The theory of Forms or theory of Ideas is a philosophical theory, concept, or world-view, attributed to Plato, that the physical world is not as real or true as timeless, absolute, unchangeable ideas. According to this theory, ideas in this sense, often capitalized and translated as "Ideas" or "Forms", are the non-physical essences
of all things, of which objects and matter in the physical world are
merely imitations. Plato speaks of these entities only through the
characters (primarily Socrates) of his dialogues who sometimes suggest that these Forms are the only objects of study that can provide knowledge.
The theory itself is contested from within Plato's dialogues, and it is
a general point of controversy in philosophy. Whether the theory
represents Plato's own views is held in doubt by modern scholarship. However, the theory is considered a classical solution to the problem of universals.
The early Greek concept of form precedes attested philosophical usage and is represented by a number of words mainly having to do with vision, sight, and appearance. Plato uses these aspects of sight and appearance from the early Greek concept of the form in his dialogues to explain the Forms and the Good.
The early Greek concept of form precedes attested philosophical usage and is represented by a number of words mainly having to do with vision, sight, and appearance. Plato uses these aspects of sight and appearance from the early Greek concept of the form in his dialogues to explain the Forms and the Good.
Forms
The meaning of the term εἶδος (eidos), "visible form", and related terms μορφή (morphē), "shape", and φαινόμενα (phainomena), "appearances", from φαίνω (phainō), "shine", Indo-European *bʰeh₂- or *bhā-
remained stable over the centuries until the beginning of philosophy,
when they became equivocal, acquiring additional specialized philosophic
meanings. The pre-Socratic philosophers, starting with Thales, noted that appearances change, and began to ask what the thing that changes "really" is. The answer was substance,
which stands under the changes and is the actually existing thing being
seen. The status of appearances now came into question. What is the
form really and how is that related to substance?
The Forms are expounded upon in Plato's dialogues and general
speech, in that every object or quality in reality has a form: dogs,
human beings, mountains, colors, courage, love, and goodness. Form
answers the question, "What is that?" Plato was going a step further and
asking what Form itself is. He supposed that the object was essentially
or "really" the Form and that the phenomena were mere shadows mimicking
the Form; that is, momentary portrayals of the Form under different
circumstances. The problem of universals
– how can one thing in general be many things in particular – was
solved by presuming that Form was a distinct singular thing but caused
plural representations of itself in particular objects. For example, in
the dialogue Parmenides,
Socrates states: "Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one
by partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many,
would that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the
absolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly
amazed."
Matter is considered particular in itself. For Plato, forms, such as
beauty, are more real than any objects that imitate them. Though the
forms are timeless and unchanging, physical things are in a constant
change of existence. Where forms are unqualified perfection, physical
things are qualified and conditioned.
These Forms are the essences of various objects: they are that
without which a thing would not be the kind of thing it is. For example,
there are countless tables in the world but the Form of tableness is at
the core; it is the essence of all of them.
Plato's Socrates held that the world of Forms is transcendent to our
own world (the world of substances) and also is the essential basis of
reality. Super-ordinate to matter, Forms are the most pure of all
things. Furthermore, he believed that true knowledge/intelligence is the
ability to grasp the world of Forms with one's mind.
A Form is aspatial (transcendent to space) and atemporal
(transcendent to time). Atemporal means that it does not exist within
any time period, rather it provides the formal basis for time. It
therefore formally grounds beginning, persisting and ending. It is
neither eternal in the sense of existing forever, nor mortal, of limited
duration. It exists transcendent to time altogether.
Forms are aspatial in that they have no spatial dimensions, and thus no
orientation in space, nor do they even (like the point) have a
location. They are non-physical, but they are not in the mind. Forms are extra-mental (i.e. real in the strictest sense of the word).
A Form is an objective "blueprint" of perfection.
The Forms are perfect and unchanging representations of objects and
qualities. For example the Form of beauty or the Form of a triangle. For
the form of a triangle say there is a triangle drawn on a blackboard. A
triangle is a polygon with 3 sides. The triangle as it is on the
blackboard is far from perfect. However, it is only the intelligibility
of the Form "triangle" that allows us to know the drawing on the
chalkboard is a triangle, and the Form "triangle" is perfect and
unchanging. It is exactly the same whenever anyone chooses to consider
it; however, time only effects the observer and not of the triangle. It
follows that the same attributes would exist for the Form of beauty and
for all Forms.
