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Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Philosophy of artificial intelligence

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_artificial_intelligence

The philosophy of artificial intelligence is a branch of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of computer science that explores artificial intelligence and its implications for knowledge and understanding of intelligence, ethics, consciousness, epistemology, and free will. Furthermore, the technology is concerned with the creation of artificial animals or artificial people (or, at least, artificial creatures; see artificial life), so the discipline is of considerable interest to philosophers. These factors contributed to the emergence of the philosophy of artificial intelligence.

The philosophy of artificial intelligence attempts to answer such questions as:

  • Can a machine act intelligently? Can it solve any problem that a person would solve by thinking?
  • Are human intelligence and machine intelligence the same? Is the human brain essentially a computer?
  • Can a machine have a mind, mental states, and consciousness in the same sense that a human being can? Can it feel how things are? (i.e. does it have qualia?)

Questions like these reflect the divergent interests of AI researchers, cognitive scientists and philosophers respectively. The scientific answers to these questions depend on the definition of "intelligence" and "consciousness" and exactly which "machines" are under discussion.

Important propositions in the philosophy of AI include some of the following:

  • Turing's "polite convention": If a machine behaves as intelligently as a human being, then it is as intelligent as a human being.
  • The Dartmouth proposal: "Every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it."
  • Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon's physical symbol system hypothesis: "A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means of general intelligent action."
  • John Searle's strong AI hypothesis: "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds."
  • Hobbes' mechanism: "For 'reason' ... is nothing but 'reckoning,' that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the 'marking' and 'signifying' of our thoughts..."

Machine intelligence

In AI research, questions about "intelligence" are concerned with the behavior of machines, and is not generally concerned with the concept of thought.

Definitions of intelligence

Turing test

The "standard interpretation" of the Turing test

In 1949, computer scientist Alan Turing reduced the problem of defining intelligence to a simple question about conversation. He suggests that if a machine can answer any question posed to it, using the same words that an ordinary person would, then we may call that machine intelligent. A modern version of his experimental design would use an online chat room, where one of the participants is a real person and one of the participants is a computer program. The program passes the test if no one can tell which of the two participants is human. Turing notes that no one (except philosophers) ever asks the question "can people think?" He writes "instead of arguing continually over this point, it is usual to have a polite convention that everyone thinks". Turing's test extends this polite convention to machines, proposing that if a machine acts as intelligently as a human being, then it is as intelligent as a human being.

One criticism of the Turing test is that it only measures the "humanness" of the machine's behavior, rather than the "intelligence" of the behavior. Since human behavior and intelligent behavior are not exactly the same thing, the test fails to measure intelligence. Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig write that "aeronautical engineering texts do not define the goal of their field as 'making machines that fly so exactly like pigeons that they can fool other pigeons'".

Intelligence as achieving goals

Simple reflex agent

Twenty-first century AI research defines intelligence in terms of goal-directed behavior. It views intelligence as a set of problems that the machine is expected to solve – the more problems it can solve, and the better its solutions are, the more intelligent the program is. AI founder John McCarthy defined intelligence as "the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world."

Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig formalized this definition using abstract intelligent agents. An "agent" is something which perceives and acts in an environment. A "performance measure" defines what counts as success for the agent.

  • "If an agent acts so as to maximize the expected value of a performance measure based on past experience and knowledge then it is intelligent."

Definitions like this one try to capture the essence of intelligence. They have the advantage that, unlike the Turing test, they do not also test for unintelligent human traits such as making typing mistakes. They have the disadvantage that they can fail to differentiate between "things that think" and "things that do not". By this definition, even a thermostat has a rudimentary intelligence.

Arguments that a machine can display general intelligence

The brain can be simulated

Hubert Dreyfus describes this argument as claiming that "if the nervous system obeys the laws of physics and chemistry, which we have every reason to suppose it does, then ... we ... ought to be able to reproduce the behavior of the nervous system with some physical device". This argument, first introduced as early as 1943 and vividly described by Hans Moravec in 1988, is now associated with futurist Ray Kurzweil, who estimates that computer power will be sufficient for a complete brain simulation by the year 2029. A non-real-time simulation of a thalamocortical model that has the size of the human brain (1011 neurons) was performed in 2005, and it took 50 days to simulate 1 second of brain dynamics on a cluster of 27 processors.

Even AI's harshest critics (such as Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle) agree that a brain simulation is possible in theory. However, Searle points out that, in principle, anything can be simulated by a computer; thus, bringing the definition to its breaking point leads to the conclusion that any process at all can technically be considered "computation". "What we wanted to know is what distinguishes the mind from thermostats and livers," he writes. Thus, merely simulating the functioning of a living brain would in itself be an admission of ignorance regarding intelligence and the nature of the mind, like trying to build a jet airliner by copying a living bird precisely, feather by feather, with no theoretical understanding of aeronautical engineering.

Human thinking is symbol processing

In 1963, Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon proposed that "symbol manipulation" was the essence of both human and machine intelligence. They wrote:

  • "A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means of general intelligent action."

This claim is very strong: it implies both that human thinking is a kind of symbol manipulation (because a symbol system is necessary for intelligence) and that machines can be intelligent (because a symbol system is sufficient for intelligence). Another version of this position was described by philosopher Hubert Dreyfus, who called it "the psychological assumption":

  • "The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules."

