on group cohesiveness. After this study he remained interested in the ways in which people make decisions under external threats. This interest led Janis to study a number of "disasters" in American foreign policy, such as failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941); the Bay of Pigs Invasion fiasco (1961); and the prosecution of the Vietnam War (1964–67) by President Lyndon Johnson. He concluded that in each of these cases, the decisions occurred largely because of groupthink, which prevented contradictory views from being expressed and subsequently evaluated.

After the publication of Janis' book Victims of Groupthink in 1972, and a revised edition with the title Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes in 1982, the concept of groupthink was used to explain many other faulty decisions in history. These events included Nazi Germany's decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1941, the Watergate scandal and others. Despite the popularity of the concept of groupthink, fewer than two dozen studies addressed the phenomenon itself following the publication of Victims of Groupthink, between the years 1972 and1998. This was surprising considering how many fields of interests it spans, which include political science, communications, organizational studies, social psychology, management, strategy, counseling, and marketing. One can most likely explain this lack of follow-up in that group research is difficult to conduct, groupthink has many independent and dependent variables, and it is unclear "how to translate [groupthink's] theoretical concepts into observable and quantitative constructs".

Nevertheless, outside research psychology and sociology, wider culture has come to detect groupthink in observable situations, for example:

• " [...] critics of Twitter point to the predominance of the hive mind in such social media, the kind of groupthink that submerges independent thinking in favor of conformity to the group, the collective"

• "[...] leaders often have beliefs which are very far from matching reality and which can become more extreme as they are encouraged by their followers. The predilection of many cult leaders for abstract, ambiguous, and therefore unchallengeable ideas can further reduce the likelihood of reality testing, while the intense milieu control exerted by cults over their members means that most of the reality available for testing is supplied by the group environment. This is seen in the phenomenon of 'groupthink', alleged to have occurred, notoriously, during the Bay of Pigs fiasco."

• "Groupthink by Compulsion [...] [G]roupthink at least implies voluntarism. When this fails, the organization is not above outright intimidation. [...] In [a nationwide telecommunications company], refusal by the new hires to cheer on command incurred consequences not unlike the indoctrination and brainwashing techniques associated with a Soviet-era gulag."

Symptoms

To make groupthink testable, Irving Janis devised eight symptoms indicative of groupthink:

Type I: Overestimations of the group — its power and morality

• Illusions of invulnerability creating excessive optimism and encouraging risk taking.
• Unquestioned belief in the morality of the group, causing members to ignore the consequences of their actions.

Type II: Closed-mindedness

• Rationalizing warnings that might challenge the group's assumptions.
• Stereotyping those who are opposed to the group as weak, evil, biased, spiteful, impotent, or stupid.

Type III: Pressures toward uniformity

• Self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus.
• Illusions of unanimity among group members, silence is viewed as agreement.
• Direct pressure to conform placed on any member who questions the group, couched in terms of "disloyalty".
• Mindguards— self-appointed members who shield the group from dissenting information.

When a group exhibits most of the symptoms of groupthink, the consequences of a failing decision process can be expected: incomplete analysis of the other options, incomplete analysis of the objectives, failure to examine the risks associated with the favored choice, failure to reevaluate the options initially rejected, poor information research, selection bias in available information processing, failure to prepare for a back-up plan.

Causes

Janis identified three antecedent conditions to groupthink:

• High group cohesiveness: Cohesiveness is the main factor that leads to groupthink. Groups that lack cohesiveness can of course make bad decisions, but they do not experience groupthink. In a cohesive group, members avoid speaking out against decisions, avoid arguing with others, and work towards maintaining friendly relationships in the group. If cohesiveness gets to such a level that there are no longer disagreements between members, then the group is ripe for groupthink.
  • Deindividuation: Group cohesiveness becomes more important than individual freedom of expression.
  • Illusions of unanimity: Members perceive falsely that everyone agrees with the group's decision; silence is seen as consent. Janis noted that the unity of group members was mere illusion. Members may disagree with the organizations' decision, but go along with the group for many reasons, such as maintaining their group status and avoiding conflict with managers or workmates. Such members think that suggesting opinions contrary to others may lead to isolation from the group.
• Structural faults: The group is organized in ways that disrupt the communication of information, or the group carelessly makes decisions.
  • Insulation of the group: This can promote the development of unique, inaccurate perspectives on issues the group is dealing with, which can then lead to faulty solutions to the problem.
  • Lack of impartial leadership: Leaders control the group discussion, by planning what will be discussed, allowing only certain questions to be asked, and asking for opinions of only certain people in the group. Closed-style leadership is when leaders announce their opinions on the issue before the group discusses the issue together. Open-style leadership is when leaders withhold their opinion until a later time in the discussion. Groups with a closed-style leader are more biased in their judgments, especially when members had a high degree of certainty.
  • Lack of norms requiring methodological procedures.
  • Homogeneity of members' social backgrounds and ideology.
• Situational context:
  • Highly stressful external threats: High-stake decisions can create tension and anxiety; group members may cope with this stress in irrational ways. Group members may rationalize their decision by exaggerating the positive consequences and minimizing the possible negative consequences. In attempt to minimize the stressful situation, the group decides quickly and allows little to no discussion or disagreement. Groups under high stress are more likely to make errors, lose focus of the ultimate goal, and use procedures that members know have not been effective in the past.
  • Recent failures: These can lead to low self-esteem, resulting in agreement with the group for fear of being seen as wrong.
  • Excessive difficulties in decision-making tasks.
  • Moral dilemmas