Etymology
The words, εἶδος (eidos) and ἰδέα (idea) come from the Indo-European root *weyd- or *weid- "see" (cognate with Sanskrit vétti). Eidos (though not idea) is already attested in texts of the Homeric
era, the earliest Greek literature. This transliteration and the
translation tradition of German and Latin lead to the expression "theory
of Ideas." The word is however not the English "idea," which is a
mental concept only.
The theory of matter and form (today's hylomorphism)
started with Plato and possibly germinal in some of the presocratic
writings. The forms were considered as being "in" something else, which
Plato called nature (physis). The latter seemed as carved "wood", ὕλη (hyle) in Greek, corresponding to materia in Latin, from which the English word "matter" is derived, shaped by receiving (or exchanging) forms.
Terminology
In the Allegory of the Cave, the objects that are seen are not real, according to Plato, but literally mimic the real Forms.
The English word "form" may be used to translate two distinct concepts
that concerned Plato—the outward "form" or appearance of something, and
"Form" in a new, technical nature, that never
...assumes a form like that of any of the things which enter into her; ... But the forms which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of real existences modelled after their patterns in a wonderful and inexplicable manner....
The objects that are seen, according to Plato, are not real, but literally mimic the real Forms. In the Allegory of the Cave expressed in Republic,
the things that are ordinarily perceived in the world are characterized
as shadows of the real things, which are not perceived directly. That
which the observer understands when he views the world mimics the archetypes of the many types and properties (that is, of universals) of things observed.
Intelligible realm and separation of the Forms
Plato often invokes, particularly in his dialogues Phaedo, Republic and Phaedrus, poetic language to illustrate the mode in which the Forms are said to exist. Near the end of the Phaedo,
for example, Plato describes the world of Forms as a pristine region of
the physical universe located above the surface of the Earth (Phd. 109a-111c). In the Phaedrus the Forms are in a "place beyond heaven" (huperouranios topos) (Phdr. 247c ff); and in the Republic the sensible world is contrasted with the intelligible realm (noēton topon) in the famous Allegory of the Cave.
It would be a mistake to take Plato's imagery as positing the
intelligible world as a literal physical space apart from this one.
Plato emphasizes that the Forms are not beings that extend in space
(or time), but subsist apart from any physical space whatsoever. Thus we read in the Symposium
of the Form of Beauty: "It is not anywhere in another thing, as in an
animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by
itself with itself," (211b). And in the Timaeus Plato writes:
"Since these things are so, we must agree that that which keeps its own
form unchangingly, which has not been brought into being and is not
destroyed, which neither receives into itself anything else from
anywhere else, nor itself enters into anything anywhere, is one thing," (52a, emphasis added).
Ideal state
According to Plato, Socrates postulated a world of ideal Forms, which
he admitted were impossible to know. Nevertheless, he formulated a very
specific description of that world, which did not match his
metaphysical principles. Corresponding to the world of Forms is our
world, that of the shadows, an imitation of the real one. Just as shadows exist only because of the light of a fire, our world exists as, "the offspring of the good".
Our world is modeled after the patterns of the Forms. The function of
humans in our world is therefore to imitate the ideal world as much as
possible which, importantly, includes imitating the good, i.e. acting
morally.
Plato lays out much of this theory in the "Republic" where, in an
attempt to define Justice, he considers many topics including the
constitution of the ideal state. While this state, and the Forms, do not
exist on earth, because their imitations do, Plato says we are able to
form certain well-founded opinions about them, through a theory called
recollection.
The republic is a greater imitation of Justice:
Our aim in founding the state was not the disproportional happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a state ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice.
The key to not know how such a state might come into existence is the word "founding" (oikidzomen), which is used of colonization.