The "symbols" that Newell, Simon and Dreyfus discussed were word-like and high level—symbols that directly correspond with objects in the world, such as <dog> and <tail>. Most AI programs written between 1956 and 1990 used this kind of symbol. Modern AI, based on statistics and mathematical optimization, does not use the high-level "symbol processing" that Newell and Simon discussed.

Arguments against symbol processing

These arguments show that human thinking does not consist (solely) of high level symbol manipulation. They do not show that artificial intelligence is impossible, only that more than symbol processing is required.

Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments

In 1931, Kurt Gödel proved with an incompleteness theorem that it is always possible to construct a "Gödel statement" that a formal system of logic (such as a high-level symbol manipulation program) could not prove. Despite being a true statement, the constructed Gödel statement is unprovable within the given system. (The truth of the constructed Gödel statement is contingent on the consistency of the given system; applying the same process to a subtly inconsistent system will appear to succeed, but will actually yield a false "Gödel statement" instead.) More speculatively, Gödel conjectured that the human mind can eventually correctly determine the truth or falsity of any well-grounded mathematical statement (including any possible Gödel statement), and that therefore the human mind's power is not reducible to a mechanism. Philosopher John Lucas (since 1961) and Roger Penrose (since 1989) have championed this philosophical anti-mechanist argument.

Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments tend to rely on the innocuous-seeming claim that a system of human mathematicians (or some idealization of human mathematicians) is both consistent (completely free of error) and believes fully in its own consistency (and can make all logical inferences that follow from its own consistency, including belief in its Gödel statement) . This is probably impossible for a Turing machine to do (see Halting problem); therefore, the Gödelian concludes that human reasoning is too powerful to be captured by a Turing machine, and by extension, any digital mechanical device.

However, the modern consensus in the scientific and mathematical community is that actual human reasoning is inconsistent; that any consistent "idealized version" H of human reasoning would logically be forced to adopt a healthy but counter-intuitive open-minded skepticism about the consistency of H (otherwise H is provably inconsistent); and that Gödel's theorems do not lead to any valid argument that humans have mathematical reasoning capabilities beyond what a machine could ever duplicate. This consensus that Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments are doomed to failure is laid out strongly in Artificial Intelligence: "any attempt to utilize (Gödel's incompleteness results) to attack the computationalist thesis is bound to be illegitimate, since these results are quite consistent with the computationalist thesis."

Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig agree that Gödel's argument does not consider the nature of real-world human reasoning. It applies to what can theoretically be proved, given an infinite amount of memory and time. In practice, real machines (including humans) have finite resources and will have difficulty proving many theorems. It is not necessary to be able to prove everything in order to be an intelligent person.

Less formally, Douglas Hofstadter, in his Pulitzer Prize winning book Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, states that these "Gödel-statements" always refer to the system itself, drawing an analogy to the way the Epimenides paradox uses statements that refer to themselves, such as "this statement is false" or "I am lying". But, of course, the Epimenides paradox applies to anything that makes statements, whether it is a machine or a human, even Lucas himself. Consider:

  • Lucas can't assert the truth of this statement.

This statement is true but cannot be asserted by Lucas. This shows that Lucas himself is subject to the same limits that he describes for machines, as are all people, and so Lucas's argument is pointless.

After concluding that human reasoning is non-computable, Penrose went on to controversially speculate that some kind of hypothetical non-computable processes involving the collapse of quantum mechanical states give humans a special advantage over existing computers. Existing quantum computers are only capable of reducing the complexity of Turing computable tasks and are still restricted to tasks within the scope of Turing machines.  By Penrose and Lucas's arguments, the fact that quantum computers are only able to complete Turing computable tasks implies that they cannot be sufficient for emulating the human mind. Therefore, Penrose seeks some other process involving new physics, for instance quantum gravity which might manifest new physics at the scale of the Planck mass via spontaneous quantum collapse of the wave function. These states, he suggested, occur both within neurons and also spanning more than one neuron. However, other scientists point out that there is no plausible organic mechanism in the brain for harnessing any sort of quantum computation, and furthermore that the timescale of quantum decoherence seems too fast to influence neuron firing.

Dreyfus: the primacy of implicit skills

Hubert Dreyfus argued that human intelligence and expertise depended primarily on fast intuitive judgements rather than step-by-step symbolic manipulation, and argued that these skills would never be captured in formal rules.

Dreyfus's argument had been anticipated by Turing in his 1950 paper Computing machinery and intelligence, where he had classified this as the "argument from the informality of behavior." Turing argued in response that, just because we do not know the rules that govern a complex behavior, this does not mean that no such rules exist. He wrote: "we cannot so easily convince ourselves of the absence of complete laws of behaviour ... The only way we know of for finding such laws is scientific observation, and we certainly know of no circumstances under which we could say, 'We have searched enough. There are no such laws.'"

Russell and Norvig point out that, in the years since Dreyfus published his critique, progress has been made towards discovering the "rules" that govern unconscious reasoning. The situated movement in robotics research attempts to capture our unconscious skills at perception and attention. Computational intelligence paradigms, such as neural nets, evolutionary algorithms and so on are mostly directed at simulated unconscious reasoning and learning. Statistical approaches to AI can make predictions which approach the accuracy of human intuitive guesses. Research into commonsense knowledge has focused on reproducing the "background" or context of knowledge. In fact, AI research in general has moved away from high level symbol manipulation, towards new models that are intended to capture more of our intuitive reasoning.

Cognitive science and psychology eventually came to agree with Dreyfus' description of human expertise. Daniel Kahnemann and others developed a similar theory where they identified two "systems" that humans use to solve problems, which he called "System 1" (fast intuitive judgements) and "System 2" (slow deliberate step by step thinking).