Although it is possible for a situation to contain all three of these factors, all three are not always present even when groupthink is occurring. Janis considered a high degree of cohesiveness to be the most important antecedent to producing groupthink, and always present when groupthink was occurring; however, he believed high cohesiveness would not always produce groupthink. A very cohesive group abides with all group norms; but whether or not groupthink arises is dependent on what the group norms are. If the group encourages individual dissent and alternative strategies to problem solving, it is likely that groupthink will be avoided even in a highly cohesive group. This means that high cohesion will lead to groupthink only if one or both of the other antecedents is present, situational context being slightly more likely than structural faults to produce groupthink.

A 2018 study found that absence of a tenured project leader can also create conditions for groupthink to prevail. Presence of an "experienced" project manager can reduce the likelihood of groupthink by taking steps like critically analysing ideas, promoting open communication, encouraging diverse perspectives, and raising team awareness of groupthink symptoms.

It was found that among people who have bicultural identity, those with highly integrated bicultural identity as opposed to less integrated were more prone to groupthink. In another 2022 study in Tanzania, Hofstede's cultural dimensions come into play. It was observed that in high power distance societies, individuals are hesitant to voice dissent, deferring to leaders' preferences in making decisions. Furthermore, as Tanzania is a collectivist society, community interests supersede those of individuals. The combination of high power distance and collectivism creates optimal conditions for groupthink to occur.

Prevention

Input from an outsider can break groupthink.

As observed by Aldag and Fuller (1993), the groupthink phenomenon seems to rest on a set of unstated and generally restrictive assumptions:

• The purpose of group problem solving is mainly to improve decision quality
• Group problem solving is considered a rational process.
• Benefits of group problem solving:
  • variety of perspectives
  • more information about possible alternatives
  • better decision reliability
  • dampening of biases
  • social presence effects
• Groupthink prevents these benefits due to structural faults and provocative situational context
• Groupthink prevention methods will produce better decisions
• An illusion of well-being is presumed to be inherently dysfunctional.
• Group pressures towards consensus lead to concurrence-seeking tendencies.

It has been thought that groups with the strong ability to work together will be able to solve dilemmas in a quicker and more efficient fashion than an individual. Groups have a greater amount of resources which lead them to be able to store and retrieve information more readily and come up with more alternative solutions to a problem. There was a recognized downside to group problem solving in that it takes groups more time to come to a decision and requires that people make compromises with each other. However, it was not until the research of Janis appeared that anyone really considered that a highly cohesive group could impair the group's ability to generate quality decisions. Tight-knit groups may appear to make decisions better because they can come to a consensus quickly and at a low energy cost; however, over time this process of decision-making may decrease the members' ability to think critically. It is, therefore, considered by many to be important to combat the effects of groupthink.

According to Janis, decision-making groups are not necessarily destined to groupthink. He devised ways of preventing groupthink:

• Leaders should assign each member the role of "critical evaluator". This allows each member to freely air objections and doubts.
• Leaders should not express an opinion when assigning a task to a group.
• Leaders should absent themselves from many of the group meetings to avoid excessively influencing the outcome.
• The organization should set up several independent groups, working on the same problem.
• All effective alternatives should be examined.
• Each member should discuss the group's ideas with trusted people outside of the group.
• The group should invite outside experts into meetings. Group members should be allowed to discuss with and question the outside experts.
• At least one group member should be assigned the role of devil's advocate. This should be a different person for each meeting.

The devil's advocate in a group may provide questions and insight which contradict the majority group in order to avoid groupthink decisions. A study by Ryan Hartwig confirms that the devil's advocacy technique is very useful for group problem-solving. It allows for conflict to be used in a way that is most-effective for finding the best solution so that members will not have to go back and find a different solution if the first one fails. Hartwig also suggests that the devil's advocacy technique be incorporated with other group decision-making models such as the functional theory to find and evaluate alternative solutions. The main idea of the devil's advocacy technique is that somewhat structured conflict can be facilitated to not only reduce groupthink, but to also solve problems.