It was customary in such instances to receive a constitution from an
elected or appointed lawgiver; however in Athens, lawgivers were
appointed to reform the constitution from time to time (for example, Draco, Solon). In speaking of reform, Socrates uses the word "purge" (diakathairountes) in the same sense that Forms exist purged of matter.
The purged society is a regulated one presided over by
philosophers educated by the state, who maintain three non-hereditary
classes
as required: the tradesmen (including merchants and professionals), the
guardians (militia and police) and the philosophers (legislators,
administrators and the philosopher-king). Class is assigned at the end
of education, when the state institutes individuals in their occupation.
Socrates expects class to be hereditary but he allows for mobility
according to natural ability. The criteria for selection by the
academics is ability to perceive forms (the analog of English
"intelligence") and martial spirit as well as predisposition or
aptitude.
The views of Socrates on the proper order of society are
certainly contrary to Athenian values of the time and must have produced
a shock effect, intentional or not, accounting for the animosity
against him. For example, reproduction is much too important to be left
in the hands of untrained individuals: "... the possession of women and
the procreation of children ... will ... follow the general principle
that friends have all things in common, ...."
The family is therefore to be abolished and the children – whatever
their parentage – to be raised by the appointed mentors of the state.
Their genetic fitness is to be monitored by the physicians: "... he (Asclepius,
a culture hero) did not want to lengthen out good-for-nothing lives, or
have weak fathers begetting weaker sons – if a man was not able to live
in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him ...."
Physicians minister to the healthy rather than cure the sick: "...
(Physicians) will minister to better natures, giving health both of soul
and of body; but those who are diseased in their bodies they will leave
to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an end to
themselves."
Nothing at all in Greek medicine so far as can be known supports the
airy (in the Athenian view) propositions of Socrates. Yet it is hard to
be sure of Socrates' real views considering that there are no works
written by Socrates himself. There are two common ideas pertaining to
the beliefs and character of Socrates: the first being the Mouthpiece
Theory where writers use Socrates in dialogue as a mouthpiece to get
their own views across. However, since most of what we know about
Socrates comes from plays, most of the Platonic plays are accepted as
the more accurate Socrates since Plato was a direct student of Socrates.
Perhaps the most important principle is that just as the Good
must be supreme so must its image, the state, take precedence over
individuals in everything. For example, guardians "... will have to be
watched at every age in order that we may see whether they preserve
their resolution and never, under the influence either of force or
enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the state."
This concept of requiring guardians of guardians perhaps suffers from
the Third Man weakness (see below): guardians require guardians require
guardians, ad infinitum. The ultimate trusty guardian is missing.
Socrates does not hesitate to face governmental issues many later
governors have found formidable: "Then if anyone at all is to have the
privilege of lying, the rulers of the state should be the persons, and
they ... may be allowed to lie for the public good."
Plato's conception of Forms actually differs from dialogue to
dialogue, and in certain respects it is never fully explained, so many
aspects of the theory are open to interpretation. Forms are first
introduced in the Phaedo, but in that dialogue the concept is simply
referred to as something the participants are already familiar with, and
the theory itself is not developed. Similarly, in the Republic, Plato
relies on the concept of Forms as the basis of many of his arguments but
feels no need to argue for the validity of the theory itself or to
explain precisely what Forms are. Commentators have been left with the
task of explaining what Forms are and how visible objects participate in
them, and there has been no shortage of disagreement. Some scholars
advance the view that Forms are paradigms, perfect examples on which the
imperfect world is modeled. Others interpret Forms as universals, so
that the Form of Beauty, for example, is that quality that all beautiful
things share. Yet others interpret Forms as "stuffs," the
conglomeration of all instances of a quality in the visible world. Under
this interpretation, we could say there is a little beauty in one
person, a little beauty in another—all the beauty in the world put
together is the Form of Beauty. Plato himself was aware of the
ambiguities and inconsistencies in his Theory of Forms, as is evident
from the incisive criticism he makes of his own theory in the
Parmenides.
Evidence of Forms
Plato's main evidence for the existence of Forms is intuitive only.