Although Dreyfus' views have been vindicated in many ways, the work in cognitive science and in AI was in response to specific problems in those fields and was not directly influenced by Dreyfus. Historian and AI researcher Daniel Crevier wrote that "time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of some of Dreyfus's comments. Had he formulated them less aggressively, constructive actions they suggested might have been taken much earlier."

Can a machine have a mind, consciousness, and mental states?

This is a philosophical question, related to the problem of other minds and the hard problem of consciousness. The question revolves around a position defined by John Searle as "strong AI":

  • A physical symbol system can have a mind and mental states.

Searle distinguished this position from what he called "weak AI":

  • A physical symbol system can act intelligently.

Searle introduced the terms to isolate strong AI from weak AI so he could focus on what he thought was the more interesting and debatable issue. He argued that even if we assume that we had a computer program that acted exactly like a human mind, there would still be a difficult philosophical question that needed to be answered.

Neither of Searle's two positions are of great concern to AI research, since they do not directly answer the question "can a machine display general intelligence?" (unless it can also be shown that consciousness is necessary for intelligence). Turing wrote "I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness… [b]ut I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question [of whether machines can think]." Russell and Norvig agree: "Most AI researchers take the weak AI hypothesis for granted, and don't care about the strong AI hypothesis."

There are a few researchers who believe that consciousness is an essential element in intelligence, such as Igor Aleksander, Stan Franklin, Ron Sun, and Pentti Haikonen, although their definition of "consciousness" strays very close to "intelligence". (See artificial consciousness.)

Before we can answer this question, we must be clear what we mean by "minds", "mental states" and "consciousness".

Consciousness, minds, mental states, meaning

The words "mind" and "consciousness" are used by different communities in different ways. Some new age thinkers, for example, use the word "consciousness" to describe something similar to Bergson's "élan vital": an invisible, energetic fluid that permeates life and especially the mind. Science fiction writers use the word to describe some essential property that makes us human: a machine or alien that is "conscious" will be presented as a fully human character, with intelligence, desires, will, insight, pride and so on. (Science fiction writers also use the words "sentience", "sapience", "self-awareness" or "ghost"—as in the Ghost in the Shell manga and anime series—to describe this essential human property). For others, the words "mind" or "consciousness" are used as a kind of secular synonym for the soul.

For philosophers, neuroscientists and cognitive scientists, the words are used in a way that is both more precise and more mundane: they refer to the familiar, everyday experience of having a "thought in your head", like a perception, a dream, an intention or a plan, and to the way we see something, know something, mean something or understand something. "It's not hard to give a commonsense definition of consciousness" observes philosopher John Searle. What is mysterious and fascinating is not so much what it is but how it is: how does a lump of fatty tissue and electricity give rise to this (familiar) experience of perceiving, meaning or thinking?

Philosophers call this the hard problem of consciousness. It is the latest version of a classic problem in the philosophy of mind called the "mind-body problem". A related problem is the problem of meaning or understanding (which philosophers call "intentionality"): what is the connection between our thoughts and what we are thinking about (i.e. objects and situations out in the world)? A third issue is the problem of experience (or "phenomenology"): If two people see the same thing, do they have the same experience? Or are there things "inside their head" (called "qualia") that can be different from person to person?

Neurobiologists believe all these problems will be solved as we begin to identify the neural correlates of consciousness: the actual relationship between the machinery in our heads and its collective properties; such as the mind, experience and understanding. Some of the harshest critics of artificial intelligence agree that the brain is just a machine, and that consciousness and intelligence are the result of physical processes in the brain. The difficult philosophical question is this: can a computer program, running on a digital machine that shuffles the binary digits of zero and one, duplicate the ability of the neurons to create minds, with mental states (like understanding or perceiving), and ultimately, the experience of consciousness?

Arguments that a computer cannot have a mind and mental states

Searle's Chinese room

John Searle asks us to consider a thought experiment: suppose we have written a computer program that passes the Turing test and demonstrates general intelligent action. Suppose, specifically that the program can converse in fluent Chinese. Write the program on 3x5 cards and give them to an ordinary person who does not speak Chinese. Lock the person into a room and have him follow the instructions on the cards. He will copy out Chinese characters and pass them in and out of the room through a slot. From the outside, it will appear that the Chinese room contains a fully intelligent person who speaks Chinese. The question is this: is there anyone (or anything) in the room that understands Chinese? That is, is there anything that has the mental state of understanding, or which has conscious awareness of what is being discussed in Chinese? The man is clearly not aware. The room cannot be aware. The cards certainly are not aware. Searle concludes that the Chinese room, or any other physical symbol system, cannot have a mind.

Searle goes on to argue that actual mental states and consciousness require (yet to be described) "actual physical-chemical properties of actual human brains." He argues there are special "causal properties" of brains and neurons that gives rise to minds: in his words "brains cause minds."

Gottfried Leibniz made essentially the same argument as Searle in 1714, using the thought experiment of expanding the brain until it was the size of a mill. In 1974, Lawrence Davis imagined duplicating the brain using telephone lines and offices staffed by people, and in 1978 Ned Block envisioned the entire population of China involved in such a brain simulation. This thought experiment is called "the Chinese Nation" or "the Chinese Gym". Ned Block also proposed his Blockhead argument, which is a version of the Chinese room in which the program has been re-factored into a simple set of rules of the form "see this, do that", removing all mystery from the program.