Diversity of all kinds is also instrumental in preventing groupthink. Individuals with varying backgrounds, thought, professional and life experiences etc. can offer unique perspectives and challenge assumptions. In a 2004 study, a diverse team of problem-solver outperformed a team consisting of best problem solvers as they start to think alike.

Joris Graff offered a new debate format designed to prevent groupthink from occurring in a classroom setting specifically regarding debate lessons. He agreed that greater diversity in arguments both within a team and against an opposing side would prevent groupthink and suggested several ways to introduce that diversity into debates. Graff also suggested that the goal of debates should be on consensus or compromise over designating a winner. He argues that encouraging opposing teams to work together to come up with a viable solution prevents common arguments from becoming the only arguments used due to perceived success at getting a specific desired outcome.

Psychological safety, emphasized by Edmondson and Lei and Hirak et al., is crucial for effective group performance. It involves creating an environment that encourages learning and removes barriers perceived as threats by team members. Edmondson et al. demonstrated variations in psychological safety based on work type, hierarchy, and leadership effectiveness, highlighting its importance in employee development and fostering a culture of learning within organizations.

A similar situation to groupthink is the Abilene paradox, another phenomenon that is detrimental when working in groups. When organizations fall into an Abilene paradox, they take actions in contradiction to what their perceived goals may be and therefore defeat the very purposes they are trying to achieve. Failure to communicate desires or beliefs can cause an Abilene paradox.

Examples

The Watergate scandal is an example of this. Before the scandal had occurred, a meeting took place where they discussed the issue. One of Nixon's campaign aides was unsure if he should speak up and give his input. If he had voiced his disagreement with the group's decision, it is possible that the scandal could have been avoided.

After the Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco, President John F. Kennedy sought to avoid groupthink during the Cuban Missile Crisis using "vigilant appraisal". During meetings, he invited outside experts to share their viewpoints, and allowed group members to question them carefully. He also encouraged group members to discuss possible solutions with trusted members within their separate departments, and he even divided the group up into various sub-groups, to partially break the group cohesion. Kennedy was deliberately absent from the meetings, so as to avoid pressing his own opinion.

Cass Sunstein reports that introverts can sometimes be silent in meetings with extroverts; he recommends explicitly asking for each person's opinion, either during the meeting or afterwards in one-on-one sessions. Sunstein points to studies showing groups with a high level of internal socialization and happy talk are more prone to bad investment decisions due to groupthink, compared with groups of investors who are relative strangers and more willing to be argumentative. To avoid group polarization, where discussion with like-minded people drives an outcome further to an extreme than any of the individuals favored before the discussion, he recommends creating heterogeneous groups which contain people with different points of view. Sunstein also points out that people arguing a side they do not sincerely believe (in the role of devil's advocate) tend to be much less effective than a sincere argument. This can be accomplished by dissenting individuals, or a group like a Red Team that is expected to pursue an alternative strategy or goal "for real".

Empirical findings and meta-analysis

Testing groupthink in a laboratory is difficult because synthetic settings remove groups from real social situations, which ultimately changes the variables conducive or inhibitive to groupthink. Because of its subjective nature, researchers have struggled to measure groupthink as a complete phenomenon, instead frequently opting to measure its particular factors. These factors range from causal to effectual and focus on group and situational aspects.

Park (1990) found that "only 16 empirical studies have been published on groupthink", and concluded that they "resulted in only partial support of his [Janis's] hypotheses". Park concludes, "despite Janis' claim that group cohesiveness is the major necessary antecedent factor, no research has shown a significant main effect of cohesiveness on groupthink." Park also concludes that research does not support Janis' claim that cohesion and leadership style interact to produce groupthink symptoms. Park presents a summary of the results of the studies analyzed. According to Park, a study by Huseman and Drive (1979) indicates groupthink occurs in both small and large decision-making groups within businesses. This results partly from group isolation within the business. Manz and Sims (1982) conducted a study showing that autonomous work groups are susceptible to groupthink symptoms in the same manner as decisions making groups within businesses. Fodor and Smith (1982) produced a study revealing that group leaders with high power motivation create atmospheres more susceptible to groupthink. Leaders with high power motivation possess characteristics similar to leaders with a "closed" leadership style—an unwillingness to respect dissenting opinion. The same study indicates that level of group cohesiveness is insignificant in predicting groupthink occurrence. Park summarizes a study performed by Callaway, Marriott, and Esser (1985) in which groups with highly dominant members "made higher quality decisions, exhibited lowered state of anxiety, took more time to reach a decision, and made more statements of disagreement/agreement". Overall, groups with highly dominant members expressed characteristics inhibitory to groupthink. If highly dominant members are considered equivalent to leaders with high power motivation, the results of Callaway, Marriott, and Esser contradict the results of Fodor and Smith. A study by Leana (1985) indicates the interaction between level of group cohesion and leadership style is completely insignificant in predicting groupthink. This finding refutes Janis' claim that the factors of cohesion and leadership style interact to produce groupthink. Park summarizes a study by McCauley (1989) in which structural conditions of the group were found to predict groupthink while situational conditions did not. The structural conditions included group insulation, group homogeneity, and promotional leadership. The situational conditions included group cohesion. These findings refute Janis' claim about group cohesiveness predicting groupthink.