Human perception
We call both the sky and blue jeans by the same color, blue. However,
clearly a pair of jeans and the sky are not the same color; moreover,
the wavelengths of light reflected by the sky at every location and all
the millions of blue jeans in every state of fading constantly change,
and yet we somehow have a consensus of the basic form Blueness as it
applies to them. Says Plato:
But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will be no one to know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that which is known exist ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process of flux, as we were just now supposing.
Plato believed that long before our bodies ever existed, our souls
existed and inhabited heaven, where they became directly acquainted with
the forms themselves. Real knowledge, to him, was knowledge of the
forms. But knowledge of the forms cannot be gained through sensory
experience because the forms are not in the physical world. Therefore,
our real knowledge of the forms must be the memory of our initial
acquaintance with the forms in heaven. Therefore, what we seem to learn
is in fact just remembering.
Perfection
No one has ever seen a perfect
circle, nor a perfectly straight line, yet everyone knows what a circle
and a straight line are. Plato utilizes the tool-maker's blueprint as
evidence that Forms are real:
... when a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the material ....
Perceived circles or lines are not exactly circular or straight, and
true circles and lines could never be detected since by definition they
are sets of infinitely small points. But if the perfect ones were not
real, how could they direct the manufacturer?
Criticisms of Platonic Forms
Self-criticism
Plato was well aware of the limitations of the theory, as he offered his own criticisms of it in his dialogue Parmenides.
There Socrates is portrayed as a young philosopher acting as junior
counterfoil to aged Parmenides. To a certain extent it is
tongue-in-cheek as the older Socrates will have solutions to some of the
problems that are made to puzzle the younger.
The dialogue does present a very real difficulty with the Theory
of Forms, which Plato most likely only viewed as problems for later
thought. These criticisms were later emphasized by Aristotle
in rejecting an independently existing world of Forms. It is worth
noting that Aristotle was a pupil and then a junior colleague of Plato;
it is entirely possible that the presentation of Parmenides "sets up" for Aristotle; that is, they agreed to disagree.
One difficulty lies in the conceptualization of the
"participation" of an object in a form (or Form). The young Socrates
conceives of his solution to the problem of the universals in another
metaphor, which though wonderfully apt, remains to be elucidated:
Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may be one and the same in all at the same time.
But exactly how is a Form like the day in being everywhere at once?
The solution calls for a distinct form, in which the particular
instances, which are not identical to the form, participate; i.e., the
form is shared out somehow like the day to many places. The concept of
"participate", represented in Greek by more than one word, is as obscure
in Greek as it is in English. Plato hypothesized that distinctness
meant existence as an independent being, thus opening himself to the
famous third man argument of Parmenides, which proves that forms cannot independently exist and be participated.
If universal and particulars – say man or greatness – all exist
and are the same then the Form is not one but is multiple. If they are
only like each other then they contain a form that is the same and
others that are different. Thus if we presume that the Form and a
particular are alike then there must be another, or third Form, man or
greatness by possession of which they are alike. An infinite regression
would then result; that is, an endless series of third men. The
ultimate participant, greatness, rendering the entire series great, is
missing. Moreover, any Form is not unitary but is composed of infinite
parts, none of which is the proper Form.
The young Socrates (some may say the young Plato) did not give up
the Theory of Forms over the Third Man but took another tack, that the
particulars do not exist as such. Whatever they are, they "mime" the
Forms, appearing to be particulars. This is a clear dip into representationalism,
that we cannot observe the objects as they are in themselves but only
their representations. That view has the weakness that if only the mimes
can be observed then the real Forms cannot be known at all and the
observer can have no idea of what the representations are supposed to
represent or that they are representations.
Socrates' later answer would be that men already know the Forms
because they were in the world of Forms before birth. The mimes only
recall these Forms to memory. The comedian Aristophanes wrote a play, The Clouds, poking fun of Socrates with his head in the clouds.
Aristotelian criticism
The central image from Raphael's The School of Athens
(1509-1511), depicting Plato (left) and Aristotle (right). Plato is
depicted pointing upwards, in reference to his belief in the higher
Forms, while Aristotle disagrees and points downwards to the
here-and-now, in reference to his belief in empiricism.