Responses to the Chinese room

Responses to the Chinese room emphasize several different points.

  • The systems reply and the virtual mind reply: This reply argues that the system, including the man, the program, the room, and the cards, is what understands Chinese. Searle claims that the man in the room is the only thing which could possibly "have a mind" or "understand", but others disagree, arguing that it is possible for there to be two minds in the same physical place, similar to the way a computer can simultaneously "be" two machines at once: one physical (like a Macintosh) and one "virtual" (like a word processor).
  • Speed, power and complexity replies: Several critics point out that the man in the room would probably take millions of years to respond to a simple question, and would require "filing cabinets" of astronomical proportions. This brings the clarity of Searle's intuition into doubt.
  • Robot reply: To truly understand, some believe the Chinese Room needs eyes and hands. Hans Moravec writes: "If we could graft a robot to a reasoning program, we wouldn't need a person to provide the meaning anymore: it would come from the physical world."
  • Brain simulator reply: What if the program simulates the sequence of nerve firings at the synapses of an actual brain of an actual Chinese speaker? The man in the room would be simulating an actual brain. This is a variation on the "systems reply" that appears more plausible because "the system" now clearly operates like a human brain, which strengthens the intuition that there is something besides the man in the room that could understand Chinese.
  • Other minds reply and the epiphenomena reply: Several people have noted that Searle's argument is just a version of the problem of other minds, applied to machines. Since it is difficult to decide if people are "actually" thinking, we should not be surprised that it is difficult to answer the same question about machines.
A related question is whether "consciousness" (as Searle understands it) exists. Searle argues that the experience of consciousness cannot be detected by examining the behavior of a machine, a human being or any other animal. Daniel Dennett points out that natural selection cannot preserve a feature of an animal that has no effect on the behavior of the animal, and thus consciousness (as Searle understands it) cannot be produced by natural selection. Therefore, either natural selection did not produce consciousness, or "strong AI" is correct in that consciousness can be detected by suitably designed Turing test.

Is thinking a kind of computation?

The computational theory of mind or "computationalism" claims that the relationship between mind and brain is similar (if not identical) to the relationship between a running program (software) and a computer (hardware). The idea has philosophical roots in Hobbes (who claimed reasoning was "nothing more than reckoning"), Leibniz (who attempted to create a logical calculus of all human ideas), Hume (who thought perception could be reduced to "atomic impressions") and even Kant (who analyzed all experience as controlled by formal rules). The latest version is associated with philosophers Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor.

This question bears on our earlier questions: if the human brain is a kind of computer then computers can be both intelligent and conscious, answering both the practical and philosophical questions of AI. In terms of the practical question of AI ("Can a machine display general intelligence?"), some versions of computationalism make the claim that (as Hobbes wrote):

  • Reasoning is nothing but reckoning.

In other words, our intelligence derives from a form of calculation, similar to arithmetic. This is the physical symbol system hypothesis discussed above, and it implies that artificial intelligence is possible. In terms of the philosophical question of AI ("Can a machine have mind, mental states and consciousness?"), most versions of computationalism claim that (as Stevan Harnad characterizes it):

  • Mental states are just implementations of (the right) computer programs.

This is John Searle's "strong AI" discussed above, and it is the real target of the Chinese room argument (according to Harnad).

Can a machine have emotions?

If "emotions" are defined only in terms of their effect on behavior or on how they function inside an organism, then emotions can be viewed as a mechanism that an intelligent agent uses to maximize the utility of its actions. Given this definition of emotion, Hans Moravec believes that "robots in general will be quite emotional about being nice people". Fear is a source of urgency. Empathy is a necessary component of good human computer interaction. He says robots "will try to please you in an apparently selfless manner because it will get a thrill out of this positive reinforcement. You can interpret this as a kind of love." Daniel Crevier writes "Moravec's point is that emotions are just devices for channeling behavior in a direction beneficial to the survival of one's species."

Can a machine be self-aware?

"Self-awareness", as noted above, is sometimes used by science fiction writers as a name for the essential human property that makes a character fully human. Turing strips away all other properties of human beings and reduces the question to "can a machine be the subject of its own thought?" Can it think about itself? Viewed in this way, a program can be written that can report on its own internal states, such as a debugger.

Can a machine be original or creative?

Turing reduces this to the question of whether a machine can "take us by surprise" and argues that this is obviously true, as any programmer can attest. He notes that, with enough storage capacity, a computer can behave in an astronomical number of different ways. It must be possible, even trivial, for a computer that can represent ideas to combine them in new ways. (Douglas Lenat's Automated Mathematician, as one example, combined ideas to discover new mathematical truths.) Kaplan and Haenlein suggest that machines can display scientific creativity, while it seems likely that humans will have the upper hand where artistic creativity is concerned.

In 2009, scientists at Aberystwyth University in Wales and the U.K's University of Cambridge designed a robot called Adam that they believe to be the first machine to independently come up with new scientific findings. Also in 2009, researchers at Cornell developed Eureqa, a computer program that extrapolates formulas to fit the data inputted, such as finding the laws of motion from a pendulum's motion.

Can a machine be benevolent or hostile?

This question (like many others in the philosophy of artificial intelligence) can be presented in two forms. "Hostility" can be defined in terms function or behavior, in which case "hostile" becomes synonymous with "dangerous". Or it can be defined in terms of intent: can a machine "deliberately" set out to do harm? The latter is the question "can a machine have conscious states?" (such as intentions) in another form.