Overall, studies on groupthink have largely focused on the factors (antecedents) that predict groupthink. Groupthink occurrence is often measured by number of ideas/solutions generated within a group, but there is no uniform, concrete standard by which researchers can objectively conclude groupthink occurs. The studies of groupthink and groupthink antecedents reveal a mixed body of results. Some studies indicate group cohesion and leadership style to be powerfully predictive of groupthink, while other studies indicate the insignificance of these factors. Group homogeneity and group insulation are generally supported as factors predictive of groupthink.

Case studies

Politics and military

Groupthink can have a strong hold on political decisions and military operations, which may result in enormous wastage of human and material resources. Highly qualified and experienced politicians and military commanders sometimes make very poor decisions when in a suboptimal group setting. Scholars such as Janis and Raven attribute political and military fiascoes, such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal, to the effect of groupthink. More recently, Dina Badie argued that groupthink was largely responsible for the shift in the U.S. administration's view on Saddam Hussein that eventually led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States. After the September 11 attacks, "stress, promotional leadership, and intergroup conflict" were all factors that gave rise to the occurrence of groupthink. Political case studies of groupthink serve to illustrate the impact that the occurrence of groupthink can have in today's political scene.

Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis

The United States Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 1961 was the primary case study that Janis used to formulate his theory of groupthink. The invasion plan was initiated by the Eisenhower administration, but when the Kennedy administration took over, it "uncritically accepted" the plan of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). When some people, such as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Senator J. William Fulbright, attempted to present their objections to the plan, the Kennedy team as a whole ignored these objections and kept believing in the morality of their plan. Eventually Schlesinger minimized his own doubts, performing self-censorship. The Kennedy team stereotyped Fidel Castro and the Cubans by failing to question the CIA about its many false assumptions, including the ineffectiveness of Castro's air force, the weakness of Castro's army, and the inability of Castro to quell internal uprisings.

Janis argued the fiasco that ensued could have been prevented if the Kennedy administration had followed the methods to preventing groupthink adopted during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which took place just one year later in October 1962. In the latter crisis, essentially the same political leaders were involved in decision-making, but this time they learned from their previous mistake of seriously under-rating their opponents.

Pearl Harbor

The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, is a prime example of groupthink. A number of factors such as shared illusions and rationalizations contributed to the lack of precaution taken by U.S. Navy officers based in Hawaii. The United States had intercepted Japanese messages and they discovered that Japan was arming itself for an offensive attack somewhere in the Pacific Ocean. Washington took action by warning officers stationed at Pearl Harbor, but their warning was not taken seriously. They assumed that the Empire of Japan was taking measures in the event that their embassies and consulates in enemy territories were usurped.

The U.S. Navy and Army in Pearl Harbor also shared rationalizations about why an attack was unlikely. Some of them included:

• "The Japanese would never dare attempt a full-scale surprise assault against Hawaii because they would realize that it would precipitate an all-out war, which the United States would surely win."
• "The Pacific Fleet concentrated at Pearl Harbor was a major deterrent against air or naval attack."
• "Even if the Japanese were foolhardy enough to send their carriers to attack us [the United States], we could certainly detect and destroy them in plenty of time."
• "No warships anchored in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor could ever be sunk by torpedo bombs launched from enemy aircraft."

Space Shuttle Challenger disaster

On January 28, 1986, NASA launched the space shuttle Challenger. This was significant because a civilian, non-astronaut, high school teacher was to be the first American civilian in space. The space shuttle was perceived to be so safe as to make this possible. NASA's engineering and launch teams rely on teamwork. To launch the shuttle, individual team members must affirm each system is functioning nominally. Morton Thiokol engineers who designed and built the Challenger's rocket boosters ignored warnings that cooler temperature during the day of the launch could result in failure and death of the crew. The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster grounded space shuttle flights for nearly three years.

The Challenger case was subject to a more quantitatively oriented test of Janis's groupthink model performed by Esser and Lindoerfer, who found clear signs of positive antecedents to groupthink in the critical decisions concerning the launch of the shuttle. The day of the launch was rushed for publicity reasons. NASA wanted to captivate and hold the attention of America. Having civilian teacher Christa McAuliffe on board to broadcast a live lesson, and the possible mention by president Ronald Reagan in the State of the Union address, were opportunities NASA deemed critical to increasing interest in its potential civilian space flight program. The schedule NASA set out to meet was, however, self-imposed. It seemed incredible to many that an organization with a perceived history of successful management would have locked itself into a schedule it had no chance of meeting.