The topic of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms is a
large one and continues to expand. Rather than quote Plato, Aristotle
often summarized. Classical commentaries thus recommended Aristotle as
an introduction to Plato. As a historian of prior thought, Aristotle was
invaluable, however this was secondary to his own dialectic and in some
cases he treats purported implications as if Plato had actually
mentioned them, or even defended them. In examining Aristotle's
criticism of The Forms, it is helpful to understand Aristotle's own hylomorphic forms, by which he intends to salvage much of Plato's theory.
In the summary passage quoted above
Plato distinguishes between real and non-real "existing things", where
the latter term is used of substance. The figures that the artificer
places in the gold are not substance, but gold is. Aristotle stated
that, for Plato, all things studied by the sciences have Form and
asserted that Plato considered only substance to have Form.
Uncharitably, this leads him to something like a contradiction: Forms
existing as the objects of science, but not-existing as non-substance.
Scottish philosopher W.D. Ross objects to this as a mischaracterization of Plato.
Plato did not claim to know where the line between Form and non-Form is to be drawn. As Cornford points out, those things about which the young Socrates (and Plato) asserted "I have often been puzzled about these things"
(in reference to Man, Fire and Water), appear as Forms in later works.
However, others do not, such as Hair, Mud, Dirt. Of these, Socrates is
made to assert, "it would be too absurd to suppose that they have a
Form."
Ross
also objects to Aristotle's criticism that Form Otherness accounts for
the differences between Forms and purportedly leads to contradictory
forms: the Not-tall, the Not-beautiful, etc. That particulars
participate in a Form is for Aristotle much too vague to permit
analysis. By one way in which he unpacks the concept, the Forms would
cease to be of one essence due to any multiple participation. As Ross
indicates, Plato didn't make that leap from "A is not B" to "A is
Not-B." Otherness would only apply to its own particulars and not to
those of other Forms. For example, there is no Form Not-Greek, only particulars of Form Otherness that somehow suppress Form Greek.
Regardless of whether Socrates meant the particulars of Otherness
yield Not-Greek, Not-tall, Not-beautiful, etc., the particulars would
operate specifically rather than generally, each somehow yielding only
one exclusion.
Plato had postulated that we know Forms through a remembrance of the soul's past lives and Aristotle's arguments against this treatment of epistemology
are compelling. For Plato, particulars somehow do not exist, and, on
the face of it, "that which is non-existent cannot be known (Metaphysics III 3–4).
Dialogues that discuss Forms
The theory is presented in the following dialogues:
- 71–81, 85–86: The discovery (or "recollection") of knowledge as latent in the soul, pointing forward to the theory of Forms
- 389–390: The archetype as used by craftsmen
- 439–440: The problem of knowing the Forms.
- 210–211: The archetype of Beauty.
- 73–80: The theory of recollection restated as knowledge of the Forms in soul before birth in the body.
- 109–111: The myth of the afterlife.
- 100c: The theory of absolute beauty
- Book III
- 402–403: Education the pursuit of the Forms.
- Book V
- 472–483: Philosophy the love of the Forms. The philosopher-king must rule.
- Books VI–VII
- 500–517: Philosopher-guardians as students of the Beautiful and Just implement archetypical order.
- Metaphor of the Sun: The sun is to sight as Good is to understanding.
- Allegory of the Cave: The struggle to understand forms like men in cave guessing at shadows in firelight.
- Books IX–X
- 248–250: Reincarnation according to knowledge of the true
- 265–266: The unity problem in thought and nature.
- 129–135: Participatory solution of unity problem. Things partake of archetypal like and unlike, one and many, etc. The nature of the participation (Third man argument). Forms not actually in the thing. The problem of their unknowability.
- 184–186: Universals understood by mind and not perceived by senses.
- 246–248: True essence a Form. Effective solution to participation problem.
- 251–259: The problem with being as a Form; if it is participatory then non-being must exist and be being.
- 27–52: The design of the universe, including numbers and physics. Some of its patterns. Definition of matter.
- 14-18: Unity problem: one and many, parts and whole.
- 342–345: The epistemology of Forms. The Seventh Letter is possibly spurious.