The question of whether highly intelligent and completely autonomous machines would be dangerous has been examined in detail by futurists (such as the Machine Intelligence Research Institute). The obvious element of drama has also made the subject popular in science fiction, which has considered many differently possible scenarios where intelligent machines pose a threat to mankind; see Artificial intelligence in fiction.

One issue is that machines may acquire the autonomy and intelligence required to be dangerous very quickly. Vernor Vinge has suggested that over just a few years, computers will suddenly become thousands or millions of times more intelligent than humans. He calls this "the Singularity". He suggests that it may be somewhat or possibly very dangerous for humans. This is discussed by a philosophy called Singularitarianism.

In 2009, academics and technical experts attended a conference to discuss the potential impact of robots and computers and the impact of the hypothetical possibility that they could become self-sufficient and able to make their own decisions. They discussed the possibility and the extent to which computers and robots might be able to acquire any level of autonomy, and to what degree they could use such abilities to possibly pose any threat or hazard. They noted that some machines have acquired various forms of semi-autonomy, including being able to find power sources on their own and being able to independently choose targets to attack with weapons. They also noted that some computer viruses can evade elimination and have achieved "cockroach intelligence". They noted that self-awareness as depicted in science-fiction is probably unlikely, but that there were other potential hazards and pitfalls.

Some experts and academics have questioned the use of robots for military combat, especially when such robots are given some degree of autonomous functions. The US Navy has funded a report which indicates that as military robots become more complex, there should be greater attention to implications of their ability to make autonomous decisions.

The President of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence has commissioned a study to look at this issue. They point to programs like the Language Acquisition Device which can emulate human interaction.

Some have suggested a need to build "Friendly AI", a term coined by Eliezer Yudkowsky, meaning that the advances which are already occurring with AI should also include an effort to make AI intrinsically friendly and humane.

Can a machine imitate all human characteristics?

Turing said "It is customary ... to offer a grain of comfort, in the form of a statement that some peculiarly human characteristic could never be imitated by a machine. ... I cannot offer any such comfort, for I believe that no such bounds can be set."

Turing noted that there are many arguments of the form "a machine will never do X", where X can be many things, such as:

Be kind, resourceful, beautiful, friendly, have initiative, have a sense of humor, tell right from wrong, make mistakes, fall in love, enjoy strawberries and cream, make someone fall in love with it, learn from experience, use words properly, be the subject of its own thought, have as much diversity of behaviour as a man, do something really new.

Turing argues that these objections are often based on naive assumptions about the versatility of machines or are "disguised forms of the argument from consciousness". Writing a program that exhibits one of these behaviors "will not make much of an impression." All of these arguments are tangential to the basic premise of AI, unless it can be shown that one of these traits is essential for general intelligence.

Theological argument

According to Turing, the argument that "thinking is a function of man's immortal soul" is "the theological objection". He writes:

In attempting to construct such machines we should not be irreverently usurping His power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children: rather we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls that He creates.

Views on the role of philosophy

In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, some scholars argue that the role of philosophy in AI is underappreciated,[6] and some argue that the AI community's dismissal of philosophy is even detrimental to their own field. Physicist David Deutsch argues that without an understanding of philosophy or its concepts, AI development would suffer from a lack of progress.

Monday, November 16, 2026

Translational research

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Translational_research

Translational research (also called translation research, translational science, or, when the context is clear, simply translation)[1][2] is the conversion of basic research into results that directly benefit human life. The term is used in science and technology, especially in biology and medical science. As such, translational research forms a subset of applied research.

The term has been used most commonly in life sciences and biotechnology, but applies across the spectrum of science and humanities. In the context of biomedicine, translational research is also known as bench to bedside.[3] In the field of education, it is defined as research which translates concepts to classroom practice.

Critics of translational medical research (to the exclusion of more basic research) point to examples of important drugs that arose from fortuitous discoveries in the course of basic research such as penicillin and benzodiazepines. Other problems have stemmed from the widespread irreproducibility thought to exist in translational research literature.

Although translational research is relatively new, there are now several major research centers focused on it. In the U.S., the National Institutes of Health has implemented a major national initiative to leverage existing academic health center infrastructure through the Clinical and Translational Science Awards. Furthermore, some universities acknowledge translational research as its own field in which to study for a PhD or graduate certificate.

Definitions

Translational research is aimed at solving particular problems; the term has been used most commonly in life sciences and biotechnology, but applies across the spectrum of science and humanities.

In the field of education, it is defined for school-based education by the Education Futures Collaboration (www.meshguides.org) as research which translates concepts to classroom practice. Examples of translational research are commonly found in education subject association journals and in the MESHGuides which have been designed for this purpose.

In bioscience, translational research is a term often used interchangeably with translational medicine or translational science or bench to bedside. The adjective "translational" refers to the "translation" (the term derives from the Latin for "carrying over") of basic scientific findings in a laboratory setting into potential treatments for disease.

Biomedical translational research adopts a scientific investigation/enquiry into a given problem facing medical/health practices: it aims to "translate" findings in fundamental research into practice. In the field of biomedicine, it is often called "translational medicine", defined by the European Society for Translational Medicine (EUSTM) as "an interdisciplinary branch of the biomedical field supported by three main pillars: benchside, bedside and community", from laboratory experiments through clinical trials, to therapies, to point-of-care patient applications. The end point of translational research in medicine is the production of a promising new treatment that can be used clinically. Translational research is conceived due to the elongated time often taken to bring to bear discovered medical idea in practical terms in a health system. It is for these reasons that translational research is more effective in dedicated university science departments or isolated, dedicated research centers. Since 2009, the field has had specialized journals, the American Journal of Translational Research and Translational Research dedicated to translational research and its findings.