Corporate world

In the corporate world, ineffective and suboptimal group decision-making can negatively affect the health of a company and cause a considerable amount of monetary loss.

Swissair

Aaron Hermann and Hussain Rammal illustrate the detrimental role of groupthink in the collapse of Swissair in 2002, a Swiss airline company that was thought to be so financially stable that it earned the title the "Flying Bank". The authors argue that, among other factors, Swissair carried two symptoms of groupthink: the belief that the group is invulnerable and the belief in the morality of the group.  In addition, before the fiasco, the size of the company board was reduced, subsequently eliminating industrial expertise. This may have further increased the likelihood of groupthink. With the board members lacking expertise in the field and having somewhat similar background, norms, and values, the pressure to conform may have become more prominent. This phenomenon is called group homogeneity, which is an antecedent to groupthink. Together, these conditions may have contributed to the poor decision-making process that eventually led to Swissair's collapse.

Marks & Spencer and British Airways

Another example of groupthink from the corporate world is illustrated in the United Kingdom-based companies Marks & Spencer and British Airways. The negative impact of groupthink took place during the 1990s as both companies released globalization expansion strategies. Researcher Jack Eaton's content analysis of media press releases revealed that all eight symptoms of groupthink were present during this period. The most predominant symptom of groupthink was the illusion of invulnerability as both companies underestimated potential failure due to years of profitability and success during challenging markets. Up until the consequence of groupthink erupted they were considered blue chips and darlings of the London Stock Exchange. During 1998–1999 the price of Marks & Spencer shares fell from 590 to less than 300 and that of British Airways from 740 to 300. Both companies had previously been prominently featured in the UK press and media for more positive reasons, reflecting national pride in their undeniable sector-wide performance.

Sports

Recent literature of groupthink attempts to study the application of this concept beyond the framework of business and politics. One particularly relevant and popular arena in which groupthink is rarely studied is sports. The lack of literature in this area prompted Charles Koerber and Christopher Neck to begin a case-study investigation that examined the effect of groupthink on the decision of the Major League Umpires Association (MLUA) to stage a mass resignation in 1999. The decision was a failed attempt to gain a stronger negotiating stance against Major League Baseball. Koerber and Neck suggest that three groupthink symptoms can be found in the decision-making process of the MLUA. First, the umpires overestimated the power that they had over the baseball league and the strength of their group's resolve. The union also exhibited some degree of closed-mindedness with the notion that MLB is the enemy. Lastly, there was the presence of self-censorship; some umpires who disagreed with the decision to resign failed to voice their dissent. These factors, along with other decision-making defects, led to a decision that was suboptimal and ineffective.

Recent developments

Ubiquity model

Researcher Robert Baron (2005) contends that the connection between certain antecedents which Janis believed necessary has not been demonstrated by the current collective body of research on groupthink. He believes that Janis' antecedents for groupthink are incorrect, and argues that not only are they "not necessary to provoke the symptoms of groupthink, but that they often will not even amplify such symptoms". As an alternative to Janis' model, Baron proposed a ubiquity model of groupthink. This model provides a revised set of antecedents for groupthink, including social identification, salient norms, and low self-efficacy.

General group problem-solving (GGPS) model

Aldag and Fuller (1993) argue that the groupthink concept was based on a "small and relatively restricted sample" that became too broadly generalized. Furthermore, the concept is too rigidly staged and deterministic. Empirical support for it has also not been consistent. The authors compare groupthink model to findings presented by Maslow and Piaget; they argue that, in each case, the model incites great interest and further research that, subsequently, invalidate the original concept. Aldag and Fuller thus suggest a new model called the general group problem-solving (GGPS) model, which integrates new findings from groupthink literature and alters aspects of groupthink itself. The primary difference between the GGPS model and groupthink is that the former is more value neutral and more political.

Reexamination

Later scholars have re-assessed the merit of groupthink by reexamining case studies that Janis originally used to buttress his model. Roderick Kramer (1998) believed that, because scholars today have a more sophisticated set of ideas about the general decision-making process and because new and relevant information about the fiascos have surfaced over the years, a reexamination of the case studies is appropriate and necessary. He argues that new evidence does not support Janis' view that groupthink was largely responsible for President Kennedy's and President Johnson's decisions in the Bay of Pigs Invasion and U.S. escalated military involvement in the Vietnam War, respectively. Both presidents sought the advice of experts outside of their political groups more than Janis suggested. Kramer also argues that the presidents were the final decision-makers of the fiascos; while determining which course of action to take, they relied more heavily on their own construals of the situations than on any group-consenting decision presented to them. Kramer concludes that Janis' explanation of the two military issues is flawed and that groupthink has much less influence on group decision-making than is popularly believed.