Translational research in biomedicine is broken down into different stages. In a two-stage model, T1 research, refers to the "bench-to-bedside" enterprise of translating knowledge from the basic sciences into the development of new treatments and T2 research refers to translating the findings from clinical trials into everyday practice, although this model is actually referring to the 2 "roadblocks" T1 and T2. Waldman et al. propose a scheme going from T0 to T5. T0 is laboratory (before human) research. In T1-translation, new laboratory discoveries are first translated to human application, which includes phase I & II clinical trials. In T2-translation, candidate health applications progress through clinical development to engender the evidence base for integration into clinical practice guidelines. This includes phase III clinical trials. In T3-translation, dissemination into community practices happens. T4-translation seeks to (1) advance scientific knowledge to paradigms of disease prevention, and (2) move health practices established in T3 into population health impact. Finally, T5-translation focuses on improving the wellness of populations by reforming suboptimal social structures

Comparison to basic research or applied research

Basic research is the systematic study directed toward greater knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and is performed without thought of practical ends. It results in general knowledge and understanding of nature and its laws. For instance, basic biomedical research focuses on studies of disease processes using, for example, cell cultures or animal models without consideration of the potential utility of that information.

Applied research is a form of systematic inquiry involving the practical application of science. It accesses and uses the research communities' accumulated theories, knowledge, methods, and techniques, for a specific, often stated, business, or client-driven purpose. Translational research forms a subset of applied research. In life-sciences, this was evidenced by a citation pattern between the applied and basic sides in cancer research that appeared around 2000. In fields such as psychology, translational research is seen as a bridging between applied research and basic research types. The field of psychology defines translational research as the use of basic research to develop and test applications, such as treatment.

Challenges and criticisms

Critics of translational medical research (to the exclusion of more basic research) point to examples of important drugs that arose from fortuitous discoveries in the course of basic research such as penicillin and benzodiazepines, and the importance of basic research in improving our understanding of basic biological facts (e.g. the function and structure of DNA) that go on to transform applied medical research. Examples of failed translational research in the pharmaceutical industry include the failure of anti-aβ therapeutics in Alzheimer's disease. Other problems have stemmed from the widespread irreproducibility thought to exist in translational research literature.

Translational research-facilities in life-sciences

Translational Research Institute, Woolloongabba

In U.S., the National Institutes of Health has implemented a major national initiative to leverage existing academic health center infrastructure through the Clinical and Translational Science Awards. The National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) was established on December 23, 2011.

Although translational research is relatively new, it is being recognized and embraced globally. Some major centers for translational research include:

Additionally, translational research is now acknowledged by some universities as a dedicated field to study a PhD or graduate certificate in, in a medical context. These institutes currently include Monash University in Victoria, Australia, the University of Queensland, Diamantina Institute in Brisbane, Australia, at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, America, at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, and at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The industry and academic interactions to promote translational science initiatives has been carried out by various global centers such as European Commission, GlaxoSmithKline and Novartis Institute for Biomedical Research.

Computational intelligence

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_intelligence

In computer science, computational intelligence (CI) refers to concepts, paradigms, algorithms and implementations of systems that are designed to show "intelligent" behavior in complex and changing environments. These systems are aimed at mastering complex tasks in a wide variety of technical or commercial areas and offer solutions that recognize and interpret patterns, control processes, support decision-making or autonomously manoeuvre vehicles or robots in unknown environments, among other things. These concepts and paradigms are characterized by the ability to learn or adapt to new situations, to generalize, to abstract, to discover and associate. Nature-analog or nature-inspired methods play a key role in this.

CI approaches primarily address those complex real-world problems for which traditional or mathematical modeling is not appropriate for various reasons: the processes cannot be described exactly with complete knowledge, the processes are too complex for mathematical reasoning, they contain some uncertainties during the process, such as unforeseen changes in the environment or in the process itself, or the processes are simply stochastic in nature. Thus, CI techniques are properly aimed at processes that are ill-defined, complex, nonlinear, time-varying and/or stochastic.

A recent definition of the IEEE Computational Intelligence Societey describes CI as the theory, design, application and development of biologically and linguistically motivated computational paradigms. Traditionally the three main pillars of CI have been Neural Networks, Fuzzy Systems and Evolutionary Computation. ... CI is an evolving field and at present in addition to the three main constituents, it encompasses computing paradigms like ambient intelligence, artificial life, cultural learning, artificial endocrine networks, social reasoning, and artificial hormone networks. ... Over the last few years there has been an explosion of research on Deep Learning, in particular deep convolutional neural networks. Nowadays, deep learning has become the core method for artificial intelligence. In fact, some of the most successful AI systems are based on CI. However, as CI is an emerging and developing field there is no final definition of CI, especially in terms of the list of concepts and paradigms that belong to it.

The general requirements for the development of an “intelligent system” are ultimately always the same, namely the simulation of intelligent thinking and action in a specific area of application. To do this, the knowledge about this area must be represented in a model so that it can be processed. The quality of the resulting system depends largely on how well the model was chosen in the development process. Sometimes data-driven methods are suitable for finding a good model and sometimes logic-based knowledge representations deliver better results. Hybrid models are usually used in real applications.

According to actual textbooks, the following methods and paradigms, which largely complement each other, can be regarded as parts of CI:

Relationship between hard and soft computing and artificial and computational intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) is used in the media, but also by some of the scientists involved, as a kind of umbrella term for the various techniques associated with it or with CI. Craenen and Eiben state that attempts to define or at least describe CI can usually be assigned to one or more of the following groups:

  • "Relative definition” comparing CI to AI
  • Conceptual treatment of key notions and their roles in CI
  • Listing of the (established) areas that belong to it
A possible perspective on the relationship between hard computing and artificial intelligence on the one hand, and soft computing and computational intelligence on the other

The relationship between CI and AI has been a frequently discussed topic during the development of CI. While the above list implies that they are synonyms, the vast majority of AI/CI researchers working on the subject consider them to be distinct fields, where either

  • CI is an alternative to AI
  • AI includes CI
  • CI includes AI

The view of the first of the above three points goes back to Zadeh, the founder of the fuzzy set theory, who differentiated machine intelligence into hard and soft computing techniques, which are used in artificial intelligence on the one hand and computational intelligence on the other. In hard computing (HC) and traditional AI (e.g. expert systems), inaccuracy and uncertainty are undesirable characteristics of a system, while soft computing (SC) and thus CI focus on dealing with these characteristics. The adjacent figure illustrates this view and lists the most important CI techniques. Another frequently mentioned distinguishing feature is the representation of information in symbolic form in AI and in sub-symbolic form in CI techniques.

Hard computing is a conventional computing method based on the principles of certainty and accuracy and it is deterministic. It requires a precisely stated analytical model of the task to be processed and a prewritten program, i.e. a fixed set of instructions. The models used are based on Boolean logic (also called crisp logic), where e.g. an element can be either a member of a set or not and there is nothing in between. When applied to real-world tasks, systems based on HC result in specific control actions defined by a mathematical model or algorithm. If an unforeseen situation occurs that is not included in the model or algorithm used, the action will most likely fail.

Soft computing, on the other hand, is based on the fact that the human mind is capable of storing information and processing it in a goal-oriented way, even if it is imprecise and lacks certainty. SC is based on the model of the human brain with probabilistic thinking, fuzzy logic and multi-valued logic. Soft computing can process a wealth of data and perform a large number of computations, which may not be exact, in parallel. For hard problems for which no satisfying exact solutions based on HC are available, SC methods can be applied successfully. SC methods are usually stochastic in nature i.e., they are a randomly defined processes that can be analyzed statistically but not with precision. Up to now, the results of some CI methods, such as deep learning, cannot be verified and it is also not clear what they are based on. This problem represents an important scientific issue for the future.

AI and CI are catchy terms, but they are also so similar that they can be confused. The meaning of both terms has developed and changed over a long period of time, with AI being used first. Bezdek describes this impressively and concludes that such buzzwords are frequently used and hyped by the scientific community, science management and (science) journalism. Not least because AI and biological intelligence are emotionally charged terms and it is still difficult to find a generally accepted definition for the basic term intelligence.

History

In 1950, Alan Turing, one of the founding fathers of computer science, developed a test for computer intelligence known as the Turing test. In this test, a person can ask questions via a keyboard and a monitor without knowing whether his counterpart is a human or a computer. A computer is considered intelligent if the interrogator cannot distinguish the computer from a human. This illustrates the discussion about intelligent computers at the beginning of the computer age.

The term Computational Intelligence was first used as the title of the journal of the same name in 1985 and later by the IEEE Neural Networks Council (NNC), which was founded 1989 by a group of researchers interested in the development of biological and artificial neural networks. On November 21, 2001, the NNC became the IEEE Neural Networks Society, to become the IEEE Computational Intelligence Society two years later by including new areas of interest such as fuzzy systems and evolutionary computation.

The NNC helped organize the first IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence in Orlando, Florida in 1994. On this conference the first clear definition of Computational Intelligence was introduced by Bezdek: A system is computationally intelligent when it: deals with only numerical (low-level) data, has pattern-recognition components, does not use knowledge in the AI sense; and additionally when it (begins to) exhibit (1) computational adaptivity; (2) computational fault tolerance; (3) speed approaching human-like turnaround and (4) error rates that approximate human performance.

Today, CI has been enhanced through machine learning and deep learning, utilizing a range of supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning approaches.

The main algorithmic approaches of CI and their applications

The main applications of Computational Intelligence include computer science, engineering, data analysis and bio-medicine.

Fuzzy logic

Unlike conventional Boolean logic, fuzzy logic is based on fuzzy sets. In both models, a property of an object is defined as belonging to a set; in fuzzy logic, however, the membership is not sharply defined by a yes/no distinction, but is graded gradually. This is done using membership functions that assign a real number between 0 and 1 to each element as the degree of membership. The new set operations introduced in this way define the operations of an associated logic calculus that allows the modeling of inference processes, i.e. logical reasoning. Therefore, fuzzy logic is well suited for engineering decisions without clear certainties and uncertainties or with imprecise data - as with natural language-processing technologies but it doesn't have learning abilities.

This technique tends to apply to a wide range of domains such as control engineering, image processing, fuzzy data clustering and decision making. Fuzzy logic-based control systems can be found, for example, in the field of household appliances in washing machines, dish washers, microwave ovens, etc. or in the area of motor vehicles in gear transmission and braking systems. This principle can also be encountered when using a video camera, as it helps to stabilize the image when the camera is held unsteadily. Other areas such as medical diagnostics, satellite controllers and business strategy selection are just a few more examples of today's application of fuzzy logic.