Groupthink, while it is thought to be avoided, does have some positive effects. Choi and Kim found that group identity traits such as believing in the group's moral superiority, were linked to less concurrence seeking, better decision-making, better team activities, and better team performance. This study also showed that the relationship between groupthink and defective decision making was insignificant. These findings mean that in the right circumstances, groupthink does not always have negative outcomes. It also questions the original theory of groupthink.

Reformulation

Scholars are challenging the original view of groupthink proposed by Janis. Whyte (1998) argues that a group's collective efficacy, i.e. confidence in its abilities, can lead to reduced vigilance and a higher risk tolerance, similar to how groupthink was described. McCauley (1998) proposes that the attractiveness of group members might be the most prominent factor in causing poor decisions. Turner and Pratkanis (1991) suggest that from social identity perspective, groupthink can be seen as a group's attempt to ward off potentially negative views of the group. Together, the contributions of these scholars have brought about new understandings of groupthink that help reformulate Janis' original model.

Sociocognitive theory

According to a theory many of the basic characteristics of groupthink – e.g., strong cohesion, indulgent atmosphere, and exclusive ethos – are the result of a special kind of mnemonic encoding (Tsoukalas, 2007). Members of tightly knit groups have a tendency to represent significant aspects of their community as episodic memories and this has a predictable influence on their group behavior and collective ideology, as opposed to what happens when they are encoded as semantic memories (which is common in formal and more loose group formations).

Collective illusions

According to scientist Todd Rose, Collective Illusions and Groupthink are linked concepts that show how social dynamics affect behavior. Groupthink occurs when individuals who are right about what the group wants, conform to the group's consensus. Collective illusions are a specific form of Groupthink where individuals mistakenly assume the group's wants, leading everyone to behave in ways that don't reflect their true preferences. Both the concepts involve social influence and conformity.

In popular culture

In the 1979 religious satire Monty Python's Life of Brian, the concept of groupthink is satirized through the reactions of the crowds to Brian and his would-be followers: when he urges them that "You don't need to follow me. You don't need to follow anybody. You've got to think for yourselves. You're all individuals.", they respond in unison "Yes. We're all different." (with one voice saying "I'm not.") The film highlights how easily people can be swayed by charismatic figures, adopt a single, often illogical viewpoint, and blindly follow without individual thought.

The Wisdom of Crowds

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Cover of mass market edition by Anchor
Author	James Surowiecki
Language	English
Publisher	Doubleday; Anchor
Publication date	2004
Publication place	United States
Pages	336
ISBN	978-0-385-50386-0
OCLC	61254310
Dewey Decimal	303.3/8 22
LC Class	JC328.2 .S87 2005

The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations, published in 2004, is a book written by James Surowiecki about the aggregation of information in groups, resulting in decisions that, he argues, are often better than could have been made by any single member of the group. The book presents numerous case studies and anecdotes to illustrate its argument, and touches on several fields, primarily economics and psychology.

The opening anecdote relates Francis Galton's surprise that the crowd at a county fair accurately guessed the weight of an ox when the median of their individual guesses was taken (the median was closer to the ox's true butchered weight than the estimates of most crowd members.)

The book relates to diverse collections of independently deciding individuals, rather than crowd psychology as traditionally understood. Its central thesis, that a diverse collection of independently deciding individuals is likely to make certain types of decisions and predictions better than individuals or even experts, draws many parallels with statistical sampling; however, there is little overt discussion of statistics in the book.

Its title is an allusion to Charles Mackay's Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, published in 1841.

Types of crowd wisdom

Surowiecki breaks down the advantages he sees in disorganized decisions into three main types, which he classifies as

Cognition

Thinking and information processing, such as market judgment, which he argues can be much faster, more reliable, and less subject to political forces than the deliberations of experts or expert committees.

Coordination

Coordination of behavior includes optimizing the utilization of a popular bar and not colliding in moving traffic flows. The book is replete with examples from experimental economics, but this section relies more on naturally occurring experiments such as pedestrians optimizing the pavement flow or the extent of crowding in popular restaurants. He examines how common understanding within a culture allows remarkably accurate judgments about specific reactions of other members of the culture.

Cooperation

How groups of people can form networks of trust without a central system controlling their behavior or directly enforcing their compliance. This section is especially pro free market.

Four elements required to form a wise crowd

Not all crowds (groups) are wise. Consider, for example, mobs or crazed investors in a stock market bubble. According to Surowiecki, these key criteria separate wise crowds from irrational ones:

Criteria	Description
Diversity of opinion	Each person should have private information even if it is just an eccentric interpretation of the known facts. (Chapter 2)
Independence	People's opinions are not determined by the opinions of those around them. (Chapter 3)
Decentralization	People are able to specialize and draw on local knowledge. (Chapter 4)
Aggregation	Some mechanism exists for turning private judgements into a collective decision. (Chapter 5)

Based on Surowiecki's book, Oinas-Kukkonen captures the wisdom of crowds approach with the following eight conjectures:

1. It is possible to describe how people in a group think as a whole.
2. In some cases, groups are remarkably intelligent and are often smarter than the smartest people in them.
3. The three conditions for a group to be intelligent are diversity, independence, and decentralization.
4. The best decisions are a product of disagreement and contest.
5. Too much communication can make the group as a whole less intelligent.
6. Information aggregation functionality is needed.
7. The right information needs to be delivered to the right people in the right place, at the right time, and in the right way.
8. There is no need to chase the expert.