Neural networks

An important field of CI is the development of artificial neural networks (ANN) based on the biological ones, which can be defined by three main components: the cell-body which processes the information, the axon, which is a device enabling the signal conducting, and the synapse, which controls signals.[9.2] Therefore, ANNs are very well suited for distributed information processing systems, enabling the process and the learning from experiential data. ANNs aim to mimic cognitive processes of the human brain. The main advantages of this technology therefore include fault tolerance, pattern recognition even with noisy images and the ability to learn.

Concerning its applications, neural networks can be classified into five groups: data analysis and classification, associative memory, data clustering or compression, generation of patterns, and control systems. The numerous applications include, for example, the analysis and classification of medical data, including the creation of diagnoses, speech recognition, data mining, image processing, forecasting, robot control, credit approval, pattern recognition, face and fraud detection and dealing with nonlinearities of a system in order to control it. ANNs have the latter area of application and data clustering in common with fuzzy logic. Generative systems based on deep learning and convolutional neural networks, such as chatGPT or DeepL, are a relatively new field of application.

Evolutionary computation

Evolutionary computation can be seen as a family of methods and algorithms for global optimization, which are usually based on a population of candidate solutions. They are inspired by biological evolution and are often summarized as evolutionary algorithms. These include the genetic algorithms, evolution strategy, genetic programming and many others. They are considered as problem solvers for tasks not solvable by traditional mathematical methods and are frequently used for optimization including multi-objective optimization. Since they work with a population of candidate solutions that are processed in parallel during an iteration, they can easily be distributed to different computer nodes of a cluster. As often more than one offspring is generated per pairing, the evaluations of these offspring, which are usually the most time-consuming part of the optimization process, can also be performed in parallel.

In the course of optimization, the population learns about the structure of the search space and stores this information in the chromosomes of the solution candidates. After a run, this knowledge can be reused for similar tasks by adapting some of the “old” chromosomes and using them to seed a new population.

Swarm intelligence

Swarm intelligence is based on the collective behavior of decentralized, self-organizing systems, typically consisting of a population of simple agents that interact locally with each other and with their environment. Despite the absence of a centralized control structure that dictates how the individual agents should behave, local interactions between such agents often lead to the emergence of global behavior. Among the recognized representatives of algorithms based on swarm intelligence are particle swarm optimization and ant colony optimization. Both are metaheuristic optimization algorithms that can be used to (approximately) solve difficult numerical or complex combinatorial optimization tasks. Since both methods, like the evolutionary algorithms, are based on a population and also on local interaction, they can be easily parallelized and show comparable learning properties.

Bayesian networks

In complex application domains, Bayesian networks provide a means to efficiently store and evaluate uncertain knowledge. A Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of random variables and their conditional dependencies by a directed acyclic graph. The probabilistic representation makes it easy to draw conclusions based on new information. In addition, Bayesian networks are well suited for learning from data. Their wide range of applications includes medical diagnostics, risk management, information retrieval, text analysis, e.g. for spam filters, credit rating of companies, and the operation of complex industrial processes.

Artificial immune systems

Artificial immune systems are another group of population-based metaheuristic learning algorithms designed to solve clustering and optimization problems. These algorithms are inspired by the principles of theoretical immunology and the processes of the vertebrate immune system, and use the learning and memory properties of the immune system to solve a problem. Operators similar to those known from evolutionary algorithms are used to clone and mutate artificial lymphocytes. Artificial immune systems offer interesting capabilities such as adaptability, self-learning, and robustness that can be used for various tasks in data processing, manufacturing systems, system modeling and control, fault detection, or cybersecurity.

Learning theory

Still looking for a way of "reasoning" close to the humans' one, learning theory is one of the main approaches of CI. In psychology, learning is the process of bringing together cognitive, emotional and environmental effects and experiences to acquire, enhance or change knowledge, skills, values and world views. Learning theories then helps understanding how these effects and experiences are processed, and then helps making predictions based on previous experience.

Probabilistic methods

Being one of the main elements of fuzzy logic, probabilistic methods firstly introduced by Paul Erdos and Joel Spencer in 1974, aim to evaluate the outcomes of a Computation Intelligent system, mostly defined by randomness. Therefore, probabilistic methods bring out the possible solutions to a problem, based on prior knowledge.

Impact on university education

Over the last decade, there has been a strong increase in academic teaching for CI or its subfields. In 2025, the website EduRank.org listed 5,925 universities worldwide offering courses in artificial intelligence. These are spread across the regions of Asia (2,536), Europe (1,368), North America (1,295), Latin America (370), Africa (305), and Oceania (51).

Some of the authors cited in this article teach at the following universities: Otto von Guericke University, Magdeburg, Germany, Stellenbosch University, South Africa, Ulster University, UK, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL, Nicolaus Copernicus University Toruń, PL, University of Applied Sciences and Arts, Switzerland, University of Warwick, UK, Michigan State University, USA, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium, University of Essex, UK, and Loughborough University, UK.

Publications

Recognized journals include Computational Intelligence, International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems, Applied Computational Intelligence and Soft Computing, and IEEE Computational Intelligence Magazine. In addition, there are IEEE publications on a number of CI fields:

Deism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deism Deism ( / ˈ d iː ɪ z ə...