Failures of crowd intelligence

Surowiecki studies situations (such as rational bubbles) in which the crowd produces very bad judgment, and argues that in these types of situations their cognition or cooperation failed because (in one way or another) the members of the crowd were too conscious of the opinions of others and began to emulate each other and conform rather than think differently. Although he gives experimental details of crowds collectively swayed by a persuasive speaker, he says that the main reason that groups of people intellectually conform is that the system for making decisions has a systemic flaw.

Causes and detailed case histories of such failures include:

Extreme	Description
Homogeneity	Surowiecki stresses the need for diversity within a crowd to ensure enough variance in approach, thought process, and private information.
Centralization	The 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, which he blames on a hierarchical NASA management bureaucracy that was totally closed to the wisdom of low-level engineers.
Division	The United States Intelligence Community, the 9/11 Commission Report claims, failed to prevent the 11 September 2001 attacks partly because information held by one subdivision was not accessible by another. Surowiecki's argument is that crowds (of intelligence analysts in this case) work best when they choose for themselves what to work on and what information they need. (He cites the SARS-virus isolation as an example in which the free flow of data enabled laboratories around the world to coordinate research without a central point of control.) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA have created a Wikipedia-style information sharing network called Intellipedia that will help the free flow of information to prevent such failures again.
Imitation	Where choices are visible and made in sequence, an "information cascade" can form in which only the first few decision makers gain anything by contemplating the choices available: once past decisions have become sufficiently informative, it pays for later decision makers to simply copy those around them. This can lead to fragile social outcomes.
Emotionality	Emotional factors, such as a feeling of belonging, can lead to peer pressure, herd instinct, and in extreme cases collective hysteria.

Connection

At the 2005 O'Reilly Emerging Technology Conference Surowiecki presented a session entitled Independent Individuals and Wise Crowds, or Is It Possible to Be Too Connected?

The question for all of us is, how can you have interaction without information cascades, without losing the independence that's such a key factor in group intelligence?

He recommends:

• Keep your ties loose.
• Keep yourself exposed to as many diverse sources of information as possible.
• Make groups that range across hierarchies.

Tim O'Reilly and others also discuss the success of Google, wikis, blogging, and Web 2.0 in the context of the wisdom of crowds.

Applications

Surowiecki is a strong advocate of the benefits of decision markets and regrets the failure of DARPA's controversial Policy Analysis Market to get off the ground. He points to the success of public and internal corporate markets as evidence that a collection of people with varying points of view but the same motivation (to make a good guess) can produce an accurate aggregate prediction. According to Surowiecki, the aggregate predictions have been shown to be more reliable than the output of any think tank. He advocates extensions of the existing futures markets even into areas such as terrorist activity and prediction markets within companies.

To illustrate this thesis, he says that his publisher can publish a more compelling output by relying on individual authors under one-off contracts bringing book ideas to them. In this way, they are able to tap into the wisdom of a much larger crowd than would be possible with an in-house writing team.

Will Hutton has argued that Surowiecki's analysis applies to value judgments as well as factual issues, with crowd decisions that "emerge of our own aggregated free will [being] astonishingly... decent". He concludes that "There's no better case for pluralism, diversity and democracy, along with a genuinely independent press."

Applications of the wisdom-of-crowds effect exist in three general categories: Prediction markets, Delphi methods, and extensions of the traditional opinion poll.

Prediction markets

Main article: Prediction market

The most common application is the prediction market, a speculative or betting market created to make verifiable predictions. Surowiecki discusses the success of prediction markets. Similar to Delphi methods but unlike opinion polls, prediction (information) markets ask questions like, "Who do you think will win the election?" and predict outcomes rather well. Answers to the question, "Who will you vote for?" are not as predictive.

Assets are cash values tied to specific outcomes (e.g., Candidate X will win the election) or parameters (e.g., Next quarter's revenue). The current market prices are interpreted as predictions of the probability of the event or the expected value of the parameter. Betfair is the world's biggest prediction exchange, with around $28 billion traded in 2007. NewsFutures is an international prediction market that generates consensus probabilities for news events. Intrade.com, which operated a person to person prediction market based in Dublin Ireland achieved very high media attention in 2012 related to the US Presidential Elections, with more than 1.5 million search references to Intrade and Intrade data. Several companies now offer enterprise class prediction marketplaces to predict project completion dates, sales, or the market potential for new ideas. A number of Web-based quasi-prediction marketplace companies have sprung up to offer predictions primarily on sporting events and stock markets but also on other topics. The principle of the prediction market is also used in project management software to let team members predict a project's "real" deadline and budget.

Delphi methods

Main article: Delphi method

The Delphi method is a systematic, interactive forecasting method which relies on a panel of independent experts. The carefully selected experts answer questionnaires in two or more rounds. After each round, a facilitator provides an anonymous summary of the experts' forecasts from the previous round as well as the reasons they provided for their judgments. Thus, participants are encouraged to revise their earlier answers in light of the replies of other members of the group. It is believed that during this process the range of the answers will decrease and the group will converge towards the "correct" answer. Many of the consensus forecasts have proven to be more accurate than forecasts made by individuals.

Human Swarming

Designed as an optimized method for unleashing the wisdom of crowds, this approach implements real-time feedback loops around synchronous groups of users with the goal of achieving more accurate insights from fewer numbers of users. Human Swarming (sometimes referred to as Social Swarming) is modeled after biological processes in birds, fish, and insects, and is enabled among networked users by using mediating software such as the UNU collective intelligence platform. As published by Rosenberg (2015), such real-time control systems enable groups of human participants to behave as a unified collective intelligence. When logged into the UNU platform, for example, groups of distributed users can collectively answer questions, generate ideas, and make predictions as a singular emergent entity. Early testing shows that human swarms can out-predict individuals across a variety of real-world projections.

In popular culture

Hugo-winning writer John Brunner's 1975 science fiction novel The Shockwave Rider includes an elaborate planet-wide information futures and betting pool called "Delphi" based on the Delphi method.

Illusionist Derren Brown claimed to use the 'Wisdom of Crowds' concept to explain how he correctly predicted the UK National Lottery results in September 2009. His explanation was met with criticism on-line, by people who argued that the concept was misapplied. The methodology employed was too flawed; the sample of people could not have been totally objective and free in thought, because they were gathered multiple times and socialised with each other too much; a condition Surowiecki tells us is corrosive to pure independence and the diversity of mind required (Surowiecki 2004:38). Groups thus fall into groupthink where they increasingly make decisions based on influence of each other and are thus less accurate. However, other commentators have suggested that, given the entertainment nature of the show, Brown's misapplication of the theory may have been a deliberate smokescreen to conceal his true method.

This was also shown in the television series East of Eden where a social network of roughly 10,000 individuals came up with ideas to stop missiles in a very short span of time.

Wisdom of Crowds would have a significant influence on the naming of the crowdsourcing creative company Tongal, which is an anagram for Galton, the last name of the social-scientist highlighted in the introduction to Surowiecki's book. Francis Galton recognized the ability of a crowd's median weight-guesses for oxen to exceed the accuracy of experts.

Criticism

In his book Embracing the Wide Sky, Daniel Tammet finds fault with this notion. Tammet points out the potential for problems in systems which have poorly defined means of pooling knowledge: Subject matter experts can be overruled and even wrongly punished by less knowledgeable persons in crowd sourced systems, citing a case of this on Wikipedia. Furthermore, Tammet mentions the assessment of the accuracy of Wikipedia as described in a study mentioned in Nature in 2005, outlining several flaws in the study's methodology which included that the study made no distinction between minor errors and large errors.

Tammet also cites the Kasparov versus the World, an online competition that pitted the brainpower of tens of thousands of online chess players choosing moves in a match against Garry Kasparov, which was won by Kasparov, not the "crowd". Although Kasparov did say, "It is the greatest game in the history of chess. The sheer number of ideas, the complexity, and the contribution it has made to chess make it the most important game ever played."

In his book You Are Not a Gadget, Jaron Lanier argues that crowd wisdom is best suited for problems that involve optimization, but ill-suited for problems that require creativity or innovation. In the online article Digital Maoism, Lanier argues that the collective is more likely to be smart only when

1. it is not defining its own questions,

2. the goodness of an answer can be evaluated by a simple result (such as a single numeric value), and

3. the information system which informs the collective is filtered by a quality control mechanism that relies on individuals to a high degree.

Lanier argues that only under those circumstances can a collective be smarter than a person. If any of these conditions are broken, the collective becomes unreliable or worse.

Iain Couzin, a professor in Princeton's Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, and Albert Kao, his student, in a 2014 article in the journal Proceedings of the Royal Society B, argue that "the conventional view of the wisdom of crowds may not be informative in complex and realistic environments, and that being in small groups can maximize decision accuracy across many contexts." By "small groups," Couzin and Kao mean fewer than a dozen people. They conclude and say that “the decisions of very large groups may be highly accurate when the information used is independently sampled, but they are particularly susceptible to the negative effects of correlated information, even when only a minority of the group uses such information.”